G.R. No.

112386 June 14, 1994

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eatern Samar, was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of that province prior to the May 1992 elections. He was suspenden from office
after he was charged before the Sandiganbayan with having violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Lobanan’s suspension violated his constitutional right to due process.

HELD:

No. The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Public office is “a public agency or trust,” and it is not the property envisioned by
the Constitutional provision which the petitioner invokes.
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,

vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

FACTS:

This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to
declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence
this case.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him
the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
G.R. No. L-14078            March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

FACTS:

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro.

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected
by him and approved by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the
Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be
selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans
may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are
previously recommended by the provincial governor.

Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says
that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that
any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within
the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their
will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison
at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

ISSUE/S: 

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.

HELD:

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person
of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the
Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional. The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart
the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Considered purely as an exercise of the
police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority.
It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic
remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases. The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of
the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino
people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue.
G.R. No. 148560               November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558,
finding probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the
Philippines has committed the offense of plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080
was unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the “reasonable
doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of the
accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:
‘combination,’ ‘series,’ and ‘unwarranted.’ Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge
to question the validity of RA7080.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. Whether or not the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to due
process.
3. Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether
it is within the power of Congress to classify it as such.

RULING:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. The
over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. 
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the employment of
general terms or the failure to define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is
sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible guide as to what would
render those subject to the said law liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely
consist of imprecise language.
 2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is entitled to an acquittal unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt of the accused with proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The contention that Sec. 4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal
act done, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole. 

3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The legislative
declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a
previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Thus, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 147096            January 15, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. and BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO.,
INC., respondents.

FACT:

Bayantel filed an application with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience or
Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter the NTC
issued directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective
applications before the Commission and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the
NTC with respect to Bayantel’s original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
admit an amended application. the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this
amended application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as
the notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were
conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of
its evidence, the NTC grant of two (2) separate Provisional which resulted in the closing out of
all available frequencies for the service being applied for by herein applicant, and in order that
this case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, ordered ARCHIVED without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. NTC
issued Memorandum re-allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the radio frequency spectrum for
the expansion of CMTS networks. Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the
availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators, the NTC granted BayanTel’s motion to
revive the latter’s application and set the case for hearings. Extelcom filed an Opposition
praying for the dismissal of Bayantel’s application which was denied for lack of merit. Extelcom
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,which was granted.
Petitioner filed MR but subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, the NTC filed the instant
petition. 

ISSUE/S:

Whether the 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC is operative and should be applied to the
Respondent even with the absence of publication requirement?

HELD:

No, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations
can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC fall squarely within the scope
of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera. which is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take
effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after
their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such publication,
therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.
Tumey vs. Ohio
[273 US 510, 7 March 1927]

FACTS:

Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village
of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his
dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment.
The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing
intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be
imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried
the case on error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case
and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state
sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the
common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme
Court refused Tumey's application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the
case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the
mayor's court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May
1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no
debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to
the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme
Court, to which it was rightly directed.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in
prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the
case.

HELD:

All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be
matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and
deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to
the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest
in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he
exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison
until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in
convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his
behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not
exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The
system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant
has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or in this
country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so
small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim "de minimis non curat lex." The
Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a
minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought
before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the
prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the
pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding
that due process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate
small municipalities, in the country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize
and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the
county. The inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the village the large fines
provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without
opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of
exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the weighing
of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate
mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence
was against him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised
the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which
existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official
motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were
thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the present opinion.
G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985
memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a
week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a
Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal
instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena,
with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of
MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was
made for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting
the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a
manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena.
 
The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier
of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The
P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez
did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the second
withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The
third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s
co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied
Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5
Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not
go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the
P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena.
The receipt was dated January 30, 1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation
of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took
part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the
questions asked were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for
review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of
20 December 1991.
 
ISSUE/S: 

Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of departing from
that common standard of fairness and impartiality.
 
HELD:
 Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set aside. Tabuena and Peralta are acquitted of
the crime of malversation. The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan
Justices was just too excessive that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial,
or even under the standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given
more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence.
 
It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney. However
anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is
as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as
he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L.
DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO
FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA
G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch
274, respondents, LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.

FACTS: 

Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde massacre.
Preliminary investigation was provided by NBI and the case was raffled to Judge Zosimo
Escano who inhibited himself from the case for being employed with NBI before. His pair Judge
Escano issued warrant of arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided
by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest. Webb and the others voluntarily
surrendered. They files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They
contend that (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them:
(2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause
to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their
constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel
unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
Information as an accused.

