MODULE 1 LEGISLATIVE POWER

LEGISLATIVE POWER IN GENERAL, WHERE LODGED

David vs Arroyo

Legislative power is the power to make, alter and repeal laws. It is vested in Congress by the 1987
Constitution. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Sanidad vs Comelec

The Supreme Court held that the governmental powers are generally concentrated to the President in
times of crisis. The separation of powers, in abnormal times, may form an insurmountable barrier to a
decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence.

The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is conceded valid at Sec. 3, Par. 1
and 2 of the transitory provisions. With no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be
paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery with the interim National Assembly not convened
and only the President and the Supreme Court in operation, urges absolute necessity upon the President
to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the constitution.

BICAMERALISM

Chavez vs JBC

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission
had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. regardless of it
being a unicameral or a bicameral body thus closing any room for further interpretation.

Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Republic Act No. 7716 is not unconstitutional as Article VI section 24 of the 1987 Constitution provided
that “the senate may propose or concur with amendments.” The Senate HB No. 1630 was made the
latter a mere amendment of the former. Also, Article VI section 26 also provided that “Except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.”
Senate concurred that said HB No. 1630 was deemed urgent by the President.

1|MMdoc tors i xto

EXTENT OF AND LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER

In re: Cunanan

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law.

Ang NARS Party List vs Executive Secretary

According to the Supreme Court, under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Before a Bill
becomes a law, it must pass three readings on separate days unless the President certifies that its
enactment is urgent as specified in Art VI Sec 26 of the Constitution. The purpose for which three
readings on separate days are required is to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on
and to give the members of Congress notice that a measure progressing through the legislative powers
allowing them to prepare their positions for that matter.

Under both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, there is no difference between a bill
and a joint resolution. In the Unites States Constitution, every Order, Resolution or Vote which
concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be presented to the President before
it can take effect. However, this instance cannot be applied in our jurisdiction for there is no counter
part provision in our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution insofar as “Order, Resolution or Vote” is
concerned. All our Constitutions, including the present 1987, have only provided “Bill”.

Belgica vs Ochoa

the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa –
is lodged in Congress.

Abakada Guro Party-list vs Purisima

Section 12, RA 9335 creating a joint Congressional Oversight Committee to implement rules and
regulations of the law is unconstitutional. The Congress can only exercise its oversight power through
legislative veto. Participating in an Oversight Committee would mean that the Congress participates in
the implementation which is the breach of the separation of powers between legislative and executive
branch.

No. The rest of the RA 9335 remains valid. The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the
legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may
continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid section.

2|MMdoc tors i xto

Doctrine of Separation of Powers - “ to justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of
the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had
supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent."

Datu Michael Abas Kida vs Senate

It would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind
the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing,
exercising as they do the same plenary powers. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts assed
by itself or its predecessors.

The passage of RA No. 10153 does not require a supermajority vote and plebiscite. The court held that
Section 1 and 3 is unconstitutional for giving RA 9054 the character of an irrepealable law and for
excessively enlarging the plebiscite requirement found in the Constitution.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business." In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business
and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve
acts. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage
of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had
passed. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It would be noxious anathema
to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative
body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same
plenary powers.

The passage of RA No. 10153 did not violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The requirement that bills passed by the House or the
Senate must pass through three reading on separate days to become laws are subject to the exception
when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. In the present case, the
records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections.

3|MMdoc tors i xto

MODULE 2 STATUTES AND THEIR ENACTMENT

TITLE OF BILLS

Lidasan vs COMELEC

RA 4790 is deemed unconstitutional. It projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the
Province of Lanao del Sur," makes the title. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged
purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-
one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also
dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory
is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur;
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are
the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

Giron vs COMELEC

It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of
a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this
strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear,
unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. The Court
finds that the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a compelling reason
that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election
Act.

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of
the legislators and the public.

4|MMdoc tors i xto

FORMALITIES

Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in
Sec.26(2), Art.VI of the Constitution qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
1) the bill has passed three readings on separate days; and 2) it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.

Philippine Judges Association (PHILJA) vs Prado

While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely new provision.
The court also added that said the bill in question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification by the Senate President and Speaker of the House
of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by the President. Under the doctrine of
separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore
declined to look into the petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify
that the measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government.

