Devashish Tiwari Internship Report

Internship Report 2022
INTERNSHIP REPORT
Internship Report Submitted to GGSIP University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of
Bachelor of Law (H)
Batch: 2017 – 2022
Submitted By:
Name: Devashish Tiwari
Enrollment No: 01025503517
Semester: 10th
JEMTEC SCHOOL OF LAW

GREATER NOIDA GAUTAM BUDDHA NAGAR, U.P.-201308, INDIA
2022
LIST OF CONTENT
1. DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP
2. CERTIFICATE OF INTERNSHIP
3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
4. UNDERTAKING REGARDING THE AUTHENTICITY BY THE STUDENT
5. EMPLOYER FEEDBACK FORM
6. OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNSHIP
7. MONTHLY REPORT OF LEX FAVIOS
8. MONTHLY REPORT OF ADP & ASSOCIATES
9. MONTHLY REPORT OF KHAITAN & CO.
10. CONCLUSION
DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP
The internship for the tenth semester was done under the supervision of:
1. Lex Favios
Office Address: E-299, Kailash Colony, Greater Kailash 1, New Delhi – 110048
Duration of the Internship: 7th February 2022 – 7th March 2022 (One Month)
2. ADP & Associates
Office Adress: 53A, 2nd Floor, Padav Nagar Main road, New Delhi – 110092.
Duration of the Internship: 8th march 2022 to 4th April 2022 (Four Weeks)
3. Khaitan & Co.
Office Address: 7th & 8th Floor, Max Towers, Sector 16B, Noida – 201301
Duration of the Internship: 4th April 2022 to 29th April 2022 (Month of April)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I express my gratitude and a deep sense of indebtedness to JIMS School of Law, affiliated
with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University for encouraging and providing me with this
opportunity to undergo legal training before entering into the profession.
I am thankful to Lex Favios, ADP & Associates and Khaitan & Co., who allowed me to intern.
I am very grateful that the mentors in Lex Favios, ADP & Associates and Khaitan & Co., who
trained me under their guidance and gave me wide exposure. I am thankful to them for their
invaluable teachings, guidance & advice given to me, for helping me in exploring and
understanding the legal field better. Nothing concrete can be achieved without an optimal
combination of inspiration and perspiration.
No work can be accomplished without taking the guidance of experts. It is only the critiques
from ingenious intellectuals that help to transform a product into a quality product. I would
especially like to thank Mr. Mohit Wilkinson, Mr. Arun Vir Singh & Mr. Umang Katariya,
for their guidance during my internship. Their deep sense of commitment towards their work
and their want for perfection inspired me to put my best during the course of the internships.
INTRODUCTION
“Not only does an internship allow you to work hard and gain experience, but it also allows
an employer to experience how hard of a worker you are.”
-R.J. Calvo
With practical legal skills, a law student is equipped with essential professional skills.
Practical training enables one to meet the demands of legal practice, business, industry, or
wherever the law degree takes you.
In practical legal skills, a law student uses highly developed research and analytical skills and
then translates this knowledge into a persuasive and convincing argument. A law graduate
emerges from a law degree with not only theoretical knowledge but technical competency and
appreciation of how the law operates in practice.
Law internships in particular are a great way to gain real-life. Students get to know themselves
better in a real work environment because they come face to face with the reality of being able
to know whether they can finish the task required or not, though most internships require
completion of at least the 2nd year of law school course. An internship provides the
opportunity to gain hands-on work experience that you just can’t get in the classroom. An
internship can be seen as the pinnacle of one’s undergraduate education as it gives you the
chance to use the skills you’ve learned in the classroom in a real-world setting. It’s a chance
to prove the worth of your qualifications and to show that you can perform in the role that you
have been given.
Probably because of the abovementioned reason, it is seen that almost all professional courses
have included a semester of compulsory internships in their course curriculum.
During the year 2022, I got the opportunity to intern in the Lex Favios, ADP & Associates
and Khaitan & Co. All the Firms are multi-disciplinary law firm providing a wide range of
transactional, regulatory, corporate advisory and dispute resolution services. All the Firms are
committed to finding practical solutions that produce tangible and cost-effective results for its
clients. The cornerstone of the firm’s philosophy is to safeguard and advance the clients’
interests effectively and efficiently.
I interned at Lex Favios, ADP & Associates and Khaitan & Co., for a period of one month
each. I was expected to research various propositions of law, besides drafting key documents
& applications. The Associates working in the organization was very understanding and
always assisted me in performing legal research, besides making me feel part of the team.
The Objective of the Internship
The Legal Internship Program is not designed to teach students how to be good lawyers (or
how to be lawyers at all) - it takes more than study at University to do that. The objectives are
to:
• Expose you to the law in operation in contexts where you will come to perceive aspects of
the law that cannot be learned from reading or hearing about it;
• Allow you to perceive ways in which the formal learning you acquire at University may be
applied in practice and therefore to develop an appreciation of the practical dimensions of
legal principles;
• Enable you to relate the different areas of legal practice to the importance of developing the
skills of legal research, communication, drafting, practice management and problem-solving;
and
• Enable you to observe and reflect upon the values, ethical standards and conduct of the
legal profession in practice and to develop your own attitudes of professional responsibility.
Letter of Undertaking
I, DEVASHISH TIWARI, student of BBA LLB, JIMS, School of law hereby declare that the
internship report I have prepared is solely my own effort. It contains the work accomplished
during the internship which was assigned during the internship. This work was done in respect
of the partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of LLB (HONS)
DEGREE.
This internship report has not been submitted either in whole or in part to any other Law
university or affiliated Institute recognized by the bar council of India for the award of any
law degree or diploma within the territory of India. If I am found guilty of misleading or
concealing the fact at any stage then the college is authorized to take disciplinary action
against me according to university rules and regulations.
Signature for the Authenticity

Monthly Report
[Lex Favios]
An Overview of the Internship Work
7th February 2022
1. Researched on the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, revolving around the
concept of placing on record additional documents.
Concluded that the same comes under the purview of Order 7 Rule 14(3) read with Section 151,
the relevant excerpts of which is produced below:
Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented,
or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered
accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the
hearing of the suit.
Also produced the judgements in support of the research:
1. S. Rathinaswamy vs S. Bhanumathi, AIR 2006 Mad 221
“The main object of Order 7, Rule 14(3), C.P.C., conferring the power upon the Court to receive
the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause is shown to the
satisfaction of the Court for the non-production of the documents at the earlier stage. The Courts
are expected to receive the documents and give an opportunity to the parties.”
2. Further, I Tracked the application status of over fifty trademarks on the website of
ipindiaonline.gov.in. The reproduction of which is stated below:
Serial Proprietor’s Name Status Objection Tm

Number Application
No.
1. Mahesh Advani Dispatching Of Two Different 4354437

Single Firm Examination Labels Cannot Be
Report As On Claimed In Single
21/07/2020 Application
Unless It’s A
Series Mark
Unless It Is A
Series Mark
Unless It Is A
Series Mark
4. Eagle Home Appliances Opposed Opposed By 1868955
Pvt.Ltd. Eagle Glass Deco
(P) Ltd. On
12/11/2014
5. Abdulla S. Khatri Registered NA 2756
Trading As : Khatri Art
Jewellers
Body Incorporate
6. Eagle Vacuum Bottle Mfg. Registered NA 193366
Co. Private Ltd. But Renewal
Body Incorporate Request
Pending
Co. Private Ltd. But Renewal
Body Incorporate Request
Pending
8. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. Registered NA 495056
Single Firm But Renewal
Request
Pending
9. Sankar Basak Registered NA 790729
Trading As : Tirthamoyee
Aluminium Products
Single Firm
10. Eagle Glass Deco (P) Ltd., Registered NA 937689
Trading As : Eagle Glass But Renewal
Deco (P) Ltd., Request
Body Incorporate Pending
11. Eagle Glass Deco (P) Ltd. Registered NA 1208329
Body Incorporate
12. Eagle Home Appliances Registered NA 1298076
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
13. Future India Abandoned Application Form 1289077
Trading As : Future India Not Digitized
Single Firm
14. Ramesh Kundanmal Jain. Opposed Opposed By Kunj 1724343
Trading As : Oswal Aluminum (P)
Appliances Ltd, Eagle Home
Single Firm Appliances
Pvt.Ltd., Eagle
Glass Deco (P)
Ltd.
15. Sankar Basak Opposed Opposed By 1725162
Trading As : Tirthamoyee Eagle Home
Aluminium Products Appliances Pvt.
Single Firm Ltd.
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
17. Eagle Home Appliances Renewal of NA 2265874
Pvt. Ltd. trademark is
Body Incorporate overdue
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
Private Limited
Body Incorporate

Co. Private Ltd.
Single Firm
22. Mohd. Nafis Renewal due NA 202632
Trading As : Mohd. Hanif
Mohd. Anis.
Partnership Firm Details :
Shahid Nafis
23. Banarsi Dass Bhambri Renewal due NA 229955
Single Firm
24. Eagle Vacuum Bottle Mfg. Renewal due NA 237135
Co. Private Ltd.
Body Incorporate
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
26. Trade Team Limited Abandoned Application Form 1298075
Body Incorporate not Digitized
27. Mr. Pankaj Babu Jain Abandoned NA 1332817
Trading As : Eagle Light
Enterprises
Single Firm
28. ASHOK J. SHAH Abandoned NA 1562512
Trading As : SHAH
TRADERS
Partnership Firm
29. Prakashbhai K Patel Registered NA 1582782
Trading As : Bhagwati
Enterprise
Single Firm
30. Vikramkumar Registered NA 1685503
Chandrakantbhai Ashar
Trading As : M/S. Eagle
Ceramics
31. Prashanth Jain Renewal due NA 1739796
Trading As : Eagle
Technologies
Single Firm
32. Vikrakumar Registered NA 1823052
Chandrakantbhai Ashar
Trading As : M/S. Engle
Ceramics
33. R. Gopalakrishnan Abandoned NA 1841327
Single Firm
34. Eagle Flask Private Renewal due NA 420247
Limited.
Single Firm
35. Eagle Flask Private Renewal due NA 420244
Limited.
Single Firm
36. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. Registered NA 374886
Body Incorporate
37. Eagle Flask Industries Renewal due NA 374887
Limited
Trading As : Eagle Flask
Industries Limited
Body Incorporate
38. Eagle Flask Industries Renewal due NA 387285
Limited.
Body Incorporate
39. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. Renewal due NA 495058
Single Firm
Single Firm
Single Firm
Body Incorporate
Single Firm
Co. Private Ltd.
Body Incorporate
45. EAGLE GAZ & Renewal due NA 842280
APPLIANCES PVT. LTD.
Body Incorporate
Co. Private Ltd.
Body Incorporate
47. EAGLE VACUUM Registered NA 185011

BOTTLE MFG. CO.
PRIVATE LTD.
Body Incorporate
48. Sunil Sikka Removed NA 1117471
Trading As : Micro Optical
Specialities
Single Firm
49. Bhavna Nanda Registered NA 2188376
Single Firm
50. Bhavna Kohli Objected Show cause 3542625
Trading As : Bhavna Kohli notice issued on
Single Firm 23/10/2019 for
31/12/2019
51. Lucid Holdings, Llc Registered NA 3328510
Body Incorporate
52. Lucid Holdings, Llc Registered NA 3328511
Body Incorporate
53. LUCID HOLDINGS, LLC Registered NA 3328512
Body Incorporate
54. LUCID HOLDINGS, LLC Registered NA 3328513
Body Incorporate
55. INACCES GEOTECNICA Refused Application has 3706541
VERTICAL, S.L been refused
Body Incorporate under Section
18(4) on
21/05/2019 by the
tribunal
56. INACCES GEOTECNICA Abandoned NA 3076542

VERTICAL, S.L
Body Incorporate
57. KANCHAN Removed NA 1045955
DINKARRAO MALI
Trading As : CHIKOO
MUSIC
Single Firm
58. KANCHAN Removed NA 1045956
DINKARRAO MALI
Trading As : CHIKOO
MUSIC
59. KANCHAN Abandoned NA 1045957
DINKARRAO MALI
Trading As : CHIKOO
MUSIC
Single Firm
60. MAHESH ADVANI Objected Request for 3204395
Single Firm amendment is
Pending for
processing
61. MAHESH ADVANI Opposed Opposed by Soma 3465437
Single Firm Vine Village Pvt
Ltd
Vine House,
Saptashrungi
Colony, Gangapur
Road, Nasik -
422005,
Maharashtra on
08/06/2021
62. MAHESH ADVANI Objected Ready for Show 3465438
Body Incorporate cause Hearing
8th & 9th February 2022
1. Researched and wrote a comprehensive article on the topic of “Marital Rape”, for the
website of Lex Favios. In the article, I covered aspects like the present legal position of
marital rape in India, the Report of Justice J.S. Verma Committee, legal precedents and
India’s International Legal obligations on the matter. The reproduction of which is stated
below:
Impunity to Marital Rape: An Opportune Time to Show it the Door?
Introduction
“A forced sexual intercourse against a women is considered one of the most heinous offences
in our statue boook, but the same outrageous act becomes lawful if committed in wedlock,
perhaps in our country the institution of marriage is far more superior to human rights”
Marital rape can be referred to as forced sexual intercourse by a husband against his wife in
wedlock. The gut-wrenching behavior compromises the dignity, basic human rights, and
bodily autonomy of a married woman, besides contravening our international obligations to
extend protection to married women from any form of sexual abuse. It is surreal to know that
marital rape, a grave affront to married women, has not been treated like an offense in our
country, rather express impunity is granted to the offense in our country in the form of an
exception given under Section 3751, penalizing rape, Such is the level of patriarchal deeply
entrenched thought process we have towards married women in our society.
India is no stranger to the fact that marital rape occurs, the survey of National Family Health
Survey 4—for the year 2015-16 only certifies that fact.2 We pride ourselves in having one of
the biggest constitutions, a reservoir of rights for our citizens yet we fall short of giving one
section of our society (Married Women) the most cardinal right, that of equality with their
counterpart. This is deeply reflected in the offense of marital rape, which assumes the consent
of a woman in every sexual intercourse with her husband from the point of marriage till her
death without any exception, putting the husband on a pedestal. The present article will dwell
on the legality of the impunity to marital rape, our international obligations, legal
repercussions, and why it should be shown the door.
The Present Legal Position of Marital Rape in India
The exception given under Section 375 3 creates an unnecessary distinction between a married
woman and unmarried women with respect to forceful sexual intercourse. The provision
strives to penalize rape against unmarried women but spares married women of similar
protection on the erroneous notion that the wife is the property of the husband. The said
provision treats women as a chattel or instrument of the husband, deeming the consent of the
women immaterial in intercourse. The exception entitles the husband to rape her wife with
impunity.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the matter of marital rape, but only with respect to the minor
married women aged between 15 and 18 years old in the case of Independent Thought Vs.
Union of India and Anr.4 but missed the opportunity to look at the bigger opportunity to pacify
the suffering of adult women too. As a result, we have a section of women who are victims of
1
The Indian Penal Code, 1908, Section 375, Exception 2
2
National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015-16: India., http://rchiips.org/NFHS/NFHS-4Reports/India.pdf
3
supra 1
4
Independent Thought Vs. Union of India and Anr., AIR 2017 SC 4904, (2017) 10 SCC 800
non-consensual sex at the hand of their husband but are devoid of any criminal remedy other
than to plead it as cruelty, to seek divorce/judicial separation. On that too, the views of the
various high court are sharply divided, some view it as a ground of divorce whereas others
view it as the right of the husband.
Why Should the Impunity to Marital Rape be shown the Door?
Report of Law Commission of India and Outdated Notion of Marital Rape
The law commission of India via its “Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal
Law” through Justice J.S. Verma Committee recommended many reforms in criminal law,
marital rape being one of them. The committee took cognizance of our international
obligations, outdated notion on which the law of marital rape is based, looked up to countries
that have criminalized marital rape and suffering of the married women to rightly conclude
that the second exception of Section 375 5 needs to be removed. The committee further
recommended a further addition in the legislative book, that the relationship between the
parties must not be the mitigating factor while awarding a sentence for the Rape. However,
these recommendations were turned a blind eye to by the legislature.
Further, there is no denying the fact that marital rape is based on an outdated notion that, the
wife is the property of the husband and the wife has no bodily autonomy over her body. Being
marital rape an exception is none other than the denial to the fundamental rights enshrined
under Article 146, Article 157, Article 19(1)(a)8 & Article 219. we are relying on a set of land
mark judgements of the apex court, beginning from the decision of K.S. Puttaswamy10, where
a nine-judge bench acknowledged the right to privacy as a fundamental right in 2017.
Furthermore, in Navtej Singh Johar11, the apex court struck down section 37712 and
decriminalize the same sex relationship and after this, the Apex Court has frowned down on
such a notion, it is worth recalling the landmark pronouncement in the case of Joseph Shine
Vs. Union of India13, whereby the Apex Court decriminalized the offense of adultery on the
ground that it treats husband like a master and wife as a chattel. These recognition of the apex
court through judgements, has concreted a way for rescinding the marital rape as an exception
and to held it unconstitutional. As we go past our 75th year of independence, we need to
introspect the need to have such laws which are subservient to women, denying equality to
5
supra 1
6
The Constitution of India, 1949
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. vs Union Of India And Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1
11
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321
12
Indian Penal Code, 1860
13
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2018) SC 1676.
them. Time has again come for the judiciary to undo the injustice meted out to the married
women, which it has always done in the face of adversity.
Is Impunity to Marital Rape Helping in Protection the Institution of Marriage?
It has been often argued that marital rape is to protect the institution of marriage, however, the
very offense can be pleaded as a ground of cruelty to seek judicial separation/divorce. Kerala High
Court on 30th July 2021 had recently rightly held that marital rape though not recognized by law,
comes under the ambit of physical and mental cruelty, hence can be a valid ground to claim
divorce. The relevant excerpts of the judgments are as follows:
“Merely for the reason that the law does not recognise marital rape under penal law, it does not
inhibit the court from recognizing the same as a form of cruelty to grant divorce. We, therefore,
are of the view that marital rape is a good ground to claim divorce.”14
Therefore the argument that marital rape is to protect the institution of marriage is ill-thought and
obtuse. Additionally, the argument that supports marital rape is in the line that it can be misused
as a weapon to harass the husband in the institution of marriage. There are long strings of
judgments by the Apex Court stating that the mere possibility of the misuse of the legislation
cannot be the sole ground to strike it off from the book of the legislature.15 Also, there are adequate
judicial discourses in the form of Section 21116, providing for prosecution in the event of malicious
prosecution by a party, with the intent to cause injury. Thus the apprehension that the law of marital
law may cause a great deal of injury to the institution of marriage is unfounded, as there is a judicial
discourse available in the event of it being used as a weapon of harassment.
India’s International Obligations
We have laws affording protection to unmarried women against rape, however, the same protection
is not extended to women in wedlock. The non-recognition of marital rape as an offense is costing
dearly to married women in terms of human rights. Article 1 of the CEDAW 17, of which India is
a signatory, obliges us to treat women with parity, irrespective of their marital status but the non-
recognition of marital rape is discriminatory since the same level of protection is not being afforded
to both the groups, i.e Married and Unmarried Women.
14
LIVE LAW, https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/marital-rapewatermark-398094.pdf (Last visited Feb. 02, 2022)
15
Collector of Customs, Madras & Anr. v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty & Anr., AIR 1962 SC 316.
16
supra at 12
17
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979
Moreover, along the same lines (General Recommendation - 19)18 says that any form of violence
against women, which deprives them of exercising their fundamental and human rights goes
against the principle of equality. (General Recommendation – 35)19 expounds that marital rape is
rape due to lack of freely given consent and should be condemned. The provisions of international
conventions extend similar protection towards married women, like Article 26 of ICCPR 20 and
Article 1 of UDHR21 that propagate a similar sense of equality among all classes of citizens,
without making a distinction between married and non-married women.
Moreover, other countries have shown the way in enacting legislation criminalizing marital rape,
with an exception of just 32 countries worldwide, each nation has undertaken to criminalize marital
rape to preserve the bodily autonomy of married women. 22 It is time that India, follows the
humanitarian approach too to promote the ethos of our Constitution and fulfill its constitutional
mandate as a welfare state towards women.
Conclusion
It may not be an opportune time to remove impunity to marital rape and show it the door, as the
opportune time is long gone by, however, better late than never, it is high time to strike off marital
rape as an exception. Failure to do so shall demonstrate our non-committal attitude to safeguard
the very cardinal right of equality to married women. As the matter is sub judice before the Delhi
High Court, the onus is on court to take stern cognition of the sinful act, stemming from an outdated
notion. It is time we see the outrageous act through the prism of the constitutionality and challenge
the deeply entrenched patriarchal attitude. An impetus is required to further a course correction in
the form of striking down of second exception of Section 375 23, otherwise the posterity will never
forgive us for our dilatory attitude of denying the basic human rights to married women of refusing
to get RAPED.
18
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women, 1992, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/52d920c54.html [accessed 6 March 2022]
19
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 35: Violence against women updating General Recommendation No. 19, 2017, available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/gr35.aspx#:~:text=On%2014%20July%202017%2C%20the,19.
[accessed 6 March 2022]
20
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
21
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
22
Marital Rape is Not a Crime in 32 Countries. One of Them is India, News 18, (AUGUST 26, 2021, 16:31 IST),
https://www.news18.com/news/india/marital-rape-is-not-a-crime-in-32-countries-one-of-them-is-india-
4130363.html
23
supra 12
1. Researched and worked on the comprehensive article on the topic of “CSR Policy and
the Recent Amendments”, covering aspects like the Applicability of Corporate Social
Responsibility, Role of CSR Committee, Activities under the purview of CSR and the
amendments brought forth by the recent amendments on CSR. The reproduction of
which is stated below:
Brief Summary of Corporate Social Responsibility
What is Corporate Social Responsibility?
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the way and mean through which corporates can repay the
obligations made by the Society by contributing the resources in its various forms as required for the
efficient operation of the Business. Corporate Social Responsibility is strongly connected with the
principles of sustainability. Organization make decisions based not only on financial or operational
factors, but also on the social and environmental consequences. Therefore, it is the core corporate
responsibility to practice its corporate values through its commitment to grow in a socially and
environmentally responsible way, while meeting the interests of its stakeholders.
Applicability of CSR on the Companies
Every company is mandated as per the provision of Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, having:
> Net Worth of Rs.500 Crores or More
> Turnover of Rs.1000 Crores or More
> Not Profit of Rs.5 Crore or More (Net Profit before Tax)
During the immediately preceding financial year shall establish a Corporate Social Responsibility
Committee of the Board involving of three or more directors, out of which at least one director
shall be an independent director. Provided that where a company is not required to appoint an
independent, it shall have in its Corporate Social Responsibility Committee two or more directors.
What is the Role of Corporate Social Responsibility Committee?
(a) Formulate and recommend to the Board, a Corporate Social Responsibility Policy,
(b) Recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the activities and
(c) Monitor the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company from time to time.
(d) Approve the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy for the company and disclose contents of
such Policy in its report and also place it on the company’s website,
(e) Ensure that the activities as are included in Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company
are undertaken by the company,
(f) Ensure that the company spends, in every financial year, at least 2% of the average net profits of
the company made during the three immediately preceding financial years.
Penalty- If a company contravenes the provisions shall be punishable with fine which shall not be
less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to twenty-five lakh rupees and every officer
of such company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may
extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.
Activities that have been included in the CSR as per Schedule 7 of the Companies Act, 2013
Activities which may be included by companies in their Corporate Social Responsibility Policies
Activities relating to:-
(a) Eradicating hunger, poverty and malnutrition, promoting health care including preventive
health care and making available safe drinking water.
(b) Promoting education, including special education and employment and livelihood
enhancement projects.
(c) Promoting gender equality, empowering women, setting up homes and hostels for women
and orphans; setting up old age homes, day care centres and such other facilities for senior
citizens.
(d) Ensuring environmental sustainability, ecological balance, protection of flora and fauna,
animal welfare, agroforestry, conservation of natural resources.
(e) Protection of national heritage, art and culture including restoration of buildings and sites
of historical importance and works of arts.
(f) Measures for the benefit of armed forces veterans, war widows and their dependents.
(g) Training to promote rural sports, nationally recognized sports, paralympic sports and
olympic sports
(h) Contribution to the prime minister’s national relief fund or any other fund set up by the
central govt. for socio economic development.
(i) (a) Contribution to incubators or research and development projects in the field of science,
technology, engineering and medicine, funded by the Central Government or State
Government or Public Sector Undertaking.
(j) (b) Contributions to public funded Universities; Indian Institute of Technology (IITs);
National Laboratories and autonomous bodies, engaged in conducting research in science,
technology, engineering and medicine aimed at promoting Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs)
(k) Rural development projects
(l) Slum area development.
Changes Incorporated through the Amendments

Activities that can now be Included as CSR
(a) COVID-19-related activity in the normal course of business: This covers companies
undertaking research and development into vaccines, medical devices, and drugs related to
COVID-19, even if such activity is in their normal course of business. This exemption is
allowed up to the financial year 2022-2023.
(b) Acquisition or creation of a capital asset provided that it is not owned by the company: The
asset created using CSR funds must be owned either by the organisation supported, or the
people served by the project (for instance, collectives such as self-help groups), or by a public
authority.
Activities that have been excluded by the CSR Amendment Rules, 2021
(a) Any activity that is done by the company in its original course of business apart from this the
exception granted for companies is undertaking Research and Development activities for Covid-
19 related activities like vaccines, drugs, and medicines.
(b) Any activity that is done outside India, apart from training of sports personnel representing
India in national or international competitions.
(c) Any activity to donate or contribute any amount to political parties under Section 182 of the
Companies Act.
(d) Any activity which benefits employees of the companies as per Section 2(k) of the Code on
Wages, 2019.
(e) Any activity that the companies support on a sponsorship basis, for deriving marketing benefits
or goods and services.
(f) Any activity that is done to fulfill the statutory obligations under any statute.
It must be ensured by the companies that their CSR policy does not include these activities, as
these are statutorily excluded from the ambit of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility.’ Any
expenditure incurred with respect to these activities cannot be accounted for as CSR expenditure.
New obligations of the Board and CSR Committee besides exclusion of certain activities from
CSR via Amendment
In accordance with the amendment, the board and CSR committee has certain obligations. Where
a company is not willing or not required to appoint an independent director under this act, then it
shall have so in its Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of two or more directors. As per
Section 135(2) the composition of Corporate social responsibility shall be disclosed in the board’s
report. According to Section 135(9), there is no need for the CSR committee to be constituted if
the company spends an amount that exceeds fifty lakh rupees as these functions are to be carried
on by the Board of directors of such a company.
Utilization of Surplus
According to the new CSR Regime, the utilization of surplus is the surplus arising out of CSR
projects. This Utilization of Surplus should not be a part of the business profit of the company.
The Amendment rules provide that such surplus should be invested again into the same project or
it must be transferred to the identified CSR fund/government fund within a period of 6 months of
the expiry of the financial year
Impact Assessment
There is a new requirement for mandatory impact assessment of CSR projects.

