Tolentino v.

Secretary of Finance
Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision
dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there
are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of
the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory
taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support
of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand,
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies
transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule
that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a
progressive system of taxation”.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to
adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present
Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT
would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law
granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without
offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State
does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing
the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which
other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really
matter that the law does not discriminate against the press because “even
nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a
license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the
press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The
VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or
subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though
such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person
and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class
and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the
Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in
its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts
such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and
medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property
which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary
services, etc., which are essential goods and services was already exempt under
Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716.
Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these
transactions while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is
contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that
“The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of taxation
mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the
statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in
similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition
of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that
Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” The constitutional provision
has been interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as
much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.” The mandate to Congress is not
to prescribe, but to evolve, a
As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying
that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is
contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation:
charitable institutions, churches, and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-
stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no
constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld

Tax Case Digest: ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita GR No

168056
By PactaSuntServanda - July 08, 2014

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056                                       September 1, 2005

Facts:

ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). 

Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;

Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and

Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;
These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:

Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. ( SECTION 24.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.)

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was
acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
and excise and franchise taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of
legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes
of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind
of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule,
the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN - CASE DIGEST -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN                    G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.

On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions

3. it abolishes the element of  mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the
offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.

Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness
and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:

WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

HELD:

NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information
itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence
violative of his fundamental right to due process.

Tondo Medical Center Employees Association vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local health system. It was formed in order to
provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals, secure funding for priority public programs, promote
the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance, strengthen the capacities of
health regulatory agencies and expand the National Health Insurance program. However, the petitioners
alleged that the implementation of the HSRA had resulted in making free medicine and medical services
inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. They alleged that the HSRA is void for being in
violation of several constitutional provisions (e.g. Art III Sec 1, Art II Sec 5, Art II Sec, 9, etc.)
EO 102 was the order to redirect the functions and operations of the Department of health which provided
for the changes in the roles functions and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed order,
DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific
health services and technical assistance, as a result of being the devolution of basic services to local
government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in excess of the Presidential Authority.
Issue:

Whether or Not the HSRA and EO no. 102 are unconstitutional

Ruling:
No, HSRA and EO 102 are not unconstitutional. The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on
petitioners’ allegations that it violates the general principles. The argument that the EO 102 is in excess of
the presidential authority due is without basis. Records are devoid of any explanation of how HSRA
violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in the Sec 1 Art III of Consti.
Petitioners failed to substantiate how the constitutional guarantees were breached and petitioners are
unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition.

With the EO 102, the constitution clearly states that the president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. Furthermore, DOH is among the cabinet level departments enumerated
under the Book IV of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work
of the president.

Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. No.

72873 (1987)
 upxateneo Uncategorized September 22, 20182 Minutes

Topic. Characteristics of construction: Necessary when legislative intent cannot be ascertained

Case. Appeal of lower court decision dismissing redemption claim

Facts. Five siblings equally inherited pro indiviso* land from their deceased parents. Sibling 1 sold his share to
Alonzos. Sibling 2 also sold his share to Alonzos a year after. Alonzos built a house and a fence in their bought land.
Sibling 3 lived in inherited land, which was next to the Alonzo’s house. Sibling 2 lived there with her. Sibling
3 is friends with Alonzos in that their children went to school together. 13 years after, Sibling 4 filed for redemption
but revoked because he is American citizen. Year after, Sibling 3 filed complaint for redemption.

Trial court dismissed complaint saying that 30-day period for filing after notice of sale had lapsed. Art. 1623 of the
Civil Code which states that “the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor/s.” Since 13 years has passed, the court presumes that at
some point, the siblings have been informed and that the prescription has passed. Though no written notice was
served to the siblings, court held complainants had actual knowledge given that they are neighbors.

Issue. Did the lower court interpret and apply the relevant law correctly? -Yes
Ratio. Yes, the lower court was correct in its application of the law because the facts prove the likelihood of the
notice happening at one point.The relevant law is Art. 1623 of the Civil Code which states that “the right of legal
pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor/s.” (1) One of the issues here is whether notice was given the complainants. Even if we grant that
there was no written notice, it is impossible to deem there being no notice at all. They live next to each other. (2)
When did the notice begin? The Court does not know but it assumes that it had begun and elapsed in the 13 years.

Regarding the prescription of the right of redemption, the law specifically states that it should be 30 days after
notice. Given the 13 years, the court assumes that the prescription has as well lapsed.

Case Brief: Javier v COMELEC

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 JEFF REY

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81  September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F.
PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the
bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner
were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments
were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the
private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on
Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were
dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division
of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission
on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend
the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the
same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal,
which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique.
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said decision on the basis
that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was
gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang
Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being
dead and the respondent missing.
2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
winner in the election?
Held:
1. No.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their
separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there
are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in
the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone
wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must
also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer
possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

2. No.
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases
may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date
of their submission for decision.