Murao, Jose Pepito G.

III, 174085

1.
a) A maritime protest is a written statement by the master of a vessel or
any authorized officer, attested by the proper officer or a notary, stating that
damages has been suffered by the ship.

b) A, as a passenger who failed to file a protest, cannot maintain an action

to recover losses and damages arising from the collision. Under Art. 835 of
the Code of Commerce, a maritime collision is one of several instances
where a maritime protest is required. Furthermore, passengers or other
persons interested who may be on board the vessel should file said
protests within 24 hours before competent authority of the point where the
collision took place, or that of the first port of arrival of the vessel, if in
Philippine territory, and to the Filipino consul if it occurred in a foreign
country. In the instant case, with A failing to abide by the requirements of
the Code of Commerce, he is precluded from maintaining an action.
However, A can alternatively maintain a civil action based on quasi-delict.

Meanwhile, B, a non-passenger but a shipper who suffered damage to his

cargo, can maintain an action to recover losses and damages arising from
the collision. Under Art. 836 of the Code of Commerce, persons who were
injured or whose cargo were damaged are not required to file a protest as a
condition of an action, when they were not on board or not in a condition to
make known their wishes. In the instant case, B is not privy to the
circumstances surrounding the collision is not required to file a protest.
Thus, B and can file an action to recover losses and damages without filing
a protest.

c) Yes my answer would be the same if the collision occurred in Pasig

River between two vessels used to transport passengers for compensation.
Although the Civil Code is still the primary source of law vis-à-vis common
carriers, the Civil Code has no particular provisions on the maritime
exploits. On the other hand, the Art. 835 and Art. 836 of the Code of
Commerce do expressly address collisions between vessels. Hence, with
the specific law controlling, my answer would be the same.

2.
a) Y’s defense of limited liability is untenable. Jurisprudence has held that
cases of injuries or death of passengers due to the ship owner’s fault or the
concurring negligence of the ship owner and captain is one of the instances
which bars the application of the limited liability rule. In the instant case, the
Murao, Jose Pepito G. III, 174085

overloading of M/V Cebu and the absence of sufficient life belts display the
fault and negligence on the part of Y as a ship owner. Thus, Y cannot
invoke the limited liability rule to mitigate his liabilities.

b) Yes, my answer would be the same. Under the Civil Code, in case of
injury to passengers or damage to cargo, the common carrier is presumed
to have been negligent with only the aggrieved party only needing to prove
the injury or damage. In the instant case, the presence of sufficient life belts
does negate that the fact that M/V Cebu was overloaded with passengers
since the vessel could have simply kept extra life belts. Thus, Y is still
precluded from invoking the limited liability rule to mitigate his liabilities.

c) If Y wants to use the limited liability rule as a defense, Y must first prove
the exercise of extraordinary diligence in the transport of passengers and
goods. Moreover, Y must prove that M/V Cebu completely sunk constituting
total abandonment of the vessel. Without fault or negligence on Y’s part
and with the vessel totally abandoned, Y can invoke the limited liability rule
and reduce his liability to P3M instead of the P10M in damages demanded
by the heirs of X.

3. The arrastre operator cannot invoke the limited liability rule.

Jurisprudence dictates that only ship owners can invoke the limited liability
rule due to the inherently more apparent risks in marine transportation. In
the instant case, the arrastre operator merely handled X’s goods between
the ship’s tackle or government wharf/piers to the establishment of the
shipper. Thus, the limited liability rule is inapplicable to the land-based
operation of the arrastre operator.

4. The real and hypothecary nature of are evident in the following rules of
Supreme Court A.M. No. 19-08-14-SC:
a) Sec. 3, Rule 6 allows the plaintiff or defendant to apply for a Warrant of
Arrest for the arrest of the ship, cargo, or freight against which the action or
any counterclaim in the action may be brought.
b) Sec. 3, Rule 7 provides that in case of numerous prevailing parties in an
action in rem, they may file a motion before the court to determine the
priority of the claims against the proceeds of the sale of the ship.
c) Sec. 2, Rule 8 allows the plaintiff to initiate a limitation action in cases of
collisions, injuries to third party, and acts of the captain or master of the
ship so long as he abandons the vessel will all appurtenances, equipment,
and freightage earned.
Murao, Jose Pepito G. III, 174085

In the abovementioned provisions, the Supreme Court reiterated the real

and hypothecary nature of maritime law by limiting the liability of ship
owners to the ship, cargo, or freightage earned. The restriction of recovery
up to the value of the ship, cargo, or freightage is also apparent in the rule
determining priority of parties who may recover only upon the proceeds of
the sale of the ship.

