Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G.

4282
Facts:

Petitioner Kuroda is the commanding general of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines
during the Japanese Occupation. He was charged due to cruelty against non combatant civilians and
prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which established the National
War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided
in the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional

RULING: YES, EO No. 68 is constitutional. This order was enacted by the President and was in
accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of our constitution which renounces war as an instrument of
national policy. It is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law
including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons both military or
civilian guilty of plan, preparing waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws
and customs of war.

Agustin v. Edu, [G.R. No. L-49112, February 2, 1979]

Facts:

An LOI prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized safety warning device was assailed for
lack of legislative enactment that would authorize the issuance of said LOI. Pe

Issue:
W/N a legislative intent is necessary in order to authorize the issuance of LOI based on the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road signs and Signals and the United Nations.

Ruling:
Agustin v. Edu, [G.R. No. L-49112, February 2, 1979]
FACTS:
A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized early
warning devices to prevent vehicular accidents was assailed for the lack of a legislative
enactment that would authorize the issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two whereas
clauses of the assailed LOI: [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have
been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas],
the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No.
207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices.
ISSUE: Whether or not a legislative enactment is necessary in order to authorize the issuance
of said LOI based on the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.).
HELD:
No. The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court is that the petition must be dismissed. The
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization; the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under PD 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation
of road safety signs and devises. It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle
found in the Constitution possesses relevance: ‘The Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.’ The 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate
a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of pacta sunt servanda stands in
the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of tons of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Meanwhile, Petitioner Gonzales - a rice planter, and president
of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association filed this petition, averring that, in making or
attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are, acting
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because RA No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or
amends RA No. 2207 - explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.”
Respondents contended that the Government of the Philippines entered into 2 contracts for the
purchase of rice – with Vietnam and Burma, that both of these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; that these are binding upon signing of the representative
parties thereto, that in case of conflict with the statute and treaty, under American jurisprudence,
the one which is the latest in point of time should be favored.
They also said that the contracts have been consummated (Philippines already paid the price)

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents, in attempting to import foreign rice, are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

RULING: Yes. The respondents acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements.
But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements,
the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements
being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of law by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the
one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar for
respondents not only admit but also insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties.
Our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law but also when it runs counter to an act of Congress-- Municipal law against
international law on the basis of separation of powers
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778
Facts: Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the
morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao,
purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in
houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in
two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were
being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had
no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban,
Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They
prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them
to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their
consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was
no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
Issue: Whether or not the deportation order issued by Lukban was valid.

Ruling: The court held, No. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting
the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing
his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence.
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to
the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived
of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban and the other officials must be severely punished.
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 221697,221698-700, 8 March 2016]
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro. Parental care and custody over the
petitioner was passed on to his relatives. When the petitioner was 5 years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) filed a petition
for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan City. Susan Roces
 discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
Poe’s new name as well as the name of her adoptive parents. Roces then submitted an
affidavit and in 2006 a Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was
released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo. She then got married to Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S. Desirous of being with her
husband, the couple flew back to the U.S.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003. Petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.". On 9
December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States”. Effective October 2010. Five years later, petitioner filed
her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. Petitioner's filing of her COC for
President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases. They argued that
petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that
she was a foundling and claimed that International law does not confer natural born
status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections.
1.W/N Grace Poe is a natural born citizen of the Philippines

2.W/N Grace Poe-LLamanzares satisfies the 10 year residency requirement

1. Yes, the Supreme Court considers Grace Poe-Llamanzares to be a natural born
Filipino citizen, satisfying one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for Presidency. Petitioner’s physical features highly resemble that of a
Filipino and she was abandoned and found in a municipality with an overwhelmingly
Filipino population, it would be reasonable to assume based on the evidence that her
parents are Filipinos. By votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class,
natural born citizens.

