CASE 1

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his
office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for
reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas PambansaBlg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for
office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In
general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law

(1) Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the

Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void

Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional

guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case,
employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees.
The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the
workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be
declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to an accused.

CASE 2
PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Assoc of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assails the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706 as amended and RA 139. Act No. 2706 provides that before a private school
may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the Sec. of Education, which
they aver restrains the right of a citizen to own and operate a school. Said Act also confers
on the Sec. of Education the duty to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private
schools xxx. PACU contends this confers unlimited power constituting unlawful delegation of
legislative power. On the other hand, RA 139 confers upon the Board of Textbooks power to
review all textbooks to be used in private schools and prohibit the use of those deemed, in
sum, unsuitable. PACU avers this is censorship in “its baldest form”.
ISSUE:
May PACU validly assail the constitutionality of foregoing statutes?

HELD:
No. The action is premature. There is no justiciable controversy as petitioners have suffered
no wrong and therefore no actual and positive relief may be had in striking down the assailed
statutes.* Petitioner private schools are operating under the permits issued to them pursuant
to the assailed Act, and there is no threat, as they do not assert, that the Sec. of Education
will revoke their permits. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might, under the law,
withdraw the permit does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Petitioners also do not
show how the “general standard of efficiency” set by the Secretary has injured any of them or
interfered with their operation. It has not been shown that the Board of Textbooks has
prohibited certain texts to which petitioners are averse and are thereby in danger of losing
substantial privileges or rights.
CASE 3
PHILCONSA VS.VILLAREAL

Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that

Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as
teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2) They
deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency;
and (3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court
Decision: Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a
statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when
the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference, a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited
to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary
of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not
constitute a justiciable controversy

CASE 4
PEREZ VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD

CASE 5
MORELOS VS. DELA ROSA

Facts: 
In a petition for annulment of election with injunction filed in the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Rizal, seeking the annulment of the elections held on January 28, 1968 at Barrio Baclaran,
Parañaque, Rizal for the positions of barrio Captain and Barrio Councilmen, petitioners therein
allege that said elections were null and void ab initio for the following reasons:  (1.) The list of
voters used was null and void because it was made during the illegal registration. (2.) The election
was not conducted, the votes were not counted, and the alleged winners were not proclaimed, by a
duly elected board of election teller. (3.) The election was not determined, fixed and/or sanctioned
by the Baclaran barrio Council as required by law.

Issues: Whether or not the grounds laid down by petitioners for annulment of the election are
justifiable.

Ruling:

The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic, by reason of the expiration of the term of
office of the positions disputed by parties, the instant case has been rendered moot and academic.
Subsequent to the elections in 1968, elections in the Barrio level were held anew in January 1972,
pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 3590, as amended, otherwise known as the revised barrio
charter. Petitioners have lost their standing, and it would serve no useful purpose for the court to
make any pronouncement on the matter

CASE 6
KUYENGKENG VS. CRUZ

FACTS:
Among the 12 nominees for the Board of Medical Examiners, only 6 were shortlisted by the
President, which includes Dr. Pedro Cruz, a government physician. The petitioners, who are
among the nominees cut by the president, prayed for two causes of action. The first, being
that any one of them is qualified for the position and that Dr. Cruz’s appointment be rendered
illegal, thus null and void. While the second, prays for a writ of preliminary injunction,
ceasing, desisting and refraining the respondent from assuming and performing the role of
Board Medical Examiner, and for the respondent to pay for the costs of this suit

ISSUE: Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ have valid causes of action.

Held: No.
The Court Ruled that Respondent has a good and valid right to his title on the grounds that one who
does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
cannot question his title by quo warranto. This suggests that petitioners have no cause of action against
the respondent. While the intervenors have no right to question the title of respondent. Hence, the
petition for quo warranto has no merit.

