MANTRADE WORKERS UNION VS BACUNGAN

FERIA J ‘86

FACTS
The Petitioner union question that the respondents arbitrator
decision that respondent Mantrade corp. is not under a legal
obligation to pay holiday pay pursuant to Art. 94 of LC to its
monthly employees who are uniformly paid by month, irrespective
of the number of working days therein. In the said provisions the
monthly salaried employees were not excluded from the said holiday
pay however it appeared that they are excluded under sec 2 of R.4
Book 3 of Rules and regulations implementing the said provision.

ISSUE
WON the the petitioners as monthly salaried workers are excluded
from the holiday pay?

HELD
NO. The SC held that the respondent corporation is under
legal obligation to grant its montly salaried employees holiday pay.
One of the cases decided by the SC which the latter ruled that Sec.2
R.4.Book 3 of the rules and regulations implementing the Labor
Code is null and void for enlarging the scope of the exclusion
provided for in Art 94.LC ART 82 provides for its inclusion and art
94 provides for exclusions.
In this case the petitioners were excluded to receive holiday
pay as adjudication made by the respondent arbitrator based on the
Book 3 Sec 2 of the rules and regulation implementing labor code.
However the SC found out that the there was an erroneous in the
interpretation of such law made by the respondent arbitrator
because same was already declared null and void. Hence the
petitioner are entitle to receive such holiday pay.
CONDE VS IAC
GUTIERREZ J

FACTS

Conde, et. al. initially filed a complaint for the recovery of

possession of a parcel of land before the Court of First Instance in
Tarlac (Now Regional Trial Court Branch 64). After a full blown trial
in the RTC Branch 64, Marcello Gutierrez lost the suit and was
ordered to pay the Conde, et. al.

Gutierrez filed a petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) which

then reversed the decision of the RTC ordering Conde, et. al. to
deliver the property to Gutierrez. The decision became final and
executory on December 20, 1982.

Conde, et. al. filed a petition before the RTC Branch 56, Third
Judicial Region in Capas, Tarlac to annul the judgment of the CA
which was then dismissed for it had no jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the CA.

Conde, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration before the

respondent court which was then denied. A petiton for certiorari,
mandamus, and a writ of injuction was filled before the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and raffled to the Third Special
Case Division. The court dismissed the case for lack of merrit on
the grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction to annul the IAC.

Finally, Conde, et. al., filed a motion for reconsideration to this

court (Supreme Court - SC) where it was denied.

ISSUE
WON the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the case of fraud?
HELD
NO. One of the cases decided by the SC which ruled that the
judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the significance of a
constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a
procedural or a municipal ordinance. It discharge the role no
crucial than the roles played by the two other departments in
maintaining the rules of law. To assure stability in legal relations
and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. Logically and
rightly it does so with finality through the highest judicial organ,
the SC. What is says is definite and authoritative, binding on those
who occupy the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy.
In the case at bar, the IAC was correct when it dismissed the
petition for lack of merit on the ground that RTC is without
Jurisdiction to annul judgment of IAC because only the SC has
power to annul the decisions of the former.

KA TOC &SONS VS RICOBO

GUTIERREZ 67

FACTS
Plaintiff-appellee Go ka toc is a duly registered partnership,
not wholly owned by Filipinos engaged in manufacture, processing
of vegetable extract corn, rice, copra, soybean peanuts and
vegetable products. At the arrival of the RA 3018, It prohibited the
Partnership whose capital was not wholly owned by Filipino citizen
form engaging, directly or indirectly in rice and corn industry. But it
allowed such partnership provided it manage to register with the
municipal treasurer. Later RICOBO issued Res.No.10 defining the
term “by product” which means the secondary product resulting
from process of husking, grinding, milling and cleaning of palay and
corn. (corn drips, corn meals).
 RICOBO required the appellee Ka toc to register pursuant to
its resolution. RICOBO ruled that since the appellee engaged in the
manufacturing and dealings of products that are covered by the
definition of “by products” under the RICOBO issued resolution. Ka
toc filed before CFI to declare the said law and RICOBO resolution
inapplicable to it.
TC- Decided the case in favour of Plaintiff-appellee. Ruled that
RA 3018 and the said resolution was not applicable to the Plaintiff
appellee business. Filed an appeal,

ISSUE
WON the Lower court committed an error when it ruled that
resolution 10 and particularly term “by product not applicable to it?