Presumption of the Constitutionality of Statutes - as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the
attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

APPROVAL OF BILLS

Bolinao Electronics vs Valencia

Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the
same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or
items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20)

ABAKADA Guro Partylist vs Purisima

There are two steps required for a bill to become a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress after three readings. In the first reading, the bill is introduced by any member of the Congress
and involves mainly the reading of the number and title of the bill as well as its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker of the House to the proper committee for study. Second reading, which is the
most important stage, consists of reading the bill in its entirety where it will be debated on, criticized
and amended if needed. In this stage, the bill is printed in its final form and copies must be disseminated

5|MMdoc tors i xto

at least three days before the last reading. The last stage is where the members vote for or against the
bill. After the last reading, the bill must be sent to the other chamber where it shall also undergo the
same procedure. If there are differences between the versions from the two chambers, they must
create a conference committee to draft a compromise measure. Once approved by both chambers, it
shall be passed on to the President or approval, which is the second and final step. Once the bill is
approved by the President, it takes effect after 15 days upon its publication. Without the presentment
of the bill to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law as stated in Section 27,
paragraph 1, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. This is because the Constitution treats law-making as a
joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Therefore, assuming that legislative veto is a valid
legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment to the President
even if approved by both chambers of Congress.

EVIDENCE OF ENACTMENT OF LAWS

Enrilled Bill Theory

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito

The enrolled bill doctrine pertains to the rule that, in the case of Acts of the Philippine Legislature, when
there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. (based on Section 313
of the old Code of Civil Procedure)

(Note: this means that courts are not to look behind the enrolled copy of the legislative bill and examine
the pertinent journals of the legislative proceedings to determine if the bill was indeed passed in
compliance with the Constitution and legislative rules)

It has been declared that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to
a coequal and independent department of the government. (citing American Jurisprudence)

The rule is also one of convenience, because , otherwise, courts could not rely on the published session
laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any
printed bills and amendments which might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. (citing
American Jurisprudence)

Section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides two methods of
proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the legislature, by a
copy signed by the presiding Officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were the
documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in
existence or was placed before the Court.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the
issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as

6|MMdoc tors i xto

already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section
313 of Act No. 190 as amended. More importantly, the court did not say that if a discrepancy existed, it
would give greater weight to the journals.

Arroyo vs De Venecia

The court found no ground holding that grave abuse of discretion was committed. What was alleged to
have been violated are merely internal rules of House procedures rather than constitutional
requirements for law enactment. In the case at bar, the claim was not there was no quorum but only
that the petitioner was prevented from questioning the forum.

In addition, the signing of HB No. 7198 is conclusive of its due enactment under the enrolled bill
doctrine. When there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court must respect its certification.

Finally, due enactment of the law is confirmed by the Journal of the House of Nov. 21, 1996 as required
by Article VI Sec. 16 (4) of the Constitution. Legislative Journals of Proceedings are conclusive with
respect to matters that are required by the Constitution as well as to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine – bills passed by Congress, authenticated by the Speaker of the House and Senate
President, certified by the secretaries of both Houses and signed by the President imports absolute
verity and considered binding on the courts. The procedural method observed during its enactment
cannot be challenged by judicial powers unless “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” is established (Sec. 1 Article VIII 1987 Constitution).

Journal Entry Rule

Astorga vs Villegas

The Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by
the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved
bill. The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has
passed Congress. The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered
approved after it has passed both Houses. It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly
on "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department
"to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also
been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity
of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of

7|MMdoc tors i xto

Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law.

8|MMdoc tors i xto

MODULE 3 CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

CONSTITUION, DEFINITION, AND CHARACTERISTICS

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has
been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION

Gold Creek Mining Corp vs Rodriguez

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adapting it.

The Supreme Court held that the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public
domain when the provisions of Art XII of the 1935 Constitution became effective. Hence, it does not
come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources. The location of the mining claim
under consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
commonwealth was inaugurated. The Court construed and applied McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia,
“The moment the locator discovers a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located and perfected his
location in accordance with law, segregates such location from public domain even against the
Government”.

AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secertary

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office and employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when EXPRESSLY
authorized by the Constitution itself.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or

9|MMdoc tors i xto

assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

Luz Farms vs Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

Upon looking at the transcripts of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. The committee adopted the
definition of “agricultural land” as defined under Sec 166 of RA 3844, as land devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land. It was also
explained in the statement of Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:

“Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay
Commissioner Regalado na hindi naming inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito
and piggery, poultry, at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama
ang piggery, poultry, at livestock workers” (Record CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol II, p. 621)

It is evident that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government.

