G.R. No.

L-42927 January 28, 1980

VISITACION N. PAJARILLO, petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(VINZONS PILOT HIGH SCHOOL, DIVISION OF CAMARINES NORTE, BUREAU OF
PUBLIC SCHOOLS), and PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner, after serving the government as a schoolteacher for more than 28 years,
retired on July 1, 1973 on which date she also filed with the respondent Commission a
claim for compensation by reason of her illnesses of chronic cataract (both eyes) and
diabetes mellitus. She actually stopped working on June 4, 1973 when she went on sick
leave by reason of her aforesaid illnesses.
On August 24, 1974, the Chief Referee issued an award on the bases of his findings
that the illnesses were contracted by petitioner in the long course of her employment
and/or aggravated by the nature of her employment, and that furthermore, the claim
was uncontroverted.

A copy of the aforesaid award was received on September 16, 1974 by the Solicitor
General who filed on October 3, 1974 a motion for extension of ten [10] days from
October 1, 1974 to file his motion for reconsideration and the same was granted by the
Chief Referee on December 2, 1974. On December 4, 1974, the Solicitor General filed
his motion to set aside award. The said motion was denied but directed the elevation of
the entire records of the case to the respondent Commission for its review.

On October 9, 1975, the respondent Commission reversed the award and stated that
the claim was not compensable because it did not show that the claimant was ever
prevented from performing her work on account of these illnesses. It was only natural
for the claimant to suffer or contract cataract on account of her age, she being 64 years
old already. The claimant had retired because she was qualified under the law to do so
on the basis of her age and length of service, but definitely not on account of her
cataract and/or her diabetes.

On December 12, 1975, petitioner thus filed this appeal.

On January 1, 1976, the Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of (a) payment of
the legal fees; and (2) statement of material dates to determine the timeliness of the
filing of the petition.

Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Court resolved to require petitioner to pay the
docket fee and the legal research fund fee; and counsel for petitioner to show cause
why he should not be subjected to administrative action for ignorance of the basic rules
for docketing petitions through payment of corresponding fees and thereby prejudicing
the orderly administration of justice and the cause of his client.

On March 24, 1976, the Court received the compliance of Petitioner and its explanation
stating:

“The undersigned counsel was misled to believe that the Petition for Review
must first be given due course before payment of legal fees could be made
within three (3) days from notice by the clerk of court. pursuant to the provisions
of Sec. 7, Rule 43, Rules of Court.

Besides, your petitioner-appellant was in the hospital at the time of the filing of
the Petition for Review undergoing operation, and she needs all her money for
her medical treatment and considering that there was very limited time to file the
same, the undersigned counsel deemed it wise to forward the pleadings despite
lack of corresponding fees. With all humility and candor, there was no intention
on the part of the undersigned counsel to prejudice the orderly administration of
justice nor the cause of his client. In short, what was done was the best under
the circumstances.”

ISSUES:

1. WON respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion when it reversed the
award of the Chief Referee? (YES)
2. WON the claim of the Petitioner is compensable? (YES)
3. WON Petitioner’s counsel’s belated compliance with the orders is satisfactory?
(YES) (Only thing related to Leg Ethics)

RULING:

1. Yes, the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it reversed the award.

Respondent Commission was on October 9, 1975 already without jurisdiction to pass

upon and reverse the August 26, 1974 award of the Chief Referee, for the reason that
the same had become final and executory; because of the failure of the Solicitor
General to interpose an appeal (motion for reconsideration) therefrom or to timely file a
motion to set aside the award. The records reveal that the Solicitor General received a
copy of the award on September 16, 1974. Hence, when he filed on October 3, 1974
(the 17th day from receipt of the copy of the award), his motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1974 award, the 15-day period for
filing said motion for reconsideration had already elapsed.

Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, commands that "such

petition must be filed within fifteen days after the entry of any referee's order or award of
the Commissioner unless further time is granted by the referee or the
Commissioner within said fifteen days (emphasis supplied)
The order of the Chief Referee issued on December 2, 1974 granting the extension
prayed for did not cure the lapse as the 15-day period for filing the said motion for
reconsideration can only be extended if the motion for extension were filed before the
lapse of the period sought to be extended. Instead, the Solicitor General in this case
filed a Motion to Set aside the Reward on December 4, 1974 or 99 days from receipt of
decision.

2. Yes, the claim of the Petitioner is compensable.

Respondent employers have not successfully discharged their burden of overthrowing

the presumption of compensability enjoyed by petitioner arising from the incontrovertible
fact that petitioner's ailment and consequence disability all supervened in the course of
her employment. Hence, said presumption was thereby rendered conclusive.

Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended proceeds from the

assumption that as the employer has all the facilities which enable him, better than the
injured, to determine whether a claim against him would lie under the circumstances
attending any accident or ailment be falling the worker, it is his obligation to apprise the
Commission of his determination, whether to contest or not the injured worker's right to
receive the benefits of the Act. If he sleeps on his right, he cannot subsequently be
heard to complain that the law is hard against him (De los Santos vs. WCC, 88 SCRA,
134,142 [1979]).

Relatedly, it must be stated that the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers
mandates that "the effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teacher's health
shall be recognized as a compensable occupational disease in accordance with existing
laws" (Sec. 23, R.A. 4670).

3. With respect to petitioner's counsel's compliance with Our February 20, 1976
resolution, We find the same satisfactory.

However, counsel is hereby reminded to exercise reasonable care, skill and

diligence in the prosecution of his cases so as to avoid prejudicing the orderly
administration of justice and the cause of his client. Indeed, "(t)he lawyer owes it to
his dents to exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining causes. A license
to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the licensee possesses
sufficient skill and knowledge to manage their causes" (Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics 102 [11th ed.]). That portion of his proffered explanation that he " ... was
misled to believe that the petition for review must first be given due course before
payment of legal fees could be made within three (3) days from notice by the clerk of
court, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 43, Rules of Court, ... " betrays
his lack of usual diligence commonly possessed and exercised by legal practitioners
of ordinary skill and capacity. The aforesaid section clearly refers to costs; not
docketing fee, which under Section 5 of the same Rule must be paid to the clerk of
court "upon the filing of the petition.WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF' THE
RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND
RESPONDENT' EMPLOYERS ARE HEREBY ORDERED