PEOPLE VS.

VERA, 65, PHIL 56

FACTS:

Mario Cu-Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case. He applied for PROBATION under the provisions of ACT # 4221. He
insists that he is innocent of the crime for which he has convicted, and that he has no prior criminal record and the he
would observe good conduct in the future. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office, but the Office
DENIED THE PROBATION. Nevertheless, Judge Vera heard the petition. The City Fiscal obviously opposed the grant of
probation. Among the arguments raised was that Act 4221 (which granted probation) was violative of the
Constitution as an undue delegation of legislative powers to the provincial boards of several provinces. This is because
Act 4221 ENDOWS THE PROVINCIAL BOARDS WITH THE ABSOLUTE POWER TO MAKE SAID LAW EFFECTIVE OR
RESPECTIVE NOT IN PROVINCES, THEIR AND SUBJECT TO THE DIRECTION OF THE PROBATION OFFICE. Act 4221 gives
discretion to provincial boards whether the Probation Law can be made applicable in their area, and subject to
whether they FUNDS have APPROPRIATED FOR THE SALARY OF PROBATION OFFICER.

ISSUE:

Whether there was valid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards, in the matter of implementation of the
Probation Law?

RULING:

SC: LAW INVALID. UNDUE DELEGATION. The Probation Law does not fix nor impose upon the provincial boards, any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a ROVING COMMISSION which
enables them to exercise arbitrary discretion. In reality, the Legislature has left the entire matter to provincial boards
to determine. The legislature has not made the operation of the Law contingent upon any specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any
fact or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is BOUND BY NO RULE, LIMITED BY NO PRINCIPLE OF
EXPEDIENCY. If a province does not want to enforce said law, all it has to do is to simply decline appropriations
needed for the salary of a probation officer. It need not give any reason for refusing or failing to appropriate funds for
the salary of the probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure. This is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.

EMMANUEL PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL, GR No. L-23825, 1965-12-24

Facts:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippin... es,... pursuant to Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders No... creating thirty-three (33)... municipalities...
etitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives... and agents,... from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
 Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present... action is premature and that not all proper
parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the
mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because the latter have...
taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivision intervened in the case.
Hence, since
Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the... areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which
the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is... composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order.
Issues:
President has... power to create a municipality by executive order.
Ruling:
Wherefore the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character.
US VS ANGTANG HO, 43 PHIL 1

FACTS:

The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and
authorizing the Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor xxx”.

Pursuant thereto, the Governoe-General issued Executive Order No. 53 fixing the price at which rice should be
sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 was found
guilty of violation thereof. He contested the validity of said law averring that it constituted invalid delegation of
legislative power.¹

ISSUE:

Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the Governor-General?
Held:

No. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves the legislative branch of the government,
nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the legislature. The Legislature does not undertake to
specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation,
but says that it may be issued “for any cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion
of the Gov-Gen.

The Act also says it may be issued “…whenever… conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise.”

The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to issue and
promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not
specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or
emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.

That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left
it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-Gener to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or
what is not “an extraordinary rise in the price, and as to what is a “temporary rule” or an “emergency measure” for
the carrying out the purposes of the Act.

Tio v Videogram
G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected assailed
the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The Decree promulgated on October 5, 1985, took
effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and in effect amended the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). Petitioner contended among others  that the tax provision of the decree is a rider. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision included

RULING: PD 1987 is constitutional.

  The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.
 The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its
title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the
motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. 
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
TOPIC: Constitutional Law, RA 7716, VAT
FACTS:
PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others,
the law discriminates against the press. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 impairs the obligations of contracts, and
violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of
taxation”.
CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the
present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be
to infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other
businesses have long ago been subject. The VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed purely for revenue purposes.
Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at
the same rate. It is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations
placed in similar situation.

Case Digest: Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)

 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such retirement benefit 

FACTS:  Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was
held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court’s
unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for retirement claim.
House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved amount. Congress Auditor
did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied, hence the petition.  

DECISION:  Dismissed. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay
them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.  

Case Digest: People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000

FACTS:  The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at

the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for
his constituents to be represented. 

ISSUE:  Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general.
DECISION:  Denied. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11,
Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.  
Martinez v Morfe (1972) case digest
G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972
FACTS:
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of
senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and
returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace.
Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention
would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in
connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the
sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime
punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."
Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for falsification of a public document and for violation of the
Revised Election Code.
The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any
criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a
provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal charges.
HELD:
No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the
Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether
defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders
one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities.
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any
transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other
citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.