2.Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements in acquiring a new domicile. Her domicile
had been changed as of May 24, 2005 and not on July 18, 2006 when her application
under RA 9225 was approved. Grace Poe presented satisfactory evidence of her actual
stay and intent to permanently abandon her domicile in the US. Additionally with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, her intent for permanent residency is
evident.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282
FACTS: Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial
Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before
the Military Commission due to the cruelty that were done against non combatant
civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which
established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the
said EO arguing that the same is not provided in the Constitution. He further
underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any
criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international. Petitioner
argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because
the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It
cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions
form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional

RULING: YES, EO No. 68 is constitutional. This order was enacted by the President and
was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of our constitution which renounces war as an
instrument of national policy. It is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention and other
international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all
persons both military or civilian guilty of plan, preparing waging a war of aggression
and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war
Agustin v. Edu, [G.R. No. L-49112, February 2, 1979]
FACTS:
A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) prescribing the use of triangular reflectorized
early warning devices to prevent vehicular accidents was assailed for the lack of a
legislative enactment that would authorize the issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted
two whereas clauses of the assailed LOI: [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified
by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.
ISSUE: Whether or not a legislative enactment is necessary in order to authorize the
issuance of said LOI based on the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
and the United Nations Organization (U.N.).
HELD:
No. The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court is that the petition must be
dismissed. The hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization; the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devises. It
 cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
possesses relevance: ‘The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.’ The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of pacta sunt
servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.
Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of tons of foreign
rice to be purchased from private sources. Meanwhile, Petitioner Gonzales - a rice
planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association filed this
petition, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice,
the aforementioned respondents "are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction", because RA No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207 -
explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.”
Respondents contended that the Government of the Philippines entered into 2 contracts
for the purchase of rice – with Vietnam and Burma, that both of these contracts
constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that these are binding
upon signing of the representative parties thereto, that in case of conflict with the
statute and treaty, under American jurisprudence, the one which is the latest in point of
time should be favored.
They also said that the contracts have been consummated (Philippines already paid the
price)

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents, in attempting to import foreign rice, are acting
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

RULING: Yes. The respondents acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive
agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of
the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case
at bar for respondents not only admit but also insist that the contracts adverted to are
not treaties.
 Our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts
with the fundamental law but also when it runs counter to an act of Congress--
Municipal law against international law on the basis of separation of powers
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115
FACTS: Petitioner, Lao Ichong, who is engaged in the retail industry in the Philippines
filed a petition to declare RA 1180 “AN ACT TO REGULATE THE RETAIL BUSINESS” as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner argues that RA 1180 denies alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law the subject of
the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title the Act violates international and
treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those
requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in
the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines?
RULING: Under the doctrine of incorporation, it is to be applied whenever courts are
confronted with situations where there’s a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. If the 2 laws couldn't
be harmonized to give effect to them both, the municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts.
In this case, RA 1180 cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement. In other words, the Retail Trade National Law was passed in
the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the medium
of a treaty or a contract.
People v. Lagman & de Sosa, 66 Phil. 13
FACTS: The two appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa were charged
with the violation of Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 also known as the National
Defense Law. It is alleged that the appellants refused to register in the military service
notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so and that they possess all
the qualifications – being Filipinos and having reached the age of 20. The appellants do
not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the
military service because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight
years old to support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed. Both of them averred that the National Defense
Law is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the National Defense Law, which establishes a
compulsory military service, is constitutional. The National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. The right
of the government to require compulsory military service is the consequence of its duty
to defend the State and is reciprocal to its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizens. Having dependent families to support does not excuse them from
compliance with the law since they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty
and obtain proper pecuniary allowance for their family responsibilities.
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative
of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the Thirty- third
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. In spite of
the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent
to the United States the designs of the postage for printing
ISSUE: Is there a violation of the principle of separation of church and state?
HELD:
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
stamps in question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to
the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular
sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in
question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church
or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to
that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5,
1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in
issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people". It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed,
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of
the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows:
"Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat
of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question
may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious
in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination
to mere incidental results not contemplated.

There is no violation of the principle of separation of church and state. The issuance
and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be separably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church,
was not the aim and purpose of the government (to promote tourism).
Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510
FACTS: The Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted Resolution No. 5 which
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a
waiting shed. Funds for the project were obtained through the selling of tickets and
cash donations. Resolution No. 6 was subsequently issued specifying that the Hermano
Mayor will be the caretaker of the image for a year. However, the image was temporarily
placed in the altar of the Catholic Church. After the fiesta, Parish Priest Fr. Sergio
Osmeña refused to return custody of the image to the barangay council arguing that it
was a property of the church and he uttered defamatory words against Barangay
Captain Manuel Veloso. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Fr. Osmeña a
charge for grave oral defamation.

