CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 2
CASE DIGESTS
(Other Rights)

Submitted:
WILLY C. DUMPIT
FIRST YEAR - LLB
 A. Liberty of Abode
and of Travel

Article III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of

changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law.
 VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN
G.R. L-14639, March 25, 1919

FACTS:

On October 16-25, 1918, 170 prostitute women were ordered to be deported

to Davao City by Manila City Mayor Justo Lukban. His reason was to preserve good
morals of the people of Manila. The women were given no opportunity to collect their
belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to
a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in Mindanao. Relatives and friends of majority of these deported women,
through their attorney filed charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of
Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of
habeas corpus against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170
women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. It was found out that these
women were deported without their consent during trial. The trial court ruled in favor
of the petitioners. Hence, this CASE.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deportation of 170 women to Davao City valid?

HELD:

No. The acts of Mayor Justo Lukban were not valid. Instead, the Mayor
committed grave abuse of discretion for deporting the women to a new domicile
against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his actions. On the contrary,
there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation,
who compels any person to change his residence. Furthermore, these women
although in a sense "lepers of society" are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled
to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their
choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women
have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given
the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without their consent. The
Supreme Court said that women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had
fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. Hence, Manila
Mayor Justo Lukban lose this case and ordered to pay for damages thereto.
 MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the Supreme Court voted 8-7 to dismissing the
petition of the Marcos family to allow the return of former President Ferdinand
Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held that President
Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare. The
decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal,
fearing the instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former
President Marcos were to be brought back to the country. She said, "In the interest
of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society,
the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country
until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding
one, shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the petitioners right to abode and right
to travel?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right involved is the right to
return to one’s country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. The right to return to one's country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is well considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land (Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution). These rights are: (a) the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state (b) the right to leave a country, and (c) the right to enter
one’s country (Article 13 Section 1&2) as separate and distinct rights from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection. Hence, it would be inappropriate to construe
the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. However, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers, it also involves the residual power to protect
the general welfare of the people.
 B. Non-Impairment
Clause

Article III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of

contracts shall be passed.
 ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP VS. FEATI BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979

FACTS:

On March 4, 1952, petitioner, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla Angeles and

Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
installments over two parcels of land of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at
Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and
interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of
payment of the purchase price, the petitioner executed the deeds of sale in favor of
Emma Chavez and this stated that the “The parcel of land subject of this deed of
sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall
not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots
belonging to the Seller.” Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma
Chavez in the name of Republic Flour Mills. Ortigas and Co. On May 5, 1963, Feati
started the construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking
purposes, but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop
construction but Feati continued and refuse to comply contending that the building
was being constructed according to the zoning regulations. A civil case was filed and
decided by the trial court in favor of Feati which predicated its conclusion on the
exercise of police power for general interest and welfare. Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration but denied. Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Zoning Regulations can nullify or supersede contractual

obligations?

HELD:

Yes. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the

rule is not absolute. This is because it must be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety of the general welfare of the people.” This general welfare clause shall be
liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local governments
in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the
people in the community. Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to
property should prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. The
Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial and
commercial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in
the locality. Hence, the contractual obligations assumed by the petitioner cannot
prevail over zoning regulations. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise
of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare
of the people in the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
 BPI vs. SEC
G.R. No. 164641, December 20, 2007

FACTS:

On Jan 30, 2004, CA seeks petition upholding the SEC’s approval of the
rehabilitation of the ASB Group of Companies. Herein, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), through its predecessor-in-interest, Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC), extended credit accommodations to the ASB Group with an outstanding
aggregate principal amount of P86,800,000.00, secured by a real estate mortgage
over two properties located in Greenhills, San Juan. On 2 May 2000, the ASB Group
filed a petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payments before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). On 18 August 2000, the interim receiver
submitted its Proposed Rehabilitation Plan for the ASB Group. The Rehabilitation
Plan provides that, among others, a dacion en pago by the ASB Group to BPI of one
of the properties mortgaged to the latter at the ASB Group as selling value of
P84,000,000.00 against the total amount of the ASB Group’s exposure to the bank.
In turn, ASB Group would require the release of the other property mortgaged to BPI,
to be thereafter placed in the asset pool. BPI opposed the Rehabilitation Plan and
moved for the dismissal of the ASB Group's petition for rehabilitation. BPI filed a
Petition for Review before CA but was dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Rehabilitation Plan of SEC, impair obligations of contract?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court explained that SEC’s approval of the Rehabilitation
Plan did not impair BPI’s right to contract. The SEC, through the hearing panel that
heard the petition for approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was acting as a quasi-
judicial body and thus, its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment
of the right and the freedom to contract. The mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan
proposes a dacion en pago approach does not render it defective on the ground
of impairment of the right to contract. The Court found no element of compulsion in
the dacion en pago provision of the Rehabilitation Plan. It was not the only solution
presented by the ASB to pay its creditors. Thus, if BPI does not find the dacion en
pago modality acceptable, the ASB Group can propose to settle its debts at such
amount as is equivalent to the selling price of the mortgaged properties. Thus,
petition was denied and the decision of the CA affirmed.
 C. Access to Courts

Article III, Section 11. Free access to the courts and

quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
 IN RE: MR ROGER PRIORESCHI
A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC August 19, 2009

FACTS:

On May 22, 2009 the administrator of Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. Mr.
Roger C. Prioreschi, wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
requesting for exemption from payment and compliance from paying docket fees
granted to indigent litigants. He pointed out that Good Shepherd works with and for
the most Indigent persons such as “the poorest among the poor, to the newly born
and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old
people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, to broken
families who returned to a normal life”. In other words, the former have been working
hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach
to, or have rejected or abandoned them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can grant Good Shepherd foundation who works for
indigent people, from the payment of legal fees?

HELD:
No. The Courts cannot grant the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same
exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the
foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. The Art. III, Sec. 11
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that “Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty.” In implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, and
Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court. The clear intent and precise language of the
aforequoted provisions indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as
an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a juridical person,
therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent
and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly
premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a
natural person can suffer.
 D. Prohibited
Punishment

Article III Sec. 19.

(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,

degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or

degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

PEOPLE VS. ESTOISTA

 G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953

FACTS:

On February 10, 1949, Alberta Estoista testified that his son Alberto Estoista
fired accidentally wounded their servant when they fired wild chicken on their
plantation scratching their “palay” and corn. Herein petitioner appealed for acquittal
for the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence and convicted for illegal
possession of firearm under one information by the CFI of Lanao. The firearm with
which the appellant was charged with having in his possession was a rifle and
belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Thus, Estoista
is now assailing his conviction saying that the 5-10 years’ penalty for the illegal
possession of firearms is cruel and excessive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the form of penalty imposed infringe the constitutional

provision against cruel and harsh punishment?

HELD:

No. It is of court’s opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing

or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent
conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb without deciding whether the
prohibition of the Constitution against in︎fliction of cruel and unusual punishment
applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of
exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are,
like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that
courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency
or reduction of the penalty. In this case, it being established that the defendant was
alone when he walked to the plantation where he was to hunt with the gun of his
father, in whose name the ︎rearm was licensed, and that the son, away from his
father's sight and control, carried the gun for the only purpose of using it, as in fact
he did with fatal consequences, the evidence support the son's conviction for the
offense of illegal possession of ︎rearm which was in accordance with law. Therefore,
the penalty provided for in Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code is deemed constitutional

PEOPLE VS. ESPARAS

 G.R. No. 120034, August 20 1996

FACTS:

On May 20, 1994, in the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, accused Josefina and
her husband Rodrigo Libed were charged, not being lawfully authorized by law to
import or bring into the country any prohibited drug/regulated drug, conspiring,
confederating, and helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously import or bring into the country Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu),
a regulated drug, with a total weight of 20.09314 kilograms under Section 14, Article
III of Republic Act 6425. Accused Josefina Esparas pleaded not guilty when
arraigned on August 26, 1994. She absconded after the prosecution presented its
key witnesses. Accused Rodrigo Libed has remained at large. Subsequently, the trial
court found the accused guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty but
she remains at large.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court may proceed to review petitioner’s death sentence
despite her absence?

HELD:

Yes. A decision of Trial court does not become final unless and until it has been
reviewed by the Court. An accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is
entitled under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon
which it is founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the land, to the
end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determined. Such
procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the
accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no interference
and tolerates no evasions. The reimposition of the death penalty revived by the
procedure by which the Supreme Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the
Rules of Court remains automatic and continues to be mandatory and does not
depend on the whims of the death convict and leaves the SC without any option. Any
court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. It is
not only within the power of the SC but also it is its duty to reviewal death penalty
cases. Sec. 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which authorizes the dismissal of an
appeal when the appellant jumps bail has no application to cases where the death
penalty has been imposed. Counsel for accused is given a new period of 30 days
from notice hereof within which to file the brief of the accused Esparas.
 ECHAGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601, October 12 1998

FACTS:

On June 25, 1996, Leo Echegaray Pilo, petitioner, was convicted for the crime
of rape of the ten year old daughter of his common-law spouse and was sentenced
to death penalty. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the imposition of
death penalty. The motions were denied finding no reason to declare it
unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its
imposition. The RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 81 of the RPC as amended by
Sec. 24 of RA 7659, where the mode of execution was changed from electrocution to
lethal injection. Echagaray filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to
enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out
the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are
unconstitutional and void. On March 3, 1998, the court required respondents to
comment and mandated the parties to maintain status quo. CHR filed a motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death
penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing
how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become
abolitionists in practice. Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel,
degrading, inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional proscription against

cruel, degrading or inhumane punishment.