Osmena vs Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)

Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground
of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from
proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the
President during his privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of
the President’s administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations,
Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.
 ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech and words
of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself as stated
in the provision that “xxx shall not be questioned in any other place”.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the judiciary,
because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything
to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the suspension of the
House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison,
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

SANTIAGO V. COMELEC

FACTS

Miriam Defensor Santiago was criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan for allegedly approving
applications for legalization of the stay of a number of aliens in the Philippines. She was charged in
relation to her position as the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena suspended
Miriam from her position as Senator of the Philippines and from any gov’t position she was holding for 90
days. This is in the form of a preventive suspension pending investigation of the case before the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE
 Was the act of the Sandiganbayan valid?

RULING

YES. RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where
he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. It is also the ministerial duty of
the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before
it. The court reiterated that the preventive suspension is not a penalty since if acquitted, the accused is
reinstated to his previous position plus back wages. The order of suspension under RA 3019 is different
from the power of Congress to discipline its members under the Constitution. The constitutional provision
is a punitive measure imposed by the Senate or HOR upon an erring member. On the other  hand, R.A.
3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan
did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Case Digest: Avelino vs Cuenco

FACTS:  The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session
of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by
his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech.
The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then
walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was
recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the
four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three
senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would
be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at
any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from
the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators
who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the
shadow of a doubt.  
ALEJO MABANAG ET AL. v. JOSE LOPEZ VITO ET AL., GR No. 1123, 1947-03-05
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended
as an ordinance thereto."... that three of the... plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate...
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the
lower House, except to take part in the election of the
Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended.
s a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Issues:
he validity of the above-mentioned resolution is attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
uestion of the jurisdiction of this Court.
he respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the collusiveness on the courts of an enrolled
bill or resolution.
Ruling:
that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory... provision.
(16 C. J. S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers,... If ratification of
an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question.
The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted
that the amendatory process as provided in... section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists
of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one
and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly... political
function performed by the "Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief
Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention... of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is leas reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification.
we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators and representatives who were
ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote Mere members of Congress within the
meaning of section 1 of Article XV of... the Philippine Constitution.

Casco Philippine Chemicals v. Gimenez

FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the
Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner had
bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, raw materials for resin glues,
and was thus paying for the margin fees at that time. Relying on Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary
Board of the said bank declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt
from the said fee, the petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee

HELD:
Urea and formaldehyde are not exempt from fees by law. RA 2609 only exempts urea formaldehyde
and not the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde as they are different, the former being a
finished product. The enrolled bill which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” is conclusive upon the
courts. The courts cannot speculate that there had been an error I printing of the bill as this shall
violate the principle of separation of powers. Shall there have been any error in the printing, the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by a judicial decree.

Case Digest: Bondoc vs Pineda,201 SCRA 792

ISSUE:  Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with election protests in the
HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET? 

FACTS:  On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for Congressman of
the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner having garnered a total of 31,700 votes
compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members,
3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from political parties. A decision was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes,
another recount was insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107 votes
more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as
the winner. Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from
the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and inviting LDP members
to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn. 

DECISION:  Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests in relation to
the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is created as non-partisan court to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and
manipulate the political component for their benefit and interests. The alleged “party disloyalty” of Cong.
Camasura, as a reason for his removal from the party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the
independence of the HRET. Such members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced
in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid
cause of termination.  
Lazatin v Comelec G.R No. 80007, January 25, 1988
Facts: Carmelo Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the Comelec to annul his proclamation
after he had taken oath of office, assumed office, and discharge the duties of Congressman of the 1st district of
Pampanga. The petitioner claims that the HRET and not the Comelec is the sole judge of all election contests . Buan
Jr. and Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition) alleged that the instant petiton has become moot and academic because the
assailed Comelec resolution had already been become final and executory when the SC  issued a TRO. In the
comment of the Solicitor Gen. , he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the
proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the Comelec directing the canvassing board to proclaim the
winner if warranted under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code ,was in effect a grant of authority by the Comelec
to the canvassing board to proclaim the winner. A separate comment was filed by the Comelec, alleging that the
proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin
without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan Jr. and Lazatin against certain
election returns.