(a) This requirement applies to companies that have an average CSR spend of INR 10 crore or
more in the past three financial years.
(b) It must be conducted for all CSR projects that have budgets of INR 1 crore and more; and
have been completed one year prior to undertaking the impact assessment.
(c) An ‘independent’ agency must be appointed to undertake the impact assessment. The costs
of such an agency cannot exceed INR 50 lakh or five percent of the total CSR spend for
that financial year (whichever is lower).
Support from ‘international organizations’
The rules permit companies to appoint an international organisation for designing, and monitoring
and evaluation of CSR projects or programmes as per its policy, as well as for building the capacity
of their own CSR teams. However, the costs or fees paid to such entities may be subject to the cap
of five percent on administrative overheads, if it relates to the general management and
administration of CSR functions in a company. (This might be the case if the international
organisation is providing capacity building services.
Registration of CSR Undertakings
With effect from April 1st, 2021, every entity listed above is required to mandatorily register itself
with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA). Such entities are required to apply in the prescribed
form (providing details of their legal entity, directors, trustees, and so on) and thereafter obtain a
unique CSR registration number
14th February 2022
1. Researched extensively on the requirement of public health licence in the state of

Himachal Pradesh and the penalty for not complying with the requirement. Also,
researched extensively on the requirement of licence for the eating housing, lodging
house, hotel, boarding house, restaurant or any other public place in the State of
Himachal Pradesh and the penalty for not complying with the requirement. The
reproduction of which is stated below:
THE HIMACHAL PRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1994
Requirement for Public Health Licence
324. Premises not to be used for certain purposes without licence.-

Section 324 makes it mandatory for any person to obtain licence from the commissioner and
comply with its terms, if in the opinion of the Commissioner the purpose is dangerous to life,
health or property or is likely to create a nuisance;
Requirement of licence for eating housing, lodging house, hotel, boarding house, restaurant
or any other public place
328. Eating houses etc. not to be used without licence from Commissioner. -
Section 328 of The Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 provides that no person
can keep an eating housing, lodging house, hotel, boarding house, restaurant or any other public
place for the sale of any food or drink without obtaining the licence by the commissioner or anyone
from his behalf. The Section also provides that in case of non-compliance with the terms of the
licence, the commissioner can suspend the licence.
330. Power of Commissioner to stop use of premises used in contravention of licences.-

Section 330 entitles the commissioner to stop the use of any eating housing, lodging house, hotel,
boarding house, restaurant or any other public place for a specified period as it deems necessary,
if the same has been opened without obtaining the licence from the commissioner or the terms of
the licence has been violated.
Penalty
383. Punishment for certain offences

Section 383 of the Act provides that of case of a violation of the provisions of this Act, then the
same shall entail a punishment of three years of imprisonment or penalty of Rs. 10,000/- .
1. Drafted a written statement under Section 9, read with Rule 6 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in the case of M/s Empowertrans Pvt Ltd. Vs. M/s Power
Machine. on behalf of the Corporate Debtor. The reproduction of which is stated below:
IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL,

CUTTACK BENCH, CUTTACK
COMPANY PETITION (IB) NO. 225/2022
IN THE MATTER OF:

M/s Empowertrans Pvt Ltd. ………Applicant/Operational Creditor
Versus
M/s Power Machine (India) Ltd. ……. Respondent/Corporate Debtor
INDEX
S. No. Particular Pg. No.

1. Reply to the Petition filed under section 9 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 read with Rule
6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2016.
2. Vakalatnama
3. Proof of service
4. List of documents
Place Respondent/Corporate Debtor

Date Through

IN THE MATTER OF:
Versus
REPLY TO THE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE INSOLVENCY AND

BANKRUPTCY CODE 2016 READ WITH RULE 6 OF THE INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY RULES 2016.
1. That the instant replay is being filed by the Respondent in the captioned matter, through its
authorised Representative Ivan Koltsov authorized vide board resolution dated 26.06.2020.
Copy of board resolution dated 26.06.2020 is herein annexed as Annexure A.
2. That the present petition filed by the petitioner under section 9 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016 read with Rule 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2016
seeking insolvency of the Respondent Company is bad in law as the present petition
conceals material facts and is based on false and frivolous claims.
3. At the outset, the Respondent denies and dispute all the averments made and submissions
put forth in the Petition except those that are matters of record or expressly admitted
hereinafter. The said Respondent state that the denial shall be treated as a specific denial.
That subject to the forgoing, the Respondent submits the following preliminary submission
and objections:
PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION AND OBJECTIONS
Preliminary Submission
A. That the fact of the matter is that the parties entered into a commercial relation in the
year 2006. That the Petitioner was providing services related to installation of Electro
Technical Equipment’s. That the Petitioner provided services to the Respondent from
… to …. That the work order in question was issued on 01/03/2006 and the invoice as
was raised on 23/04/2008. Although shockingly, in 2018 the petitioner raised a
frivolous Demand i.e., after a period of 10 year from the date of Invoice so raised.
B. That, in terms Clause 4 of the said Work Order, Petitioner were required to obtain a
clearance certificate from Orissa Hydro Power Corporation Limited (hereinafter
referred to as “OHPC”) and the said clearance certificate had to be specifically
submitted along with the Invoice, for receiving the final payment. It was also a
condition precedent that the final payment shall be released only on the basis of
submission of the Invoice duly supported by the clearance certificate. However,
Petitioner failed to provide the said Clearance Certificate from OHPC and completion
certificate along with the invoice as Petitioner had failed to complete the work in
satisfaction to the said Work Order.
C. That further, as per clause 7 of the said work order, the said work undertaken by
Petitioner, had to be specifically completed by September 2006, however, admittedly
Petitioner had allegedly completed the said work only in the month of April 2008.
Petitioner were in blatant breach of the Work Order so executed between the
Undersigned and Petitioner and accordingly were liable for deduction in terms of para
14 of liquidated damage. That the Petitioner has breached the terms of the work order
on multiple occasions by failing to complete the work on time and attaining Clearance
Certificate from OHPC. That the Petitioners insufficient execution of work caused
wrongful loss to the Respondent
D. That in the year 2011, the petitioner filed a frivolous petition under Companies Act,
1956 before the High Court of Odisha in order to extract money from the respondent.
Eventually during pendency of the matter, vide order dated 13.12.2019 the Hon’ble
High Court transferred the matter to NCLT, Cuttack observing that the Companies Act,
2013, has envisaged that all proceedings under the Companies Act, 1956 including
proceedings relating to arbitration, compromise, arrangements and reconstruction and
winding up of companies, pending before any District Court or High Court.
E. That vide order dated 17.12.2021 the NCLT, Cuttack dismissed the company petition
filed by the Petitioner as the same was was filed under the Companies Act 1956 which
stands repealed and directed the Petitioner to file petition under Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016 within four weeks.
Preliminary Objections
F. That the petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has not followed due
process.
I. That as per Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, it is

mandatory for an operational creditor to serve demand notice to debtor in
prescribed format before institution of insolvency proceeding. That Section 8
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is a mandatory provision to be
adhered by an operational creditor which the Petitioner has failed to do.
Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is reiterated as follows:
8. (1) An operational creditor may, on the occurrence of a default, deliver a

demand notice of unpaid operational debtor copy of an invoice demanding
payment of the amount involved in the default to the corporate debtor in such
form and manner as may be prescribed.
(2) The corporate debtor shall, within a period of ten days of the receipt of the
demand notice or copy of the invoice mentioned in sub-section (1) bring to the
notice of the operational creditor—
(a) existence of a dispute, if any, and record of the pendency of the suit or
arbitration proceedings filed before the receipt of such notice or invoice in
relation to such dispute;
(b) the repayment of unpaid operational debt—

(i) by sending an attested copy of the record of electronic transfer of the unpaid
amount from the bank account of the corporate debtor; or
(ii) by sending an attested copy of record that the operational creditor has
encashed a cheque issued by the corporate debtor.
II. That in terms of Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 an
operational creditor must serve a claim notice along with the invoice of unpaid
financial/operational debts to the corporate debtor. That an insolvency
proceeding can be initiated only if the debtor fails to respond to the notice within
10 days, and/or the admitted debt is unpaid within 10 days.
III. That the Petitioner had served a demand notice in 2010 under The Companies
Act, 1956, before filing a winding up petition under the Companies Act,1956.
That vide order dated 17.12.2021 the NCLT, Cuttack dismissed the company
petition filed by the Petitioner as the same was was filed under the Companies
Act 1956 which stands repealed. That the company petition filed by the
Petitioner and the Companies Act 1956 both stands repealed hence the demand
notice dated 06.07.2010 also stands redundant. That in the present case the
Respondent did not receive any demand notice as per the prescribed format
under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rule 2016 therefore, the Petitioner has failed
to follow due procedure hence the present petition is not maintainable and liable
to be dismissed
G. That the petitioner is not an Operational Creditor as claims made by the petitioner
is not an Operational debt
I. That Section 5(20) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 defines
Operational Creditor as follows:
"Operational Creditor" means a person to whom an operational debt is owed

and includes any person to whom such debt has been legally assigned or
transferred.
II. That the petitioner is not an Operational Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 as no Operational Debt is owed to
them by the Respondent. An Operational creditor refers to a person to whom an
operational debt is owed and includes any person to whom such amount has
been legally assigned or transferred for goods or services done by them, which
is not the present case that the Petitioners has a made a frivolous claim against
incomplete work. The frivolous claims made by the petitioner is not an
Operational debt in terms of Section 5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code 2016 as the claims raised by the Petitioner are disputed payments.
III. Section 5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 defines Operational
Debt as follows:
"Operational Debt" means a claim in respect of the provision of goods or
services including employment or a debt in respect of the repayment of dues
arising under any law for the time being in force and payable to the Central
Government, any State Government or any local authority.
IV. That the Petitioner had raised frivolous invoices without completing the
assignment and attaining competition certificate therefore the Respondent
refused to accept the invoices. That, in terms Clause 4 of the said Work Order,
Petitioner were required to obtain a clearance certificate from Orissa Hydro
Power Corporation Limited and the said clearance certificate had to be
specifically submitted along with the Invoice, for receiving the final payment.
It was also a condition precedent that the final payment shall be released only
on the basis of submission of the Invoice duly supported by the clearance
certificate. However, Petitioner failed to provide the said Clearance Certificate
from OHPC and completion certificate along with the invoice as Petitioner had
failed to complete the work in satisfaction to the said Work Order hence the
Petitioner is not entitled to any payment or claims made in this Petition. That
the Petitioner has filed the present case based on unaccepted invoices and
disputed payments which does not fall under the definition of Operation Debt
hence the present petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.
PARA WISE REPLY
1. That the contents of Part I of the Petition are a matter of record and needs no reply on
merit.
2. That the contents of Part II of the Petition are a matter of record and needs no reply on
merit.
3. That the contents of Part III of the Petition need no reply.
4. That the contents of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied to the extent that
Operational debt is owed by the Respondent. That the petitioner is not an Operational
Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 as no
Operational Debt is owed to them by the Respondent.
5. That the contents of Para 1 of Part IV of the Petition are a matter of record and needs
no reply on merit.
no reply on merit.
no reply on merit.
no reply on merit
no reply on merit.
10. That the contents of Para 6 of Part IV of the Petition
11. That the contents of Para 17 and 18 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied.
That no Operational debt is owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner. That the
petitioner is not an Operational Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code 2016 as no Operational Debt is owed to them by the Respondent.
An Operational creditor refers to a person to whom an operational debt is owed and
includes any person to whom such amount has been legally assigned or transferred for
goods or services done by them, which is not the present case that the Petitioners has a
made a frivolous claim against incomplete work. The frivolous claims made by the
petitioner is not an Operational debt in terms of Section 5(21) of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016 as the claims raised by the Petitioner are disputed payments.
That the Petitioner had raised frivolous invoices without completing the assignment
and attaining competition certificate therefore the Respondent refused to accept the
invoices. That, in terms Clause 4 of the said Work Order, Petitioner were required to
obtain a clearance certificate from Orissa Hydro Power Corporation Limited and the
said clearance certificate had to be specifically submitted along with the Invoice, for
receiving the final payment. It was also a condition precedent that the final payment
shall be released only on the basis of submission of the Invoice duly supported by the
clearance certificate. However, Petitioner failed to provide the said Clearance
Certificate from OHPC and completion certificate along with the invoice as Petitioner
had failed to complete the work in satisfaction to the said Work Order hence the
Petitioner is not entitled to any payment or claims made in this Petition.
12. That the contents of Para 19 and 20 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied.
That it is wrong and denied that the Respondent is unable due to liability being more
than assets. That the Respondent has a healthy financial status and has not made
payments to the Petitioner as the claims made by the Petitioner are false and frivolous.
That the Petitioner has filed the present case to based on unaccepted invoices and
disputed payments. That the Respondent is not liable to any unadmitted payments based
on frivolous invoice raised without completing assignment and attaining completion

certificate.
13. That the contents of Para 21 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied. That the
present petition filed by the petitioner under section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code 2016 read with Rule 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2016 seeking
insolvency of the Respondent Company is bad in law as the petitioner is not an
Operational Creditor and the petition is based on false and frivolous claims. That the
Respondent does not owe any operational debt hence it is not liable for winding up.
That the Petitioner is not an operational creditor, nor the present petition has been filed
following due process hence the present petition is not maintainable and liable to be
dismissed.
14. That the contents of prayer clause are false and frivolous and hence denied. It is denied
that the Petitioner is entitled to any of the relief sought in the Petition under reply. It is
submitted that the facts and contentions under the present reply clearly shows that the
Petitioner is not an operational creditor, nor the present petition has been filed
following due process hence the present petition is not maintainable and liable to be
dismissed in its entirety with exemplary costs for it being deliberately misleading, false,
frivolous and contemptuous in nature.
15. That the contents of Point 2 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied. That no
Operational debt is owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner. That the petitioner is not
an Operational Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code 2016 as no Operational Debt is owed to them by the Respondent.
16. That the contents of Point 1 to Point 7 of Part V of the Petition are a matter of record
and need no reply on merit.
17. That the contents of Point 8 of Part V of the Petition are wrong and denied. That the
Petitioner has made an absolutely false and frivolous statement. That the Petitioner had
served a demand notice in 2010 (marked as Annexure 8 of the Petition) under The
Companies Act, 1956, before filing a winding up petition under the Companies
Act,1956. That vide order dated 17.12.2021 the NCLT, Cuttack dismissed the company
petition filed by the Petitioner as the same was was filed under the Companies Act 1956
which stands repealed. That the company petition filed by the Petitioner and the
Companies Act 1956 both stands repealed hence the demand notice dated 06.07.2010
also stands redundant. That the Respondent did not receive any demand notice as
prescribed in Form 3 & Form 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2016. That
Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is a mandatory provision to be
adhered by an operational creditor which the Petitioner has failed to do and is making
a frivolous statement on oath hence the present petition is not maintainable and liable
to be dismissed in its entirety with exemplary costs for it being deliberately misleading,
false, frivolous and contemptuous in nature.
That further it is wrong and denied that the Petitioner has not received any notice
relating to dispute relating to the unpaid debt. That the Respondent on multiple
occasions has raised dispute with respect to the frivolous claims made by the Petitioner.
That the Petitioner has filed the present case to based on unaccepted invoices and
disputed payments. That the Respondent is not liable to any unadmitted payments based
on frivolous invoice raised without completing assignment and attaining completion
certificate.
18. That the reply is made bonafide and in the interest of justice and in case the present
reply is allowed, no prejudice would be caused to the Petitioner and an effective
assistance will be given to this Hon’ble Court in adjudication of the captioned petition.
PRAYER
In view of the above stated facts and circumstances this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to.
A. Take the present reply on record and dismiss the captioned petition
B. Pass such other and further order(s) as may be deem fit and proper in the facts and
on the circumstances of the case in favour of the Respondent in the interest of
Justice.
Respondent/Corporate Debtor
Through
Place:
Date:
IN THE MATTER OF:

Versus
AFFIDAVIT
I, Ivan Koltsov , S/o , aged ….. residing ……., do solemnly affirm and say as follows:
1. That I am authorised representative of the Respondent in the captioned matter authorised

vide board resolution dated 26.06.2020 and I am conversant with the facts and
circumstances of the present Reply and therefore competent to depose the present
Affidavit.
2. I state that I have read and understood the contents of the accompanying Reply which has
been drafted under my instructions.
3. I further state that the facts contained in the accompanying reply are true and correct to the
best of knowledge. The submissions are made on the basis of the legal advice which I have
received and believed to be true.
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION
Solemnly verified at …… on this the.... 2022 that the contents of my aforementioned Affidavit
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and nothing material has been concealed
therefrom.
DEPONENT
Place:
Date:
17th February 2022
1. Researched on the grounds on which the Court can implead out a party from a suit under
Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The reproduction of which is stated
below:
1. RAMESH HIRANAND KUNDANMAL Vs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF

GREATER BOMBAY AND ORS.
Citation - 1992 SCC (2) 524
Court – Supreme Court of India
Link - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1084618/
Findings – “The line has been drawn on wider construction of the rule between the direct interest
or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be
directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead
to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights.”
2. Kasturi Vs. Uyyamperumal & Ors.

Citation – (2005) 6 SCC 733
Findings – Para 11 - “The question of jurisdiction of the Court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 of the
CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party
proposed to be added has direct interest in the controversy involved in the suit.”
3. Razia Begum vs Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Others

Citaion - 1958 AIR 886
Findings – “To the same effect is the decision in Re I. G. Farbeninadusrie A. G. Agreement (1).
The Court held that in order that a party may be added as a defendant in the suit, he should have a
legal interest in the subject-matter of the litigation-legal interest not as distinguished from an
equitable interest, but an interest which the law recognizes.”
4. Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt.
Ltd. & Ors.
Citation - (2010) 7 SCC 417
Findings – Para 10 - “This Court also explained that a person who has a direct interest in the
subject matter of the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale may be impleaded as a
proper party, on his application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC.”
5. Vidur Impex & Traders Pvt.Ltd.& ... vs Tosh Apartments Pvt.Ltd.

Findings – Para 36 - “The Court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application made
by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have been
joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court is necessary for effective and
complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit.”
Also,
Para 26 - “Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect
of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties on record.
The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10
which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary party is one
without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an
effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on
the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial
jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the
facts and circumstances of a particular case.”
18th & 21st February 2022
1. Executed comprehensive research on the legal proposition of enforceability of indemnity

bonds in loan agreement against a surety under the Contract Act, 1872, possible defenses
available to guarantors, circular of Reserve Bank of India on the matter and produced
landmark legal precedents on the matter. The reproduction of which is stated below:
Enforcement of Indemnity Bond in a Loan Agreement
Legal Provisions Involved –
Section 128 of Indian Contract Act, 1872
Surety’s Liability - The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor
unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. - The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that
of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract."

Co-Sureties Liable to Contribute Equally - Where two or more persons are co-sureties for the
same debt or duty, either jointly or severally, and whether under the same or different contracts,
and whether with or without the knowledge of each other, the co-sureties, in the absence of any
contract to the contrary, are liable, as between themselves, to pay each an equal share of the whole
debt, or of that part of it which remains unpaid by the principal debtor.
Circular of Reserve Bank of India
RBI's circular dated September 9, 2014, issued concerning the Master Circular on Wilful
Defaulters DBOD.No.CID.BC.3/20.16.003/2014-15 dated July 1, 2014, clarified that when a
payment default is made by the principal debtor, the bank is entitled to proceed against the
guarantor/surety even without exhausting the remedies against the principal debtor. In case the
said guarantor refuses to comply with the demand made by the creditor/bank, despite having
sufficient means to make payment of the dues, such guarantor would also be treated as a 'wilful
defaulter'. In nutshell, the liability of the guarantor is well established and co-extensive with that
of the debtor. The link of the said circular is stated below -
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/CGC090914FC.pdf
Leading Judgments with Relation to that of Surety against the Enforcement of Indemnity
Bond in a Loan Agreement
The liability of the principal borrower is coextensive with that of Guarantor. It is for the secured
creditor to choose the property against which it decides to proceed.
1. Ram Kishun Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

Citation - (2012) 11 SCC 511
Link - https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48d5c607dba348fff290f
Findings – Para 10 – There can be no dispute to the settled proposition of law that in view of the
provisions of Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter called “the Contract Act”), the
liability of the guarantor/surety is coextensive with that of the debtor. Therefore, the creditor has
a right to obtain a decree against the surety and the principal debtor. The surety has no right to
restrain execution of the decree against him until the creditor has exhausted his remedy against the
principal debtor for the reason that it is the business of the surety/guarantor to see whether the
principal debtor has paid or not. The surety does not have a right to dictate terms to the creditor as
to how he should make the recovery and pursue his remedies against the principal debtor at his
instance.
2. State Bank Of India vs Indexport Registered And Ors

Citation – 1992 AIR 1740

Findings - A surety's liability to pay the debt is not removed by reason of the creditor's ommission
to sue the principal debtor. The creditor is not bound to exhaust his remedy against the principal
before suing the surety, and a suit may be maintained against the surety though the principal has
not been sued.
3. Central Bank Of India vs C. L. Vimala & Ors

Citation – AIR 2015 SC 2280
Findings - We are of the opinion that the questions that need to be decided by us are regarding the
liability of the guarantor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The legislature has
succinctly stated that the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor
unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. This Court has decided on this question, time and
again, in line with the intent of the legislature.
4. United Bank of India vs Satyawati Tondon & Ors

Findings - The liability of the guarantor and principal debtor is co-extensive and not in alternative
and the creditor/decree-holder has the right to proceed against either for recovery of dues or
realization of the decretal amount.
5. Laxmi Pat Surana vs Union Bank Of India on 26 March, 2021

Citation – LL 2021 SC 186
Findings - The liability of the guarantor is coextensive with that of the principal borrower.
Possible Defenses Available to Guarantors
Even though the possible defenses available to a guarantor against his liability under the contract
of guarantee are limited, the guarantor can take certain defenses against his liability in certain cases
as discussed below.
1. Clause in the Contract – If there is a clause in the agreement to the effect specifically stating
that the liability of the guarantor will not be extensive or will be limited to a certain amount, and
then the liability will be limited or non-extensive, as the case may be.
Central Bank Of India vs C. L. Vimala & Ors

Citation – AIR 2015 SC 2280
Findings - We are of the opinion that the questions that need to be decided by us are regarding the
liability of the guarantor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The legislature has
succinctly stated that the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor
unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. This Court has decided on this question, time
and again, in line with the intent of the legislature.
2. Variance in Contract - In case the guarantor successfully establishes that there have been
subsequent variations to the contract of guarantee to which the guarantor was not privy to or
had no knowledge of, the guarantor can be excused from performing his obligations under law
for all the subsequent transactions post the variance.
Section 133 of Indian Contract Act 1872 - Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract
Any variance, made without the surety’s consent, in the terms of the contract between the principal
1and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance. —Any
variance, made without the surety’s consent, in the terms of the contract between the principal and
the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance.
1. Keshavlal Hari Lal Setalvad and Ors vs Pratapsingh Moholalbhai Sheth and Ors
Court – Bombay High Court
Citation - 137 Ind Cas 564
Findings - It is true that this was do eat the request of the principal debtor, but as the sureties were
not consulted it cannot be said that they agreed to the variance Here there could be no question of
certain transactions being prior to the variance and certain other transactions being subsequent
thereto. The only fact that can be definitely stated about it is that the contract on the fulfilment of
which the sureties' liability could arise was not carried out.
2. State Bank of India vs Dharam Kumar And Anr.
Court – Madras High Court
Citation - 2000 102 CompCas 166 Mad
Findings - Section 133 of the Act itself would indicate that any variance would entitle the surety
to claim for discharge provided there is no consent in the terms of the contract by the surety
regarding the variation.
3. Release of Debtor by Creditor:
In terms of Section 135 of the ICA, if without the consent of the surety, the creditor and debtor
enter into a contract, whereby the creditor agrees to make composition/compromise with or gives
time to or agrees not to sue the surety, in such a case, guarantor being the surety stands discharged
by law to fulfil his obligations under the contract of guarantee unless the surety assents such
contract.
Section 135 of Contract Act, 1872
Discharge of surety when creditor compounds with, gives time to, or agrees not to sue, principal
debtor.—A contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the creditor makes a
composition with, or promises to give time to, or not to sue, the principal debtor, discharges the
surety, unless the surety assents to such contract – “A contract between the creditor and the
principal debtor, by which the creditor makes a composition with, or promises to give time to, or
not to sue, the principal debtor, discharges the surety, unless the surety assents to such contract."
Ramswaroop And Anr. vs State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur
Citation - 2002 (3) WLN 430
Court – Rajasthan High Court
"It is true that in each and every case of compromise surety cannot claim discharge of the liability
under the surety bond but when the creditor accepted that the decree be passed against all the
defendants and this decree is to be satisfied by defendant No. 1 and when the creditor himself
agrees to accept entire decretal amount from only the borrower defendant, then it amounts to
voluntarily entering into new contract by the creditor with the debtor. This new compromise
(agreement), by necessary implication, discharges the guarantor."
4. Guarantee Obtained by Misrepresentation & Concealment
If the guarantee was obtained by the creditor by means of keeping silence as to certain material
circumstances and in such circumstances the guarantee can be challenged as invalid. Also, where
a guarantee has been obtained by means of misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his
knowledge and consent, concerning a material part of the transaction, such a guarantee is invalid.
In terms of Section 142 of ICA, any guarantee which has been obtained by means of
misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his knowledge and assent, concerning a material
part of the transaction, is invalid.
Guarantee obtained by misrepresentation, invalid. —Any guarantee which has been obtained by
means of misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his knowledge and assent, concerning a
material part of the transaction, is invalid. —Any guarantee which has been obtained by means of
misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his knowledge and assent, concerning a material
part of the transaction, is invalid."
1. Krishan Kumar vs. Syndicate bank & Ors

Citation - (RFA No. 1/1997 decided on Februray 19, 2009
Court – Delhi High Court
Findings - The finding of the trial court in holding the guarantor liable as much as the principal
borrower was erroneous in light of the fact that the plaintiff bank had miserably failed to prove the
authenticity of the guarantee forming the subject matter of the case & hence was set aside.
2. M/S Poysha Oxygen Pvt. Ltd. vs Sh. Ashwini Suri & Others
Citation - OMP No.126/2001
Findings - Reference is also made in the award to Sections 142 & 143 of the Contract Act laying
down that any guarantee obtained by means of misrepresentation is invalid.
5. Remedy of Surety impaired by the act or omission of the Creditor
Where the creditor either does something, which is inconsistent with the rights of the surety or
omits to do his duty towards the surety and because of this, the eventual remedy of the surety that
he had against the principal debtor is impaired, the surety/guarantor is discharged from his liability
towards the creditor in accordance with section 139 of the ICA.
Section 139 of Indian Contract Act – Discharge of surety by creditor’s act or omission impairing
surety’s eventual remedy. - If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the rights of the
surety, or omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the eventual
remedy of the surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired, the surety is
discharged. —If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the rights of the surety, or
omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the eventual remedy of the
surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired, the surety is discharged.
Jose Inacio Lourence vs Syndicate Bank and Another

Citation - 1989 65 Comp Cas 698 Bom
Court – Bombay High Court
Findings - The failure in not registering the charge is also an act which is inconsistent with the
rights of the surety within the meaning of Section 139 of the Contract Act and it is obvious that
the eventual remedy which the surety may have against Krishna Naik or the purchaser in Andhra
Pradesh is impaired resulting in the discharge of the surety.
22nd February 2022
Researched on the ambit of the enforceability of employment bonds with reference to Section
27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The reproduction of which is stated below for your kind
perusal.
Indemnity Bond
An Indemnity Bond is an undertaking providing a surety that the party shall be compensated
monetarily in event of the breach of the contract. Indemnity bonds are enforceable provided they
don’t run contrary to the public policy & test of reasonableness. Such a contract is governed by
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and comes under the purview of section 74 of the said Act, which
provides for compensation for breach by way of liquidated damages.
Judicial Precedents
Employment Bonds
1. Super Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai

Findings – “The drafting of a negative covenant in a contract of employment is often a matter
of great difficulty. In the employment cases so far discussed, the issue has been as to the
validity of the covenant operating after the end of the period of service. Restrictions on
competition during that period are normally valid, and indeed may be implied by law by
virtue of the servant's duty of fidelity. In such cases the restriction is generally reasonable,
having regard to the interest of the employer, and does not cause any undue hardship to the
employee, who will receive a wage or salary for the period in question. But if the covenant
is to operate after the termination of services, or is too widely worded, the Court may refuse
to enforce it.”
2. The Brahmaputra Tea CO. Ld. Vs. E. Scarth

Citation - (1885) ILR 11 Cal 545
Court – Calcutta High Court
Findings – “An agreement to serve a person exclusively for a definite term is a lawful agreement,
and it is difficult to see how that can be unlawful which is essential to its fulfilment, and to the
due protection of the interests of the employer, while the agreement is in force. It is unnecessary
to consider all the conditions in the 10th clause”
3. Dr. S. Gobu Vs. State of Tamil Nadu

Citation - 2010 SCC Mad 3389
Court – Madras High Court
Link -
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1730294/#:~:text=1%20obliges%20a%20candidate%20to,not
%20as%20a%20direct%20candidate.
Findings - The result of the above discussion is that considerations against restrictive covenants
are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after the termination of
the contract than those in cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract. Negative
covenants operative during the period of the contract of employment when the employee is
bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and
therefore do not fall under Section 27 of the Contract Act. A negative covenant that the employee
would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get himself employed by any other
master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not therefore a
restraint of trade unless the contract as aforesaid is unconscionable or excessively harsh or
unreasonable or one-sided as in the case of W.H. Milsted & Son Ltd. Both the trial court and the
High Court have found, and in our view, rightly, that the negative covenant in the present case
restricted as it is to the period of employment and to work similar or substantially similar to the
one carried on by the appellant when he was in the employ of the respondent Company was
reasonable and necessary for the protection of the companys interests and not such as the court
would refuse to enforce. There is therefore no validity in the contention that the negative
covenant contained in clause 17 amounted to a restraint of trade and therefore against public
policy."
4. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai & Co. Vs. Chittaranjan Chandulal Pandya

Citation - 1965 (11) FLR 299
Court – Gujarat High Court
Findings - An agreement to serve a person exclusively for a definite term is a lawful
agreement, and it is difficult to see how that can be unlawful which is essential to its
fulfilment, and to the due protection of the interests of the employer, while the agreement is
in force.
5. Chairman & Managing Director, Indian Airlines v. Binod Kumar Sinha

Findings – “If a person is in employment he is certainly subject to certain terms and
conditions and he can quit his employment under those terms and conditions only which
cannot be stated to be violative of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 23, much less Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution unless on examination such conditions are held invalid.”
6. Satyam Computer services Limited v Ladella Ravichander

Citation – MANU/AP/0416/2011
Court – Andhra Pradesh High Court
Link - https://blog.ipleaders.in/key-features-employment-contracts/#_ftnref9
An employee left the job suddenly and was charged to pay Rupees two lakhs in addition to
stipend charges and additional expenditure meted out by the employer for his purpose as per the
bond agreement he had entered into. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that as the employee
had not caused any damage to the organisation he should not be charged abnormally and fixed
an amount of Rupees one lakh considering his job period and the actual cost incurred.
7. Sicpa India Limited v Manas Pratim Deb

Citation - MANU/DE/6554/2011
Link - https://blog.ipleaders.in/key-features-employment-contracts/#_ftn10
An employee left the job suddenly and was charged to meted out by the employer for his purpose
as per the bond agreement he had entered into.
23rd February 2022
Researched the legal validity of the arbitration clause in the former agreement with reference
to Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The reproduction of which is stated below:
Legal Proposition
If one agreement supersedes the other agreement, then the arbitration clause has to be incorporated
again
Legal Provision of Relevance
1. Section 62 of the Contract Act - Effect of novation, rescission, and alteration of contract
- If the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it,
the original contract need not be performed. —If the parties to a contract agree to substitute
a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed.
Judicial Precedents
1. Sanjiv Prakash v. Seema Kukreja & Ors.

