CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Tolentino Vs. Secretary of Finance (1997)

FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in
all, have been filed by the several petitioners.

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support of the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the
obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes
should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax
exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT
would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be declared
unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take
back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not
forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to
the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the
law does not discriminate against the press because “even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The
VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is
imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties
purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the
press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation may affect particular contracts,
as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and
release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the
obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no exemption
on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc.,
which are essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of
R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while subjecting those of
petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides
that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless,
equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this
requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar
situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive.
What it simply provides is that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” The constitutional provision has been
interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.”
The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.

As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are
exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation:
charitable institutions, churches, and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by
reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven persons, believed to be
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG)where the petitioner was one of the heads. Then, in a media expose, it was said that what
happened was a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues that Republic Act (R.A.)
8249, that was enacted during his case was pending,has a retroactive effect and is plan from the facts and was
made to suit the petitioner’s case, thus, making it an ex-post facto law that would affect the right of the
accused to procedural due process. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statute R.A. 8249 may be considered as an ex post facto law that may affect the
petitioner’s right to due process?
HELD:
No.
REASONING: There is nothing ex-post facto in R.A. 8249 – an ex post facto law generally provides for a
retroactive effect on penal laws. However, the Court explains, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court
defines, ‘Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
thereof; or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment’. Republic Act
8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character, thus, may not be considered an ex
post facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive effect and
may affect his right to due process is wrong.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Gonzales v. Macaraig (G.R. No. 87636)

November 19, 1990 | 191 SCRA 133
Neptali Gonzales, et al., petitioners v. Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., et al., respondents
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino vetoed Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the
GAA for the fiscal year 1990. The reason cited by President Aquino was that both of these sections restrict or
prevent the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the heads of the constitutional
commisions and the Chief Justice of the SC from restoring or increasing items of appropriation recommended
by the President, which recommendations have already been reduced or disapproved by Congress through
the assailed GAAs. In effect, these sections nullify the statutory and constitutional authority of the aforesaid
officials to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
appropriation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential veto on Section 55 of the GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the
GAA for the fiscal year 1990 is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, the presidential veto on Section 55 of GAA for the fiscal year 1989 and Section 16 of the GAA for
the fiscal year 1990 is constitutional. These sections were vetoed because they violate Section 5(5) of Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution, which grants the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions, and the CJ of the SC the authority to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations.
This constitutional mandate, also known as the power of augmentation, finds statutory basis in
Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any appropriation in
the Executive Department.
Congress had the power to override the veto on both sections by having a 2/3 vote of approval by
members of each House, but Congress did not choose to do so. At the same time, Section 55 of GAA 1989 and
Section 16 of GAA 1990 should not be construed as having repealed PD 1177, mainly because implied repeals
are frowned upon.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Philconsa Vs. Enriquez, GR No 113105, April 19, 1994

Facts:
The General Appropriations Act appropriated Php 86.3 billion for debt services. Congress added a
special provision which provided that the amount appropriated shall be used for payment of the national debt
only and not to be paid to the liabilities of the Central Bank. The appropriation for DPWH also provided that
the maximum amount to be contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges should not exceed
30% the appropriation for medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines required approval Congress for
the release of funds.
In the General Appropriations Act of 1994 the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
contains a provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the appropriation to augment the pension
and gratuity fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The President vetoed the authorization given by the
Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension and gratuity fund. Several Senators questioned the
validity of the veto.
Issue: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Congress cannot include in the general appropriations matters that
should be enacted in a separate legislation and if it does so, the inappropriate provision must be treated as an
item and can be vetoed by the President.
The provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension and gratuity
fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section 29 (paragraph 1) of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Only
the President is authorized to augment items from savings in the general appropriation to the executive
branch. Also pursuant to Section 29 – no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

a) Araullo Vs. Aquino III, GR nNo 209287 February 3, 2015

FACTS:
Section 24 and 26(2), Article VI, 1987 When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and
said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as
noted by the Supreme Court).
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP realignments or transfers are unconstitutional?
DECISION: Yes. The Court held that for the transfer of appropriated funds to be valid
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Such transfer must be made upon the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) there is a law
authorizing the president, the Senate President, the Speaker of the HOR, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer such funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds
to be transferred are savings, generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) the
purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices.
That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs should
expressly authorize such transfers. Whereas the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize
transfers of funds under the DAP, such transfers were unconstitutional. DAP also failed to comply with the
second requisite since the DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there
is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, discontinued, or abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition
of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis for the transfers, further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. However, under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
from certain projects in the middle of the year and subsequently being declared as savings by the Executive
through the DBM.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR,
et al, Respondents
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the
2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order
be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from
releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere
of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to
mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL
FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE
PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE
MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE
TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members,
ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION, ANATALIA
BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO, NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO
KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO
REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of
Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR.
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of the
Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and
legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic
Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with
a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP,
the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to
individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of
Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an
executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is,
in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must
be considered nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on
mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and
2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged
unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete,
real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the
sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is
established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the
Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

II.