5. No, X’s action against A Company would not prosper. Under Sec. (3),
par. 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless a suit is
brought within 1 year after delivery or date when goods should have been
delivered. In the instant case, X’s damaged watches and goods had both
arrived on December 2, 2018 but he only filed a case in 2020. Thus, with
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act governing international shipping and with
A Company’s vessels registered in the US and Cyprus, X’s action has
already prescribed.

6. The trial court is correct. Although Art. 18, par. 1 of the Warsaw
Convention generally holds the carrier liable for damages sustained in the
event of destruction, loss, or damage to baggage or goods in transportation
by air, the 1998 case of British Airways v. CA has carved out an exception.
In the mentioned case, the air carrier was not held liable for the loss of
baggage in the amount in excess of the limits specified in the tariff. Art
1749 of the Civil Code supports the case by providing that a stipulation of
the common carrier’s liability appearing in the bill of lading is binding unless
the shipper or owner declares a greater value. In the instant case, Dona
Buding is estopped by her non-declaration of a higher value.

7.
a) Yes the limit of liability under the Warsaw Convention may be invoked in
this case. The Philippines ratified the Warsaw Convention in 1950 to
govern all international transportation of persons, baggage, and good by an
aircraft. In the instant case, X’s goods were being shipped from one
member of the Warsaw Convention to another. Hence, the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention in limiting the liability of carriers may be invoked.

b) X can sue both A Airline Co. and B Airline Co. Under Art. 1 par. 3 of the
Warsaw Convention, carriage performed by several successive air carriers
is deemed to be one undivided carriage, if the parties have regarded it as a
Murao, Jose Pepito G. III, 174085

single operation. In the instant case, no mention was made X procuring the
services of A Airline Co. and B Airline Co. in separate transactions. Hence,
X can pursue an action against both A Airline Co. and B Airline Co.

c) Yes, the Warsaw Convention mandates the filing of a notice of claim.

Under Art. 26, par. 2, the person entitled to delivery must file a notice within
3 days in case of luggage, 7 days in case of goods, and 14 days in case of
delay from the time the baggage is placed under the disposal of such
person. Meanwhile, the prescriptive period to file a case for damages
prescribed by Art. 29, par. 1 of the Warsaw Convention is within 2 years
from the date of arrival at the destination, date on which the aircraft arrived,
or date the carriage stops. However, authorities have posited that the
prescriptive period in the Warsaw Convention only supplements the 4-year
prescriptive period in the New Civil Code.

d) By the provisions under Art. 28, par. 1 of the Warsaw Convention, X may
file an action for damages in the courts where the carrier is domiciled,
where carrier’s principal place of business stands, where carrier has an
establishment or where a contract has been made, or the court of the place
of destination. These stated venues are qualified by the jurisdiction over the
case for damages that the courts must first acquire.

8.
a) No, the Warsaw Convention is not applicable. Under Art. 17, par. 3 of
the Warsaw Convention, transportation by air shall not extend to any
transport by land, sea, or by river performed outside an airport. In the
instant case, it is certain that X’s goods was damaged in a traffic accident
in Makati en route to X’s warehouse in Quezon City. Hence, the Warsaw
Convention on international transportation does not apply.

b) Yes, my answer would be different if there is no certainty surrounding

when the damage to the goods occurred. Art. 17, par. 3 of the Warsaw
Convention creates the presumption that damage takes place during
transportation by air when loading, delivery, or transshipment occurs by
virtue of a contract for transportation by air. In the modified case where it is
not known when the goods were damaged, the presumption
abovementioned is controlling. Thus, with Japan and Philippine being both
members of the Warsaw Convention, the provisions of said convention are
applicable.
Murao, Jose Pepito G. III, 174085

9. No, A Airline Co.’s argument is not tenable. Under Art. 25, par. 1 of the
Warsaw Convention, a carrier is not entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by default on his part. In the
instant case, the loaders of A Airline Co. willfully stole R’s goods, which
were under their dominion. Thus, A Airline Co., as the employers of the
loaders, must answer to R.

10.
a) The Joint DOTC-DTI Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 2012,
otherwise known as the “Air Passenger Bill of Rights”, provide that flights
may either be delayed or cancelled, with a delay of at least 6 hours
counting as cancellation. In the instant case, the rights in Sec. 11.1 of the
Administrative Order on cancelled flights to refreshments and meals, to
hotel accommodation, to transportation from hotel to airport, to free
communication, to be endorsed to another air carrier without paying, to
notified of the cancellation by public announcement or written notice of the
flight status, and to rebooked or be reimbursed the are all available to R. In
R’s case, Sec. 11.1 (e) expressly provides that the carrier shall rebook his
ticket for the following day without additional charge. The carrier can also
issue a paper ticket with the same being more advantageous to the
passenger as a written confirmation of reservation.