Citation - Arbitration Petition Number 4/2020
Findings - The Delhi High Court has reiterated that novation of an agreement would necessarily
result in destruction of the arbitration clause contained therein. In this regard, it was observed that
an arbitration agreement being a creation of an agreement may be destroyed by agreement. When
a contract with arbitration clause gets novated /superseded, the arbitration clause perishes and the
same cannot be invoked.
2. Damodar Valley Corporation Vs. KK Kar

Citation - AIR 1974 SC158
Findings - As the contract is an outcome of the agreement between the parties it is equally open
to the parties thereto to agree to bring it to an end or to treat it us if it never existed. It may also be
open to the parties to terminate the previous contract and substitute in its place a new contract or
alter the original contract in such a way that it cannot subsist. In all these cases, since the entire
contract is put an end to the arbitration clause, which is a part of it, also perishes along with
it, Section 62 of the Contract Act incorporates this principle when it provides that if this parties to
a contract agree to substitute a new contract or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not
be performed. Where, therefore, the dispute between the parties is that the contract itself does not
subsist either as a result of its being substituted by a new contract or by rescission or alteration,
that dispute cannot be referred to the arbitration as the arbitration clause itself would perish if the
averment is found to be valid. As the very jurisdiction of the arbitrator is dependent upon the
existence of the arbitration clause under which he is appointed, the parties have no right to invoke
a clause which perishes with the contract.
3. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. Vs. Mohan Lal Harbans Lal Bhayana
Citation - 2015 (2) SCC 461
Findings - The arbitration agreement stands modified by the supplementary agreement when the
terms of the supplementary agreement changed the entire edifice of the principal arbitration
agreement, there could be no arbitration between the parties for the claims raised by the appellant
and an application filed under Section 11 would thus be misconceived.
4. Union of India Vs. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros.

Citation - AIR 1959 SC 1362
Findings - The principle laid down is that if the contract is superseded by another, the arbitration
clause, being a component part of the earlier contract, falls with it. But where the dispute is whether
such contract is void ab intio, the arbitration clause cannot operate on those disputes, for its
operative force depends upon the existence of the contract and its validity. The various other
observations were made by this Court in the above-mentioned judgment in respect of "settlement
of disputes arising under the original contract, including the dispute as to the breach of the contract
and its consequences".
5. M/s Young Achievers vs. IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd.

Citation – CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2013
Findings - Once new contract supersedes the former contract containing arbitration clause, the
operative effect of said arbitration ends with the end of former agreement. The parties deciding to
enter into a fresh contract and while doing so mutually agrees upon the mode and manner of
settlement of dispute, if any arising in the future and there is no reference to previously executed
contract vis-a-vis settlement of disputes arising therefrom, is clearly indicative of novation of
contract.
24th February 2022
Researched on the legal proposition as to at what stage the jurisdiction of the civil court can
be challenged under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The reproduction of
which is stated below:
Relevant Legal Provision
Section 21 of CPC
[(1)] No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or Revisional Court
unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity
and in all cases where issues or settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.
[(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its
jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken
in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where issues are
settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.
(3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of
its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was
taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.]
Order 14 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure
Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.-(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on
a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment
on all issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the
case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if
that issue relates to -
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it
thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined,
and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue".
Landmark Precedents
1. Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v DLF Universal Ltd.
Findings - The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important
categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction
over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection
to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before
settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the
earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter,
however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission,
it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity.”
2. Hasham Abbas Sayyad v Usman Abbas Sayyad
Link – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71315/
Findings - We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree
passed by a court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction in regard to the
subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere with
the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be
interfered with.
3. Arun Agarwal v. Nagreeka Exports (P) Ltd.
Citation - (2002) 10 SCC 101
Findings - In a case where the suit can be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court was obliged
to decide that question first without compelling the parties to undergo the stress of a regular trial.
4. Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan,
Citation - (1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340

Findings - It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without
jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought
to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A
defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-
matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect
cannot be cured even by consent of parties.
5. Union of India & Ors vs Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6320-6321 of 2000
Link – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1307808/
Findings - Having considered the arguments addressed on behalf of the parties and having perused
the records, we are of the considered opinion that the question of jurisdiction should be first
decided by us before going into the merits of the case in hand. As a matter of fact, we feel it would
have been more appropriate on the facts of these cases if the High Court had proceeded under
Order XIV Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code by deciding the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary
issue first instead of deciding the case on merit.
6. Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig

Citation - 1964 AIR 497
Findings - Under Order 14, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where issues both of law and of fact
arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed
of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit,
postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The
jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the
opinion of the court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code
confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary
issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the court; not to do so, especially when
the decision on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a
lopsided trial of the suit.
25th February 2022

o Had to take leave from the law firm on account of the submission of the internship report to
the college, in person.
28th February & 2nd March 2022
Made a very comprehensive note on the Section 8 Company. The reproduction of which is stated
below for your kind perusal:
Section 8 of Companies Act – An Overview
Introduction
A company is referred to as Section 8 Company when it registered as a Non-Profit Organization

(NPO) i.e. when it has motive of promoting arts, commerce, education, charity, protection of
environment, sports, science, research, social welfare, religion and intends to use its profits (if any)
or other income for promoting these objectives.
Eligibility to Apply for Section 8 Company

An individual or associations of individuals are eligible to be registered as Section 8 Company if

it holds below-mentioned intentions or objectives. The objectives have to be confirmed to the
satisfaction of the Central Government. When the company intends to promote science, commerce,
education, art, sports, research, religion, charity, social welfare, protection of the environment or
alike other objectives; when the company holds an intention to invest all the profits (if any) or any
other income generated after incorporation in the promotion of such objects only; when the
company does not intend to pay any dividend to its members. Noncompliance with the same shall
entail strict legal action against the company.
Name
As per rule 8(7) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, for the Companies under Section
8 of the Act, the name shall include the words foundation, Forum, Association, Federation,
Chambers, Confederation, council, Electoral trust and the like etc
Incorporation of a Section 8 Company
To incorporate a Section 8 Company, an application shall be made to the Registrar of Companies,

which shall be accompanied, inter alia, by the following documents:
Draft Memorandum of Association (MOA) and Articles of association (AOA) of the Company in
prescribed format (Form no. INC – 13) where the photographs of subscribers are affixed.
A Declaration is to be attached in Form no. INC-14 (on the stamp paper, duly notarized) by an
Advocate, a Chartered Accountant, Cost Accountant or Company Secretary in practice, that the
draft memorandum and articles of association have been drawn up in conformity with the
provisions of section 8 and rules made there under and all the requirements under section 8 have
been complied with.
An estimate of the future annual income and expenditure of the company for next three years,
specifying the sources of the income and the objects of the expenditure.
A declaration (in Form no. INC-15) on stamp paper duly notarized by each of the persons
making the application and
Form no. INC-9 from each subscribers and first directors, on appropriate stamp paper of the State
and duly notarized
Documents Requirement for the Registration of Section 8 Company

Digital Signature Certificate

Memorandum of Association
Articles of Association
Passport Size Photographs
Members’ Id Proof such as Aadhar Card, Passport, Voter Id
Details of Director (When the Members Are Other Companies/LLPs)
Address Evidence
Director Identification Number
Who is Authorized to Issue License to Section 8 Companies
Registrars of Companies of respective jurisdictions are delegated with the powers of Central
government to issue license to Section 8 Companies
Number of Directors in a Section 8 Company
There is no minimum or maximum prescription for section 8 company though Under Section
149(3) – Section 8 company must have a minimum of one Resident Director i.e. a director who
has resided in India at least for a total period of 182 days (one hundred and eighty-two days) or
more within the previous calendar year.
Can a Company with Limited Liability or Unlimited Liability be registered under Section 8
of Companies Act
Rule 20(1) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 provides that only a limited company
registered under this Act or under any previous company law shall make an application to the
Registrar for issue of license. Therefore, a company with unlimited liabilities cannot be registered
as a Section 8 Company.
Membership in Section 8 Companies
One Person Company - Rule 3(6) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits one
person company to invest in securities of any corporate.
Partnership Firm or Limited Liability Partnership - Yes, under the Companies Act, 2013, a
Partnership firm or an LLP can become the member of Section 8 Company. The provisions of
respective Acts need to be complied with by the partnership firm or LLP as the case may be.
Trust - There is no restriction in the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 for a registered Trust
to become a member of Section 8 Company. In case of unregistered trusts, provisions of section
89 would be applicable.
Co-operative Society - In terms of Section 8, any person or an association of persons intending to

register a limited liability company for objects specified in section 8(1)(a), subject to the
restrictions provided in section 8(1)(b) and (c), can opt to apply for registration of Section 8
Company. Co-operative society can be regarded as Person and thus capable of becoming
subscriber of a company including Section 8 Company.
Conversion of Organizations to Section 8 Companies
Foreign Companies - Now since a Company or a body corporate incorporated outside India for
doing not for profit activities, which has opened a branch office in India, cannot fall in definition
of a foreign company as business activity is missing. Therefore, such company cannot be termed
as foreign company. However, subject to compliance of FEMA regulations, it can open branch.
Such not for profit companies or bodies corporate incorporated outside India can promote and
register a Section 8 Company in India as a distinct entity.
One Person Companies - Rule 3 of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits a one
person company to be incorporated as section 8 company or to convert into a Section 8 Company.
Also, Rule 3(6) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits one person company to
invest in securities of any corporate.
Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Section 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013
allows person or association of persons to be registered as a Section 8 Company on fulfillment of
certain conditions and procedure as prescribed therein. The term “person” has not been defined in
the Companies Act, 2013. Section 2(41) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that “person”
shall include any Company, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.
Accordingly, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is a person. Therefore,
Society can be registered/converted as a Section 8 Company.
Co-operative Society - Cooperative Society is a person and accordingly can be registered as a

Section 8 Company in terms of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 after completion of
necessary formalities prescribed therein.
Trust - A Trust is a person. Therefore, there is no bar in conversion of trust to Section 8 Companies.
Limited Liability Partnership - Section 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 allows person or
association of persons to be registered as a Section 8 Company on fulfillment of certain conditions
and procedure as prescribed therein. The term “person” has not been defined in the Companies
Act, 2013. Section 2(41) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that “person” shall include
any Company, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Accordingly, a
Limited Liability Partnership is a person. Therefore, it can be registered/ converted as a Section 8

Company.
Partnership Firm - Section 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 allows person or association of persons
to be registered as a Section 8 Company on fulfillment of certain conditions.
Conversion of Section 8 Companies
One Person Company - Rule 7(1) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits
conversion of Section 8 Company to one Person Company.
Advertisement at the Time of Conversion
Rule 20 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 provides for the procedure for conversion of
an entity into a Section 8 Company. Sub-rule (3) of rule 20 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules,
2014 provides that any entity which is desirous of being registered as section 8 Company, it,
interalia, shall be required to publish a notice in Form No. INC- 26 within a week from the date of
making the application to the Registrar in at least once in a vernacular newspaper in the principal
vernacular language of the district in which the registered office of the proposed company is to be
situated or is situated, and circulating in that district, and at least once in English language in an
English newspaper circulating in that district. A copy of the notice, as published, shall be sent
forthwith to the Registrar and also to be placed on the websites as may be notified by the Central
Government.
Stamp Duty
Stamp duty on memorandum & articles of association of a Company or on any increase in share
capital is governed by Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as adopted by respective state or stamp act of
respective state, as the case may be. Some of the states provide privileged rates for stamp duty on
MOA/ AOA of Section 8 Companies or on increase in authorized share capital. No relaxation of
special rate of stamp duty has been provided by any of the state in respect of stamp duty payable
on issue of share certificates by Section 8 Company.
Altercation in MOA & AOA
A Section 8 Company can alter the provisions of its Memorandum or articles by passing a special
resolution; however such alteration requires the approval of the Registrar of Companies.
Corporate Social Responsibility

Section 135 applies to every company including section 8 company fulfilling the criteria laid down
in that section. The amount needs to be spending on activities other than normal activities of the
company and not for the benefit of the company or its employees. Spending by the company in its
own activities will not qualify as CSR spend. MCA General circular No 21/2014 dated June 18,
2014 clarifies that contribution to corpus of a Trust / Society / Section 8 Companies etc. will qualify
as CSR expenditure.
Amalgamation
Section 8(10) provides that a company registered under section 8 shall amalgamate only with
another company registered under section 8 company and having similar objects. In view of section
8(10), Section 8 Company cannot be amalgamated with a company which is not a Section 8
company.
Section 8 Company can be amalgamated with another Section 8 Company. However section 8(10)
provides that the other company be “having similar objects”. What are similar objects is not
specified. Therefore a view is possible that so long as the main objects of two section 8 companies
are within the objects specified under section 8 (1) (a) the objects will be considered similar
because the similarity between the objects is established by the fact that with either of such objects
the said companies can be registered as section 8 companies.
Contributions from Overseas
There are special requirements to be complied with under the Foreign Contribution and Regulation
Act, 2010 before a Section 8 Company can receive any contributions or donations from
overseas/outside India from non-residents. The provisions of the said Act are in addition to the
provisions under the Companies Act.
Cancellation of License
Section 8 companies require a grant of a license by the Central Government. All such licenses are
revocable as well on the following grounds: the company contravenes provisions of Section 8; terms
of the license are violated; when its conduct is fraudulent, or it violates its own objectives and public
policy. The Government can even order the company to be wound-up or amalgamated with another
similar company under certain circumstances. The Government has to hear the company before
passing such orders.
Winding Up
Section 8 companies can wind-up or dissolve themselves either voluntarily or under orders given by
the Central Government. If any assets remain after satisfaction of debts and liabilities upon such
winding-up, the National Company Law Tribunal can order the transfer of these assets to a similar
company. It can also order that they must be sold and the proceeds of this sale should be credited to
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund.
Punishment for Contravention
Any company that contravenes provisions of Section 8 is punishable with a fine ranging from Rs. 10
lakhs to Rs. 1 crore. Further, directors and officers of the company are liable to punishment with
imprisonment up to 3 years and a fine between Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 25 lakhs. Such officers can also face
prosecution under stringent provisions of Section 447 (dealing with fraud) if they conduct any affairs
with fraudulent motives.
3rd & 4th March 2022
Wrote a comprehensive article for the firm, on the issue of the recent amendment to IT Rules,
2021. The reproduction of which is stated below for your kind perusal.
Information Technology Rules, 2021 – A Blemished Approach towards Unbridled

Regulations
Introduction
Ever since the notification of the Information Technology (Guidelines for Intermediaries and
Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the government of the day has been receiving backlash
from all corners of society. Under the guise of promoting self-regulation, there has been an attempt
to compromise the freedom of speech of digital media. Aspersions are often cast upon the
intentions of the actions of the present government; however, the same is not unfounded, given the
precedents of this very government in matters concerning public importance. For many, these rules
denote the rise of fascism & the breakdown of democracy in the country. Amid this political
slugfest, let us take a moment to analyze what this regulation is & how it abridges the very
foundation on which our constitution is based.
The ruling government on 25th February 2021 notified the IT rules 2021 via its official gazette.
What followed after was an enraged response from the public. A three-tier mechanism has been
announced through the new rules; the first two tiers elucidate self-regulatory measures by the
platform itself, whereas the third tier is an oversight mechanism in case of a contingency that
warrants instant remedial action against the content. The first tier recommends the appointment of
a grievance redressal officer to be appointed by the content creator itself, which is bound to act on
a receipt of a complaint within 15 days. The second tier embodies the self-regulatory method of
the streaming methods headed by a retired Supreme Court judge or High Court judge. The final &
third tier encompasses an inter-departmental committee for the resolution of the grievances. i
Procedural Blemishes – Legal Challenges
The present rules are a case of excessive delegation, suffering from procedural defects. When
regulation & oversight is not prescribed by the parent Act then bestowing the same via delegated
legislation raises inevitable legal challenges, on which the Apex Court has already made its stand
amply clear. If delegated legislation goes beyond the scope envisioned by the parent Act, then it
can’t be sustained and is liable to be struck down.ii If a rule goes against the authority of the parent
Act or statute, on this ground alone the rule is liable to be set aside. iii The Supreme Court reiterated
its stand that the delegated legislation can’t enlarge the objective of the Act, the rules have to be
in line with the objectives & provisions of the parent Act, contrary to which the legislation becomes
ultra vires & is liable to judicial scrutiny. iv
In the case of Shreya Singhal Vs. Union of India, the Apex Court rightfully struck down Section
66-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which penalized content that causes “annoyance”
or is “offensive”, on the ground of vagueness. The Information Technology Rules 2021 exceeds
the scope contemplated by the Information Technology Act, 2000, the parent Act, besides going
against the spirit of the ruling of Shreya Singhal rendered by the Supreme Court. By bringing back
the impugned rules emanating similar objectives through its code of ethics, thus undoing the result
of Shreya Singhal's judgment. Simultaneously, attempting to do something indirectly, that is
prohibited directly, nullifying the effect of the established legal dictum, Quando aliquid prohibetur
ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum, which has been upheld by various legal precedents.v
Over-regulations of Digital Media – Conundrum of Rights & Restrictions
The fundamental right to freedom of speech & expression is regarded as one of the basic elements
of an active & vibrant democracy since it allows the citizens to participate in the political process
of the country, including expressing their dissent against the government policies. It is axiomatic
that no right is absolute, but restrictions imposed should not be more than what is required. The
Supreme Court rightfully recognized that Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution guarantees freedom
of speech & expression to receive information regarding matters of public concern. vi
One cannot rule out the possibility of misuse of these rules to target outspoken journalists who are
critical towards government draconian actions & policies, hindering journalistic freedom, the
fourth pillar of democracy. By means of these rules, the line between the rights & restrictions has
been further blurred, leaving it to the whims & fancies of the government of the day via its
emergency powers to decide the degree of restriction, therefore, strangulating free speech. The
government by its actions has arrogated itself the functions of deciding disputes, which ought to
have been discharged by the judiciary & which it did not possess earlier.
With the introduction of the draconian IT rules, 2021, digital media can be subjected to a code of
ethics, allowing the government to block content provided it goes against the sovereignty, integrity
& other grounds which are indeed legitimate restrictions. However, blocking the content based on
“public order” is a very vague ground, to say the least, and is heavily prone to misuse. vii If anyone
from the society lambastes the functioning of the government or expresses its disagreement with
the policies of the government on an online platform, the government can invoke the defence of
“public order”, which it is known to do for face-saving, therefore, stifling any kind of dissent.
The immunities that intermediaries earlier possessed in respect of their functioning, as held in
Avnish Bajaj Vs. Stateviii confront the peril of being done away with since, under the new IT rules,
intermediaries can be compelled to track the originator of the message. Therefore, end-to-end
encrypted chats can potentially be a thing of the past & mockery will be made of privacy. ix Also,
the data retention period has been extended to 6 months. The repercussions of these rules will have
a chilling effect on the landmark ruling of K.S. Puttaswamy Vs. Union of India, enunciating the
right to privacy, which can result in a state of surveillance. Adding insult to injury, the absence of
robust data protection laws shall ensure that the privacy of the internet users will go for a toss.
Ousting Judicial Scrutiny - Strangulating Democratic Framework
It is also worth highlighting that to contain the spread of hate, defamatory, false & obscene content;
we already have a dearth of penal provisions including civil & criminal law, courtesy of provisions
like Section 153A, 295A 499, & 505 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 66E, 67 & 67A
of the Information Technology Act, 2000, providing for judicial recourse in case a person is
aggrieved by digital content, however by the means of this rules, the judicial process has been
attempted to be ousted by empowering the executive to act against the content that it deems
“objectionable” in its opinion as per its whims & fancies, hence doing away with any form of
accountability. We ought to strengthen our judicial system by timely filling of vacancies across
the courts rather than creating an imbalance of powers among the institutions, by letting the
executive subjugate other institutions.
The rules also entrust emergency power to the law enforcing agencies (On the Directions of
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting) that they are authorized to take down any content if
necessary without rendering the opportunity of being heard to another party, again a provision
which can be misused to the height of absurdity. x The power to adjudicate such matters should
have been vested with the judiciary, the third pillar of the democracy, denoting an overreach of
power by the executive. It comes as no surprise that we have fallen to 53rd position in the 2020
Democracy Index’s Global Ranking & 111th position in the 2020 Human Freedom Index.
Conclusion
As an opportunity cost of regulating the online digital platforms, fundamental rights of the citizens
have been proposed to be compromised. The present government is indeed by the people but
apparently not for the people. As the matter has reached various High Courts challenging the vires
of the Rules, now it’s up to the Courts to obliterate this imbroglio, a lot would depend upon the
courage of the court to call a spade a spade & stand up as an institution to defend the right of the
citizens & not to abdicate its responsibility. The balance of powers among the democratic
institutions in a democracy is much required, which is being attempted to be imbalanced. It can be
said without an iota of doubt that regulation is required in the context of digital media but that
cannot come at the cost of the fundamental rights of the citizens, without any data protection laws
& procedural blemishes. Judicial review should be the way to go rather than executive
exhortations.
i
Rule 9(3) of Information Technology Rules, 2021.
ii
Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 127.
iii
Union Of India & Ors vs S. Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683.
iv
Assam Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (2001) 4 SCC 202.
v
State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252, M/S. M.R.F. Ltd. Vs. Manohar Parrikar & Ors., Civil
Appeal No. 4220 of 2002 & Rajiv Agarwal Vs. Union of India, W.P.(C) 7978/2020
vi
State of U.P vs Raj Narain & Ors, 1975 AIR 865.
vii
Code of Ethics, Information Technology Rules 2021.
viii
Avnish Bajaj Vs. State (2005) 3 CompLJ 364 Del.
ix
Rule 4(2) of Information Technology Rules, 2021.
x
Rule 16 of Information Technology Rules, 2021.
7th March 2022
Made a note on the issue of Moment Marketing: Whether it is a Case of IPR Infringement
or not? The reproduction of which is stated below:
The existing precedent comprises of a few cases which have read the right to privacy with the right
of publicity to hold that an individual acquires a right of publicity by virtue of their association
with an event, sport or movie. An important case here is ICC Development (International) Ltd v
Arvee Enterprises where this right was created and the court held that any effort to take away the
right of publicity from the individual would be violative of Articles 19 and 2l of the Constitution
of India. The court has held that the right of publicity rests with the individual alone and that they
alone may profit from it. However, the approach of the court here has been through fundamental
rights and the right to privacy and noticeably not through Intellectual Property.
In the United States, Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co marked the beginnings of the
understanding of the right of publicity through the concept of privacy. Initially courts adopted a
more narrow application of the right to privacy on celebrity’s rights until a court in Georgia
recognised publicity as a property right based on commercial considerations. The current