CASE NO 7
PEOPLE VS. VERA
Facts
Petitioners challenged the provisions of the Probation Act (Act No. 4221) saying that the said
Act is unconstitutional as it is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards.
The challenged provision thereof reads, “This act shall apply ONLY in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.”.
Issue
Whether or not the Probation Act constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Ruling
Yes.
The effectivity of the Act was made to depend upon an act to be done by the provincial
boards, that is, the appropriating of funds for the salary of the probation officer.
But the act does not fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of this discretionary power. What is granted is a roving commission.
LAW INVALID. UNDUE DELEGATION.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

CASE NO. 8
CUSTODIO VS. SENATE PRESIDENT

FACTS:
This case involved a petition for prohibition filed by a taxpayer and employee of the
government against the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Insular Treasurer and Auditor, praying that the Court declare invalid and unconstitutional the
appropriation of 51Cf.Sec. 1, Art. XV, Philippine Constitution.

Issue: WON the petioner”s action is tenable?

HELD:

in the case at bar. petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he
represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most populated political subdivision,
8and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the
Philippines.

Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently
justify petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this
action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary
injunction should have been maintained.

CASE NO. 9
Facts – Araneta Vs Dinglasan
In view of the State of world war in 1941, Commonwealth Act (CA) 671 (Emergency Act) was
enacted by the National Assembly. It authorizes the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency. CA 671 did not expressly fix the term of its
effectiveness. Several executive orders by the authority vested by CA 671.
Issue
Whether CA 671 ceased to have force and effect
Ruling
Yes.
Emergency power must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency. It is clear
from the language of Section 3 of CA 671 that the legislative body intended to limit the
duration of the Act.EOs issued before the adjournment of the regular session of the
Congress in 1946 are valid, but EOs issues after the said date are null and void

CASE 10

RTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B.
HONASAN

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special
elections of 2001 were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held
simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the
documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were
proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining
term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.

Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the
declaration of the 13th elected senator.

Issue:
1Whether or not  Court had jurisdiction.

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were
questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan
was elected and not to determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as
Senator proper under a quo warranto

CASE 11

PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ

Facts: The petitioners assail the validity of RA 3836 and filed this Petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the disbursing officers of
both Houses of Congress from passing in audit the payment to any former member of the Congress of
retirement and vacation gratuities.

Issues:
1. Whether Philconsa has a standing to institute this action.
 2. Whether or not RA 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Philconsa, a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life
whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution, has legal standing to institute the
action as substantial taxpayers in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds. 2. Yes. The
provisions of RA 3836 falls squarely within the prohibition set forth in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution

CASE 12
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

CASE 13
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the referendum-plebiscite; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree numbers
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution as well as PD 1031,
insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite.
Petitioners contend that the President has no power to propose amendments to the new
constitution, a such, the referendum has no legal basis.
Issues
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Ruling
Yes.
In the transitory provision of the 1973 provisions, the National Assembly, although composed
mainly by legislators, amending the Constitution is not legislating.
The prerogative of the President to approve or disapproved applies only to the ordinary case
of legislation. The President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution.
The petitions are dismissed

CASE 14
Lozada vs COMELEC
FACTS: 
Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an
election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their
contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy
arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the
Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the
vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of
a copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is
sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the
aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority
on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

CASE 15
GUASON VS. DE VILLA
FACTS
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong” because Article VIII, Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of
San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts

ISSUE:

W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional
provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

HELD
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is complied
with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject
matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper
legislation.

CASE 16
KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

FACTS: 
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the
gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is
allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the
equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995
ISSUES: 
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved.  LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since
the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The
parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still
apply. 

CASE 17
OSMENA VS. COMELEC

FACTS
Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and
shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section
2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;The same paragraph of Section 3 of
Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be
elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution;

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987
Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said
law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that
there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in the mentioned
constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since
this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. 

