EN BANC (d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural
laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.
[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court
Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby
approves, the following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they
keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and
enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from the approval of
these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted
and shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule
7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal
education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit
units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four
(4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to
five (5) credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent
to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international
conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by
the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period shall begin not later
than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance
period for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all
compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the
end of the previous compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE
requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:
(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila
are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance
Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance
Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever
it may be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE
requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the
program. Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the
program shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter
membership on the date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of
the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other
members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission FACILITATOR
or readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for
the initial compliance. 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after 2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK
admission or readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of
LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PER
approved continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in
the compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the
number of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded 2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK
up to the next whole number.
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
EDITOR
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT
UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based 2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY
on the category of the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The following
are the guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/
required therefor:
CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
TECHNICAL
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION
REPORT/PAPER
PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED
PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF

LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER

ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH COMPLIANCE PERIOD

NUMBER OF HOURS 2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED

1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF

LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF

SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORS

BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR

CERTIFICATION
LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION DIRECTOR

COMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either participatory or non-
participatory.
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory credit units may be claimed
for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions,
symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource
speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory credit units may be
claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for
publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute
to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary
course of the members practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual
time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in
decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members of the Bar are
exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and
incumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing
judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience
for at least ten (10) years in accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following Members of the Bar are
likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement A member may file
a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability,
illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or
modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in
accordance with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month
in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall
end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE
requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing regulations that
may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be
granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is
an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this
Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal
education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal education activities must
meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects
and the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or
medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in
legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials
must be distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the
time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free
from interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by
the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or group may
be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon
written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house
providers, are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to
the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the
provider for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include
the member on the official record of attendance only if the members signature was
obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall
contain the members name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the
time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such
record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of ________
hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content
of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by
these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time,
date, location, subject matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal
education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or
designees of the Committee and IBP staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance
with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time
devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to
each participant a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation
Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a
period of not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE
COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or
issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate
sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a provider may be
renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of
the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the
preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of any provider
referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after
notice and hearing and for good cause.
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education activity or
accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the
Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a
Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by
attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is
exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned
to the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members compliance
period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficient
record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record
required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9
should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-
participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3
of Rule 5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-
compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt
status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance
within sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent
or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failing
to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be
given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the
deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall
contain the following language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE
LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW
UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this
period to attain the adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned
during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance
period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case
the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-
compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as
a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission
on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the
active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT
SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated
when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including
payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet
the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on
inactive status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance
in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. The termination of
listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the
MCLE Committee.

Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members,
namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members
respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center
designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be
appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such
compensation as may be determined by the Court.

SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such
implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It
shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees
with the approval of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the
MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-
keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme
Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain
the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., on official leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the huge volume
of cases filed each year and the slow and cumbersome adversarial syste1n that the
judiciary has in place;
Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact that
complainants simply give up con1ing to court after repeated postponements;
Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the Philippines because
its courts are unable to provide ample and speedy protection to their investments, keeping
its people poor;
Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses
in cases under litigation, on February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court approved for piloting
by trial courts in Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial affidavits in place of the direct
testimonies of witnesses;
Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by about two-
thirds the time used for presenting the testimonies of witnesses, thus speeding up the
hearing and adjudication of cases;
Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, headed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the
Rules on Civil Procedure, headed by Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, have
recommended for adoption a Judicial Affidavit Rule that will replicate nationwide the
success of the Quezon City experience in the use of judicial affidavits; and
Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the
following:
Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents
requiring the reception of evidence before:
(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but shall not
apply to small claims cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;
(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;
(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the Shari'a
Appellate Courts;
(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive
evidence, including the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP); and
(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are subject to
disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar as their existing rules of procedure contravene
the provisions of this Rule.1
(b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies, or investigating
officers shall be uniformly referred to here as the "court."
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a)
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by
licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference
or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses'
direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the
judicial affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant
or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in
his possession, he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and
authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to
such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or
witness shall bring the original document or object evidence for comparison during the
preliminary conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which the
latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original
when allowed by existing rules.
Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the
language known to the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a
translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:
(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;
(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of
the witness and the place where the examination is being held;
(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious
that he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or
perjury;
(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively
numbered, that:
(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he
testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents; and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their authenticity
in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and
(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer
who is authorized by law to administer the same.
Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a
sworn attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer who conducted or supervised the
examination of the witness, to the effect that:
(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the
corresponding answers that the witness gave; and
(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the witness
regarding the latter's answers.
(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including
disbarment.
Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested witness,
who is neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines
to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books,
documents, or other things under his control available for copying, authentication, and
eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules
governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as
when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit shal1 be
understood to be ex parte.
Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party presenting
the judicial affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall state the purpose of
such testimony at the start of the presentation of the witness. The adverse party may
move to disqualify the witness or to strike out his affidavit or any of the answers found in
it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall promptly rule on the motion and, if granted,
shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by placing it in brackets under the initials
of an authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence under
Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. - The adverse party shall
have the right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and on the exhibits
attached to the same. The party who presents the witness may also examine him as on
re-direct. In every case, the court shall take active part in examining the witness to
determine his credibility as well as the truth of his testimony and to elicit the answers that
it needs for resolving the issues.
Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of the
testimony of his last witness, a party shall immediately make an oral offer of evidence of
his documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in their chronological order, stating the
purpose or purposes for which he offers the particular exhibit.
(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for
his objection, if any, to its admission, and the court shall immediately make its ruling
respecting that exhibit.
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that
describe and authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their
markings during the offers, the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description
of each exhibit.
Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all criminal
actions:
(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;
(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty
involved; or
(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved are.
(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five
days before the pre-trial, serving copies if the same upon the accused. The complainant or
public prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he
may have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial affidavit, MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial. Chief Justice

(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits
of the prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those
of his witnesses to the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a
copy of each on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object
evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as
direct testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to
testify.

Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who
fails to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have
waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of
the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the
opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor more
than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.

(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the
scheduled hearing of the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause
despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his client's right to confront by cross-
examination the witnesses there present.

(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the
content requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The
court may, however, allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant
replacement affidavits before the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason
and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and provided further, that public or
private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less
than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.

Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. - The provisions of the Rules of
Court and the rules of procedure governing investigating officers and bodies authorized by
the Supreme Court to receive evidence are repealed or modified insofar as these are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.1âwphi1

The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby
disapproved.

Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation not later than September 15, 2012. It
shall also apply to existing cases.

Manila, September 4, 2012.

 Republic of the Philippines Sec. 5. Copies to be filed. – Unless otherwise directed by the court, the number of court-
Supreme Court bound papers that a party is required or desires to file shall be as follows:
Manila
a. In the Supreme Court, one original (properly marked) and four copies, unless the case
A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC is referred to the Court En Banc, in which event, the parties shall file ten additional copies.
For the En Banc, the parties need to submit only two sets of annexes, one attached to the
EFFICIENT USE OF PAPER RULE original and an extra copy. For the Division, the parties need to submit also two sets of
annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy. All members of the Court shall
Whereas, to produce 500 reams of paper, twenty trees are cut and 100,000 liters of water
share the extra copies of annexes in the interest of economy of paper.
are used, water that is no longer reusable because it is laden with chemicals and is just
released to the environment to poison our rivers and seas; Parties to cases before the Supreme Court are further required, on voluntary basis for the
first six months following the effectivity of this Rule and compulsorily afterwards unless
Whereas, there is a need to cut the judicial system’s use excessive quantities of costly
the period is extended, to submit, simultaneously with their court-bound papers, soft
paper, save our forests, avoid landslides, and mitigate the worsening effects of climate
copies of the same and their annexes (the latter in PDF format) either by email to the
change that the world is experiencing;
Court’s e-mail address or by compact disc (CD). This requirement is in preparation for the
eventual establishment of an e-filing paperless system in the judiciary.
Whereas, the judiciary can play a big part in saving our trees, conserving precious water
and helping mother earth;
b. In the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, one original (properly marked) and two
copies with their annexes;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the
following:
c. In the Court of Tax Appeals, one original (properly marked) and two copies with
annexes. On appeal to the En Banc, one Original (properly marked) and eight copies with
Sec. 1. Title of the Rule– This rule shall be known and cited as the Efficient Use of Paper
annexes; and
Rule.
d. In other courts, one original (properly marked) with the stated annexes attached to it.
Sec. 2. Applicability. – This rule shall apply to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies under
the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 6. Annexes Served on Adverse Party. – A party required by the rules to serve a copy
of his court-bound on the adverse party need not enclose copies of those annexes that
Sec. 3. Format and Style. – a) All pleadings, motions and similar papers intended for the
based on the record of the court such party already has in his possession. In the event a
court and quasi-judicial body’s consideration and action (court-bound papers) shall written
party requests a set of the annexes actually filed with the court, the part who filed the
in single space with one-and-a –half space between paragraphs, using an easily readable
paper shall comply with the request within five days from receipt.
font style of the party’s choice, of 14-size font, and on a 13 –inch by 8.5- inch white bond
paper; and
Sec. 7. Date of Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 after
publication in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
b) All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and quasi-judicial bodies under
the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court shall comply with these
Manila, November 13, 2012.
requirements. Similarly covered are the reports submitted to the courts and transcripts of
stenographic notes.

Sec. 4. Margins and Prints .— The parties shall maintain the following margins on all
court-bound papers: a left hand margin of 1.5 inches from the edge; an upper margin of
1.2 inches from the edge; a right hand margin of 1.0 inch from the edge; and a lower
margin of 1.0 inch from the edge. Every page must be consecutively numbered.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 2343. July 30, 1982.]
FACUNDO LUBIANO, Complainant, v. JOEL G. GORDOLLA, Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant Lubiano charged respondent Gordolla for his failure to observe the standard
expected of him as a member of the Bar, imposed by the Canons of Professional Ethics,
when, in a motion for reconsideration filed by him as counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., he
described the award of separation pay to the complainant as "ill-gotten wealth", the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission as an "unknowing" one, and the
sheriff’s office as "a partner in ‘crime’." Respondent attributed said statements to his zeal
and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty to uphold his client’s case and argued that
they are covered by the mantle of absolute privileged communication, being relevant and
pertinent to the subject of inquiry in the NLRC case.
The Supreme Court held that, although the insouciant language used by respondent
Gordolla does not constitute sufficient cause for his disbarment, it falls short of the
criterion mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of
Professional Ethics; that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the
National Labor Relations Commission he remained a member of the Bar whose first duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and
must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics; and that, despite the fact that the rule
of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and
criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings, he remains subject to the
Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a
member of the legal profession.
Respondent Gordolla is ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and warned that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; IMPOSES A STANDARD TO BE
OBSERVED BY LAWYERS. — The Canons of Professional Ethics imposes upon the lawyer
the duty of maintaining a respectful attitude towards the court. He is likewise expected to
treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration. As such, he
should never minister to the malevolence or prejudice of a client in a trial or conduct of a
cause (Section 18, Canons of Professional Ethics). He should be temperate in acts and
words, a paragon in civility.
2. ID.; SECTION 20(b) OF RULE 138 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; STATEMENTS USED BY RESPONDENT IN HIS MOTION VIOLATED
CRITERION PROVIDED THEREIN. — Complainant decries the statements contained in the
motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order filed by respondent Gordolla,
as counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-22635-78-T. It is through a
scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his
observance or respect due to the courts and judicial officers, as mandated by Section
20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of this criterion. In describing the
award of separation pay to complainant Lubiano as "ill-gotten wealth", the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, as an "unknowing" one, and the sheriff’s office as a "partner in ‘crime’",
respondent precariously ventured beyond the bounds of propriety and civility.
3. ID.; ID.; LAWYERS REMAIN SUBJECT TO COURT’S DISCIPLINARY POWERS; ALTHOUGH
STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS ARE PRIVILEGED. — Respondent’s attempt to escape
responsibility by attributing the insouciant language used in his motion for reconsideration
to his zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty to uphold his client’s cause, is
unavailing. Respondent became unmindful of the fact that, in addressing the National
Labor Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-
bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. The rule of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer
from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the
member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising
from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof (Article
VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution), but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary
authority of the legislature for said speech or debate (Osmeña v. Pendatum, 109 Phil,
863), a lawyer equally remains subject to the Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers
for lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.
4. ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT NOT DISBARRED FOR INSOUCIANT LANGUAGE USED IN HIS
MOTION, BUT ORDERED TO PAY FINE AND WARNED; CASE AT BAR. — While the
insouciant language used in his motion does not constitute sufficient cause for disbarment
of respondent, the Court is not inclined to disregard them as merely trivial and innocuous.
Respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and is warned that a repetition of a similar act would
be dealt with more severely.
 really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right
direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due
regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government."cralaw virtua1aw
DECISION library

ESCOLIN, J.:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations
Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the
The Canons of Professional Ethics imposes upon the lawyer the duty of maintaining a
law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose
respectful attitude towards the court. He is likewise expected to treat adverse witnesses
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics 3 .
and suitors with fairness and due consideration. As such, he should never minister to the
malevolence or prejudice of a client in a trial or conduct of a cause 1 . He should be
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant and pertinent to
temperate in acts and words, a paragon in civility.
the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the mantle of absolute privileged
communication; and that, as such, they cannot be used as basis for any action, however
For what is claimed as a failure of Atty. Joel G. Gordolla to observe this standard, his
false and malicious the statements may be. We find no necessity to dwell at length on the
disbarment is sought by complainant Facundo Lubiano.
issue as to whether or not the statements in question are relevant, for in either case this
Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who
Complainant describes the following statements contained in a motion for reconsideration
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar.
with prayer for restraining order filed by respondent Gordolla, as counsel for Robina
Indeed, the rule of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer
Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-22635-78-T:cralawnad
from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the
member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising
"Meanwhile, the complainant, very eager to get hold of the ill-gotten wealth (thru
from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof 4 , but
unknowing award by the Hon. Commission) has used the Sheriff’s Office as his partner in
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said speech
‘crime’ and the latter thru Sheriff Juanito Atienza, is now and about to enforce the terror
or debate 5 , a lawyer equally remains subject to this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary
(sic) of the award thru Writ of Execution."cralaw virtua1aw library
powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the legal
profession.cralawnad
While the aforequoted paragraph does not constitute sufficient cause for disbarment of
respondent, We are not inclined to disregard the insouciant language used by respondent
PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is hereby ordered to pay a fine
as merely trivial and innocuous. The language of a lawyer, oral or written, must be
of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this
respectful and restrained, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It is through
decision, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is further warned that a
a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his
repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.
observance or respect due to the courts and judicial officers, as mandated by Section
20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of this criterion. In describing the
award of separation pay to complainant Lubiano as "ill-gotten wealth", the decision of the
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ.,
National Labor Relations Commission, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
concur.
functions, as an "unknowing" one, and the sheriff’s office as a "partner in ‘crime’",
respondent precariously ventured beyond the bounds of propriety and civility.

Respondent’s attempt to escape responsibility by attributing said statements to his zeal

and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty to uphold his client’s cause, is unavailing.
As this Court said in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer 2 :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not
 FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014
HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his clients
on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. This is because he is always expected to be honest and forthright in his
dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign sanction of suspension from the
practice of law, if not disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative
complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. AbelJana who had represented him as the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics,
Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative
complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty.
Abellana, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil Case
No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the
complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;
Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer
with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform
the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing,
thereby incurring for the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as
the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually
submit it three months later;
Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings;
and
Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for
his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes,
namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and of the
cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2
A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the order issued
on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that “[t]he formal offer of plaintiff’s
exhibits is rather very late;”3 and
The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to
promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him as the
counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to
the reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative
complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of
documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June
14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to
cover the filing fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out
only P5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as
the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction
of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving
the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the
copies of the reply (Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not
him, who had scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his non- attendance at
the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the
RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the
arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await
his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer
of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of
the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latter’s absence from the
country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte
had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement
on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that
the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts
were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most
lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change
counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him
beforehand on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that
Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of Court had told
him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried Atty.
Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.9
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8, 1990 10 embodying
additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based
on the reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the
reply attached to the comment of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the
categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to
the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber
stamp affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not
also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 Samonte denied being the cause of delay in
the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that the documentary exhibits
concerned had been shown to the trial court during his testimony, with the opposing party
not even objecting to their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal
services stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount
demanded was P1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing
expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellana’s services
after discovering the latter’s inefficiency and fraudulent practices.
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
Proceedings in the IBP
On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their evidence at
10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought postponements.16 The
hearing was reset several times more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994
due to the IBP Commissioner being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the parties on
December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March
7, 2003, with the hearing being cancelled until further notice.19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from
Atty. Abellana,20seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack
of interest on the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had
always sought the postponement of the hearings.
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on
February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against
Atty. Abellana.
On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the
mandatory conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte
appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to submit their verified position
papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory
hearing on August 18, 2005.24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty.
Abellana requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to
allow him to secure relevant documents from the trial court.26
On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was
thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his
allegations against Atty. Abellana.27
Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August
17, 2005,28 in which he represented that although he had been at times late for the
hearings he had nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte;
that he had not caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been
unavailable at times because of his work as an airline pilot; that the complainant had
discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying his obligation to him; and that the
complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil case in the RTC. He
attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant, except the above-
stated replies.
On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in
handling certain aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the defendants’
answer with counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the answer;
resorting to falsehood to make it appear that he had filed the reply; and being
considerably late in submitting the formal offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by
the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It observed that although the
negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his client’s case, his lack of
honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and deceitful
practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first
being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988
despite the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on June
14, 1988; and the second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his
having filed the reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking
distinctively different from that of the trial court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces of
material evidence adduced against him; that he had explained that the reason for his
delay in the filing of the complaint had been the complainant’s failure to pay the agreed
fees on time; and that he had only stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting
proof of his having actually filed such in court.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana,
observing as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has
shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up
his delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as
a whole, the respondent’s acts are nothing short of deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or
deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as
befits a member of the bar. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one
year, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above- entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to
exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following
grounds:32
That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of
law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by
the respondent;
That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with evidence;
That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence so that
it is hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and
stated that the “enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to
counterclaims, which were attached as Annexes “8” and “9” of the Position Paper of
respondent.”33 It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellana’s position
paper were different documents, namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex 935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he
argued that both documents were already part of the records of the case, and that anyway
Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute any affidavit or
certification to the effect that both documents were inexistent. He reminded that Samonte
had only said that both documents “seemed to be falsified documents” based on the
certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for reconsideration.36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty.
Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted
that the reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed
either to his position paper and motion for reconsideration.
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit
certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.38
On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39
On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. 40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of
Atty. Abellana.41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being
substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest,
imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding,
are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they
have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has
taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I, __________________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but
also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing
of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that
honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in
his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to
outright falsification by superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into
believing that he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised,
instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that
Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the
correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon,
did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest
and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember
that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law
Profession than his transactions with his client.
Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading
Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted his
dishonesty on the Court no less. To counter Samonte’s accusation about his not filing the
reply in the civil case, he knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment
during the investigation by the IBP, and represented said documents to have been part of
the records of the case in the RTC. His intention in doing so was to enhance his defense
against the administrative charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged and
spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because the rubber stamp marks the
documents bore were not the official marks of the RTC’s, as borne out by the specimens of
the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that
“court personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even without the usual
rubber stamp.”44 In these acts, he manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court
and his client.
The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was entirely
warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the
formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that
he could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in
the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited
some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest
of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty.
Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte,
contending that such proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that
of the other.45 In order to determine if the evidence of one party is greater than that of
the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that the court may consider
the following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with
the greater number.
The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty.
Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the “0” on “4” but justified
himself by claiming that he had done so only because the complainant had not given to
him the correct amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious
document by making it appear as one actually filed in court by using a fake rubber stamp.
His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint on his document was
different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended himself by
stating that court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without necessarily using
the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of course, that such statement did not
fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged
filings, like certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove
his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty.
Abellana misrepresented the papers he had supposedly filed by stating that he was
attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned
out to be papers different from those he represented them to be.
Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW effective upon receipt of this decision, with the stern warning that any repetition
by him of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as
a member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted
the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath.
Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law
Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up
one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an
unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness
to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem
disciplinary sanctions.

The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the
Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were
unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually
finished presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty.
Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with
mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr.,46 the
respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from the practice of law for
representing in court that the complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in
truth the complainant had made no such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity
of his representation, but gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the case.
In Molina v. Magat,47 the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by
stating that the complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another
court, but his invocation was false because no other case had been actually filed. He was
suspended from the practice of law for six months for making the false and untruthful
statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for
six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition suffices.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that
 Republic of the Philippines presided; and, that every time an audit team of the OCA visits Iligan, Lanao del Norte and
SUPREME COURT Marawi City, Judge Flores would meet them at the airport, act as their driver, entertain
Baguio City them and even give presents for their return to Manila.3

EN BANC In addition, "John Hancock" alleged that Judge Flores demands ₱5,000.00 for special
proceedings and notarial commissions; that he maintains the services of four non-court
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325 April 14, 2015 personnel who regularly reported to him and acted as his errand boys, bag-men, personal
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-7-132-RTC) security and drinking buddies; and if Judge Flores is not with his mistress in Cagayan de
Oro City or Ozamis City, he is having drinking sprees from 3 p.m. until 7 or 8 p.m. with his
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
errand boys at "Randy's Place" in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Judge Flores also allegedly
vs.
claims to be protected by one of the associate justices of the Supreme Court (SC) who is a
JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7,
former Free Legal Assistance Group lawyer, and by a "Lawyer-Administrator" who is
TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE AND FORMER ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
assigned in Lanao del Norte.4
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
Acting on these anonymous letters, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 7, 2011,
x-----------------------x
approved OCA's request for an audit team (OCA team) to conduct an investigation and
inspection of the pending and decided cases in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tubod,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3649-RTJ
Lanao del Norte, Branch 7, where Judge Flores is the presiding judge, and RTC of
PROSECUTOR DIOSDADO D. CABRERA, Complainant, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, where Judge Flores presided in an acting
vs. capacity. The authority included an "on-the-spot" investigation/examination of any
JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, available document in other government offices which may have direct connection with the
TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE AND FORMER ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL charges.5
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
OCA INVESTIGATION REPORT
DECISION
After conducting its investigation from June 27, 2011 to July 8, 2011, the OCA team
Per Curiam: submitted its report dated September 12, 20116 with the following findings and
observations regarding the active/pending and decided cases before the trial courts
Before the Court are two consolidated administrative cases, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325 presided by Judge Flores:
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-7-132-RTC) and A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3649-RTJ, filed against Judge
Alan L. Flores (Judge Flores). RTC of Tubod, Lanao del Norte, Branch 7