framework for understanding celebrity rights in the US is both by common law and statutory
recognition. Noticeably, in France personality rights remain protected under Article 9 of the French
Civil Code and if a person’s personal history or image is used without authorisation, it is actionable
as per French law.
An Indian IPR Perspective
In India, protection of an athlete or celebrity’s rights from the perspective of trademark law is quite
limited in scope. Courts have previously accorded protection to names, characters and even film
titles in the past under trademark laws. Trademark registration by celebrities allows them to defend
those specific aspects of their personality against unauthorised use while also allowing for limited
commercialisation of their personae. From the realm of copyrights, not much can be said on the
protection of celebrity rights as the scope of its protection is limited to images, sketches or
portrayals of the celebrity. It has been previously held in Sim v Heinz & Co Ltd that voice,
likeliness or other identifier of personality can not form the subject matter of a copyright. While
copyright laws may accord celebrities or athletes the right to control the sale, dissemination and
use of their images the same can not be said of the more abstract concepts of fame, goodwill or
reputation.
The common law tort of “passing off” is connected closely with Intellectual property rights and it
generally covers infringement of non-registered trademarks. In cases where a person’s name,
likeliness or image is misused, a cause of action may lie in a suit for “passing off.” When there is
injury to the goodwill or reputation of a person which may be caused by misrepresentation to pass
off one’s goods as the goods of another, a passing off remedy may be available. In the context of
celebrity or athlete’s rights being infringed by brands purporting to “congratulate” them, it may be
argued that it constitutes exploitation of their fame or goodwill in order to indicate that celebrity’s
endorsement of that brand or product. In Henderson v Radio Corporation Pvt Ltd the claimants
succeeded in a suit for passing off when the defendants wrongfully used their picture in a cover
illustration. A few of the alleged brands which capitalised on Sindhu’s victory in fact used her
image alongside their brand logo in their posters and social media posts without her consent which
closely resembles the fact scenario of the above case.
Monthly Report
[ADP & Associates]
1. 8th March 2022 to 11th March 2022
In my first week of the Internship, I wrote an article on the topic of Pegasus Spyware. The
Pegasus Spyware: Privacy of People at Peril
Introduction
The right to privacy is innate and inherent to everyone. It is a fundamental human right to be left
alone, free of intrusion or disruption. "A state in which one is not watched or disturbed by other
people," according to the Oxford English Dictionary, or "the state of being free from public
attention." Article 21 of the Indian Constitution protects the right to privacy, which is an extension
of the right to life and personal liberty. xHowever, as technology progresses, the operation of these
rights has grown increasingly difficult with the introduction of complex data storage and
administration programmes.
Spyware is an example of a potentially dangerous technology that might intrude on one's privacy.
Spyware is malicious software that infiltrates a person's computer, mobile device, or other devices
in order to collect information about them and send it to a third party without their permission.
This type of dangerous software is designed to make money of stolen information. Spying is a
violation of a person's privacy, dignity, and freedom to exercise civic and political rights by
exerting near-complete control over his or her life. Spyware first appeared in the early 1990s and
has since grown into a booming industry with tens of thousands of users. Pegasus is currently the
most widely used and functional spyware in the world. The NSO Group (NSO stands for Niv,
Shalev, and Omri, the company's founders' names) produced Pegasus, a proprietary surveillance
software developed in Israel. Because it provides its developer or owner influence over the user
devices, proprietary software does not respect the freedom of its users.
How is the use of Pegasus Spyware against the Tenets of Privacy?
When spyware is put on a device, it immediately begins taking images, videos, and other digital
data to send to the criminal. It can even record calls and track a target's location while running the
phone's microphone and camera on its own and invisibly. The attacker can exploit this feature to
listen in on private and sensitive chats and relay them back to the user. Even a missed WhatsApp
call could start a chain of events that leads to the smartphone being hacked. This demonstrates that
claims of end-to-end encryption and security are false and speculative.
NSO Group insists on only licencing its spyware to approved government clients under the
pretence of combating international crime and terrorism. To do this, the company entered into its
first partnership with Mexico in 2011, while former President Felipe Calderon was still in power,
and gave the government its flagship product Pegasus, which is used to follow drug gangs. Pegasus
assisted in the arrest of Joaqun Guzmán alias El Chapo, a famous Sinaloa Cartel drug boss, in 2016
by gaining access to his phone and tracking his travels. It's a good thing that this malware is being
used to catch criminals and terrorists. According to allegations from 17 news organisations, the
NSO-made Pegasus spyware was allegedly used to try to hack into the phones of political leaders
in India, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Morocco, and Hungary, including heads
of state, lawyers, activists, and journalists. There has been evidence of Pegasus's mistreatment in
the past. It was related to the suspected hacking of Jeff Bezos' and journalist Jamal Khashoggi's
phones by Saudi Arabia's crown prince in 2018.
According to the Pegasus Project, Pegasus has been linked to the monitoring of roughly 300 Indian
phone lines, including those belonging to opposition leaders like Rahul Gandhi and leading
journalists. x 22 of these phones were forensically examined by Amnesty International, which was
then peer-reviewed by the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto.x Ten of them were positively
recognised as Pegasus targets, while the other eight were unconfirmed. According to The Wire,
the database includes over 40 journalists, three prominent opposition leaders, one constitutional
authority, two sitting ministers in the Narendra Modi administration, current and former security
chiefs and personnel, and hundreds of business people.
Existing Privacy and Surveillance Related Laws in India
In India, there is no separate personal data protection law that protects personal data and
information submitted or acquired. The majority of the safeguards are dispersed throughout a slew
of laws, standards, and recommendations. The most essential clauses are found in the Information
Technology Act of 2000 (IT Act, 2000). The IT Act of 2000 is the primary law in India that governs
electronic trade and cybercrime. Section 72 of the IT Act is the only explicit clause dealing with
privacy and confidentiality breaches. Anyone who reveals the contents of any electronic record,
register, book, or other object without the approval of the person involved faces a two-year prison
sentence, a fine of one lakh rupees, or both under Section 72 of the IT Act, 2000. x
Awful things can happen when sensitive information slips into the wrong hands. A security breach
at a government entity, for example, could provide unauthorised access to critical information.
When it comes to data privacy, it appears that users have every option available to them except the
one they want, which is data control. Understanding who collects data, where it is stored, how it
is used, and what can be done if the data is misused are all part of the Data Protection bill. There
have been far too many instances of personally identifiable information being misused, whether
anonymised or not. According to Canalys research, the data of nearly three-quarters of the adult
population of the country has been in threat since 2017. The majority of these intrusions took place
while India pushed its IT reforms, digitising various papers, and the risk of future incursions is
certain to increase.
Data Protection Bill
With the increase of user-generated data and the ever-increasing industrial value of data,
governments must defend individual data rights more than ever. Personal data is safeguarded by
data protection regulations, which control the collection, use, transfer, and disclosure of such
information. They also give individuals access to their data and hold businesses that collect
personal data accountable, as well as providing remedies for unauthorised or harmful processing.
This bill, however, has several flaws. The PDP Bill creates a monopoly in which the state and its
agencies will have exclusive access to all personal and non-personal data. While it gives Indians
main rights over their personal data, it also gives the federal government exemptions that go against
the norms of data processing. This bill safeguards people's fundamental rights, including as their
right to privacy and data protection, but it also allows the government to process sensitive personal
data as needed without the data owners' express approval.
Conclusion
In August 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously confirmed the right to privacy as a fundamental
right under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution in the landmark case of K. S. Puttaswamy
and Anr. v. Union of India and Others. x The Supreme Court declared in this landmark decision
that privacy is a cornerstone and important component of future judicial battles over the
government's surveillance powers. India is a democratic nation with its people at its heart. When
instances like Pegasus espionage occur, citizens' fundamental rights are compromised.
Surveillance in and of itself is a violation of personal rights, and so breaches both Article 14 and
Article 19 of the Constitution. Such an intervention chills the populous, prompting people to
practise self-censorship in the event that someone is listening. As a result, it is vital to ensure that
every individual has the right to regulate his or her personal data and the ability to govern his or
her own life, including the right to control one's own life and online presence.
I was asked to do legal research on the legal enforceability of oral agreements and to make a note
on it, the reproduction of which is stated below:
Oral Contracts
Agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract,
for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be
void.
Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in [India], and not hereby expressly repealed,
by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses, or any law
relating to the registration of documents.
An oral contract by which the parties intend to be bound is valid and enforceable x,unless required
by any other law to be in writing; but, oral contracts require clear and satisfactory evidence about
formation and contentsx
So from this section, we can conclude the following necessary things for making an Agreement a
valid contract:
I. Competent parties: Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority
according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind and is not disqualified
from contracting by any law to which he is subject.
II. Free consent: Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by—
a. coercion,
b. undue influence
c. fraud,
d. misrepresentation,
e. mistake,
III. Lawful consideration and Lawful object: The consideration or object of an agreement is
lawful, unless—
a. it is forbidden by law; or
b. is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or
c. is fraudulent ; or
d. involves or implies, injury to the person or property of another; or
e. the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy
By fulfilling these 4 necessary requirements, an agreement becomes a contract under Section 10

of the Act. Hence it can be understood that an agreement plus the essentials tabled in Section 10
will deem the contract valid. Section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 says that an Agreement
is defined as “every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other”.
On the validity of oral agreements while dealing with several cases the courts recognised the
acceptability of oral agreements once they were found to be fulfilling the essentials provided in
section 10. As we see in the case of Alka Bose vs. Parmatma Devi & Orsx, the Supreme Court by
coming to the conclusion of the case observed that how oral agreements are valid. A sale agreement
can be oral also and valid. It is not necessary that agreement should be written, what is more
important is that it should be within the ambit of Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act. All oral
and written agreements will be valid if they fulfil the conditions specified in Section 10.
In the case of Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devix the Supreme court observed that An agreement of
sale comes into existence when the vendor agrees to sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase, for
an agreed consideration on agreed terms. It can be oral. It can be by exchange of communications
which may or may not be signed. It may be by a single document signed by both parties. It can
also be by a document in two parts, each party signing one copy and then exchanging the signed
copy as a consequence of which the purchaser has the copy signed by the vendor and a vendor has
a copy signed by the purchaser. Or it can be by the vendor executing the document and delivering
it to the purchaser who accepts it.
In the case of S.V. Narayanaswamy vs. Savithrammax Karnataka High Court, appellant
successfully proved the existence of an oral agreement. The appellant filed the case for specific
performance of sale agreement. The sale agreement was oral in nature. Appellant showed the
cheques given by the respondent for the consideration of the subject matter. Respondent willfully
acted towards the agreement. Even from the witnesses who were examined, it was clear that there
was an agreement between the appellant and respondent. After considering the shreds of evidence
produced by the appellant, the court held that there was an oral agreement between the two. The
cheques were shown as an evidence that entire considerable amount was paid. This clearly proves
the oral agreement.
Then in the case of T Jayaram Naidu vs. Yasodha and Orsx Madras High Court, the case was for
relief of specific performance. The court by referring Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act said
that even oral agreement for sale is valid and also enforceable through court. The main point is
that the burden of proof lies on the person claiming the right to prove the existence of such
agreement. In this case, appellant failed to establish that there was an oral agreement. It is
necessary that for proving the existence of an oral agreement, a person should have some evidence
to prove it, whether by a witness or anything. Appellants also failed to furnish the date of oral
agreement on the reply notice which was sent by them to the respondents. This could have been
the evidence but appellants were unable to do so. Hence it is held that there was no oral agreement.
In the case of Y V Narasimha Sarma vs. Soorampalli Appalarajux held that it is not necessary
that a contract should be written only, an oral contract is also valid. Under section 54 of Transfer
of Property Act, an oral sale of a contract is true and valid. It is upon the plaintiff who has filed
the case to prove that oral agreement is true. He has to show a true evidence in support of his
contention. It is true that written contract has some valid authenticity, but if there is some oral
agreement of sale, one has to prove it with sufficient evidence. Court also has to scrutinize the
matter very carefully to come to any conclusion.
Then in the case of Sheela Gehlot vs. Sonu Kochar & Orsx Delhi High Court observed that oral
agreements are valid and enforceable and there could be no dispute about it. Until there is anything
which needed to be written, an oral agreement will enforce. Further for a contract, there has to be
some proposal and acceptance. And for the oral agreement, there should be some circumstances
surrounding the alleged oral agreement. No one can question the oral agreement as invalid.
This was substantiated by the Delhi High Court, in the case of Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt.
Ltd. vs. Vinod Kumar Alagx, whereby the Court held that even an oral agreement can be a valid
and enforceable contract. Therefore, in the strict sense, it is not essential that a contract must be in
writing, unless specified by law or the parties themselves contemplate the reduction of terms of
agreement to writing.

In my second week of the Internship at ADP & Associates, I wrote an article on homosexuality,
the reproduction of which is stated below:
Homosexuality and the Law
Introduction
Science has reached an agreement on homosexuality, stating that a person's attraction to people of
the same sex or gender is natural. They are neither compelled or persuaded by anyone, and their
feelings are instinctive. They are based on inbreeding. Our forefathers and mothers, on the other
hand, could not embrace or comprehend the concept of this unchangeable sex. This lack of clarity
has resulted in the devastation of the youth, who are now experiencing self-doubt. As a result,
discussing it with parents and children is frowned upon. As a result of society's suppression of
LGBTQ rights, such persons are distressed and experience emotional breakdowns. Many families
reject their children for this reason, and the children suffer from serious mental and emotional
problems as a result. Families are concerned about what others would think if their children are
gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Society holds them in low regard.
Homosexuality vis-á-vis Constitutional Law
St. Peter Damian coined the phrase LGBTQ to explain the term "Sodomy," which is a short term
for "Sin of Sodom," alluding to the Genesis tale of the males who tried to have intercourse with
two angels and became obsessed with blindness. In the year 1050, this was provided. William
Blacksmith, a well-known scholar, overruled this. He took sodomy in a really obnoxious manner.
For his ideas, he enacted anti-sodomy legislation and wielded considerable power in the British
colonies. As a result, section 377 of the Indian Penal Code was enacted, which was initiated by
Lord Macaulay and was regarded as the country's most conservative view.
The Naz Foundationx, a non-governmental organisation dedicated to the prevention of AIDS and
the upliftment of bisexual minorities, is a well-known case that went against section 377 of the
Indian Penal Code. In the year 2001, a campaign to change this clause was launched. Furthermore,
the Delhi High Court knocked down section 377 of the Indian Constitution, which authorised
harmonious sexual actions of adults in private, stating that it infringed the fundamental rights of
life and liberty, as well as the right to equality, as stated in articles 21 and 14. It also went against
the Indian Constitution's article 15(1), which states that no one can be discriminated against on the
basis of sex or gender.
The Naz Foundation also argued that the LGBTQ community's fundamental rights under Article
19 were being violated because they were unable to move freely as they desired. Then, on
September 6, 2018, a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra sullied section
377 of the Indian Penal Code in the well-known case of Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India.
This was done to acknowledge the people's bisexual nature in the books of law and to give them a
social position. Minorities and animals are protected by the law against sexual assaults. The law
establishes that minorities and animals are protected from sexual assaults. Section 377 cites the
unnatural offence, and those who violate it will face life imprisonment or a minimum of 10 years
in prison, with the possibility of life imprisonment. As a result, section 377 makes it plain that acts
that are against the nature of the law, whether heterosexual or homosexual, would be regarded
criminal. Following this decision, it was stated that all people should be treated equally, and the
state should adhere to constitutional morality.
As a result of these investigations, the gay community's belief grew stronger, and it was certain
that the gay community link must exist. Michel Foucault's work "The History of Sexuality
Appetites" enlightened people's minds about sexual desires. Sexual desires are the ones that are in
us and have the desire to find the truth, according to that book. Sexual desires aid in the discovery
of our sexual identities. It has been viewed as a political and social issue that has been utilised to
oppress the LGBTQ community because of their differences.
Various human rights development programmes have been performed on a global scale on
numerous occasions. When it comes to LGBT rights, though, the situation is far more dangerous.
The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, which protects all human rights, included no
mention of LGBT rights since homosexuality was deemed a mental disease at the time it was
formed. “In 2003, the State of Brazil presented a resolution to the UN Commission on Human
Rights to affirm rights based on sexual orientation.” However, the proposal was deferred to 2004
and faced a dead end when, it expired from the UN agenda in 2005. In 2005, New Zealand’s
statement supporting the rights of these sexual minorities was backed by 32 states in the UN, but
did not result in a formal vote.
According to the Special Marriage Act, any Indian citizen or foreign national can marry anyone,
regardless of caste, creed, sex, or religion. There have been no such acts for the same-sex, but the
apex court will have to deal with it eventually. Despite the fact that multiple petitions have been
filed before the Supreme Court, the situation has not altered. Marriage is significant because it is
founded on a love tie and commitments. As a result, the community should maintain their optimism
and persevere in their efforts.
Conclusion
By examining the entire problem, we can see that society should help the LGBTQ community
rather than being the cause of people's emotional and mental breakdowns. Society should be open
enough to accept and respect the decisions of those who are born with disabilities. People should
strive to be the best versions of themselves while maintaining sound morality. They should be
treated like everyone else, not as if they were aliens from society. Whether or not we assimilate
such variation in ourselves is determined by our biological matrix, which is reinforced by our
character strength. However, just as we have the freedom to accept or reject this variation, the
LGBT community should have the same freedom. To them, what society considers normal could
just as easily be a variety. As a result, criminalising homosexuality is not a viable option. The goal
is to keep a robust, liberal, and healthy attitude toward all members of society.
4. 21st March 2022 to 24th March 2022
Cinematograph Bill
Films have always been a popular form of entertainment in India. Bollywood is one of the world's
major film industries, with around 1800 films released each year in a variety of languages. I They
are the only forms of expression in India that have been found to be valid prior to censorship and
prior constraint. [ii] Under the Constitution, pre-censorship is considered unconstitutional for other
types of expression. [iii] The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) is authorised under the
Cinematograph Act to recommend cuts or restraints on a film's exhibition. [iv]
Many films have been subjected to protracted legal battles that have reached the Supreme Court.
Many of these disagreements have stemmed from concerns of outright vulgarity, profanity, and
sensitive political and humanitarian topics. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting issued
a notice proposing modifications to the quinquagenarian Cinematograph Act in June 2021. [v] The
proposed amendment, which directly addresses the state's revisionary powers, has generated
concerns about the Constitution's creative freedoms and rights to free speech and expression.
Proposed Amendment of Concern
The proposed modification, which has sparked fears of "super-censorship," is related to the Central
Government's revisionary powers. [vi] The Central Government has been given the authority to
prevent the screening of a film that has previously been approved by the CBFC. If the Union
Government believes the film does not comply with the guidelines set out in Section 5B (1) of the
Cinematograph Act, it will be able to do so. These limitations are analogous to Article 19(2) of the
Indian Constitution's restrictions on freedom of expression. Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph Act
contains the clause relating to revisional rights. These limitations are analogous to Article 19(2) of
the Indian Constitution's restrictions on freedom of expression. Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph
Act contains the clause relating to revisional rights. In KM Shankarappa v. Union of India, the
Karnataka High Court struck down this provision. [vii] In this case, the petitioner argued that
Section 6(1) is unconstitutional since it grants the Central Government the ability to overturn any
decision made by the Tribunal.
The petitioner went on to say that the presence of such a provision is unconstitutional in law. The
Supreme Court (SC) later affirmed the Karnataka High Court's decision, calling it a farce of the
rule of law, which is enshrined in the Constitution's core framework. The Supreme Court further
declared that the legislature cannot ignore a judicial order issued by any tribunal without
implementing appropriate legislation. As a result, the Ministry of Broadcasting noted in the
notification, citing the Shankarappa decision, that the legislature can nullify the order through
legislative action. This is significant because the legislature can choose to disregard a judicial
declaration by passing laws repealing it.
Any film that is submitted to the CBFC for consideration goes through a lengthy and complicated
procedure of review, document filing, translated versions, and so on. The final step before a film
is released for public viewing is its certification. The certificate issued by the CBFC will no longer
be the final authority after this revision. The government now has the authority to impose
restrictions on film distribution. If this power is misused, it might have a negative impact on the
film business. Films have recently been analysed for the prevalence of profanity, decency,
morality, and obscenity. "One man's vulgarity is another man's song," Justice Harlan once
famously quipped about obscenity. [viii] In the well-known Bandit Queen case, the Supreme Court
ruled that the overall impact of the picture should be examined rather than individual elements of
the film that were significant to the storyline and intended to have an impression on the audience.
[ix] The interpretation of "sovereignty and security" may result in extensive censorship of films
based on historical events, current events, or sensitive subjects.
Films have the ability to influence public opinion. Bollywood has produced a number of films that
are based on and intended to address current situations. A couple of these films have been
scrutinised by the CBFC and have sparked debate in the film industry. The dispute surrounding
the film 'Udta Punjab,' which was initially outright prohibited by the CBFC due to 'excessive
profanity, abusive language, and drug consumption,' but was ultimately permitted after around 90
changes. Films have the power to sway public opinion. Bollywood has produced a lot of films that
are based on contemporary events and are intended to address them. The CBFC has examined a
few of these films, which have stirred criticism in the film industry. The controversy surrounding
the film 'Udta Punjab,' which was initially banned by the CBFC owing to 'excessive vulgarity,
harsh language, and drug consumption,' but was eventually approved after approximately 90
revisions. The amendment will only make things more difficult for filmmakers. The Film
Certificate Appellate Tribunal (FCAT) was a valuable resource for the film industry when it came
to resolving disputes. The abolition of this tribunal, on the other hand, was a further setback for
the sector.
Abolishment of the FCAT
The Tribunal Reforms Ordinance of 2021 made a significant alteration to the Cinematograph Act,
replacing the phrase "tribunal" with "high court." The FCAT was practically abolished as a result
of this. The Film Certification Appellate Tribunal (FCAT) was a quasi-judicial organisation tasked
with resolving disputes about film certification. The FCAT played a critical role in defending
filmmakers' right to free speech and preserving their interests. Filmmakers fear that now that the
FCAT is no longer in existence, their difficulties and challenges will be overlooked. A tribunal's
objective is to deliver rapid justice in cases where a decision must be made promptly.
In terms of chronology, the FCAT was abolished long before the Cinematograph Act was intended
to be changed. To put it another way, the dedicated quasi-judicial authority that could defend the
interests of filmmakers was disbanded, and the Central Government was given the last say.
Filmmakers can take their objections to the High Court, but many are unconvinced that the High
Courts would be able to comprehend and protect their interests, especially when High Courts
around the country are overburdened with cases that have yet to be heard.
The Supreme Court held in KM Shankarrapa that a decision by a quasi-judicial body formed by
the government, namely FCAT, is binding on the government. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
held that the government could not use its revisionary powers to intervene and overturn an FCAT
ruling. The government cannot intervene if an expert body has appraised a film and its influence
on the general population. As a result, in this scenario, the CBFC will evaluate a film using the
principles set forth in Section 5B (1) of the Act. They can also guess on the film's impact on an
audience, as well as its immediate reaction and other key factors. Because there will be no quasi-
judicial body to keep the administration in check, the proposed change could make it exceedingly
easy for the government to exercise its revisionary powers because it will no longer be subject to
judicial proclamation. The proposal to eliminate the tribunal has endangered the judiciary's
independence by giving the Central Government broad and arbitrary powers. This extends beyond
the Constitution's supremacy, basic framework, equal protection of the law, and separation of
powers.
Conclusion
The planet has progressed from its previous state. People today are hungry for new ideas and
unique art forms. Films are more than just a business, and they deserve to be protected in the same
way that other kinds of expression do. Cinema limitations should be made more free in such a
modern society, but recent revisions and advances suggest the reverse. Government intervention
in movies and the media has long been frowned upon. Mrs. Leela Samson, for example, resigned
as CBFC chief, alleging government pressure and corruption as grounds. As a result, Mr. Pahlaj
Nehlani's tumultuous term exemplifies how government intervention may be disastrous for the
film sector.
The most recent revisions are against Shankarappa's ideas. The judiciary examines decisions made
by the legislature and the executive branch, not the other way around. The elimination of the FCAT
and subsequent amendments to the Cinematograph Act impose arbitrary limits on film expression
and give the Central Government broad powers, which is illegal and requires reevaluation. It is
past time for film to be treated similarly to other forms of expression.
5.25th & 26th March 2022
I was asked to make a short note on Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the
Note on Order XXXVII CPC
 Rule 1
 Summary suits should be instituted in High Courts, City Civil Courts, Courts of
small causes or any other court notified by the High Court
 Summary suits could be instituted only in matters of specified documents such as
promissory notes, bills of exchange or hundies
 In case of summary suits, plaintiff should seek to recover a debt through a written
contract only
 The sum which is sought to be recovered must be fixed
 The nature of the sum must be of a debt or a guarantee
 Rule 2
 Suit must be instituted by presenting a plaint
 It shall contain a specific averment that the suit is filed under this Order
 Relief claimed must fall within the ambit of this rule
 Title must contain the order no.
 Summons- Form 4 Appendix B
 Defendant must enter an appearance. In case of failure, plaint shall be admitted,
and plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for a sum, not exceeding the one which is
mentioned in summons, along with interest.
 Rule 3
 It mentions about the procedure of the appearance of the defendant
 As and when the notice is served on the address given by the defendant, he must
enter an appearance in the Court within 10 days of the service.
 On the date of appearance, the defendant must serve a notice of his appearance to
the plaintiff.
 After defendant’s appearance, plaintiff must serve summons for judgment in Form
No. 4A in Appendix B- returnable not less than 10 days from the service date and
it must contain-
 cause of action
 amount claimed
 affidavit stating that he believes there is no defence to the suit
 Within 10 days of the service of the summons, defendant must apply for leave to defend,
leave to defend could be granted either unconditionally or with certain conditions. Leave
to defend can be rejected in case the defence is-
 unsubstantial
 frivolous
 vexatious
 If it is admitted by the defendant that the amount is due from him, leave to
defend will not be granted till the time he doesn’t deposit the admitted amount
in the Court
 If defendant has not applied for leave to defend, plaintiff will be entitled to a decree straight
away
 If leave to defend is granted to the defendant, he must deposit some security in the Court
 Delay could be condoned in case the defendant shows some sufficient cause.
6.28th March 2022 to 31st March 2022
Hijab Controversy and the Law
Introduction
It's an ancient saying that the way you pose a question will determine the answer you give yourself.
That giveaway can be found on page 39 of today's Karnataka high court order maintaining a ban
on the wearing of the hijab in classrooms, where the Full Bench poses four questions for
discussion. The second question is as follows:
“Whether prescription of school uniform is not legally permissible, as being violative of

petitioners Fundamental Rights inter alia guaranteed under Articles, 19(1)(a), (i.e., freedom of
expression) and 21, (i.e., privacy) of the Constitution?” [Emphasis supplied]
It's worth noting that the court asks itself a question that no one else has asked, and that no one
could ask, given how ridiculous the topic is: whether a school uniform is unconstitutional in and
of itself. However, that framing permits the court to elide the essential point – that wearing the
hijab with a school uniform is consistent with the greater purposes of constitutionalism and
education – in favour of the uniform's purity. On every page of the judgement, the uniform haunts
the court's imagination, culminating in the astonishing remark on page 88, when the court states
that "no reasonable mind can envisage a school without a uniform." The judgment's unstated
premise is that the right to wear the hijab is a claim against the fundamental concept of a school
uniform, and that granting the former would lead to the destruction of the latter. Respectfully, this
omission causes the court to misconstrue and misapply a number of well-established constitutional
principles, and the verdict should be reversed on appeal.
To begin with, a short recap: the court's decision to uphold the hijab ban is based on three
constitutional grounds. The first is that wearing the hijab is not a "essential religious practise"
under Islam, and thus is not immune from state regulation; the second is that to the extent that
wearing the hijab is an aspect of freedom of expression or the right to privacy, the ban is a
reasonable restriction on the exercise of those rights; and the third is that the government order
under challenge is facially neutral and non-sectarian (i.e., does not discriminate based on religion);
and finally, because the government.
Essential Religious Practices
I don't want to linger too long on the first point. I've previously written about why framing the
argument in terms of the essential religious practises test is unsatisfactory, not least because it
denies Muslim women any agency in the matter, and essentially argues that wearing the hijab is
not a matter of choice (no matter how situated, complex, or otherwise messy the context of that
choice may be), but is objectively compelled by Islamic tenets.
The court concludes that the petitioners have failed to prove that wearing the hijab is vital to Islam
— that it is necessary, non-optional, and that Islam would lose its essence if women did not wear
it. These are the general contours of the examination under the essential religious practises doctrine
(leaving aside the fact that, as most people have pointed out, neither the court nor external
observers are especially well-positioned to conduct this study). After establishing this, the court
can conclude that the right to wear the hijab is not protected from governmental restriction as a
matter of religious freedom. Of course, there is a flaw in the approach in that it effectively denies
Muslim women the chance to frame their case in terms of religious choice, forcing them to argue
in terms of religious coercion instead. This is especially amusing when we consider the right as a
"right to religious freedom"; the fault, however, lies squarely with the basic religious practises test
as it has evolved over the previous seventy years, and it is evident that there is no way out of this
conundrum unless that criteria is overridden.
Freedom of Expression and Privacy