ISSUE: W/N RESOLUTION NOS. 5 AND 6 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish
any religion nor abridge neither religious liberty nor appropriate public money for the
benefit of any sect, church or sectarian institution. The image was purchased with the
use of public funds such as funds from solicitations and cash donations and not with
tax money. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. The
barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have
custody thereof. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the
wooden image in order to avoid any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic Church.
The barrio fiesta is also a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition
in rural communities.
Estrada v. Escritor [A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006]
FACTS: Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not her
husband, having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that
Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.2 Consequently, respondent was charged with committing
"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the
Revised Administrative Code.
 Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago
when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that
she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and
has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991, a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness."

ISSUE: Whether respondent was to be held administratively liable for committing

"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the
Revised Administrative Code

RULING: No, the respondent Escritor cannot be held administratively liable given her
defense in exercising her freedom of religion or their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs and congregation. The SC ruled that it cannot or
could not, at that time, rule definitively on the ultimate issue of whether respondent was
to be held administratively liable for there was need to give the State the opportunity to
adduce evidence that it has a more "compelling interest" to defeat the claim of the
respondent to religious freedom. Thus, in the decision dated August 4, 2003, the SC
remanded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and ordered the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in the case so it can:
The immediate petition is DISMISSED.
Basis of the ruling
1.Law of the Case
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.
2. Recognizing State Interests
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms -
including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the
state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its
violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe
to the Infinite
In Re Letter of Tony Valenciano [A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017]
Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had
been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of
Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He believed that
such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and
State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or
property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice showed that it tended to favor Catholic litigants.
 Judge Maceren clarified that the basement of the QC Hall of Justice was known as the
prayer corner. He opined that the use of the said area for holding masses did not violate
the constitutional prohibition against the use of public property for religious purposes
because the religious character of such use was merely incidental to a temporary use.
The OCA (Office of the Court Administrator) added that by allowing or accommodating
the celebration of Catholic masses within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice, the
Court could not be said to have established Roman Catholicism as an official religion or
to have endorsed the said religion, for the reason that it also allowed other religious
denominations to practice their religion within the courthouses.

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice violates
the constitutional principle of freedom of religion and non-establishment clause
No, it is merely accommodation and not establishment.
Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may
not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these
measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the
exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. Religious freedom, however, is
not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state interest.
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that “no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion,” otherwise known as the non-
establishment clause.
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and
State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance;
that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity
or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or
practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any
religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot
establish or sponsor an official religion.
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses
at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely
accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly
constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the
Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses
to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will
and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no
government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning continue
to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has
neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently
appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has
not prejudiced other religions.
 Fonacier v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L- 5917, January 28, 1955]
This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI) by the Iglesia
Filipina Independiente, represented by its Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca, against
Bishop Santiago A. Fonacier seeking to require the latter to render an accounting of his
administration of all the temporal properties he has in his possession belonging to said
church and to recover the same from him on the ground that he had ceased to be the
Supreme Bishop of said religious organization. Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., having
been elected as Supreme Bishop after the filing of the original complaint, was later
made a co-plaintiff in a supplementary complaint.

The petitioner was elected as Supreme Bishop in accordance with the Constitution of
the church. Suddenly, was forced to resign. In his defense, he has not been properly
removed as Supreme Bishop, (b) his legal successor was Juan Jamias who had been
elected in accordance with the church constitution; (c) Bishop De los Reyes, Jr. formally
joined the Protestant Episcopal Church of America and for this reason ceased to be a
member of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente; (d) Bishops De los Reyes and Bayaca
having abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and practices of the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, ceased to be members and consequently, have no personality in filing
the complaint.

The court declared Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as the legitimate Supreme Bishop of the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente. As for Fonancier, he was ordered to render an accounting
of his administration of the properties and funds of the church.

The CA affirmed the ruling of CFI. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
SC.