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-7-132-RTC)
This administrative case originated from an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) pursuant to two anonymous letters alleging certain
irregularities being committed by Judge Flores. The first letter dated April 28, 2011 was
received on May 10, 2011 by the OCA and sent by a certain "John Hancock"1 while the
other was received on June 15, 2011 and sent by "Concerned Citizens."2
Both letters accused Judge Flores of rendering favorable judgments in exchange for
monetary consideration; of taking cognizance of, and deciding cases on annulment of
marriage even if said cases were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts he
I. In the following active/pending cases for declaration of nullity of marriage,7 the OCA
team noted an apparent disregard of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as amended:
1) In Salvador v. Salvador(CC No. 07-659) filed on October 23, 2009, the petitioner
alleged that heresides at "Titunod, Purok-1, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte." Per return of
subpoena, however, the petitioner could not be found at the given address. During cross
examination, petitioner claimed that he has been residing in a rented house in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte for almost 20 years but he exercises his right of suffrage in
Cagayan de Oro City. He also does not know the name of his landlord;8
2) In Amba v. Amba(CC No. 07-668) filed on March 7, 2011, the petitioner used a "care
of" address (c/o BENITO "BOYET" MEGRINIO, Purok 4 Bag-ong Dawis, Baroy, Lanao del
Norte, Philippines). In an Investigation Report dated July 26, 2010, Prosecutor Emelita Go
(Prosecutor Go) reported that the petitioner admitted that she still works as a school
teacher in Iligan City and "when she retires, she will live in Bag-ong Dawis, Baroy, Lanao
del Norte;"9
3) In Neri v. Neri(CC No. 07-673) filed on April 17, 2010, the petitioner declared that she
is a resident of "Purok 3, Bag-ong Dawis, Baroy, Lanao del Norte." During direct and
cross-examination, the petitioner testified that she is a resident of Bag-ong Dawis, Tubod,
Lanao del Norte. Prosecutor Diosdado Cabrera (Prosecutor Cabrera), being a resident of
Tubod since birth, claimed that no "Barangay Bag-ong Dawis" exists in the Municipality of
Tubod;10
4) In Dabuet v. Dabuet, Jr. (CC No. 07-674) filed on April 7, 2010, the petitioner alleged
that she resides at "Mukas, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte," while her husband lives at
Corrales Dolores Corner, Fernandez Street, Cagayan de Oro City. During cross-
examination, the petitioner testified that the signature appearing on the summons
purportedly signed and received by her husband is not his signature; hence, Prosecutor
Cabrera manifested that there appears to be no proper service of summons on the
respondent but Judge Flores failed to act on the matter;11 5) In Maybituin v. Dayanan-
Maybituin (CC No. 07-684) filed on July 8, 2010, the petitioner declared that he is a
resident of "Poblacion, Baroy, Lanao del Norte;" however, in his Employment Contract
dated March 23, 2010, the petitioner's residence was 1162 Purok Roadside, Suarez, Iligan
City. Even on the assumption that he became a resident of Baroy, Lanao del Norte after
March 23, 2010, the petitioner still lacked the requisite "six months residency" at the time
the case was filed on July 8, 2010. Consequently, the case should have been dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.12
The OCA team made similar observations of violation of the rule on venue in Benitez v.
Benitez (CC No. 07-686),13Narvasa v. Narvasa (CC No. 07-688),14 Emborong v. Ornopia
(CC No. 07-692),15 Cangcolcol v. La Viña (CC No. 07-694),16 and Mancia v. Mancia (CC No.
07-697).17
II. The following cases on declaration of nullity of marriage,18 meanwhile, were resolved
by Judge Flores within six (6) months to one (1) year and seven (7) months from the date
of filing. The OCA team also noted similar violations of the rule on venue:
1) In Placibe v. Placibe(CC No. 07-606) filed on March 23, 2007, the petitioner's address is
"c/o Arsenia Ybañez, Mukas, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte" and that the respondent's
residence is at Tolosan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. Prosecutor Cabrera, however,
reported that both parties are residents of Balingasag, Misamis Oriental and recommended
the dismissal of the petition since the petitioner admitted the foregoing fact in the course
of his investigation. Despite this, Judge Flores set aside Prosecutor Cabrera's report
because according to him, the role of the prosecutor in the investigation is only to
determine if collusion exists between the parties, or if the evidence is being suppressed.
The petition was granted after one (1) year and seven (7) months from its filing;19
2) In Eusebio v. Eusebio(CC No. 07-626) filed on September 17, 2008, the petitioner
declared her address as "Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte" but "she can be served with
notices and other court processes at the residence of her parents in Ronquillo Obina's
residence, Purok 2, Camague, Tomas Cabili, Iligan City." The respondent also stated that
the petitioner is not a resident of Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Judge Flores granted the
petition after only ten (10) months from filing;20
3) In Mante v. Mante(CC No. 07-594) filed on August 16, 2006, the petitioner declared his
address as "Brgy. Poblacion, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, c/o Sanny Sy" and that the
respondent resides in Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol. Their marriage certificate, however,
stated that they were both residents of Catagbacan Sur, Loon, Bohol. Moreover, the
officer's return of service of subpoena stated that "subject person cannot be found x x x."
Prosecutor Cabrera filed a manifestation asking for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that none of the parties are residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Judge
Flores, nevertheless, granted the petition after one (1) year and seven (7) months from its
filing.21
Similar cases were also noted by the OCA team to have been decided by Judge Flores in
disregard of the rule on venue, namely: (1) Patuasic v. Patuasic (CC No. 07-658),22 (2)
Obsioma v. Obsioma (CC No. 07-653),23 (3) Tablason v. Tablason (CC No. 07-647),24 (4)
Patana v. Patana (CC No. 07-646),25 (5) Amper v. Amper (CC No. 07-671),26 (6) Carreon
v. Carreon (CC No. 07-612),27 (7) Labunog-Catambacan v. Catambacan (CC No. 07-
634),28 (8) McFarlane v. Mc Farlane (CC No. 07-678),29 (9) Del Rosario v. Del Rosario(CC
No. 07-675),30 (10) Emano v. Emano (CC No. 07-611),31 (11) Dela Cruz v. Saldivar (CC
No. 07-635),32 (12) Alcopra v. Salazar(CC No. 07-681),33 (13) Caidic v. Caidic (CC No. 07-
685),34 and (14) Musni v. Musni (CC No. 07-644).35
III. In Gallibot v. Gallibot(SPL. PROC. No. 194-07-2009), a petition for judicial declaration
of presumptive death based on Article 41 of the Family Code filed on November 13, 2009,
the residential address of the petitioner - Pantalan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte - was non-
existent; yet, Judge Flores granted the petition after four (4) months from filing.36
IV. Criminal cases with incidents that were resolved by Judge Flores beyond the
reglementary period, and those with incidents that remain pending even after the
reglementary period to resolve has already lapsed,37 to wit:
1) In People v. Pinuti, Jr.(CR No. 270-07-2006 for Attempted Rape), a motion for early
resolution of the motion to dismiss was filed by the accused on January 10,2008 and was
granted on January 11, 2008. The motion to dismiss was resolved only on February 23,
2009 or one (1) year and one (1) month from January 11, 2008;38
2) In People v. Rivera, et al.(CR No. 322-07-2006 for Robbery by Use of Force Upon
Things), the motion to dismiss was resolved after one (1) year and six (6) months from
the date the Comment thereon was filed;39
3) In People v. Gomera and Alfafara (CR No. 358-07-2006 for Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended), the demurrer to evidence (including the opposition and
comment) remains pending from January 25, 2010 up to the time the OCA team
conducted the investigation, or a delay of more than one (1) year and five (5) months; 40
4) In People v. Mautin, et al. (CR No. 569-07-2008 for Qualified Theft), the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration was delayed by about five (5) months, while the notice of
appeal was resolved after one (1) year and four (4) months;41
5) In People v. Pasanting (CR No. 763-07-2010 for Homicide), the resolution of the motion
for reconsideration was delayed by about eight (8) months while the notice of appeal was
resolved after one (1) year and four (4) months;42
6) In People v. Guigue and Clerigo (CR No. 773-07-2010 for Violation of Section 3(e) of
the Republic Act [R.A.] No. 3019), the motion to dismiss was resolved after seven (7)
months;43 7) In People v. Buale(CR No. 363-07-2006 and CR No. 526-07-2008 for
Violation of Sections 12 and 15 of Article II of the R.A. No. 9165), the motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved since November 26, 2010 up to the time the OCA
team arrived in the RTC of Tubod, Lanao del Norte, Branch 7, ora delay of more than
seven (7) months.44
RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21
I. Pending/active cases where the rule on venue may have also been violated:45
1) In Southey v. Palmes(CC No. 21-350) filed on February 16, 2010, evidence showed
that the petitioner's real address is Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon and not Taguitic, Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte. Judge Flores, however, disregarded this in favor of an unnotarized lease
contract and denied the respondent's motion to dismiss. The OCA team also interviewed
Sabina Alta, the purported landlady of the petitioner, and she categorically stated that the
petitioner never resided nor brought any personal belongings inside her house; 46
2) In Rocamora v. Rocamora(CC No. 21-365) filed on July 1, 2010, the case should have
been dismissed outright based on the prosecutor's first report since the petitioner used a
"care of" address; however, Judge Flores set aside the report because according to him,
the role of the prosecutor in the investigation is only to determine if collusion exists
between the parties, or if the evidence is being suppressed.47
II. Cases where Atty. Bernardino Bering, Clerk of Court VI, RTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, Branch 21, allegedly usurped the function of a judge by issuing orders during
preliminary conference:48
1) Lim v. Undag, et al., CC No. 21-322 for Sum of Money etc., Order dated May 9, 2011;
2) Cartin v. Cartin, CC No. 21-372 for Annulment of Marriage, Order dated July 13, 2011;
3) Rocamora v. Rocamora, CC No. 21-365 for Nullity of Marriage, Order dated May 12,
2011;
4) Heirs of Basiao, et al. v. Heirs of Abadies,Sr., CC No. 21-366 for Recovery of
Possession, Order dated January 24, 2011;
5) Albano v. Damalerio, et al., CC No. 21-363 for Sum of Money, Orders dated June 27,
2011 and April 25, 2011;
6) Gonzaga v. Papalid, CC No. 21-356 for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Order
dated June 27, 2011;
7) Tormis, Jr., et al. v. Tormis, CC No. 21-354 for Judicial Partition, Order dated June 13,
2011;
8) Heirs of Opada, Sr. v. Sison, et al., CC No. 21-344 for Partition, Order dated March 21,
2011;,/p>
9) Jasmin, et al. v. Jasmin and Tagalogon, CC No. 21-269 for Recovery of Ownership,
Order dated March 21, 2011;
10) Heirs of Polbos v. Sps. Polbos, CC No. 21-280 for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, Order dated June 6, 2011.
Consequently, the OCA submitted to the Court a Memorandum49 dated May 31, 2012. The
OCA agreed with the observations of the OCA team that the practices in Branches 7 and
21 presided by Judge Flores were "patently inconsistent and contrary to the Rules of
Court, especially in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,"50 and recommended that:
1. The OCA Investigation Report dated 12 September 2011 be DOCKETED as a formal
administrative complaint against Judge Alan L. Flores, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte and CONSOLIDATED with A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3649-RTJ entitled
"Prosecutor Diosdado D. Cabrera vs. Judge Alan L. Flores;"
2. Judge Alan L. Flores be IMMEDIATELY placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION from the
service, pending final resolution of herein administrative cases or until further orders from
the Supreme Court;
3. Judge Alan L. Flores be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Gross
Misconduct and be DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and privileges, with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of government service,
including government-owned and controlled agencies or corporations:
a. for acting and taking cognizance of the following nullity of marriage cases in violation of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as amended, wherein the petitioners used the abbreviation
"c/o"(care of) in their addresses in their respective petitions: Civil Cases (still active) Nos.
07-668; 07-688 and 21-365;
b. for acting and taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 07-684 and 07-686, for nullity of
marriage, despite the fact that petitioner failed to comply with the requisite six (6) months
residency under the rule;
c. for deciding the following nullity of marriage cases in favor of petitioners, even if they
used the abbreviation "c/o" in their respective addresses: Civil Case Nos. 07-606; 07-594;
07-658; 07-653; 07-635; and 07-644;
d. for failing to make a judicious assessment of the allegations contained in the petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage (which are still
active/pending in the respective court dockets), particularly with respect to the addresses
of petitioners, even if there are documentary and/or testimonial evidence that attest to the
fact that the petitioners are actually residents of places outside the territorial jurisdiction
of his courts, to wit: Civil Case Nos. 07-659; 07-673; 07-692; 07-697 and 21-350;
e. for deciding the following nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage cases in favor
of petitioners even if there are documentary and testimonial evidence that they are not
actually residents of the place they alleged in their respective petitions, to wit: Civil Case
[Nos.] 07-626;07-647; 07-646; 07-671; 07-612; 07-634; 07-678; 07-675; 07-611; 07-
681 and 07-685; and
f. for deciding the case of "Daisy L. Gallibot vs. Dedios T. Gallibot" for Judicial Declaration
of Presumptive Death, docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 194-07-2009, in favor of petitioner even
if petitioner failed to establish her residency in Tubod, Lanao del Norte.
4. Judge Alan L. Flores be found GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering an Order in the
following seven (7) criminal cases and be FINED in the maximum amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (Php 20,000.00), to wit: x x x x
5. Atty. Bernardino M. Bering, Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Branch 21, Kapatagan, Lanao del
Norte, be DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice, why no
administrative sanction should be imposed upon him for usurping the function of a judge
when he issued orders during the respective preliminary conferences in the following ten
(10) civil cases: Civil Case Nos. 21-322; 21-372; 21-365; 21-366; 21-363; 21-356; 21-
354; 21-344; 21-269; and 21-280; and
6. Atty. Bernardino M. Bering be DIRECTED to ensure that each case record/rollo in RTC,
Br. 21, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte is properly stitched.51 (Citations omitted)
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3649-RTJ
While the OCA team was conducting its investigation, they were informed by Prosecutor
Cabrera, who was then assigned to handle the cases in Branch 7, that he filed an affidavit-
complaint against Judge Flores, which was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3649-RTJ.
Prosecutor Cabrera's Affidavit-Complaint52 dated April 29, 2011 was endorsed53 by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lanao del Norte.
Particularly, Prosecutor Cabrera charged Judge Flores with violating the provisions of SC
Administrative Circular No. 23-9554 dated October 11, 1995 when he failed to timely
resolve several incidents in Criminal Cases Nos. 270-07-2006 and 322-07-
2006.55 Prosecutor Cabrera also claimed that Judge Flores neglected to resolve incidents in
eight criminal cases,56 which were then pending in his sala, and that he rendered favorable
decisions in numerous petitions for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in exchange for
monetary consideration even if the parties reside in areas outside the territorial
jurisdiction of his courts.57 It was also alleged that he maintained the services of Oscar
Flores (Oscar), Gedeon Catedral (Gedeon),58 Mario Capalac and Jeter Flores (Jeter) who
served as his driver, unofficial security guards and bribe collectors.59
Judge Flores filed a Comment60 dated June 17, 2011, alleging, among others, that
Prosecutor Cabrera has an "attitude problem" and that he has an inclination to
indiscriminately file cases against anyone who incurs his displeasure. He also admitted
that there was delay in the resolution of pending incidents but this was due to the heavy
caseload of Branches 7 and 21, and that he already issued several orders and resolutions
in June 2011 to address these. Judge Flores clarified that he only inherited the petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage from the previous presiding judge of Branch 21.
Nevertheless, he claimed that the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of marriage does
not require a judge to verify the exact address of the parties, and that the prosecutor is in
a better position to verify the veracity of the parties' statements.
In a Memorandum61 dated June 8, 2012, the OCA found merit in Prosecutor Cabrera's
administrative complaint and recommended that:
1. [T]he instant administrative matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter; and 2. Judge Alan L. Flores, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte be found GUILTY of incompetence and inefficiency and be FINED the amount of
₱20,000.00.62
On July 10, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution,63 which reads:
(a) RE-DOCKET this matter as A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325 (Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Judge Alan L. Flores, RTC, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte) and CONSOLIDATE with A.M.
OCA IPI No. 11-3649-RTJ (Prosecutor Diosdado D. Cabrera v. Judge Alan L. Flores);
(b) PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND Judge Flores pending final resolution of above-consolidated
administrative complaints, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court;
(c) REQUIRE Atty. Bernardino M. Bering, Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Branch 21, Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why no
administrative sanction should be imposed upon him for usurping the functions of a judge
when he issued orders during the respective preliminary conferences in the following ten
(10) civil cases: Civil Case Nos. 21-322, 21-372, 21-365, 21-366, 21-363, 21-356, 21-
354, 21-344, 21-269 and 21-280; and
(d) DIRECT Atty. Bering to ensure that each case record/rollo in the RTC, Branch 21,
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte is properly stitched. x x x
The Court further Resolved to REFER the subject administrative complaints to Executive
Justice Romulo V. Borja of the COURT OF APPEALS-CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY for assignment
to one of the Justices therein, and then, for investigation, report and recommendation on
the complaints, all within ninety (90) days from notice hereof. x x x64
In his Comment65 dated November 5, 2012, Judge Flores contended that the allegations in
the letters are unfounded and are mere attempts to put him in a bad light, especially since
the letters are not supported by "public records of indubitable integrity."66 The cases
before his courts are decided based on the merits and the evidence presented and that
only those required by law on notarial commissions and special proceedings are charged
with a 5,000.00 fee and its collection is the responsibility of the Office of the Clerk of
Court. Further, the people who come to his court are accorded with utmost respect and
consideration. Finally, he denied the accusations that he keeps a mistress; that he
engages in a habitual drinking spree; and that he entertains OCA teams in an excessive
and lavish fashion whenever they visit his sala.
INVESTIGATION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station (CA) received the evidence for the complainants,
which consisted of documents67 and the testimonies of Prosecutor Cabrera, Ricardo Dayak,
Sr. (Dayak), Atty. Dorothea Saligan-Basalo (Atty. Saligan-Basalo) and Randy Nadusa
Quijano (Quijano).68
Prosecutor Cabrera, in addition to the allegations in his complaint, testified that in
Tablason v. Tablason (CC No. 07-647), the Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Go,
declared that the venue was improperly laid; however, per Order dated September 17,
2009, Judge Flores pronounced that, "[t]he determination of compliance of residence is
addressed to the Court and not the Investigating Prosecutor whose determination is that
of collusion of the parties or the evidence is suppressed. Whether she is an actual
[resident] of Tubod, Lanao del Norte could be threshed out in due time when [the]
petitioner presents her evidence."69 According to Prosecutor Cabrera, there were many
instances when the actual residence of the parties were discovered during trial but Judge
Flores ignored these and did not even issue a show cause order requiring the parties to
explain why their respective petitions should not be dismissed. Worse, the latter even
asked leading questions in order to remedy said procedural flaw. Prosecutor Cabrera
added that since 2004, a total of 96cases for annulment of marriage and declaration of
nullity of marriage have been filed in Branch 7, while 17 similar cases were filed in Branch
21 since Judge Flores became its acting judge in December 2009.70
On cross-examination, Prosecutor Cabrera admitted that the Prosecutor's Office neither
moved for reconsideration nor appealed Judge Flores' decisions in these cases because it
was not authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to do so. He also admitted
that he did not call the attention of the OSG on the perceived irregularities in these cases.
He asserted, however, that he rigorously cross-examined the petitioners, and in fact,
some of them candidly admitted before the court that they are not residing within the
territorial jurisdiction of Branch 7. Nevertheless, Prosecutor Cabrera also admitted that he
did not file any motion to have the petitioners cited for contempt, or move for the
dismissal of the petitions or any similar action, as he sensed that Judge Flores was actually
helping some of the petitioners.71
Dayak, meanwhile, testified72 that Judge Flores extracted money from him in exchange for
a favorable judgment in his son's cases, which were then pending trial before his court.
According to Dayak, he purposely sought audience with Judge Flores sometime in 2004 at
the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Romeo Bringuela (Spouses Bringuela) in Limot Village,
Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte where Judge Flores was temporarily residing. He told
Judge Flores about the predicament of his son who was facing two criminal cases for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Judge Flores assured him not
to worry as long as he gives him ₱15,000.00. Despite his financial difficulties, Dayak gave
the amount asked for. Thereafter, in one of their weekly drinking sessions some time in
2005, Judge Flores told him that he was about to decide the cases and he would be
needing an additional amount of ₱15,000.00, which he gave. His son was eventually
acquitted of the charges. He thanked Judge Flores for the favorable decision but the latter
asked for another 15,000.00 as bonus but he failed to raise the same. When Oscar, Judge
Flores' first cousin and allegedly one of his four errand boys, went to his house on behalf
of Judge Flores to get the "bonus," he explained to Oscar his poor economic condition but
the latter allegedly told him to personally reason with Judge Flores. When he went to
speak with Judge Flores, he was immediately asked if he already brought the money -
telling him of the urgency to produce it as his birthday was already forthcoming. Judge
Flores also instructed him to get a goat and a pig from Spouses Bringuela in Limot, and to
bring them to his house in Iligan City. When Dayak brought them as instructed, he was
initially relieved to find that Judge Flores was not around as he feared that the latter might
insist on the bonus he was asking, but as he was about to leave, Judge Flores arrived.
Judge Flores then asked him, "Dala nimo [D]oy?" (Did you bring it [D]oy?). Dayak
answered in the affirmative and pointed at the beasts. Judge Flores went fuming mad and
in an angry voice said: "Animal ka [D]oy! Peste ka! Yaw aka! Gibuangan ka nako? Bantay
lang nang imong anak. Magmahay ra jug ka!" (You're a son of a bitch! You are a pest! You
are a devil! Are you fooling me? Watch out for your son. You will really regret!) 73
For her part, Atty. Saligan-Basalo stated that since her admission to the Philippine Bar in
2007, she has been engaged in private practice. She usually charges ₱30,000.00
acceptance fee and ₱1,000.00 per court appearance. Her office is in Tubod, Lanao del
Norte and as such, her practice is generally confined to cases falling within the jurisdiction
of Branches 7 and 21. She handles cases of declaration of nullity of marriage, among
others.74
Atty. Saligan-Basalo testified that in Estrada v. Estrada (CC No. 07-693), her services
were personally engaged by Judge Flores on behalf of the petitioner. She recalled that
before the start of a hearing, Judge Flores summoned her to the staff room where Haylane
Estrada (Haylane) who had a pending case for annulment of marriage was introduced to
her. He asked her to handle the petition for an acceptance fee of ₱20,000.00 without,
however, mentioning anything about her appearance fee. After Haylane left, Judge Flores
asked her to join him in his chamber where he told her, "Mantiner lang ha, unhan ta ka ug
₱10,000.00" (Please bear with me, I will just give you an advance of ₱10,000.00.). Judge
Flores later handed her the amount as advance, but she never received anymore the
₱10,000.00 remaining balance.75
During cross-examination, Atty. Saligan-Basalo stated that when she asked Haylane about
the balance, the latter said, "Attorney, toa naman tanan ni Judge" (Attorney, the whole
amount was already with Judge.), adding, "I gave him ₱80,000.00 because it's a package
deal." Atty. Saligan-Basalo replied, "You better talk it up [with him] because I don't have
anything to do with your transaction. What I get is only for my services." The respondent
in Estradadid not participate in the proceeding, and the case was later decided by Judge
Flores in favor of Haylane.76
The same thing happened in Aradas v. Aradas (CC No. 07-687), another case for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Judge Flores introduced Atty. Saligan-Basalo to
petitioner Benjamin Aradas (Benjamin), and asked her to handle his petition. When Atty.
Saligan-Basalo interviewed Benjamin, the latter told her that the partial payment of her
acceptance fee will be belatedly given to her. After a couple of days, an envelope
containing ₱10,000.00 was left in her office. According to her staff, it came from a certain
Gideon Catedral, allegedly a personal aide of Judge Flores. Thinking of the Estrada case as
a pattern, she presumed that it was the acceptance fee for the Aradas case.77
Atty. Saligan-Basalo further testified that she did not directly receive her acceptance fee
from either Haylane or Benjamin, and neither did she dare refuse to handle said cases nor
ask Judge Flores about the actual amount of acceptance fees for fear of jeopardizing her
other cases pending in Branches 7 and 21. In the course of her cross-examination, Atty.
Saligan-Basalo categorically stated that the acceptance fee in the Estrada case was
personally handed to her by Judge Flores. She was also of the belief that the money
intended for her acceptance fees in the cases of Estrada and Aradas were coursed through
Judge Flores.78
Witness Quijano testified that Judge Flores and his errand boys Gedeon and Jeter made
money out of the case of his brother-in-law, Monceslao Lizada (Lizada), who was charged
with Murder before the RTC Branch 7, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-1474. According
to Quijano, Jeter approached him and inquired if he is related to Lizada. Upon knowing
that Lizada is his brother-in-law, Jeter told him that the delay in the release of the accused
can be avoided if he will personally talk to Judge Flores that afternoon at Little Randy's
Store. Quijano agreed, but as Jeter was about to leave, the latter asked for ₱2,000.00,
allegedly to be spent for lunch and a drinking session with Judge Flores. When he met with
Judge Flores, the latter was with Gedeon, Jeter and Oscar. He immediately noticed the
.380 calibre pistol on top of the table that Judge Flores occupied. Judge Flores immediately
asked him if he cangive ₱50,000.00 in exchange for the release order of his brother-in-law
but he replied that his family cannot afford it. They negotiated until the amount of
₱20,000.00 was agreed upon. As he was about to leave, Gedeon and Jeter followed him
and asked him to add ₱5,000.00 for the two of them.79
Eager for Lizada's immediate release, Quijano's family pooled their resources, and in the
morning of July30, 2012, Quijano and his elder sister went to Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte to deliver the money to Judge Flores. On their way, Jeter kept calling his mobile
phone in order to monitor their arrival. Jeter also instructed him to pass by Branch 7 and
to proceed in front of the San Isidro Labrador Church, which is more or less 50 meters
away from the court, where Jeter and Gedeon will follow. It was Gedeon who personally
received the ₱20,000.00intended for Judge Flores, and the ₱2,500.00 representing half of
the ₱5,000.00 being asked by the two.80 The evidence in behalf of Judge Flores,
meanwhile, consisted of documents, his own testimony and the testimonies of Oscar,
Conrado Hingco, Jr. (Hingco), and Gedeon.
Judge Flores stressed that as much as possible, he dutifully attended to all the cases
before his sala and maintained his integrity in all proceedings. Judge Flores admitted that
there was delay in the issuance of orders and court processes but this was due to the
demands of the two courts he was handling. He denied the accusations of Dayak and
Quijano, and although he admitted having heard of Dayak who was previously a public
official, he, nevertheless, denied personally meeting him. On the other hand, he has never residence of Spouses Bringuela since Mrs. Bringuela, who happened to be his sister, is
seen Quijano prior to the proceedings in the instant case and he was not aware that his sickly and does not approve of such activity. He further averred that Dayak has never
brother-in-law, if ever he had one, had a pending case before his court. He also denied been to the residence of Spouses Bringuela.84
handling and resolving cases on declaration of nullity of marriages for monetary
consideration, claiming that he would never tarnish his name and the integrity of the court CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF THE CA
with such abominable act. On the issue of whether the courts he handled are the proper
In the Consolidated Report85 dated June 11, 2013, Investigating Justice Renato C.
venues for said cases, he reiterated that he merely relied on the declarations in the
Francisco (Justice Francisco) found sufficient evidence to hold Judge Flores
concerned petitions as these were verified and sworn under oath by the petitioners and
administratively liable for ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and undue delay in
the court cannot go beyond such declarations. He further pointed out that since the public
rendering decisions and orders. According to Justice Francisco, the "undisputed
prosecutors are mandated to investigate on the existence of collusion between the parties,
Investigation Report of the OCA" shows an alarming number of pending cases, as well as
they are the ones who are in the position to properly examine the actual residence of the
decided cases, where the actual residence of the parties are apparently not within the
parties. It was Prosecutor Cabrera or any concerned prosecutor, for that matter, therefore,
territorial jurisdiction of the courts presided by Judge Flores but these were disregarded, in
who should have filed the proper motion upon their determination that neither the
violation of Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as amended. Moreover, Justice Francisco
petitioner nor the respondent resides within the territorial jurisdiction of his courts. Judge
opined that in the petitions where "c/o" (care of) addresses were utilized, Judge Flores
Flores claimed that it was only upon his receipt of Prosecutor Cabrera's complaint-affidavit
should have, at least, required the concerned parties to show cause why their respective
that he learned of the defects in some of the addresses of the parties.81
petitions should not be dismissed, consistent with Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Hingco, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 7, testified in behalf of Judge Flores and sought to Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu.86 There were also several instances when
controvert Prosecutor Cabrera's allegation that the service of summons in Dabuet v. the public prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the cases on ground of improper
Dabuet, Jr. (CC No. 07-674 for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Custody of venue but Judge Flores simply stated that the prosecutor's role in these cases is merely to
Children) was invalid. Hingco stated in his judicial affidavit that on August 15, 2010, he determine if collusion exists between the parties, or if evidence is being suppressed. 87
served the summons, together with a copy of the petition, on respondent Percival Dabuet,
Judge Flores' acts also cast suspicion of personal interest in the cases before his court.
Jr. (Percival). According to Hingco, the person who received the summons confirmed that
Specifically, in the cases for declaration of nullity of marriage, Judge Flores rendered
he was the respondent in the case, and that he was even accompanied by one Eden, who,
judgment in record time despite the heavy case load he was claiming. Such suspicion was
allegedly, is Percival's best friend. Hingco, however, admitted during cross-examination
validated by Atty. Saligan-Basalo, Dayak and Quijano who were all credible witnesses.
that he did not ask Percival for any document that could properly confirm his identity.
Justice Francisco concluded that the special interest shown by Judge Flores in these cases
Judge Flores eventually upheld the validity of the service of summons on the ground of
constitutes gross misconduct, which was aggravated by the fact that it resulted in the
presumption of regularity in the performance of an official function and granted the
pendency of incidents in other cases and prejudiced the affected parties. Moreover, these
petition. No appeal was interposed therefrom and the same has long become final and
serious imputations were merely denied by Judge Flores sans evidence and he failed to
executory.82
show any ill motive on the part of the witnesses. Thus, Justice Francisco recommended
Gedeon sought to refute the allegations that Judge Flores demanded money from Quijano that Judge Flores should be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and gross
for the dismissal of the criminal case against the latter's brother-in-law, and that Judge misconduct, and, citing Re: Complaint of Dr. Virata against Judge Supnet,88 concurred with
Flores coursed the payment of Atty. Saligan-Basalo's acceptance fee in Aradas case the recommendation of the OCA team that the penalty of dismissal should be imposed.89
through him. Essentially, Gedeon testified that: he has never met Quijano; he never
As regards the allegation that Judge Flores unduly delayed the resolution of pending
accepted any money from him; and he has never contacted or gave any envelope
incidents in other cases, he admitted that there was indeed delay due to the heavy
containing money to a certain Atty. Saligan-Basalo.83
caseload of the courts he was handling. Finding that Judge Flores did not even ask the
Oscar denied receiving any amount from Dayak that was intended for Judge Flores, or for Court for an extension of time to resolve the said incidents, Justice Francisco agreed with
the acquittal of Dayak's son. Neither was he ordered by Judge Flores to negotiate with the OCA team that Judge Flores should be held liable for said infraction.90
Dayak. He alleged that he is not familiar with Dayak, and that he has never been to the
Accordingly, Justice Francisco recommended that:
latter's house. He does not know of any case filed against Dayak's son, and he has never
talked to Dayak about it. Oscar also denied any drinking spree that happened at the
1. Respondent Judge Alan Flores be held GUILTY of gross misconduct and gross ignorance Q: Where did you reside from 2006 to the present?
of the law, and be DISMISSED from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government A: Steel Town
nor any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
Q: Are you sure?
corporations;
A: But currently, sir, since I am managing the big company, and we are operating Kwarta
2. For undue delay in rendering orders, respondent Judge Alan Flores be FINED in the
Gram or Money gram, so, from time to time, I travel. But for now, since my case is going
amount of ₱20,000[.00]; and
on, I am now renting here in Poblacion at Quibranza Building upstairs.
3. The charge of usurpation of the judge's function against Atty. Bernardino Bering (raised
Q: The court is constrained to ask you that question of which you stated that you are
by the OCA in its memorandum) be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
residing, from2006 to present at Steel Town, Iligan City despite of the fact that in your
appropriate action.91
petition, you alleged that you are a resident at Lacson Residence, Tubod, Lanao del Norte.
Ruling of the Court Have you ever resided in Tubod, Lanao del Norte for purposes of your petition?