Let us now turn to the point in which, in my humble opinion, the court's analysis is incorrect. The
freedom of expression and the right to privacy have already been discussed on this site as
fundamental rights implicated by this case. To summarise the reasoning, the Supreme Court
concluded in NALSA v Union of India that dress might be a form of "symbolic expression" that
is protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution on some circumstances and depending on the
context (why it should be treated as such in this case has been argued in the linked posts). It is also
clear that the right to privacy is applied in terms of decisional autonomy. It's worth noting that the
reasons for freedom of expression and privacy aren't always neatly separated from the arguments
for religious liberty: in certain circumstances, it's possible that wearing the hijab is a kind of
symbolic expression because it's worn to defend a besieged identity.
Following the activation of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, the analysis shifts to
constraints, which are subject to the proportionality test. Proportionality demands the state to use
the least restrictive approach to achieve its objectives, among other considerations. As a result,
where something less than a ban would suffice, a ban is excessive. When dealing with situations
regarding dress rules and uniforms, the proportionality framework provides the broad intellectual
scaffolding under which numerous countries around the world, including India in the NALSA
verdict, have adopted the standard of reasonable accommodation.
Reasonable accommodation requires the court to consider whether, in the presence of a default, a
specific claim for deviating from that default, based on constitutional rights, may be properly
accommodated by the state (or a private party) without the activity losing its character. The claim
for reasonable accommodation in the case of the hijab is straightforward: that wearing the hijab
(especially hijab that is the same colour as the uniform and is draped over the head like a shawl)
can be accommodated alongside the uniform without harming or vitiating the overall public goal
of education.
Previously, thorough arguments were made on this blog regarding how the hijab ban violates the
constitutional provision of non-discrimination. The court just briefly considers this point, noting
simply that the proscription – which was based on a government directive – was facially neutral
and non-sectarian. Unfortunately, while this reasoning holds true in the case of direct
discrimination, it does not hold true in the case of indirect discrimination, in which seemingly
neutral rules and regulations have disproportionate effects on various groups. The Supreme Court
has long recognised the idea of indirect discrimination, and it is now part of Indian law. Indeed,
the court's own analysis – particularly its distinction of the South African case – demonstrates how
indirect discrimination is plainly applicable in this case. The court's distinction between "ocularly
insignificant" and (presumably) "ocularly significant" is a classic example of a "facially neutral
rule" (which, in the court's interpretation, would allow "ocularly insignificant" adornments to a
uniform but not others) that has a disproportionate impact, in this case, grounded at the intersection
of religion and burden). The court's omission to address this ground at all, in my opinion, presents
even another compelling reason why this judgement should be reversed on appeal.
Conclusion
The first is that the court expressly states that its decision is applicable to schools (i.e., not even
school premises, but classrooms). It expressly mentions this on page 124, following some quite
unpleasant remarks about how outlawing the headgear is emancipatory "for women in general, and
Muslim women in particular," in my opinion. Second, I believe that the judgement is erroneous
for the reasons stated above, and that it should be overturned on appeal. It is incorrect for the
following reasons: first, it incorrectly assumes that the rights to freedom of expression and privacy
are diminished, or derivative, in this case; second, it misapplies the reasonable accommodation
test, failing to show how allowing the hijab as a uniform accessory is incompatible with the goal
of education; third, it fails to consider that the ban amounts to indirect discrimination against
Muslim women; and fourth, it fails to consider that the ban amounts to indirect discrimination
against Muslim women. This results in an overarching structure of thinking in which the sanctity
of the uniform is prioritised over both educational purposes and constitutional rights. A proper
calibration, in my opinion, requires us to recognise that educational settings in a plural and diverse
society should represent that plurality and diversity, and that facilitating freedom of choice and
expression is one important way to do so. This approach is more in line with our founding
documents.
7. 1st April, 2nd April & 4th April 2022
Executed research and made a comprehensive note on the requirement of trade license for
hotels in Rajasthan
Trade License for Hotels in Rajasthan

 Rajasthan Tourism Trade (Facilitation and Regulation) Act, 2010
 Section 2(q)- "service provider" shall include hotels, heritage hotels, motels,
restaurants, dhabas, Paying Guest 1-louses, handicraft shops or emporiums, travel
agents, tour operators, excursion agents, travel transport agencies, taxi-cabs, Guides
and similar service providers who are providing services to the tourists whether they
are recognized and registered as such or not by the prescribed authority;
 Section 3- Expert Committee for setting out norms, standard and general
principles for recognition and registration of service providers. –
(1) For the purpose of ensuring that services provided by service providers to the
tourists are of acceptable standard, the State Government shall appoint a Committee
to set out standards for service providers of various categories.
(2) After considering the recommendation of the Committee referred to in sub-section
(1), the State Government shall declare standards and norms for recognition and
registration of service providers and general principles governing such recognition
and registration by framing and publishing a scheme of recognition and registration
for general information. The scheme shall also classify the norms and standards,
contravention of which shall be deemed minimal, graver or gravest for the purposes
of Section 4.
 Section 4- Recognition and registration of service providers, their obligations and
consequences of non-adherence to norms and conditions of recognition. –
(1) Any service provider operating or intending to operate as a service provider in the
State, if and when desire to have itself/himself recognized by the Department of
Tourism of the State, may apply to the prescribed authority in such manner and in
such form as may be provided in the scheme framed under Section 3.
(2) Every application presented under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of by the
prescribed authority within ninety days from the date of receipt thereof.
(3) The prescribed authority shall, unless the application is rejected and recognition
and registration is disallowed or refused, record particulars of the concerned service
provider in the prescribed register of service providers which are recognized and
registered as such. The register shall contain such particulars and shall be
maintained in such form as may be prescribed.
(4) Whenever the application of a service provider is allowed and registered under sub-
section (3), the prescribed authority shall issue a certificate of recognition and
registration, in such form and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed.
(5) Where any application is rejected under sub-section (3), the prescribed authority
shall record reasons thereof and communicate the same, in writing, to the applicant:
Provided that no application for recognition and registration shall be rejected or
refused unless the applicant is heard and reasonable opportunity of being heard is
afforded to him in the matter.
(6) Every service provider who is recognized and registered under this Section shall be
under an obligation to maintain the requisite standard and follow the norms of trade
specified under the scheme framed and published under Section 3.
(7) When any service provider fails to maintain the requisite standard of services
provided by him or to comply with the norms of the trade or services offered and
make default in discharging responsibility as recognized service provider as set out
for him in the scheme made and published under Section 3, then such service
provider shall, besides being liable for imposition of penalty not exceeding the
amount specified for each category of service providers in the schedule, be
derecognised and his name shall be struck off from the register and his certificate
of recognition and registration shall be cancelled.
Provided that before imposing penalty and/or derecognising, cancelling registration
of any service provider after striking off his name from the register, the prescribed
authority shall serve a notice upon him calling him to show cause as to why the
purported action should not be taken against him and afford him a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in the matter.
(8) Where the non-adherence to norms and standards is found to be minimal, the
prescribed authority may, instead of proceeding against the service provider under
sub-section (7), censure the service provider and ask him to be careful in future and
where the breach of norms is graver, the prescribed authority, instead of proceeding
under sub-section (7), impose upon the defaulting service provider a penalty, not
exceeding the amount specified in the Schedule appended to this Act :
Provided that action under sub-section (7), may he taken only in such of the cases of
default where violations of norms and standards are gravest and where situation
does not improve even after censuring and/or penalizing the service provider.
(9) The register containing names and particulars of service providers shall constantly
be maintained, updated and shall be available on the website of the Department of
Tourism of the State Government for information of tourists and people in general
and may also be published in Newspapers, other periodicals as also through other
modes, at such intervals, as the Commissioner of the Department of Tourism may
consider appropriate.
 Schedule- [See sub-section (7) of Section 4]
Categories of service providers Amount of penalty

which may be imposed
for non-adherence to
standard
1. Hotel—
(a) having upto 40 rooms Rupees 10,000/-
(b) having more than 40 rooms Rupees 20,000/-
2. Motel— Rupees 10,000/-
3. Heritage Hotel—
(a) basic Rupees 10,000/-
(b) classic and grant Rupees 20,000/-
4. Tour operator or Travel Agency Rupees 20, 000/-
5. Excursion Agent or Elephant, Horse, Camel Rupees 15,000/-
Safari Operator
6. Restaurant or Cafeteria Rupees 5,000/-
7. Handicraft Emporium Rupees Rupees 25,000/-
8. Tourist Village Operator Rupees 10,000/-
9. Ropeway Service Provider Rupees 25, 000/-
10. Amusement Park Operator Rupees 25,000/-
11. (a) Government of India approved Guide Rupees 10,000/-
(b) State Level Guide Rupees 5,000/-
(c) Local Level Guide Rupees 5,000/-
12. Any other service providers Rupees 5,000/-
Note:- The above penalty is for first offence. For second offence the amount of penalty shall be
doubled. For other subsequent offence the licences of operation shall be forfeited.
 Section 14- Duties of local authorities towards public health and sanitation etc. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any Rajasthan Law, the local authorities
under whose local areas, the places of tourist destination or tourist areas are situate,
shall have the duty to ensure cleanliness and check defacement and defiling of the
properties in their respective local areas as also to effectively enforce the laws
prohibiting littering on streets and public places and to maintain general cleanliness
at all roads, streets and public places and therefore, it is hereby declared their
statutory duty to keep all places and areas of tourist destination, clean and hygienic
and concerned local authorities shall ensure cleaning of roads, drains, main-holes
and maintenance of Street lights and prevention of encroachments in and around
those places and heritage sites in respective areas, which are known as tourist area
or an area frequented by tourists.
(2) The State Government, in the Department of Urban Development shall oversee the
compliance of provisions contained in sub-section (1) and may issue directions to
the concerned local authorities for strict compliance of their statutory duty and in
cases of persistent non-compliance and default, initiate action against erring local
authorities in accordance with the laws governing such local authorities.
 Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009

 269. Licensing markets, slaughter-houses and certain business. –
(1) It shall be lawful for the Municipality to direct that no place not belonging to or vested
in it, shall be used for the purposes specified in clause (j) of sub-Section (1) of Section
340 except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence from the
Municipality which may from time to time grant, suspend, withhold or withdraw such
licences either generally or in individual cases.
(2) Whoever uses or permits the use of any place contrary to such direction, without the
licence required as aforesaid, or in contravention of any of the conditions or during the
suspension or after the withdrawal of such licence shall be punished with fine which
shall not be less than one thousand rupees but which may extend to two thousand
rupees.
(3) Upon a conviction being obtained in respect of any place under sub-Section (2) of this
Section, the Magistrate shall on the application of the Municipality, but not otherwise,
order such place to be closed, and thereupon appoint persons or take other steps to
prevent such place being so used and every person who so uses or permits the use of
place after it has been so ordered to be closed shall be punished with fine which shall
not be less than fifty rupees but which may extend to one hundred rupees for each day
during which he continues so to use, or permits such use of the place after it has been
so ordered to be closed.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Municipality under sub-Section (1) granting,
suspending, withholding or withdrawing any licence may, within thirty days of the such
order exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy thereof appeal to the Collector
and the order of the Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be
questioned in any Court.
 Section 340- Power of Municipality to make bye-laws. –
(1) Every Municipality may, from time to time, make bye-laws not inconsistent with this
Act and the rules made thereunder
(a) for regulating the payments from the municipal fund;
(b) for prescribing all matters relating to the imposition, levy, assessment and
collection of user charges under Section 104;
(c) for prescribing the form of and the manner of keeping of maps, drawings and
description of underground utilities and maps of fire hydrants and sewerage
manholes;
(d) for regulating the permission for temporary erection of a booth or any other
structure on any public place;
(e) for prescribing the terms and conditions subject to which the precautions to be
taken during construction or repair of street, drain or premise;
(f) for regulating the erection of all kind of buildings;
(g) for determining the technical qualifications and experience for the person seeking
licence to act as a plumber;
(h) for regulating the projections of the building under Section 192;
(i) for the regulation and inspection of markets, public places used for the sale of
articles and slaughter houses, all places used by or for animals which are for sale or
hire, or the produce of which is sold, and for the proper and clean conduct of
business therein; for regulating the sale of fruits and vegetables in the municipal
markets or other charges to be levied for the use of any of them which belong to
the Municipality;
(j) prescribing the conditions on or subject to which, and the circumstances in which,
and the areas or localities in respect of which, licences may be granted, refused,
suspended or withdrawn for the use of any place not belonging to the Municipality
(i) as a slaughter house;
(ii) as a market or shop for the sale of animals intended for human food, or of
meat, or of fish, or as a market for the sale of fruits or vegetables;
(iii) for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 282;
(iv) as a dairy, hotel, restaurant, eating-house, coffee-house, sweet, meat-shop,
bakery, camping-ground, sarai, dhobi-ghat, flour mill, sawmill, ice-candy
factory, food grain-godown, Municipality house, lodging-house (other than
a students' hostel under public or recognized control) or for manufacturing
ice or aerated water;
(v) as a place for the preparation or manufacture of oil;
(vi) for parching grain or Bengal grain on a large scale; or
(vii) for any other purpose for which the issuing of a licence may be
prescribed, and providing for the inspection and regulation of the conduct
of business in any place used as aforesaid, so as to secure cleanliness therein
or to minimize any injurious, offensive or dangerous effect arising or likely
to arise therefrom;
(k) prohibiting the stabling or herding of horses, camels, donkeys, sheep or goats,
otherwise than in accordance with such rules prescribed in such bye-laws in regard
to the number thereof, and the places to be used for the purpose, as may be
necessary to prevent danger to the public health;
(l) (i) for the inspection of milk cattle; and prescribing and regulating the
construction, dimensions, ventilation, lighting, cleansing, drainage and water-
supply of dairies and cattle-sheds in the occupation of persons following the trade
of dairymen or milk sellers;
(ii) for securing the cleanliness of milk-stores, milk-shops and vessels used by
milksellers or butter-men for milk or butter;
(m) for the registration of births, deaths and marriages, and the taking of a census
within the Municipality and for enforcing the supply of such information as may be
necessary to make such registration or census effective;
(n) regulating the disposal of the dead and of the carcasses of dead animals and the
maintenance of all places for the purpose in good order and in a safe sanitary
condition, due regard being had to the religious usages of the community or Section
of the community entitled to the use of such places for the disposal of the dead;
(o) enforcing the supply of information as to any cases of dangerous disease, and
carrying out the provisions of Section 273;
(p) enforcing the supply of such information by inhabitants of the Municipality as
may be necessary to ascertain their respective liabilities to any tax imposed therein;
(q) regulating the use of public bathing and washing places within municipal limits;
(r) regulating sanitation and conservancy;
(s) regulating the conditions for the construction, sue and disposal of houses
intended for the homeless under sub-clause (c) of clause (iv) of Section 46;
(t) regulating the conditions on which permission may be given for the temporary
occupation of, or the creation of temporary structures on public streets, or for

projections over public streets;
(u) regulating the structure and dimensions of plinths, walls, foundations, floors,
roofs and chimneys of new buildings for the purpose of securing stability and the
prevention of fires and for purposes of health;
(v) regulating the erection or use of buildings for grain shops or grain stores, the
use of sites for erection of buildings and, in localities intended for residential
purposes, the erection or use of buildings for shops, market places, manufacturing,
places of public resort or for any other purpose;
(w) preventing the erection of building without adequate provision being made for
the laying out and location of streets;
(x) ensuring the adequate ventilation of buildings by the provision and maintenance
of sufficient open space either internal or external and of doors and windows and
other means for securing a free circulation of air;
(y) regulating, in any other particular manner not specially provided for in this Act,
the construction, maintenance and control of drains, sewers, ventilation shafts,
receptacles for dung and manure, cess-pools, water-closets, privies, latrines, urinals
and drainage or sewage works of every description, whether the property of the
Municipality or not;
(z) determining the conditions, restrictions, norms and specifications for all kinds
of constructions looking to the local need for the purpose of operation of Section
194 and Section 236 in conformity with the directions issued and restrictions
prescribed if any, from time to time, by the State Government;
(za) prohibiting the transit of any vehicles of such form, construction, weight or
size, or laden with such machinery or other unwieldy objects as may be deemed
likely to cause injury to the roadway or any construction thereon, or risk or
obstruction to other vehicles or to pedestrians, along or over any street, except under
such conditions as to time, mode of traction or locomotion, use of appliances for
protection of the roadway, number of lights and assistants and other general
precautions as may be prescribed, either generally in such bye-laws or in special
licences to be granted in each case upon such terms as to time of application and
payment of fees therefore as may be prescribed in such bye-laws;

(zb) securing the protection of public parks, gardens and open spaces, vested in or
under the control of the Municipality from injury or misuse, regulating their
management and the manner in which they may be used by the public, and
providing for the proper behaviour of persons in them;
(zc) regulating or prohibiting any description of traffic in the streets and providing
.or the reduction of noise caused thereby;
(zd) rendering licences necessary for the proprietors or drivers of vehicles or
animals kept or plying for hire within the limits of the Municipality, and fixing the
fees payable for such licences and the conditions on which they are to be granted
and may be revoked;
(ze) limiting the rates which may be demanded for the hire of any carriage, cart or
other conveyance or of any animals hired to carry loads or persons, or for the service
of persons hired to carry loads or to impel or carry such conveyance, and limiting
the loads which may be carried by any animal, or carriage, cart, or other
conveyance, plying for hire, within the limits of the Municipality;
(zf) for the licensing, inspection and proper regulation of places of public resort,
recreation or amusement;
(zg) regulating the posting of bills and advertisements, and the position, size, shape
and style of sign-posts;
(zh) rendering licences necessary for hand-carts employed for transport, or hawking
articles for sale, and for, the persons using such hand-carts, and prescribing the
Conditions for the grant and revocation of such licences;
(zi) generally for the regulation of all matters relating to municipal administration;
-and every Municipality may prescribe fine for the infringement of any such bye-
laws.
(2) Every Municipality shall, before making any bye-laws under this Section, publish,
in such manner as shall in its opinion be sufficient, for the information of persons
likely to be affected thereby, a draft of the proposed by-laws together with a notice
specifying a date on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration and
shall, before making the bye-laws, receive and consider any objection or suggestion
with respect to the draft which may be made in writing by any person before the
date so specified.
 For Section 340, Udaipur Municipal Corporation of Udaipur has framed “The Hotel
and Restaurant Licensing Bye Laws, 2014”
Monthly Report of Khaitan & Co.
4th April 2022
 Researched on the legal framework on online gaming in the state of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Punjab &
Goa. The reproduction of which is stated below:
Online Gaming in India
Games based on skills are allowed in most parts of the country while games of chance are in the ambit of
gambling, treated as immoral and prohibited in most parts of the country. As betting and gambling is a state
subject, different states have their own legislation. Every state in India, except Goa, Sikkim, and the Union
Territory of Daman explicitly prohibits any sort of gambling, betting or wagering on games of chance.
Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Nagaland, Odisha, Tamil Nadu and Telangana have placed restrictions on games
of skill as well. Only Goa, Sikkim, and Daman of all 29 Indian states have made gambling legal within
their borders.
State Wise Overview of the existing legal framework
o State of Goa
1. In the State of Goa, the ambit of online gaming is governed by the Daman, and Diu Public Gambling
Act, 1976
2. Section 13 of the Daman, and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 provides blanket protection to game
of skills.
3. Under Section 13A of the Daman, and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976, the government allowed
the slot machines in five-star hotels and card-rooms in offshore vessels subject to prior approval
and authorization of the government of Goa after the payment of a specified fee.
4. Also, under Section 13A of the Daman, and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976, it allows for offshore
vessel casinos but lacks transparent law on online gambling despite being a hotspot for offline
casinos.
5. But small amendments were made to it by the government that made gambling legal in Goa. The
government amended to allow the slot machines in five-star hotels and card-rooms in offshore
vessels subject to prior approval and authorization of the government of Goa after the payment of
a specified fee. The laws of gambling state that there is a need for specific skills, knowledge of the
field, and the game is a must.
o State of Rajasthan
1. In the State of Rajasthan, the ambit of online gaming is governed by the legislation of Rajasthan
Public Gambling Ordinance, 1949.
2. Section 12 of the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance, 1949 specifically provides that the
provisions of the Act would not apply to game of skills, hence online games based on the skills
are permitted.
3. In October 2020, in the case of Chandresh Sankhla vs State of Rajasthan (2020), the court
opined that success in Dream 11's fantasy sports depends upon user's exercise of skill based on
superior knowledge, judgment and attention, and the result thereof is not dependent on the
winning or losing of a particular team in the real world game on any particular day and it’s a
game of skill and not a game of chance.
4. Similarly in 2002, in the case of Tulsiram Vs. State of Rajasthan, the Court opined that video
game is a game of skill and such game is exempted from purview of penal provisions.
5. The game of pure chance or combination of chance and skills are struck by the provision of
Section 13 of the Rajasthan Public Gambling Ordinance, 1949.
6. The Rajasthan Public Gambling (Prevention) Bill, 2021 is in the pipeline which has stricter
provisions to stop online gambling and betting
o State of Punjab
1. In the State of Punjab, the ambit of online gaming is governed by the legislation of The Public Gambling
Act, 1867.
2. The Act, through Section 13 strives to penalize the game of chance or gambling, but at the same time
via Section 12 exempts game of skills from the criminal prosecution.
3. In Varun Gumber v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (2017), the court held that Dream 11 game
does not involve any commission of offence of gambling and betting and accordingly, the writ petition
was dismissed. An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court but the same was dismissed in 2019.
o State of Maharashtra
1. In the State of Maharashtra, the ambit of online gaming is governed by the legislation of The
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887.
2. In 2019, in the case of Gurdeep Singh Sachar Vs. Union of India, the Bombay High Court held that
Dream 11 fantasy sports depends upon the user’s ability to exercise his skill based on superior
knowledge, judgement and attention. Therefore, the result is not dependent on the winning or losing of
a particular team in the real world game on any particular day. It is without an iota of doubt, a game of
skill and not a game of chance. An appeal was filed in the Supreme Court but the same was dismissed.
3. Section 13 of The Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 provides that game of skills is
exonerated of any criminal implication
4. Section 12 of The Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 puts a criminal penalty in the event
of a participation in a game of chance.
5th April 2022
 Researched and provided precedents on the proposition of the differentiation between game of chance
and game of skills. The reproduction of which is stated below:
Judicial precedents on the matter of differentiation between game of chance and game of
skills
1. State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana & Ors
Citation: AIR 1968 SC 825.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Findings: “The game of Rummy is not a game entirely of chance like the 'three-card' game
mentioned in the Madras case to which we were referred. The 'three card' game which goes
under different names such as 'flush', 'brag' etc. is a game of pure chance. Rummy, on the other
hand, requires certain amount of skill because the fall of the cards has to be memorised and
the building up of Rummy requires considerable skill in holding and discarding cards. We
cannot, therefore, say that the game of Rummy is a game of entire chance. It is mainly and
preponderantly a game of skill. The chance in Rummy is of the same character as the chance
in a deal at a game of bridge. In fact, in all games in which cards are shuffled and dealt out,
there is an element of chance, because the distribution of the I cards is not according to any
set pattern but is dependent upon how the cards find their place in the shuffled pack. From this
alone it cannot be said that Rummy is a game of chance and there is, no skill involved in it.”
2. Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs State Of Tamil Nadu And Anr
Citation: 1996 SCC (2) 226
Findings: “A game of skill, on the other hand - although the element of chance necessarily
cannot be entirely eliminated is one in which success depends principally upon the superior
knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of the player. Golf, chess and even
Rummy are considered to be games of skill. The courts have reasoned that there are few games,
if any, which consist purely of chance or skill, and as such a game of chance is one in which
the element of chance predominates over the element of skill, and a game of skill is one in
which the element of skill predominates over the element of chance. It is the dominant element
- "skill" or "chance" - which determines the character of the game.”
(i) the competitions where success depends on substantial degree of skill are not
`gambling' and
(ii) (ii) despite there being an element of chance if a game is preponderantly a game of skill
it would nevertheless be a game of "mere skill". We, therefore, hold that the expression
"mere skill" would mean substantial degree or preponderance of skill.
The Court described the game of chance as:
“In these games the result is wholly uncertain and doubtful.”
(i) the competitions where success depends on substantial degree of skill are not
`gambling' and
(ii) (ii) despite there being an element of chance if a game is preponderantly a game of
skill it would nevertheless be a game of "mere skill". We, therefore, hold that the
expression "mere skill" would mean substantial degree or preponderance of skill.
3. Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs State Of Tamil Nadu
Citation: 1996 SCC (2) 226
Findings: “ A game of chance is determined entirely or in part by lot or mere luck. The throw
of the dice, the turning of the wheel, the shuffling of the cards, are all modes of chance. In
these games the result is wholly uncertain and doubtful. No human mind knows or can know
what it will be until the dice is thrown, the wheel stops its revolution or the dealer has dealt
with the cards. A game of skill, on the other hand - although the element of chance necessarily
cannot be entirely eliminated is one in which success depends principally upon the superior
knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of the player. Golf, chess and even
Rummy are considered to be games of skill. The courts have reasoned that there are few games,
if any, which consist purely of chance or skill, and as such a game of chance is one in which
the element of chance predominates over the element of skill, and a game of skill is one in
which the element of skill predominates over the element of chance. It is the dominant element
- "skill" or "chance" - which determines the character of the game.”
4. Manoranjitham Manamyil Mandram vs The State Of Tamil Nadu And Ors.

Citation: AIR 2005 Mad 261

Court: Madras High Court
Findings: “The question whether a particular game is a game of skill or chance is to be decided
on the facts and circumstances of each case. As and when proceedings are; initiated against
the appellant in accordance with law, the appellant shall always have the right to question the
same or challenge the action of the respondents if it is not in accordance with law.”
5. Ramachandran K Vs. The Circle Inspector of Police

Court: Kerala High Court
Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 6788
Findings: “No game can be a game of skill alone. In any game in which even great skill is required,
chance must play a certain part. Even a skilled player in a game of mere skill may be lucky and
unlucky, so that even in a game of mere skill chance must play its part. But it is not necessary to
decide in terms of mathematical precision the relative proportion of chance or skill when deciding
whether a game is a game of mere skill. When in a game the element of chance strongly
preponderate, it cannot be a game of mere skill. Therefore, it is not practicable to decide whether
particular video game is a game of skill or mixed of skill and chance. It depends upon the facts, in
each case.”
6. Gurdeep Singh Sachar Vs. Union of Inda & Ors.

Court: Bombay High Court
Citation: Judgment dated 30th April 2019 in Criminal P.I.L. No. 16 of 2019, (2019) 75 GST 258
(Bombay)
Findings: “It is evident that the expressions 'betting' or 'gambling' were used interchangeably in
Section 65B(15) of the Finance Act, 1994. Again, the test applicable was whether it was a game
of chance or game of skill. Only if the result of the game/contest is determined merely by chance
or accident, any money put on stake with consciousness of risk and hope to gain, would be
'gambling' or 'betting'.”
7. Junglee Games India Private Limited & Anr Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.
Court: Madras High Court
Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2762
Findings: “A "game of chance" is described as a game wherein the outcome is determined by luck
rather than skill, and a "game of skill" is said to be a game in which the outcome is determined by
the player's superior knowledge or ability, not chance.”
“Irrespective of what meanings are ascribed to these words in dictionaries, gambling is equated
with gaming and the activity involves chance to such a predominant extent that the element of skill
that may also be involved cannot control the outcome. A game of skill on the other hand, may not
necessarily be such an activity where skill must always prevail; however, it would suffice for an
activity to be regarded as a game of skill if, ordinarily, the exercise of skill can control the chance
element involved in the activity such that the better skilled would prevail more often than not.”
8. Head Digital Works Private Limited & Ors vs State of Kerala and Ors.
Citation: WP(C) NO. 7785 OF 2021
Court: Kerala High Court
Findings: “On the question whether Rummy when played for stakes becomes a game neither
covered by Section 14 nor by a notification issued under Section 14A, I hold that the “mere skill”
contained in Section 14 and “any game the element of skill is more predominant than the element
of chance” contained in Section 14A do not suggest that skill in playing a game is in any manner
dependent on stakes. As such playing for stakes or playing not for stakes can never be a criterion
to find out whether a game is a game of skill. On the question whether Online Rummy is a 'game
of skill' and 'not of chance', I hold that on the very same reasoning adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court to find the game of Rummy as a 'game of skill', the game of Online Rummy will also have to
be held to be a 'game of skill'. On the question whether inclusion of stakes for playing Online
Rummy would make any difference to the nature of the game as a game of skill, I hold in the
negative and declare that Online Rummy played either with stakes or without stakes remains to be
a 'game of skill'”
9. All India Gaming Federation Versus State of Karnataka

Citation: Writ Petition No. 18703 of 2021
Court: Karnataka High Court
Findings: “The distinction lies in the amount of skill involved in the games. There may not be a
game of chance which does not involve a scintilla of skill and similarly, there is no game of skill
which does not involve some elements of chance. Whether a game is, a 'game of chance' or a 'game
of skill', is to be adjudged by applying the Predominance Test: a game involving substantial degree
of skill, is not a game of chance, but is only a game of skill and that it does not cease to be one
even when played with stakes. As a corollary of this, a game not involving substantial degree of
skill, is not a game of skill but is only a game of chance and therefore falls within the scope of
Entry 34 in the State List.”
6th April 2022
 Researched and provided precents on the effect of independence of the arbitration agreement. The
reproduction of which is stated below:
Independence of Arbitration Agreement

Section 16(1)(a) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(a) “an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract; and”
1. National Agricultural Co-op. Marketing Federation India Ltd Vs. Gains Trading Ltd
Arbitration Petition No. 15 of 2006
Para 6
“This position is now statutorily recognized. Sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Act makes it
clear that while considering any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement, an arbitration clause which forms part of the contract, has to be treated
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and a decision that the contract
is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.”
2. Today Homes & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. V. Ludhiana Improvement Trust
(2014) 5 SCC 68
Para 14
“Reference was made in the said judgment to the provisions of Section 16(1)(b) of the 1996
Act, which provides that even if the arbitral tribunal concludes that the contract is null and
void, it should not result, as a matter of law, in an automatic invalidation of the arbitration
clause. It was also held that Section 16(1)(a) of the 1996 Act presumes the existence of a valid
arbitration clause and mandates the same to be treated as an agreement independent of the other
terms of the contract. By virtue of Section 16(1)(b) of the 1996 Act, the arbitration clause
continues to be enforceable, notwithstanding a declaration that the contract was null and void.”
3. N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Others
2021 SCC OnLine SC 13
Para 3
“It is well settled in arbitration jurisprudence that an arbitration agreement is a distinct and
separate agreement, which is independent from the substantive commercial contract in which
it is embedded. This is based on the premise that when parties enter into a commercial contract
containing an arbitration clause, they are entering into two separate agreements viz. (i) the
substantive contract which contains the rights and obligations of the parties arising from the
commercial transaction; and, (ii) the arbitration agreement which contains the binding
obligation of the parties to resolve their disputes through the mode of arbitration.”
4. Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon Gmbh & Anr.