Issue: WON the issue should be paced under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

Held: The SC in a resolution dated Nov. 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is
impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner for the Congressional Election in the 1st
district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to
take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the HRET. The alleged
invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the comelec itself) despite alleged
irrigularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protest of the rival candidates, is a matter that
is also addressed concerning the premises, to the sound judgment of the electoral tribunal.
The revocation by the Comelec of Petitioners proclamation is hereby set aside.

Case Digest: Abbas v. SET, 166 SCRA 651

 ISSUE:  Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the
tribunal 

FACTS:  On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the exemption of
Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and
resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. 

DECISION:  Dismissed 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and
affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather,
just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.  
DAZA VS SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496
 FACTS:

Rep. Daza represents the Liberal Party (LP) in the Commission on Appointments (CA). When Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, the political realignment resulted in the swelling
of the number of LDP members to 159 and diminishing of that of LP to 17. The House consequently
revised its representation in the CA giving Daza’s seat to Singson as additional member from the
LDP. Daza now comes to this Court to challenge his removal, arguing that the LDP is not the
permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered.
However, when LDP was subsequently registered, he then contended that it must still pass the test
of time to prove its permanence.

ISSUE:

Is the replacement of Daza in the CA in accordance with the proportional representation of parties
contemplated in Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution?

RULING:

Yes. Under Daza’s theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House would
still not be entitled to representation in the CA as long as it was organized only recently and has not
yet “aged.” LP itself would fall in such a category. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be
represented in the CA xxx by virtue of its status as the majority party xxx. At that time it was only 4
months old. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among
the members of LDP, but these are to be expected in any political organization and it surely cannot
be considered temporary because of such discord. We resolve in favor of the authority of the House
of Reps to change its representation in the CA to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire
in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent
and do not include the temporary alliances.

GUINGUNA VS GONZALES, 214, SCRA 786

Facts:

In the 1992 elections, the Senate was composed of 15 members from LDP, five from NPC, three from
the LAKAS-NUCD and one from the LP-PDPLABAN. In accordance with the rule of proportional
representation in electing members to the Commission on Appointments (CA), LDP was entitled to 7.5
seats, NPC to 2.5 seats, LAKAS-NUCD to 1.5 seats and LPPDP-LABAN 0.5 seat. In the approved
composition of the CA, eight were from LDP and one from LP-PDP-LABAN. Sen. Guingona now files
this petition to prohibit Sen. Pres. Gonzales, as ex officio Chairman of the CA, from recognizing the
membership of the 8th representative from LDP and the lone member of the LP-PDP-LABAN on the
ground that it was violative of the rule of proportional representation.
Issue:

Was the constitutional rule on proportional representation in the CA violated when LDP rounded up
its membership by ½ a seat?

Held:

Yes. In converting the fractional ½ membership into a whole, one other party’s fractional membership
is made greater while the other suffers diminution of its rightful membership. The provision of Sec 18
[of Art VI] on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion
to the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. No party can claim
more than what it is entitled. Furthermore, the Constitution does not contemplate that the CA must
necessarily include 12 senators and 12 members of the House of Reps to function. Although CA rules
by a majority vote of all its members (Art VI, sec 18), evidently in Art VI, sec 19 all that is required for
the CA to function is that there be a quorum. Election of the respondent Senators as members of the
CA, null and void.

SARMIENTO VS MISON, 156, SCRA 549

FACTS: 

In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments. Herein
petitioners, both of whom happened to be lawyers and professors of constitutional law, filed the
instant petition for prohibition on the ground that the aforementioned appointment violated
Section 16, Art. VII of the1987 Constitution. Petitioners argued that the appointment of a bureau
head should be subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments. 

HELD: 

No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the President is well
within her authority to appoint bureau heads without submitting such nominations before the
Commission on Appointments. In its ruling, the SC traced the history of the confirmatory powers of
the Commission on Appointments (which is part of the legislative department) vis-a-vis the
appointment powers of the President. 

Arnault Vs Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29

 A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Arnault to relieve him from his confinement in the New
Bilibid Prison

Arnault was cited for contempt by the Senate. It is because of persistently refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave a sum of money in connection to the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates deal the Senate was investigating.

The Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates. The entire amount allocated to buy said estates was given to a certain Burt,
through his representative petitioner Arnault. 

He was ordered imprisoned and claims to be released as Congress is no longer in session.

Issue

1. Whether or not contempt of court and its sanction is dependent on the Congress’ session.
2. Whether Arnault can be relieved from answering the query by merely declaring that to do so is self-
incriminating?
3. Ruling

No.