Case 18
Telecom and Broadcast Attorneys vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337; G.R. No. 132922; 21 Apr.
1998

Facts:
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines
under a franchise granted by Congress, challenged the validity of section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881
on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to
supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of laws
Ruling:

The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of charge
is not new. Petitioners' argument that it violates due process and equal protection is without
merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. The government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the
broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the radio
and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair
exchange for what the industry

CASE 19
PEOPLE v. MUNAR (1973)

FACTS: 
Accused-appellant Feliza Munar was originally charged with grave slander in the municipal
court of San Fernando, La Union for having uttered defamatory words in calling the offended
party, Erlinda Munar, an unmarried woman and a distant relative, the paramour of somebody

ISSUES:
[1] WON the private prosecutor for the offended party had no legal personality to conduct the
examination of some witnesses and that his participation rendered null and void the
proceedings
[2] WON the crime of grave slander of which accused-appellant was charged comes within
the area of concurrent jurisdiction of Municipal Courts of Provincial Capitals or City Courts
and Courts of First Instance,

HELD:
[1] Accused-appellant hold that private prosecutor for the offended party had no legal
personality to conduct the examination of some witnesses and that his participation rendered
null and void the proceedings is manifestly without merit. Aside from the fact that accused's
objection brought up only in her motion for reconsideration was too late, the objection had no
valid basis since the private prosecutor had withdrawn the reservation to file a separate civil
case and prosecution of the case remained at all times under the control of the government
prosecutors

CASE 20
TIJAM VS. TIBONGHANOY

Facts:
On June 19, 1948 - RA 296, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was passed.July 19, 1948 - Sps Tijam
commenced a civil case in the CFI Cebu against the Sps. Sibonghanoys to recover a debt
worth P1908 , CFI ruled in favor of the Tijams and issued a writ of execution, first against
defendants then against the surety. Surety opposed for lack of demand and sought
affirmative relief by seeking to be relieved of its liability. Writ was denied but was granted
eventually after proper demand.

Issue :
WON the CFI Cebu acquired jurisdiction over the case in light of RA 296.– YES.

HELD
SC held that surety is estopped in raising the jurisdictional issue. the facts of this case show
that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party in 1948, it could have raised the issue of
lack of jurisdiction but for 15 years, it did not and instead, at several stages of the case, it
invoked the jurisdiction of the courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. (Estoppel by laches)

CASE 21
Laurel vs Garcia

Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is
located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as
reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public
dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.

Issues and Held:

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have
failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of
man. It cannot be alienated.

CASE 22

LALICAN v. HON. VERGARA, et al.

FACTS
Lalican was charged with violating Section 68 of PD 705 for possessing without lawful
authority of permit, 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of LUMBER on 2
passenger jeeps with a value of P14,000. Lalican claimed that the law is “vague and
standardless” as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing
forest laws and regulations. Hence, the information should be quashed as it violated his
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE
whether a charge of illegal possession of “lumber” is excluded from the crime of illegal
possession of “timber” as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 to warrant the
quashal of an information charging the former offense or a “nonexistent crime.”

RULING
No, to exclude possession of “lumber” from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly
emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act
which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance
with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. 

CASE 23

Zandueta vs. De la Costa

Facts
Zandueta received a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance with authority to
preside over the CFI of Manila and Palawan. After taking his new oath, Zandueta performed
several acts pertaining to the office. Meanwhile, the CA disapproved his ad interim
appointment. The President then appointed respondent De la Costa as judge of first instance
with authority to preside over the 5th Branch of the CFI of Manila and Palawan, and his
appointment was approved by CA. Zandueta now prays to declare De la Costa to be illegally
occupying the office of judge of the 5th Branch of the CFI of Manila, and himself to be
entitled to continue occupying said office.