HELD
YES. The SC held that the purpose of the Act, as expressly in
the introductory bill can control the language of the law only in
cases of ambiguity. The law is clear in enunciating the policy that
only Filipino and association, partnership or corporations 100%
Filipino can engage even in the trade and acquisition of the by
products rice and corn. So the courts duty is to apply the law.
In the instant case the plaintiff claimed that term by product
was not applicable to their business since it was not specifically
stated in the title of RA 3018 however the SC ruled that they are
covered by the said law because they were corporation which are
not wholly owned by Filipino citizen engaged in the corn and rice
industry in that sense they are required to register their business
otherwise they will violate the RA 3018. Since they did not complied
with that requirement therefore they cannot continued to run their
business.

PEOPLE VS MAPA
FERNANDO J
FACTS
The defendant Mario Mapa was apprehended for the violation
of illegal possession of firearms for carrying the same unlicensed
and at the sametime he does not have a permit to carry a weapon.
He argued that he is a secret agent of the Governor and that he is
exempt from the requirement of securing a license of firearm. The
defendant also showed a certification that he was appointed as
such.
TC- rendered decisions convicting the accused of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and sentence to year an done day to
two years and to pay costs.

ISSUE
WON a secret agent is not required to get a license for his
firearm?

HELD
NO. the SC held that a secret agent is not exempted for the
requirements securing license firearms. The law is clear that
firearms and ammunition were lawfully issued to the officials and
public servant for use in the performance of their duties.
In this case the defendant claimed that since he is a secret
agent of a Governor he is exempt to the secure license for carrying
firearms but the SC said that the persons that are lawfully granted
to the issuance of firearms even without securing permit and
license are those person that enumerated in the law such as public
servants and officials in the performance of their duties.

LUZON SURETY VS DE GARCIA

FERNANDO J
FACTS
Ladislao Chavez, as a principal and the petitioner is Luzon
Surety co. Executed a surety bond in favour of PNB to guaranty a
crop loan in favour of Ladislao Chavez. On the same date Vicente
Garcia together with Chavez, and Ramon Lacson as, guarantors
signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves
solidarily liable to indemnify Luzon surety. The PNB file before CFI
civil case against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety to recover sum
of money. In turn a third party complain against Chavez, Lacson
and Vicent Garcia instituted by Surety Co.
LC- decided the case ordered Chavez, and Luzon surety to pay
the PNB solidarily.
CFI- issued writ of execution against Defendant De Garcia for
the satisfaction of claim by the Luzon surety.
Provincial Sheriff- levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of
the respondents Garcia form their sugar plantation.
LC- rendered decision favour of De Garcia. Declared that writ
of garnishment was contrary to Article 161 of NCC.
CA- affirmed the decision of the Lower Court. It said that
under the art 163 of the NCC that a husband as an administrator of
the conjugal property, The only obligation incurred by the husband
that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those
incurred that redounded to the benefit of the family. Which was
absent in this case when no proof was presented that the De Gacia
acting as a guarantor received consideration which may redound to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The petitioner Claimed that the transaction based on credit
which De Gacia acted as gurantor acquires capacity being trusted
add to his reputation which enhance his standing as a citizen of
community in which he lives in which case he can secure money to
carry on the purpose of their conjugal partnership.

ISSUE
WON the Conjugal Partnership could be liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party
in favour of a surety agreement?
HELD
NO. SC held that argument made by the petitioner had no
basis and does not carry to convictions. As provided by art.161 of
NCC that the Conjugal partnership is liable only for such debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The language is clear it does not admit of
doubt . No process of interpretation or construction need to be
resorted to. Imperatively calls for application.
In this case the conjugal partnership of respondents Sps.
cannot be held liable for the obligations contracted by Vicente De
Garcia because the purpose of the said agreement was to
accommodate a third party and said purpose was not enumerated
in the article 161 or NCC. As such it did not redounded to benefit of
the conjugal partnership therefore the conjugal partnership cannot
be held liable.

BOLOS VS BOLOS

Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration

of nullity of her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC
granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was
received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the
Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure
to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter,
the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity,
Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia,
who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home
and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and
executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between
Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before
the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to
marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word“petitions” rather than to
the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of
the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage
was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his
Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14,
1980, years before its effectivity.
ISSUE
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration
of AbsoluteNullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room
for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under
the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code”
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word“petitions” rather than to
the word “marriages.”
cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear
and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

MUNICIPALITY OF SANJUAN METRO MANILA VS

CA
 FACTS
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center
Site Purposes certain parcels of land located in the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila. After resettling hundreds of squatter
families occupying the land covered by the proclamation, the
Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July
26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 by excluding from its
operation the parcels of land not being utilized for government
center sites purposes but actually occupied for residential
purposes. On June 1, 1998, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, filed with
the Regional Trial Court a petition for prohibition with urgent
prayer for restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and
Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to
enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the
association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied
have been awarded to them by Proclamation No 164.
The regional trial court dismissed the petition and the appeal before
the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed. This decision became
final. Disregarding the ruling of the court, private respondent hired
a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the
land in question, submitting the same to respondent DENR in
connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation
No. 164. To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private
respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association. The
regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality but the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision, hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE
Is proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More
specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?