1. The Senate is a continuing body and therefore the incarceration should continue despite the
election of the Lower House.

2. No. Since according to Arnault himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, there is no basis upon which
to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

Petition is denied with cost to petitioner

Case Digest: Senate v. Ermita GR 169777

ISSUE:  Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional? 
FACTS:  In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation. The Committee of the
Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election
fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate
Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided
by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress 

DECISION:  Partly Granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by
the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing
that obligation in a particular case.  
Case Digest: Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers 549 SCRA 77 and
564 SCRA 152)

FACTS:  The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the
Senate cited him for contempt. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege 
 DECISION:  Granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The Supreme Court found the Senate to have gravely abused its discretion in
citing the petitioner for contempt for his refusal to answer questions propounded to him in the course of
legislative inquiry.   The Court declared that “there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the
issuance of contempt order suffers from constitutional infirmity.” Executive privilege: 2 kinds:
presidential communications (between president and executive official) and deliberative process
(between executive officials only)  

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, 136781, October 6, 2000

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of
38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives
as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.

On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling
up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives,
as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent
congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.

ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a
policy to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order
to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them.

It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the
system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”

Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

DELA CRUZ VS PARAS, 123 SCRA 569

FACTS: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord.
No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred
that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go
out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due
hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they
were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited,
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with
the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by
Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
Gonzales v. Macaraig (G.R. No. 87636)
FACTS: 

President Corazon Aquino vetoed Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the
GAA for the fiscal year 1990. The reason cited by President Aquino was that both of these sections
restrict or prevent the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the heads of the
constitutional commisions and the Chief Justice of the SC from restoring or increasing items of
appropriation recommended by the President, which recommendations have already been reduced
or disapproved by Congress through the assailed GAAs. In effect, these sections nullify the statutory
and constitutional authority of the aforesaid officials to augment any item in the GAA for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriation. 
ISSUE:

Whether or not the presidential veto on Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the
GAA for the fiscal year 1990 is constitutional.

HELD: 

Yes, the presidential veto on Section 55 of GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA
for the fiscal year 1990 is constitutional. These sections were vetoed because they violate Section
5(5) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which grants the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House, the heads of the Constitutional Commissions, and the CJ of the SC the
authority to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
 savings in other items of their appropriations.

TOBIAS VS ABALOS, 239 SCRA 106

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
only one legislative district.  A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they
approved of the said conversion.  The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion.  Nevertheless,
18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:

For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct
from the subject of its conversion.  Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has
been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.  The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the
number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment.  
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which
drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

AQUINO VS COMELEC, G.R NO. 189793

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquino was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac for over 50 years. He, in fact, indicated in his
Certificate of Candidacy for the 1992 congressional elections that he was a resident of thereof for 52
years immediately preceding that election. His birth certificate also places Concepcion, Tarlac as the
birthplace of both his parents.

For the 1995 elections, Aquino ran for the Congress representing the new 2nd district of Makati City. He
stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he has resided “in the constituency where” he sought “to be
elected” for only “10 months.” He in fact has just transferred to a leased condominium in Makati from his
residence in Tarlac. Private respondents filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground that he lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman mandated in Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution.
The following day, Aquino amended his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating he has been a resident in
said place for 1 year and 13 days. Meanwhile, elections were held and he garnered the highest number
of votes. However, COMELEC, acting on the private respondents’ petition, suspended his proclamation
permanently. Hence this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did Aquino satisfy the constitutional residence requirement in the 2nd district of Makati City as
mandated by Art VI, Sec 6?

RULING:

No. The essence of representation is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district. Clearly, Aquino’s domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac,
and the same is not easily lost. That coupled with the fact that Aquino himself claims to have other
residences in Metro Mla. and that he claims to be resident of the condominium unit in Makati for only a
short length of time “indicate that” his “sole purpose in transferring his physical residence” is not to
acquire a new residence of domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd
 district of Makati City.” The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of
domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification— sentimental, actual or otherwise
—with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement [of the
condominium unit in Makati (instead of buying one)] was effected all belie his claim of residency for the
period required by the Constitution.

Case Digest: Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566

ISSUE:  Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati 

FACTS:  Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting
grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents 

DECISION:  Partly Granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which
govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role
must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.  

