Lozano v.

Martinez
G.R .No. L-63419; December 18, 1986

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes
a person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at
putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes injury to the
public interest. Contentions on the law are that: 1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection
clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed
because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the Third Reading

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)

HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in circulation
can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise
of police power and is not in conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.

There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since
contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal
protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check and not the payee. Additonally,
BP 22 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to the contention,
the power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On
the last contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause in
question was an authorized amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the
constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.
MMDA vs GARIN

FACTS:

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his driver’s license was confiscated
for parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his
license and expressed his preference for case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate reply
from the reply from the Chairman, Garin filed a complaint for preliminary injunction assailing
among other that Sec 5 of RA 7942 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited
fines and penalties. RTC ruled in his favor directing MMDA to return Garin’s driver’s license and
for MMDA to desist from confiscating driver’s license without first giving the driver to opportunity
to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or
revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of traffic is constitutional.

RULING:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local
government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislative to
make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the same.

There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, P.O.,
NGO’s and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services.”
Carlos Superdrug vs DSWD

Facts:

Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the
“Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%)
discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has generalwelfare for its object.

Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same.”

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare.
ERMITA VS MAYOR OF MANILA

FACTS

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them
into 1stclass (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2ndclass (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to
get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to
have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate
impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due
process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

RULING

The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in
this case Municial Board), is valid. Without a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the
presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail
over the presumption.

Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the
challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes as a valid exercise of police power
not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the
revenue of the LGU concerned.

The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has
reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to
curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere
singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.
Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance
No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it
became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down
of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of
understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97.
In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April
30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

2. Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila,
to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the
courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were
contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on
the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the
Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila
from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the
Pandacan Terminals.

The Court finds no reason why such a protective measure should be delayed.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
 vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.

MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728               January 21, 2015

FACTS:

                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as
either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

 
FIRST ISSUE: No.

                The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded
jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely
into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.

                Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government
before a court may come into the picture.”

                Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this
right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

                In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position

that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.

                Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it, holds no water.

                The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

                By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,
definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

                Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

                The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

                Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

                Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”

                Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

                The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.

                Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws.

                The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

                The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
PBM Employees Association v. PBM
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang on
March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO, thru Pagcu, confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to
do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management.

The Management, thru Atty. CS de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers,
who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed, stating that such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would constitute to an
illegal strike.

Petitioners and their members of about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration
and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 AM to 2
PM on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first
shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike
and No Lockout.'

Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners’ right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
This is not present in the case.

It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels
for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In
seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition
against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution —
the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.

The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon is a plea for the preservation merely
of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassed and
persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and
brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of
human rights— freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances —
over property rights has been sustained.

To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, as "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition.

Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third,
then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-
third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank (94 SCRA 533 [1979])

Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their
rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes
only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5,
1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes
but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but
Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA
to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of
Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution
No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and
order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Balacuit vs Court of First
Instance GR L-38429 30
June 1988
Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing
any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling admission tickets to any
movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be
charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and
constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition
for review.  Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive
, unfair , unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 – prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to children 7-12 y/o
at full price  is constitutional or not?
Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed ordinance be
held constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To invoke the exercise the police power, it must
be for the interest of the public without interfering with private rights and adoptive means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the
property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think
most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
Vicente Dela Cruz, et.al. v. Hon. Edgardo Paras, et.al. G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983 Fernando, C.J.

FACTS

The Local Government of Bocaue, Bulacan enacted Ordinace No. 82 which sought to prohibit the
operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses in such night clubs. The Petitioners filed with
the Court of First Instance a petition for prohibition with preliminary injuction alleging that (1) the
ordinance is null and void as the municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, (2) it
violated the petitioners’ right to due process and equal protection of the law as their permits were
withdrawn without judicial hearing, and (3) that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, the
power to license and regulate tourist-oriented business including night clubs has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism.

In answer, the municipality responded that (1) it has been authorized by law to prohibit the
establishment and operation of night clubs under Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) it
was not violative of their rights as property rights are subordinate to public interests because night clubs
has been the principal cause of decadence of morality and has adverse effects to the community, and (3)
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive municipal councils to regulate or prohibit
night clubs.

The Court of First Instance upheld the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ordinance No. 84 as enacted is a valid exercise of police power by the local government
unit.