HELD
NO. Procalmation NO 164 is obviously not a valid act of
legislation. The long standing principle that every statute is
presume to be valid however this rests upon the premise that the
statute was duly enacted by the legislature. This presumption is not
applicable when there is a clear usurpation of legislative power by
the executive branch.
In this case Ferdinand Marcos issued a proclamation no.
1716 is a valid legislation in the due exercise of legislative power
vested on him. The amendment made by pres. Corazon c Aquino
which the proclamation 164 is obviously not a valid legislation
because she lost this power under the freedom consititution the
said power was already vested solely in congress.” The president
shall continue the legislative power until a legislature is elected and
convened under the constitution.

LOPEZ v ROXAS
G.R L-25716
July 28, 1966

FACTS
Lopez and Roxas were Vice-Presidential candidates for the
November 1965 elections. By Resolution No. 2, Congress
proclaimed petitioner as VP, with 26,724 more votes over Roxas. On
January 5, 1966, respondent filed an election protest with the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal against petitioner on the ground that
it was not he, but the respondent who obtained the largest number
of votes for the office. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with the SC to prevent the PET from
exercising jurisdiction over the case, on the ground that RA 1793
which created the said Tribunal is unconstitutional.

ISSUE
Whether RA 1793 is unconstitutional

RULING: No. It merely vests additional jurisdiction in the SC.

Section 1 of RA 1793 which provides that

“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal ...

which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-
president-elect of the Philippines”,
gives the defeated candidate a legal right to judicially contest the
election of the Pres-elect or VP-elect and to demand a recount of the
votes cast as well as secure a judgment declaring that he is the one
elected Pres or VP and as such, entitled to assume the duties
attached to the said office. And by providing, further, that the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal

"shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members
of the Supreme Court,"

said legislation has conferred upon such Court

an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.

RA 1793 has not created a new or separate court, but merely

conferred upon the SC the functions of a PET. In this case, the
court is only one, although it may perform the functions pertaining
to several types of courts, each having some characteristics
different from those of the others. Likewise, the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it
is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal
are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic
Act No. 1793 does not entail an assumption by Congress of the
power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It
merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Also, the power to be the "judge ... of ... contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications" of any public officer is
essentially judicial. As such, under the principle of separation of
powers, it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except
only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. This is the
reason why the Constitution ordains that

"the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members" (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution);

the purpose of this provision was to exclude the power to decide

such contests — which by nature is judicial — from the operation of
the general grant of judicial power to "the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as may be established by law.

Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact Republic Act No.
1793, the Constitutional provision establishing said Electoral
Tribunals for Members of Congress only, proves the exact opposite:
that the Constitution intended to vest Congress with discretion to
determine by law whether or not the election of a president-elect or
that of a vice-president-elect may be contested and, if Congress
should decide in the affirmative, which court of justice shall have
jurisdiction to hear the contest. Hence, not only that Republic Act
No. 1793 is not inconsistent with the Constitution or with the
principle of separation of powers underlying the same, but, also,
that it is in harmony with the aforementioned grant of "the judicial
power" to said courts.

The power of Congress to declare who has obtained the largest

number of votes is different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by
Republic Act No. 1793. Congress, acting as national board of
canvassers has a ministerial and executive duty to make such
declareations. On the other hand, the PET has the judicial power to
determine WON said election returns have been irregularly made or
tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas
covered by each, and if not, to recount the ballots cast and
incidentally pass upon the validity of each ballot to determine
whether they shall be coundted, and in whose favor. In imposing
upon the Supreme Court the additional duty of performing the
functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Congress has not,
through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing
power of the Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes,
neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer.

PETITION DENIED

MANILA HOTEL VS. GSIS

FACTS
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, will provide
management expertise or performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid
of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS
refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

ISSUE
WON the sec 10 (2) of Article 12 self executing?
HELD
Yes. The constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which complete in itself and which needs no further guideline or
implementing law or rules for its enforcement from its very words,
the provision does not require any legislation to put in operation.
The constitution mandates the grant of rights, privileges and
concession covering national patrimony the state shall give
preference to the Filipino citizen.
In this case Manila Hotel has become a landmark living
testimonial of Philippine Heritage, since then it become a venue of
various significant event which shape the Filipino history in that
sense the GSIS should be in favour of MPH a company run by
Filipino citizen over the Renong berhad a Malaysian firm.