Araneta Vs Dinglasan Case Digest

In view of the State of world war in 1941, Commonwealth Act (CA) 671 (Emergency Act) was enacted
by the National Assembly. It authorizes the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet
such emergency. CA 671 did not expressly fix the term of its effectiveness. Several executive orders
by the authority vested by CA 671.
Issue

Whether CA 671 ceased to have force and effect

Ruling

Yes.

Emergency power must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency. It is clear from the
language of Section 3 of CA 671 that the legislative body intended to limit the duration of the Act.

EOs issued before the adjournment of the regular session of the Congress in 1946 are valid, but EOs
issues after the said date are null and void.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896
and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as
both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII
other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of
justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.

Ratio:

In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

Sarmiento v. Mison
Sarmiento v. Mison
156 SCRA 548
FACTS:
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then
President Corazon Aquino. Petitioners questioned the appointment of Mison as it appears that Mison’s
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento
insists that under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of COA. Sarmiento
also seeks to enjoin Guillermo Carague, then Secretary of the Department of Budget from disbursing
salary payments for Mison.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed the confirmation given by the
Commission on Appointments

HELD:
The 1987 Constitution framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing
confirmation by COA. There are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
groups are: 1) heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2) all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3) those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; and 4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone. The first group are the only public officers appointed by the president which
requires the confirmation of COA. The position of Mison does not belong to the first group, hence, his
appointment need not be confirmed by the COA.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA, G.R. No. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006

FACTS:

President Arroyo issued EO 420 directing a unified ID system among the various government agencies
and GOCCs for the purpose of having a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and
others assailed this EO for being a “usurpation of legislative powers by the president” and it infringes the
citizens’ right to privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not

EO 420 on Unified  ID System among government agencies infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

(Executive Order 420 of April 13, 2005 was issued for the adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification
(ID) system for the government)
RULING:

No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID
cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens
that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy, and in the collection and
recording of personal identification data.

Moreover, EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID
cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government
entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws.
 Mondano v. Silvosa

L-7708, 30 May 1955

FACTS:
The petitioner, Jose Mondano, is the duly elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality of Mainit,
Surigao. On 27 February 1954, Consolacion Vda. De Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of rape and concubinage which was
subsequently indorsed by the Assistant Executive Secretary to the respondent, Fernando Silvosa,
Governor of Surigao for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On April 10,1954,
petitioner appeared, upon summon, before the respondent with the Provincial Board. On the same day,
the respondent issued Administrative Order No.8 suspending the petitioner from office, and thereafter,
the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges against him.

ISSUE:
Whether the indorsement of the complaint, by the Assistant Executive Secretary, to the respondent is
legal.

HELD:
Yes because the heads of various executive departments are agents of the President who,
constitutionally, have general supervision over local governments, as may be provided by law.
“Supervision, in administrative law, means overseeing or the power or authority of an official to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties…” The respondent Governor, upon the indorsement of the
Assistant Executive Secretary, is only acting as an agent of the President in investigating the petitioner.
L-7708, 30 May 1955

David v. Arroyo

David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the
seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General
Order No. 5 implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government,
in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling
upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature,
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”. To
be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees
are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military
to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the military under
PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Olaguer etal. v. Military Commission, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-
of-Staff of the AFP created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal case
against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further action on their
case for the tribunal should be considered null and void. Respondents invoked that the creation of
Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case – Aquino v. Military Commission
No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners contend that such ruling must be
overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be abandoned and/or modified in so
far as the case at bar is concerned?

HELD: Yes.

REASONING: First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the case is
still pending, military tibunals, which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void
already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting views of some justices
in Aquino v. MilComm, stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner placed on tiral for civil offenses
under general law are entited o trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process…
xxx..Judicial power exist only in courts’. 1Moreover, the Court emphasized that “Reverence for
precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand
otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified
accordingly. after all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be right.’

Barrioquintos et al vs Fernandez, 82 Phil 642

Facts:
Petitioner Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder.  Barrioquinto
had not yet been arrested.  The case proceeded against Jimenez and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Before the period of perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez availed of Proclamation No. 8.  However, the
Amnesty Commission had their cases returned to the CFI-Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they
are entitled to the benefit s of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that neither Barrioquinto
alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of
amnesty.

Issue:
WON petitioners are precluded from availing the benefits of Amnesty as they have not admitted to the
commission of the crime.

Held:
No.  Respondents fail to differentiate between amnesty and pardon.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of 1946, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957)

ISSUE:  Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. 