The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of the CA and the OCA. A: Yes sir.

Gross Ignorance of the Law and Gross Misconduct Q: When was that?

When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply the law. A: When the Pryce Company started its Kwarta Gram and Money Gram here in Tubod and
"Anything less is gross ignorance of the law."92 that was last year.

In petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages, the applicable rule is A.M. No. 02- Q: In 2010?
11-10-SC, as amended. In particular, Section 4 categorically states the venue where a
A: Yes your Honor.95 (Emphasis ours)
petition shall be filed, to wit:
Corollary to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as amended, is Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
SEC. 4.Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where
Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu,96 where the Court sustained the findings of
the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date
the Court's audit team and concurred that the use of "c/o" (care of) addresses in petitions
of the filling, or in case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
for nullity of marriage raises doubt as to the veracity of their actual residence.
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
The undisputed OCA Investigation Report in the present consolidated cases showed an
In this case, the OCA report is replete with findings showing that Judge Flores deliberately
alarming number of pending and decided cases where the actual residence of the parties
disregarded the foregoing rule. He continued to try and resolve cases despite glaring
are obviously not within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts presided by Judge Flores
circumstances, which should have created doubt as to the veracity of the residential
but he nevertheless took cognizance of these cases without even making an inquiry as to
addresses declared in the petitions. Prosecutor Cabrera even actually brought these to the
their veracity. Judge Flores' incompetence became even more manifest when he curtailed
attention of Judge Flores but he was merely brushed aside. Worse, there were even
the efforts of the public prosecutors in ensuring that the rule on proper venue will not be
instances when Judge Flores, during clarificatory questioning, knowingly led a party into
circumvented. As observed by the OCA team, Judge Flores almost always rejects the
curing the defect. Thus, in the Narvasa,93 the petitioner declared that she resides at c/o
public prosecutors' recommendation of dismissal in their investigation report on the
Lacson's Residence, Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. During her cross-
alleged reason that the role of the prosecutor is only to determine if collusion exists
examination,94 however, she admitted that she actually resides in Steel Town, Sta. Elena,
between the parties or if the evidence is being suppressed.97 Competence and diligence
Iligan City. When Judge Flores propounded clarificatory questions, the petitioner ended up
are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office98 and every judge is required to
declaring that she resides in Quibranza Building, Tubod, Lanao del Norte - "for purposes of
observe the law.99 There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the
her petition," viz:
judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or
Court fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In OCA v. Castañeda,100 the Court found the respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and procedure for her blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. Nos.
02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC, among others, and imposed the penalty of dismissal. The
Court stated:
No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the
laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good
judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with
procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of
the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the
duty to be proficient in the law.
Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure
must be at the palm of a judge's hands.101
The utter disregard shown by Judge Flores displays not only a lack of familiarity with the
law but a gross ignorance thereof. What's more, Judge Flores rendered judgments in
several cases for nullity of marriage in record time, which ranged from six (6) months to
one (1) year and seven (7) months from the date of filing, despite his claim of being
burdened by heavy caseload. According to Justice Francisco, this breeds a suspicion that
Judge Flores has personal interest in some of the cases before him. Eventually, the
suspicion took a foothold in the testimonies of Atty. Saligan-Basalo, Dayak and Quijano,
who all bared the reasons for Judge Flores' unusual interest in the cases before him, thus
making him liable, in turn, for Gross Misconduct. "Misconduct means intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection
with one's performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to
exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to
violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."102 No less than the New Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to conduct his office and personal demeanor with
integrity, competence and diligence.
CANON 2 - INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO THE PROPER DISCHARGE OF THE
JUDICIAL OFFICE, BUT ALSO TO THE PERSONAL DEMEANOR OF JUDGES.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
xxxx
CANON 6 - COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE ARE PRE-REQUISITES TO THE DUE
PERFORMANCE OF JUDICIAL OFFICE.
xxxx
Section 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of
judicial duties.
The testimony of Atty. Saligan-Basalo disclosed that Judge Flores secured her legal
services for several cases pending before his own sala. Atty. Saligan-Basalo, who is a
private practitioner handling cases generally falling within the jurisdiction of the courts
presided by Judge Flores, stated that Judge Flores obtained her services for the petitioners
in the case of Estrada and Aradas. In Estrada, Judge Flores offered her an acceptance fee
in the amount of ₱20,000.00 and she was compelled to accept the referral because she
was wary of the other cases she handles that are pending in Judge Flores' courts. In
Aradas, Atty. Saligan-Basalo received ₱10,000.00 as acceptance fee, but this time the
money was delivered to her office by Gedeon. Meanwhile, both Dayak and Quijano
testified that Judge Flores demanded and was given money for the favorable resolution of
certain criminal cases where their relatives are the accused. According to Quijano, at the
instance of Jeter, he transacted with Judge Flores for the early release of his brother-in-
law. On the other hand, Dayak stated that he personally approached Judge Flores for the
acquittal of his son and in consideration thereof, the latter asked for money and was given
a total amount of ₱30,000.00. Judge Flores, however, was not satisfied with the amount
and asked for a "bonus" of ₱15,000.00. On top of that, Judge Flores also asked him to
fetch a goat and pig for his birthday celebration, and when Dayak failed to deliver the
"bonus", he was berated by Judge Flores, who uttered: "Animal ka Doy! Peste ka! Yaw
aka! Gibuangan ka nako? Bantay lang nang imong anak. Magmahay ra jug ka!" Certainly,
such conduct exhibited by Judge Flores not only was unbecoming of someone in his
exalted position but degraded the judicial office and eroded public confidence in the
Judiciary.103
The Court is not unmindful that the testimonies of Atty. Saligan-Basalo, Dayak and
Quijano are not corroborated; however, owing to the private nature of the acts imputed
against Judge Flores, it is not at all surprising that the statements of Atty. Saligan-Basalo,
Dayak and Quijano will have to be taken on the basis of their credibility and the credibility
of their testimonies vis-à-vis Judge Flores' counter-statements. In weighing their
respective testimonies, Justice Francisco concluded that:
Judge Flores x x x merely denied the said imputation without any evidence to support such
denial. Settled is the rule that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of a credible witness who testifies on
affirmative matters. Besides, Judge Flores had not imputed any ill-motive to Atty. Saligan-
Basalo, Ricardo Dayak, Sr. and Randy Nadusa Quijano for testifying against him. It is also
settled that where there is no evidence that the witnesses were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit. x x x.104
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings and analysis of Justice Francisco as
they are well-supported by the records and the OCA investigation and report. Moreover,
with regard to the credibility of Atty. Saligan-Basalo who primarily conducts her legal
practice in the courts presided by Judge Flores, certainly, she would not have testified
against him and risked earning his ire unless she was emboldened by some noble or deep
personal conviction. Moreover, it did note scape the Court's attention that although
Quijano pointed to Jeter as the one who initiated the transaction for the early release of
his brother-in-law, Judge Flores did not present Jeter as a witness to controvert Quijano's
claim. The rule is that findings of an investigating justice on the credibility of witnesses are
generally given by this Court great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.105
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order
Section 15(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that judges must resolve all
matters within three months from the date of submission. A matter is deemed submitted
for resolution upon the filing of the last pleading.106
The OCA team uncovered several criminal cases where Judge Flores failed to resolve
pending incidents within the prescribed period, to wit: (1) People v. Pinuti, Jr.(CR No. 270-
07-2006) where the motion to dismiss was resolved after a delay of one (1) year and one
(1) month; (2) People v. Rivera, et al.(CR No. 322-07-2006) where the motion to dismiss
was resolved after one (1) year and six (6) months from the date the Comment was filed;
(3) People v. Gomera and Alfafara (CR No. 358-07-2006) where the demurrer to evidence
has been pending for more than one (1) year and five (5) months; (4) People v. Mautin, et
al. (CR No. 569-07-2008) where resolution of the motion for reconsideration was delayed
for five (5) months and the notice of appeal, for one (1) year and four (4) months; (5)
People v. Pasanting (CR No. 763-07-2010) where resolution of the motion for
reconsideration was delayed by about eight (8) months while the notice of appeal was
resolved after one (1) year and four (4) months; (6) People v. Guigue and Clerigo (CR No.
773-07-2010) where the motion to dismiss was resolved only after seven (7) months; and
(7) People v. Buale (CR Nos. 363-07-2006 and 526-07-2008) where the motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved since November 26, 2010 up to the time the OCA
team arrived in RTC Branch 7, or a delay of more than seven (7) months.107
While Judge Flores admitted that there were indeed instances of delay and attributed them
to the heavy caseload of the courts he was handling, as stated by Justice Francisco, his
excuse can only be given short shrift since he could have asked the Court for extension of
time to resolve said incidents, which he never did. The Court is not oblivious to the heavy
caseload of trial courts and usually allows reasonable extensions of time. Given Judge
Flores' failure to ask for an extension to resolve the pending and due incidents before his
courts, he is deemed to have incurred delay.108 The Court held in Tañoco v. Sagun, Jr.:109
Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in
the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.110
APPROPRIATE PENALTIES
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Gross Misconduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct are both classified as
serious charges under Section 8(9) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Section 11 of the
same Rule provides the imposable penalties for serious charges, as follows:
SEC. 11.Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government- owned or controlled corporation: Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
xxxx
The Court notes that this is not the first time that Judge Flores has been disciplinarily dealt
with for gross ignorance of the law. In Efren T. Uy, Nelia B. Lee, Rodolfo L. Menes and
Quinciano H. Lui v. Judge Alan L. Flores, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte,111 Judge Flores was suspended by the Court for three (3) months and one (1) day
without pay when he assumed jurisdiction over a Rule 65 petition questioning a
reassignment order issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and failed to dismiss
the same on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, among others. He
was warned that similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. Given that
Judge Flores' gross ignorance of the law is compounded by his commission of grave
misconduct, the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service is justified.112
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a less serious charge. Pursuant to
Section 11(b) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, such offense is punishable by suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or more than three
(3) months; or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. Considering
the number of pending incidents and the length of time it took Judge Flores to dispose of
them, the Court finds the recommendation of Justice Francisco that the imposition of a
₱20,000.00 fine should be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds:

(1) respondent Judge Alan L. Flores, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Gross
Misconduct, and is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except as to
accrued leave credits and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; and

(2) respondent Judge Alan L. Flores GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering Decisions/Orders
and is imposed a FINE of ₱20,000.00 to be deducted from the balance of the monetary
value of the accrued leave credits and/or other benefits that he may be entitled to.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,113 these administrative cases against Judge Alan L.
Flores are also considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the
bar. He is therefore REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why he
should not be disbarred from the practice of law for cond4ct unbecoming of a member of
the bar. Further, these consolidated administrative cases are referred to the Office of the
Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.

The charge against Atty. Bernardino Bering, Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21 is referred to the Office of the Court Administrator
for its investigation, report and recommendation.

This Decision is immediately executory and Judge Flores is ORDERED to CEASE AND
DESIST from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998]
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the
bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the
Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint[1] for
disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having
violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers.[2]
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in
the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and
as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first
year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as
her teacher, and as a prominent member of the legal profession and then member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening
her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community, but
which they managed to keep from me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to
me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live
with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of
Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for
this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and
morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has
abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student
in the tertiary level[.][3]
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[4]
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from
complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She
alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and
spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were
forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from emotional confusion arising from extreme
jealousy. The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and
responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous
relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family.[5] Supporting her letter were
an Affidavit of Desistance[6] and a Motion to Dismiss,[7] attached as Annexes A and B,
which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline.[8] In a Decision dated October
8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors [9] dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure
to prosecute.[10]
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court [11] received
another letter[12] from the complainant, with her seven children[13] as co-signatories, again
appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped
the case against him because of his continuous threats against her.[14]
In his Comment on the complainants letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with
this Courts Resolution issued on July 6, 1992,[15] respondent prayed that the decision of
the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or
intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of
Desistance[16] and Motion to Dismiss,[17] even appearing before the investigating officer,
Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and
Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof.
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his
family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally
disturbed, viz.:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive
woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or
complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely
on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her loving jealousy. Then, as is her
nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry
for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11,
1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy.[18]
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of
respondent to the IBP.[19] In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C.
Jose, respondent alleged the following:[20]
2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square
meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful
education.Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich parents who value
material possession more than education and the higher and nobler aspirations in
life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love,
forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an
entirely different environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-eight
(38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance,
a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and most of all, a good and
respected name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and children. Even
in the most trying times, he remained calm and never inflicted violence on them. His
children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has been
systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their
family.Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been
incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED,
physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their
marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his
misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family
and their marriage.But this is not to be. The Complainant never mellowed and never
became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and
predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in
sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement. Paraphrasing
Dorfman in Death and the Maiden, can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live
together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only
obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret
and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC,
Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Respondent
never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good name
and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey
your spouse, for better or for worse, in sickness and in health. . . Even in this case, Your
Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is
constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells everyone,
everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes
to colleges and universities, professional organizations, religious societies, and all other
sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells
them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband
is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since when did love become an instrument to
destroy a mans dearest possession in life - his good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainants virulent disinformation campaign against her husband,
employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has
been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is
not a scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the
Complainant.[21]
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as
evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita:
3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. x x x
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-
114. x x x
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case
No. 1-92-0083. x x x
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109.
DISMISSED.(x x x). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x x).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x x
x). DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. x x
x[22]
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x x) are inadmissible in
evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.
al., G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).
xxxxxxxxx
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the
Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman in the
DTI.He never had or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He
never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini
or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with
her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and
fabricated, x x x
xxxxxxxxx
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly drove
respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the
conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the
family from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of
the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. x x x
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive, scandalous,
virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat,
battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty.
Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, x x x.
V. Complainant Julieta Narags claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28, 1996,
to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was
obtained through force and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit
freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript
of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC
Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs.
Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man - a senior citizen of 63 years - sickly,
abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and
arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological,
and economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to him by
the complainant.Please see the attached medical certificates, x x x, among many other
similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from
hypertension.[23]
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report,[24] recommending the
indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said
report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the
contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondents own
family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;
b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondents Comment
vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution and contents of which, although
he objected to their admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him
on the witness stand much less presented and offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondents witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the
complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering
everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness
stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn comment; much less did he present
his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the adulterous relationship between him
and their having begotten their illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita
and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondents denial that he is the father of the two
is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to disciplinary
action as a member of the legal profession.[25]
In its Resolution[26] issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the
investigating commissioners recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the
respondent.[27] Subsequently, the complainant sought the disbarment of her husband in a
Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty
and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by
the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty
of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal A Yes, sir.
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
ATTY. NARAG:
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent[28]
to the practice of law, but
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty
of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.[29]
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
community.[30]Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
Dominador.
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree[31] or committed under such x x x x x x x x x [43]
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[32]
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol[33] that, as officers of the court, lawyers must not his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral children:
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must wife. You claim that?
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards. A Yes, sir.

Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live Q Why do you say that?
with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already
exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
two children and I know that that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me
satisfactory evidence.[34]
to follow since my moral values dont allow me that my sister is living with a married man
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself,[35] were: Charlie like you.
Espita,[36] Magdalena Bautista,[37] Bienvenido Eugenio,[38] Alice Carag,[39] Dr. Jervis B.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the
Narag,[40] Dominador Narag, Jr.,[41] and Nieves F. Reyes.[42]
house?
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainants
A Yes, si[r].
charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating
officer:
xxxxxxxxx

Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?

Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family.[44]
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love
letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him
from appearing at the disbarment proceedings.[45]
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie
Espita.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty.
Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband
and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.[46]
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she
learned from the Narag children -- Randy, Bong and Rowena -- that their father left his
family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back,
that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent went back to his woman, and
that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife.[47]
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish
that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence
showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent,
their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent
to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two
children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also submitted as
evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that
handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those
admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence
were written by one and the same person.[48] Besides, respondent did not present any
evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied
that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to
himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the
bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his
right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the
charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and
this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[49] This he failed
to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same
time, he depicts his wife as a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending, and as an
insanely and pathologically jealous woman, whose only obsession was to destroy, destroy
and destroy him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against
him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of
documentary evidence[50] and ten (10) witnesses.[51]
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish
the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would
render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as
proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita,
with whom he had two children.Some of them testified on matters which they had no
actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent himself or
other people, while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family -- they enjoyed a comfortable life and Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh,
his children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth,
lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his is that what you are saying.
moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law.
A Sort of, sir.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support,
educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned,
give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual you have no more father, am I correct?
guidance.[52] As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love,
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because
respect and fidelity; and to render help and support.[53]
my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me love.[54]
the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he
abandoned his family to live with his paramour, who bore him two children. It would
went through:
appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good father. His
children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must have scarcely felt the
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is
warmth of their fathers love.
maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on
you?
Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his fathers moral
frailties in his testimony:
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially
my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve]
Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a
parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that
fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
affected us.
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?
of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although I am a God-fearing person, but I
h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes,
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not
sir.
face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known
family in our community.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.
COMR. JOSE:
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst,
that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.
hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is
the question.
xxxxxxxxx
CONTINUATION.
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the
pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime. Q In your wifes family?

A In our family, sir.

Q And what do you mean by that?

A What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to
the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a puta in provincial government, which
my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife
knew for a fact that my father has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore
two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and
I stand firm to this, Your Honor.[55]

Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove
otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a
partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her
until death.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova[56] The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[58] the respondent was disbarred after the complainant
proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a
married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree
of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting,[59] a lawyer may be
disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED

STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record
of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed
the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966,
1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and
July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953,
when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort
to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first
acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a
son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes
the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more
than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the
latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned
that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in
failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains interested in the
resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to
dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.[2] Respondents third motion to
dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982.[3] In 1988,
respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and
good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending
as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges
of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate
child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his
promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on
his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held
that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite relevant because mere intimacy between
a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried
on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend even after she
had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with
him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their
relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not
for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely
and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted
into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to
him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco,

Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave

EN BANC
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, A.C. No. 7902
ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ,
Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar is a Motion for Reconsideration,[1] dated, October 21, 2008 filed by respondent
Godwin R. Valdez (Valdez), praying that the September 30, 2008 decision of this Court
disbarring him from the practice of law be reconsidered by remanding the records of the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline. He
further prays that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline be directed to receive his Answer,
evidence and Position Paper and thereafter, that he be absolved of the charges against
him and that his name be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.[2]
We have previously decided in Torben B. Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez,[3] that
respondent Valdez committed malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney
and is thus unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the bar.
The complainant, Torben Overgaard (Overgaard) engaged the services of
respondent Valdez as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed
against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees of P900,000.00 as
stipulated in a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his
obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainants request for a
report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the complainants
demands for the return of the money paid to him.
Complainant Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment against Valdez before the IBP.
During the investigation, respondent Valdez did not participate despite due notice. He was
declared in default for failure to submit an answer and attend the mandatory conference.
He did not submit a position paper or attend the hearing.
On September 30, 2008, this Court held that respondent Valdez committed multiple
violations of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion
of this Decision states:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to immediately
return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%)
interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the
date of promulgation of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to
immediately return all papers and documents received from the complainant.[4]
xxxx
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration filed on October 21, 2008, by respondent Valdez,
based on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT HAD ABSOLUTELY NO KNOWLEDGE THAT COMPLAINANT
HAD FILED CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND THAT THERE WERE DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
AND AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
II. HAD HE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, HE WOULD HAVE
PRESENTED STRONG, VALID AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES TO THE CHARGES LEVELLED
AGAINST HIM WHICH DEFENSES, CORRECTLY APPRECIATED, WOULD HAVE TOTALLY
EXONERATED HIM. [5]
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
On the first issue, the respondent argues that the IBP has no jurisdiction over him since
proof of service of the initiatory pleading to the defendant is a jurisidictional
requirement.[6]He states in his Motion for Reconsideration that he had no inkling
whatsoever of the existence of the disbarment case filed by the complainant.[7] He asserts
that, in September 2006, he abruptly abandoned his office at Suite 402 Pacific Irvine
Bldg., 2746 Zenaida St., at Makati City following persistent and serious threats to his
physical safety and security x x x. [8] On the advice of his close friends and clients to lie
low and make himself scarce,[9] he stayed for a few days in his residence at
Imus, Cavite then relocated to Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.[10] He has been holding office
and residing in Bukidnon since then, and he only found out about the decision from a
colleague in Bukidnon who read the decision from the Courts website.
He claims that because he abruptly abandoned[11] his Makati office on September 2006, he
was not able to receive the demand letter[12] sent by the complainant.[13] He was also not
able to receive any of the notices, orders and other papers pertaining to the disbarment
proceedings because at the time these were sent to his Makati office address, he was
already holding office in Bukidnon.
Complainant Overgaard filed an Opposition/Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration[14] on December 9, 2008. He counters that respondent Valdez was duly
notified of the charge against him and of all the proceedings at the IBP,[15] since all notices
were sent to Suite 402 Pacific Irvine Bldg., No. 2746 Zenaida St., Makati City, Metro
Manila, Philippines,[16]which is the respondents office address indicated in his letterhead
and made known to the complainant and to the public. He sent the respondent a letter
dated November 27, 2006, demanding that the latter return the documents and
the P900,000.00 paid to him in relation to the case. The demand letter was sent to the
same address and was received by one whose signature was RRJ, as noted in the Registry
Return Receipt.[17]
Complainant Overgaard argues that respondent cannot claim ignorance of the disbarment
case against him, since this is a natural offshoot of a wrongful act.[18] Complainant
Overgaard points out that when respondent Valdez left for Bukidnon, he already knew that
the complainant was looking for him and demanding the return of the money and
documents he received from the complainant.[19] The November 27, 2006 demand letter
further contained a warning that [i]f [the respondent] will not return the documents and
the money within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, [the complainant] will bring the
matter to the proper authorities/forum for the redress of [his] grievances.[20] The
complainant denies that he or his business partners know of respondents whereabouts,
and he argues that it is the respondents duty as his counsel to adopt and strictly maintain
a system that efficiently takes into account all notices sent to him.[21]
We hold that respondent was given reasonable notice of the complaint for disbarment
against him.
A copy of the Complaint as well as the Order[22] to answer the Complaint was sent by the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to the respondents Makati office address, and it was
duly received by the respondent. The Registry Return Receipt[23] shows that it was also
received by one RRJ, whose signature appears on the space for the signature of the
addressees agent. The respondent cannot claim lack of knowledge of the complaint for
disbarment against him when the Complaint and the Order for him to submit an Answer
were duly received by his agent at his Makati law office. Succeeding notices in connection
with the disbarment proceedings were also sent to the respondents Makati law office. He
cannot escape liability for his misdeeds by feigning ignorance of the disbarment case,
since the notices in connection with the proceedings were sent to his office address made
known to the public and properly received by his agent.
Respondent Valdez was given full opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to answer the
charges against him and to present evidence on his behalf. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline was correct in proceeding with the investigation ex parte, because it was due to
the respondents own fault and negligence that he was not able to submit an answer to the
Complaint and participate in the investigation. Rule 138, Section 30 provides that an
attorney should be heard before he is removed or suspended; but if, upon reasonable
notice, an attorney fails to appear and answer the accusations against him, the matter
may be dealt with ex parte. Rule 138, Section 30 states:
SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be
removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he
fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine
the matter ex parte. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents feeble excuse that he was no longer holding office at his Makati office
address at the time the Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was sent to him is
unacceptable. Ordinary prudence would have guarded against his alleged failure to receive
the notices. All notices to the respondent were sent to his Makati office address, which was
the address made known to the public and to the complainant. This is even the address
printed on the letterhead of the Retainer Agreement between the complainant and the
respondent. And although the respondent claims that he had to make himself
scarce[24] due to threats to his life and safety, this does not mean that he avoids the
responsibility of taking account of his mail. The respondent owes it to himself and to his
clients to adopt a system whereby he would be able to receive mail sent to his law office
during his absence. Assuming that circumstances would justify the respondents abrupt
abandonment[25] of his Makati office, it absolutely does not give him the license to
abandon his clients as well.
This brings us to the second issue: whether or not respondent committed multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus his disbarment should be
sustained.
The respondent argues that he did not abandon his client. He denies that he refused to
perform any of his obligations under the contract for legal services between himself and
the complainant. He claims that he gave the complainant legal advice, and that he
searched for and interviewed witnesses in relation to the cases he was handling for the
complainant.[26] He also denies that he ignored the complainants requests for a report of
the cases entrusted to his care. He claims that he gave periodic status reports on the
result of his work, that he returned the documents in connection with the case, and that
he rendered an accounting of the money that he actually received.
We find that respondents disbarment should be upheld. From the facts of the case, and
based on his own admissions, it is evident that he has committed multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his client and without making sure
that the cases he was handling for his client were properly attended to during his absence,
and without making arrangements whereby he would receive important mail, the
respondent is clearly guilty of gross negligence. A lawyer cannot simply disappear and
abandon his clients and then rely on the convenient excuse that there were threats to his
safety. Even assuming that there were serious threats to his person, this did not give him
the permission to desert his client and leave the cases entrusted to his care hanging. He
should have at least exercised reasonable and ordinary care and diligence by taking steps
to ensure that the cases he was handling were attended to and that his clients interest
was safeguarded. If it was not possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his care,
he should have informed the complainant of his predicament and asked that he be allowed
to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel
who could properly represent him.[27] Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared,
deserted his client and forgot about the cases entrusted to his care, to the complainants
damage and prejudice.
The respondent denies that he did not do anything in connection with the cases included in
the Retainer Agreement. He asserts that he reviewed the documents in relation to the
case and gave the complainant important advice. He claims that he travelled to Bato,
Camarines Norte to negotiate for an amicable settlement with the members of the family
of the adverse party in one of the cases filed against the complainant.[28] He also went
to San Carlos City (Negros Oriental), Antipolo City, and other parts of Metro Manila to
interview and search for witnesses for the cases that he was handling for the
complainant.[29]
The respondents disbarment is not anchored on his failure to do anything in relation the
cases entrusted to his care, but on his abandonment of his client. He will not be absolved
from liability on the basis alone of these inconsequential acts which he claims to have
accomplished because the glaring fact remains that he has failed to perform his essential
obligations to his client, to the courts and to society. As the complainants lawyer, the
respondent is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence.[30] This includes
not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care and giving the complainant sound
legal advice, but also properly representing his client in court, attending scheduled
hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrusted to his
care with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for his client or
the court to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of his client in
a state of uncertainty. The complainant declared that he did not receive the documents being demanded from the
respondent, nor did he receive an accounting of the money he paid to the respondent. He
stated in his Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration that the respondents
empty claims -- that he already returned the documents sometime in the middle of July
The respondents acts and omissions were not just a case of inaction, but they amount to 2006 and that he rendered an accounting of the money paid to him immediately after July
deceitful conduct and are contrary to good morals. After assuring the complainant that he 25 or 26, 2006 -- are refuted by the demand letter sent by the complainant on November
would protect the latters interest and attend to the cases included in the Retainer 27, 2006, four months after the alleged time of return.
Agreement, he abandoned his client. It was only after the complainants own inquiry that
he discovered that the respondent never appeared in court to represent the complainant in
the cases filed against him, so much so that he had no knowledge that warrants of arrest
were already issued against him. The respondent also failed to enter his appearance in the We agree with the complainant.
civil case for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. After
receiving the complete amount of legal fees, giving the complainant initial legal advice,
and interviewing some witnesses, the respondent just disappeared and the complainant
If the respondent had indeed returned the documents sometime in the middle of July
never heard from him despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent.
2006, he would have presented a receipt to prove such turnover of documents. And if the
respondent had indeed rendered an accounting of the money that was paid to him, he
would have attached a received copy of the accounting to his Motion for Reconsideration.
The complainant put his trust in the respondent with full faith that the latter would exert But he failed to do both. There was no proof presented. We cannot rely on his bare
his best effort and ability in the prosecution and defense of his clients cause. But instead allegation, especially when the complainant demanded the return of the documents
of devotion to his clients cause, the respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client. months after they were allegedly returned.
After all the representations he made to the complainant and after receipt of the full
amount of the legal fees, he absconded from his responsibilities and betrayed his clients
trust. There is no excuse for this, and his gross negligence and appalling indifference is
Neither are we persuaded by the respondents explanation as to how and where
unforgiveable.
the P900,000.00 was spent. He claims that out of the P900,000.00, he only
received P600,000.00 because he paid P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives. In
paying the intelligence operatives, he stated in his Motion for Reconsideration that he
On the Courts finding that the respondent refused to return the money he received from deposited P100,000.00 to the Land Bank account of one Investigator Operative Collado
the complainant despite written and verbal demands and was not able to give a single (Collado) sometime in the second week of January 2006, and that the rest of
report regarding the status of the cases, the respondent claims that he returned the the P200,000.00 was personally handed by him to Collado in the last week of January
documents to the complainants representative in the middle of July 2006,[31] and that he 2006 at McDonalds restaurant at the corner of Pasong Tamo and J.P. Rizal Streets at
also gave an accounting of the money he received sometime immediately after it was Makati City.[34]
demanded from him on July 25 or 26, 2006. The respondent counters that although he
initially received the amount of P900,000.00, he gave P300,000.00 to two intelligence
operatives for locating witnesses in favor of the complainant in Antipolo City and
Such an account offered by the respondent is insufficient to free him from liability. If the
other parts of Metro Manila.[32] He claims that only P600,000.00 was actually received by
respondent indeed paid P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives with the knowledge of
him, and from this amount he drew all expenses in connection with the complainants
the complainant, he would have presented a receipt issued by Collado, and he would have
cases. The respondent further avers that he made an accounting of the P600,000.00
also presented a validated deposit slip or certification as proof that he deposited the
received by him and offered to return P250,000.00, but it was the complainants business
amount he claims to have deposited to Collados account. His failure to attach proof of
partner who refused to accept the P250,000.00 and insisted on the payment of the whole
payment of the P300,000.00 to the intelligence operatives does not only make his defense
amount.[33]
flawed, it also highlights his incompetence in handling the money he received from the
client.