BIRAOGO VS PHL TRUTH COMMISSION AND LAGMAN

VS EX SEC. OCHOA
FACTS
There are cases of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of E.O 1 creating the phil truth commission of
2010. The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instated
by petitioner Biraogo in his capacity as a taxpayer being violative to
the constitution as its usurps the consititutional authority of the
legislature to create public office and to appropriate funds thereof.
The Second civil case filed by the petitioner Edcel lagman together
with the 3 other incumbent members of HR being violative to equal
protection clause of the constitution. They contends that it did not
applicable equally to all members of the same class its intent
singling out the previous administration PTC as adventure in
partisan hostitlity. Also issued that said order only to investigate
graft and corruption cases committed during the previous
administration.
ISSUE
WON the E.O no.1 violates the equal protection clause?
HELD
Yes. The SC held that it is violative to the Equal protection
clause. Pursuant sec 1 of PH constitution which embrace the due
process and equal protection clause to prevent any unfair
discrimination which offends the requirement of justice and fair
play.
In this case the EO does not applicable to all the members of
the same class such the intent of singling out the previous
administration as its sole object makes the ptc a partisan.

Marcos v Manglapus, et. al.

Facts: Same as above, except that Ferdinand has died.

Held: Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in

compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote
the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return
of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the
present time and under present circumstances is in compliance
with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she
had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in
arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.

------------------
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking
the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc.
To issue a "travel documents "to former Pres. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses "to return "in the
Philippines is guaranteed by "the Bill of Rights, specifically
"Sections "1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so.

They further assert that under "international law, their right "to
return "to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on "Civil "and Political Rights, which has been ratified by
the Philippines.

Issue:
"Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by "the
constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.

Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to "travel from "the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the
right "to return "to one's country, a distinct right under
"international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on "Civil "and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of "movement "and abode within the territory of a state,
the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country
as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is
the "right to freedom of "movement "and residence within the
borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the right to liberty of "movement "and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his
own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
"national security, public order, "public health "or morals or the
separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate
to construe the limitations to the right "to return "to ones country in
the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the
right to travel.

The Bill of rights "treats only the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is a well considered view that the right "to return "may
be considered, as a generally accepted principle of "International
Law "and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. "
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former
Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore

prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.

TDC vs CA
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized
the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. Subsequently
Act No. 1657 amended the former act which states that the City of
Manila was authorized to sell or lease the set aside for hotel site.
The City of Manila sells the land to Manila Lodge No. 761 then the
latter sold the land to Tarlac Development Corporation. The City of
Manila filed a petition for re-annotation of its right to repurchased
ISSUE
WON the city of manila
Held
The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of
Manila is a grant of "public" nature, the same
having been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have
always been strictly construed against the
grantee.33 One compelling reason given for the strict interpretation
of a public grant is that there is in such grant a
gratuitous donation of, public money or resources which results in
an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that
reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in favor of the
public.34 This reason for strict interpretation obtains
relative to the aforesaid grant, for, although the City of Manila was
to pay for the construction of such work and
timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making
of the Luneta extension, the area to be
reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government
and without cost to the City of Manila, with
material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the statute
should be narrowed to exclude maters which if
included would defeat the policy of the legislation.

The sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to

the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent for lack of
subject matter. It suffered from an incurable defect that could not
be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The
Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right by virtue of the
said sale. Hence to consider now the contract inexistent as it always
has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No. 761, an
impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was it,
contemplation of law, no contract at all

PASCUAL VS BALLESTEROS
FACTS
Spouses Albino and Margarita Mariano together with spouses
Melecio and Victoria Melchor, and Angela Melchor were co-owned of
a parcel of land. Upon the death of Spouses Melchor their share
was inherited by their daughter and the latter husband the
petitioner in this case and subsequently the spouses acquired the
share of Lorenza. Margarita, widowed already, sold the share to
spouses pascual and Francisco. The old TCT was cancelled and a
new one was issued in their names together with angela and the
spouses Melchor. Respondent spouses Ballesteros filed a complaint
for legal redemption as a co-owner claiming that they not received
any written with that sale.
RTC- dismissed, failed to exercise such right within the
prescribed 30 period. Art 1623 NCC. They have actual notice.
CA- granted the appeal
ISSUE
WON the respondents could no longer exercise their right of
redemption having failed to exercise the same within 30 days form
actual knowledge of the said sale.?
 HELD
NO. The respondent can still exercise their right of
redemption. The SC cited the art 1623 of NCC which provides that
the right of legal redemption shall not be exercise except within 30
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor. And shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property unless accompanied
with the affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice to
all possible redemptioners. Juriscprudence dictate that it is
mandatory and that law appears in a clear and categorically
language there is no room for interpretation only for application.
In this case the 30 days prescription period has not yet
commenced in the absence of a written notice. The written notice is
indispensable for the commencement of 30 day period.