FACTS:  Lao Ichong, representing himself and other resident-aliens who are engagedin the retail
industry in the Philippines petitioned the Supreme Court to declare RA1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business) as unconstitutional. One of the provisions of the Act was the prohibition of persons,
not Filipino citizens, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations not wholly-owned by
citizens of the Philippines from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Petitioners said that
the act denies them the equal protection of laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process. 

DECISION:  Yes, a law may supersed a treaty or a generally accepted principle. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally
accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that
the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”  

Gaudencio Vera vs. People Case Digest,7 SCRA 152

Facts: 

Vera and 96 others were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder before CFI of
Quezon. They invoked the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of the President; thus, the case
was referred to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission which tried the case. During the hearing, none
of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime. Vera was the only one who took the witness
stand and denied having killed Lozanes. The Commission said it could not take cognizance of the
case because the benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting commission of the crime, plead that the said crime was committed in pursuance of the
resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese
occupation. The Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.

The CA affirmed the decision of the Commission. Vera appealed to the SC, contending that to be
entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation it is not necessary for them to admit the
commission of the crime charged, citing the case of Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, etc.

Issue:

Should persons invoking the benefit of amnesty first admit having committed the crime of which they
were accused?

Held:

Yes. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which,
according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when
an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.
Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the
accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a
plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him
but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would being the crime
charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez and the other cases cited by petitioner were superseded and deemed
overruled by the subsequent cases of People v. Llanita, et al. (L-2082, April 26, 1950, 86 Phil. 219) and
People v. Guillermo, et al. (L-2188, May 18, 1950, 86 Phil. 395).  

Soliven vs. Makasiar

GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988 [167 SCRA 394]

FACTS:

The case at bar is a petition raised by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an interpretation of
the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest.

The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant
for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause. So

Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally" convinced him that the judge is solely
responsible to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when the warrant of arrest was issued. S

HELD:

No.

The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the respondent judge. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Case Digest: Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission

FACTS:  Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010.    PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts
if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.    Petitioners
asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions; 

DECISION:  No 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing

funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of
the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.  

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIERMERLIN ANONUEVO,

MINDA GALANG .et.al. vs. THE HON. PERFECTOLAGUIO JRG.R. No. 95445 August 6,
1991NARVASA, J.:

FACTS:A "mass action" was undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the
petitioning associations to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
The petition alleges in great detail the character and origins of those grievances as perceived by the
petitioners, and the attempts to negotiate their correction.

ISSUES:Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes?
RULING:Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to
strike, although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law.Public school teachers have the right to
peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT during class hours, for then this would be a strike,
which is illegal for them.
Case Digest: Ambil v Comelec, 143398

ISSUE:  Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions of the
COMELEC. 

FACTS:  On 04 Jun 1998, respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the
COMELEC challenging the result of the 11 May 1998 elections where petitioner Ruperto
Ambil, Jr. was proclaimed the duly-elected governor of Eastern Samar. On 24 Feb 2000,
Commissioner Japal Guidani retired from the service prior to the finalization of his proposed
resolution in the Ramirez protest. In said resolution, Commissioner Julio Desamito had
dissented while Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco did not indicate her vote. 

DECISION:  Yes 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  Article IX-A, Section 7 provides that any decision, order or ruling of each
commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court interpreted the provision to mean final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, not a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.  
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 | September 3, 1991

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in
the law office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the World Bank Group
(1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or economic
consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member
of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation
and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case
of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law
requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As such, the petition
is dismissed.

National Housing Corporation vs. Benjamin Juco and the National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. L-64313
January 17, 1985
 Topic Query: Are employees of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations covered by the Labor
Code or the Civil Service Commission?

Facts

Benjamin Juco was a project engineer for the National Housing Corporation when he was implicated in a
case of theft and/or malversation of public funds. Subsequently, he was terminated by NHC. He filed a
case for illegal dismissal against the NHC before the DOLE, contending that the criminal charges
imputed against him are merely a fabrication made to harass him, as he has previously stood as witness
in the theft case filed against certain officials of NHC.  The NLRC certified the complaint for arbitration.
However, NHC contended that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case, considering that the
former is a government-owned and controlled corporation. The NLRC however countered that the (then
1973) constitution contemplates only those GOCCs that are created by special charters, which is not the
case for NHC.