Aids to Construction – Aid to Construction are those found in the printed page of the statute itself, know
as intrinsic aids, and those facts and circumstances outside the printed page are called extrinsic aids

Legislative History –It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that where a statue is susceptible of
several interpretations or where there is ambiguity in its language, there is no better means of
ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the
statute. If the statute is based on, or is a revision of, a prior statute, the latter’s practical application and
judicial construction, the various amendments it underwent, and the contemporary events at the time
of its enactment form part of its legislative history.

Legislative Debates, views and deliberations – Courts may resort to the legislative deliberations in the
legislature on a bill which eventually was enacted into law to ascertain the meaning of its provisions.
Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning which was put to the
provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted.

However the views expressed by the legislators during the deliberation of a bill as to the bill’s purpose,
meaning, or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law.

The opinions expressed by legislators in the course of debates concerning the application of existing
laws are not also given decisive weight, especially where the legislator was not a member of the
assembly that enacted said laws.

10 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
Reports of Commissions – In the codification of laws, commissions are usually formed to compile and
collate all laws on particular subject and to prepare the draft of the proposed code.

TANADA VS CUENCO

CONFLICT BETWEEN SPIRIT AND LETTER OF A STATUTE.—As a general rule of statutory construction, the
spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of a
statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the
letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute, but, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

DOCTRINE OF CONTEMPORANEOUS OR PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION; WHEN APPLICABLE.— As a general

rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or
practical construction has any application. Where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a
contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight and will not be
allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning. The reason is that the application of the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of
constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions, and that, except as to matters
committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or
practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts even in a oubtful case. Hence if in the
judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative
by any paramount consideration of public policy, it may be rejected.

Galman vs Pamaran

Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be
avoided. So much so that if two or more constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to,
then that one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for
this purpose to disregard the more usual and apparent import of the language used.

To save the statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it must be given a reasonable construction
that will bring it within the fundamental law. Apparent conflict between two clauses should be
harmonized.

ORDINARY SENSE VS TECHNICAL SENSE

Ordillo vs Comelec

(Ordinary Sense)

In construing words and phrases, the general rule is that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. For words are
presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptance.

11 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
The grammatical and ordinary reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. (Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus)

Statutory Definition:

(Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute)

In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt that interpretation that accords best with the
manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its object. It is generally recognized that if a
statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one onstruction, the literal meaning of the word or
phrase used therein may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning will be to defeat the purpose
which the legislature had in mind. The word or provision should not be given a meaning that will restrict
or defeat, but should instead be construed to effectuate, what has been intended in an enacting law.

Kirvenko vs Register of Deeds

The term "Public agricultural lands" includes residential lands, Constitutional construction and legislative
construction. “Public agricultural land” has both a broad and a particular meaning. Agricultural lands
(including residential lands) may only be owned by Filipinos; Land ownership is preserved for the Filipino
people; Subsequent legislative acts confirm that all agricultural lands (which include residential lands)
are restricted to Filipinos.

The purpose of Sec 1, Article 13 of the 1935 Constitution is to establish a permanent and fundamental
policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the nation. Although it mentions
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in determining whether a parcel of land is
agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation
for agricultural purposes. Hence, “public agricultural land” was construed as referring to those lands that
were not timber or mineral. Therefore, including residential lands.

SELF-EXECUTING VS NON-SELF-EXECUTING

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Pamatong vs COMELEC

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered
not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain

12 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-
executory.

MANDATORY VS DIRECTORY

Mandatory Statute is a statute which contains word of command or prohibition to which a person has
no choice but to obey

Directory Statute is a statute which operates to confer discretion upon a person, namely to act
according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment of
others.

Tanada vs Cuenco

As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter
thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the
letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the
statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on
the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

The Supreme Court held that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that
the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3)
members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in
the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in
the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a
person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its
representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such
nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the
election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

Gonzales vs COMELEC

There is nothing in the Constitution or in the history thereof that would negate the contest of different
Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in different
sessions or different days of the same congressional session. No plausible reason has been advanced to
justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.

The Congress has the authority of Congress to choose either alternative (general or special election) as
implied in the term "election" used, without qualification based on Article XV of the Constitution.