LANDBANK VS CA
FACTS
Pedro yap Heirs of Emiliano Santiago AMADCOR and are
landowners whose landholiding wear acquired by the DAR and
subjected to the qualified beneficiaries under CARP LAW. The
aggrieved by the alleged lapses of DAR and landbank with respect
for payment of just compensation, Respondent file with before the
SC that the DAR A.O no 9 was issued in GADA excess in
jurisdiction permitted the opening of trust accounts by the
landbank in leiu of depositing in cash or bonds in accessible bank.
Under sec 16 of ra 6657 . The Issuance of the Certificate of Deposit
by the landbank was a substantial compliance with section 16 RA
6657 and in consonance with Cirulars.
ISSUE
WON the issuance Cerfiticate of deposit is in accordance with sec
16(e) of RA 6657?
HELD
NO. Sec 16 (e) RA 6657 is very specific in limiting to the type
of deposit to be made as compensation for rejecting land owners
that is in cash or in LPB bonds. The law is clear and unambiguous.
The law is clear and unambiguous leave no any doubt as to include
the opening of trust accounts within the coverage of deposit. CA-
annul and set aside the decision of the RTC.
The sugar corporation failed to deliver the said sugar due they
sought for reimbursement of the 25% conversion fee. RTC- ruled in
favor of the plaintiff ordered the SRA to pay the plaintiff. The said
bidding rule comtemplated delay in in the arrival of imported sugar
and cancellation of its import.
ISSUE
WON the RTC committed erred when it ruled that the sugar
corporation should be reimbursed?
HELD
YES. The court held that RTC gravely erred when ruled that
the sugar corporation should be reimbursed. It well settled rule the
when the language of the law is clear, it is the duty of the court to
enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word. There is no
occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. The Bidding
rules give to situation which would constitute forfeitures of 25% a)
when the importer fails to make the importation b) when imported
sugar fails to arrive in the PH. On or before the set arrival date.
In this case the sugar corporation was not justified when they
failed to deliver the said sugar despite of their argument that they
cancelled to deliver the remaining sugar as such it is not a case of
delay hence they should be reimbursed but the SC ruled that the
corporation are deemed to have assented to the bidding rules
including the forfeiture provision and the RTC was erred in the
interpretation of the rules that it was only cancellation and not
case of delay.

G.R. No. 180462 : February 9, 2011

SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA

SUGAR MILL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS
and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of

sugar due to the effects of El Niño and La Niña phenomena. To fill the expected
shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999 (EO 87), facilitating sugar
importation by the private sector.

On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction issued the Bidding

Rules providing guidelines for sugar importation. Under the Bidding Rules, the
importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working days from receipt
 of notice of the bid award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported
sugar.

The Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation
or if the imported sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the
conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the Sugar Regulatory Administration.

The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the publication of the

invitation to bid. Several sugar importers submitted sealed bid tenders.
Petitioners Southeast Asia Sugar Mill Corporation (Sugar Mill) and South Pacific
Sugar Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged as winning bidders for the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd tranches.

Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion fee
amounting to P14,340,000.00, while Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fee
amounting to P28,599,000.00.

As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations) delivered only
10% of their sugar import allocation, or a total of only 3,000 metric tons of sugar.
They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining 27,000 metric tons of sugar
import allocation blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar corporations
sought immediate reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee
amounting to P38,637,000.00.

The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages in
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 77) of Quezon City.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Raul Labay of the SRA’s
legal department to assist the OSG in this case. The RTC held that paragraph G.1
of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not
cancellation of sugar importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did
not apply to the sugar corporations which merely cancelled the sugar
importation. the deputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul Labay, received his own copy
of the Decision and filed a notice of appeal. The sugar corporations moved to
expunge the notice of appeal, which was thereafter granted, on the ground that
only the OSG, as the principal counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be
made.

The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had authority to file a
notice of appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Whether or not the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of

P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee.

