Angara v.

Electoral Commission
G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936

FACTS:
Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among
other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified. Petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. Petitioner, in seeking for the issuance of the writ prayed for, contends that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National
Assembly.
HELD:
No. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by
the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Aids to Construction

Ebarle v. Sucaldito,
G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987

FACTS:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks
injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-
71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Principally, the
petitioner relies on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of
Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," preliminary to their
criminal recourses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The
very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal
"offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred
to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these
existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. It is moreover
significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or
otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as
"accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in
construing the intent of the measure.

People v. Purisima
G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978

FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the Philippines charging the respective accused with
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the
three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of
the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “illegal
possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9.

HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be
alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is
determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the
quashing of the accusation is in order.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit
of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this
has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the preamble or, “whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales

G.R. No. 83736. January 15, 1992

FACTS:
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of
P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters,
however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year
ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of
P6,156,525.00. On July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for
refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on the ground that "granting, without admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner is already
barred from claiming the same considering that more than two years had already elapsed between the payment and the filing of
the claim in Court.

ISSUE:
Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 or the National Internal
Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date the filing of the Final
Adjustment Return?

HELD:
Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return
and final payment of income tax. The Court states that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to
the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the
law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the
Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and
absurdity.
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment Return
required in Section 87, is equivalent to the tax paid during the first quarter. A literal application of Section 292 would thus pose
no problem as the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was paid can be easily
determined. However, if the quarter in which the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section
292 would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.

The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of filing
the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay
additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.

People v. Subido
G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975.

FACTS:
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that although he
could not pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the
amount of fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment did not expressly and specifically
provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond
and asked the lower court to require accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The lower court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion and declared in
accordance with the terms of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the accused-appellant has to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.

HELD:
No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to
impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be noted that the lower court chose to impose
upon the accused: three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the sum of
P10,000.00; subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals in the exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the
indemnity of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.

A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is
separated by a comma from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor with the accessory
penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in
the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma in the part of the sentence is to make "the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil
liability.

It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in
favor of the accused. In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny, and to construe it with
such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be made applicable to him. Thus applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot also be required to serve his civil liability to the offended party in form of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no longer required by the aforesaid article.