Whether the CA erred “in holding that the ouster of Bishops Manuel Aguilar, Alejandro
Remollino, Isabelo de los Reyes Jr., Gerardo Bayaca, Juan Quijano and Pablo Tablante
decreed by the Supreme Council and the petitioner as Obispo Maximo was illegal?
No. The courts may take cognizance to cases related to property rights of the church
and its members. In this case, since it is claimed that the ouster was made by an
unauthorized person, or in a manner contrary to the constitution of the church, and that
the ousted bishops were not given notice of the charges against them nor were they
afforded an opportunity to be heard, the civil courts, have jurisdiction to review the
action regarding the ouster.

The SC enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving religious institutions or

organizations, there is one area which the court should not touch: doctrinal and
disciplinary differences.

The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and

abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church
having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province
of the civil courts.

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Taruc v. Dela Cruz [G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005]

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC).
Respondents Fr. Porfirio De La Cruz and Fr. Rustom Florano were bishop and parish
priest, respectively of the same church. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored
for the transfer of Fr. Rustom Florano to another parish but Bishop De La Cruz denied
their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged
to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the two
factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop De La
Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another
parish.

Meanwhile, hostility among the members of the PIC in Socorro, Surigao Del Norte
worsened when petitioner Taruc tried to organize an open mass to becelebrated by a
certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. The Bishop appealed to
petitioner Taruc’s to refrain from committing acts of inimical and prejudicial to the best
interests of the PIC. He likewise advised petitioners to air their complaints before the
higher authorities of PIC if they believed they had valid grievances against him, the
parish priest, the laws and canons of the PIC.

Bishop De La Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans. Taruc and
his symphathizers proceeded to hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant.
Consequently, Bishop De La Cruz, declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from
the Philippine Independent Church.

Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.

Ruling: NO, under Article 3 Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution,

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The court held the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. It is
not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions.
The courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it
having been found that, in a form of government where the complete separation of civil
and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves
to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature The SC agree with the Court of
 Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the
laws and canons, of said institution/organization.

The court also emphasizes that the power of excluding from the church those allegedly
unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
the province of the civil courts. The court ruled the petitioner’s appeal DENIED for lack
of merit.
Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18

FACTS: Petitioner Senator Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the

concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the International
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO opens access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on
its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and
more investment in the country.
Petitioners argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the
WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of
our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by
Filipinos.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the WTO agreement is unconstitutional.

RULING: No. The Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the basis of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair.

In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.

The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
 contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.”
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726

FACTS: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of

Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the
respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente
Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public
Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and
Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution
resolved to recommend to the Director and Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario
Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m.
to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from
the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on national roads, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people.

ISSUE: W/N the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works
infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice

RULING: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken

sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is
neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of welfare of people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to ensure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society.Social justice, therefore, must be found on the recognition of the
necessity of interpedence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
 Ondoy v. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611

FACTS: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was
drowned while in the employ of private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. According to the
chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the respondent’s enterprise
as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and
thereafter was found dead due to drowning. Thus the petitioner asked for
compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the
hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also
filed before the Secretary of Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional;
is social justice applicable in this case?

RULING: YES, Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of
Labor. It merely disregarded the statements made by the chief engineer and oiler.
Secondly, the principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, not
equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to the claim of compensation
because her son was shown to have died while “in the actual performance of his work.”
To strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, The
Court quoted another case “as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the
employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand
from the latter the stricter compliance.”
Salonga v. Farrales, 105 SCRA 459

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo [G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008]

FACTS: The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition
for a writ of amparo filed before this Court. This case was originally a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and TRO to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers and
agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights and enjoined
them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as
guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were
suspected of being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their
home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units.
 After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their
abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also
learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader
of the communist insurgents.

While in captivity, they met other desaparecidos (including the still-missing University
of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also
suspected of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA.

After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the
brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

While the said petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated
by the SC on October 24, 2007 in order to address the prevalence of extralegal killing
and enforced disappearances. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition asking the
SC to modify their petition for prohibition into a petition for Writ of Amparo.

The SC remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) which in turn rendered a
decision in favor of the Manalo brothers based on the testimonies of the Manalos and
the corroborating testimony of the doctor who conducted medical examinations on the
respondents after their escape

ISSUE: Whether the Petition for issuance of Writ Amparo should be granted?