Issue:
Is Zandueta entitled to repossess the office occupied by him under his former appointment?
Held:
No. There is incompatibility between his former and latter appointments; consequently, he is
deemed to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment.
The territory over which Zandueta could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his
latter appointment is wider than that over which he could exercise and did exercise
jurisdiction by virtue of his former appointment

CASE 24

De La Llana Vs Alba

Facts
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 which in effect would
cause the abolition of 1,663 judicial positions in the inferior courts terminating the
incumbency of Justices and Judges.
It is argued that the legislation impairs the independence of the Judiciary as protected and
safe guarded by the Now Article VIII, Section II of the Constitution

Issue
Whether or not the “Security of Tenure” Provision of the Constitution disregarded by BO 129
thereby impairing the independence of the Judiciary?
Ruling
No.
The Court ruled that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if
done in good faith suffers no infirmity.
No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved.
The constitutionality of BP 129 not having been shown, the petition is dismissed. No costs

CASE 25

MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL T. FLORES

Facts:

In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to
recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments
which fell due in September 1941. Defendant pleaded prescription 1941 to 1954. The
complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining
Plaintiff’s contention that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period, and that deducting the time during which said laws were in operation.

Issue:
Whether or not the moratorium laws did not have the effect of suspending the period of
limitations, because they were unconstitutional, as declared by this court in Rutter vs.
Esteban, 49 Off.

Held:
In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial SC held that the moratorium laws suspended the period of
prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be stated
however, in fairness to Appellant, that the Montilla decision came down after he had
submitted his brief. And in answer to his main contention, the following portion is quoted from
a resolution of this Court. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at
the time of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the
prevailing circumstances. 

CASE 26
TAN VS.BARRIOS

A decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5
of the accused guilty of murder, sentenced to suffer imprisonment. A sixth accused was found guilty
of both murder and illegal possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
electrocution and 8 of the accused were acquitted. SC promulgated the decision in Olaguer vs.
Military. 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed by prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had been
tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions.

ISSUE

W/N the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy?

HELD
Yes. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-
accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of
the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of
their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission

CASE 27
REPUBLIC VS.HERIDA
FACTS
 
Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder) and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion Perpetua. Accused Jamila) on the other hand) was acquitted for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE
Appellant avers that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him

HELD

The SC agreed with appellant that nowhere in the assailed +judgment is it shown how the
trial court arrived at its conclusion that the /killing of the victim was attended by treachery. -
here was absolutely no showing from the testimony of the witness how the attack indicates
whether the attack/ was so sudden and un expected that it afforded the victim no chance to
defend himself. In the absence of this information) treachery cannot be established from the
circumstances. -treachery cannot be presumed it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence as clearly as the /billing itself.
CASE 28
REPUBLIC vs. CFI MANILA and MAYER STEEL PIPE CORP.

FACTS:
In November 13, 1975, the CFI of Manila issued an injunction enjoining the Collector of
Customs (Collector) from enforcing an order to seize some packages of machinery from the
Private Respondent, Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation. 

The complaint with the CFI alleged the lack of due process in the proceedings leading to the
order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue an injunction over the order of the
Collector.

HELD:
The mandate of the law is very specific.  Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code
provides:

"SEC. 2312. Decision or Action by Collector in Protest And Seizure Cases. — When a
protest in proper form is presented in a case where protest is required, the Collector shall
issue an order for hearing within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the protest and hear the
matter thus presented. Upon the termination of the hearing, the Collector shall render a
decision within thirty (30) days, and if the protest is sustained, in whole or in part, he shall
make the appropriate order, the entry reliquidated if necessary."

CASE 29
BARRAMEDA VS. MOIR

FACTS:
A preliminary injunction was issued by this court to stay the execution of the judgment, and
he now prays that the respondent judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. The
said judge has demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The basis of the demurrer is that Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131,
conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real state, are
inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By Act No. 2041,
section 3, it was provided:

ISSUE:
Whether or not Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 are unconstitutional.

HELD:
Yes. In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster, it was held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
and Courts of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added but to
not diminished by the Philippine Legislature. Therefore, there will be sufficient reason for
declaring the disputed provisions of Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine
Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance where the title to realty is involved. The original jurisdiction of those courts extends
to "all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest
therein".

CASE 30
IN RE CUNANAN
FACTS

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50
per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court

ISSUE

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

HELD

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.