(2014) 5 SCC 1
Para 83
“The Indian Arbitration Act, 1996, as noticed above, under Section 16 accepts the concept that
the main contract and the arbitration agreement form two independent contracts.”
7th April 2022
 Made a Note on the process of applying for a trademark. The reproduction of which is stated below:
Process of Applying for Trademark
1. Step 1: Filing
The registration application is Form TM- A which can be either filed online through the official
IP India website or physically at the Trade Marks Office which depends on the jurisdiction of the
trademark.
The link of which is stated below:
https://ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/Images/pdf/FORM-TM-A.pdf
In case the applicant is claiming prior use in the trademark, then a user affidavit has to be filed
supporting the usage along with the evidence of its prior usage.
2. Step 2: Examination of the Trademark
Post the filing of the trademark application, a mandatory examination report is issued by the
Examiner after an extensive examination of the trademark application in consonance with the
guidelines of the Trade Marks Act, 2016. The examination report by the authority may or may not
disclose some objections which can be either, absolute, relative or procedural. This examination
report by the Trademark Authority is issued within a period of 30 days of having filed the
registration application. A reply to the examination report is required to be filed within a period of
30 days after receiving the report asserting the arguments and evidence against any objections to
waive them off.
3. Step 3: Post-examination
After the filing of the reply to the examination report, the Examiner (Trademark Authority) may
appoint a hearing if the Examiner is not entirely satisfied by the reply filed or in case the objections
are not met. After the said hearing, the Examiner may accept the mark and subsequently forward
the application for publication in the journal or reject the said application if any objection still
persists.
4. Step 4: Registration
Cost: Government fees are Rs. 4,500/- in case of Individual/ Startup/ Small Enterprise (it would
be 9,000/- in all other cases) and trademark attorney professional fees is Rs. 3500/- per application
per class.
 The Trademarks Office will first check your application to see if it’s already been taken. If
it has, a trademark objection will be raised.
 If it has no objection, it makes an advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal.
 If there is no opposition from other businesses in the next four months, your trademark is
registered around six months later.
8th April 2022
 Researched and provided precedents on the proposition that cause of action cannot be amended in a
pleading. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. B.K-Narayana Pillai vs Pararneswaran Pillai & Anr, (2001) 1 SCC 71
“All amendments of the pleadings should be allowed which are necessary for determination of the
real controversies in the suit provided the proposed amendment does not alter or substitute a new
cause of action on the basis of which the original l's was raised or defence taken.”
2. A.K. Gupta & Sons Ltd.vs Damodar Valley Corpn. AIR 1967 SC 96
“The general rule, no doubt, is that a party is not allowed by amendment to set up a new case or a
new cause of action particularly when a suit on the new case or cause of action is barred.”
3. Usha Balashaheb Swami & Ors vs Kiran Appaso Swami & Ors, (2007) 5 SCC 602
“It is equally well settled principle that a prayer for amendment of the plaint and a prayer for
amendment of the written statement stand on different footings. The general principle that
amendment of pleadings cannot be allowed so as to alter materially or substitute cause of action
or the nature of claim applies to amendments to plaint. It has no counterpart in the principles
relating to amendment of the written statement. Therefore, addition of a new ground of defence or
substituting or altering a defence or taking inconsistent pleas in the written statement would not be
objectionable while adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action in the plaint may be
objectionable.”
4. Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh , (2006) 6 SCC 498
“It is true that some general principles are certainly common to both, but the rules that the plaintiff
cannot be allowed to amend his pleadings so as to alter materially or substitute his cause of action
or the nature of his claim has necessarily no counterpart in the law relating to amendment of the
written statement. Adding a new ground of defence or substituting or altering a defence does not
raise the same problem as adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action. Accordingly, in
the case of amendment of written statement, the courts are inclined to be more liberal in allowing
amendment of the written statement than of plaint and question of prejudice is less likely to operate
with same rigour in the former than in the latter case.”
5. Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Thr. Lrs vs M/S. S.K.Sarwagi & Co. Pvt. Ltd, 2008 14 SCC
364
Para 7 “It is settled law that the grant of application for amendment be subject to certain
conditions, namely,
(i) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment;
(ii) when the amendment would result introducing new cause of action and intends to
prejudice the other party;
(iii) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation. The plaintiff not
only failed to satisfy the conditions prescribed in proviso to Order VI Rule 17 but even
on merits his claim is liable to be rejected.”
11th April 2022
 Researched on the proposition as to whether a criminal complaint can be amended or not under the
code of criminal procedure. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. S.R.Sukumar vs S.Sunaad Raghuram, (2015) 9 SCC 609
“17. Insofar as merits of the contention regarding allowing of amendment application, it is true
that there is no specific provision in the Code to amend either a complaint or a petition filed under
the provisions of the Code, but the Courts have held that the petitions seeking such amendment to
correct curable infirmities can be allowed even in respect of complaints.”
“18. What is discernible from the U.P. Pollution Control Board’s case is that easily curable legal
infirmity could be cured by means of a formal application for amendment. If the amendment sought
to be made relates to a simple infirmity which is curable by means of a formal amendment and by
allowing such amendment, no prejudice could be caused to the other side, notwithstanding the fact
that there is no enabling provision in the Code for entertaining such amendment, the Court may
permit such an amendment to be made. On the contrary, if the amendment sought to be made in
the complaint does not relate either to a curable infirmity or the same cannot be corrected by a
formal amendment or if there is likelihood of prejudice to the other side, then the Court shall not
allow such amendment in the complaint.”
“19. In the instant case, the amendment application was filed on 24.05.2007 to carry out the
amendment by adding paras 11(a) and 11 (b). Though, the proposed amendment was not a formal
amendment, but a substantial one, the Magistrate allowed the amendment application mainly on
the ground that no cognizance was taken of the complaint before the disposal of amendment
application. Firstly, Magistrate was yet to apply the judicial mind to the contents of the complaint
and had not taken cognizance of the matter. Secondly, since summons was yet to be ordered to be
issued to the accused, no prejudice would be caused to the accused. Thirdly, the amendment did
not change the original nature of the complaint being one for defamation. Fourthly, the publication
of poem ‘Khalnayakaru’ being in the nature of subsequent event created a new cause of action in
favour of the respondent which could have been prosecuted by the respondent by filing a separate
complaint and therefore to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, the trial court allowed the
amendment application. Considering these factors which weighed in the mind of the courts below,
in our view, the High Court rightly declined to interfere with the order passed by the Magistrate
allowing the amendment application and the impugned order does not suffer from any serious
infirmity warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India.”
2. U.P. Pollution Control Board vs Modi Distillery & Ors, 1988 AIR 1128
“The learned Single Judge has focussed his attention only on the technical flaw in the complaint
and has failed to comprehend that the flaw had occurred due to the recalcitrant attitude of Messrs
Modi Distillery and furthermore the infirmity is one which could be easily removed by having the
matter remitted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate with a direction to call upon the appellant to make
the formal amendments to the averments contained in paragraph 2 of the complaint so as to make
the controlling company of the industrial unit figure as the concerned accused in the complaint.
All that has to be done is the making of a formal application for amendment by the appellant for
leave to amend by substituting the name of Messrs Modi Industries Limited, the Company owning
the industrial unit, in place of Messrs Modi Distillery.”
3. Mr. Amol Shripal Sheth v. M/S. Hari Om Trading Co. & Ors., (2014) 6 MhLJ 222
‘17. It is not disputed that there is no specific provision dealing with the amendment of the
complaint. There is also no provision preventing the Court from allowing the amendment in
complaint in such a case. From the aforesaid provisions and particularly, the fact that the
Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, this Court holds that the Magistrate has incidental
and ancillary power to the main power of taking cognizance of offence to allow such
amendment. In view of the discussion made above, this Court further holds that the power can
be exercised before and after taking cognizance of the offence in a case like present one.”
4. Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji V. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari (2016) 11
SCC 774
“What we are emphasizing is that even in criminal cases governed by the Code; the Court is not
powerless and may allow amendment in appropriate cases. One of the circumstances in which
such an amendment is to be allowed is to avoid the procedural multiplicity. The argument of
the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, that there is no power of amendment has to be
negated.”
12th April 2022
 Researched and provided proposition on the remedies available to a party in case of breach of mediation
settlement agreement, with respect to Section 138, Negotiable Instrument Cases. The reproduction of
which is stated below:
Non-compliance of the Settlement Agreement under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881
1. Dayawati vs Yogesh Kumar Gosain, (CRL.REF. No.1/2016) (Delhi High Court)
“Question IV: If the settlement in Mediation is not complied with - is the court required to proceed
with the case for a trial on merits, or hold such a settlement agreement to be executable as a decree?
In case the mediation settlement accepted by the court as above is not complied with, the following
procedure is required to be followed:
IV (i) In the event of default or non-compliance or breach of the settlement agreement by the
accused person, the magistrate would pass an order under Section 431 read with Section 421 of
the Cr.P.C. to recover the amount agreed to be paid by the accused in the same manner as a fine
would be recovered.
IV (ii) Additionally, for breach of the undertaking given to the magistrate/court, the court would
take appropriate action permissible in law to enforce compliance with the undertaking as well as
the orders of the court based thereon, including proceeding under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 for violation thereof.”
“116. Where proceedings are disposed on settlement terms by the High Court, it would be an order
passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Upon breach of such order and
non- payment of the agreed amounts, the same may be recoverable in terms of Section 431 read
with Section 421 Cr.P.C.”
“117. In addition, if the party has tendered an undertaking to abide by the terms of the agreement,
which stands accepted by the court, in the event of breach of the undertaking, action and
consequences under the Contempt of Courts Act could also follow.”
2. Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 925 (Supreme Court of
India)
“Once a settlement agreement has been entered into by the parties, the proceedings in the original
complaint cannot be sustained and a fresh cause of action accrues to the complainant under the
terms of the settlement deed.”
“Once parties have voluntarily entered into such an agreement and agree to abide by the
consequences of non-compliance of the settlement agreement, they cannot be allowed to reverse
the effects of the agreement by pursuing both the original complaint and the subsequent complaint
arising from such non-compliance. The settlement agreement subsumes the original complaint.”
3. Hardeep Bajaj Vs. ICICI Bank Ltd., 2013 SCC On Line Del 124 (Delhi High Court)
“10. Once the settlement reached is accepted by the Court or an undertaking is given, it becomes
binding on the parties. Moreover, the Petitioner's conduct does not entitle him of any indulgence.”
4. M/S. Arun International Vs. State of Delhi & Anr., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9334
“7. It is settled law and even otherwise the settlement of the Mediation Cell is deemed to be a
decree and cannot be challenged”
5. Abhinav Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Uppal Engineering Company Pvt
Ltd 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3304.
“There are various decisions given by this Court in several cases wherein it has upheld the sanctity
of the mediation settlement and the Courts did not allow the parties to back track from the terms
and conditions of the settlement on the ground that in case the same is allowed, it will negate the
aims and objective of the mediation and defeat the whole process of mediation.”
6. Chandra Gupt vs Bharat Gupt & Anr. , MANU/DE/2201/2018

“9. It was however observed in yesterday‟s order that even if that be so, the plaintiff, who admits
to be substituted in place of his father in the earlier suit and who had arrived at a settlement with
defendants, ought to enforce the said settlement in accordance with law and cannot start a fresh
litigation.”
“22. Though the plaintiff has not filed before this Court the orders of the Court in which the suit
was pending after the date when settlement was so reached before the Mediation Centre of the
District Court but the position in law does not admit of any ambiguity. This Court in Surinder Kaur
Vs. Pritam Singh (2008) 154 DLT 598 has held (i) by amendment of the year 2002 to the CPC,
Section 89 provides for settlement of dispute outside Court; (ii) that Section 89(2) mandates the
Court to effect a compromise between the parties where the matter has been referred to mediation
and has been compromised; and, (iii) once the matter has been compromised as per terms contained
in the settlement before the Mediator and of which the Mediator has sent a report, decree in terms
thereof is to be passed. Yet again, the Division Bench of this Court in Naresh Kumar Vs. Ashok
Arora MANU/DE/9778/2007 held (a) if settlement is arrived at before the mediator, one cannot
back out; (b) if such an attempt is permitted, it would negate the very purpose for which Section
89 has been inserted by the Parliament by way of amendment to the CPC; (c) if the Courts were to
start entertaining pleas to back out of the settlement arrived at before the Mediation Cell in terms
of Rules 24 & 25 of the Mediation and Conciliation Rules, 2004, the sanctity and purpose of
amicable settlement between the parties would stand totally eroded; (d) amicable resolution of
disputes and negotiated settlement is public policy in India; (e) Section 89 of the CPC, Arbitration
& Conciliation Act, 1996 as well as Legal Services Authorities Act, 1995 call upon the Court to
encourage settlement of legal dispute through negotiations between the parties; (f) if amicable
settlements are discarded and rejected on flimsy pleas, the parties would be wary of entering into
negotiated settlement and making payment thereunder as a shrewd party, after entering into
negotiated settlement, may take the amount received under it and thereafter challenge the
settlement and re-agitate the dispute causing immeasurable loss and harassment to the party
making payment thereunder; and, (g) this tendency has to be checked and such litigants
discouraged by the Courts.”
“23. It is thus inexplicable as to why the plaintiff, who has already been substituted in place of his
father in the previous suit, instead of seeking a decree in terms of the settlement aforesaid arrived
at, is choosing to file this fresh suit.”
“24. It appears that the plaintiff is not satisfied with the litigation in the previous suit stated to be
pending since the year 1991 and when the said litigation has culminated, instead of enforcing the
settlement having force of decree therein, desires to file a fresh suit and to keep it pending for a
few more decades. This is a classic case of a person approaching the Court, instead of being
interested in the relief, being only interested in remaining before the Court.”
7. M/s Allied Chemical Industries Vs. M/s Shiva Dies & Chemical and another, CRM-M-
24043-2019 (O&M)
“5. The above referred case also pertained to an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, wherein at one point of time a settlement had been effected amongst the parties
but later on the accused did not honour the terms of the settlement and then a question arose as to
whether on account of non-compliance of said terms, the Court is required to proceed with the trial
on merits or to hold such a settlement as executable as a decree. A perusal of the finding returned
by the Division Bench, to which the said matter had been referred, as extracted above, does show
that the complainant would have a remedy of recovery in terms of Section 431 Cr.P.C. read
with Section 421 Cr.P.C. to recover the amount as had been agreed to amongst the parties.”
“6. It has further been held therein that on account of the non-compliance, after having made a
specific statement in the Court to pay the amount, the accused would also render himself liable for
proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act. However, the said judgment does not mandate that
pursuant to such non-compliance, a conviction of the accused for offence under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act can ipso facto be recorded on the basis of the statement made by him
towards compromise.”
13th April 2022
 Researched and provided precedents on the proposition that entry in balance sheet amount to admission
of liability. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. V. Padmakumar Vs. Stressed Assets Stabalisation Fund (SASF) & Anr., Company Appeal
(AT) (Insolvency) No. 385 of 2020
15. Thus, I find it is settled law appearing from the Judgements of the High Court of Delhi and
other High Courts that Balance Sheets can be looked into to see if there is acknowledgement of
debt. Perusing Judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court I find that even Hon’ble Supreme Court has
looked into Balance Sheets and Books of Account to see if there is Acknowledgement of Liability.
If the amount borrowed is shown in the Balance Sheet, it may amount to Acknowledgement. I find
the Judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India are binding and Balance Sheets cannot be outright
ignored. the Judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India are binding and Balance Sheets cannot
be outright ignored.
2. Mahabir Cold Storage v. CIT, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 402
“The entries in the books of accounts of the appellant would amount to an acknowledgement of
the liability to M/s Prayagchand Hanumanmal within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 and extend the period of limitation for the discharge of the liability as debt”
3. Shahi Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. CMD Buildtech Pvt. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 2535 : (2013)
202 DLT 735
It is hardly necessary to cite authorities in support of the well-established position that an entry
made in the company’s balance sheet amounts to an acknowledgement of the debt and has the
effect of extending the period of limitation under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However,
I may refer to only one decision of the learned single judge of this Court (Manmohan, J.) in Bhajan
Singh Samra v. Wimpy International Ltd. 185 (2011) DLT 428 for the simple reason that it collects
all the relevant authorities on the issue, including some of the judgments cited before me on behalf
of the petitioners. This judgment entirely supports the petitioners on this point.
4. N.S. Atwal v. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd., , 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3902
This Court in ESPN Software India (P) Ltd. v. Modi Entertainment Network Ltd., [2012] 173
Comp Cas 465 (Delhi), noted that:
“17. Admission in balance-sheet is per-se an admission of liability… xxx xxx xxx

19. This entry clearly states that an amount of Rs.8,00,04,000/- is due and payable by the
respondent in accordance with the terms of the contract.”
5. Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited v. Bishal Jaiswal, MANU/SC/0279/2021
In this appeal, the judgment of the NCLAT dated 07.02.2020 is assailed, in which the NCLAT has
held that entries made in balance sheets of the corporate debtor for the years ending 2014-2015,
2015-2016, and 2016-2017 cannot amount to acknowledgements of liability, as a result of which
the NCLT order admitting the appellant’s application under Section 7 of the IBC was set aside
14th April 2022
 Executed time stamping for the purpose of NBDSA complaint. The reproduction of which is stated
below:
DNA Live, October 14, 2021 Show
20:00 – 22:17 Sudhir Chaudhary: Udharan ke taur me 2-3 baate batana chahta hu.
Aap yaad kariye Punjab me sabse pehle aantkwad aa gya tha or
Punjab me aantakwad kha se aaya tha, Khalistan ki mang kha se
aayi thi, Khalistan ki mang ko leke jo aantakwad faila tha, unko
hatiyaar kha se mila tha.
Ticker at the bottom: BSF ko adhikaar par Rajya Vs. Kendra

Sarkaar
Ticker at the bottom: BSF ka dyara badhne se dikhat kyu
Ticker at the bottom: BSF ko shakti par siyasat kyu
Ticker at the bottom: Rasthriya shruksha jaruri ya siyasat
Ticker at the bottom: BSF ke badhe adhikhar, shru hogyi siyasi
takrar
(Repeated thereafter till 31:00)
Pakistan se milte the or jo Punjab ka border lga hua tha, wha se

madad milti thi. Isliye Punjab bharat ka sabse samvedanshil rajya

mana ja sakta h, Jammu Kashmir ke baad. Isliye Punjab me aap
kise bhi party, Rajya Sarkar ya Police ke hatho Punjab ki suraksha
nhi chor sakte or Punjab me maan lijeye kabhi koi aise mukhya
mantri man jye jo ki Pakistan ke Army Chief ko gale lgata ho, Jo
Pakistan ki Pradhan Mantri ka jigri dost ho, jo Pakistan se dosti
krna chahta ho. Jisse Pakistan ke aantakwaide, aantakwadi nhi
krantikari lgte ho. Agar aisa vyakti kabhi Punjab ka mukhya mantri
bn jae toh kya hoga?
Ab dusra udharan dekhiye, Aise bhi rajnitik partiya ha jo Punjab

me apni Sarkar bnane ki iss same koshish kr rhi ha or iske liye kuch
partiya ha jinko aisa lgta ha agar voh Khalistanio ka samarthan
krna shru kr denge, Khalistanio ke sath dikhna shru kr denge,
Khalistanio ke ghar me jakar khana shru kr denge, unke sath photo
khich va lenge toh unhe Punjab me ache kaise vote mil jayenge or
ye voh partiya ha, ek Punjab me inka sashan aa gya toh ye
vibhajankaari vichardhara ke tahat kaam krne lgegi uske baad ye
apne fyade ke liye kuch bhi kr sakti ha. Ye Pakistan se mil sakti
ha, aantakwadio se mil sakti ha, Hathiayro ko border se idhar lane
me madad kr skte ha, drugs ki smuggling me madad kr sakte ha or
ye sab kuch hoga rajya sarkaar me rehte hue. Sochiye, agar inme
se kise ek rajya me aise ek sarkaar aa jaye. Pashchim Bengal me
kya dekh rhe aaj aap, pashchim bengal me bhi aap yhi dekhte ha ki
ek khass varb ko vha par samarthan diya jata ha kyunki vote bank
ki jo calculation ha who iss tarah ke kaamo ko samarthan deti ha.
Aaj humne iss mudhe par Raksha Visheshagya or BSF ke purv
ADG, P.K. Mishra se baat ki ha jinhone Kendra Sarkar ke iss faisle
ko rashtriye suraksha ke liye bahut jaruri bataya ha
22:18 – 23:31 P.K. Mishra, Purv ADG, BSF: Punjab, Assam or Bengal ka jo 15
KM se 50 KM ko badhaya gya, iske baare me batana chahta hu, ye

kadam jo ha bahut deshhit me bnaya gya ha kyunki yha par jo ha
interior areas me BSF ko apna saurce or apna communication bna
ke rakhna chaiye. Jaruri ha jo drugs peddler aate ha, jo handlers
hote ha, voh joh pakde jaate ha, voh toh couriers pakhde jaate ha.
Main aadmi jo rehte ha, interiors areas me rehte ha. At a time, jb
koi kiseko follow krta ha, vha pe drone jata ha or drugs ya arms ko
drop krta ha, usko follow kia jata ha toh BSF ko vha par jaana
padega. BSF ko interior areas me jo handlers ha unko pakadna
padega. Jo Pakistan ke sath contact me ha, woh Muzaffarabad me
ho, Kerala me ho, kahi par bhi ho, contact me ha, unko pakadna
padega, information leak out na hojae, iski wazah se yeh bahut
soch samajh kr ke BSF ko vha par operate ke liye diya gaya ha.
23:32 – 24:04 B.N. Singh, Purv Mahanideshak, BSF: Iss power ki badhne se yeh
ha ki BSF inn elakho me aur achi tarah tezhi se vha par kaam kr
ski ki, pehle bhi hum police ke sath jointly kaam krte the, milkar
kaam krte the jab 15 KM tha, tab bhi koi dikkat nhi aati thi. Fyada
yhi ha state me jo yeh ha ki State me jo already samsaya ha, usse
nipatne me mehjib aur acha lagega, state ko hi fyada ha, jo police
ha, jo apne aur kaam ha unke, law and order ke ha, policing ke ha,
crime detection ha, wah uske liye pura kaam kr skte ha.
24:07 – 24:55 Vikram Singh, Purv DGP, U.P.: Dhara 139(1) BSF Act ke andarkat
ye pehle se hi BSF Act me tha. Uske aadhar par kendra sarkaar
jiske liye adiukt thi veh adhikaar BSF ko pradaan kiye gaye ha.
Vigat me iske pehle ye drishtiguchar hua tha ki Kashmir or Punjab
me drone ke madhyam se or Punjab me vishesh tor se madhak
pradato ki taskari, rashtriyavirodhi gatividhiyo ko bahut hawa dene
ke prayas kiye gaye the. Iss paridishya me ye avashyak tha ki
humari suraksha na kavel ki char chogun ho, balki anya Adhikari
ke madhyam se jo log isme sanglikt ha unke upar prabhavi karvaai
ki jae or iske liye kendra Sarkar ne jo kadam uthae ha, woh bahut
hi avashyakt the, uske bina kadachit shayad wo humari dhardhaar
pradhiuthar nhi hota agar isme BSF ko yeh adhikhaar nhi diye
jaate.
24:58 – 31:40 BSF Bharat ke 5 sasthra police balo me se ek ha jo ki Kendra Ghrah
mantralaya ke tahat aata ha or isme dhai lakh se bhi jyada sainik or
adhikhari ha, isko duniya ka sabse bada seema suraksha bal mana
jata ha or pichle Das varsho me, BSF ke 144 jawono ne desh ke
liye apne shaadat di ha lekin fir bhi humare desh me aaj vipakshi
dall BSF par hi rajneeti kr rhe ha or BSF ko aur jyada shakti nhi
dena chahte. Yaani inhe apne hi force BSF par vishwaas nhi ha,
lekin inhe antakwadio me vishwaas ha, inhe Pakistan me vishwaas
ha, inhe Pakistan ke Army Chief or Pakistan ke sena par bhi
vishwaas ha, lekin apni suraksha balo me vishwaas nhi ha. Vote
bank or tushtikaran ki rajneeti me nateeza kya hota ha, iska
udharan humne Jammu Kashmir me varsho tak, darskho tak dekha
ha, jb vha Rajya Sarkare, aantakwadio ke prati humdardi rakha krti
thi, sena inn antakwadio ko pakadhne ki koshish krti thi Jammu
Kashmir me, toh khi baar stania police, stania prashashan ke hi
kuch log unn antakwadio ki mukbari krdete the or aantakwadi bach
ke nikal jaate the. Yaani aap sochiye kisi rajye me sena bhi nyukt
ha, sena antakwadio ka picha kr rhi ha or jo local administration
ha, jo local police ha, jo local neta ha, vidhyak ha ya jo sansaad ha,
ya jo log sarkaar me baithe ha woh muslim tushtikaran ke naam pe
aantakwadio ko samarthan de rhe ha, chupne ki jagah bta rhe ha,
or saari information sena ki leak kr rhe ha ki army kb kya karne
wali ha or ye kaam humne Jammu Kashmir me lambe samme tk
dekha jb sena toh pakadhna chahti thi aantakwadio ko lekin local
administration se unhe bahut samarathan milta tha or sena ka kaam
mushkil ho jata tha. Ye sab kuch Muslim tushthikaran ke naam me
hota ha, lekin ab Kashmir me tushthikaran me rauk lg gyi ha, jo ki
aapne dekha, kendriya Sarkar ne bahut saare khadam uthaye or ab

chah ke bhi inn antakwadio ki koi madad nhi kr sakta
Aur aapne ye bhi dekha jaise hum aapko pehle bta rhe the ki agar
koi aisa neta mukya mantri bnn jaye jo ki Pakistani Army chief ko
gale lgata ho, jo ki Pakistan ke Pradhan Mantri ka jigri dost ho, ya
kisse local party ko ye lalach aa jaye ki ab drugs ki jariye hi paisa
kamana ha kyu ki alag alag rajye me chunav ladne ha or paisa kisse
bura lagta ha or agar voh drugs syndicate me khud shamhil ho jae
toh aap uska kya bigaar lenge. Aap shayd aaj andaja bhi nhi lga
sakte hamre desh aaj aise bhi neta ha jo ki Khalistaniyo ke ghar
jaate ha, Khalistaniyo ke ghar jaake khana khaate ha or unse vote
mangte ha, Kehte h Punjab ke saare logo ko kahiye ki hume vote
de taaki humari Sarkar Punjab me bann jaye. Agar aisa hogya toh
kya hoga? Ye hathiyaar, ye drugs, ye aantakwadi sirf Punjab tk
simit nhi rahege, sirf Paschim Bengal me hi nhi rahege, Uske baad
ye desh ke kone kone me fail jayenge, Jaise ki aapne iss baar dekha,
ye anatakwadi parchim Bengal ki seema ke jariye bharat me
pravesh kisne kiya tha. Or uske baad ye Delhi tk pahuch gya.
Bharat ki senaiye seema ki suraksha karti ha par senaiyo ke sath
humare desh me kya rajneeti hoti ha hum aapko who batana chahte
ha. Siyasit kaise hoti ha, ek aur udharan aap dekhiye, aaj hi China
ne ek propaganda video, ek jhootha video failaya or uske jariye
unhone yeh avfa falaiyi ki pichle saal galwan me China or bharat
ke saniko ke beech jo jharap hui thi , uss durann china ne bharat ke
kuch saniko ko bandhi bna aliya tha. or ye saare sainik buri tarag
ghayal the or china sena ki garafat aa gye the. Unhone ye video
dala jo me aapko iss samme dikha rha hu tweet, ye state state
affiliate media, aap isme paadh sakte ha, wha ke state media ne ye
tweet daala ha or ye China ki purani aadat ha ki voh nakli or fake
videos social media me daal kar apna propaganda chalata ha. Aaj
kl bharat se sambandh theek nhi chl rhe ha toh Bhartiya sena ko