RULING: Yes. Since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The
threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.

Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their
abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence or overt acts of threat such as
face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and
security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture
and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they
will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.
These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition
for a writ of amparo.

The right to security is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect
for human rights” under Sec.11, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if the government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus
 to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Sec. 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
Obergefell v. Hodges [576 U.S _ (2015)]

FACTS: This case comes from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, States that
define marriage as a union between one man and one woman
The petitioners are 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are
deceased. The respondents are state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in
question. The petitioners claim the respondents violate the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying them the right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed in
another State, given full recognition.
Obergefell (petitioner/appellant) travelled to Maryland to marry his ailing partner who
was suffering from ALS. His partner died in the couple’s home state, Ohio, shortly after
they were married; but, because the laws of Ohio did not allow for same-sex marriage,
Obergefell could not be listed as his partner’s surviving spouse on Obergefell’s death
certificate. Obergefell sued with the co-plaintiffs to have his Maryland marriage
recognized in Ohio so that his name could appear on his dead husband’s death
certificate. Other co-plaintiffs sued for adoption rights as well as for the right not to
have their “marriage stripped from them whenever” they moved between states.
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain
specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their
identity. The petitioners in these cases seek to find that liberty by marrying someone of
the same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful on the same terms and
conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite sex.

ISSUE: W/N the denial of issuance of marriage licence violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

RULING: Yes. The US Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that same-sex marriage is
protected under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Consequently, same-sex marriage bans were struck down as
unconstitutional.

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Fourteenth Amendment states that:
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE VIS A VIS DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
  The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires states to practice
equal protection.
 Equal protection forces a state to govern impartially and NOT draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.
 in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court ruled and has recognized
that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality
within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and
unchallenged. …
 The majority tied the Equal Protection clause to the Due Process clause in finding
that same-sex marriage bans violated both. Justice Kennedy wrote that “The Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way"
and that under Equal Protection, “the Court has recognized that new insights and
societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged."

Under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and the liberty to marriage.
Petitioners now have equal dignity in the eyes of the law.
Falcis v. Civil Registrar General [G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019]

FACTS: Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) petitioned the SC to "declare Articles 1 and 2
of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and
55(6) of the Family Code."

Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing separate opinions of
various cases saying that this Court should follow a "'fresh' approach to this Court's
judicial power" and find that his Petition pertains to a constitutional case attended by
grave abuse of discretion. He also asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code,
with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, and that
the issues he raised were of such transcendental importance as to warrant the setting
aside of procedural niceties.
The Civil Registrar General prays that this Court deny due course to or dismiss the
Petition. It notes that the Petition was not in the nature of a class suit, but was instead
personal only to Falcis. Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to show injury-in-fact
and an actual case or controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory opinion that this
Court cannot issue.

On April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church), Reverend Crescencio
"Ceejay" Agbayani, Jr. (Reverend Agbayani), Marlon Felipe (Felipe), and Maria Arlyn
"Sugar" Ibañez (Ibañez)—collectively, petitioners-intervenors—whose counsel was
Falcis himself, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention. They ask this Court to allow them to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
that: (1) they offer further procedural and substantive arguments; (2) their rights will not
be protected in a separate proceeding; and (3) they have an interest in the outcome of
this case. They adopt by reference the arguments raised by Falcis in his Petition.
 Subsequently, they filed their Petition-in-Intervention, which is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the same reliefs as those in Falcis' Petition,
namely: (1) the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code;
and (2) the invalidation of Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the application of the Doctrine of Transcendental Importance is
warranted; and
2. Whether or not the Right to Marry and the Right to Choose whom to marry are
cognates of the Right to Life and Liberty.

RULING:
1. No. The issues involving transcendental importance is an oft-cited justification for
failing to comply with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and for bringing
admittedly factual issues to this Court. The Diocese of Bacolod recognized
transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to
constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this Court. This Court declared that
there must be no disputed facts, and the issues raised should only be questions
of law. Thus, concerning the extent to which transcendental importance carves
exceptions to the requirements of justiciability, the elements supported by the
facts of an actual case, and the imperatives of our role as the Supreme Court within
a specific cultural or historic context, must be made clear.