HELD:
 The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: SRA

First issue: The deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987
authorizes the OSG to represent the SRA, a government agency established
pursuant to Executive Order No. 18, Series of 1986, in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was
cured when the OSG subsequently filed its opposition to the motion to expunge
the notice of appeal.

Second issue: The sugar corporations are not entitled to reimbursement of 25% of
the conversion fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.

Paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules provides that if the importer fails to make the
importation, 25% of the conversion fee shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA. In
joining the bid for sugar importation, the sugar corporations are deemed to have
assented to the Bidding Rules, including the forfeiture provision under paragraph
G.1.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. L-25326 May 29, 1970

IGMIDIO HIDALGO vs. POLICARPIO HIDALGO

DOCTRINE:

Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof.
Whatever is within the spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result
in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

FACTS:

Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and
March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-
square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, Policarpio sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels
of land for P4,000.00. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel
worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas,
productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the
execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by Policarpio in their favor.

In Case L-25327, Policarpio sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and Hilario Aguila
and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the
same price of P750.00 by Policarpio in their favor.

The Igmidio and others have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day
notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by
Policarpio to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by Policarpio-vendor were
registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of their
respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by Policarpio-vendor of the affidavit required by
section 13 of the Land Reform Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working
form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their
landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the
affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale. Or, is the right of
redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?

HELD
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its
enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition
of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the
enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into
agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by
the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes
the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a
statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p.
526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary,
the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not
correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.

Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court to
determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Policarpio Hidalgo for redemption of
the landholding in accordance with the observations made.

ISSUE

Was the agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition?

 HELD

The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of
redemption granted by Sec12 of Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold tenants” only and not
“shares tenants” and that their respective rights and obligations are not coextensive or coequal.

The very essence of Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. It was
error of the agrarian court to state that “the systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this
jurisdiction are share tenancy and leasehold tenancy” even after the enactment of the Land Reform
Code.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The Court has consistently held in line with authoritative principles of statutory construction that, it will
reject a narrow and literal interpretation, such as that given by the agrarian court, that would defeat and
frustrate rather than foster and give life to the law's declared policy and intent. Finally, under the
established jurisprudence of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation, it will be
guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will ultimately
resolve grave doubts in favor of the tenant and worker.

“PLEASE CONCENTRATE ON THE DOCTRINE AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION”

There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

first, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed;

second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima, meaning that the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers; and

third, ut magis valeat quam pereat, meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.3

VERBA LEGIS = verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation

RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA = The reason of the law is the soul of the law

UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT = referring to a legal concept that stands for trying to construe a
law in a way to make sense, rather than void it. The law should be given effect rather than be destroyed.

Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Phil.

FACTS:
Appellants' applied for an urban real estate loan which was
approved by appellee bank on April 80, 1953. they executed the
mortgage contract on March 23, 1954, and that the release of the
amount of the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in
instalments subject to certain conditions. That the loan obtained
from DBP is to be received in several releases and to be paid later in
instalments, under the terms and conditions specified in the loan
agreement. That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29,
1954, and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter,
then the balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him
later than June, 1953. Rodriguez paid the instalments as they fell
due. When a balance of about P14,000.00 remained unpaid,
quijano offered to pay for the said outstanding balance with his
back pay certificate pursuant to Republic Act. No. 897, The
Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953. The Bank refused to accept the
said tender of payment in certificate on the ground that the loan
was not incurred before on June 20, 1953.
ISSUE
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at
the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897, the Amendatory
Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic Act 304.
Whether or not there is a room for interpretation or construction.
HELD
Thus even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said
law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations
subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has
ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on June 18,
1948 cannot come within its purview.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.
Stat. Con
Clear and unambiguous provisions of law offer no room for
interpretation or construction. The Supreme Court has steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation
being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No
process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where
a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a
requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous
terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.
 Marcos vs Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)
Posted: July 11, 2011 in Political Law
Tags: Case Digest, Separation of Powers