13 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
PROSPECTIVE VS RETROACTIVE

Filoteo vs Sandiganbayan

While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed
here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the
Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of
individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal
laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed
against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. A penal law denotes
punishment imposed and enforced by state for a crime against the law. As such, the law cannot apply
retroactively in this case.

Co vs Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives

To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in
an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive

A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born
of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected,
he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid
which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions.

14 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
MODULE 4 EFFECTIVITY OF STATUTES

WHEN THE CONSTITUTION BECOMES EFFECTIVE

De Leon vs Esguerra

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have [been] superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no
longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by
petitioners.

WHEN STATUTE BECOMES EFFECTIVE

Article 2 Civil Code

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.

The ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera case rests on the general principle that before the public is bound by the
provision of the law, they must be punished and the people officially and especially the informed
hereof, which is a requirement of due process of law that cannot be dispensed with by the legislature

Administrative Code Book I, Chapter 5, Section 18

When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise
provided

The same provisions are cited in the Article 2 of the New Civil Code where it was clarified by the courts
that the phrase “unless otherwise provided” pertains to the fifteen-day period after publication as to
when the law shall take effect and not on the manner or platform where it must be published.
Therefore, if the law did not specifically state when it shall ake effect, then the fifteen-day period after
publication shall be applied.

Administrative Code, Book I, Chapter 6, Sections 24 – 25

SECTION 24. Contents.—There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application;
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of
similar rank, as may be deemed by the said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and such documents
or classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have general application
or which he may authorize so to be published. The publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.

15 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
SECTION 25. Editing and Publications.—The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Office of the President
and published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and distributed by the
National Printing Office which shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of postage.

Tanada vs Tuvera

The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not
to the requirement of publication.

Philippine Veterans Bank vs Vega

Under the rule, laws take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to
provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval.
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2,
1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date. Assuming for the sake of argument that
publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February
24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as
erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

WHEN STATUTE BECOMES EFFECTIVE (NADOBLE LOL)

Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 2 – 9S9

SECTION 2

Definitions.—As used in this Book:

(1) “Agency” includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National
Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or
privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government
corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and
officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law.

(2) “Rule” means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes
and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The
term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an
agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.

16 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
(3) “Rate” means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including
individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage,
kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and
followed by any person.

(4) “Rule making” means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

(5) “Contested case” means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or
privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined
after hearing.

(6) “Person” includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization
of any character other than an agency.

(7) “Party” includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled
as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes.

(8) “Decision” means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character,
whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate
fixing and granting of rights and privileges.

(9) “Adjudication” means an agency process for the formulation of a final order.

(10) “License” includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance,
approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or
regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege.

(11) “Licensing” includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension,
annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license.

(12) “Sanction” includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the
liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking,

17 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution,
compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other
compulsory or restrictive action.

(13) “Relief” includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege,
exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or
exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person.

(14) “Agency proceeding” means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and
licensing.

(15) “Agency action” includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its
equivalent or denial thereof.

SECTION 3. Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of
this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection.

SECTION 4. Effectivity.—In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to
persons who may be affected by them.

SECTION 5. Publication and Recording.—The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:

18 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
(1) Publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter;
and

(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a
complete index and appropriate tables.

SECTION 6. Omission of Some Rules.—(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from
the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or
otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency
which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the
omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.

(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law is punishable as a crime
or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.

SECTION 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules.—The University of the Philippines Law Center
shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or
supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The
bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies
as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or
distribution costs.

SECTION 8. Judicial Notice.—The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly
filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.

SECTION 9. Public Participation.—(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity
to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

19 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
Tanada vs Tuvera

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. The people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.

Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds

Failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and publication under the Revised Administrative
Code invalidates an agency’s regulation.

Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an importer of wheat,
it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the ertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of
the Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of the CMO.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Michael J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other and, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.