It is a lawyers duty to properly account for the money he received from the client.[35] If
indeed the respondent told the client that he would pay P300,000.00 to two intelligence
operatives, as he claims in his Motion for Reconsideration, he should have held this money
in trust, and he was under an obligation to make an accounting. It was his duty to secure
a receipt for the payment of this amount on behalf of his client. But he failed to present
any receipt or certification from Collado that the payment was received. Since the
respondent was not able either to present an accounting of the P900,000.00 paid to him
upon the complainants demand, or to provide a sufficient and plausible explanation for
where such amount was spent, he must immediately return the same.

For these reasons, and those previously stated in the September 30, 2008 Decision of this
Court, we find that respondent Valdez has committed multiple violations of the canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He has failed to observe the fundamental duties of
honesty and good faith and, thus, we sustain his disbarment.

We must emphasize that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise,[36] and it may be extended or withheld by
this Court in the exercise of its sound discretion. As guardian of the legal profession, this
Court has ultimate disciplinary power over members of the Bar in order to ensure that the
highest standards of competence and of honesty and fair dealing are maintained. We find
that the respondent has fallen below such exacting standard and is unworthy of the
privilege to practice law.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. This Courts en

banc decision in Administrative Case No. 7902 dated September 30, 2008,
entitled Torben B. Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7360 July 24,2012
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty.
Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which
he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague
Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held
Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of
reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funa’s
recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared
as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2
Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated
murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan
took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the
Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from
the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name,
Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused
numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position of the
private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s
request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered
judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty.
Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail
pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a
case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio
reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from
frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa,
Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered
her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision
in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo
Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant
in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas
still remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from
Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an
entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television
program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage
was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty.
Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive
portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months
and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision
in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa
claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty.
Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as "self-
serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude
since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’" He further claims that "it is not
the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the
charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of crimes
against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case
No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be
unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of
said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such would
constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa]
entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are
merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone
unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more than
seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on November
2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the
allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified
with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted
by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever
involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this
Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be
given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty.
Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October
2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from
the practice of law to two years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the
Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule
2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of
the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall
not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions
can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was
only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his
subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of
the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer
or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s
pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open
court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed
not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to
protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is
founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating
that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect
agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show
that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed
her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized
by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no
reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on
the other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent.
Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not
binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no
doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office
and from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents
as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or
by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute
proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776,
and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present
case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is
a matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by
submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No.
27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. –
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. 10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with
the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees
to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the
part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in
general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a
betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the
accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of
the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under
Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction
of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension
because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was
not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the
unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty.
Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his

name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
Manila 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009 Back

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
SERVICES OFFERED:
RESOLUTION
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
CORONA, J.: TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
encroachment of professional services.
ABROAD.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
1avvphi1
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services,
he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
(emphasis supplied)
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
Hence, this complaint.
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6 Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.7
Front
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
LAW OFFFICE
complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
Fe Marie L. Labiano stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
Paralegal
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not
a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of
law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a
ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as
a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to
his office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the
lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional
stake in its outcome.23Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his
own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care
of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for
the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on
lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence
to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally
and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of
one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines 2. The amount of rent to be paid by FKI for the first twenty-five (25) years is ₱40,126.00
SUPREME COURT per annum .11
Manila
The Deed of Donation also stipulated that the lease over the subject property is renewable
SECOND DIVISION for another period of twenty-five (25) years " upon mutual agreement" of FKI and the
respondent.12 In which case, the amount of rent shall be determined in accordance with
G.R. No. 198075 September 4, 2013 item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation, viz:

KOPPEL, INC. (formerly known as KPL AIRCON, INC.), Petitioner, g. The rental for the second 25 years shall be the subject of mutual agreement and in case
vs. of disagreement the matter shall be referred to a Board of three Arbitrators appointed and
MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC., Respondent. with powers in accordance with the Arbitration Law of the Philippines, Republic Act 878,
whose function shall be to decide the current fair market value of the land excluding the
DECISION
improvements, provided, that, any increase in the fair market value of the land shall not
exceed twenty five percent (25%) of the original value of the land donated as stated in
PEREZ, J.:
paragraph 2(c) of this Deed. The rental for the second 25 years shall not exceed three
This case is an appeal1 from the Decision2 dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in percent (3%) of the fair market value of the land excluding the improvements as
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 116865. determined by the Board of Arbitrators.13

The facts: In October 1976, FKI and the respondent executed an Amended Deed of Donation14 that
reiterated the provisions of the Deed of Donation , including those relating to the lease of
The Donation the subject land.

Fedders Koppel, Incorporated (FKI), a manufacturer of air-conditioning products, was the Verily, by virtue of the lease agreement contained in the Deed of Donation and Amended
registered owner of a parcel of land located at Km. 16, South Superhighway, Parañaque Deed of Donation , FKI was able to continue in its possession and use of the subject land.
City (subject land).3 Within the subject land are buildings and other improvements
dedicated to the business of FKI.4 2000 Lease Contract

In 1975, FKI5 bequeathed the subject land (exclusive of the improvements thereon) in
favor of herein respondent Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Incorporated by way of a
conditional donation.6 The respondent accepted the donation with all of its conditions.7 On
26 May1975, FKI and the respondent executed a Deed of Donation8evidencing their
consensus.
The Lease and the Amended Deed of Donation
One of the conditions of the donation required the respondent to lease the subject land
back to FKI under terms specified in their Deed of Donation.9 With the respondent’s
acceptance of the donation, a lease agreement between FKI and the respondent was,
therefore, effectively incorporated in the Deed of Donation.
Two (2) days before the lease incorporated in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation was set to expire, or on 23 May 2000, FKI and respondent executed another
contract of lease ( 2000 Lease Contract )15covering the subject land. In this 2000 Lease
Contract, FKI and respondent agreed on a new five-year lease to take effect on the 26th of
May 2000, with annual rents ranging from ₱4,000,000 for the first year up to ₱4,900,000
for the fifth year.16 The 2000 Lease Contract also contained an arbitration clause
enforceable in the event the parties come to disagreement about the" interpretation,
application and execution" of the lease, viz :
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this 2000 Lease Contract shall be governed,
interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.

Pertinent terms of such lease agreement, as provided in the Deed of Donation , were as Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this 2000 Lease
follows: Contract shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in accordance
with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of the arbitrators
1. The period of the lease is for twenty-five (25) years,10 or until the 25th of May 2000; shall be binding upon FKI and respondent.17 (Emphasis supplied)
2005 Lease Contract
After the 2000 Lease Contract expired, FKI and respondent agreed to renew their lease for
another five (5) years. This new lease (2005 Lease Contract )18 required FKI to pay a fixed
annual rent of ₱4,200,000.19 In addition to paying the fixed rent, however, the 2005 Lease
Contract also obligated FKI to make a yearly " donation " of money to the
respondent.20 Such donations ranged from ₱3,000,000 for the first year up to
₱3,900,000for the fifth year.21Notably, the 2005 Lease Contract contained an arbitration
clause similar to that in the 2000 Lease Contract, to wit:
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this 2005 Lease Contract shall be governed,
interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this 2005 Lease
Contract shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in accordance
with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of the arbitrators
shall be binding upon FKI and respondent.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Assignment and Petitioner’s Refusal to Pay
From 2005 to 2008, FKI faithfully paid the rentals and " donations "due it per the 2005
Lease Contract.23 But in June of 2008, FKI sold all its rights and properties relative to its
business in favor of herein petitioner Koppel, Incorporated.24 On 29 August 2008, FKI and
petitioner executed an Assignment and Assumption of Lease and Donation25 —wherein
FKI, with the conformity of the respondent, formally assigned all of its interests and
obligations under the Amended Deed of Donation and the 2005 Lease Contract in favor of
petitioner.
The following year, petitioner discontinued the payment of the rent and " donation " under
the 2005 Lease Contract.
Petitioner’s refusal to pay such rent and "donation " emanated from its belief that the
rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract, and even of the 2000 Lease Contract,
cannot be given effect because they violated one of the" material conditions " of the
donation of the subject land, as stated in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of
Donation.26
According to petitioner, the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation actually
established not only one but two (2) lease agreements between FKI and respondent, i.e. ,
one lease for the first twenty-five (25)years or from 1975 to 2000, and another lease for
the next twenty-five (25)years thereafter or from 2000 to 2025. 27 Both leases are
material conditions of the donation of the subject land.
Petitioner points out that while a definite amount of rent for the second twenty-five (25)
year lease was not fixed in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation , both
deeds nevertheless prescribed rules and limitations by which the same may be
determined. Such rules and limitations ought to be observed in any succeeding lease
agreements between petitioner and respondent for they are, in themselves, material
conditions of the donation of the subject land.28
In this connection, petitioner cites item 2(g) of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed
of Donation that supposedly limits the amount of rent for the lease over the second
twenty-five (25) years to only " three percent (3%) of the fair market value of the subject
land excluding the improvements.29
For petitioner then, the rental stipulations of both the 2000 Lease Contract and 2005
Lease Contract cannot be enforced as they are clearly, in view of their exorbitant
exactions, in violation of the aforementioned threshold in item 2(g) of the Deed of
Donation and Amended Deed of Donation . Consequently, petitioner insists that the
amount of rent it has to pay thereon is and must still be governed by the limitations
prescribed in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed of Donation.30
The Demand Letters
On 1 June 2009, respondent sent a letter (First Demand Letter)31 to petitioner notifying
the latter of its default " per Section 12 of the 2005 Lease Contract " and demanding for
the settlement of the rent and " donation " due for the year 2009. Respondent, in the
same letter, further intimated of canceling the 2005 Lease Contract should petitioner fail
to settle the said obligations.32 Petitioner received the First Demand Letter on2 June
2009.33
On 22 September 2009, petitioner sent a reply34 to respondent expressing its
disagreement over the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract — calling them "
severely disproportionate," "unconscionable" and "in clear violation to the nominal rentals
mandated by the Amended Deed of Donation." In lieu of the amount demanded by the
respondent, which purportedly totaled to ₱8,394,000.00, exclusive of interests, petitioner
offered to pay only ₱80,502.79,35 in accordance with the rental provisions of the Deed of
Donation and Amended Deed of Donation.36Respondent refused this offer.37
On 25 September 2009, respondent sent another letter (Second Demand Letter) 38 to
petitioner, reiterating its demand for the payment of the obligations already due under the
2005 Lease Contract. The Second Demand Letter also contained a demand for petitioner
to " immediately vacate the leased premises " should it fail to pay such obligations within
seven (7) days from its receipt of the letter.39 The respondent warned of taking " legal
steps " in the event that petitioner failed to comply with any of the said
demands.40 Petitioner received the Second Demand Letter on 26September 2009.41
Petitioner refused to comply with the demands of the respondent. Instead, on 30
September 2009, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City a
complaint42 for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed
of Donation against the respondent. This case is currently pending before Branch 257 of
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.
The Ejectment Suit
On 5 October 2009, respondent filed an unlawful detainer case43 against the petitioner
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City. The ejectment case was
raffled to Branch 77 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-307.
On 4 November 2009, petitioner filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. 44 In it,
petitioner reiterated its objection over the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease Contract
for being violative of the material conditions of the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed
of Donation.45 In addition to the foregoing, however, petitioner also interposed the
following defenses:
1. The MeTC was not able to validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant unlawful detainer
case in view of the insufficiency of respondent’s demand.46 The First Demand Letter did
not contain an actual demand to vacate the premises and, therefore, the refusal to comply
there with does not give rise to an action for unlawful detainer.47
2. Assuming that the MeTC was able to acquire jurisdiction, it may not exercise the same
until the disagreement between the parties is first referred to arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.48
3. Assuming further that the MeTC has jurisdiction that it can exercise, ejectment still
would not lie as the 2005 Lease Contract is void abinitio.49 The stipulation in the 2005
Lease Contract requiring petitioner to give yearly " donations " to respondent is a
simulation, for they are, in fact, parts of the rent. 50 Such grants were only denominated
as " donations " in the contract so that the respondent—anon-stock and non-profit
corporation—could evade payment of the taxes otherwise due thereon.51
In due course, petitioner and respondent both submitted their position papers, together
with their other documentary evidence.52 Remarkably, however, respondent failed to
submit the Second Demand Letter as part of its documentary evidence.
Rulings of the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals
On 27 April 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment53 in favor of the petitioner. While the
MeTC refused to dismiss the action on the ground that the dispute is subject to arbitration,
it nonetheless sided with the petitioner with respect to the issues regarding the
insufficiency of the respondent’s demand and the nullity of the 2005 Lease Contract.54 The
MeTC thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the case x x x, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.55
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). This appeal was assigned to
Branch 274 of the RTC of Parañaque City and was docketed as Civil Case No. 10-0255.
On 29 October 2010, the RTC reversed56 the MeTC and ordered the eviction of the
petitioner from the subject land:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the appealed Decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 77, Parañaque City, is hereby reversed, judgment is thus rendered in
favor of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendant-appellee, and ordering the latter
–
(1) to vacate the lease[d] premises made subject of the case and to restore the
possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellant;
(2) to pay to the plaintiff-appellant the amount of Nine Million Three Hundred Sixty Two
Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Six Pesos (₱9,362,436.00), penalties and net of 5%
withholding tax, for the lease period from May 25, 2009 to May 25, 2010 and such
monthly rental as will accrue during the pendency of this case;
(3) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱100,000.00 plus appearance fee of ₱3,000.00;
(4) and costs of suit.
As to the existing improvements belonging to the defendant-appellee, as these were built
in good faith, the provisions of Art. 1678of the Civil Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED.57
The ruling of the RTC is premised on the following ratiocinations:
1. The respondent had adequately complied with the requirement of demand as a
jurisdictional precursor to an unlawful detainer action.58 The First Demand Letter, in
substance, contains a demand for petitioner to vacate when it mentioned that it was a
notice " per Section12 of the 2005 Lease Contract."59 Moreover, the issue of sufficiency of
the respondent’s demand ought to have been laid to rest by the Second Demand Letter
which, though not submitted in evidence, was nonetheless admitted by petitioner as
containing a" demand to eject " in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.60
2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract
while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity.61 Even assuming that it can,
petitioner still did not file a formal application before the MeTC so as to render such
arbitration clause operational.62 At any rate, the MeTC would not be precluded from
exercising its jurisdiction over an action for unlawful detainer, over which, it has exclusive
original jurisdiction.63
3. The 2005 Lease Contract must be sustained as a valid contract since petitioner was not
able to adduce any evidence to support its allegation that the same is void.64 There was, in
this case, no evidence that respondent is guilty of any tax evasion.65
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed66 the decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 274, in Civil Case No. 10-0255 is AFFIRMED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.67
Hence, this appeal.
On 5 September 2011, this Court granted petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order68staying the immediate implementation of the decisions
adverse to it.
OUR RULING
Independently of the merits of the case, the MeTC, RTC and Court of Appeals all erred in
overlooking the significance of the arbitration clause incorporated in the 2005 Lease
Contract . As the Court sees it, that is a fatal mistake.
For this reason, We grant the petition.
Present Dispute is Arbitrable Under the
Arbitration Clause of the 2005 Lease
Agreement Contract
Going back to the records of this case, it is discernable that the dispute between the
petitioner and respondent emanates from the rental stipulations of the 2005 Lease
Contract. The respondent insists upon the enforce ability and validity of such stipulations,
whereas, petitioner, in substance, repudiates them. It is from petitioner’s apparent breach
of the 2005 Lease Contract that respondent filed the instant unlawful detainer action.
One cannot escape the conclusion that, under the foregoing premises, the dispute
between the petitioner and respondent arose from the application or execution of the 2005
Lease Contract . Undoubtedly, such kinds of dispute are covered by the arbitration clause
of the 2005 Lease Contract to wit:
19. Governing Law – The provisions of this 2005 Lease Contract shall be governed,
interpreted and construed in all aspects in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Any disagreement as to the interpretation, application or execution of this 2005 Lease
Contract shall be submitted to a board of three (3) arbitrators constituted in accordance
with the arbitration law of the Philippines. The decision of the majority of the arbitrators
shall be binding upon FKI and respondent.69 (Emphasis supplied)
The arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract stipulates that "any disagreement" as to
the " interpretation, application or execution " of the 2005 Lease Contract ought to be
submitted to arbitration.70 To the mind of this Court, such stipulation is clear and is
comprehensive enough so as to include virtually any kind of conflict or dispute that may
arise from the 2005 Lease Contract including the one that presently besets petitioner and
respondent.
The application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract in this case carries
with it certain legal effects. However, before discussing what these legal effects are, We
shall first deal with the challenges posed against the application of such arbitration clause.
Challenges Against the Application of the
Arbitration Clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract
Curiously, despite the lucidity of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract, the
petitioner, as well as the MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals, vouched for the non-
application of the same in the instant case. A plethora of arguments was hurled in favor of
bypassing arbitration. We now address them.
At different points in the proceedings of this case, the following arguments were offered
against the application of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract:
1. The disagreement between the petitioner and respondent is non-arbitrable as it will
inevitably touch upon the issue of the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract.71 It was
submitted that one of the reasons offered by the petitioner in justifying its failure to pay
under the 2005 Lease Contract was the nullity of such contract for being contrary to law
and public policy.72 The Supreme Court, in Gonzales v. Climax Mining, Ltd.,73 held that "
the validity of contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings " as such questions
are " legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and
jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function ." 74
2. The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract
while, at the same time, impugn such contract’s validity.75
3. Even assuming that it can invoke the arbitration clause whilst denying the validity of the
2005 Lease Contract , petitioner still did not file a formal application before the MeTC so as
to render such arbitration clause operational.76 Section 24 of Republic Act No. 9285
requires the party seeking arbitration to first file a " request " or an application therefor
with the court not later than the preliminary conference.77
4. Petitioner and respondent already underwent Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
proceedings before the RTC.78 Hence, a further referral of the dispute to arbitration would
only be circuitous.79 Moreover, an ejectment case, in view of its summary nature, already
fulfills the prime purpose of arbitration, i.e. , to provide parties in conflict with an
expedient method for the resolution of their dispute.80 Arbitration then would no longer be
necessary in this case.81
None of the arguments have any merit.
First. As highlighted in the previous discussion, the disagreement between the petitioner
and respondent falls within the all-encompassing terms of the arbitration clause of the
2005 Lease Contract. While it may be conceded that in the arbitration of such
disagreement, the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract, or at least, of such contract’s rental
stipulations would have to be determined, the same would not render such disagreement
non-arbitrable. The quotation from Gonzales that was used to justify the contrary position
was taken out of context. A rereading of Gonzales would fix its relevance to this case.
In Gonzales, a complaint for arbitration was filed before the Panel of Arbitrators of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (PA-MGB) seeking the nullification of a Financial Technical
Assistance Agreement and other mining related agreements entered into by private
parties.82
Grounds invoked for the nullification of such agreements include fraud and
unconstitutionality.83 The pivotal issue that confronted the Court then was whether the PA-
MGB has jurisdiction over that particular arbitration complaint. Stated otherwise, the
question was whether the complaint for arbitration raises arbitrable issues that the PA-
MGB can take cognizance of.
Gonzales decided the issue in the negative. In holding that the PA-MGB was devoid of any
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for arbitration, this Court pointed out to
the provisions of R.A. No. 7942, or the Mining Act of 1995, which granted the PA-MGB with
exclusive original jurisdiction only over mining disputes, i.e., disputes involving " rights to
mining areas," "mineral agreements or permits," and " surface owners, occupants, claim
holders or concessionaires" requiring the technical knowledge and experience of mining
authorities in order to be resolved.84 Accordingly, since the complaint for arbitration in
Gonzales did not raise mining disputes as contemplated under R.A. No. 7942 but only
issues relating to the validity of certain mining related agreements, this Court held that
such complaint could not be arbitrated before the PA-MGB.85 It is in this context that we
made the pronouncement now in discussion:
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement
between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the
interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by
members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence
or validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this
case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations
of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial
function.86(Emphasis supplied)
The Court in Gonzales did not simply base its rejection of the complaint for arbitration on
the ground that the issue raised therein, i.e. , the validity of contracts, is per se non-
arbitrable. The real consideration behind the ruling was the limitation that was placed by
R.A. No. 7942 upon the jurisdiction of the PA-MGB as an arbitral body . Gonzales rejected
the complaint for arbitration because the issue raised therein is not a mining dispute per
R.A. No. 7942 and it is for this reason, and only for this reason, that such issue is
rendered non-arbitrable before the PA-MGB. As stated beforehand, R.A. No. 7942 clearly
limited the jurisdiction of the PA-MGB only to mining disputes.87
Much more instructive for our purposes, on the other hand, is the recent case of Cargill
Philippines, Inc. v. San Fernando Regal Trading, Inc.88 In Cargill , this Court answered the
question of whether issues involving the rescission of a contract are arbitrable. The
respondent in Cargill argued against arbitrability, also citing therein Gonzales . After
dissecting Gonzales , this Court ruled in favor of arbitrability.89 Thus, We held:
Respondent contends that assuming that the existence of the contract and the arbitration
clause is conceded, the CA's decision declining referral of the parties' dispute to arbitration
is still correct. It claims that its complaint in the RTC presents the issue of whether under
the facts alleged, it is entitled to rescind the contract with damages; and that issue
constitutes a judicial question or one that requires the exercise of judicial function and
cannot be the subject of an arbitration proceeding. Respondent cites our ruling in
Gonzales, wherein we held that a panel of arbitrator is bereft of jurisdiction over the
complaint for declaration of nullity/or termination of the subject contracts on the grounds
of fraud and oppression attendant to the execution of the addendum contract and the
other contracts emanating from it, and that the complaint should have been filed with the
regular courts as it involved issues which are judicial in nature.
Such argument is misplaced and respondent cannot rely on the Gonzales case to support
its argument.90(Emphasis ours)
Second. Petitioner may still invoke the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract
notwithstanding the fact that it assails the validity of such contract. This is due to the
doctrine of separability.91
Under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement is considered as independent
of the main contract.92Being a separate contract in itself, the arbitration agreement may
thus be invoked regardless of the possible nullity or invalidity of the main contract.93
Once again instructive is Cargill, wherein this Court held that, as a further consequence of
the doctrine of separability, even the very party who repudiates the main contract may
invoke its arbitration clause.94
Third . The operation of the arbitration clause in this case is not at all defeated by the
failure of the petitioner to file a formal "request" or application therefor with the MeTC. We
find that the filing of a "request" pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 is not the sole
means by which an arbitration clause may be validly invoked in a pending suit.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9285 reads:
SEC. 24. Referral to Arbitration . - A court before which an action is brought in a matter
which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so
requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both parties
thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. [Emphasis ours; italics original]
The " request " referred to in the above provision is, in turn, implemented by Rules 4.1 to
4.3 of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC or the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution (Special ADR Rules):
RULE 4: REFERRAL TO ADR
Rule 4.1. Who makes the request. - A party to a pending action filed in violation of the
arbitration agreement, whether contained in an arbitration clause or in a submission
agreement, may request the court to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with
such agreement.
Rule 4.2.When to make request. - (A) Where the arbitration agreement exists before the
action is filed . - The request for referral shall be made not later than the pre-trial
conference. After the pre-trial conference, the court will only act upon the request for
referral if it is made with the agreement of all parties to the case.
(B) Submission agreement . - If there is no existing arbitration agreement at the time the
case is filed but the parties subsequently enter into an arbitration agreement, they may
request the court to refer their dispute to arbitration at any time during the proceedings.
Rule 4.3.Contents of request. - The request for referral shall be in the form of a motion,
which shall state that the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement.
A part from other submissions, the movant shall attach to his motion an authentic copy of
the arbitration agreement.
The request shall contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties specifying the date
and time when it would be heard. The party making the request shall serve it upon the
respondent to give him the opportunity to file a comment or opposition as provided in the
immediately succeeding Rule before the hearing. [Emphasis ours; italics original]
Attention must be paid, however, to the salient wordings of Rule 4.1.It reads: "a party to
a pending action filed in violation of the arbitration agreement x x x may request the court
to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with such agreement."
In using the word " may " to qualify the act of filing a " request " under Section 24 of R.A.
No. 9285, the Special ADR Rules clearly did not intend to limit the invocation of an
arbitration agreement in a pending suit solely via such "request." After all, non-compliance
with an arbitration agreement is a valid defense to any offending suit and, as such, may
even be raised in an answer as provided in our ordinary rules of procedure.95
In this case, it is conceded that petitioner was not able to file a separate " request " of
arbitration before the MeTC. However, it is equally conceded that the petitioner, as early
as in its Answer with Counterclaim ,had already apprised the MeTC of the existence of the
arbitration clause in the 2005 Lease Contract96 and, more significantly, of its desire to
have the same enforced in this case.97 This act of petitioner is enough valid invocation of
his right to arbitrate. Fourth . The fact that the petitioner and respondent already under
went through JDR proceedings before the RTC, will not make the subsequent conduct of
arbitration between the parties unnecessary or circuitous. The JDR system is substantially
different from arbitration proceedings.
The JDR framework is based on the processes of mediation, conciliation or early neutral
evaluation which entails the submission of a dispute before a " JDR judge " who shall
merely " facilitate settlement " between the parties in conflict or make a " non-binding
evaluation or assessment of the chances of each party’s case."98 Thus in JDR, the JDR
judge lacks the authority to render a resolution of the dispute that is binding upon the
parties in conflict. In arbitration, on the other hand, the dispute is submitted to an
arbitrator/s —a neutral third person or a group of thereof— who shall have the authority
to render a resolution binding upon the parties.99
Clearly, the mere submission of a dispute to JDR proceedings would not necessarily render
the subsequent conduct of arbitration a mere surplusage. The failure of the parties in
conflict to reach an amicable settlement before the JDR may, in fact, be supplemented by
their resort to arbitration where a binding resolution to the dispute could finally be
achieved. This situation precisely finds application to the case at bench.
Neither would the summary nature of ejectment cases be a valid reason to disregard the
enforcement of the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract . Notwithstanding the
summary nature of ejectment cases, arbitration still remains relevant as it aims not only
to afford the parties an expeditious method of resolving their dispute.
A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is that it is,
first and foremost, a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to " make
their own arrangements to resolve their own disputes."100Arbitration agreements manifest
not only the desire of the parties in conflict for an expeditious resolution of their dispute.
They also represent, if not more so, the parties’ mutual aspiration to achieve such
resolution outside of judicial auspices, in a more informal and less antagonistic
environment under the terms of their choosing. Needless to state, this critical feature can
never be satisfied in an ejectment case no matter how summary it may be.
Having hurdled all the challenges against the application of the arbitration clause of the
2005 Lease Agreement in this case, We shall now proceed with the discussion of its legal
effects.
Legal Effect of the Application of the
Arbitration Clause
Since there really are no legal impediments to the application of the arbitration clause of
the 2005 Contract of Lease in this case, We find that the instant unlawful detainer action
was instituted in violation of such clause. The Law, therefore, should have governed the
fate of the parties and this suit:
R.A. No. 876 Section 7. Stay of civil action. - If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an
issue arising out of an agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which
such suit or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit
or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or proceeding until an
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement: Provided, That
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.[Emphasis
supplied]
R.A. No. 9285
Section 24.Referral to Arbitration. - A court before which an action is brought in a matter
which is the subject matter of an arbitration agreement shall, if at least one party so
requests not later that the pre-trial conference, or upon the request of both parties
thereafter, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the arbitration agreement is
null and void, in operative or incapable of being performed. [Emphasis supplied]
It is clear that under the law, the instant unlawful detainer action should have been
stayed;101 the petitioner and the respondent should have been referred to arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract . The MeTC, however, did
not do so in violation of the law—which violation was, in turn, affirmed by the RTC and
Court of Appeals on appeal.
The violation by the MeTC of the clear directives under R.A. Nos.876 and 9285 renders
invalid all proceedings it undertook in the ejectment case after the filing by petitioner of its
Answer with Counterclaim —the point when the petitioner and the respondent should have
been referred to arbitration. This case must, therefore, be remanded to the MeTC and be
suspended at said point. Inevitably, the decisions of the MeTC, RTC and the Court of
Appeals must all be vacated and set aside.
The petitioner and the respondent must then be referred to arbitration pursuant to the
arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease Contract.
This Court is not unaware of the apparent harshness of the Decision that it is about to
make. Nonetheless, this Court must make the same if only to stress the point that, in our
jurisdiction, bona fide arbitration agreements are recognized as valid;102 and that
laws,103 rules and regulations104 do exist protecting and ensuring their enforcement as a
matter of state policy. Gone should be the days when courts treat otherwise valid
arbitration agreements with disdain and hostility, if not outright " jealousy,"105 and then
get away with it. Courts should instead learn to treat alternative means of dispute
resolution as effective partners in the administration of justice and, in the case of
arbitration agreements, to afford them judicial restraint.106 Today, this Court only
performs its part in upholding a once disregarded state policy.
Civil Case No. CV 09-0346
This Court notes that, on 30 September 2009, petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque
City, a complaint107 for the rescission or cancellation of the Deed of Donation and
Amended Deed of Donation against the respondent. The case is currently pending before
Branch 257 of the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.
This Court recognizes the great possibility that issues raised in Civil Case No. CV 09-0346
may involve matters that are rightfully arbitrable per the arbitration clause of the 2005
Lease Contract. However, since the records of Civil Case No. CV 09-0346 are not before
this Court, We can never know with true certainty and only speculate. In this light, let a
copy of this Decision be also served to Branch 257of the RTC of Parañaque for its
consideration and, possible, application to Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED . Accordingly, We