2. Yes. Accordingly, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations

will earn state recognition is better left to Congress.

Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable
according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent "legalness" of
marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured simply by removing legal
barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must create
the "thing" to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes
an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework.
Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive
and egalitarian arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Prematurely adjudicating
issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may
unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+ community's capacity to create a strong movement
that ensures lasting recognition, as well as public understanding, of SOGIESC.
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014

FACTS: The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the
executive and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate.

Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
 modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective
the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control.

Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.

Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood,
the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand,
respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and
that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.

ISSUE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional

RULING: No. Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court
sees it as principally a population control measure.
The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country’s population.
While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modern family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared
towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective
of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees
with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire
RH Law.
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City
[G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017]

FACTS: Following the campaign of President Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew

for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their
curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as
part of “Oplan Rody”. Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) filed a petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive
minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and
(d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process. Petitioners argued that there is no compelling State interest to
impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of
their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling
interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the curfew ordinances are unconstitutional as it deprives parents
of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the Petitioners are NOT CORRECT that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard,
they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that
the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's
interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.
Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792

FACTS: The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners(Oposas’), are all
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.

The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers’ class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical rainforests."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss..

In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and
(3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion
to dismiss
 Petitioners thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and asked this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have the right or locus standi to file a class suit
by virtue of Section 15 and 16 Article III of the constitution?

RULING: Yes, the instant petitions have been granted. The provisions such as the
Section 15 & Section 16 Art, III of the 1987 Constitution are considered enforceable
rights. Given that these specific provisions even under the Declaration of State and
Principles are still enforceable or unenforceable as it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.Moreover, their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
[G.R. No. 171947-48, December 18, 2008]

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the clean-up, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila
Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically the Philippine
Environment Code or Presidential Decree (PD) 1152. As plaintiffs a quo, respondents
prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The RTC ruled in the respondents’
favor.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Public

Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five
(5) other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for
review under Rule 45. Petitioners were one in arguing that the pertinent provisions of
the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the
Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. The CA
denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC
in toto, stressing that the trial court decision did not require petitioners to do tasks
outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws. Thus, the Manila Bay
Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive
reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision
and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific completion periods, the
Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their
assigned tasks
 ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the bay

RULING: YES. Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a
ministerial duty.
A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person
executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to
exist and imposed by law. Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on
matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one
way or the other.

While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

In the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste & liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. Such duty is spelled out in
Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA
Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221

FACTS: In the 1990 National Budget, P86 Billion is appropriated (through automatic
appropriation) for debt service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department
of Education.
Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution provides: “The State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other
means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.”
Senators Guingona and Pimentel went to the SC to declare such appropriation
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:Whether or not the appropriation of P86 billion for debt service vis-a-vis only 27
billion for education violates Section 5, Article XIV of the Constitution.

RULING: The court held, No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to
education” in order to “insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of
the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are
so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to
upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of
teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the
 Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act
(R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets.
This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education. Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation that
can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited
from the previous administration.
It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than
the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343

FACTS: The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of
retention granted by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the
same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by
tenants who re actually cultivating such lands. Because P.D. No. 316 provides that no
tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-
farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary to
issue the implementing rules and regulations, as they could not eject their tenants and
so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.

ISSUE:Whether P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Proc. No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No, 6657
are
constitutional.

RULING: The Court held, YES. Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were
promulgated by Pres. Aquino before July 27, 1987, when she still had legislative power,
in accordance with Article XVIII, Section 6 of the Constitution. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657
also provides for retention limits regarding Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
Equal protection means that similarly situated persons must be treated alike. Petitioners
have not shown sufficient proof that they belong to a different class.
The requirements to properly exercise the power of eminent domain are: 1) public use
and 2) just compensation.
i. The requirement of public use is satisfied by Article XIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution, which P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and R.A. No. 6657 simply elaborate on.
ii.Petitioners contend that the compensation modes provided by R.D. No. 6657,
which include stocks and bonds, does not satisfy the monetary requirement for just
compensation. However, the court held that the framers of the Constitution have
allowed for such unorthodox payment,
given CARP’s massive scale.
 Hacienda Luisita vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council [G.R. No. 171101, July 5,
2011]

FACTS: The Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously to dismiss or deny the petition
filed by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and affirm with modifications the resolutions of the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan
(SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court
however did not order outright land distribution. The Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court
cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as
HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution. The parties thereafter filed their
respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUE: Whether the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is
November
21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s stock distribution plan (SDP).