ISSUE/S: 

Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their right to fair
trial.

HELD:

Petition dismissed. to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation

and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the
tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects
of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by
the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and
the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of
their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of
the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
G.R. Nos. 121039-45            October 18, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION,
LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

(The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon
approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the
back of the latter's van, which was parked in front of Café Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos,
Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van
while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in the
ambulance.

Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, which was owned
by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought inside
the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayor’s room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis,
Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse.

At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by
Luis and Medialdea – her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and
stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et.
al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire
was heard from the van. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was
already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single
gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away.

Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan,

Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit.
After Kawit’s turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men
boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileen’s
remains behind.

Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador
Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further
investigation, and forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and
Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's theory.

On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City,
Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and
Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering them to pay
Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the
heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity.

On 25 January 1999, the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the
judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion
and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
 The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez
avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity, besides claims that principal witness
Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the testimony of his 13- year old daughter should
have been given full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded have no factual
and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently
impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain to material and crucial points of the events
at issue, besides that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the
prosecution’s version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance
with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was assigned to Justice Melo for study and
preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September 2001.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge handling the
case.

HELD:

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.
Responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial. The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges
are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances
of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se
fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez,
et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.
The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and
he has not discharged the burden.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH
E. ESTRADA

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG

PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO
ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.

FACTS:

The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court
to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the
public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo. 

ISSUE/S:

Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court. 

HELD: 

The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the
other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a
fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that
the right of the accused must be preferred to win. 

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in
a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of public’s attention and
where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be
evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded. 

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that
he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. 

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
G.R. No. 130442             April 6, 2000

THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, PNP,
REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, petitioners,
vs.
C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA, respondent.

FACTS:

On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide,
PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a
Mazda pick-up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with
four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza
and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a
vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a
sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high
speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with
del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for
them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the
back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex
Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against
Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority
and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12
administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a
police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to
establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place
between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of
violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita
was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly
committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while
in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same
period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine
National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not
charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was
denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the
questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of
duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of
irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal

discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police
Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.
HELD:

Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal
process. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing
a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and
tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.
Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses
mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of
official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that
Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic
drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment
finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory
conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking
drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings
referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty,
he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of
duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private
trip fetching his wife.
G.R. No. 117040           January 27, 2000
323 SCRA 445

RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT
STORE, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by the Respondent Isetann Department Store as a

security checker to apprehend shoplifters. As a cost-cutting measure, private respondent
decided to phase out its security section engage the services of an independent security
agency. Petitioner was then terminated prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
NLRC ordered petitioner to be given separation pay holding that the phase-out of the
security section was a legitimate business decision. However, respondent was denied the right
to be given written notice before termination of his employment.

ISSUE/S: 

What is the effect of violation of the notice requirement when termination is based on an
authorized cause?

HELD: 

The Wenphil doctrine stated that it was unjust to require an employer to reinstate an
employee if, although termination is made with cause, if due process was not satisfied. The
remedy was to order the payment to the employees of full backwages from the time of his
dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But his dismissal must be
upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because the dismissal is ineffectual. In
termination of employment under Art. 283, the violation of notice requirements is not a denial of
due process as the purpose is not to afford the employee an opportunity to be heard on any
charge against him for there is none. The purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual
loss of his job and the DOLE to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment. With respect to Art. 283, the employer’s failure to comply with
the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure
to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of
employment merely ineffectual.

If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should

be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or given separation pay, he should be
paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance.
With respect to dismissals under 282, if he was dismissed for any of the just causes in 282, he
should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment
was terminated until it is determined that the termination is for a just cause because the failure
to hear him renders the termination of his employment without legal effect.
G.R. No. 196425               July 24, 2012

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as
Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary Board, Respondents.

FACTS:

On 2001, Pres. Arroyo issued EO 12 creating Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and

vesting it with power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft
and corruption against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to
the president. On 2010, President Aquino III issued EO 13 abolishing PAGC and transferring its
functions to the ODESLA, more particularly to its newly-established investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Respondent filed before ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner from the purchase by LWUA of 445, 377 shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc. EO 13 was filed after the petitioner alleged that no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of due process.

HELD:

No, since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by
Secretary Purisima. As long as the petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and
present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because
what the law anchors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. His own failure to submit
his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process. Petition
was therefore dismissed.
G.R. No. 157036             June 9, 2004

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR
GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE
PNP, ET. AL., respondents.