hereby render a Decision:

1. SETTING ASIDE all the proceedings undertaken by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
77, of Parañaque City in relation to Civil Case No. 2009-307 after the filing by petitioner of
its Answer with Counterclaim ;

2. REMANDING the instant case to the MeTC, SUSPENDED at the point after the filing by
petitioner of its Answer with Counterclaim;

3. SETTING ASIDE the following:

a. Decision dated 19 August 2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 116865,

b. Decision dated 29 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, of Parañaque
City in Civil Case No. 10-0255,

c. Decision dated 27 April 2010 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77, of Parañaque
City in Civil Case No. 2009-307; and

4. REFERRING the petitioner and the respondent to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause of the 2005 Lease Contract, repeatedly included in the 2000 Lease Contract and in
the 1976 Amended Deed of Donation.

Let a copy of this Decision be served to Branch 257 of the RTC of Parañaque for its
consideration and, possible, application to Civil Case No. CV 09-0346.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC THE CASES

The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)

It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic)
revealed (e)vidence of ego disintegration and developing psychotic
Petitioner,
process. Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he
applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem,
- versus -
mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness,
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was
unfit to be a judge.
Respondent.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council
x------------------------x (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second
opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional
Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of
x------------------------x the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.[2]

LUZ ARRIEGO, After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura,
reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted
Petitioner,
his own report/memorandum[3] to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July
1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an
- versus -
administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo
recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the
Respondent. duration of the investigation against him.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x In a Resolution[4] dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of
the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of
DECISION the following acts or omissions as reported by the audit team:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: (a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
regarding qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his
Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives.
qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran[1]
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;

(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36,
Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-
accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending
before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule
5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private
practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme
Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing.
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance
filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the
civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the
accused is mahina ang pick-up;
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he
issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly
criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 13[5] dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals
Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation
within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within ten days from
receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental
examination to be conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution. In the same breath, the Court resolved to
place Judge Floro under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation of the
administrative charges against him. He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both
affirmative and negative defenses[6] while he filed his Answer/Compliance on 26 August
1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for
failure to prosecute.[7] However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first
witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.[8] Subsequently, on 7 July 2000,
Judge Floro filed a Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification against Justice Ramirez as
investigator[9] which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July
2000.[10] Judge Floros motion for reconsideration[11] suffered the same fate.[12] On 27 July
2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to
this Court.[13] On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice
Ramirez.[14]
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on
Judge Floros motion to dismiss,[15] recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001.[16] The day after, Justice Ramirez
came out with a Partial Report recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office by
reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and
functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon,
Metro Manila, Branch 73.[17]
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even
after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001,
Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he perceived to have
connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension
follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura,
Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator[18]
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72, Malabon City[19]
3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge
Benjamin Aquino, Jr.[20]
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office,
Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the
Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court,
Branch 73, Malabon[21]
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator
Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator[22]
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez[23]
7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez[24]
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be
dismissed.[25] On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.[26]
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: (f)or
using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the
case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even
without the presence of the trial prosecutor. The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of
the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified
on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was
opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified
on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October
2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.[27]
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on
11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A
Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner. The resolution disposed of the motions
for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the
petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S.
Narvasa, the petitioners counsel.[28] The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo,
made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it
as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to
inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be
assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing
and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case
anew as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the
interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a
finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted,
irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be
conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case
since such is only allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a
provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judges finding that if a special raffle is not
conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order
is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution
that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It
is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a padrino (who helped him get his
position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge
guilty of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such
flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge
shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for
reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no authority to review. The
remedy is judicial, not administrative.[29]
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle
of the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of
the subject resolution that Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in
the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x.
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of
the OCA.[30] Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October
1999[31] which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge
Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January
2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case
as well as in the second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14
February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two
cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so
far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of
the two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr., manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on
the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No.
RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her
willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and
on the evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006,
Judge Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of
A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated
cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floros
alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For
our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically impaired and/or
disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our
sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to
depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge
Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the
irreverent in order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the
charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue
is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because
of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the
applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges (c and g, h and j, e and f) will
be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges
involve common facts and to treat them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of
dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications AND for announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name
as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a
bar exams topnotcher (87.55%) and with full second honors from the Ateneo de Manila
University, A.B. and LL.B.[32] The audit team likewise reported that: (b)efore the start of
court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo
de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar
Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible,
particularly the Book of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the
courtroom were given the opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No
questions were asked; hence the session commenced.[33]
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin,[34] the use of
professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is
not improper and that the word title should be broad enough to include a Judges legal
standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other
lawyers do include in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like President
of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge
Floro argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to
close friends or by reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that
he is not allowed by law to seek other professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro
counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who
suggested that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce his appointment
with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro
agreed as the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into
office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that a judge
should not seek publicity for personal vainglory. A parallel proscription, this time for
lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: a
lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting
standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants
hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics,
(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or
self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking
publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians,
who thrive by publicity.[35]
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did
Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.,[36] we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple
professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards
cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received
from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the
norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given
by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same.[37] The investigation by
Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA
categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards.[38] Worse, Judge Floros very
own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her
one of these cards.[39]
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured
against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more
favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its amendment, automatically
classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a
serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it
may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
Misconduct is defined as wrong or improper conduct while gross connotes something out
of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.[40] For serious
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[41]
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not
motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a
persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is
an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial
robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal
vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the
code they swore to observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing
in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not
use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience
of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of
insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice confident,
competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of
his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely
erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge
Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only.
(b) Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a folding bed with
cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge
Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team, the driver immediately
went out of the room.[42]
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit
team saw sleeping on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or alalay whom
he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and especially during court
sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the
audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro
having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office
hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation would have been different
if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities
such as in the case of Presado v. Genova[43] wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of
serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and
his family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government
paying for the electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his
aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this
case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff
who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge
allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36,
Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance
filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial
prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos.
20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled People vs. Luisito Beltran, People vs. Emma
Alvarez, et al., People vs. Rowena Camino, and People vs. John Richie Villaluz,
respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a
form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being
sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch
Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his
questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an
offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the
accused that they are qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even
instruct his staff to draft the application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for
release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be consequently granted. As
appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes 3 to 6), the
custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of
the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on
recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor
circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the motion,
Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session. Photocopies of
the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and
20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes 3 to 5.
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-
MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing a written order. Copies of the
minutes are hereto attached as annexes 6 to 7.[44]
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure
with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final
and not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered
and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent
faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the
applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION
FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special
Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of
by respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office
of the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially
in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998
almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC,
Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his
being a responsible member of the community where the accused reside/resides; the
questions propounded are in the form of direct and even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is
no such requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters
of probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether
or not he has had previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on
application for release on recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the
applications, included the interview/hearing on the applications for release on
recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at
other times, the hearing is held in the chambers.[45]
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his
remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory
interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law,[46] and as we
explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,[47] it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the
application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a disqualified offender as (p)utting
the discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass
upon the request for provisional liberty.
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with
the requirement for an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation
Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is warranted only during the period for awaiting the
submission of the investigation report on the application for probation and the resolution
thereon.[48] As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares[49]:
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case
study prior to action on application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely
to underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned under
the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is
effective no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report
and the resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60)
days to finish the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the report for the trial judge to resolve the application for probation. By allowing the
temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the case study
and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge
of the accused to the detriment of the prosecution and the private
complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on
recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals[50] wherein we held that no
judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it
is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of
Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation. Obviously, then, Judge Floro
was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the
release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and
20442 entitled, People v. LuisitoBeltran, People v. Emma Alvarez, et al., People v. Rowena
Camino, and People v. John Richie Villaluz.[51] From his explanation that such written
orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to
inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation
cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence
of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said
release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation
officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order
granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well
as his eventual probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his
application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to
draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the
observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving
applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of
the law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in
favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so
warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as the
unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and the
private complainants of their right to due process.[52]
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on
probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[53]
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and
uphold it conscientiously.[54] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office
to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the
law.[55] True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed
in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions.[56] To hold otherwise would be
nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering
infallible judgments.[57] This rule, however, admits of an exception as good faith in
situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment
and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle
evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error.[58] Thus, even if a judge acted
in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. [59]
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused
which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal
cases, he is always pro-accused particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded
accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency
of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty.
Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention
prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a
permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the
sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had
not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At
any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any
litigant or private complainant that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under
oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73
and in the presence of his Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for
the reason that he commiserated with them especially those under detention as he,
himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded
offenses.[60]
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it
is corroborated by independent evidence,[61] e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted eagerness in
approving application for release on recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. This
means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice should not only be
impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest as well.[62] Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but
above suspicion.[63] Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is
pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and
judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to
himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or
improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.[64] His language,
both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.[65]
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent
judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty
of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily
eroding the publics trust in his ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan[66]:
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone
concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or
even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first
impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It
would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather
than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It
must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of
adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the
risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should
possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance
true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his
impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed
with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the
civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he
issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: People vs.
Nenita Salvador, Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering
that the private complainant was not being represented by a private prosecutor, used his
moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant to settle and
eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making
the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed
stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex 8).
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide,
Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the manifestations of the private complainant and the
accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In the same
order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the public
prosecutor has given his comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch
73, the aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order
given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even without the
presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving not only
the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further reported
that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or
persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic
notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic
notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes 8, 13, and 14. (Note: the
stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN,
Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I.
No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint[67] dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8
March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughters case against the accused
therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on
the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining
witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to study the matter and
consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the case be settled immediately,
uttering, ngayon na! ngayon na! Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that
the counter-charges filed by the accused against the complaining witness would likewise
be dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by
respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs.
Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the
Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as they openly manifested
their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then,
considering that the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due
course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be
reduced to writing.Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and
Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of
guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on
even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to
revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally
dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals[68] wherein we
declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until
and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge
to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed,
even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly
served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or
judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft
thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party.
In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after
service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it
indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or
form on motion of any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a
final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality.(Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court
ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement which was amended or revised
by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order merely stating that Judge
Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a
compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments
thereto.[69]
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral
order per the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an
amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph j of the
complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the
civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail
for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially
approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually
had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did
not reflect the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that
this agreement was reached under duress at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the
mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused
is mahina ang pick-up
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No.
20347-MN, Judge Floro motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the
accused by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground
that the accused is mahina ang pick-up.[70]
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused
NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo,
PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a
plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he
appeared trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused
is nauutal, has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind
regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the
Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental
Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court
(plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that the accused
is mahina ang pick-up;
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF
MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that the court
may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental
condition is material to the issues involved. (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.).[71]
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that
he moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused
Nestor Escarlan Escancillain order to assess his mental fitness for trial.[72] As reflected in
the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his
Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is mahina ang pick-up.
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu
proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor. It must be remembered that
the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999 when the applicable rule was still
Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and,
if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion
filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made upon motion by the proper
party.[73] Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of
the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact,
jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found
that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.[74] As we
underscored in People v. Alcalde[75]:
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is
apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to
investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could
not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend
the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties
are recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to
the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the
bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the
proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial
with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accuseds mental
fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution
which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable wrong.
(e) Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending
before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule
5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private
practice of law
(f) Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on
the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i. Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the
lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of
these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as
collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted
that he does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case
in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing and filing
pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the
pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a
pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as
Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and
Benjamin V. Floro. In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of
Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission wherein he signed as the
petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73,
Malabon, Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos,
Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath
taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading.
Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex 9.
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the
Court Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases
(except the above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts.[76]
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice
of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to
client. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides
that: A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to
attend to his personal cases.[77]
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of
Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been
appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading (Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of
Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission) jointly with his counsel of
record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the
custody of their mild, mentally-retarded brother. He explained, however, that he prepared
the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in
that case.[78] He likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to
inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with
Affidavit of Merit.[79] Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he
filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel.[80]
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public
policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are
inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention
to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private
interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their
functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to
promote the public interest.[81]
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by private
practice is more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self
to the public as a lawyer.[82] In herein case, save for the Motion for Entry of Judgment, it
does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any
other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude,
therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated
case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot
ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he
himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law
as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated
that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the
pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation
we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the
right.[83] Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge
shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency. By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say
the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been
attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge
Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove
its case. Time and again we have held that although administrative proceedings are not
strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative
actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due
process.[84]
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge
Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was
able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the
transcript of the proceedings (Annex 15). The tape record of the court proceedings is also
submitted along with this report as Exhibit A.
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was
appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the
defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding
Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila
maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil
Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong
maraming eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang yon Sabi ko si
Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin
except na hindi papayag kasi marami diyang
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding
trial, discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the
Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the
system. Thus, he said:
Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang
hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera.
He continued:
Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko
retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni
Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun ganun Sabi ko
paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di
Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na
yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay
napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling
eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto
(laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito.[85]
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all
hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC
personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent
tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by
Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine
judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his
staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their
plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the
conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted
to the OCA sans the yellow notes and the official transcribed copy thereof.[86] This means
that the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit team as Annex 15 is but an
unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court
proceeding.This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were
taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the
unauthorized recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No.
4200.[87]
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only
Judge Floros word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath
as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate
language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore depend upon which party is
more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when
he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the
alleged kabulukan ng hustisya. Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He
said that since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules of Court does
not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did he criticize but likewise
Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt
na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan.
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now
serving? Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he
uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter L which reads for the use of highly improper and
intemperate language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court
Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding
practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he
said, Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan and then he would call even not during court
session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the
sun. So, it did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case,
for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado, he uttered offensive language
against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted
by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator.
Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open
Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the
defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the
stenographic notes or even the actual transcription of the proceedings because it
contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a certain judge, against
a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact,
instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement
between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may
not use my discretion whether or not to advise the stenographer to indeed present the
same or attach the same in the record because it contained offensive languages highly
improper and intemperate languages like for example, putang ina, words like ako ang
anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera.[88]
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid
declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro
himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are
consistent with Judge Floros claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with
several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed 13th in the bar
examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account of his
perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case are not far removed from his
reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by
the persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of
participation therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said
what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as
intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go
his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the
judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases,
the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[89] In this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge
Floros part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his
personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that [a] judge shall maintain order
and proper decorum in the court. A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An
indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and
proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will respect him
too. When he is orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted
formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with honor and dignity
befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to ascertain the
truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the
judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction
therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides
that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan
the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and
movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law.
Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain
and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen little friends
are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity
to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge
Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain
in the judiciary.[90]
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would
suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13
charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which
allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his office. This
being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be
endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is
the angel of death and that he has unseen little friends in determining the transcendental
issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be
imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found
Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge a - simple misconduct
2) Charges c and g gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge d unbecoming conduct
4) Charge e unbecoming conduct
5) Charges k and l unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended,
a judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months
or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the
circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed
his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken
in his favor. And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in
bad faith or with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is
to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple
misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances.[91]
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions
of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated
accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro
embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental or psychological
examination and which necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This charge of
mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office
notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of
dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter
applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in
September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D.
(Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was
argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked
suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of
the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his
obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of
whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated
Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed
dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept
failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related that, for the
past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing Psychic vision every morning and that the
biggest secret of the universe are the unseen things. He can predict future events because
of power in psychic phenomenon as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights
in the sky no. 13-1, and he got the 13th place. He has been practicing parapsychology
seeing plenty of dwendes around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent
findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious
level).[92]
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the
Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC
Malabon.Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical
Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in
this. During the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family
background and would rather talk about his work and academic achievements. However,
he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with
the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a
tendency to vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to
mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and
level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive
pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed discomfort
with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as
perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is
below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic
background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with
decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role
as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally
equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when
exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation.[93]
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro
to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however,
resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to preside over a regional
trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit
to appropriate psychological or mental examination.
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez,[94] the Court clarified that
the appropriate psychological or mental examination being adverted to in the Resolution
of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge
Floro to submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten
(10) days from notice.[95] Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the
Court on 22 February 2000.[96]
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was
reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros failure
to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions.[97]
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October
2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric
examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.[98] This was denied
by the Court on 14 November 2000.[99]
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or
disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors[100] and psychologist[101] with a
manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and
the PAP[102] for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of
Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics.[103]
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator
Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to
comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According to Justice
Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et
al., is an indication of the latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the
Court.[104] The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was
ordered to submit to psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt,
otherwise, he shall be ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) x x x.[105]
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000.[106] He
likewise sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out
with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001.[107]
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December
2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical
Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that (o)ver all data strongly suggest a
delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid direction. Dr. Celeste Vista, for her
part, stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and
suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu.
Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current
functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test
protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing
which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective assessment
and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment
resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such
that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of
healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system,
that it has interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is
found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a judge.[108]
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior
Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in
March 2001 that
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by
evidence. Based on the three [3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two [2]
psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge
Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier
psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals which were all
favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with his application as RTC
Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having failed the examination given
by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist,
Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday
demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to
details, he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to A: Yes, Sir.
arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures
and details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional Q: Fatal [flaw]?
standards to determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept
A: Yes, Sir.
others ideas and contributions especially if these oppose his own.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally, he
a trance?
prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and
decisions.
A: He did not.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings.
A: He did not.
Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and
others according to these standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he xxxx
may become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and
can be expected to comply with conventional social demands.[109] Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or
making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-
examination that psychologically speaking, Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus: xxxx

JUDGE AQUINO: A: Yes sir.

Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every
available records of the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic
Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell
you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having
trances in the course of his private activities and even in the course of the performance of
his official duty as a Judge.Will you not agree with that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning
tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng
by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same
time. Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?

A: Yes, Sir. A: Yes, Sir.

xxxx Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.

Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here xxxx
when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the
course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his power Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook?
xxxx
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.[110]
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the A: He did not.
Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of
the interview Judge Floro xxxx

[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4)
a wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
logical and reality based.He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good
A: Not during our interview.
judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological disturbances.[111]
xxxx
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998,
who stated in his report that
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed
some information or it is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with
everything.
graying hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times
approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did
in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was
not admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be
logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be
altered a little?
argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness
of associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and xxxx
appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal involuntary movements or
tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and other test for A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your
higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results. Honor in the absence of any corroborative contradiction.

Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would
Jr. do not contradict his nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking.[112] that be correct?

On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified A: The interview has its limitations.
that the interview had its limitations[113] and he might have missed out certain information
left out by his patient.[114] The following exchange is thus instructive: Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by
events that transpired after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, have your evaluation altered?
unheard friends known as duwendes?
A: Yes.
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been
xxxx proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called
him as a psychic at all?
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim
to be the number five psychic in the country? xxxx

xxxx Q: Would it be really more altered?

A: No, Your Honor. A: I would say so.

Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena? xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are
confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview, would your finding
of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is capable or possessed of
the power of bilocation?
xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros mental and
psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was
abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your
evaluation favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record
Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a letter?
xxxx
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically
altered.[115]
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba,
M.D.,[116] dated 3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not
reveal delusional thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession
and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling
his pending administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not
suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect
to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were
adequately functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He
talked about his family and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for
prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a covenant made during a dream
between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the
first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and
alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The
battery of test consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA
Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test and
(5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above
Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is
meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-
oriented and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as
professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further
observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-
oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor
hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His
belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro
was unfit to be a judge.[117] The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino
are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim
that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one
time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course
of his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another
spirit, another person, another character unseen who is with him at the same time or in
tagalog sumapi sa kanya.
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion sumapi to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?
xxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about
hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder
like schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from
hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this symptom might
also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions could be
transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with
psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was
doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as
part of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the
phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental disorder. It is also
common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of
concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a
case in court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of
witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the
prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of attention span and
concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as in the case of
Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to
rationalize or to control expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a
trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call
that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these
cases held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of
Atty. Dizon. Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very
precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: Nakalakip sila. I call it a trance, but I
distinguished not the trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats
a trance that is created by the so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi
awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection. He is correct in a
sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the
hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the
person. But in my case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the
lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this
very moment, Mr. witness, meron kayong kalakip ngayon? Ngayong oras naito?
JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? JUDGE FLORO,
JR.: They cannot be seen but ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them? To point to us
where are they in this room?, Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein
Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a
trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal
person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will
show to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always
had and still had a socalled counter part, his other side, other self, what can you say to
that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxx
A: Yes.[118]
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and
Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to
remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President
Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in
his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher
with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan
who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his
alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is
improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in the course of
hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he is very successful over many other
applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute
self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer,
amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is
unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in
court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to
determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or insane
and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The
life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his
hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and
condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him
incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent
Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office.[119]
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because
of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his
office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified
to conclude that Judge Floro is insane as, in fact, the psychologists and
psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due
to insanity, he was apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general
laymans term, a catchall word referring to various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps
the appropriate medical term[120] as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the
Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations
all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of
the people.[121] An honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer
justice in order to promote the stability of government, and the well-being of the
people.[122] Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of administering justice are
our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are
entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only
succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men,
competent and independent.[123]
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in
our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross
misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health
professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and
independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in psychic visions, of foreseeing
the future because of his power in psychic phenomenon. He believes in duwendes and of a
covenant with his dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel. He believes that he can write
while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at
the same time. He has likened himself to the angel of death who can inflict pains on
people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He
took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His
own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on
Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in
his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme
Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over
to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs,
especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial
thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to
apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving
controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he
rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr.[124] sticks out like a sore thumb. In said
decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a fairytale or a fantastic story.[125] He then went to
state that psychic phenomena was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who
transcribed the testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is
quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident)
NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor
points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of fraud/perjury
(flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief,
assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative
is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is
acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the
foregoing conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and
Raul Ineria were sinalubong by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley
Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the nagpambuno between Raul and Ando,
and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the
nagpambuno; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P.
Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie,
having been asked to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the
stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995,
pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or
maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING during
the testimony, so that the word DAY should have been corrected to another word
SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had synthesized the entire
NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming error DAY
should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR
SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS
FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.);[126] (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro[127] we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not
mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both
implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include
accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of
law.[128]
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinate to the primordial necessity of order in the social life.[129]
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial
tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in
judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as
suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic
phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and
hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x[130]
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as
RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with
large components of the judges role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is
likely to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is
said to have the judicial temperament. He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior
that the judges role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop
and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of
court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of
some court buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most
unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt
political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a
judge.[131]
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other
public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify
themselves with the law to an even greater degree than legislators or executives.[132]
As it has been said, [j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some
abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its
Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is primarily
adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we
call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity.[133] We, thus, quote
Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt
demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own
views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are
precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities
society has a right to expect from those entrusted with judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not
to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.[134]
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of
competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue
as judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a critical and
impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a
period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as
RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot
hold anyone legally responsible for such major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for
judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was
nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having failed
the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was
disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted
by mental health professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him.
Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these
evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second
opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had
been guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes that members of the Judiciary
must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity,
probity and independence.[135] It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-
009, the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, that the JBC put down in writing guidelines
or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining if one seeking such office meets the
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected
of the Judiciary.[136] Rule 6 thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and
emotional condition of the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to
perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to
psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by
a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of
a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be
faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of mental health professionals not
affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What
awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND
EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost seven years of suspension in the light of the
fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.[137] The Constitution limits this power
through the admonition that such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.[138]
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative
cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases
when the judge is preventively suspended pending investigation. This is the state of things
even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.[139] This power --
consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective
law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension
resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him
within ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and
recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT
Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be
conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical
and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately
under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative
charges against him.[140]
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit
indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which
the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of the records of
the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that (t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall
terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant[141] and, (w)ithin thirty (30) days
from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to
the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation.[142]
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only
for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the
Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or
justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge
until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or
her.[143] This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a
serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon
expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively
suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially
where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed,
the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that
may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also
intended to protect the courts image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights
and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an
exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in
the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the
embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and
oppression.[144]
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of
the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation
into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the
delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records,
it would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of
his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the
appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case
against him ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common
questions of fact and law.[145] All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he
perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he
filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez.[146]
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case
considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly
included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled similarly in the case
of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under
preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive
suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the
peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
until further orders.
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months, during which
period he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching
job that the Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the administrative
case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred several loans to
provide for his familys basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and
other economic benefits for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we
have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending investigation is not
a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an
unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude
the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive
suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back
salaries, allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his
preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court
of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety
(90) days and such may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such
a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the
entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the
case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his
preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without
basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his
subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the
first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable
grounds.[147]
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to
the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the
receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves preventively suspended by
the Court until further orders or, as this case, for the duration of the investigation. Judge
Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros suspension
of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro
could not practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers
largesse. And, though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing,
obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension
exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a
matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We
cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be
compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the
resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against
those he perceived connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the
investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde
was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his
suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be
countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on
the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of
his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent
of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the
reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors
are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt
their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity
regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather
than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.[148]
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the
resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three years. This is
because Judge Floros separation from the service is not a penalty as we
ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro
out of necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders
him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As
discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it
would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution of these
cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February
2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than
three years then the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years
suspension he had to live through with Damocles sword hanging over his head and with
his hands bound as he could not practice his profession.
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M.
No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is
dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the
complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in
this case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to separate Judge Floro from the
service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge h in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering
that charge h is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must
necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of
his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such
separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned
or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding
of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-
entering government service for positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The
reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in
all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work
environment. Thus:
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and

a. High intellectual assets as a result of self-discipline and self- 5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11
organization.[149] May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.

b. (I)mpressive academic achievements with no drastic change in his

personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice.[150]

c. (C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with

SO ORDERED.
paranormal and psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a lawyer.[151]

d. Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate

proficiency . His concern for the details that make up a total field represents his attempts
at being systematic and cautious.[152]

e. (E)quipped with analytical power.[153]

Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the

sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of
endeavor.

Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floros current
administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed
to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the
delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement
on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition.

Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics[154] and/or adverse

environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we
cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment factors they
have no control over.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND
(P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;

2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the
service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to
discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately;
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar,
For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in
contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the
limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated
to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the
entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due
course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to
elucidate upon the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to
seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del
Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the
former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint
for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the
Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No.R-
13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No.
R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not
call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court
rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral
damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as
attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-
13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the
Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated
to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S.
Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola,
Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of
evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail
over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips
that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication
of Gica and instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as
counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision
with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly
rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the
innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court
denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed
that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust
judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It
admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel
any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his
second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by
stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President
of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as
Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next
appeal that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its
admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive
language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to
assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear
on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said
that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but
only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same
date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals
informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a
copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said
letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that
move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the
Court of Appeals wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of
the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in
accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do
so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that
frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he
believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does
not accord with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court,
personally and individually, in the interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of
evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5,
1973, cannot more eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of
respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its
decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar,
instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a
reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their
decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on
the Justices concerned by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and
civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or
unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the
offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del
Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining
against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the Former Society that
there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse
than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the
authorities, including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is
the program to cure in the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel
del Mar is found guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered
suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies
of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of
Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law
when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court was
directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty.
Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three
Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for
damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself
moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the
Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-
justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten
the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he
did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance
with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October
10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the
Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No.
R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed
against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned
against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his
motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court
requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution denying
his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for
reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our
resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before
Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that, had your
Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the
Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled
Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting
the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who,
rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions
of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding
evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their
extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not
complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled
threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G.
R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No.L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a
pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our
other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar
to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the
contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No.
46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have
committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to
make his contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge
Montecillo is as to what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in
question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done without thinking) or
"buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the
former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate
Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on
the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore,
what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He
is foolish or stupid), thus making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R.
No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G.
R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate
Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would
warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final
and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he
should not be disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973,
he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is
attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy
marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
(copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and
Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the
Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that
he is firmly convinced that human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested,
he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God
the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his
contemptuous statements contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents
reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny del
Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G
R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear
personally at the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26,
1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated,
among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct
and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I
have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God
the filling-up of human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down
justification(as compared to his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous
contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing
what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and
outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an
alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government,
We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's
logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the
pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning
and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from
a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all
wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial
Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals
suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a
motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said
directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had
been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum
in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no
need for further investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule
138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar
stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy
and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty;
he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes
he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices thereof knowingly
rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view
that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking
Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was
high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all the
confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and
old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval
thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has
contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and
physical ailment as a mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant
justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a
case for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was
dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an
American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly
held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines
which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now
independent and Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for
observance and fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme
Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time
pleading that his physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive
respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has decided
for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical
anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus making it
appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever
this Court may decide to do in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt
proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act
which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense
of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said
prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his
clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule
138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger
brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer
of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering
justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.
Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which,
without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil.
595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to
the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by
fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective,
in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run
short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967;
20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C.
J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the
latter conspiracy or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to
securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt
to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all
without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge
presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that nature
have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a
serious disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice(Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p.
5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based
on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No.
L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason
for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the
Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their
respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the SCRA, p. 562.)
decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for said tribunals. The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the practice of law.
land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust SO ORDERED.
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma
gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
and Aquino, JJ., concur.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming
Fernando, J., took no part.
that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode
the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of
justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for
his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive
terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to
comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others.
He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or
erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's mind delves
into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern
that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a
paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance,
coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and
circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that,
who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the
book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in
disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and
those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case
as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our
democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March
5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our
resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be,
as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.
GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on
October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of
Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death.
Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R.
No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion
of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August
19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder
case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from
the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in
due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the
authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving
moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude"
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In
re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between
man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur.Sec. 279. pp.
428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to
respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is
placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of
bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this
Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from
the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a
pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the
disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the
Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to
support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App.
343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article
226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and
could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony."
Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon
falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which
that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95
U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok
case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the
existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike
that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him
committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United
States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent
Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the
pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent
being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being
purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the
Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk
of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He
is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for
which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and
his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998]
FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and PRICILIANO B. GONZALES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue of whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may resolve the issue
of ownership of the property involved in an unlawful detainer case has been discussed by
this Court in a number of cases, the more recent of which is that of Hilario v. Court of
Appeals.[1] Jurisprudence on the matter has in fact been reflected in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure under Rule 70, to wit:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession. (4a)
These developments in the law notwithstanding, there remains some misconceptions on
the issue of jurisdiction of inferior courts in ejectment cases where ownership is raised as
a defense that the Court deems proper to clarify in this petition.
Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the registered
owner of a parcel of land with an area of 2,000 square meters. The land with
improvements, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-54556 (383917), is situated
at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
In June 1988, private respondent obtained a four million peso - (P4,000,000.00) loan from
the China Banking Corporation. To guarantee payment of the loan, private respondent
mortgaged the Gilmore property and all its improvements to said bank. Due to irregular
payment of amortization, interests and penalties on the loan accumulated through the
years.
On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B. Gonzales, signed
and executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the Gilmore property
and its improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad L.
Oronce.[2] The deed, which states that the sale was in consideration of the sum
of P5,400,000.00,[3] provided inter alia that
x x x the VENDOR (PBGDC) also guarantees the right of the VENDEES (petitioners) to the
possession of the property subject of this contract without the need of judicial action; and
possession of said premises shall be delivered to the VENDEES by the VENDOR at the
expiration of one (1) year from the date of the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage.
On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private respondents indebtedness
with China Banking Corporation.
In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, petitioners paid private respondents indebtedness with the bank. However,
private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of the premises to
petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year period from April 13, 1992. Almost six
months later since the execution of the instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners
caused the registration of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register
of Deeds. Simultaneously, they obtained a new title, TCT No. 67990, consistent with the
fact that they are the new owners of the property.[4] Sometime in July 1993, they paid the
real estate taxes on the property for which they were issued Tax Declarations Nos. C-061-
02815 and C-061-02816.[5]
On November 12, 1993, petitioners sent private respondent a demand letter asking it to
vacate the premises. Said letter, just like three other consecutive notices sent through the
Quezon City post office, was unclaimed. Hence, on April 11, 1994, petitioners filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for unlawful detainer against
private respondent. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8638 was raffled to Branch
41. Petitioners alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage,
they acquired from private respondent the Gilmore property and its improvements, for
which reason they were issued TCT No. 67990. However, they added, in violation of the
terms of that document, specifically Sec. 3 (c) thereof, private respondent refused to
surrender possession of the premises. Consequently, they demanded that private
respondent vacate the premises through notices sent by registered mail that were,
however, returned to them unclaimed.
In its answer to the complaint, private respondent raised the issue of ownership over the
property. It impugned petitioners right to eject, alleging that petitioners had no cause of
action against it because it was merely a mortgagee of the property. It argued that when
the parties executed the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, its real intention was
to forge an equitable mortgage and not a sale. It pointed out three circumstances
indicative of an equitable mortgage, namely: inadequacy of the purchase price, continued
possession by private respondent of the premises, and petitioners retention of a portion of
the purchase price.
During the preliminary conference on the case, the parties agreed to stipulate on the
following: (a) the existence and due execution of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, and (b) the issue of whether or not the premises in litis are being unlawfully
detained by private respondent.[6]
On March 24, 1995, the MTC[7] decided the case in favor of petitioners. It ruled that
petitioners are the owners of the Gilmore property on account of the following pieces of
evidence: (a) TCT No. 67990; (b) petitioners payment to the China Banking Corporation
of P8,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage entered into between private respondent
and said bank; (c) payment of real estate taxes for 1993, and (d) Tax Declaration No.
02816 in petitioners names. The MTC further held that private respondents possession of
the premises was merely tolerated by petitioners and because it refused to vacate the
premises despite demand to do so, then its possession of the same premises had become
illegal. Thus, the MTC decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant and
all persons claiming rights under it to vacate the premises-in-litis located at No. 52
Gilmore St., New Manila, Quezon City, and to peacefully surrender possession thereof to
the plaintiffs; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 a month as compensation for the
unjust occupation of the same from April 11, 1994 (the date of filing of this case) until
defendant fully vacates the said premises; to pay plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as
and for attorneys fees plus costs of suit.
Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On April 25, 1995, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 219, of Quezon City that docketed it as Civil Case No. Q-95-23697. Private
respondent stressed in its appeal that it was not unlawfully withholding possession of the
premises from petitioners because the latters basis for evicting it was the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage that did not reflect the true intention of the parties to enter
into an equitable mortgage. Clearly in pursuance of that allegation, private respondent
filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain its appeal. On the other
hand, petitioners filed a motion for the immediate execution of the appealed decision. The
RTC granted the motion on September 21, 1995 and the corresponding writ of execution
was issued on September 25, 1995. The following day, the sheriff served upon private
respondent the writ of execution and a notice to vacate the premises within five (5) days
from receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of its appeal, private respondent filed an action for
reformation of instrument with the RTC. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24927
and assigned to Branch 227.
In a resolution dated December 7, 1995, RTC Branch 219 asserted jurisdiction over the
appeal. It ruled that the issue of whether or not an action for reformation of a deed of sale
and an unlawful detainer case can proceed independently of each other has been resolved
by this Court in Judith v. Abragan.[9] In said case, this Court held that the fact that
defendants had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute
sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First
Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by
law to the plaintiff.
On December 12, 1995, private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioners and RTC Branch 219. It assailed the September 21, 1995 order
granting the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, the writ of execution and the
notice to vacate served upon private respondent (CA-G.R. SP-39227).
On December 13, 1995, RTC Branch 219[10] rendered the decision affirming in toto that of
the Metropolitan Trial Court. Stating that in ejectment proceedings, the only issue for
resolution is who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises involved,
RTC Branch 219 held that:
x x x the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are vendees of the defendant (PBGDC) by virtue of
a deed of sale where the extent of its right to continue holding possession was stipulated.
In the agreement, the existence and due execution of which the defendant had admitted
(Order, December 16, 1994, Rollo, p. 111), it was clearly stated that the defendant shall
deliver the possession of the subject premises to the plaintiffs at the expiration of one (1)
year from the execution thereof, April 12, 1992. The defendant failed to do so. From then
on, it could be said that the defendant has been unlawfully withholding possession of the
premises from the plaintiffs.
In any case, this ruling on the matter of possession de facto is without prejudice to the
action for reformation. This is because `the judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind
the title or effect the ownership of the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the
facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154 SCRA 153; Section 7, Rule 70,
Rules of Court).[11]
On that same date, December 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining RTC Branch 219 from enforcing the writ of execution and the
notice to vacate the premises and on January 15, 1996, the same court granted private
respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation
of both the writ of execution pending appeal and the decision of RTC Branch 219.
Around six months later or on July 2, 1996, RTC Branch 227[12] issued an order declaring
private respondent non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial and, therefore,
dismissing the action for reformation of instrument in Civil Case No. Q-95-24927. Private
respondent, not having sought reconsideration of said order, the same court issued a
resolution on August 15, 1996 directing the entry of judgment in the case.[13] The Clerk of
Court accordingly issued the final entry of judgment thereon.[14]
In the meantime, on July 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein questioned
Decision.[15] It set aside the December 13, 1995 decision of RTC Branch 219 and declared
as null and void for want of jurisdiction, the March 24, 1995 decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41. It made permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining petitioners from implementing the decision of RTC Branch 219, the
writ of execution and the notice to vacate. In so holding, the Court of Appeals said:
It is quite evident that, upon the pleadings, the dispute between the parties extended
beyond the ordinary issues in ejectment cases. The resolution of the dispute hinged on the
question of ownership and for that reason was not cognizable by the MTC. (See: General
Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Castelo, 13 SCRA 652 [1965]).
Respondent judge was not unaware of the pendency of the action for reformation.
However, despite such knowledge, he proceeded to discuss the merits of the appeal and
rendered judgment in favor of respondents on the basis of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage which was precisely the subject of the action for reformation
pending before another branch of the court. Prudence dictated that respondent judge
should have refused to be drawn into a discussion as to the merits of the respective
contentions of the parties and deferred to the action of the court before whom the issue
was directly raised for resolution.
On whether or not private respondent was in estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of
the MTC since it voluntarily submitted thereto the question of the validity of its title to the
property, the Court of Appeals said:
This is not so. As earlier pointed out, petitioner (private respondent here) had, in its
answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer, promptly raised the issue of jurisdiction by
alleging that what was entered into by the parties was just an equitable mortgage and not
a sale. Assuming the truth of this allegation, it is fairly evident that respondents would not
have had a cause of action for ejectment. In other words, petitioner, since the start of the
case, presented a serious challenge to the MTCs jurisdiction but, unfortunately, the court
ignored such challenge and proceeded to decide the case simply on the basis of
possession.
`The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not, if it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by
estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). (La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA
78 [1994]).
Contrary to respondents pretense, the filing by petitioner of an action for the reformation
of contract may not really be an afterthought. As we understand it, petitioner, to support
its allegation that the contract was a mere equitable mortgage, cites the fact that the price
was inadequate; it remained in possession of the premises; it has retained a part of the
purchase price; and, in any case, the real intention of the parties was that the transaction
shall secure the payment by petitioner of its loan, adverting to Article 1602 of the Civil
Code. Under Article 1604 of the same code, it is provided that the presence of only one
circumstance defined in Article 1602, such as those cited above, is sufficient for a contract
of sale with right to repurchase to be presumed an equitable mortgage. Without in any
way preempting the decision of the court in the action for reformation, it is our considered
view that, under the factual milieu, the action was initiated for the proper determination of
the rights of the parties under the contract, and not just an afterthought.
No derogatory inference can arise from petitioners admission of the existence of the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage. The admission does not necessarily dilute its claim
that the same does not express the true intent of the parties.
Verily, since the case at bench involves a controverted right, the parties are required to
preserve the status quo and await the decision of the proper court on the true nature of
the contract. It is but just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain
in possession pending decision on said case, and the parties cannot be permitted
meanwhile to engage in petty warfare over possession of property which is the subject of
dispute. To permit this will be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to the
social order. (Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795 [1990]).[16]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari where petitioners raise the following
assigned errors allegedly committed by respondent Court of Appeals:
I.
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE
PROVISIONS OF SEC. 33 (2) OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980
CONFERRING EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ON THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
IN EJECTMENT CASES AND VESTING IT WITH AUTHORITY, INDEED MANDATORILY, TO
RESOLVE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP TO DETERMINE ISSUES OF POSSESSION.
II.
THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IS CONTRARY TO CURRENT AND
PREVAILING DOCTRINE AS ENUNCIATED IN WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 208 SCRA 108; SY VS.COURT OF APPEALS, 200 SCRA 117; AND ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 229 SCRA 627.
III.
THE FILING OF THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OVER THE EJECTMENT CASE; THE DISMISSAL OF THE
REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED MERELY AS A PLOY TO
DELAY DISPOSITION OF EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND BARES NOT JUST THE ERROR
BUT THE UTTER INEQUITY OF THE RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION ANNULLING THE
EJECTMENT DECREE AND SETTING ASIDE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DECISION OF
AFFIRMANCE.
Petitioners argue that the precedent laid down in Ching v. Malaya[17] relied upon by the
Court of Appeals, was based on the old law, Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948),
as amended, which vested in the city courts original jurisdiction over forcible entry and
unlawful detainer proceedings and the corresponding power to receive evidence upon the
question of ownership for the only purpose of determining the character and extent of
possession.[18] They claim that since the original complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
on April 13, 1992, then the applicable law should have been Section 33 (2) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). That law vests in the city courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases and the
corresponding power to receive evidence upon questions of ownership and to resolve the
issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession.[19]
The history of the law vesting Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts with jurisdiction over
ejectment cases has invariably revolved upon the assumption that the question of
ownership may be considered only if necessary for the determination of the issue as to
who of the parties shall have the right to possess the property in litigation.[20] Thus, under
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, Section 88 vested municipal and city courts with
authority to receive evidence upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the
value of the property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of
possession and damages for detention. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 that was
enacted on June 21, 1969, provided that city courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
Courts of First Instance over ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in
issue in the pleadings and that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in conjunction with
the issue of possession. Expounding on that provision of law, in Pelaez v. Reyes,[21] this
Court said:
x x x We are of the considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is to
precisely grant to the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of first
instance over the cases enumerated therein, which include `ejection cases where the
question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. To sustain petitioners
contention about the meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) of said section regarding
the resolution of the issue of ownership `in conjunction with the issue of possession is to
disregard the very language of the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a
conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance
over ejection cases in which ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. It is to Us
quite clear that the fact that the issue of ownership is to be resolved `in conjunction with
the issue of possession simply means that both the issues of possession and ownership
are to be resolved by the city courts. And the jurisdiction is concurrent with the Courts of
First Instance precisely because usually questions of title are supposed to be resolved by
superior courts. In other words, this grant of special jurisdiction to city courts is to be
distinguished from the power ordinarily accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence
of title only for the purpose of determining the extent of the possession in dispute.
Upon the approval on August 14, 1981 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, however, the power of inferior courts, including city courts, to
resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases was modified.
Resolution of the issue of ownership became subject to the qualification that it shall be
only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In effect, therefore, the city
courts lost the jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership per se that was theretofore
concurrent with the then Courts of First Instance. Thus, Section 33 of B.P. Blg. 129
provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
Accordingly, the Interim Rules and Guidelines in the implementation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 provides as follows:
10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and
municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and
detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the question of
possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, but the question
of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Explaining these provisions of law, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court said:
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296 which merely
allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon the question of title solely for the purpose
of determining the extent and character of possession and damages for detention, which
thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to the effect that if it appears during the
trial that the principal issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any
question of possession which may be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the
inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts is lost and the
action should be dismissed. With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior
courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if the question of possession
cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express
qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the issues of ownership
and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the case
for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.
Another development in the law has emphasized the fact that inferior courts shall not lose
jurisdiction over ejectment cases solely because the issue of ownership is interwoven with
the issue of possession. Under the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure, as amended by a
resolution of this Court that took effect on November 15, 1991, all forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases shall be tried pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, regardless of whether or not the issue of ownership of the subject property is
alleged by a party.[23] In other words, even if there is a need to resolve the issue of
ownership, such fact will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over ejectment
cases[24] that shall be tried summarily.
When the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts was expanded, thereby amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, by virtue
of Republic Act No. 7691 that took effect on April 15, 1994, the jurisdiction of said courts
over ejectment cases was retained. Thus, in Hilario v. Court of Appeals this Court said:
x x x. As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even
if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of
ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to ownership
could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded
as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence
of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be
settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de
facto and not possession de jure.
In other words, inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over
the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit.[25] These courts
shall resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a
determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of
possession. Considering the difficulties that are usually encountered by inferior courts as
regards the extent of their power in determining the issue of ownership, in Sps. Refugia v.
Court of Appeals, the Court set out guidelines to be observed in the implementation of the
law which, as stated at the outset, has recently been restated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The guidelines pertinent to this case state:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that
ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be
resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, x x x, the
legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the
preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is dependent
upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff
really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the
allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the
recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or
where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute
of such claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be
resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.
x x x x x x x x x,
5. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of who the
real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership
and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the
same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of
the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the
claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these
issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made
affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence,
does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment
rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect
to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building.[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioners clearly intended recovery of possession over the Gilmore
property. They alleged in their complaint for unlawful detainer that their claim for
possession is buttressed by the execution of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage, a copy of which was attached as Annex A to the complaint and by the issuance
of TCT No. 67990 that evidenced the transfer of ownership over the property.[27] Because
metropolitan trial courts are authorized to look into the ownership of the property in
controversy in ejectment cases, it behooved MTC Branch 41 to examine the bases for
petitioners claim of ownership that entailed interpretation of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage.
However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
that embodies the agreement of the parties that possession of the Gilmore property and
its improvements shall remain with the vendor that was obliged to transfer possession
only after the expiration of one year,[28] MTC Branch 41 apparently did not examine the
terms of the deed of sale. Instead, it erroneously held that the issue of whether or not the
document was in fact an equitable mortgage should not be properly raised in this
case. Had it examined the terms of the deed of sale, which, after all is considered part of
the allegations of the complaint having been annexed thereto, that court would have found
that, even on its face, the document was actually one of equitable mortgage and not of
sale. The inferior court appears to have forgotten that all documents attached to a
complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the
defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing
evidence thereon.[29]
Article 1602 of the Civil Code provides that a contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage by the presence of any of the following:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties
is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.
Article 1604 of the same Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply
to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. The presence of even one of the
circumstances in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as one of equitable
mortgage.[30] The explicit provision of Article 1602 that any of those circumstances would
suffice to construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage is in consonance
with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of property rights.
The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the 2,000-square-meter lot
located at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City provides as follows:
3. That the total consideration for the sale of the above-described property by the
VENDOR to the VENDEES is FOURTEEN MILLION (P14,000,000.00) PESOS, in Philippine
currency, payable as follows:
a) The VENDOR shall be paid by the VENDEE the sum of FIVE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P5,400,000.00) PESOS upon the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale
With Assumption of Mortgage after computation of the mortgage obligation of the VENDOR
with CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the amount of ______________________ which
the VENDEES agree to assume as part of the consideration of this sale. The VENDEES
hereby assume the mortgage obligation of the VENDOR with the CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION in the total amount of ___________________.
b) The VENDOR hereby undertakes and agrees with the VENDEES that the first-named
party shall warrant and defend the title of said real property hereby conveyed in favor of
the VENDEES, their heirs, successors or assigns, against all just claims of all persons or
entities; that the VENDOR also guarantees the right of the VENDEES to the possession of
the property subject of this contract without the need of judicial action; and furthermore,
the VENDOR binds itself to execute any additional documents to complete the title of the
VENDEES to the above-described property so that it may be registered in the name of the
VENDEES in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
c) It is hereby expressly agreed and understood by and between the VENDOR and the
VENDEES that the house and other improvements found in the premises are included in
this sale and that possession of said premises shall be delivered to the VENDEES by the
VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the signing and execution of
this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
d) It is furthermore expressly provided and agreed by and between the VENDOR and the
VENDEES that the capital gains tax shall be paid by the VENDOR while any and all fees
and expenses incident to the registration and transfer of the title to the aforementioned
property shall be defrayed and borne by the VENDEES.
e) Attached to this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage as Annex `A thereof is the
Certificate of ROSANA FLORES, Corporate Secretary of PRICILIANO B. DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws who
certified that at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of said corporation held on
December 3, 1991 at which meeting a quorum was present, the following resolution was
adopted and passed, to wit:
`RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the company, PRICILIANO B. GONZALES
DEVELOPMENT is (sic) hereby authorized the President, Mr. Antonio B. Gonzales to enter
into and/or negotiate for the sale of a property described as Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 383917 with an area of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQUARE METERS under the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City;
`RESOLVED FURTHER, that Mr. ANTONIO B. GONZALES, is hereby authorized to sign,
execute any and all documents relative thereto.
That aforesaid resolution is in full force and effect.
(sgd.)
ROSANA FLORES
Corporate Secretary
(SGD.)
f) Full title and possession over the above-described property shall vest upon the
VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions herein set
forth.[31] (Underscoring supplied.)
That under the agreement the private respondent as vendor shall remain in possession of
the property for only one year, did not detract from the fact that possession of the
property, an indicium of ownership, was retained by private respondent as the alleged
vendor. That period of time may be deemed as actually the time allotted to private
respondent for fulfilling its part of the agreement by paying its indebtedness to petitioners.
This may be gleaned from paragraph (f) that states that full title and possession of the
property shall vest upon the VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms
and conditions herein set forth.
Paragraph (f) of the contract also evidences the fact that the agreed purchase price of
fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) was not handed over by petitioners to private
respondent upon the execution of the agreement. Only P5,400,000.00 was given by
petitioners to private respondent, as the balance thereof was to be dependent upon the
private respondents satisfaction of its mortgage obligation to China Banking
Corporation. Notably, the MTC found that petitioners gave private respondent the amount
of P8,500,000.00 that should be paid to the bank to cover the latters obligation, thereby
leaving the amount of P100,000.00 (P5,400,000.00 + P8,500,000.00 = P13,900,000.00)
of the purchase price still unpaid and in the hands of petitioners, the alleged vendees.
Hence, two of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are manifest in the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, namely: (a) the vendor would remain in possession of
the property (no. 2), and (b) the vendees retained a part of the purchase price (no. 4). On
its face, therefore, the document subject of controversy, is actually a contract of equitable
mortgage.
The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not binding as to its nature. The
decisive factor in evaluating such an agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown,
not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract, but by their conduct, words,
actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the
agreement.[32] Private respondents possession over the property was not denied by
petitioners as in fact it was the basis for their complaint for unlawful detainer.
Neither does the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in petitioners favor import
conclusive evidence of ownership or that the agreement between the parties was one of
sale.[33] In Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide, this Court said:
x x x it must be borne in mind that the equitable doctrine x x x to the effect that any
conveyance intended as security for a debt will be held in effect to be a mortgage,
whether so actually expressed in the instrument or not, operates regardless of the form of
the agreement chosen by the contracting parties as the repository of their will. Equity
looks through the form and considers the substance; and no kind of engagement can be
adopted which will enable the parties to escape from the equitable doctrine to which
reference is made. In other words, a conveyance of land, accompanied by registration in
the name of the transferee and the issuance of a new certificate, is no more secured from
the operation of the equitable doctrine than the most informal conveyance that could be
devised.[34]
A closer look into the allegations of the complaint would therefore show that petitioners
failed to make out a case for unlawful detainer. By the allegations in the complaint, private
respondent as a mortgagor had the right to posses the property. A mortgage is a real right
constituted to secure an obligation upon real property or rights therein to satisfy with the
proceeds of the sale thereof such obligation when the same becomes due and has not
been paid or fulfilled.[35] The mortgagor generally retains possession of the mortgaged
property[36] because by mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a
lien but ownership thereof is not parted with.[37] In case of the debtors nonpayment of the
debt secured by the mortgage, the only right of the mortgagee is to foreclose the
mortgage and have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding
indebtedness. The mortgagors default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the
ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is against public
policy.[38] Even if the property is sold at a foreclosure sale, only upon expiration of the
redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of
redemption, does ownership of the land sold become consolidated in the purchaser.[39]
Petitioners tenuous claim for possession of the Gilmore property was emasculated further
by private respondents answer to their complaint. The latter claimed ownership of the
property, alleging that the agreement was one of mortgage and not of sale. Private
respondent alleged therein that in March 1993 (sic), it borrowed money from petitioner
Felicidad Oronce alone to redeem the subject property from China Banking Corporation.
She agreed to lend it the amount on condition that the Gilmore property should be
mortgaged to her to guarantee payment of the loan. However, petitioner Flaminiano took
the money from petitioner Oronce and paid the mortgage obligation of private respondent
to the China Banking Corporation while claiming that 50% of the amount was hers.
Petitioner Flaminianos husband, Atty. Eduardo Flaminiano, forthwith prepared the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage and, without private respondents knowledge, had it
registered for which reason a new certificate of title was issued to petitioners. In claiming
that the agreement was one of mortgage, private respondent alleged in its answer, inter
alia, that the actual total value of the property was thirty million pesos (P30,000,000.00);
that while it had possession of the property, petitioners did not then attempt to repossess
the same, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the execution of the document; that
petitioners did not pay the real estate taxes even after the transfer of title in their favor,
and that petitioners did not deliver to private respondent the alleged purchase price.
Considering these claims of private respondent, MTC Branch 41 should have passed upon
the issues raised on the ownership of the Gilmore property for the purpose of determining
who had the right to possess the same. As it turned out, it simply accepted the allegations
of petitioners without examining the supporting documents. Had it closely analyzed the
documents, it would have concluded that petitioners could not have validly ousted private
respondent from the property since the basis for its claim of ownership, the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage, was actually a document evidencing an equitable mortgage.
It would have accordingly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
In fine, had the MTC exercised its bounden duty to study the complaint, it would have
dismissed the same for lack of cause of action upon a provisional ruling on the issue of
ownership based on the allegations and annexes of the complaint. Or, exercising caution
in handling the case, considering petitioners bare allegations of ownership, it should have
required the filing of an answer to the complaint and, having been alerted by the adverse
claim of ownership over the same property, summarily looked into the issue of ownership
over the property. As this Court declared in Hilario v. Court of Appeals:
It is underscored, however, that the allegations in the complaint for ejectment should
sufficiently make out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the case may be;
otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is, after all, determined by the nature of the action as alleged or pleaded in the
complaint. Thus, even where the defendant alleges ownership or title to the property in his
or her answer, the inferior court will not be divested of its jurisdiction. A contrary rule
would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary
in nature, as he could easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting
ownership.[40]
As discussed above, even a perusal of the complaint without going over the claims of
private respondent in his answer would have sufficed to arrive at a provisional
determination of the issue of ownership. The importance of such provisional ruling on the
issue of ownership is demanded by the fact that, in the event that the claim of the plaintiff
in an ejectment case is controverted as in this case, any ruling on the right of possession
would be shaky, meaningless and fraught with unsettling consequences on the property
rights of the parties. After all, the right of possession must stand on a firm claim of
ownership. Had the MTC made a provisional ruling on the issue of ownership, the parties
would have availed of other remedies in law early on to thresh out their conflicting claims.
Private respondents action for reformation of instrument was in fact a step in the right
direction. However, its failure to pursue that action[41] did not imply that private
respondent had no other remedy under the law as regards the issue of ownership over the
Gilmore property. There are other legal remedies that either party could have availed
of. Some of these remedies, such as an action for quieting of title, have been held to
coexist with actions for unlawful detainer.[42] There is a policy against multiplicity of suits
but under the circumstances, only the institution of proper proceedings could settle the
controversy between the parties in a definitive manner.
Hence, although the Court of Appeals resolved the appeal under the misconception that
the action for reformation of instrument was still viable, it correctly held that the
controversy between the parties was beyond the ordinary issues in an ejectment
case. Because of the opposing claims of the parties as to the true agreement between
them, the issue of ownership was in a sense a prejudicial question that needed
determination before the ejectment case should have been filed. To reiterate, a decision
reached in the ejectment case in favor of any of the parties would have nonetheless
spawned litigation on the issue of ownership. At any rate, proceedings would have been
facilitated had the inferior courts made even a provisional ruling on such issue.
The contentious circumstances surrounding the case were demonstrated by an occurrence
during the pendency of this petition that cries out for the resolution of the issue of
ownership over the Gilmore property.
After the parties had filed their respective memoranda before this Court, private
respondent filed an urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her husband,
Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt of court.[43] The motion was founded on an
affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who resided at the contested property, deriving his right to
do so from private respondent corporation that is owned by his family. Gonzales alleged
that on September 20, 1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her husband entered the property
through craftiness and intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men
knocked at the gate. When the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate for
pedestrians tentatively, the two men told him that they would like to visit Gonzales mother
who was ailing.
Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened the gate for
twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter. When Gonzales went outside
the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) trucks entering the driveway.
The person he asked regarding the presence of those people inside the property turned
out to be the brother of petitioner Flaminiano. That person said, Kami ang may-ari dito.
Matagal na kaming nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa labas. After Gonzales had told him that the
property was still under litigation before this Court, the man said, Walang Supreme Court
Supreme Court. When Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the premises,
to order the people to leave, she said, Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa amin ito.
Maglalagay ako ng tao diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap. When a power
generator was brought inside the property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out
because the noise it would create would disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales,
petitioner Flaminiano said, Walang awa-awa sa akin. Atty. Flaminiano butted in and,
referring to Gonzales mother, said, Ialis mo na, matanda na pala. When Gonzales
prevented the switching on of some lights in the house due to faulty wiring, Atty.
Flaminiano suggested, Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance pa kayo 5 million,
madali lang yan. Short circuit. Since the Flaminianos and their crew were not about to
leave the property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and informed
him of what happened. However, instead of confining themselves in the driveway, the
Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in food.
Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who had just been
discharged from the hospital. However, the Flaminianos stayed until the next day,
September 22, 1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other fixtures in the house.
Gonzales took pictures of Flaminiano and his companions. When Atty. Flaminiano arrived,
he confronted Gonzales and told him, Hindi ako natatakot kahit kanino ka pa mag-report,
kahit pa sa Supreme Court, gusto ko nga mag-reklamo kayo para matapos ang kaso. Sa
September 25, may shooting dito, gagawin ko ang gusto ko dito.[44]
The affidavits of Renato C. Mola, driver of Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and that of Luis R.
Fernandez, houseboy of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales, as well as the xerox copy of the sworn
statement dated September 21, 1997 of Pria B. Gonzales before the Philippine National
Police in Camp Crame where she filed a complaint against Atty. Flaminiano for the illegal
entry into their house, support the affidavit of Dr. Gonzales.
In its supplemental motion[45] to cite petitioner Flaminiano and her husband, Atty.
Flaminiano, in contempt of court, private respondent alleged that the Flaminianos
committed additional contumacious acts in preventing another member of the family, Mrs.
Cipriana Gonzales, from entering the property. In her affidavit, Mrs. Gonzales said that the
Flaminianos and their people used the whole house, except the bedrooms, for their filming
activities.[46]
Thereafter, private respondent filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with this Court to enjoin petitioners,
Atty. Flaminiano and their representatives and agents from preventing private respondent,
its agents and representatives from entering the property and to cease and desist from
occupying the property or from committing further acts of dispossession of the
property.[47] On October 13, 1997, this Court issued the temporary restraining order
prayed for.[48] In the motion it filed on October 21, 1997,[49] private respondent informed
the Court that the TRO could not be served upon petitioners immediately because, Atty.
Flaminiano, their counsel of record, had changed address without informing the Court. It
was served upon said counsel only on October 15, 1997. However, instead of complying
with this Courts order, petitioners continued occupying the property. On October 16, 1997,
after receiving a copy of the TRO, petitioners put up a huge billboard in front of the
property stating that it is the national headquarters of the Peoples Alliance for National
Reconciliation and Unity for Peace and Progress (PANRUPP).
In their comment on the motion for contempt, petitioners noticeably did not controvert the
facts set forth by private respondent in said motion. Instead, it reasserted its claim of
ownership over the property as evidenced by TCT No. 67990. They alleged that they had
mortgaged the property to the Far East Bank and Trust Company in the amount of thirty
million pesos (P30,000,000.00) for which they are paying a monthly interest of
around P675,000.00 without enjoying the material possession of the subject property
which has been unlawfully and unjustly detained by private respondent for the last four
(4) years as it was used as the residence of the members of the family of its President
ANTONIO B. GONZALES without the said private respondent paying rentals thereon for the
period from January 1995 up to October 5, 1997 when the said property was voluntarily
vacated by the members of the President (sic) of respondent corporation, ANTONIO B.
GONZALES, who has since then been a fugitive from justice having been convicted by final
judgment of the crime of estafa through falsification of public document and has
succeeded in evading his sentence.
They averred that Tadeo Gonzales erroneously claimed that the rights of ownership and
possession over the property are still under litigation because the issue of ownership is no
longer involved in this litigation when the complaint for reformation of instrument with
annulment of sale and title filed by private respondent was dismissed with finality by
reason of non-suit. Hence, they claimed that they now stand to be the unquestionable
registered and lawful owners of the property subject of controversy and that the July 24,
1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals has already lost its virtuality and legal efficacy with
the occurrence of a supervening event which is a superior cause superseding the basis of
the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 39227 of respondent court.
They informed the Court that they are now leasing the property to PANRUPP from October
1, 1997 to September 30, 1998. They alleged, however, that the property is in a
deplorable state of decay and deterioration that they saw the need to act swiftly and
decisively to prevent further destruction of the property where they invested millions of
pesos of their life-time savings to acquire the same. Hence, they sought the assistance of
barangay officials in Barangay Mariana, New Manila who helped them effect the peaceful
entry into the property of the petitioners without the use of strategy, force and
intimidation contrary to what was alleged in the motion for contempt. They peacefully took
over possession of the property on September 20, 1997 but allowed the immediate
members of the family of private respondents president to stay on. The family finally
agreed to vacate the premises on October 5, 1997 upon the offer of the petitioners to
shoulder partially the expenses for the hospitalization of the ailing mother at the St. Luke
General Hospital where she was brought by an ambulance accompanied by a doctor at
petitioners expense.
Petitioners questioned the issuance by this Court of the TRO on October 13, 1997,
asserting that when it was issued, there were no more acts to restrain the illegal
occupants of the subject property (as they) had already peacefully vacated the premises
on October 5, 1997 or more than a week after the said TRO was issued by the Third
Division of this Court. They prayed that the motion for contempt be denied for lack of
merit and that the TRO issued be lifted and set aside for the act or acts sought to be
restrained have already been done and have become a fait accompli before the issuance of
the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER on October 13, 1997.[50]
As earlier discussed, petitioners claim that the dismissal of the action for reformation of
instrument for non-suit had written finis to the issue of ownership over the Gilmore
property is totally unfounded in law. Petitioners should be reminded that the instant
petition stemmed from an unlawful detainer case, the issue of which is merely possession
of the property in question. The issue of ownership has not been definitively resolved for
the provisional determination of that issue that should have been done by the MTC at the
earliest possible time, would only be for the purpose of determining who has the superior
right to possess the property. Inasmuch as this Court has resolved that the rightful
possessor should have been private respondent and its representatives and agents, the
TRO issued by this Court on October 13, 1997 should not be lifted.That the TRO was
issued days before private respondent left the property is immaterial. What is in question
here is lawful possession of the property, not possession on the basis of self-proclaimed
ownership of the property. For their part, petitioners should cease and desist from further
exercising possession of the same property which possession, in the first place, does not
legally belong to them.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as alleged by
private respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-handed. On an erroneous
assumption that she had been legally vested with ownership of the property, she took
steps prior to the present proceedings by illegally taking control and possession of the
same property in litigation. Her act of entering the property in defiance of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals constituted indirect contempt under
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.
are certainly unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his
comment on the motion for contempt that petitioners peacefully took over the
property. Nonetheless, such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of
preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force. Notably, he did not comment on nor
categorically deny that he committed the contumacious acts alleged by private
respondent. Through his acts, Atty. Flaminiano has flouted his duties as a member of the
legal profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from
counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.[52]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing by
either party of an action regarding the ownership of the property involved. The temporary
restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is hereby made permanent. Petitioners and
their agents are directed to turn over possession of the property to private respondent.
Petitioner Rosita Flaminiano is hereby held guilty of contempt of court for disobeying the
writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and accordingly fined P20,000.00
therefor. Her counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, is ordered to pay a fine
of P25,000.00 for committing contumacious acts unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar with a stern warning that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with
more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his record at the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no part.

Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her husband, Eduardo
Flaminiano, a lawyer[51] whose actuations as an officer of the court should be beyond
reproach. His contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore property without the consent of
its occupants and in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals and making utterances showing disrespect for the law and this Court,
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY,
and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the
grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention
despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court
cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment
accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of
Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary,
with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical
and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending
to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he
lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and
commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two
separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In
June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary
from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as
for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages,
thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding
that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a
valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as
penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department
of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with
this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in
toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1)
whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3)
whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume
the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when
petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary
amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in
the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by
petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the
NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the
Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992
largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor
Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the
special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could
very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For
this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and
therefore the only heir against his own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may
justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were personal matters
affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to
their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of
just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also
charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as
only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in
seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for
failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling,
and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in
each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the
interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted
the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned
the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment,11 provided that he draws up his
decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately
reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985,
and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided
the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions,13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process,
ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted
to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent
in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of
one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and
jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker
shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer
may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a
crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding
separation pay rates provided by law.15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his
co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives
the prescribed separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by
an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from
employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely
erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner
abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as
even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt
from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December
1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and
fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc.,
Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda
Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really
obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and
basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent
Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's
absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event,
such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear
intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and
Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment.
In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment
to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from
which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly,
in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is
justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some medical
certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter
(Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal
when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had
no intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment.
Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of
health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even
advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement
as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization
and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on
account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending
physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of
petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is
clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that
is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may
be classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion
in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself
where I want to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the
sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to
keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to
specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is
that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may
definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful,
as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner
was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from
illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations
were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private
respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control
contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and
could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with)
requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of
residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his
residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights,
nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an
employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on
the payroll, reported him as an employee of the haciendafor social security purposes, and
paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of
December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner
would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work
and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private
respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a
father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made
therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving
said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been
saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes
de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's
intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of
petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment
of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to
support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts
the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about
petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion
regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser
about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his
indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the
farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends
that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as
salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in
view of his continued service as farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly
be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in
this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans
of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged
though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had
full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer
returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any
reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even
after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that
petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services
directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly
evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A.
Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery
shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the
payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from
Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or
even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering
the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums
involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone.
Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at
least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and
other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his
job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or
even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating
to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated
employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a
dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill
District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing
payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place
and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given
the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or
receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me
for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for
an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's
intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition
without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve
reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity
to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of
the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded
equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,
pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm
administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in
the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of
petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of
concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be
necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by
petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can
qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also
hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by
the employee of his employment38 does not square with the elements constitutive of
abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and
hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the
employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this
case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was
petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out
in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2.Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish
him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for
his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last
known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5.Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against
him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with
the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6.Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of
a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7.Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by
filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11.Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional
Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during
the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their
dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of employment, the positions last
held by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for policy
guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner
was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his
impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of
procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was
served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that
no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the
second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires
service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance.
While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be
lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security
of tenure in favor of the employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation
and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required
by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer
was not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic)
existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be
upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent
for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69.
In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause,
he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due
process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even
worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. However,
the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case,
however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable
excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee
to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of
P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that
penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees
to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be
dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
every worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in
some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability
of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained
relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and severance
pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial
employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is
therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what
the law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the
time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs.
NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this
Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made
between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company
which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable
manner. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary
workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same
ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a
reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private
respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other
employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one
for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and
social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of
the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under
Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a
matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery
of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or
fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that
an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly,
the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal
where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were
genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious
exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the
undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good
faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this
reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no
voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his
absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties
backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the
reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision,
salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences
in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims on more convivial terms.
for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault.54
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth
over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and SO ORDERED.
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the
useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for
dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.56

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not
show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement
between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally
hostile eyes of their respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor
arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of
the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a
bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring
resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this
dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29543 November 29, 1969
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM
BAZAR CO.,respondents-appellees.
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal from the lower Court's Order of
dismissal of her petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
against respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the
defendant in a simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated August 16,
1968 certifying the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of law:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated July 21,
1962 issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad Santos of
the Municipal Court of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co.
There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares
before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit
was docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was eventually assigned to
the sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows:
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made goods and
delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did not make the full
payment up to the present time;
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85, representing the
balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is already overdue and
payable."
Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill
of particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the
kinds of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company, the respective
dates they were taken and by whom they were received as well as their purchase prices,
alleging that without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the
complaint.
After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of
particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court, she
then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging in
support of her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent
judge acted in grave abuse of discretion.
But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction, for the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint filed by the said
company in the inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are clear, specific
and sufficiently appraise the defendant, now herein petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature
of the cause of action against her so as to enable her to prepare for her defenses; and (2)
that things asked for in the motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters, which
are beyond the pale of such bill. Convinced that the said motion of the company is well
founded, the lower court accordingly dismissed the petition on April 21, 1962.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court
below, Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under her
lone assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in
dismissing her petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in its order dated July 21,
1962, as amended by its order dated August 18, 1962.
The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are: (1) whether the allegations of the
complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against
her; and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill
of particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To our mind these are purely legal questions.
A perusal of the brief of the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions are at all
involved in this appeal.
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was
committed by respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the
collection case instituted in the Municipal Court of Manila by private respondent-appellee
for the recovery of her indebtedness of P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her
account for ready-made goods ordered by and delivered to her in 1961. Appellee's
complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the ultimate or essential facts
constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance with the requirements of the
Rules of Court.1
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion that printing of her appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have been much more than
appellee as plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the goods sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with the
represented by the alleged amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers on same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more
which they were delivered to the defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and by than the amount in litigation in this worthless cause.
whom they were received." These particulars sought all concerned evidentiary matters and
do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of the Rules of Court which permits a As we recently said in another case,3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is
party "to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be
not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare his avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial." which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there
Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly
at her stall at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one of her creditors admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
from whom she used to buy on credit ready made goods for resale, appellant had no need disciplinary action."
of the evidentiary particulars sought by her to enable her to prepare her answer to the
complaint or to prepare for trial. These particulars were just as much within her knowledge WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's counsel shall
as appellee's. She could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, for all she had to pay treble costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the
do was to check and verify her own records of her outstanding account with appellee and attorney for petitioner-appellant in this Court for future reference. So ordered.
state in her answer whether from her records the outstanding balance of her indebtedness
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando
was in the sum of P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser amount.
and Barredo, JJ., concur.
The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection case, it
had written appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account in the
said sum of P354.85 within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee
under date of March 23, 1962, acknowledging her said indebtedness but stating that "Due
to losses she has sustained in the operation of her stall, she would not be able to meet
your request for payment of the full amount of P354.85 at once. I would therefore request
you to be kind enough to allow her to continue paying you P10.00 every 15th and end of
the month as heretofore."

No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing appellant's
petition for certiorariagainst respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of
particulars, as pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of error. Well may we apply
to this appeal, the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an analogous case,2that "the
circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a
plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves
condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to
meritorious cases."

Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven
years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and
ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred by way of filing fees in the
Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond, appellate court docket fees,
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36138 January 31, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ROSQUETA, JR., EUGENIO ROSQUETA and CITONG BRINGAS,
defendants-appellants; ATTY. GREGORIO B. ESTACIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Every now and then, although there seems to be more of such cases of late, a
member of the bar is proceeded against for failure to live up to the responsibility
owed to a client as well as to this Court. This is another such instance. In our
resolution of May 25, 1973, we required respondent Gregorio B. Estacio,
counsel de parte for appellants to show cause why disciplinary action should not
be taken against him for failure to file the brief for appellants within the period
which expired on March 30, 1973. He failed to show cause as thus required, and
on September 7, 1973, we issued a resolution suspending him from the practice
of law except for the purpose of filing the brief which should be done within
thirty days from receipt of notice. Then on October 22, 1973, he filed a motion
for reconsideration wherein it appeared that he did seek to explain his failure to
file the brief on time, but he left it to be mailed on June 9, 1973 with Antonio
Rosqueta, Sr., father of appellants Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and Eusebio Rosqueta,
who, however, was unable to do so as on the 10th of June, his house caught fire.
He would impress on this Court that he was not informed of such occurrence
until the preparation of his motion for reconsideration. At any rate, he would
stress that both Antonio Rosqueta, Sr. and Salvador Labariento, father-in-law of
the third appellant, Citong Bringas, informed him they would withdraw the
appeal as they could not raise the money needed for pursuing it. He had a
supplement to such motion for reconsideration filed on October 25, 1973 wherein
he stated that he could not secure the affidavits of appellants themselves as two
of them were in the Penal Colony in Davao and the third in the Iwahig Penal
Colony in Palawan. On November 5, 1973, this Court required appellants to
comment on a motion for reconsideration of respondent concerning specifically
their alleged desire to withdraw appeal.
Then on December 27, 1973, there was a motion of respondent submitting two
affidavits, one from Antonio Rosqueta, Jr. and the aforesaid Citong Bringas and
the other from Eusebio Rosqueta wherein they indicated their consent and
approval to respondent's motion to withdraw appeal. The joint affidavit of the
first two appellants reads as follows: "1. That we are the same persons named
above who have been charged in Criminal Case No. L-36138 entitled People v.
Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., et al. pending on appeal before the Supreme Court of the
Philippines; 2. That we hereby consent and approve the motion to withdraw the
appeal filed by our counsel, Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio before the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on that Criminal Case No. L-36138 their pending in said Court;
3. That we have given our consent and approval of our own will voluntarily,
without duress, force, threat or fraud or deceit; [In witness whereof], we have
hereunto set our signatures this 4th day of December 1973 in the Municipality of
Panabo, Davao."1 The affidavit of Eusebio Rosqueta follows: "1. That I am one of
the accused in that case entitled People v. Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., et al. under G.R.
No. L-36138 now pending before the Supreme Court of the Philippines; 2. That I
hereby give my consent and approval to the Motion to Withdraw the
Appeal which has been filed by our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio before the
Supreme Court on the above-stated case; 3. That I have reached this conclusion
after I have conferred with our counsel Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio and this
statement hereby revokes and nullifies the statement signed by me on December
5, 1973 at the Central Sub-Colony, Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan before
witnesses, namely, Mr. Abencio B. Gabayan and Miss Merle J. Jopida; 4. That I
have executed this affidavit of my own free will, without intimidation, threat,
fraud, deceit, duress or force; [In witness whereof], I have hereunto set my
hand this 13th day of December, 1973 in the City of Puerto Princesa."2
Respondent's liability is thus mitigated but he cannot be absolved from the irresponsible
conduct of which he is guilty. Respondent should be aware that even in those cases where
counsel de parte is unable to secure from appellants or from their near relatives the
amount necessary to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his connection
with the case. It has been a commendable practice of some members of the bar under
such circumstances, to be designated as counsel de oficio. That way the interest of justice
is best served. Appellants will then continue to receive the benefits of advocacy from one
who is familiar with the facts of the case. What is more, there is no undue delay in the
administration of justice. Lawyers of such category are entitled to
commendation.<äre||anº•1àw> They manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a
profession and not a mere trade with those engaged in it being motivated solely by the
desire to make money. Respondent's conduct yields a different impression. What has
earned a reproof however is his irresponsibility. He should be aware that in the pursuance
of the duty owed this Court as well as to a client, he cannot be too casual and
unconcerned about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he prepares them; he
must see to it that they are duly mailed. Such inattention as shown in this case is
inexcusable. At any rate, the suspension meted on him under the circumstances is more
than justified. It seems, however, that well-nigh five months had elapsed. That would
suffice to atone for his misdeed.

WHEREFORE, the suspension of Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is lifted. The requirement to file
the brief is dispensed with but Atty. Gregorio B. Estacio is censured for negligence and
inattention to duty. Likewise, as prayed for by appellants themselves, their appeal is
dismissed.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez.and Aquino, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of
the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v.
Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on
30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition
did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would
still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal,
a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in
view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of
the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of
gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision
of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed
a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when
it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied
the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en
banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be
filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R.
No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to
restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986,
within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30,
1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision
of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the
ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active
law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the
"last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the
tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976
LORENZO JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco Carreon & Zosimo D. de Mesa for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos
and Solicitor Teodoro G. Bonifacio for respondents.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives
(handgrenade) and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five years, seeks a new trial
which was denied him by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and by
respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioner thus poses one legal issue for the Court to resolve, viz: did respondent appellate
court commit an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's
motion for new trial "for the reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess
and use handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with
Code No. P-36-68 and code Name 'Safari' (both documents are dated 31 January
1968)"? 1
The following incidents are not in dispute:
On February 8, 1968, at the poblacion of Floridablanca, Pampanga, petitioner Jose was
arrested by the local police leading to the filing with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III of several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of
firearm (Crim. Case 6235), robbery (Crim. Case 6236) and illegal possession of explosives
(Crim. Case 6237). These three cases were jointly tried after which the trial judge, Hon.
Honorio Romero, in a decision dated December 15, 1969, and promulgated on January 15,
1970 2 acquitted accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but
convicted him for illegal possession of the handgrenade that was found on his person at
the time of his arrest.
After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day filed his notice of appeal.
Nine days thereafter or more particularly on January 24, 1970, petitioner filed a motion
praying that the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he
had made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The
trial court in its order of January 30, 1970 denied the motion mainly on the ground that it
had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused
on the very date the decision was promulgated. 3
The records of Criminal Case 6237 were then elevated to the Court of Appeals where
petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal
possession of explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime,
and (2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to
possess the handgrenade. 4 In his brief, Lorenzo Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the
alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial court for a new trial.
Resolving the appeal, respondent Appellate Court, 5 rendered its decision of March 8,
1972, affirming the findings of fact and the judgment of conviction of the court a quo, and
declaring that no reversible error was committed by the latter when it denied the
reopening of the case as the court had lost its "power to change, modify, or alter its
decision." 6
A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed with a plea that
"assuming arguendo that the court a quo lacked jurisdiction to act upon appellant's motion
for new trial because of the perfection of the appeal, this Honorable Court — before which
said motion was reiterated and which has competence to act thereon — should have
granted the same if for no other reason than to prevent a miscarriage of justice which is
the inevitable result of its denial." 7 This motion for reconsideration was denied in
respondent court's resolution of April 3, 1974. 8
A second motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by Lorenzo Jose 9 but this
was also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution promulgated on July 24, 1974. 10
Forthwith, appellant Lorenzo Jose assisted by counsel, Atty. Francisco Carreon, filed with
Us this petition for review which We denied outright on September 6, 1974, "the question
raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the finding of facts by respondent
court are unsupported by substantial evidence, and for lack of merit."
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner stressing that the following grounds
should justify this Court to review the ruling of respondent appellate court to wit:
1. petitioners's plight is of compelling human and legal interest, and his being imprisoned
for five (5) years when there is indubitable exculpatory evidence on hand is a result so
harsh that the Honorable Court may well undertake a review of the case just to satisfy
itself of the justice and inevitability of such a result;
2. a question of substance not heretofore determined by the Honorable Court is involved,
as the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial is, technically, not newly
discovered: and
3. the denial of a new trial in the circumstances mentioned in his above-quoted statement
of the main legal issue, is contrary to the decisions of this Honorable Court because under
these decisions, the new trial should have been granted since there is a 'strong,
compelling reason' in this case for granting the relief prayed for, such strong compelling
reason being the very strong probability of petitioner's acquittal if a new trial were
granted. (Workmen's Insurance Co. vs. Augusto, 40 SCRA 123; Sison vs. Gatchalian, 51
SCRA 262; Rubio vs. Mariano 52 SCRA 338; Montecines vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 14;
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, L-38071, April 25, 1974; please see Annotation: 52 SCRA
346 ... (pp. 157-158, rollo)
The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for reconsideration
claiming that there was neither a denial of "substantial justice nor error of any sort on the
part of respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of convinction," and that it
being admitted by petitioner that the evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new
trial is not newly discovered evidence, the denial of the new trial "visibly papers as
correct". This Opposition drew a lengthy reply from petitioner's counsel.
On February 13, 1975, a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing
the Court that in view of the " Persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before
this Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing
appointment as PC Agent and/or authority to handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he
was constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in
reply sent his letter dated December 27, 1974 with enclosures, xerox copies of which are
being attached to the manifestation as Annexes A, B, C, C-1 and D. 11
Annex A of the above-mentioned Manifestation of the Solicitor General reads:
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
Padre Faura, Manila
Dear Solicitor General Mendoza:
With reference to your letter of December 5, 1974, please be informed that Colonel
Pedrito C. de Guzman who is now Provincial of Sorsogon Constabulary Command,
confirmed that he executed an affidavit on May 4, 1974 at Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating
that he appointed Mr. Lorenzo Jose of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga as PC Agent on January
31, 1968.
The incumbent Provincial Commander of Pampanga Constabulary Command also
confirmed the appointment of Lorenzo Jose as PC agent during the year 1968.
Attached herewith pertinent papers related to the said appointment.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
FIDEL V. RAMOS
Major General, AFP
Chief of Constabulary (p. 191, rollo)
Inclosure:
Appointmenmt paper
of subject person dtd
Jan. 31, 1968 with
Personal History
Statement
Annex B is the appointment dated January 31, 1968 of petitioner Lorenzo Jose as a PC
Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code Number P-36-68 and Code
Nanie "Safari" with expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We
quote:
This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide our firearms and such other equipment
which it may deem necessary for your personal protection on the need basis which will be
covered by separate written authority. (p. 192, rollo)
In a Resolution of February 21, 1975, the Court resolved to set aside the denial of this
petition for review, to give due course and consider the Petition as a special civil action. In
another Resolution of April 4, 1975, the parties were given time to submit their respective
memorandum.
This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the
overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due-to secure to every
individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is
charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation,
involving as it does the liberty of an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a
miscarriage of justice be averted, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion which calls for
relief from this Court.
At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the
time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et
al that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and
interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not escape,
innocene shall not suffer. (69 Phil. 556, 564-565, qouting Justice Sutherland of the U.S.
Supreme Court in 69 U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309) The Solicitor General
now concedes that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to
the court of origin for a new trial.
We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-
discovered evidence because the same — his alleged appointment as an agent of the
Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade — were supposed to be
known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter.
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as ought to produce a
different result if admitted. 12
However, petitioner herein does not justify his motion for a new trial on newly discovered
evidence, but rather on broader grounds of substantial justice under Sec. 11, Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Power of appellate court on appeal. — Upon appeal from a judgement of the Court of First
Instance, the appellate court may affirm or modify the judgment and increase or reduce
the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case ito the Court of First Instance for
new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.
Petitioner asserts, and correctly so, that the authority of respondent appellate court over
an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the instant case
where the court may grant a new trial or a retrial for reasons other than that provided in
Section 13 of the same Rule, or Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. 13While Section
13, Rule 124, and Section 2, Rule 121, provide for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e.
newly discovered evidence, and errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial.
Section 11, Rule 124 quoted above does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound
discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute
meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or re-trial.
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgate to aid and not to obstruct the
proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but
not to bind and chain the hand that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or except a case from them for the
purposes of justice 14 or, in a proper case, disregard them. 15 In this jurisdiction, in not a.
few instances, 15* this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not
mentioned in the statute, vis retraction of witness, 16 negligence or incompetency of
counsel. 17 improvident plea of guilty, 18 disqualification of an attorney de oficio to
represent the accused in the trial court, 19 and where a judgment was rendered on a
stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense. 20
Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the
severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice. 21
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case now before Us which
may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial if only to afford him an
opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged.
Thus — petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a
handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary
with a permit to possess explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he
found himself in a situation where he had to make a choice — reveal his Identity as an
undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on
subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the
dissidents considering that Floridablanca the site of the incident, was in the heart of
"Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on
insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Without revealing his Identity as an agent
of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had a permit to
possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The permit however
could not be produced because it would reveal his intelligence work activities. Came the
judgment of conviction and with it the staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The
competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime
he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner's
appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to possess a
handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the trial
court because in the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.
We find and hold that the above circumstances justify a reopening of petitioner's cas to
afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating exculpating evidence. An outright
acquittal from this Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not As correctly
stressed by the Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the
documentary sought to be produced, and of cross-examining the persons who executed
the same, as well as the accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-
production of the of the evidence during the trial.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby set aside the judgment of conviction of the herein
petitioner, Lorenzo Jose, and remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial only for
purpose of allowing said accused to present additional evidence in his defense. The trial
court shall inform this Court of the final outcome of the case within a reasonable time.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.


EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26222. July 21, 1967.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO
PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA,
TAMBAC ALINDO, and RUFINO BORRES, Respondents.
Dominador L. Padilla for Petitioner.
Narbasa, Tambac Alindo & Borres for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MURDER; SEPARATE SHOTS KILLING
VARIOUS VICTIMS GIVE RISE TO SEPARATE CRIMES; SEPARATE INFORMATIONS SHOULD
BE FILED. — Where the facts alleged are that defendants fired guns in rapid succession
from outside the house of a family, killing the father, and that defendants then forcibly
entered the house, letting loose several shots, killing all the three minor children and
wounding the mother, the City Fiscal correctly presented five separate informations — four
for murder and one for frustrated murder. When various victims expire from separate
shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
2. ID.; COMPLEX CRIMES; SINGLE ACT, NOT SINGLE IMPULSE, IS DECISIVE. — To apply
the first half of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes as a complex crime a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies, there must be singularity
of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CASES OF RELATED OFFENSES MAY BE TRIED JOINTLY. — To
obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one is a laudable purpose but cannot,
by itself, justify a trial judge to order the fiscal to file only one information for multiple
murder. Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court, confers upon the judge the power to try
these cases jointly.
4. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; FISCAL NOT COMPELLED TO FILE A PARTICULAR
CHARGE; REASONS THEREFORE. — A prosecuting attorney is under no compulsion to file
a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop
up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion,
notwithstanding the possibility of abuses on his part, because he should not be unduly
compelled to work against his conviction and, in case of doubt, should be given the benefit
thereof. A contrary rule may result in courts being unnecessarily swamped with
unmeritorious cases and, worse still, a criminal suspect’s right to due process may be
transgressed.
5. ID.; FISCAL’S OPINION ON WHAT CRIME IS TO BE CHARGED NORMALLY PREVAILS. —
As the question of instituting a criminal charge is addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigating fiscal, in a clash of views as what crime is to be charged, between the judge
who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended
party or the defendant, those of the fiscal’s should normally prevail.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for
murder and one for frustrated murder, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza; and
Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from
his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a
full-dress trial on the merits.
The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza
and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Puga-an. City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then
that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and pali-untod (home-made gun) were fired in rapid
succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants
below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein and let loose several shots killing
Neceforo Mendoza, Epifania Mendoza and Marcelo Mendoza — all minor children of the
couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa
and Tambac Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their
plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one
impulse."cralaw virtua1aw library
Giving the nod to defendant’s claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966,
directed the City Fiscal to unity all the five criminal cases, and to file one single
information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248,
1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."cralaw virtua1aw library
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the
ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than
one victim was killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position
that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the
accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should
therefore be treated as one crime to the series of shots killed more than one victim" ; and
that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to "obviate the necessity of
trying five cases instead of one."cralaw virtua1aw library
Primarily to annul respondent Judge’s orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.
The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for
the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery
with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as
they are?
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period."cralaw virtua1aw library
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is
to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other (delito complejo). 1
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the
death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the
complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application. 2 A similar rule
obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter’s body through and
through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the second, seven days
later, This Court convicted the assailant of double murder. 3 So where a person plants a
bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes with the result that a number of persons are
killed, that single act again produces a complex crime. 4
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply
rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. 5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others
(armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Grand rifles), fired volleys
into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty
of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven)." 6 Again, eleven persons
were indicted for quadruple murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a
piece of bamboo — of a man, his common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood.
The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in reversing
this ruling below, held that" [t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by
various acts committed on different occasions and by different parties" ; that such acts
"may not be regarded as constituting one single crime" ; and that" [t]hey should be held
as separate and distinct crimes." 7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an
elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" — from a
pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died.
This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by
appellant Juan Mones. 8 And finally, in People v. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the
spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by one
burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun fire, two of the
couple’s children — also asleep — were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found
guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that
"appellant must be declared guilty of four murders." 9
The present case is to be differentiated from People v. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955.
There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards.
It was held that there was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no
conspiracy to perpetrate the killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts.
And the informations charge conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is
the act of all. 10 Not material here, therefore, is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible
to ascertain the individual death caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be
borne in mind, at this point, that to apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted,
there must be singularity of criminal act, singularity of criminal impulse is not written into
the law. 11
The respondent judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the
five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five
cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers
upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by
respondent Judge could easily be remedied. 12
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented
the five separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.
2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of
one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit
robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were
committed in pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the case within the coverage of
the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other.
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly
performed. 13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is
alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by
the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor’s opinion thereon. The
Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of
proving the elements of that offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but
a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the
informations charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are
reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal’s action. We are not now to say
that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the
nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where
he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the
evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of
the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize
that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction.
In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our
court being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal
suspect’s right to due process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be transgressed. So
it is, that in People v. Sope, 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the pronouncement that"
[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the
prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be
controlled by the offended party. 14
3. The impact of respondent Judge’s orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for
that of the prosecutor’s on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of
instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating
Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought
about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views
between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal
and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal’s should normally prevail. In
this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as
saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity
"may be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary
(a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the
statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was ‘held invalid.’" 15 Nothing in the record
would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited.
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are
loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases
for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of
robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We
state that, here, the Fiscal’s discretion should not be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders
of respondent Judge of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set aside and declared
null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent
Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246,
1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final
determination thereof.
Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres.So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., did not take part.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-35133. May 31, 1974.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMUNDO MADERA @
"Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO ANDRES @
"Ross", Defendants-Appellants.
Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.
Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, Et. Al.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L.
Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for Appellee.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the Circuit
Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the cost proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970,
three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag,
Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs
of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then
sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on
the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana
did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife to call for his brother Conrado who
lives not far away from their house. The victim’s wife fetched Conrado; but when they
returned, the wounded man was no longer at home for he was already brought to the
Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with
the assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva
Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20, 1970.
We affirm the lower court’s finding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino
Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso
Andres were with Madera at the time.
Juanito Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and saw
the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45
caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just
behind the appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda
Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo Madera as the one who shot her
husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres
were then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the dying
declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal
Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman
Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain
Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the
Municipal Building Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana that he would have to take down his
written statement regarding the shooting incident, and the latter agreed. The latter was
then in agony. It was then 3:00 o’clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was
asked who shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could
not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman
Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him
that he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an
investigator in the police force since 1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was
giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not
know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did not do this. It must be noted that not
only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration,
testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the identities of
the appellants to the victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco
Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they
were asked by their relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked,
they would have readily revealed appellants’ identities as they did to the Chief of Police
and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a
formal investigation of the case in the Office of the Chief of Police when and where they
executed their respective sworn statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn on
the same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana
categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross
and Totoy Andres were downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must he familiar with their house. He
testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross
examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That does not show any
inconsistency in his testimony, because on further questioning, he said that the balcony
referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he heard the shots, he
jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The falsity of this
statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which
apparently show that there was no such opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall
grasses could obscure the back portion of the house where the kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of gunfire.
But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
"An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would otherwise have
observed."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a keen edge. .
. . In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the
impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which confuses, but that which
focalizes the faculties to scrutinize the circumstance of the threatened danger in order to
avoid it." 2
The appellants asserted in their briefs 3 that "the evidence on record does not show that
there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug,
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and
Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature" 4 and, under this rule, of the
time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day. 5 This notwithstanding and for
certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather Bureau 6
which shows that the moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident. It
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To whom It May Concern:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the following
astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day, April 20,
at 4:27 A.M.;
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34 degrees above
the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West;
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full moon having
occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22, 1970.
"This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez, Associate
Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.
For the Administrator:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. INCIONG
Chief, Astronomical Division"
It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for
there is no doubt as to their identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI, appellant
Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that,
the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after the incident, the test could
have given a negative result even if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier,
because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have been washed off by washing or could
have been removed by perspiration.
The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant
Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We
agree.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter
fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no
proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is
They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso
did not make them liable either as co-principals or accomplices. In one of the latest Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate
decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q. Antonio. We held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they
are held for another legal cause.
"It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or connected with the
same he present when the crime was perpetrated. There must be established a logical
relationship between the commission of the crime and the supposed conspirators,
evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and among the latter, such as
by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design. Considering the far-
reaching consequences, of criminal conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of its presence that is, it must be
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.

"The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as
an accomplice, it must he shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the
principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes
to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly stated
in People v. Tamayo: ‘It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only
that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed
to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material
or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.’ . . . From our view of the
evidence it has not been convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the
commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement
or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the
perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his
mere passive presence at the scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-
principal or an accomplice in the commission of the offense." 7

This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of
criminal cases that the prosecutor’s finest hour is not when he wins a case with the
conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate’s natural
obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of
the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty
and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for
having correctly recommended the acquittal of the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO
TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal
Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Adriano for petitioner Jorge P. Tan, Jr.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner Cesar Tan.
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner Teofanis Bondoc.
Amadeo Seno, Artemio Derecho & Manuel Quimbo for petitioners Librado Isode, Osmundo,
Tolentino and Mariano Bartido.
Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and
Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors.
ANTONIO, J.:
In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the annulment of
respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC—XIII-50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-
L-S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners' motion for respondent
Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New
Trial and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23,
1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental
Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused
(petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of
prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with the afore-
mentioned criminal cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was required to
file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary
restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the
afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the
People of the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. The
Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases
for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the
motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the
circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and
the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge
"appeared to have been heedless of the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges
to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on
prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission of said official "that the
case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with
instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with the right of the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as inay be warranted" and, therefore, they
interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the
rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the parties shall have adduced
such additional evidence as they may wish to make, under such terms and conditions as
this Honorable Court may deem fit to impose. 2
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the
challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked
Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has
"absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence,
without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to
take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the
Solicitor General.
The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene
independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the
latter in the present proceedings.
There are important reasons which support the view that in the present proceedings, the
private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent
with that of the Solicitor General.
To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the
instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to
collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that
may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the
Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand
independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.
There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the
State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the
prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et al., 3the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et
al., 4 that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court
the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the
guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the
court, to the accused, and to the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-
mentioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction,
control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended
parts, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately.5 Thus,
"an offended party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially
in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended
party. 6 The only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil
action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in
which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost
his interest in its prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in
the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the
direction and control of the prosecuting official. " 8 As explained in Herrero v. Diaz,
supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that
all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in
control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the
Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right which the procedural law reserves to the
injured party is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the
civil liability for the criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10 As
explained in People v. Orais: 11
... the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal
because, as promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the
People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to control the
proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal
proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not, depending upon whether or not there
is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the
continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the
proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks
the competent Court of first Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal
thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the
commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the
principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the
Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once
it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's
right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petiton of the
promotor fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an order
overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor
fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a
person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a
criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promotor fiscal,
would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and control of a
criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General
Orders, No. 58.
Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and
punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may
not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. 12
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or
the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court.
Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the
Office of the Solicitor General", provides:
SECTION 1.Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. ... The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of
the Government, and such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It
shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the
party.
xxx xxx xxx
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or
commission in any matter, action or proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of
the people as the ends of justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the
State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate
to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of
the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and
control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules
on the matter.
Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of the
case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his
contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution on the subsequent motions
by the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor
General stated:
In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge, petitioners assert
that:
(a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by the
Larrazabals in connection with the decision of the two cases against petitioners herein;
(b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress, respondent
judge received, through one of his court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor
Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco
Larrazabal;
(c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent judge, after which
the latter received from one of the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in a
newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and which allegedly contained "something else
inside";
(d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the memorandum
of the prosecution which was literally copied in said decision although with some
corrections; and
(e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, respondent judge amended his
already prepared decision in the two criminal cases involved herein by changing the
penalty of double life sentence for the double murder charge against the petitioners to the
death penalty.
The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit executed on June
26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Tacloban City (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of the charges made in such affidavit are
denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the instant petition dated October 11, 1975),
who in turn claims that it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in the
aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a copy of the draft of his
decision of conviction by the same court stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr. (please see
Answer of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA
191 (1973), and Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein
petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting the grounds for disqualifying the respondent
judge in the instant petition are disputed.
Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in denial of the
alleged bribery of respondent judge, we have been informed of evidence obtained by the
National Bureau of Investigation when it cannot appropriate for us at this time, however,
and we are unable to do so, to submit to this Court definite conclusions on the charges
and counter-charges. An exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps precede the
making of categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that there are bases for stating
that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolutions on the motions for
new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice (See Martinez Gironella, 65
SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]).
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and
counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that
respondent Judge appeared to have been heedless to the oft-reiterated admonition
addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the
accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring
opinion, Martinez Gironella, supra, at 252). ...
It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly
and impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A
judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at
all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process
requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the
duty of rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been
stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For
"impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state of mind" 14 and, consequently, the
"appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality. 15 It must be
obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they
can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act
and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.

It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the
question as to whether or not he should be disqualified from further proceeding with the
aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot.

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court
in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve
the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and concepcion Jr. JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a
member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal
representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent
and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to
drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery,
for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of
complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the
lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to
get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the
outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its
requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for
malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed,
This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice.
Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as
counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office
as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not
prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his
appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds
provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent
also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC
proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been
paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to
members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the
case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to
appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same
counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written
motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his
absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for
complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that
his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When
asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the
complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint
withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger
believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his
complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he
believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his
profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension
or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding
notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may
appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service
Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed
and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police
Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to
mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal
protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General
recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in
accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the
authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney
is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court
in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there
might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession
while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to
be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the
Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not
be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of
impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living
true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of
whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was
inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor
be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called
alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future
actuations as a member of the bar.should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts
and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for
membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who
does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is

dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his
record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.