FACTS
February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced
into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of
the Republic under a revolutionary government.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return
to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his
family.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill
of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court
may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel
may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government,
there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right
of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary
to protect national security, public order (order public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.
ISSUE
• Whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
• Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcose’s to the Philippines poses
a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar
their return.
HELD
SC well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power
which justifies her act of banning the return of the Marcoses and
she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one’s
country, a totally distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave a country, and the right to enter one’s country as separate
and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the “right to freedom
of movement and residence within the borders of each state” [Art.
13(l)] separately from the “right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.” [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand,
the Covenant guarantees the “right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence” [Art. 12(l)] and the right to “be free
to leave any country, including his own.” [Art. 12(2)] which rights
may be restricted by such laws as “are necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own
country” of which one cannot be “arbitrarily deprived.” [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right to return to one’s country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being “arbitrarily deprived”
thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.”
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that “[t]he
prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people”
and that “[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.” [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s
powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep
the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-
chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but
is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion,
within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of
powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s
exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of
the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that
the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao,
rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder
with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials,
to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcose’s and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier
narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from
taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though
still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government.
The preservation of the State the fruition of the people’s sovereignty
is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful
execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its
efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the
continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles
and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of
widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting
precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is
easily within the ambit of judicial notice

SALAS VS JARENCIO
FACTS
Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution requiring the Pres.
to consider the feasibility of declaring an area to be a patrimonial
property of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the
actual occupants. RA 4118 was passed declaring the area as an
alienable/disposable land of the State, to be placed under the Land
Tenure Administration(Land Authority). Gov. Yap of Land Authority
wrote letter to Mayor of Manila for the proposed subdivision plan of
w/c Manila accepted. But due to unknown reasons, Manila decided
to go against their “agreement” and prayed that RA 4118 be not
implemented and that it is unconstitutional.
Respondent Judge Jarencio declared that RA 4118 is
unconstitutional and invalid, thus the petition for review.

ISSUE
Is RA 4118 valid?

HELD
VALID! Manila has not shown any evidence that it acquired said
land as private or patrimonial property. Further, RA 4118 was
intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution
and the “Land for the Landless” program. The RA was never
intended to expropriate the property involved but confirmed its
character as communal land of the State and to make it available
for disposition by the Nat’l Gov’t through the Land Authority.
(STATCON PRINCIPLE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTES)
Presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of the law. To
declare a law as unconstitutional, the repugnancy must be clear
and unequivocal. To strike down a law, there must be a clear
showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the
statute allows it to be done.

FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO ROXAS & PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966
CONCEPCION, C.J.

FACTS
Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were
candidates for the position of Vice-President of the Philippines.
Petitioner was later proclaimed the winner as a result of the election.
Respondent then filed a protest with the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal. Petitioner then instituted in the Supreme Court an action
for prohibition against respondent, preventing the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal from hearing and deciding the contest upon the
ground that RA No. 1793 which created the said tribunal is
unconstitutional on the grounds that it was not provided for by the
Constitution and that since the members of PET are Supreme Court
Justices, Congress created another court within the Supreme Court,
a violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA No. 1793 is unconstitutional on the ground that
election protest for the position of President and Vice-President is not
provided in the Constitution and that its enactment created a new
court within the Supreme Court

HELD
No. Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact Republic Act
No. 1793, the provision of the Constitution, establishing Electoral
Tribunals for Members of Congress only proves the exact opposite,
namely: that the Constitution intended to vest Congress with
discretion to determine by law whether or not the election of a
president-elect or that of a vice-president-elect may be contested and,
if Congress should decide in the affirmative, which court of justice
shall have jurisdiction to hear the contest. Also, Republic Act No.
1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred
upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal. Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and
courts of first instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well
as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are booth
trial courts and appellate courts, without detracting from the fact
that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one
court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharged dual
functions. So, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions
peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1793 does not entail an assumption
by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution
in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional
duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court. The petition is
hereby dsmissed.

Cecilleville Realty v. CA
G.R. No. 120363

FRANCISCO, J.:

FACTS
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation owns a land in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, in which private respondent Herminigildo
Pascual occupies. Despite private demands, petitioner refused to
vacate the property and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land
because he helping his mother Ana Pascual to cultivate the land in
question. Hence, petitioner instituted an ejectment suit before the
MTC of Sta. Maria, Bualacan. Finding no tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private respondent, the Municipal Trial
Court, ordered private respondent to vacate the land. Private
respondednt appeled to the RTC. The RTC remanded the case to the
DARAB for further adjudication. A Motion for reconsidered was
likewise denied. Hence, private respondent seek appeal to the CA.
The CA find the petition devoid of merit. The tenancy relationship
dated back to 1976 when the defendants father, Sotero Pascual,
became the tenant of Jose A. Resurreccion, the President of the
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation. The defendant, although
not the tenant himself, is afforded the protection provided by law as
his mother is already old and infirm and is allowed to avail of the
labor of her immediate household. He is entitled to the security of
tenure accorded his mother. His having a house of his own on the
property is merely incidental to the tenancy. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE
WON, the CA erred in not finding that while the private respondent
is entitled to work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his
capacity as member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless
he can not occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same
for residential purposes.