RULING:Yes. When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were transferred by

Tadeco (former owner thereof) to HLI in order to comply with CARP through the stock
distribution option scheme, sealed with the imprimatur of PARC under PARC Resolution
No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989, Tadeco was consequently dispossessed of the
afore-mentioned attributes of ownership. Notably, Tadeco and
HLI are two different entities with separate and distinct legal personalities. Ownership
by one cannot be considered as ownership by the other. Corollarily, it is the official act
by the government, that is, the PARC’s approval of the Stock distributionProgram (SDP),
which should be considered as the reckoning point for the taking of the agricultural
lands of Hacienda Luisita. Although the transfer of
ownership over the agricultural lands was made prior to the SDP’s approval, it is this
Court’s consistent view that these lands officially became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP.
Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition.

By a vote of 8-6, the Court affirmed its ruling that the date of taking in determining just
compensation is November 21, 1989 when PARC approved HLI’s stock option plan.
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52

FACTS: On July 11, 1983 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
was created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869, pursuant to the policy of the
government, “to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.” This was subsequently
proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also the society in general. It is a
reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

A TV ad proudly announces: "The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible

gaming." But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition
seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter
— PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order and
because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has intruded into
the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

ISSUE: W/N PD No. 1869 is violative of the constitutional principle of Local Autonomy.

RULING: The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to
“limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Since P.D. No. 1869 remains an
“operative” law until “amended, repealed or revoked”, its “exemption clause” remains
as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local
autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means “decentralization”. It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state or an “imperium in imperil.”

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Limbona v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786

FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly). Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members
through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his
presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on
November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice,
where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of
the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution
from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom.

ISSUE: Whether the autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction of

the national courts?
 RULING: Court held that it was. Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree, in the
first place, mandates that “the President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services.
Province of North Cotabato v. Gov’t. of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain [G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

FACTS: In 2005, GRP (gov’t of the RP) and the MILF, through the chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a memorandum of
agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).
MOA-AD – is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the
government and the MILF starting in 1996; In 1999 and early 2000.

In the early 2000s, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao,
they took over a hall in Lanao del Norte; hence, then President Estrada declared an all-
out-war which tolled the peace negotiation. When the administration of President
Estrada came to an end, President Arroyo continued the peace talk negotiations. The
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. MILF suspended
all its military actions.

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli Libya, in 2001. The outcome
of which was the GRP-TRIPOLI AGREEMENT ON PEACE, containing the basic
Principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation:
(1) Security Aspect
(2) Rehabilitation Aspect
(3) Ancestral Domain Aspect
The Tripoli Agreement led to a ceasefire between the parties. After the death of the MILF
Chairman, Iqbal took over, and the MOA-AD in its final form was born.

The body of the MOA-AD states that the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain of the Bangsamoro shall be under the BJE. The BJE (Bangsamoro judicial
entity) has the freedom to enter into economic and trade relations with other states or
foreign countries. With regards to governance, a shared responsibility and authority
between the Central Government and BJE shall have an associative relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution

RULING: Yes. It violates the Constitution. The Supreme Court described the relationship
of the “Central Government” or the Republic of the Philippines and the BJE. Under the
proposed agreement as “ASSOCIATIVE STATE” arrangement which has usually been
used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
The Court further stressed out that the proposed agreement cannot be reconciled with
the present constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely the associative relationship is unconstitutional, for the very
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is
on its way to independence.
Pamatong v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]

FACTS: When the petitioner, Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due
course to petitioner’s candidacy.
Petitioner then moved for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied his
request and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for the presidency. . The
COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or
are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency , as stated
in the Omnibus Election Code.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties.