FACTS: 

GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend
the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued
guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves
requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition
for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief
Ebdane.

ISSUE/S: 

Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not

the banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: 

Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as
the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it
might be revoked. Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the
carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms
outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If
the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.
FACTS:

On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree

1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in
a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed
its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the
documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the
Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522
containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the
Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District
Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez
was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense
or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4
counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False
statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another;
33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of
the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested copies of the official
extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted
therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999,
Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for
mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to
give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);
certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to
restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the
petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request
and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment
with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.

FACTS:

Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an
extradition process.

HELD:
 Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides
the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court
(Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will
be answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives
an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request
from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the
request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government,
maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to
afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
extradition process’ evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in
character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible
for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure."
Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his
right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to
resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.
G.R. No. 130487               June 19, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishop’s chair while the
sacrament of confirmation was being performed at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City.
Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers.
Mararac went near Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice tapped
Estrada’s hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was about to strike again, Estrada drew a
knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat.
Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding, Mararac slowly dragged himself down the altar. SP01
Conrado Francisco received a report of the commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the
cathedral, approached Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and advised the latter to drop his
knife. Estrada obeyed. However, when Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief,
who was also at the confirmation rites, went near Estrada, Estrada embraced Rosario and two
wrestled with each other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada. Estrada was brought to the
police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after arrival at the hospital. On
29 December 1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of Mararac. On
6 January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital."
It was alleged that Estrada could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was
suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the
psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. The motion was opposed by the
City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on Estrada.
Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court
denied the motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was
entered by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial court (RTC Dagupan City,
Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a decision upholding the prosecution evidence
and found Estrada guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered
him to pay P50,000 for indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral
damages. Estrada’s counsel appealed.

ISSUE/S:

Whether a mental examination of the accused should be made before the accused may
be subjected to trial.

HELD:

The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused
disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent
person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair
trial and due process of law. Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
speaks of a "mental examination." An intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for
rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his
mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a
medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be
determined by the trial court. By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court
effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court's negligence was a violation of the
basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court
must be nullified.
G.R. No. 170288             September 22, 2006

PEDRO E. BUDIONGAN, JR., Municipal Mayor; JOSIL E. TRABAJO, Municipal Vice Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan; FULGENCIO V. PAÑA, Municipal
Treasurer; TACIANA B. ESPEJO, Municipal Budget Officer; and SB Members: RUFINO G.
ADLAON, TITO R. MONTAJES, MARIO M. SORIA, ALFONSO L. UNAJAN, CARLITO B.
TORREFRANCA, VICENTE A. TORREFRANCA, JR., etitioners,
vs.
HON. JACINTO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., Asst. Special Prosecutor I; HON. CORNELIO L.
SONIDO, Acting Director, Prosecution Bureau IV; HON. ROBERT E. KALLOS, Deputy
Special Prosecutor; HON. DENNIS M. VILLA IGNACIO, The Special Prosecutor; HON.
WENDELL E. BARRERAS-SULIT, Acting Director, Case Assessment, Review and Re-
investigation Bureau; and OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, public respondents.
VALERIANO U. NADALA, ARLENE PAINAGAN-PALGAN, private respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Budiongan is the mayor of the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol. By virtue of

Municipal Ordinance No., 2, Series of 2001, the municipality appropriated the amount of
PHP450,000.00 for the purchase of a road roller. However, through Resolution No. 3, it was
recommended that the said amount be realigned for the use of asphalt laying. The proposed
realignment was included in the agenda, and thereafter a Certificate or Availability of Funds was
issued. A Program of Works and Cost Estimates was prepared, followed by a bidding which
awarded the project to the lowest bidder, Herbert Mamis General Merchandise and Contractor,
Inc. After entering into contract with Budiongan, Mamis commenced with the project.

It was thereafter discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment
of funds. Subsequently, the municipality passed an ordinance approving such realignment and
Mamis was accordingly paid the contract price.

Before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondents Palgan and
Nadala filed a complaint against the petitioners for alleged illegality in the conduct of the
bidding, award, and notice to commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the
purpose.

A case for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against the
petitioners. This was later amended with violation of Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019 for prematurely
awarding the project despite the absence of funds specifically appropriated for such purpose,
and thereafter paying the contract price from the Municipal Treasury which was originally
appropriated for the purchase of a road roller; causing damage and undue injury to the
government. For their part, petitioners contend that the modified charges were filed without
according them the opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer or rebut the same.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioners are denied of their right to due process since they were
not given the opportunity to answer and present evidence on the modified charge in the
preliminary investigation.