HELD

Petition is impressed with merit.

Under Section 22, paragraph 3, of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 2263 “The tenant shall have the right to demand for a
home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than 3 per
cent of the area of his landholding…” The law is unambiguous and
clear. only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the
right to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here, private
respondent does not dispute that he is not petitioners tenant. . Under
the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a home
lot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to
continue maintaining the same within the very small landholding of
petitioner. Compassion for the poor, as we said in Galay, et. al. v.
Court of Appeals, et. al. is an imperative of every humane society but
only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
privilege.

Tabao vs. Espina a.m. No. Rtj-96-1348, 14 june 1996.

Facts:

In the 4th of July 1995, First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban
City, Leo C. Tabao, accused Judge Pedro S. Espina then presiding
judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City of:

(a) Gross Irregularity,

(b) Abuse of Authority

(c) Bias in favor of the accused, in handling and deciding Criminal

Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Salvador
Padernal" a case for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Drug
Pushing).

In 21st of July 1995, a sworn complaint of Regional State Prosecutor

Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr. manifested his desire to be a co-
complainant against Judge Espina for his handling of the above-
mentioned criminal case.

In 22 June 1995, the prosecution received a notice of promulgation

of judgment in the said criminal case which was set on 27 June
1995.

On the same day, 22 June 1995, the prosecution filed an urgent

manifestation seeking to postpone promulgation of judgment since
the defense had not submitted its documentary evidence, formal
offer of exhibits and rested its case. The prosecution also
manifested its intention of adducing rebuttal evidence to the
documentary exhibits to be submitted.

On 23rd of June 1995, Judge Espina nonetheless issued an order

reiterating the notice setting the date of promulgation of judgment
on 27 June 1995.

On 27th day of June 1995, Judge Espina promulgated a judgment

in the said Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People v. Salvador
Padernal" acquitting the accused. The decision was dated 1 June
1995.

ISSUE

a.) Whether the deliberate haste of Judge Espina to acquit the

accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted by
respondent judge without hearing the prosecution's evidence
and;

b.) Having denied the prosecution`s right to present rebuttal

evidence when it had manifested its intention to present
rebuttal evidence when informed of the promulgation of
judgment legal.

HELD
Accordingly, regular course of trial should always take into
consideration the rights of all the parties to the case and he
miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity required of members of the
bench which is necessary, even indispensable, to maintain the
public's trust and confidence in the courts.

In conclusion, respondent judge should be penalized for gross

ignorance of the law in granting bail to the accused in Criminal
Case No. 93-04-197, where the then imposable penalty was life
imprisonment, without hearing. He should also be accordingly
sanctioned for having promulgated the decision in the same
criminal case before the defense had rested and without according
the prosecution an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.

For these two (2) acts constituting grave misconduct, ignorance of

the law and gross incompetence, respondent Judge Pedro S.
Espina, now Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan is hereby dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

PEOPLE VS PURISIMA
FACTS
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and
joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question
of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed
motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders
quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts
constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime,
which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to
maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless
violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other
legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned
that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the
purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The
petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act
is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The
City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of
the act is voluntary is enough.

ISSUE
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of
“Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

HELD
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to
penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion,
subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and
spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify
the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

The petition is DISMISSED.

US VS HART ET AL.
FACTS
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty
on a charge of vagrancy under the provision of Act no. 519. All three
appealed and presented evidence showing that each of the
defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or business
sufficient enough to support themselves. However, the Attorney-
General defender his clients by arguing that in Sec. 1 of Act no. 519
the phrase “no visible means of support’ only applies to the clause
“tramping or straying through the country” and not the first clause
which states to that “ every person found loitering about saloon or
dram shops or gambling houses;” thus making the 3 appellants
guilty of vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for
“without visible means of support” to qualify the first part of the
clause, either comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else a comma after would have been inserted.
ISSUE
 WON Hart and Miller and Natividad are guilty of Vagrancy under
the Attorney-General’s argument based on a mere grammatical
critisim?
HELD
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and
the effect intended by the Legislature should be the relevant
determinant of the interpretation of the law. When the meaning of a
legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to
ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, an adopt that
construction of the statute which will give if effect. Moreover,
ascertaining the consequence flowing from such a construction of
the law is also helpful in determining the soundness of the
reasoning.
Considering that the argument of the Attorney-general would
suggest a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature
of the various classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all
three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate means at
a level of comfort higher that usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad were
acquitted, with the costs de officio.