badnaam krne ke liye unhone ek jhootha video daala. Isse hume
unse shikhayat nhi honi chaiye, China ek dhushman desh ha , ye
sab toh krega hi lekin humare desh ken eta kya karte ha? Iske baad
bharat ke vipakshiyo neta ne China ki media ki jhuthi khabhar ko
hatho hath le liya or apne hi desh ki sarkaar or apni hi sena se safai
ispar magne lage . Ab dekhiye congress party ke, youth congress
ke adhyaksh BV Srinivas kya tweet kr rhe ha dekiye, Ab me puri
screen me aapko BV Srinivas ka tweet dikhata hu. Yeh unhone
China ka sarkari media ha, usse inhone video uthaya. Na humari
seema me koi gussa, na gussa hua ha. Na hamari post me kabja hua
ha. Agar ye video shi ha, fir humai jawoona ko bandhak banana ki
himmat China sena ne kaise ki? Ye ek tareeki se iss video ko leke
rajneeti krna chahte ha or apni hi sena ka Mazak udhana chahte ha
or keh rhe ha Dear Government of India please clarify. Or dekhiye
nicha likha bhi ha video released by Chinese media. Ab Chinse
media kya chahtha ha, yji toh Chinese media chatha ha. China ki
sarkaar kya chahthi ha? Voh chahti ha voh ek jhutha video float
kre, jaari krde or uspe bharat ke hi jo neta ha, bharat ke hi badhe
badhe vipakshiya dal ha, uss video ko utha le, vivshniya bnade,
usse pure desh me viral krde jisse humari sena ka manobhal girre,
humari apni sarkaar dabhav me aa jaye, yhi toh china chahta ha or
China ka sath de rhe ha iss tarah ke neta. Hosakta ha bhavishya me
congress party ke neta, Rahul Gandhi iss jhoothe video ko Social
Media par voh khud bhi post karke, bharat sarkaar se sawaal
puchne lage.
Fir Punjab or Parschim Bengal ke mukya mantri iss race me piche

nhi rahege kyu ki voh bhi yhi krna chahege. Lekin ye log kabhi
China se ye nhi puchege ki voh iss mamle me dushtprachar kyu kr
rha ha or ye log kabhi China ko nhi khaege ki kum se kum iss
mamle me bharat ke sath ha, bharat ki sena ke sath ha, bharat ki

sarkaar ke sath ha or China ke sath seema bavadh ko leke kabhi bhi
bharat ki suraksha ko khatre me nhi daalege, bharat ki suraksha pe
rajneeti nhi karege, aisa byaan ye neta kabhi nhi dege.
18th April 2022
 Researched on the proposition of delay in filing of the claim with the liquidator under IBC.
The reproduction of which is stated below:
Research on the Delay in Filing of the Claim with the Liquidator (Along with Grounds, the
Grounds are Highlighted in Yellow)
1. Re: Kamla Syntex Ltd. (18.05.2018 - DELHC): MANU/DE/2115/2018
“As has been stated, there has been a long delay in filing the proof, but a claim is within the period
of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, the only consequence of the delay will be that
prescribed by Section 474 of the Companies Act according to which a creditor, who does not prove
his debt or claim within the time fixed by the court, has to be excluded from the benefit of any
distribution made before his debt or claim is proved. A perusal of Rules 177 & 178 of the Rules
lends support to this view, for the reason that while Rule 177 provides for relief by the Court to a
creditor who fails to file proof within the prescribed time-limit, Rule 178 lays down that a creditor
who has not proved his debt before the declaration of any dividend shall not be entitled to disturb
the distribution of any dividend declared before the proof of his debt by reason of the fact that he
did not participate in it. He is however, entitled to be paid out of any money for the time being in
the hands of the Liquidator available for distribution of dividend The scheme of the law therefore
does not prescribe any other penalty in the case of a belated claim.”
2. Isack Jesudasen Pillai vs. Divan Bahadur Ramasamy Chetty (02.12.1903 - MADHC) :
MANU/TN/0164/1903
“The only penalty for failure to come in within the time stated in the notice is the penalty prescribed
in the latter part of Section 156, viz., that the claimant is "excluded from the benefit of any
distribution made before such debts are proved," that is, he can only claim a proportionate share
in such assets as may remain undistributed at the time when he proves his claim and without
disturbing any distribution made before such proof.”
3. Ganeshilal Gupta vs Bharatpur Oil Mills, 1972 WLN 68
“As has been stated, there has been a long delay in filing the proof, but a the claim is within the
period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, the only consequence of the delay will be
that prescribed by Section 474 of the Companies Act according to which a creditor, who does not
prove his debt or claim within the time fixed by the court, has to be excluded from the benefit of
any distribution made before his debt or claim is proved. A perusal of Rules 177 & 178 of the
Rules lends support to this view, for the reason that while Rule 177 provides for relief by the Court
to a creditor who fails to file proof within the prescribed time-limit, Rule 178 lays down that a
creditor who has not proved his debt before the declaration of any dividend shall not be entitled to
disturb the distribution of any dividend declared before the proof of his debt by reason of the fact
that he did not participate in it. He is however, entitled to be paid out of any money for the time
being in the hands of the Liquidator available for distribution of dividend The scheme of the law
therefore does not prescribe any other penalty in the case of a belated claim.”
4. ICICI Bank Ltd. and Ors. vs. Varun Corporation Ltd. (06.05.2020 - NCLT - Mumbai) :
MANU/NC/8583/2020
it was held and, thus, well-settled proposition of the law that a creditor may come in and prove his
debt at any time before the final distribution of the assets, but he cannot disturb any dividend which
has already been paid. Therefore, in my opinion, because the liquidation proceedings are yet to be
finalized. In the present case, no prejudice will be caused if the claim of the applicant is
adjudicated. Also, section 238A of the I&B Code makes applicable the provisions of Limitation
Act, 1963 on this Code, the delay in filing of this application by the applicant deserves
condonation. Further, it cannot be said that the requirement of "sufficient cause" is not met out in
this case as the applicant was not sleeping over its rights, but was continuously following up with
the liquidator for the perusal of its claims and this process caused the delay in filing this
application. Hence, I at this moment condone the delay in filing this application by the provisions
of the Code.
5. Mr Rohan Augustine Vs. The Official Liquidator of M/s Vijaya Leasing Ltd, .
C.A.104/2013
“It is stated that applicant did not notice the newspaper publication due to oversight and they came
know from other creditors about the company having been wound up and creditors are required to
file claim application. It is submitted that the delay in lodging the claim is neither intentional nor
deliberate as such delay is sought to be condoned. Cause shown therein being accepted and would
satisfy the same being `sufficient cause' delay in lodging the claim is condoned. C.A.104/2013 is
hereby allowed. Official Liquidator is directed to adjudicate the claim in accordance with law.”
6. UCO Bank v. Nicco Corporation Limited
“According to the ld. Counsel for the Appellant, the delay was due to want of necessary documents
to be filed along with the reply and the documents were traced out of the connected files only on
2.2.2018 because of renovation and repair work which has been going on in the premises of the
Bank where the records were kept. According to him, the Appellant being a member of the
Consortium and the entire facilities availed by the Corporate Applicant are restructured on 22-6-
2010 vide master restructuring agreement executed by the Corporate Applicant in favour of the
various Financial Creditors, irrespective of the delay in submission of the proof of claim, the
Liquidator would have considered the claim condoning the delay.”
“In view of the above said discussion, it appears to me that the delay in submission of the claim
by the appellant is liable to be condoned. Accordingly, I hereby condone the delay in the
submission of the claim by the appellant and directed the liquidator to reconsider the claim in
accordance with the provision of code and regulations.”
7. Asmi Enterprises Vs. Yog Industries Ltd. [MA1098/2018 in CP
No.82/IBC/NCLT/MB/MAH/2017] [Could not find the Judgement, but is relevant to the
cause]
The liquidator rejected the claim of an OC which was not filed before the due date. The OC filed
an application before AA for condoning the delay in submission of claim and seeking directions
against the liquidator for admitting and verifying the applicant’s claim. Referring to section 42 of
the Code which enables a creditor to approach the AA and rules 177 and 178 of the Companies
(Court) Rules, 1959, which allows a creditor to apply to the Court for relief, Adjudicating
Authority observed that the liquidation proceedings are yet to be finalised in the matter, no
prejudice would be caused if the claim of the applicant is adjudicated and admitted. It condomed
the delay in submission of the claim by the applicant and directed the liquidator to consider the
claim.
19th April 2022
 Researched on scope of the applicability of Section 57A of Indian Succession Act 1925, with
specific reference to Indore. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. Bhaiyalal Vs. Kashi Bai and Ors., MANU/MP/0706/2000
The combined effect of Section 213(2)(i) and Section 57 of the Indian Succession Act is that obtaining of
a probate of the Will is not a condition precedent to the establishment of a right where the Will has been
made by a person who is a resident of Madhya Pradesh in respect of the property situated in Madhya
Pradesh.
In the case of Chandmal Jain v. Devisingh Rajput 1982 MPWN 297, the learned Single Judge Shri H. G.
Mishra, J. has taken the view that a Hindu Will need not be probated. this Court placed reliance on the
decision in Ahmed v. Ghisia Hera, 1945 NLJ 289 : MANU/NA/0132/1944 : AIR 1945 Nag 237, and Ruprao
v. Ramrao,1952 NLJ 86 : AIR 1952 Nag. 88. Shri G. P. Singh, J. (as he then was) in Bharat Kumar v. Firm
A. K. Joshi, 1977 (2) MPWN 347, also took the view that Section 213 has no application to the case of
Wills made by any Hindu which do not fall under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57. Clauses (a) and (b) of
Section 57 relate to Wills and codicils made within the local limits of the ordinary original Civil Jurisdiction
of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay and to Wills and codicils relating to immovable
property situated within the said territories. In that case, the Will was executed in Madhya Pradesh and it
related to the property in Madhya Pradesh. The Will, therefore, fell under Clause (c) of Section 57. The bar
of Section 213 was, therefore, not applicable to the Will with which this Court was concerned. similar is
the view taken by Shri S. R. Vyas, J. in Ramcharanlal v. Madhavlal, 1978 (2) MPWN 86 and Shri G. P.
Sen, J in the case of Marwad Saw Mill v. Nemichand, 1984 MPLJ SN 6, relying on the decision in
Lachhman Singh (supra). The Allahabad High Court in the case of Bhaiyaji v. Jageshwar Dayal Bajpai,
MANU/UP/0066/1978 : AIR 1978 All 268 has also taken the view that probate need not be obtained by a
Hindu in respect of a Will made in respect of immovable property situated in other territories than Bengal,
Bombay and Madras, relying on previous decision of that High Court. The Orissa High Court in the case
of Balaram Tripathy v. Lokanath Tripathy, MANU/OR/0042/1973 : AIR 1973 Ori 112, had held that a Will
executed in exfeudatory State of Dhenakanal is not a Will falling under Section 57, probating is not a
condition of its admissibility. A Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of M/s Behari Lal
Ram Charan v. Karam Chand Sahni and others, MANU/PH/0030/1968 : AIR 1968 P&H 108, has also laid
down that obtaining a probate of a Will is not necessary in case where both the persons and the property of
any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina are outside the territories specified in Section 57(a). Suit was held to be
competent. The Rajasthan High Court in Mst. Jadav v. Ramswarup and another, MANU/RH/0016/1961 :
AIR 1961 Raj 40, has also taken the similar view.
2. Mayank Vs.Public in General and Ors., MANU/MP/0975/2006
Accordingly, a person sets up a Will does not fall within Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 57 can establish his
right as legatees in any Court of justice without obtaining a probate. To put it differently, obtaining of
probate in such a case is optional. In the matter of Madan Gopal v. Ramjiwanibai reported 1986 LLJ 806,
this Court has held that Will falling under Section 57(a) or (b) are exempted from the requirement of being
probated in order to establish legatee's right under the Will. In the matter of Balbir Singh Wasu v. Lakhbir
Singh (2005) 12 SCC 503, the question before Hon'ble Apex Court was that Section 213 of Succession Act
which requires an executor to obtain probate before establishing his claim under the Will was not applicable
outside the Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The Hon'ble Court held that assuming this
to be correct, we do not read Section 213 as prohibiting the executor from applying for probate as a matter
of prudence or convenience to the Courts in other parts of the country not covered by Section 213. Those
Courts are competent to entertain such applications if made.
In the present case, the application is filed for grant of Probate and the same could not have been rejected
in view of the aforesaid settled position of law. Since the petition was filed before District Judge, Indore
for grant of Probate which could not be rejected on the ground that in Madhya Pradesh petition filed for
grant of Probate or Letter of Administration is not maintainable.
3. : Rupinder Singh Anand Vs. Respondent: Gajinder Pal Kaur Anand and Ors.,
MANU/MP/1060/2015
8. In the present case, undisputedly the Will and codicil have been signed at Indore outside the local limits
of High Court at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. So far as the properties which are situated at Indore are
concerned, in respect of those properties no probate or letter of administration is required. It is the settled
position in law that if the will is not executed within the territory mentioned in clause (a) of section 57 or
Will does not relate to the property situated within the territory mentioned in clause (a) of section 57, the
provision of sub-section 1 of section 213 are not attracted and the probate or letter of administration is not
required.
20th April 2022
 Researched on the proposition that external development charges ought not to be paid if no
development work has been carried out by the development authority.
1. Shaukat Ali Vs. Allahabad Development Authority, MANU/UP/0394/2003
Section 33 has been quoted in Para 20 of the writ petition. In para 21 of the writ petition it is
alleged that A.D.A has not provided any amenity nor has it carried out any development activity
in respect of the plots over which the constructions have been raised by the petitioners and all the
development activities and amenities have been provided the petitioner themselves from their own
resources. Hence the development charges are illegal.
We are, therefore, of the that A.D.A. can levy development fee/charge only where some
Hence, merely because there are statutory provisions enabling the A.D.A. to Levy development
charge. this does not mean that the A.D.A. can levy development charge as of course and in every
case, irrespective of
development work has been done by the A.D.A. in relation to the land in question, and there too,
the charge must have some co-relation with the expenses incurred by the A.D.A. In this connection,
and the procedure of Section 33 must be followed.
What has been happening in Allahabad (and other cities in U.P.) is that the A.D.A. or other
Development invariably demands Authority Development charge or other charges in advance
whenever any building in sought to be constructed in the city, and an application is made for
sanction of the map for this purpose, even though the A.D.A. may not have done any development
work in this clearly connection. unauthorized and illegal, being directly in contravention of the
language and the scheme of the statute. This will be apparent from a simple analysis of the
provisions of Section 33 of the Act which clearly envisages that the development charge is
recoverable only as and by way of recompense for any development work undertaken by the
development authorities upon the default of the owner to carry out his obligations in regard to the
proposed construction. What was supposed to be recompensed cannot be converted into means of
augmenting the revenues of the A.D.A. which is what the A.D.A. has been actually doing.
whether it has done development work or not. In our opinion, the A.D.A. can levy development
fee/charge only when it has done development work in relation to the land in question, and that
too after strictly complying with the procedure laid down in Section 33, and the charge/fee must
have some co-relation with the expenses incurred in this connection by the A.D.A.
2. Smt. Benu Agrawal Vs. State of U.P.& Ors., MANU/UP/1680/2003
The petitioner in paragraph 8 of the supplementary rejoinder-affidavit has denied that any
drainage, or sewerage has been constructed by the A.D.A. or that any kind of development has
been done by the A.D.A. or a penny spent for the same
In paragraph 11 of the supplementary counter-affidavit the A.D.A. has stated It constructed storm
water drainage in the residential colony on the undertaking of the rolling occupants of the colony
to jointly pay cost of storm water drainage. However, no such undertaking has been internal
annexed to the supplementary counter-affidavit, and the A.D.A. has not stated how much it has
spent in this connection.
In the circumstances we direct that if there is any written undertaking given by the petitioner to
Jointly pay the cost of the storm water drainage, then he has to abide by that undertaking, but if
there is no written undertaking, the demand of storm water drainage charge from the petitioner is
illegal and is quashed.
3. Raj Nagar Extension (NH 58) Developer Association & another Vs. State of U.P. & Ors
Sri Shashi Nandan argued that the demand of additional external development charges under the
head elevated road cess and metro cess as also demand of fee for additional F.A.R. and security
for the rain water harvesting system is completely alien to the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (for short the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder
and as such are illegal and without jurisdiction. He submits that Individual developers/builders or
the members of the Society are not concerned with the construction of any elevated road or metro
station and therefore, no fee on account of the same demanded under the head external
development charges.
4. VPN Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., MANU/PH/3844/2015
The scheme under the Act provides for payment of proportionate development charges with
respect to the external development works and, therefore, the practice and procedure adopted by
the respondents requiring the colonizer to pay the entire amount of EDC.
without linking the same to the extent of development being carried out is illegal and unjustified.
A colonizer is liable to pay EDC only in proportion to the external development works completed
and, in any event, the work in respect thereof actually and physically commencing. In any event,
some of the external development works have not even been taken up for implementation and,
therefore, there is no question of any external development charges being payable in relation at
least to such works.
In any event, the liability to pay EDC is dependent upon the completion of certain basic and
essential works, such as, those specified in Rule 11(1)(c). A view to the contrary would render the
requirement of payment of EDC irrespective of whether the external development works are
completed or not arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and unconstitutional.
Admittedly, in the case before us, these works are to be laid out and constructed by the
Government. The undertaking, therefore, applies irrespective of whether the works are carried out
or not when the liability to pay the tentative EDC arises. The undertaking, admittedly, has not been
complied with. Indeed, the petitioners, in effect, seek to be relieved of this undertaking. The non-
completion of the other external development works, in any event, does not absolve the petitioners
of their liability to pay the EDC.4.
Indeed, if ultimately certain external development works are not done and it is found that they will never
be done, the EDC would stand reduced proportionately. That, however, does not absolve the petitioners of
their liability to pay the tentative EDC under the agreement. As we mentioned earlier, as on date, there is
nothing to indicate that the external development works or any of them are not to be carried out. If the
position changes in future, adjustments can always be made in the final accounts pertaining to EDC.
5. Suncity Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana, MANU/PH/2364/2017
The respondents carried out the external development works of the nature and to extent required
in the area. Each colonizers activities are but a part of the larger area in which the external
development works are carried out. The external development works are not for the benefit of any
particular colonizer alone but for the entire area for which it is carried out. The petitioner was in
respect of its activities to be carried out under License No. 141/2008 entitled to avail the benefit
of external development works carried out by the respondents. Having applied for and obtained
the licence in this larger scheme, it is not open to a developer absent anything else to contend
subsequently that it has not availed of the benefits of the external development works and is,
therefore, not liable to pay the same. A view to the contrary would place the respondents in an
unfair position. Having planned the nature and extent of the works, after keeping in mind the
demands and requirements of each licensee and other factors as well, they alter their position to
their detriment by expending large amounts for the same. Licensees/colonizers/developers cannot
at their option midstream abandon the projects and claim a refund of the EDC alleging that they
do not now wish to avail the facilities.
21st April 2022
 Researched on the proposition that declaration of suit is right in rem and right in rem is not
arbitrable. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. G.Venkatachalam vs Al.Ar.K.Vr.Chinna Veerappan

Madras High Court
“The petitioners herein have filed a comprehensive suit for declaration and the decree passed is
a right in rem and it binds everyone unless a third party comes in and say that the plaintiffs in
whose favour the decree was passed have no title to the properties by way of producing
unimpeacheable documents.”
2. Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) through Lrs. vs. Jasjit Singh and Ors. (18.03.1993
- SC) : MANU/SC/0496/1993
“It is a judgment in rem and conclusive and binds not only the parties but also the entire world.
The award deprives the parties of statutory right of appeal provided under Section 299. Thus the
necessary conclusion is that the Probate Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction and the Civil Court
on original side or the Arbitrator does not get jurisdiction, even if consented to by the parties, to
adjudicate upon the proof or validity of the Will propounded by the executrix, the applicant.”
3. Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. vs. SBI Home Finance Ltd. and Ors. (15.04.2011 - SC) :
MANU/SC/0533/2011
“23. It may be noticed that the cases referred to above relate to actions in rem. A right in rem is a
right exercisable against the world at large, as contrasted from a right in personam which is an
interest protected solely against specific individuals. Actions in personam refer to actions
determining the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the subject matter of the case,
whereas actions in rem refer to actions determining the title to property and the rights of the parties,
not merely among themselves but also against all persons at any time claiming an interest in that
property. Correspondingly, judgment in personam refers to a judgment against a person as
distinguished from a judgment against a thing, right or status and judgment in rem refers to a
judgment that determines the status or condition of property which operates directly on the
property itself. (Vide: Black's Law Dictionary). Generally and traditionally all disputes relating to
rights in personam are considered to be amenable to arbitration; and all disputes relating to rights
in rem are required to be adjudicated by courts and public tribunals, being unsuited for private
arbitration. This is not however a rigid or inflexible rule. Disputes relating to sub-ordinate rights
in personam arising from rights in rem have always been considered to be arbitrable.”
4. Kirori Mal Vs. Collector Delhi State and Ors, MANU/PH/0258/1962
The Plaintiff has' no doubt mentioned a lot of matters in the plaint, but' they are in the nature of historical
interest showing the reasons which have necessitated the bringing of the present suit once a declaration of
title is given it is a declaration in rem and good against the world, and the Defendants would check It if they
are minded to do so. Any further dealing with respect to such property is at their own risk. The exclusive
title of the Plaintiff having been declared, any action then taken by the Defendant in disregard of such a
title would be at the risk of the Defendant or transferee leaving completely inviolate the rights and the
interests of the Plaintiff.
5. Vishwanath Achar and Ors. Vs. Averil M.A. Cutinha and Ors., MANU/KA/4349/2021
Admittedly, the suit is filed seeking declaratory relief. Exhibits P7 and P8 would indicate that the plaintiff
herein inherited the property by way of Will probated in P&SC No. 35 of 1979 and therefore, there is no
impediment for this Court to hold that the plaintiff is to be declared as the owner of the subject matter of
the suit property. Though the defendant has contended that the judgment and decree in OS No. 134/1968 is
not binding on him, however, the judgment and decree passed by the Competent Court with regard to
declaration of title in respect of the immovable property, is a declaration in rem. This aspect of the matter
was considered by the Apex Court in the case of KIRORI MAL v. COLLECTOR DELHI STATE reported
in MANU/PH/0258/1962 : AIR 1964 PUNJAB 26. The relevant discussion made by the Apex Court at
paragraph 8 is that, "Once a declaration of title is given it is a declaration in rem and good against the world,
and the defendants would check it if they are minded to do so. Any further dealing with respect to such
property is at their own risk..."
6. D. Dwaraka Vs. The Registrar (Admn.), High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. ,
MANU/AP/0312/2008
When a declaratory relief is sought (as in the case of challenge to a legislative Act) the effect of declaration
would not only be from the date of Judgment of the Court but it can be a declaration in rem or a declaration
anterior to filing of the case or decision on the case.
7. G. Subrahmanyam and Ors. Vs. G. Leela and Ors., MANU/AP/0546/2011
A declaration of title is a declaration in rem
22nd April 2022
 Researched on the proposition that additional legal grounds can be pleaded in appeal. The
reproduction of which is stated below:
1. Appellants: National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. Respondent: Commissioner of Income Tax,
MANU/SC/1287/1997
Undoubtedly, the Tribunal will have the discretion to allow or not allow a new ground to be raised. But
where the Tribunal is only required to consider a question of law arising from the facts which are on record
in the assessment proceedings we fail to see why such a question should not be allowed to be raised when
it is necessary to consider that question in order to correctly assess the tax liability of an assessee.
2. Appellants: K. Lubna and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Beevi and Ors., MANU/SC/0025/2020
8. On the legal principle, it is trite to say that a pure question of law can be examined at any stage,
including before this Court. If the factual foundation for a case has been laid and the legal consequences
of the same have not been examined, the examination of such legal consequences would be a pure
question of law.
3. Appellants:Gurucharan Singh Vs. Respondent:Kamla Singh and Ors., MANU/SC/0402/1975
The Court narrated the twists and turns of factual and legal circumstances which served to extenuate the
omission to urge the point earlier but hit the nail on the head when it held that it was well-settled that a pure
question of law going to the root of the case and based on undisputed or proven facts could be raised even
before the Court of last resort, provided the opposite side was not taken by surprise or otherwise unfairly
prejudiced.
4. Appellants:State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Anupam Gupta and Ors.,
MANU/SC/0173/1992
Shri Yogeshwar Prasad, learned senior counsel for the State countered that this contention was not raised
in the High Court and for the first time it cannot be raised. We find no force in the contention of the State.
Though it was never raised, nor argued, since it is a pure question of law arises from record, it can be gone
into
5. Appellants: Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Respondent: Schlumberger Sea Co. Inc.,
MANU/WB/0145/1997
26. Additionally, there are authorities to the effect that where all the facts are before the Appellate Tribunal,
a pure new ground of law can usually be allowed to be taken by a party provided that party has not
disentitled itself by adopting any unfair means. If that new ground has been intentionally suppressed or
some such disentitling factor can be shown against that party, the additional ground might be refused to be
taken by the party before the Appellate Tribunal. But, ordinarily, a pure point of law is usually allowed to
be taken. Mr. Dastur gave us the Supreme Court's decision in the case of CIT v. S. Nelliappan
MANU/SC/0143/1967 : [1967]66ITR722(SC) . The right of the Tribunal to give relief to the assessee to
urge new grounds is taken note of in that case. The rules themselves permit such relief to be granted in
appropriate cases by appropriate use of discretion. Thus the matter of taking of a new ground not being
challenged before the Tribunal at all, interference by us in this regard at this stage would be thoroughly
unjust and unlawful.
6. Appellants: Collector (L.A.), South Andaman District Vs. Respondent: Himangshu Mondal and
Ors., MANU/WB/1305/2014
However, there is no bar in law for the Court to step out of the grounds urged in such memorandum and to
rest its decision on a new ground of law, or to allow the appellant to raise a new ground of law in course of
hearing of an appeal; the only rider in such case is that the respondent ought not to be taken unawares and
he should be extended the opportunity to contest such ground. Since the respondents were made aware of
our inclination to hear such ground, Ms. Nag opposed it and the nature of her objection has been noted
above. Having considered the versions on either side, we observe that the stand of the appellant has merit
and hold that the contention deserves acceptance
25th April 2022
 Researched on the proposition that summons can only be issued if the complaint discloses the
ingredients of the offence. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. Appellants: Vishnu Chandra Tripathi and Ors. Vs. Respondent: State of U.P. and Ors.,
MANU/UP/1879/2019
17. In MANU/SC/0173/1976 : AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 1947, Smt. Nagawwa v/s Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi & others, It is held by The Apex Court that "It is well settled by a long catena of
decisions of this Court that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the
allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie
satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceedings against the accused. It is not the province of
the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merit or de-merits of the case nor can the High Court
go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one."
2. Appellants: Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Respondent: Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Ors.,
MANU/SC/0094/1982
9. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is as to when the High Court acting under
the provisions of Section 482 should exercise the inherent power in so far as quashing of criminal
proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone into in greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalji and Ors. [1976] Su. S.C.R. 123 where the scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the
present Code was considered and while laying down the guidelines and the grounds on which
proceedings could be quashed this Court observed as follows: Thus, it may be safely held that in the
following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set
aside: (1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in
support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the
complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
(2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that
no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused;
3. Appellants: Birla Corporation Limited and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Adventz Investments and
Holdings Limited and Ors., MANU/SC/0714/2019
Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the
Accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of
the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against
the Accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged
against the Accused;
4. Appellants: Randheer Singh Vs. Respondent: The State of U.P. and Ors., MANU/SC/0859/2021
33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment
against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far
as the Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this Appellant is involved
in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is
absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint 20-04-2022 (Page 10 of 11)
www.manupatra.com Khaitan & Co. IP Access discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of
the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged
by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a
criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given
colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal
proceedings as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above.
5. Appellants: Pepsi
Foods Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors.,
MANU/SC/1090/1998
27. Summoning of an accused in a criminal cases is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion
as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations
in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the
accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He
has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary
in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to
the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence
before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record
and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the
truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all
or any of the accused.
26th April 2022
 Researched on the grounds of filing of a curative petition. The reproduction of which is stated
below:
1. Appellants: Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Respondent: Ashok Hurra and Ors, MANU/SC/0910/2002
49. Nevertheless, we think that a petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he establishes (1)
violation of principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgement adversely
affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings and
the matter proceeded as if he had notice and(2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose
his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the
judgment adversely affects the petitioner.
2. Appellants: N.T.P.C. Ltd. Vs. Respondent: Karri Pothuraju and Ors., MANU/SC/1270/2004
1. We have carefully perused the contents of the curative petition. As held in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok
Hurra and Anr. MANU/SC/0910/2002 : 2002 (4) SCC 388 : AIR 2002 SC 1771 curative petitions ought to
be treated as a rarity. Such a petition may be entertained ex debito justiae if the Petitioner has made but a
case of violation of the principles of natural justice, in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment
adversely affected his interests or if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the
proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice, or where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed
to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving a Scope for an apprehension of bias
and the judgment adversely affects the Petitioner.
3. Appellants: Yakub Abdul Razak Memon Vs. Respondent: State of Maharashtra and Ors.,
MANU/SC/0825/2015
1 . Curative Petitions shall be governed by judgment of the Court dated 10 th April, 2002 delivered in the
case of Rupa Ashok Hurrah v. Ashok Hurrah and Ors. in Writ Petition (C) No. 509 of 1997. 2 . (1) The
Petitioner, in the curative petition, shall aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken
in the Review Petition and that it was dismissed by circulation. (2) A Curative Petition shall be accompanied
by a certificate of the Senior Advocate that the petition meets the requirements delineated in the above case.
(3) A curative petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Advocate on Record to the effect that it
is the first curative petition in the impugned matter. 3. The Curative Petition shall be filed within reasonable
time from the date of judgment or Order passed in the Review Petition. 4 . (1) The curative petition shall
be first circulated to a Bench of the three senior-most judges and the judges who passed the judgment
complained of, if available. (2) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a curative petition shall be disposed
of by circulation, without any oral arguments but the Petitioner may supplement his petition by additional
written arguments. (3) If the bench before which a curative petition was circulated concludes by a majority
that the matter needs bearing then it shall be listed before the same Bench, as far as possible. (4) If the
Court, at any stage, comes to the conclusion that the petition is without any merit and vexatious, it may
impose exemplary costs on the Petitioner.
4. Appellants:Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Respondent:Union of India (UOI) and
Ors., MANU/SC/0837/2011
130. A four-judge bench of this Court in Sumer v. State of U.P. MANU/SC/0522/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 220
observed as under: In Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra) while providing for the remedy of curative petition, but at
the same time to prevent abuse of such remedy and filing in that garb a second review petition as a matter
of course, the Constitution Bench said that except when very strong reasons exist, the court should not
entertain an application seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on
dismissal of review petition. In this view, strict conditions including filing of certificate by a Senior
Advocate were provided in Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra). Despite it, the apprehension of the Constitution
Bench that the remedy provided may not open the flood gates for filing a second review petition has come
true as is evident from filing of large number of curative petitions. It was expected that the curative petitions
will be filed in exceptional and in rarest of rare case but, in practice, it has just been opposite. This Court,
observing that neither it is advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which curative petition
may be entertained, said that nevertheless the Petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he
establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment
adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the
proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice, and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge
failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of
bias and the judgment adversely affects the Petitioner. To restrict filing of the curative petitions only in
genuine cases, Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra) provided that the curative petition shall contain a certification by
a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of all the requirements provided in the judgment.
Unfortunately, in most of the cases, the certification is casual without fulfilling the requirements of the
judgment.
27th April 2022
 Researched on the proposition that Shareholders of a company is barred from interfering with
the sale of assets of a company. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. Appellants: Suburban Bank Private Ltd., Trichur Vs. Respondent: Thariath and Ors,
MANU/KE/0054/1968
It is a first and elementary principle of company law that, when powers are vested in a board of directors
by the articles of association of a company, they cannot be interfered with by the shareholders as such. If
the shareholders are dissatisfied with what directors do, their remedy is to remove them in the manner
provided by the articles. But so long as a board of directors exists and particular powers are vested in it by
the articles, then they are entitled to exercise those powers without interference by the shareholders and it
is, I think, irrelevant whether the shareholders approve of what the directors have done or not.
2. Appellants: N.G. George Vs. Respondent: Shirly Varkey and Ors., MANU/KE/0121/2009
Such being the position of law, delineating the right of a shareholder vis-a-vis the company, the irresistible
conclusion follows that the application under Order 21 Rule 90 C.P.C. by the appellant, a shareholder,
impeaching the sale of the property of the company is not maintainable. Point found accordingly.
3. Appellants:Bacha F. Guzdar Vs. Respondent:Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay,