HELD:

The Court finds that the petition lacks merit.

The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of
the filed charges or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing.

Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the
opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense
charged did not come as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of
facts and the same alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered
evidence nor impute commission of grave errors of serious irregularities prejudicial to their
interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required by the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petitioners’ right to preliminary investigation is
also deemed waived when they failed to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment.
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674               January 22, 2004

BAILINANG P. MAROHOMBSAR, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, respondent.

FACTS:

Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in Civil Case for “injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction.” The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun, daughter of Judge Yusoph
Pangadapun of RTC Branch 10, Marawi City. In the said complaint, Pangadapun questioned the
legality of Marohombsar’s appointment by DSWD Regional Secretary Salic-Malna as provincial
social welfare officer V of the DSWD-ARMM.  Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent
judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice indicating
that a preliminary conference would be held was also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed
an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was asked to comment and,
pending the filing of the same, the TRO was extended. Respondent issued an order stating that
a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had waived the raffle of the case.
He reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent extended the TRO to let Pangadapun submit her comment. During the hearing on
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers appeared.
Hence, respondent considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction
the following day. In his partial Comment respondent denied that: (1) he issued the TRO in favor
of Pangadapun without benefit of a hearing; (2) in his order dated March 22, 1999, he made it
appear that a preliminary conference was held where the parties agreed to waive the raffle of
the case, when in fact there was none; (3) he falsified the records of the case and (4) he
granted the preliminary injunction without a hearing. He alleged that the complaint was purely a
harassment case filed by a disgruntled party because of the latter’s failure to obtain a favorable
resolution from him. Although respondent judge admitted that Judge Yusoph Pangadapun and
Judge Abdulhakim Ibrahim were his distant relatives and townmates, he stressed that “never in
our careers in the judiciary have we interfered nor influenced one another on any pending case
before our courts.”

ISSUE/S:

Whether the complainant was denied due process because the preliminary injunction
was issued without hearing.

HELD:

No, In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and
hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for
preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-
type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. The essence of
due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. In the present case, complainant was able to
move for a reconsideration of the order in question; hence her right to due process was not in
anyway transgressed. The court ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due
process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his position. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, in Equatorial Realty vs. Anunciacion, Jr.  that, as a matter of public policy, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other
member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner
that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of
due process.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.

FACTS:

By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation

(PHILCOMSAT) was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications," the authority to "construct
and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." By designation of the
Republic of the Philippines, it is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and
the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT), as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in line
with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the United Nations’s General Assembly.
Since 1968, It has been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Communications,
Eastern Telecom, Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT, and Capitol Wireless or their
predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by PHILCOMSAT enable said
international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as
overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. It was exempt from
the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196 issued on 17 June 1987, it
was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive order, NTC required
PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering
its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor. On 9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and
maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services
it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can
continue to operate and maintain the facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the
aforesaid rates therein applied for. On 16 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT was granted a
provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then
offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for 6 months from
the date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on 17 March 1988, it was
extended for another 6 months, or up to 16 September 1988. Thereafter, the NTC further
extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT for another 6 months, counted from 16
September 1988, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a
reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed said order.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether the NTC is not required to provide notice and hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its
rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending final determination of PHILCOMSAT’s
application.

HELD:

The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. The NTC order violates
procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT
and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation,"
which is a unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its
side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and
the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to
NTC. The order pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no other. Reduction of rates was
made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect
or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT
was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on
which NTC based its questioned order. While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such ratefixing order, temporary though it
may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well
as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not
exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as
temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory
procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless
otherwise provided by the applicable law. NTC has no authority to make such order without first
giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion.
G.R. No. 81805 May 31, 1988

VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. and COMNINOS BROS., petitioners,

vs.
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), EDGAR T. BUNYOG, VEDASTO NAVARRO,
EUGENIO CAPALAD, RAUL T IS, ANTONIO TANIOAN, CELESTINO CASON, DANILO
MANELA & ROBERTO GENESIS, respondents.