HELD

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. According to the Court, police power is granted to municipal
corporations, which may enact such ordinances and make regulations as may be necessary to carry out
its powers and duties to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order and convenience of the municipality. However, citing Justice Moreland, an ordinance
is valid unless contravenes the fundamental law of the land, an act of national legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, discriminating, or in derogation of common right.
Hence, an ordinance passed must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced
invalid. The general rule found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the
general powers of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the law of the State.

In the present case, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. All the petitioners would
have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
 Velasco vs Villegas
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of
barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners challenge the
constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, which
prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They
contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of
livelihood without due process of law.
Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an
improper exercise of police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out
in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The
objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of
the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under
Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different
measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and,
(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918
decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance
and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police
power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the
particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the
courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine
jurisprudence.”
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES                     G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS:

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during
the Christmas season.

Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of Cagayan de Oro
denounced such project.

In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2) ordinances
prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit to establishment for the
operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and providing
penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner.

Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1
Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are
merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino
gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.

As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality of gambling is
not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter,
even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng  and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it
been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide,
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and
not to the courts of justice.

CITY OF MANILA VS LAGUIO

FACTS:

The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and
lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was
licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism
as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted
which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in
case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment
shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the
Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons
but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power

W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law
HELD:

The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a
valid exercise of police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual
diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that
classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day
clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns.
These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare
of the community.

Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most
innocent places.... Every house, building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles
for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there
are no "pure" places where there are impure men.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues
of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster
the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not
a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.

The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general

laws; it is ultra vires. The Local Government Code merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property

rights adn impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The
Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend
the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
unde the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra
vires null and void.
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL VS DMCI

FACTS
On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-PDI) acquired a 7,716.60-
square meter lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former
Manila Jai-Alai Building and Adamson University. The lot was earmarked for the
construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project.
On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start the construction of its
project. It then obtained a Zoning Permit from the City of Manila's City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) on 19 June 2012 allowing it to build a "Forty-Nine (49) Storey
w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level Res'l./Condominium" on the property.
On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office
of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing
among others, that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans,
upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly
dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line
of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]"
Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manila's City
Legal Officer on whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121. In his letter dated
12 September 2012, City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is "no legal
justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-
PDI]" since the construction "lies outside the Luneta Park" and is "simply too far to be a
repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical
significance" of the Rizal Monument.
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that
garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146,
reiterating its directive in Resolution No. 121 enjoining the City of Manila's building
officials to temporarily suspend DMCI-PDI's Building Permit.
On 12 September 2014, the Knights of Rizal (KOR), a "civic, patriotic, cultural, non-partisan,
non-sectarian and non-profit organization" created under Republic Act No. 646, 19 filed a
Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project.

KOR Contends
The KOR asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure will "[stick] out like a sore
thumb, [dwarf] all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever
ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila building would
loom at the back and overshadow the entire monument, whether up close or viewed from a
distance. ''

ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of Torre De Manila should be prohibited

SC RULING. NO
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not
expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to
morals, customs and public order."
In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of
law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through law. Without this
principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily jand
whimsically trampled upon by the shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or
those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet trolls.
In other instances, the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not expressly
prohibited by statutes when it determines that these acts were not contrary to morals,
customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable
solution to the controversy.
However, it is the law itself - Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code - which prescribes
that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if
also not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to
morals, customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the
community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied
with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre
de Manila Project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the
construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista,
sightline, or setting" of the Rizal Monument.

ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of Torre De Manila violated the zoning laws of
City of Manila
SC RULING. NO.
Zoning, as well as land use, in the City of Manila is governed by Ordinance No. 8119. The
ordinance provides for standards and guidelines to regulate development projects of
historic sites and facilities within the City of Manila.
The standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as guides, as it
expressly states that "the following shall guide the development of historic sites and
facilities." A guide simply sets a direction 'or gives an instruction to be followed by
property owners and developers in order to conserve and enhance a property's heritage
values.
Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the "development of historic sites
and facilities." Section 48 regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is
nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a
building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect
the background of a historic site.

In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument
and "cannot possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument." Likewise, ;the Torre de
Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an "anthropological or archeological area" or in
an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure
by the NHCP.