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption
of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation,
there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate
[a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it
but also of the executive which approved it.”

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge
the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which
may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects
submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the
power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of
the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress
receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of
legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the
Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
_______________
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Abra vs Hernando (1981)

Facts:

The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief. A
summary judgment was made granting the exemption without hearing the side of the Province of Abra.

Issue: Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-exempt.

Held:

The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of religious property from
taxes as tehy should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious purposes.
Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is
compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of
jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the
province rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from taxation is not
favored and is never presumed, so that if granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. There
must be proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious (or
charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation.

The case was remanded to the lower court for a trial on merits.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)

Posted: July 25, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of
Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real
estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal
Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes
thereon.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned
decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used
by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively for educational
purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari
with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

HELD:

Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ
Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to
and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot
for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of
the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination
be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the
property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.

The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be
returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for
commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the
director).
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND MANUEL D. ANDAL, Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,Respondents .

FACTS:

PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),

a government-sequestered organization in which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.
For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
regularly received cash dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered its first loss.

In view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of the Thirteenth
Congress of the Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry, in
aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors.

Respondents Senate Committees submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to
examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the
respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees over POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests
in the said corporations. In sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and transfer of
the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office
(PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT.

Petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with which the respondent
Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No. 312.

ISSUE: Whether or not Committee Resolution No. 312 should be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and
having been hastily approved by the respondent Senate?

HELD: Committee Report No. 312 is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: senate's power of inquiry

The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section
21 of the Constitution, as follows:

"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected."

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case
the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional
mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day
that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative
inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.

DISMISSED
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged
anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres.
Aquino.

2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation
was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants
in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention.
The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation

NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related
to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.

2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire into the same
justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already
earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the
inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal.

4. Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action ‘including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the
right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle
of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the
Constitution.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

July 18, 1950 | 87 Phil. 29

Jean L. Arnault, petitioner
Leon Nazareno in his capacity as Seargant-at-Arms of the Philippine Senate and Eustaqio Balagtas in his capacity as Director of
Prisons, respondents

FACTS:

In October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista
and Tambobong for P4.5M and P0.5M respectively, or for an aggregate amount of P5M. Of this sum, P1.5M was paid to Ernest H.
Burt, a nonresident American, supposedly as payment for his interest in the two aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arnaut, Burt's
representative in the Philippines, collected the sum of P1.5M in the form of checks. From this amount, he encashed P400,000, which
he eventually gave to an undisclosed person as per Burt's instructions.

It turned out, however, that these transactions were dubious in nature. For one, both estates were already owned by the Philippine
Government, so there was no need to repurchase them for P5M. Second, Burt's interest in both estates amounted to only P20,000,
which he wasn't even entitled to because of his failure to pay off his previous loans.

A Senate investigation was thereafter held to determine how the Philippine Government was duped and who ultimately benefited
from the assailed transaction. One of the issues pursued was to whom did Arnault give the cash amounting to P400,000. Arnault's
refusal to provide the name of the person, initially because he couldn't remember it and later for fear of self-incrimination, led to his
being cited for contempt. He was thereafter held in prison, and was to be freed only after saying the name of the person he gave the
P400,000 to.

Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for habeas corpus in an apparent bid to be freed from imprisonment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt.
2. Whether or not the Senate can impose punishment beyond the legislative session.
3. Whether or not Arnault can invoke the right against self-incrimination as an excuse in not answering the question he is being
asked in the Senate.

HELD:

Before delving into the issues at hand, the Court laid down some general principles of law:

The Philippine Constitution is patterned after the US Constitution. But despite similarities in the basic structure of government, one
essential difference is that the Philippine legislative department is more powerful than its US counterpart, in the sense that the
latter shares power with the congresses of individual states.
The power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function of the
Philippine congress. Although there are no express provisions in the constitution that invest either the House or the Senate with the
power to conduct investigations and exact testimony, such power is implied.

1. Yes, the Court ruled that such power is necessary, especially in the conduct of inquiries that fall within the Senate's jurisdiction
(see [b] above). With this in mind, it is not a requirement that each and every single question asked of witnesses necessarily be
material to the case. This is so because the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the
action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction
of such information elicited from a single question.

2. In the instant case, the resolution holding Arnault for contempt was issued on May 15, 1950. He was subsequently detained for
13 days, or beyond the legislative session of Congress, which session ended on May 18 of the same year. Arnault claimed that his
continued detention had no legal basis, since the body that issued the resolution had already been dissolved by law. But the Court
ruled that the Senate is a continuing body and does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. As such, there
is no time limit to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may be constitutionally exerted.
3. No, the Court held that Arnault's invocation of the right against self-incrimination has no basis. Arnault failed in discharging his
duty of providing frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority -- a violation of the State's right to exact
fulfillment of a citizen's obligation. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or
uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter.

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED.