HELD:

No. Republic Act 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel,
degrading or inhuman" punishment. It is settled in jurisprudence that the death
penalty is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. The Court believes that the
lack in particularity as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection does
not render said law “cruel, degrading or inhuman.” For reasons discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the
competence and expertise of administrative officials. The court further explains that
any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. The Constitution, however, does
not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which
the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.
 E. Non-
Imprisonment For
Debt

Article III Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for

debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
 LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-63419, January 21, 1993

FACTS:

On April 3, 1979, the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22),

popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law. The question is definitely one of first
impression in our jurisdiction and various petitions for decisions. These petitions
arose from moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The
motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case wherein the
trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. Among the
constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict
between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights
which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax."
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General in his comment on the petitions,
maintained the posture that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the SC
the orders denying their motions to quash, these orders being interlocutory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-

imprisonment due to debt?

HELD:

No. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a

worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended
or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order. There is therefore an element of certainty or
assurance that the instrument wig be paid upon presentation. The basis or
foundation of such perception is confidence. Hence, any practice tending to destroy
that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only
create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. The harmful practice of
putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can
very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
 F. Ex Post Facto Law
and Bill of Attainder

Article III Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted.
 UNITED STATES vs. CONDE
G.R. No. L-18208, February 14, 1922

FACTS:

On December 30, 1915, petitioners Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco

entered into a contract with the respondents concerning a debt of P300. By virtue of
the terms of said contract, the said complainants obligated themselves to pay to the
defendants interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per month, payable within the
first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day
of January, 1916. On May 6, 1921, respondents Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria
R. De Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of
P120 and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. The court stated
that at the time of the execution and delivery of said contract there was no law in
force in the Philippine Islands punishing usury; but, in as much as the defendants
had collected a usurious rate of interest after the adoption of the Usury Law. Thus,
this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are guilty for violating the Usury Law or R.A.
No. 2655?

HELD:

No. The acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the
time they were committed. A law imposing a new penalty, liability or disability, or
giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It
is well settled rule of contract that the laws in force at the time of the contract was
made must govern its interpretation and application. If a contract is legal at its
commencement or its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent
legislation. An ex post facto law, is a law that makes an action, done before the
passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such
action. In the present controversy, the respondents executed an act which was legal
before the Usury Law. Ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its
retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant. Thus, the complaint was dismissed
and respondents were discharged.
 SALVADOR vs. MAPA, Jr.
G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007

FACTS:

On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued

Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans. Behest loans are loans granted by
government banks or GOCC at the behest, command, or urging by
previous government officials to the
disadvantage of the Philippine government. The Committee was tasked to
inventory all behest loans and determine the courses of action that the
government should take to recover these loans. Atty. Orlando Salvador,
Consultant of the Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn
complaint for violations of R.A. No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
against the respondents. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated
November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of
reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they
become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61

are ex-post facto laws?

HELD:

No. An ex post facto law as defined is one (a) which makes an action done before
the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the
legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required
at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. This
Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil
rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person accused of a crime
of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of
a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. Administrative Order
No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans,
and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the
act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of
reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order
No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto
laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject
administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto. Hence the petition was
granted.
Article III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law.
WILLY C. DUMPIT Constitutional Law 2
FIRST YEAR – LLB

SHORT ESSAY (RIGHT TO TRAVEL vis a vis the Current Quarantine Situation)

It is my routine every weekends to travel from Lingig, Surigao del Sur to

Davao City and vice versa to attend classes at JMC Law School. This would usually
take me six hours one way traversing the latter; a bit sacrifice on my part to cope up
with the demands of this course and for the love of learning. However, in as much as
I would like to travel thereto, the current Quarantine situation restricts everyone from
going out abode and travel. Good thing all classes were suspended not just
respecting the National and Local Executive Orders, but for the general welfare of its
clientele.
Also, I am scheduled supposed to be third week of March for the renewal of
my Passport, PRC, and NBI for travel abroad this summer. But again, the present
crisis prohibits me thereof specially that I cannot cross a number of towns with
lockdown policies. As an abiding citizen of the country and as a law school student, I
understand the measures implemented by political leaders. I know that what they are
doing are in anchorage with the constitution and local code. Under, Article III, Sec. 6
of the 1987 Constitution “The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law”. With the
present pandemic situation, these prohibitions executed by the government is a must
for everybody’s’ protection without prejudice to the basic rights of common people.
Here is hoping that with the Police Power exercised by National and Local
Executives in collaboration with health practitioners are lawful to protect the public by
preventing people to acquire COVID-19. As such, I am just praying too, that citizens
of this country shall fully cooperate because the “Community Quarantine” carried out
by each town, city, province and national are public health practices that would
benefit all. Having said that, I am hoping that there shall be proper distribution of
goods specially to the less so that they would not also keep on going out to survive
daily needs.