ISSUE: Whether there is a constitutional right to run or hold public office

RULING: The court held, NO. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject to
limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without
discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated.
The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for limitations on electoral candidates given
the interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any
limitations, the election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including those who
are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run.
The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there
is no plausible reason for a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530

FACTS: Valentin Legaspi, the petitioner, invoked his constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern against the respondent, the Civil Service Commission.
Legaspi requests the information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibongjanoy
 and Mariano Agas who are employed as sanitarians in the Health Department.
Sibanghoy and Agas allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who
passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
The Civil Service Commission rejected the request asserting that Legaspi was not
entitled to the information. Legaspi then filed an issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus, to compel the Civil Service Commission to provide the information.
ISSUE: Whether Legaspi may invoke his constitutional right to information.

RULING: The court held, YES. Under Sec. 28, Art II of the 1987 Constitution, State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption. ”: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Under Art. III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, it recognizes the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Further, they specify that information shall be
provided, subject only to limitations provided by law.
The court ruled that in cases where the people are regarded as the “real party in
interest” and the requester is an interested citizen in the execution of the laws, did not
need to show any legal or special interest in the result.
Further, government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access to,
information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees access to
information of public concern. The government agency denying information access has
the burden to show that the information is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the information has been exempted by law from the obligation of
disclosure.
Here, the information was of public concern because it is the legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are
occupied only by eligible persons, and the Civil Service Commission failed to cite any
law limiting the requester’s right to know. Thus, the Court ordered the Civil Service
Commission to provide the information. Furthermore, people who passed civil
examinations are released to the public. Thus, there’s really nothing confidential about a
person’s civil service eligibility. Petitioner’s request is not unreasonable because the
public has the right to verify professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission
Mandamus lies.
Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256

FACTS: In February 1989, petitioner Carmen Aquino-Sarmiento, herself a member of

respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its
records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining
to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the
movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Acting on the said request, the records officer
informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel
Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that
whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
 reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as
such, are purely and completely private and personal. On July 27, 1989, that respondent
Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal,
the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

ISSUE: Whether the denial of the examination of the individual voting slips constitute a
violation of the constitutional right of access to official records

RULING: As may be gleaned from the decree (P.D. No. 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is
an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid
claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private
capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the
discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no
invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of
action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise
would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against
public scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are
neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore,
public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.
Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government
[G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998]

FACTS: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative
duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,
demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that
any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
“paramount public interest,” since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s
economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals
being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is
no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against
respondents’ argument that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions
of the Agreements are not yet effective and binding.
RULING: The court held, YES. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution,
we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-
gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized restrictions: (1) national
security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking
transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements

dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent
PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any
proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such
alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court
officials and employees as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the
various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012,
[February 14, 2012]

FACTS: During the impeachment proceedings against CJ Corona, the prosecution Panel
manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses which included
Justices of the SC, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters
internal to the Court and almost a thousand documents. Letters (from letters of Hon.
Abaya, Congressman and Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, in behalf of the
House Impeachment Panel) were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records,
and the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the
Deliberations of various cases decided by the SC for purposes of the Impeachment
Complaint. Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad
Testificandum were also issued against Clerks of Court of the SC. In light of the
subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court ruling and based on the Constitution, the
pertinent laws and of the Court’s rules and policies, we shall now determine how the
Court will comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the Prosecution Impeachment
Panel.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE LETTERS AND SUBPOENAS ISSUED BY PROSECUTION

IMPEACHMENT PANEL SHOULD BE FAVORED?

RULING: IT DEPENDS. Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution provides: The right of the
people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to officials acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
 However, the right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution’s own
terms, is not absolute. Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court grants access to court
records to any person, subject to payment of fees and compliance with rules; it is not
necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This is limited by the need to
preserve and protect the integrity of the main adjudicative function of the Court and the
Judiciary.
The following are privileged documents or communications, and are not subject to
disclosure:
1. Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the
Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts done
material to pending cases, except where a party litigant requests information on
the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
2. Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before the Court;
3. Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature, in particular,
documents and other communications which are part of or related to the
deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions,
internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
4. Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and
employees in the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above,
are privileged even after their term of office.
5. Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that
cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have
been made available by the court to the general public.