FACTS:

Var-Orient Shipping Co. Inc. and Comninos Bros. filed a complaint with the Workers'
Assistance and Adjudication Office (WAAO), Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) against the Edgar T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
Antonio Tanio-an, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the
MPV "Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with them,
which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the
International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986. After
joinder of the issues, the case was heard on 4 March 1987 with both parties required to submit
memoranda. Only the seamen submitted memoranda. On 10 June 1987, the seamen filed a
motion to resolve, which the companies' counsel did not oppose. Thus, on the basis of the
pleadings and memoranda, Achacoso rendered a decision on 9 September 1987 ordering (1)
the dismissal of the case with a reprimand and against Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an,
Cagon, Manela and Genesis, against the commission of the same or similar offense otherwise it
shall be dealt with more severe penalty; (2) exclusion of Llanes from the case; (3) reprimanding
Var-Orient Shipping Co. for failure to comply with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and
regulations and warning against committing the same or a similar offense otherwise it shall be
dealt with more severely; (4) archiving the case of Arsolon, A. dela Cruz, Montero and D. de la
Cruz with their names included in the POEA watchlist until they shall have voluntarily submitted
themselves to WAAO’s jurisdiction; (5) payment by the companies jointly and severally, unto
Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cason, Manela and Genesis the amount of P1,550.59
each, representing deductions from allotments, plus P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) payment by the companies jointly and severally unto Bunyog the amount of US$4,680.00 or
its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing his salaries for the unserved portion of
his employment contract plus P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; to be tendered thru WAAO,
10 days from receipt of the decision. A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and
delivered by the postman to the companies' counsel, then Attorney Francisco B. Figura through
the receptionist, Marlyn Aquino on 21 September 1987. Atty. Figura alleged he did not receive
the envelope containing the decision. The companies allegedly learned about the decision only
when the writ of execution was served on them on 20 November 1987 by National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) Deputy Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong.
Previously, on 19 October 1987, the seamen filed "Motion for Execution of Decision," the
companies' counsel did not oppose. On 23 November 1987, the companies, through new
counsel, Atty. Quintin Aseron, Jr., filed an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" on the
ground that the decision had not been received by them, hence, it was not yet final and
executory. On 19 January 1988, the POEA Administrator (Tomas D. Achacoso). In due time, the
companies filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:

Whether the decision of the POEA administrator has been received, rendering said
decision final and unappealable.

HELD:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Herein, the parties agreed that they would
file their respective memoranda at the 4 March 1987 hearing and thereafter consider the case
submitted for decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor
disputes. Atty. Figura's affidavit involving that he has not received the decision is self-serving.
The companies failed to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what
she did with the decision which she received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the
Administrator's ruling that the decision had been properly served on companies' counsel and
that it is now final and unappealable, should be sustained. The issuance of the writ of execution
is therefore not premature.
G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who were
members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The
National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging
therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers’ Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang
Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated against the NLU and
unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations
ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of
Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU’s
allegation that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89
workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed
a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the CIR’s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe special
requirements of due process in administrative cases.

HELD:

The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character, to wit:

a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of
the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration.

c. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle
that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and
decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board
of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such
board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary, but
such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers
(Section 10)

f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. There is no statutory authority to authorize examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to
solve the difficulty.

g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
G.R. No. L-44251 May 31, 1977

FELIX MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,
vs.
ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN SALCEDO, JR., TOMAS DAVID, MARTIN
CELINO, MARCELO AMIANA, as Members of the Panel of Investigators, Members of the
Board of Trustees, FR. ROMEO PELAYO and the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
LABOR, respondents.

FACTS:

Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of Araneta University Foundation (AUF),

serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a complaint
for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged immorality. Its then
President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to investigate such charge. The
accusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances committed against the
person of Leonardo de Lara. The first hearing, which took place on 24 April 1974, was attended
by Montemayor as well as the complainant with his two witnesses. Montemayor sought the
postponement of the investigation to 3 May 1974, which was granted. On 28 May 1974, he filed
a motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June 1974, he filed an
affidavit to sustain his defense. On 8 July 1974, the report and recommendation of the
investigating committee came, and was adverse to Montemayor. The recommendation was for
his demotion in rank by one degree. On 5 August 1974, Salcedo adopted such recommendation
and thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of the AUF for appropriate action. On
8 November 1974, new charges were filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime
Castañeda, and Jesus Martinez against Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a faculty
member. Another committee was appointed. Montemayor moved to postpone the hearing set
for 18 and 19 November 1974, but was denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. On 5
December 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges against Montemayor to
have been sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board of
Trustees of the AUF his separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and
351 of the Manual of Policies of the University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal was
ordered effective 15 November 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. On 12 December
1974, the University filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a report of his
suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on 21
November 1974, Montemayor in turn lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AUF for
reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and
increments attendant thereto. There was a motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the
labor arbiter and the NLRC found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his
former position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.
Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. AUF appealed to the
Secretary of Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the Commission's order for his
reinstatement, finding Montemayor's dismissal justified. The AUF was, however, required to pay
Montemayor the amount of P14,480.00 representing the latter's accrued back wages which the
former voluntarily offered to extend him. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, Montemayor
filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:

Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating
to his dismissal from AUF.