Issue(s)

Who has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling

Civil Service law governs all matters pertaining to employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations, regardless of whether it was created by special charter or otherwise. Indeed, the inclusion
of GOCCs within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate intent and effort to plug an earlier
loophole which allowed certain government instrumentalities to avoid the all-encompassing coverage of
the civil service system. Simultaneously, this has also prevented crafty government employees from
calling to their defense the more workforce-friendly provisions of the Labor Code. With the creation of
the Civil Service Commission, all government offices, without exemption, fall within its purview.

PEDRO G. PERALTA v. AUDITOR GENERAL ISMAEL MATHAY, GR No. L-26608, 1971-03-31

Facts:
set forth in the brief of petitioner, the GSIS, on May 17, 1966, in a resolution duly passed, granted him
an optional retirement gratuity of P40,336.07.  Of that amount, he was not able to collect the sum of
P7,032.26, covering P3,982.26 as cost of living allowance, P1,275.00 as incentive bonus, and
P1,775.00 as Christmas bonus.  Such items were not passed in audit, the view of respondent Auditor
General being that they should be deducted from his gratuity,... although during petitioner's
incumbency as Trustee, no question was raised when he was paid such allowance and bonuses. 
Respondent Auditor General justified his action on the ground that they "partake of the nature of
additional compensation," a trustee's... remuneration being fixed by law in the form of a per diem of
P25.00 for every board meeting of the GSIS attended.  Respondent so ruled on June 28, 1966, and
maintained such a stand on September 1, 1966 when he denied a motion for... reconsideration. 
Hence this appeal for review filed on September 29, 1966.
 Issues:
whether or not the cost of living allowance as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses paid to
petitioner Pedro G. Peralta, a Trustee of the
Government Service Insurance System, hereinafter called the GSIS, did fall within such a ban.
Ruling:
This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public trust.  It is
expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind the... demands of
public welfare.  He is there to render public service.  He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the
performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration.
The... intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome.  The temptation to further
personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of wealth, is to be resisted.  That at
least is the ideal.  There is... then to be an awareness on the part of an officer or employee of the
government that he is to receive only such compensation as may be fixed by law.  With such a
realization, he is expected not to avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the...
remuneration attached to his position.  It is an entirely different matter if the legislative body would
itself determine for reasons satisfactory to it that he should receive something more.  If it were to be
thus though, there must be a law... to that effect.  So the Constitution decrees.

GANZON VS CA,200 SCRA 271

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds
of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him
hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the Court of
Appeals and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local
officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend
and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
“supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

MMDA. v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. No. 135962

M.M.D.A. v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 135962

FACTS: Petitioner is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village which is sought to be opened to public vehicular traffic by
petitioner pursuant to an order issued by the latter.

ISSUES:
(1) WON petitioner has the power and mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers.

(2) WON the passage of an ordinance is a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the
opening of subdivision roads to public traffic.

HELD:
(1) The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Hence, it does not have the power to issue such order to herein respondent.

(2) Yes. The MMDA, having no police power, let alone legislative power, is not empowered to pass an
ordinance opening private roads to public traffic. Hence, an ordinance to such effect, duly
promulgated by an LGU, is a requisite.
Case Digest: Brillantes  v Yorac
  
FACTS:  The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of
the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes
challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the
independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific
provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their
independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should
therefore be sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the
functions of the COMELEC. 

ISSUE:  W/N the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the
absence of the regular Chairman. 

DECISION:  No 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as

“independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of
their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and
rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The
choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion.
That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the
Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The
situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves
without the participation of the President.  
Alunan v. Mirasol
GR. No. 122250 | July 21, 1997

FACTS:
The Local Government Code of 1991 provided for a Sangguiniang Kabataan in every barangay
to be composed of a chairman, 7 members, a secretary, and a treasurer. The COMELEC
provided guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992,
 which also placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of DILG, with the
technical assistance of COMELEC.

On September 18, 1992, the DILG issued a letter-resolution stating that the LGC intended
to exemptig certain barangay chapters from the forthcoming SK elections. Private respondents
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that petitioner Secretary of Interior and
Local Government had no power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general
elections for SKs.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and
supervision over the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can “exempt” a local
government unit from holding elections for SK officers.

 HELD:
The COMELEC placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG.
Contrary to respondents’ contention, this did not contravene Art. IX, C, §2(1) of the
Constitution. The elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in
the same way that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC. The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in
line with the legislative policy evident in several statutes.  Thus, in creating Kabataang
Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, the Secretary of Local Government and
Community Development shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed
necessary to effectively implement the provisions of the Decree.

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