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

a) Senate Vs. Ermita

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M.
FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader,
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, “COMPANERA” PIA S.
CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA “LOI” EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS,
Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169777 | April 20, 2006 | 488 SCRA 1 | En Banc Decision | Justice Carpio-Morales
Constitutional Law
Executive privilege may only be invoked by the President. The President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise
such power.

While it is discretionary for executive officials to show up during question hour, it is mandatory for them to show up
during inquiries in aid of legislation.

FACTS:
This case is about the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to
appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President
Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all heads
of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the
executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent.
Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the
investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

RULING:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the
Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited
to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. When
Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the
department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department heads during
question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:

The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to
others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one official may be exempted from this power — the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever
an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to
Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested
information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the
matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under
E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is
covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is
merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with
an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to
respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to
compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are however
valid.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines G.R.No. 163556 June 8, 2004

FACTS:
Ruy Elias Lopez, Representative of the 3 rd Legislative District of Davao City, filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus to ask the Court to declare unconstitutional the Canvassing Rules, which was approved by the Senate and
the House of Representatives in a joint session. Lopez argued that the power and authority to open all certificates of
canvass of votes for Presidential and VicePresidential Candidates are solely and exclusively vested by the Constitution
upon the Senate President. While, the power and authority to determine the authenticity and due execution of all
certificates of canvass and to canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely and
exclusively vested by the Constitution upon the Congress as one whole body. He alleged that the Canvassing Rules are
unconstitutional because: ○ It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress; ○ It
constitutes an amendment of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution; ○ It deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a
Member of Congress; and ○ By the passage of the Canvassing Rules, Congress has neglected to perform an act which the
Constitution specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office. The OSG, the Senate and the House of Representatives
similarly argued that the adoption of the Canvassing Rules is beyond the scope of judicial inquiry as it is an internal
matter of Congress. They also argued that there has been no invalid delegation to the Joint Committee of the duties of
Congress.

ISSUES and RULING: 1) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Yes, the SC has jurisdiction over the
subject matter because the petition contains sufficient allegations claiming violations of the Constitution. However,
the SC dismissed the petition on the ground that it failed to show that Congress gravely abused its discretion in
creating the Joint Committee.

2)Whether the Canvassing Rules is unconstitutional. No, Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution expressly empowers
Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

3) Whether the creation of the Joint Committee constituted an invalid delegation of the constitutional duties of
Congress. No, the decisions and final report of the Joint Committee are still subject to the approval of the joint session
of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.

Separate Opinions: 1) The Court has jurisdiction over the issue raised based on Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, which provides
that judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. It falls within the judicial power to determine
for itself whether the legality and the limits of the exercise of a power have been observed and respected. The Court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter because the issue raised by Lopez calls for the proper interpretation of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

2) The authority of Congress to adopt its own rules of procedure is a right that has been recognized to apply regardless of whether
Congress is exercising its legislative power or its other duties, such as in this case when it acts as the National Board of Canvassers.
Congress remains the body exercising its canvassing duties and delegating preliminary determinations to expedite proceedings.
Where the rules of Congress have thus been passed within the limits of constitutional and legal boundaries, everything else remains
internal and procedural. The Canvassing Rules did not violate Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. The Constitution grants Congress
the power to promulgate its own rules for the canvassing of election certificates. The Rules enjoy the presumption of legality and
Lopez has miserably failed to overcome such presumption.

3)The creation of the Joint Committee did not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. As a canvassing board, Congress
exercises no legislative power and therefore did not delegate any.

The principle of potestas delegate non delegari potest (a delegated power cannot again be delegated) does not apply in this case
insofar as no other branch of government has been tasked with the duties of Congress as a National Board of Canvassers. There has
been no delegation or abdication of any Constitutional authority, even within Congress itself. Since the Canvassing Rules subjects
the acts of the Joint Committee to the affirmation of Congress, the Committee’s report is preliminary and recommendatory in
nature. The Rules leaves to both Houses, as an entire body, the final act of determining the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass, and the proclamation of the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect. There is no deprivation of the
rights and prerogatives of the Members of Congress. The fact that the findings of the Committee are subject to a final act of
Congress, then, by casting his vote and declaring his approval or disapproval of the final report, Lopez exercises his prerogatives as a
Member of Congress.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

PIMENTEL v. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004 EN BANC

FACTS

Nature of Action: Petition for Prohibition Petitioner:

1. Sen. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint
Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and VicePresidential candidates in the May 10, 2004
elections following the ajournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004.
2. He prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist
from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
3. With the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress, all its pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon its expiration (citing Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution).

Respondent: 1. The precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the
move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee.

ISSUE

Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President upon its ajournment sine die is null and void.

HELD Supreme Court:

The instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

1. The Petition has no basis under the Constitution.
2. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the ajournment sine
die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution does not
pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions.
3. The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final
ajournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such
as being the National Board of Canvassers.
4. The joint public session cannot ajourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated task.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading (G.R. No. L-14279)

FACTS:

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to
EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and
Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring
that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals
and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD:

No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of
the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly
referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where
ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether
denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult
of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive
agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would
seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in
character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain
classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They
cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal
matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement
of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.