HELD:

In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the
investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after such
inquiry. Academic due process, a term coined, is a system of procedure designed to yield the
best possible judgment when an adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence
with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a conclusion. Every university or
college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against
him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special
or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher
accused should have full opportunity to present evidence. Herein, the procedure followed in the
first investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process requisite. The
second investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion for postponement therein
was denied, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Montemayor, and the
committee lost no time in submitting its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have
been sufficiently established and recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was
remedied, as Montemayor was able to present his case before the Labor Commission. Denial of
due process happened only in the proceeding he had before the investigating committees and
not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to present
his case, the latter being the subject matter of the petition for certiorari. Montemayor was
afforded his day in court.
G.R. No. 76353 May 2, 1988

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA,
REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHIELA DIÑOSO,
RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR.
JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of Board of Trustees of PSBA,
ATTY. P. PAULINO, etc., et al., respondents.

FACTS:

Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios
Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are
all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City.
As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain
matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the
students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new
agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and
barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October
1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the
school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or
conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and
7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter.
During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied
admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the
Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and
student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President,
Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding
their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan
Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All
these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for
review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit
them.

HELD:

After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated,
there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another
contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of
students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been
recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as
valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is
not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court
to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4
and 5 had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be
conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well settled that by
reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters
falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to
factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by
evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure
which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny
of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not
fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in
the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic
deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should
be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-783 July 29, 1996

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL, respondent.

FACTS:

Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon.
Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that
irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.

On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in
order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be
conducted. Ordered to conduct a “discreet investigation” by the then NBI Director Epimaco
Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI
Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for
Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view
of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in
respondent’s sala.

In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared
that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated
Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided
that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed
jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent
that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00.
Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to
serve his vice.

In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge
to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante
delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:

“On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge
PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where
Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL
that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge
PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people
around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the
following day.

At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ
proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and
thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.

In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15
minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge
PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the
room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything
from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted
between the pages of a blue book on top of his table.

Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to
ultra violet light examination. After finding Subject’s right hand for the presence of fluorescent
powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard
Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).

On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge
FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for
Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.”

FACTS:

Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong
enough to convict him.

HELD:

We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only
bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon
consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript
of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the
Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein
respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.

This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases,
demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver
offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its
members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of
competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted
Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of
due process.

The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of

principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.

It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an
ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to
put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter.
The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal
acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge
could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such
vague accusations.
 While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter,
ordered the NBI investigating team to make a “discreet investigation” of respondent, the NBI
team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having
found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused
before respondent’s court who could possibly be respondent judge’s virtual victim. Approached
by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial
Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder.
Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was
that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.

But, respondent’s action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz
was “persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called ‘entrapment operation.’” The
opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz’
criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was
unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the
favorable verdict having been rendered already.

It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he
“scoured” the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no
envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz
can locate the envelope.

In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of

respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 o’clock in the morning of March 26, 1993,
Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan.
Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judge’s chambers, located thereat, and placed
before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought
that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it
with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz
replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent
judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at
Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted
it inside the pocket of Cruz’ polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta
and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judge’s chambers, introduced themselves, and
told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told
them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said
this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers,
and every nook and cranny of respondent’s chambers, and the pockets of the pants of
respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed
to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent
judge.
G.R. No. 130442             April 6, 2000

THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD, PNP,
REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, petitioners,
vs.
C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA, respondent.

FACTS:

On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide,
PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a
Mazda pick-up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with
four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza
and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a
vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a
sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high
speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with
del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect.

PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is
dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the
arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey
and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were
filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of
Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun
Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct
unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient
evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious
confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held
that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board
found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he
allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of
alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for
the same period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the
Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not
charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was
denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the
questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of
duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of
irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal

discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police
Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

HELD:

Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal
process. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing
a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and
tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.
Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses
mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of
official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that
Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic
drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment
finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory
conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking
drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings
referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty,
he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of
duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a
privatetrip fetching his wife.