MANU/SC/0072/1954
That a shareholder acquires a right to participate in the profits of the company may be readily conceded but
it is not possible to accept the contention that the shareholder acquires any interest in the assets of the
company. The use of the word 'assets' in the passage quoted above cannot be exploited to warrant the
inference that a shareholder, on investing money in the purchase of shares, becomes entitles to the assets of
the company and has any share in the property of the company. A shareholder has got no interest in the
property of the company though he has undoubtedly a right to participate in the profits if and when the
company decides to divide them. The interest of a shareholder vis-a-vis the company was explained in the
case of Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others MANU/SC/0009/1950 : [1950] S.C.R.
869, 904). That judgment negatives the position taken up on behalf of the appellant that a shareholder has
got a right in the property of the company. It is true that the shareholders of the company have the sole
determining voice in administering the affairs of the company and are entitled, as provided by the Articles
of Association, to declare that dividends should be distributed out of the profits of the company to the
shareholders but the interest of the shareholder either individually or collectively does not amount to more
than a right to participate in the profits of the company. The company is a juristic person and is distinct
from the shareholders. It is the company which owns the property and not the shareholders.
4. Appellants: Shyamlal Purohit and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Jagannath Ray and Ors.,
MANU/WB/0075/1969
15. The result of these decisions may be summarised as follows:-- (1) In the case of a public limited
company registered under the said Act the company is a separate entity from its shareholders. It is the
company which is the owner of its assets, including Immovable properties, and not the shareholders. (2)
The shareholder in such a company has a right to share in the profits, by way. of receipt of dividends. He
has a right, in an appropriate case, to apply for the winding up of the company and to take part in the
distribution of the surplus assets after payment of the debts and liabilities, which must of course be done in
accordance with the Articles of Association and the provisions of the said Act. (3) As long as the company
continues to exist, that is to say before its dissolution, no shareholders can be said to have any interest in
the properties and assets of the company, either legal or equitable. Shareholders in a company are certainly
interested in the properties and assets of the company in the sense that a wastage or frittering away of the
assets might affect their rights to enjoy the profits and eventually the distribution of surplus assets in a
winding up. This, however, is too remote an interest and cannot be included within the definition of
"interest", within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 90 of the Civil P. C. (4) The words "or whose Interests are
affected by the sale", in Order 21, Rule 90, are no longer confined to an interest in Immovable property or
to proprietary or possessory rights. The word 'interest' must be given a wide meaning, and may include a
contingent interest, but the right may be exercised by one who is directly and immediately affected by the
sale of an Immovable property. Rights which are likely to be affected or interest which may hypothetically
or remotely be affected cannot be considered as coming within the four corners of Order 21, Rule 90.
5. Appellants: Nirmalabai D. Kale and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Madan, MANU/MH/0865/2008
In H.E.M. Union v. State of Bihar (supra), it has been held that Company in holding its property and
carrying on its business, is not the agent of its shareholders and an infringement of its right does not give a
cause of action to its shareholders.
28th April 2022
 Researched on the proposition that repeated filing of Order 9 Rule 9 Application without any
cogent reasons despite dismissals is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed with
exemplary costs. The reproduction of which is stated below:
1. Sh. Sheo Raj Vs. Sh. Hans Raj & Anr. CRP No. 162/2009
In a civil suit, the plaintiff is the author of his case. It is he who puts into motion the entire case. If he shows
lack luster approach and does not pursue his case it not only waste the court time but also cause hardship
to the defendants. The solitary incident can be liberally condoned. But if it becomes a habit and repeated
again and again, the court cannot sit idle and allow it to happen. The court is under duty to ensure that such
attitude would not allowed to be perpetuated. So, in these premises, no premium can be given to the lack
luster approach of the plaintiff/appellant. I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by Ld. Trial court
which warrant interference.
2. Appellants: D.B. Manke Vs. Respondent: B. Walwekar, MANU/MH/0238/1923
1. The plaintiff filed a suit No. 283 of 1922 in the Small Causes Court, Bombay, to recover wages from the
Opponent. The suit was decreed ex parte because although the Opponent engaged a pleader he did not
attempt to contest the suit at the hearing. The Opponent then filed an application for setting aside of the ex
parte decree and notice was issued to the plaintiff and the day fixed for hearing was 10th April 1922. That
notice was issued under Order IX, Rule 9 . The notice was struck off for want of prosecution. Again the
Opponent presented an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. That was clearly time-barred, the
Court considered that it was an application to restore the application previously made under Order IX, Rule
9 . Considering the application as restored, it passed an order against the plaintiff for a now trial. The
application is made to us to revise that order as being without jurisdiction. It cannot be said that there is any
rule in the Code of Civil Procedure that enables the Court to restore an application made under Order IX,
Rule 9 , which has been dismissed for want of prosecution. It is urged upon us that the Court has inherent
powers to make orders within the provisions of Section 151 and that this was an order made accordingly.
There is no reference made in the decision of the Court that the order was made under Section 151 . It is
quite clear that if that Section had been considered, the order under revision could not possibly have been
made under it. That Section gives the Court power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. The plaintiff has got a decree and the defendant had
every opportunity of appearing in Court at the time of hearing and also when notices were issued by him
against the plaintiff for a new trial. It cannot be said, therefore, that in any circumstance it is necessary for
the ends of justice that be should have yet another opportunity of harassing the successful party. Therefore
the rule is made absolute with costs.
3. Appellants: Kuldip Kaur Vs. Respondent: State of Punjab and Ors., MANU/PH/1002/1987
4. Since Haqiqat Singh has failed about the property in dispute up to the highest Court of the land, his wife,
who acquired rights in the property in dispute on the basis of collusive decree during the pendency of the
writ petition, would be bound by rule of lis pendence rendered in the writ petition which was upheld in the
letters patent appeal and also by the Supreme Court. In this way, it would operate as res judicata against her
and the suit which she has filed soon after the decision of the appeal by the Supreme Court, was nothing
but an abuse of process of Court simply to delay the demolition of the unauthorised structure by getting
injunction/stay orders. The dismissal of the suit in default, the dismissal of the application under Order 9
Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code in default and the non-payment of costs, go to show that there was a
strong constant effort to keep the proceedings alive and to delay the matter as much as possible because if
the matter was to be decided on merits, neither Haqiqat Singh nor his wife Smt. Kuldip Kaur had any legs
to stand. Accordingly, I agree with the counsel for the State that the suit and all these proceedings are
nothing but an abuse of process of the Court. For all these reasons, I decline to interfere with the impugned
orders and dismiss this revision petition with exemplary costs which are quantified at Rs. 1,000/-.
4. Appellants: Babulal Surana and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Varalakshmi, MANU/TN/2112/2011.

18. The Interlocutory Application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 Code of Civil Procedure was dismissed,
however, the Petitioners filed a petition to restore the same with an application to condone the inordinate
delay of 711 days to restore the Interlocutory Application in I.A. No. 11 of 2007, which show that there
was lethargic attitude in part of the Petitioners and there is no bonafide reason available to condone the
delay.
20. On the facts and circumstances and also on the available materials on record, I am of the view that the
revision petitions are liable to be dismissed, to prevent the abuse of process of law and to meet the ends of
justice.
29th April 2022
 Prepared a comprehensive research paper titled “Curative Petition: The Last Beacon of Hope”
The reproduction of which is stated below:
Curative Petition: The Last Beacon of Hope
Introduction
The Supreme Court of India's decision in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Others 1 was
groundbreaking in more ways than one. For one thing, it ended the practice of litigants using
Article 32 to challenge the Supreme Court's final decisions. However, it introduced a new
dimension to its exercise of inherent power in the same manner. The procedures of the curative
petition proposed by Rupa Ashok Hurra2 bring this element to light. The formulation of curative
petition modalities went beyond the Court's inherent competence to allow meritorious petitions
under any appropriate method, and instead created a new procedure by which such petitions can
be brought before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's ruling in Rupa Ashok Hurra 3 was an
attempt by the court to put order to a constitutional question that could have easily devolved into
a jumble of highly individualized judicial pronouncements.
The Apex Court first established the concept of the curative petition in Rupa Ashok Hurra vs.
Ashok Hurra and another case (2002), 4 which addressed whether a person is entitled to any relief
against the Apex Court's final judgment/order even after the dismissal of a review petition. It has
two goals: to prevent abuse of process and to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Article 137 of the
1
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra MANU/SC/0910/2002.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid
4
Ibid.
Constitution supports the concept of a curative petition. The Supreme Court has the power to
review any judgment pronounced (or order made) by it in the case of legislation and rules made
under Article 145. A petition for this type of relief must be submitted within 30 days after the date
of the judgment or order.
History of Curative Petition
Due to Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002)5, in an instance of a wedding dispute,
the Supreme Court introduced the concept of therapeutic request to prevent the early delivery of
equity and the abuse of the cycle.
Following the dismissal of the review petition, the question of whether an aggrieved party is
entitled to any remedies against the Supreme Court's final ruling arose. In addition, the Supreme
Court stated in this case that in order to prevent and correct a miscarriage of justice, it is important
to reconsider its decisions using its inherent powers. The word "curative petition" was coined by
the court to describe this situation. The petitioner must make the grounds that are addressed there
and that were taken earlier in the audit request documented, which was excused, in a healing
appeal.
The remedial appeal is then circulated between the three senior-most appointed judges, the
adjudicators who deliver the valid verdict, from that point forward. There is no time limit for
recording the corrective request. This is guaranteed by Article 137 of the Indian Constitution,
which states that laws and rules are formed in accordance with Article 145 of the Indian
Constitution. To put it another way, it means that the Supreme Court has the authority to review
any decision it makes.
Jurisprudence on the Subject
The petitioner's goal in allowing such an appeal is to reduce or limit any mistreatment in the legal
system and to fix unsuccessful labour in an equitable arrangement; as a result, it is regarded as the
final or only option available for the reimbursement of poor behaviour.
When the Supreme Court rules on the case, the doctrine of 'interest Republicaeut sits finis litium'
comes into play. This phenomenon states that it is in the public interest for litigation to come to an
end after a protracted chain of appeals. In the spirit of fairness, the founding fathers and mothers
incorporated Article 137 of the Constitution, which allows the Supreme Court's orders to be
reviewed.
5
Ibid.
It is generally not permitted to take place in open court and is heard in the appointed authority's
workplace. It's a once-in-a-lifetime chance that the equivalent will be heard in a public courtroom.
The distressed groups have the required rights to bids or audits based on the concept of debate and
issues. The general legislation of bids permits groups to use their opportunity before the nation's
most prestigious court. When the Supreme Court of India makes the decision, the equivalent may
be considered final and authoritative.
Nonetheless, the founding fathers and mothers incorporated Article 137 of the Indian Constitution,
which allows a review of the Supreme Court's decision. The inquiry that came to light was in
regards to any situation in which the gatherings believe that justice has not been given even after
the corrective appeal. The legal executive's main point is that legal arrangements should have
genuine relevance, and any unsuccessful labour will be dangerous for the general public
everywhere, as they find the inquiry reasonable.
How is Curative Petition Different?
The term "review petition" refers to a request to have a binding Supreme Court decision reviewed.
A review petition can be filed by the parties to any Supreme Court order that contains an obvious
error. The court will not take a fresh look at the situation; instead, they will fix the mistakes. The
curative petition, on the other hand, is the last resort since, even after filing a review petition, if
the aggrieved party wishes to appeal the court's decision or verdict, they must submit a curative
petition, which does not need an open court hearing. Article 137 of the Indian Constitution also
backs it up.
Even after a review petition has been dismissed, a curative petition can be used to ask the court to
review and change its own judgement. However, the court has been highly hesitant to use such a
petition. The court stated clearly that such petitions should be rare rather than common, and to
ensure that the court stated in its guidelines for filing the petition that, unlike other petitions, a
gross violation of a principle of natural justice by the court must be proven by the opposing party
in order to file such a petition.
A senior advocate must also certify and give forth sufficient grounds for the petition to be
entertained in order to substantiate such violations. The same will be evaluated by the court's three
senior-most judges, as well as the judges who handed down the ruling, and if the majority believes
there was a violation, the curative petition will be heard by the same bench. A curative petition is
not subject to the limitation restrictions of the Limitations Act, but the court has stated that it must
be filed within a reasonable time.

Grounds for Rejection
The reason for the petition's denial is that if the petition is found to be without merit, the petitioner
may face a penalty in the form of exemplary cost.
Conditions for Filing of Curative Petition
After a review plea against the final conviction is dismissed, a curative petition might be filed. It
may be considered if the petitioner can show that there was a violation of natural justice principles
and that He was not heard by the court before an order was issued. It must be exceptional rather
than common. A curative petition must initially be sent to a bench of the three most senior judges,
as well as the judges who handed down the relevant ruling if they are accessible. Only when a
majority of the judges agree that the case deserves to be heard should it be assigned to the same
Bench. The Bench can ask a senior advocate to assist it as amicus curiae at any point throughout
the curative petition's review (Friend of the court). Unless a particular request for an open-court
hearing is made, a curative petition is normally decided by judges in the chamber.
Process of the Curative Petition
To hear such petitions, the Supreme Court will have inherent and plenary authority. According to
Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, after a case is dismissed in a review petition
filed under Article 137 of the Constitution, which gives the Supreme Court the power to review its
own judgments and orders, a curative petition can be filed under the Apex court's inherent
jurisdiction to cure abuse of its process and cure gross miscarriage of justice, as per the law laid
down in the Ashok Hurra Case6. A petition like this will be sent to the three judges and judges who
handed down the contested decision. The Court May Reject the Petition if the plea is determined
to be without merit, but if the petition is found to be just and proper, it may be scheduled for
hearing before the same benches.
The affidavit that may accompany the curative petition must state explicitly that the petition is
controlled by the Ashok Hurra decision, and it must not include any new grounds other than those
that were raised in the review petition and were dismissed on circulation. It must be accompanied
by a certificate from a senior advocate stating that the petition meets the requirements set forth in
the case, a certified or authenticated copy of the judgement or order complained of, and a certificate
from an advocate-on-record stating that it is the first curative petition filed in the case.
6
Ibid.
There is no statute of limitations that applies to the filing of this petition; thus, the fee will be the
same as it was in the initial proceedings. The concept of the curative petition came into being
maintenance considering the doctrine of stare decisis, as well as the finality and certainty of the
law announced by the Apex court, which must be considered when filling out the curative petition
and resolving it on the grounds of apparent illegality and palpable injustice in exceptional
circumstances. It is an extremely strong discretionary power that could be exercised in rare cases.
Landmark Judicial Precedents on Curative Petition
1. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra MANU/SC/0910/20027
“Nevertheless, we think that a Petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he establishes

(1) violation of the principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment
adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the
proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice, and
(2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject
matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects
the Petitioner. 52. The Petitioner, in the curative petition, shall aver specifically that the grounds
mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition and that it was dismissed by circulation.
The curative petition shall contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with regard to the
fulfillment of the above requirements.”
2. N.T.P.C. Ltd. Vs. Karri Pothuraju and Ors, MANU/SC/1270/20048
“We have carefully perused the contents of the curative petition. As held in Rupa Ashok Hurra v.
Ashok Hurra and Anr. MANU/SC/0910/2002 : 2002 (4) SCC 388 : AIR 2002 SC 1771 curative
petitions ought to be treated as a rarity. Such a petition may be entertained ex debito justiae if the
Petitioner has made but a case of violation of the principles of natural justice, in that he was not a
party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interests or if he was a party to the lis, he
was not served with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice, or
where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter
or the parties giving a Scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the
Petitioner.”
7
Ibid.
8
N.T.P.C. Ltd. Vs. Karri Pothuraju and Ors, MANU/SC/1270/2004.
3. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. MANU/SC/0825/20159
“Regard being had to what has been stated by the Constitution Bench, the Rule position of Order
XLVIII which deals with the curative petition has to be appreciated. For the sake of appropriate
appreciation, the entire Rule is reproduced below:
1 . Curative Petitions shall be governed by judgment of the Court dated 10th April 2002 delivered
in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurrah v. Ashok Hurrah and Ors. in Writ Petition (C) No. 509 of 1997.
2 . (1) The Petitioner, in the curative petition, shall aver specifically that the grounds mentioned
therein had been taken in the Review Petition and that it was dismissed by circulation.
(2) A Curative Petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Senior Advocate that the
petition meets the requirements delineated in the above case.
(3) A curative petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Advocate on Record to the
effect that it is the first curative petition in the impugned matter.
3. The Curative Petition shall be filed within a reasonable time from the date of judgment or Order
passed in the Review Petition.
4 . (1) The curative petition shall be first circulated to a Bench of the three senior-most judges and
the judges who passed the judgment complained of, if available.
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a curative petition shall be disposed of by circulation,
without any oral arguments but the Petitioner may supplement his petition with additional written
arguments.
(3) If the bench before which a curative petition was circulated concludes by a majority that the
matter needs bearing then it shall be listed before the same Bench, as far as possible.
(4) If the Court, at any stage, comes to the conclusion that the petition is without any merit and
vexatious, it may impose exemplary costs on the Petitioner.
Conclusion
Curative petitions are the last choice for petitions for judicial relief, and they are solely based on
judicial discretion. This was developed with the understanding that judges might make accidental
human errors as well, and that in order to provide the correct judgement, the SC demonstrated that
it will not leave any stone unturned. The Court in Rupa Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra 10 modified the
contours of curative jurisdiction in order to do justice. Despite the fact that there is a fine line
9
N.T.P.C. Ltd. Vs. Karri Pothuraju and Ors, MANU/SC/1270/2004
10
Supra.
between a curative petition and a petition for review, the apex court has established precise grounds
for filing both of these petitions, making it clear that the two are completely different. As a result,
the concept of a curative petition can be described as a statutory remedy that originated as a last
resort in order to correct the Supreme Court's decision as a legal and moral duty in determining
the rarest of rare cases. In the Indian legal system, a curative petition is a novel concept and judicial
innovation. It is regarded as the last and most effective option. However, in the context of justice,
such as in the Nirbhaya case, it provides a buffer for the judges to deliver the ruling on time. Our
judicial system is riddled with loopholes. It provides a means for a criminal to avoid punishment.
The request for a hearing is regarded as unusual rather than typical. If the solicitor establishes that
there was a breach of common equity norms and that he was not heard by the court prior to passing
a request, it is likely to be beneficial. To do justice, the Court in Rupa Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra 11
changed the parameters of curative authority. Despite the fact that there is a thin line between a
curative petition and a petition for review, the Supreme Court has specified specific grounds for
filing both of these petitions, clearly distinguishing the two. As a result, a curative petition is a
statutory remedy that began as a last resort to amend the Supreme Court's decision as a legal and
moral duty in determining the rarest of the rare circumstances.
11
Supra.
Conclusion
I was expected to research various propositions of law, besides drafting key documents &
applications. The Associates working in the organization was very understanding and always
assisted me in performing legal research, besides making me feel part of the team. The experience
has been very enriching and learning. The people I met at the organization were kind and patient
enough to teach me newer aspects of the profession. The internship was a push towards my career
in law.
It ended the gap between the academics and its application in real life. Reading books deprived
me of that. The experience gave me glimpse of my future. I felt privileged to be a part of the legal
fraternity and I was interned such a reputed organization at the very start of my career. In the
process of interning, I also got to know the importance of having a wide social base and the
importance of networking.
Without exposure to the real world, one cannot understand the analytical and positive application
of law and jurisprudence and the actual function and the actual structural of law. What we study
is the body, but what we have learned from the internship is a mechanical of this body.
I also learned that law is everything but constant and with the same soul as a human. In other words
or that of our counsel, laws may come and laws may repeal, but they must always stay true to our
original values and in case of laws, they must always be faithful to the constitution, which is the
most supreme law of the land and governs all equals and unequal in respect of each other.
The experience made me have the confidence to face the court as a litigant without any fear and
being versed with the curriculum of the courts. This contribution from the end of the institution
has been of great help.

Devashish Tiwari Internship Report

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Devashish Tiwari Internship Report

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Internship Report 2022

Internship Report Submitted to GGSIP University

JEMTEC SCHOOL OF LAW

1. DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP

4. UNDERTAKING REGARDING THE AUTHENTICITY BY THE STUDENT

5. EMPLOYER FEEDBACK FORM

6. OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNSHIP

7. MONTHLY REPORT OF LEX FAVIOS

8. MONTHLY REPORT OF ADP & ASSOCIATES

9. MONTHLY REPORT OF KHAITAN & CO.

DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP

2. ADP & Associates

3. Khaitan & Co.

The Objective of the Internship

Signature for the Authenticity

An Overview of the Internship Work

7th February 2022

Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies

Also produced the judgements in support of the research:

1. S. Rathinaswamy vs S. Bhanumathi, AIR 2006 Mad 221

Serial Proprietor’s Name Status Objection Tm

1. Mahesh Advani Dispatching Of Two Different 4354437

21. Eagle Vacuum Bottle Mfg. Registered NA 193367

47. EAGLE VACUUM Registered NA 185011

56. INACCES GEOTECNICA Abandoned NA 3076542

8th & 9th February 2022

Impunity to Marital Rape: An Opportune Time to Show it the Door?

The Present Legal Position of Marital Rape in India

Why Should the Impunity to Marital Rape be shown the Door?

Report of Law Commission of India and Outdated Notion of Marital Rape

Is Impunity to Marital Rape Helping in Protection the Institution of Marriage?

India’s International Obligations

10th & 11th February 2022

Brief Summary of Corporate Social Responsibility

What is Corporate Social Responsibility?

Applicability of CSR on the Companies

What is the Role of Corporate Social Responsibility Committee?

Changes Incorporated through the Amendments

Activities that can now be Included as CSR

There is a new requirement for mandatory impact assessment of CSR projects.

Support from ‘international organizations’

Registration of CSR Undertakings

14th February 2022

1. Researched extensively on the requirement of public health licence in the state of

THE HIMACHAL PRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1994

Requirement for Public Health Licence

324. Premises not to be used for certain purposes without licence.-

330. Power of Commissioner to stop use of premises used in contravention of licences.-

383. Punishment for certain offences

15th & 16th February 2022

IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL,

IN THE MATTER OF:

M/s Power Machine (India) Ltd. ……. Respondent/Corporate Debtor

S. No. Particular Pg. No.

Place Respondent/Corporate Debtor

IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL,

IN THE MATTER OF:

M/s Empowertrans Pvt Ltd. ………Applicant/Operational Creditor

M/s Power Machine (India) Ltd. ……. Respondent/Corporate Debtor

REPLY TO THE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE INSOLVENCY AND

PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION AND OBJECTIONS

I. That as per Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, it is

8. (1) An operational creditor may, on the occurrence of a default, deliver a

(b) the repayment of unpaid operational debt—