WHEN LOCAL ORDINANCE TAKES EFFECT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTIONS 54-59

SEC. 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or
municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall
affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned
may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby
making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.cralaw

(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within
fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality;
otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.cralaw

20 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
(c) ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its
members, be signed by the punong barangay.cralaw

SEC. 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan on the ground that it
is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.cralaw

(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development
plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating
liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed
item or items shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein
provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year
corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted.cralaw

(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may
override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members,
thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive
concerned.cralaw

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved
ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.cralaw

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang
panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the
sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision.cralaw

(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power
conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in

21 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has
taken.cralaw

(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission
of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore
valid.cralaw

SEC. 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan. - (a)
Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay
ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether
the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances.cralaw

(b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on
barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed
approved.cralaw

(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay
ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the
sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the
effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is
effected.cralaw

SEC. 58. Enforcement of Disapproved ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any ordinance
or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the
disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee
concerned.cralaw

SEC. 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the
resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take
effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of
the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2)
other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.cralaw

(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in
the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at

22 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after
approval thereof.

The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the
language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned,
and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the
dates of approval and posting.cralaw

(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any
newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.cralaw

(d) In the case of highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted
or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general
circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be
published in any newspaper of general circulation.

23 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
Municipality of Paranque vs VM Realty Corporation

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, it possesses a general and
permanent character while a resolution is temporary in nature.

The power of eminent domain by LGU’s may be affected only by ordinance and not by a mere
resolution. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain.

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the LGU’s to exercise the power of eminent domain to pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec 9, Article III of the Constitution and
other pertment.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was not complied with by the local
chief executive. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, it possesses
a general and permanent character while a resolution is temporary in nature.

Bagatsing vs Ramirez

The common rule is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The
fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special law is to be
considered as remaining an exception of the general law. However, the rule yields to a situation where
the special statute refers to a general subject and where the general statute refers to a particular
subject.

24 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
MANNER OF COMPUTING TIME

Article 13 Civil Code

“When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days of twenty- four hours; and nights from sunset
to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.”

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE Book 1, Chapter 8, Section 31

Legal Periods.—”Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; “month” of thirty days, unless
it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days
the specific month contains; “day,” to a day of twenty-four hours; and “night,” from unset to sunrise.

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, BOOK I, CHAPTER 7, SECTION 28

Pretermission of Holiday. – Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by
law falls on a regular holiday or special day, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.

National Marketing Corp. vs Tecson

TAKE NOTE OF THE DATE OF THIS CASE, 1969

A year is counted as 365 days

Art. 13 of the Civil Code nullified Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code which stated that
"month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." With the approval of the Civil Code of the
Philippines a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month and
added the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days."

Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) vs Primetown Property Group, Inc.

Being the more recent law, the Court held that Sec. 31 Chapter VIII of 1987 Administrative Code
impliedly repealed Art. 13 of the Civil Code as the provisions are irreconcilable. Hence, the two-year
period shall be understood to be 24 calendar months; a calendar month being a month designated in
the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. In the case at bar, the two-year
prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998)
started on April 15, 1998 of the 1st calendar month and ended on April 14, 2000 of the 24th calendar

25 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
month. The Court ruled that the respondent’s petition was filed on the last day of the prescriptive
period, therefore upholding its validity.

Philippine National Bank PNB vs Court of Appeals CA

Weeks — was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days

for the purpose of counting the first week of publication as to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969
because this will have the effect of extending the first week by another day. The publication effected on
April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for the second week because the period
for the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week
should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11,
1969 was both theoretically and physically accomplished during the first day of the third week and
cannot thus be equated with compliance in law.

Yapdiangco vs Buencamino

Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in two months. Article 13 of the Civil
Code provides that when the law speaks of months, it shall be understood that months are of thirty days
each.

The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term
of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS UNTIL REPEALED

Temporary Statutes

Temporary statutes are statutes whose duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the statute itself
or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event; no repealing statute is needed.

Co Kim Chan vs Valdez Tan Keh

In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of a de facto government are valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under
its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance
and control of said government remain good. All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of
political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory
had come again into power of true and original sovereign.

26 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o
William F. Peralta vs Director of Prisons

Unless a statute is by its provisions for a limited period only, it continues in force until changed or
repealed by the legislature. Law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative
power. It is not changed by change of sovereignty nor of a change in constitution, until the new
sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Anastacio Laurel vs Eriberto Misa

Sovereignty was not suspended because it is not transferred to the occupant. It must be emphasized
that sovereignty remains vested in the legitimate government, as distinguished from the exercise of the
rights inherent thereto. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

Belligerent Occupant cannot repeal or suspend operation of law of treason - Since the preservation of
the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen, or subject to his government or
sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from
adhering to the enemy by giving he latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of
the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason.

27 | M M d o c t o r s i x t o