Valerio Kalaw vs Ma.

Elena
Fernandez (2015)
June 19, 2015

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G.R. No. 166357 – Civil Law – Persons and Family Relations – Family Code – Article 36;
Psychological Incapacity – Gambling in the Presence of One’s Children

Testimonies of Expert Witnesses as Evaluated by the Trial Court Must Be Given Due
Consideration

Burden of Proof in Proving Psychological Incapacity Does Not Solely Lie on Plaintiff

In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his marriage with Ma. Elena
Fernandez be annulled on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC,
after hearing the expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition, but on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme
Court. In September 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed
a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822) should be reversed.

HELD: Yes.

Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weight

The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the RTC when the SC reviewed the
case in September 2011. The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the
trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge
in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect. Therefore, it was not proper
for the SC to brush aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr.
Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the Tyrone’s version
of the events. The conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were
largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after
the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the Tyrone’s factual premises.

Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage
is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are
free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure
for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the
hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay
with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:
 The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

MARCOS V. MARCOS GR 136490

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to
provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was
however reversed by CA.

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to
the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus,
his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the
guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.