1.

De Guzman v CA,
G.R. No. L-47822, Dec. 22, 1988
DOCTRINE: INTERPRETATION OF ART. 1732
"Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public."

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does
such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline").

Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.

Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

SYNOPSIS: Ernesto Cendaña, a junk dealer engaged in transporting goods, should be considered a common carrier and is not liable for the
loss of merchandise due to a hijacking, which was deemed a fortuitous event.

FACTS:
Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan, and bring such material to Manila for
resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. He charged freight rates which were
commonly lower than regular commercial rates for the cargo loaded in his vehicle.

Petitioner, Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company contracted with Cendana for the hauling of 750 cartons
of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal. 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by Cendana himself, while
600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada, Cendana's driver and employee.

The other 600 boxes never reached de Guzman, since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur
Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo.

De Guzman filed a case against Cendaña, arguing that he should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods.

Cendana denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss having
been due to force majeure.

RTC: ruled that private respondent is a common carrier and is liable for value of the undelivered as damages and attorney’s fees.

CA: reversed RTC’s decision based on the ff grounds:

 respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a casual occupation - a sideline to his scrap iron business" and
not as a common carrier;

ISSUE:
1. Whether Cendaña should be considered a common carrier
2. Whether or not, he should be held liable for the loss of the goods, and Whether the high jacking with robbery can be properly regarded as a
fortuitous event that can exempt the carrier

RULING:
1. YES. Cenada is a common carrier.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code provides that: "Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public."

Notably, Article 1732 of the Civil Code avoids any distinction between a person or an enterprise offering transportation on regular and scheduled
basis and one offering transportation service on occasional, episodic, and unscheduled basis. Neither does the law distinguish between a carrier
offering its services for the general public, that is, the general community or population and one who offers business only from a narrow segment
of the general population

In addition to the above-cited provision, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 coincides neatly with the notion of "public service,"
under the Public Service Act which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Cod3: every person that now
or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, either for freight or passenger, or both, with
or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class,

Private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "backhauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to
Pangasinan, although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private
respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee
for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here.
2. NO. Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private
respondent's control.

Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy" are held to a very high degree of care and diligence
("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of passengers.

Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which
they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

The above list of causes of loss, destruction or deterioration which exempt the common carrier for responsibility therefor, is a closed list.

Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to constitute a species of force majeure fall within the scope of Article 1735,
which provides as follows: In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.

The Court ruled that although the hijacking of the carrier’s truck—does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in
Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier’s vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735, in other
words, that the private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent.

3. YES. The limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a
result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."

In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo. Hence, Cendana is not
liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private respondent's control.

The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a
fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of
transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.

JUST IN CASE I’ASK: RE: CERTIFICATION OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE

Contrary to the ruling of CA, A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
governing common carriers.

Liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the
requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other
franchise.

The business of a common carrier impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and property of those members of the general
community who happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and protection of
those who utilize their services and the law cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply failing
to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations

2. Pilapil v. CA, G.R. No. 52159, Dec. 22, 1989

DOCTRINE:
A tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence
for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when
the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under Article 1763, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is
due to the willful acts of strangers, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only
that of a good father of a family.

SYNOPSIS: the carrier was not made liable found not liable for its failure to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from
injuries caused by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements; injury was caused by a third party and not due to any negligence on the part of
the carrier. The court emphasizes that carriers are not required to take unreasonable precautions against unlawful acts of strangers and that it is the
responsibility of Congress to enact laws to protect the public from such risks.

FACTS:
Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's bus No. 49. While the bus was in due course negotiating the
distance between Iriga City and Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the
bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye.
Private respondent's personnel lost no time in bringing the petitioner to the provincial hospital in Naga City where he was confined and treated.

Despite several treatments accorded to the petitioner, he lost partially his left eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
This prompted the petitioner to file for an Action For Recovery Of Damages Sustained as a result of the stone-throwing incident.

RTC: ruled in favor of petitioner; CA: reversed the RTC’s decision.

Hence this petition.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
 the nature of the business of a transportation company requires the assumption of certain risks, and the stoning of the bus by a
stranger resulting in injury to petitioner-passenger is one such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability.
 t the carrier was negligent on the ground that the injury could have been prevented if the latter installed mesh-work grills to cover
the windows of its bus.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case to be held liable to the injury sustained
2. Whether or not, the carrier was negligent for its failure to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries

RULING:
1. NO. While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a
presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers

Following Civil Law Article 1755, the duty of unusual care, consciousness, and precautions in the carriage of passengers by common carriers
is limited to what human care and foresight may give.

Furthermore, Art. 1763, states that a common carrier is liable for injuries suffered by a passenger as a result of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or strangers, if the majority of the carrier's employees could have prevented or stopped the act or omission
with the diligence of a good father of a family.

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of
action against the carrier.

The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort
from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be
noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers , as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be
exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

2. NO. Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not
so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of
strangers

The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where
the carrier uses cars of the most approved type, in general use by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in
maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this respect.
 3. Juntilla v. Fontanar, G. R. No. L-45637, May 31, 1985
DOCTRINE:

SYNOPSIS: A passenger injured in a jeepney accident successfully appeals a decision absolving the driver and owners of liability, as the
Supreme Court determines that the tire blowout was not a fortuitous event and highlights the potential negligence and overloading of the vehicle.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Roberto Juntilla was a passenger in the public utility jeepney with plate number PUJ71-7 that was driven by respondent Berfol Camoro
and registered under the franchise of respondent Clemente Fontanar, but was actually owned by respondent Fernando Banzon. On the way from
Danao City to Cebu City and then to Mandaue City, the right rear tire blew, which made the car flip over.

The petitioner, who was in the front seat of the jeepney, was thrown out of the car and lost consciousness for a short time. When he woke up,
he saw that his right palm had been cut and that he had also been hurt on his left arm, right thigh, and back. After that, Juntilla went back to
Danao City, but while he was traveling, he realized that he had lost his "Omega" wrist watch.

He went to the Danao City Hospital to get care for his injuries and asked his father-in-law to go to the scene of the accident right away and look
for the watch. Even though his father-in-law looked for the watch he bought for P852.70, it couldn't be found.

RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla

CA: Reversed since accident was due to fortuitous event

ISSUE: Whether the flat tire was an accident that frees the respondent from responsibility under the Contract of Carriage

RULING:
NO. The flat tire didn't happen by chance.

The most important parts of a caso fortuito are:

(1) The cause of the unexpected and unplanned event or of the debtor's failure to meet his obligation must be unrelated to the debtor's
will.
(2) The event that makes up the caso fortuito can't be predicted, or if it can be predicted, it can't be avoided.
(3) The event must be so bad that it makes it impossible for the debtor to meet his obligation in the usual way. And
(4) the person who owes the money (the debtor) can't do anything to make the damage to the creditor worse.

In this case, the respondents have done some things that show they were careless. The records show that when the passenger jeepney's right rear
tire blew, it turned around and jumped into a ditch. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was going very fast before the accident and
was overloaded at the time of the accident, with three people in the front seat and fourteen people in the back.

Even if it's true that the tire that blew up was still good because the grooves were still there, that doesn't mean that the tire blowing up was a good
thing. There was no proof that the accident happened because of bad road conditions or that the jeepney driver did anything to make up for
conditions that could cause accidents. So, the sudden blowout could have been caused by putting too much air pressure into the tire and the
jeepney being overloaded and going too fast at the time of the accident.

The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due
regard for all the circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents