I.

LIBERTY OF ABODE & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Definition and Scope
● Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919
Facts:
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by
the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to
remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered
to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans.
The Manguianes are a non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught
and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the
province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating
the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in
which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation
on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.

Issue:
WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional because it deprives a person
of his liberty of abode.

Held:
No. The court ruled that pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code it does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section
does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that
section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat
analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional.
· SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; BASIS; WHEN PROPERLY APPLICABLE.
— The power to provide for the issuance of the reconcentration orders contemplated in section
2145 of the Administrative Code rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the
liberty and freedom of action of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained, without
consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general welfare. The power rests upon
necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly exercised only where certain
individuals or groups of individuals are found to be of such a low grade of civilization, that their
own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.

· Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are not violated by section 2145 of
the Administrative Code of 1917 since there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and it applies to all of a class.

· "Liberty" as understood in democracies is not license; it is "liberty regulated by law."

Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercised without restraint,
deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulation of law.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons for the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province;
and (2) the only successful method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in
a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following: (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino
people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against
petitioners. So ordered.

Note:
Non-Christian

- Relate to degree of civilization

- All persons preserving tribal relations
14th Amendment to the US Constitution

- “That no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws.
- Universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

Liberty

- Creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses
on right.
- Regulated by law
- Consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do
what one ought not do desire.
- Freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same
right by others.

Civil Liberty

- The measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently

with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others.

Right to Liberty

- Right to exist
- Right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude.
The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to
delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.
Action pursuant to Section 2145 does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of
law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws and confinement in accordance
with the said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. Therefore,
petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.

REASONS for the action, the following:

(1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following;
(3) The protection of the Manguianes;
(4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam;
(5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power.
But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the
citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. None of the rights of the citizen can
be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been
often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and
notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion
of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. The idea of the provision in
question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest
conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is
shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill
this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and
the good of the country.

Notes:
Habeas Corpus was not granted because the resolution was a valid police power.
Americans have colonial power.
No deprivation of liberty.

● Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986

Facts: 
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain time.
He went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both
businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner of
Immigration not to clear Manotoc for departure, and a memorandum to this effect was issued
by the Commissioner.
Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for estafa
against Manotoc. Manotoc posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for permission to
leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." His motion was denied. He also
wrote the Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's
memorandum, but said request was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as the
communication-request of the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The same was denied;
hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. He contends that having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.

Issues: 

1. Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines.

2. Whether the constitutional right to travel is absolute

Held: 
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is
a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (Sec 6. Art. III, 1987 Constitution) states:
 The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court,
or when necessary, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.

Note:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is
a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

The constitutional right to travel is not an absolute right. The Constitution provides: "The liberty
of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court xxx." The
order of the trial court releasing the petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order. 

● Yap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001

Facts: 

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed
Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that he will secure “a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the
area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the
reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the
CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also
contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming
that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues: 

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violates the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held:
No. 

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights.  Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
 The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.  Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer
look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing
abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.

● Pichay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 241742 and 241753-59, May 12, 2021
Facts:
On July 12, 2016, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed eight information against petitioner
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay) with the Sandiganbayan. The charges, among others, involved
(1) violation of Section X126.2(c)(1)(2)5 of the Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB), in
relation to Sections 36 and 37 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7653; (2) violation of Sections 19 and 66
of RA No. 8791, in relation to Section 36 of RA No. 7653; (3) three counts of violation of Section
3(e) of RA No. 3019; and (4) three counts of malversation.
Pichay was faulted for his failure to comply with the requirement of prior approval of the (1)
President, under Administrative Order No. 59; and (2) Monetary Board, under Section X126.2,
Part I of the MORB, before purchasing the shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. (ESBI).
On July 18, 2016, the Sandiganbayan motu proprio issued a Hold Departure Order (HDO)
Resolution, directing the Bureau of Immigration to prohibit Pichay and his co-accused from
leaving the country for any destination abroad, except by prior written permission duly secured
from and granted by the Sandiganbayan.
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2016, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the charges against
Pichay for (1) violation of Sections 19 and 66 of RA No. 8791, in relation to Section 36 of RA No.
7653; and (2) three counts of malversation.
Later, in a Resolution dated November 17, 2017, the Sandiganbayan found probable cause to
indict Pichay for (1) violation of Section X126.2(c)(1)(2) of the MORB, in relation to Sections 36
and 37 of RA No. 7653 and (2) three counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 for (a)
fund releases for the purchase of 445,377 ESBI shares at P80,003,070.51, (b) deposit and/or
capital infusion of P400,000,000.00, and (c) deposit of P300,000,000.00.
Pichay filed a Motion to Lift HDO. the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Lift HDO for lack of
merit. 
Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Lift HDO and in
sustaining the HDO's validity.

Held:
No. Pichay failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the HDO, in upholding its validity, and in
denying the Motion to Lift the HDO. Clearly, pursuant to its inherent power as a court of justice,
the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction in issuing said HDO. Respondent People of the
Philippines contends that the issuance of a HDO does not violate Pichay's constitutional right to
travel but is an exercise of the Sandiganbayan's power to preserve and maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of Pichay. The court disagree to
Pichay that none of the allowable limitations on the right to travel are present in this case.
The Sandiganbayan is a special court tasked to hear and decide cases against public officers and
employees and entrusted with the difficult task of policing and ridding the government ranks of
the dishonest and corrupt." While there is no law particularly vesting the Sandiganbayan the
authority to issue HDOs, the same is not necessary for it to exercise this power. The
Sandiganbayan is "given the full disposition of all the powers inherent in all courts of justice to
effectuate the exercise of its jurisdiction, including the issuance of HDOs, if in its good
judgment, it finds necessary in the administration of justice."
Pichay, as one facing criminal charges with the People of the Philippines as the offended party,
should hold himself amenable to court orders and processes at all times. Otherwise, such
orders and processes would serve no purpose if he would be allowed to leave the country,
outside the reach of the courts. An accused in a criminal case may be issued an HDO, as a valid
restriction on their right to travel, so that they may be dealt with in accordance with law.

Note:

J. RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Definition and Scope
● Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9 2002
FACTS:
Through PD No. 1084, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was tasked by former president and
dictator Ferdinand Marcos, to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to
develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. As a result, an amendment
was made on a previous contract with Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). Prior to PEA, CDCP was tasked to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The amended contract now directed CDCP to transfer to PEA all the
development rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in the reclamation.

Under former President Cory Aquino, titles of parcels of land reclaimed under Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) were transferred to PEA. These covered three
reclaimed islands known as the “Freedom Islands.”

PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to
develop the Freedom Islands, notably the reclamation of an additional 250 ha of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the plan. The JVA was entered into through
negotiation without public bidding. Former President Fidel Ramos then approved the JVA.

Controversy broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. The Senate conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of public domain which
the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these
lands. Moreover, the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands were void, and that the
JVA itself was illegal.

In his capacity as taxpayer, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. He argued
that the government will lose billions of pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public disclosure of
the renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Constitutional right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.

He also alleged that the JVA is against the Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to public corporations.
A year after the filing of the petition, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement (Amended JVA). Former President Estrada signed the Amended JVA.

ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information or on going
negotiations before a final judgement

HELD:

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. The court has held that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right
to information in several legislations.

REASON: encourages our people to watch closely the proprietary acts of State functionaries
which more often than not, because they have been cloaked in technical jargon and speculation
due to the absence of verifiable resource materials, have been left unaccounted for public
debate and searching inquiry.

● Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS: 

On September 28, 2005, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 464[1].
Effective on the date of its issuance, the said order aims to (a) ensure the observance of the
principle of the separation of powers; (b) ensure adherence to the rule on executive privilege;
and (c) respect the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Section 1 of the said order requires all heads of the departments of the Executive Branch to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. Section 2(a) of the same order enumerates the kind of information covered by
executive privilege, while Section 2(b) lists down the list of officials covered by the order.
Finally, Section 3 requires all officials mentioned in Section 2(b) to secure authorization from
the President prior to appearing before the Senate or the House of Representatives. 

Curiously, E.O. 464 was issued at a time when both the Senate and the House of
Representatives were conducting congressional inquiries, to wit: (a) the North Rail Project; (b)
the "Hello Garci" wiretapping scandal; (c) Ginintuang Masaganang Ani fertilizer fund scam; and
(d) the Venable contract. With the issuance of E.O. 464, the public officials invited to attend said
inquiries were effectively barred from attending without consent from the President. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern

HELD:
Yes. Given that congressional hearings are generally held in public, any executive issuance that
tends to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the
people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can
use in formulating their opinions on the matter before Congress -- opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal
means allowed by their freedom of expression.

● Privatization Management Office v. Strategic Dev’t, G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013
● Sereno v. National Economic and Dev’t Authority, G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016
Facts:
On May 23, 2005, the CTRM, an office under the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and
certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates
on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July
2005.

Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical

Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical
sector, wrote to the CTRM Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director
Mendoza), to request a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005. 

The CTRM, again through Director Mendoza, sent a second letter as a response to the series of
letter-requests from the APMP. They said that they are constrained [not] to provide the said
minutes to the APMP, because they are of the view that the limitation pertaining to closed door
cabinet meetings under Section 3 (c) of the IRR applies to the minutes of the meeting requested
by APMP.

The APMP sent another letter-request to the CTRM through Director Mendoza reminding about
the legal implications of the refusal to furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of the
petitioner’s Constitutional right of access to information on matters of public concern.
However, the CTRM continued to refuse access to the documents sought by the APMP. The
attitude of the CTRM prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring the petition for
mandamus in the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and to grant
access to the minutes. 

Issue:
Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a
copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern and the State’s policy of full public disclosure.

Held:

No.  People’s right to information is not absolute.  It is limited to matters of public concern, and
is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State’s policy of full
public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. 
Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of
mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or
public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether
or not a particular information is of public concern or public interest. Both terms cover a wide-
range of issues that the public may want to be familiar with either because the issues have a
direct effect on them or because the issues “naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen.” As such, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern is
left to the proper determination of the courts on a case-to-case basis.

The second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-
door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was classified
as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee’s composition and the nature of
its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that
the information withheld was within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the
CTRM meetings were directly related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the
President as the Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as
provided in Section 3 (a) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.

Here, the need to ensure the protection of the privilege of non-disclosure is necessary to allow
the free exchange of ideas among Government officials as well as to guarantee the well-
considered recommendation free from interference of the inquisitive public.  

NOTE:
RTC declared that the “CTRM is an advisory body composed of various department heads or
secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and inter-agency communications;”14 and that
the record of the communications of such body “falls under the category of privileged
information because of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect public interest.
● Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, G.R. No. 210858, June 29, 2016
FACTS:
-      In an Amended Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement dated 5 April 2002 (Agreement),
petitioner Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) awarded the Machine-Readable Passport and
Visa Project (MRPN Project) to respondent BCA International Corporation (BCA), a domestic
corporation.
-      During the implementation of the MRPN Project, DFA sought to terminate the
Agreement. However, BCA opposed the termination and filed a Request for Arbitration,
according to the provision in the Agreement.
-      an ad hoc arbitral tribunal was constituted, the arbitral tribunal approved BCA's request
to apply in court for the issuance of subpoena, subject to the conditions that the application
will not affect its proceedings and will proceed whether the witnesses attend or not.
-      BCA filed before the RTC a Petition for Assistance in Taking Evidence pursuant to the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of "The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,"
or Republic Act No. 9285 (RA 9285). 
-      DFA filed its comment, alleging that the presentation of the witnesses and documents
was prohibited by law and protected by the deliberative process privilege.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the witnesses presented before the ad hoc arbitral tribunal are prohibited from
disclosing information on the basis of the deliberative process privilege
 

RULING:
No. As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency asserting the
deliberative process privilege to prove that the information in question satisfies both
requirements - predecisional and deliberative. "The agency bears the burden of establishing the
character of the decision, the deliberative process involved, and the role played by the
documents in the course of that process." It may be overcome upon a showing that the
discoverant's interests in disclosure of the materials outweigh the government's interests in
their confidentiality. "The determination of need must be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad
hoc basis," and the "factors relevant to this balancing include: the relevance of the evidence,
whether there is reason to believe the documents may shed light on government misconduct,
whether the information sought is available from other sources and can be obtained without
compromising the government's deliberative processes, and the importance of the material to
the discoverant's case."

K. RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION
Definition and Scope
● In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973 (not
docketed)
Facts:
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations. Since then, the Court has closely observed and
followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for
the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed
by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as
Rep. Act 6397. 
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and
necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to
Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well
as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine
Bar at this time.

Issue:
WON the integration of the Bar be constitutional.
Held:
Yes. The Courts have upheld their constitutionality. The Court held that Integration is not
violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become a member
of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of
activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it
does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state.
Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid by the lawyer
may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would
make every government exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice
out his objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.
The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration
of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context
of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
NOTE:
Integration of the Philippine Bar
- means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines.
- requires membership and financial support of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Bar
- refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys.
- An Integrated Bar perforce must include all lawyers.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make
reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in
order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.

Bar integration has yielded the following benefits:

(1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar;
(2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar;
(3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the
Integrated Bar;
(4) greater Bar facilities and services;
(5) elimination of unauthorized practice;
(6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns;
(7) establishment of an official status for the Bar;
(8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its
obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public.

● Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD) is a government-owned and controlled corporation
in Davao City represented by its General Manager Engr. Rodora N. Gamboa (GM Gamboa). The
private respondents are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao City Water
District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several administrative cases due to acts
committed during the anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts with
inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the designated places. The inscriptions and
postings bore employees’ grievances.
The members and officers of NAMADACWAD have been staging pickets in front of the DCWD
Office during their lunch breaks to air their grievances about the non-payment of their
Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) incentives and their opposition to DCWD’s
privatization and proposed One Hundred Million Peso Loan. GM Gamboa issued an Office
Memorandum addressed to all department managers concerning the different activities that
would take place during DCWD’s then upcoming anniversary celebration.
The officers and members of NAMADACWAD held an Emergency General Assembly and they
agreed to wear NAMADACWAD t-shirts with inscriptions stating, "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir.
Braganza Pahawa Na!" on the day of the anniversary. Officers and members sported t-shirts
with inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!" at the beginning of the
Fun Run at VictoriaPlaza at around 6:30 in the morning and continued to wear the same inside
the premises of the DCWD office during the office hours.
As a consequence of their actions, GM Gamboa sent a Memorandum addressed to the officers
and members of NAMADACWAD, requiring them to explain the reasons for the attire they wore
during the anniversary celebration. Through a collective letter, the officers and members
explained that the Memorandum only required the employees to wear any sports attire,
though theirs were with additional inscriptions containing grievances. They countered that the
inscriptions were but manifestations of their constitutional rights of free speech and freedom of
expression.
GM Gamboa filed formal charges against the officers and members of NAMADACWAD for
violation of Existing Civil Service Law and Rules of Serious Nature. Aranjuez, et al., filed an
appeal before the CSC bringing up, among other issues, the violation of their constitutional
rights to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.
CSC partly granted the appeal and held that the collective act of respondents in wearing t-shirts
with grievance inscriptions during office hours was not within the ambit of the definition of
prohibited mass action punishable under CSC Resolution 021316 since there was no intent to
cause work stoppage. However, CSC ruled that Cagula’s act of posting of grievances outside the
designated areas was a clear violation. The said act was agreed and conspired by the other
officers of NAMADACWAD which makes them liable and be reprimanded.

Issue:
WON government employees constitutional right to freedom of speech may be regulated.

Held:
Yes, though the Court finds no merit in ruling a suspension or dismissal to those who violated
the rules governing the posting of posters with grievances only within the designated places, the
court affirmed they violated the said rule and must be reprimanded.
CSC issued MC. No. 33 in recognition of the rights of the government employees to air their
grievances balanced by the delivery of services to the public which should not be prejudiced.
Pursuant to this mandate, the former General Manager of DCWD issued an office memorandum
designating the bulletin board at the motor-pool area below the Office of the Purchasing Division
and the side of the office building beside the guard house where the bundy clock is located as
the designated areas for posting of grievances. Clearly, the DCWD Office Memorandum hews
close and faithfully to MC No. 33. It is a reasonable rule issued by the heads of the agencies in
order to regulate posting of grievances of the employees.
It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different
degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the
relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by
reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment "must
accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so
fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public
employment. It is the Court’s responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these
fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.
In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of expression is not removal of the
constitutional right.

Note:
The GSIS case pronounced:
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to
voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests.
Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold
that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this
basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
Thus, in line with the civil service rules and jurisprudence, we conclude that a violation of an
office memorandum, which was issued as an internal rule to regulate the area for posting of
grievances inside the office premise, is only a light offense punishable by reprimand.
Rules and regulations are issued to attain harmony, smooth operation, maximize efficiency and
productivity, with the ultimate objective of realizing the functions of particular offices and
agencies of the government.

● Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 211145,
October 14, 2015
Facts:
Alfie F. Alipio, authorized representative of the Samahan, filed an application for registration of
its name "Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE. Attached to the
application were the list of names of the association's officers and members, signatures of the
attendees of the February 7, 2010 meeting, copies of their Constitution and By-laws. The
application stated that the association had a total of 120 members.
The corresponding certificate of registration in Samahan's favor was granted by DOLE Regional
Office No. 3 in San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction
Co., with offices at Greenbeach 1, Renondo Peninsula filed a petition with DOLE-Pampanga
praying for the cancellation of registration of Samahan's association on the ground that its
members did not fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of
Article 243 (now 249). Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers,
self-employed, and those without definite employers may form a workers' association. It
further posited that one third (1/3) of the members of the association had definite employers
and the continued existence and registration of the association would prejudice the company's
goodwill.
Hanjin filed a supplemental petition, adding the alternative ground that Samahan committed a
misrepresentation in connection with the list of members and/or voters who took part in the
ratification of their constitution and by-laws in its application for registration. Hanjin claimed
that Samahan made it appear that its members were all qualified to become members of the
workers' association.
DOLE-Pampanga called for a conference, wherein Samahan requested for a 10-day period to
file a responsive pleading. No pleading, however, was submitted. Instead, Samahan filed a
motion to dismiss. DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis ruled in favor of Hanjin. He found that
the preamble, as stated in the Constitution and By-Laws of Samahan, was an admission on its
part that all of its members were employees of Hanjin.
Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Samahan pointed out
that the words “Hanjin Shipyard” was used to refer to a workplace and not as an employer or
company. When a shipyard was put up in Subic, Zambales, it became known as Hanjin Shipyard.
Further, the remaining 63 members stated that they were either working or had worked at
Hanjin and therefore no misrepresentation.
The Bureau of Labor Relations granted Samahan’s appeal and reversed the decision of the RD,
but directed Samahan to remove “Hanjin Shipyard” from name of association. CA reversed the
decision of the BLR; the registration of Samahan is contrary to the Labor Code. The CA stressed
that only 57/120 members were working at Hanjin while the phrase in the preamble created an
impression that ALL members were employees of Hanjin à a clear proof of misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in cancelling the registration of Samahan.

Held:
Yes, right to self-organization includes the right to form a union, workers’ association and labor
management councils: More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism
workers, however, can also form and join a workers’ association as well as labor-management
councils. Art. XIII of the ’87 Constitution Sec. 3 states that the State shall guarantee the rights of
all workers to self-organization. Art. III of the Labor Code states that the State shall assure the
rights of workers to Self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work. The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism. Workers
may also form or join an association for mutual aid and protection and for other legitimate
purposes. 
Note:
The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism. Workers may also form or join an
association for mutual aid and protection and for other legitimate purposes.

L. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Definition and Scope
● Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988
Facts:
Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of Jupiter Street, Makati Metro
Manila. Sangalang and the other petitioners who are also residents of Jupiter Street initially
filed a case against Ayala to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement upon
property pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale covering the subdivision, and
for damages. The other petitions were also for the enforcement of the aforesaid restrictions
stipulated in the deeds of sale executed by the Ayala Corporation.
The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by MDC subject to certain
conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of
sale. When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the
whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and Jupiter Street, from
Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, was still undeveloped. Although it was
not part of the original plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along
Jupiter.
In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the
zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street.
Under the zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common boundary of Bel-Air
Village and the commercial zone.

Gates had been installed by BAVA (Bell-Arat strategic locations across Jupiter Street which were
manned and operated by its own security guards who were employed to maintain, supervise
and enforce traffic regulations in the roads and streets of the village. Then, on January 17, 1977,
the Office of the Mayor of Makati directed that, in the interest of public welfare and for the
purpose of easing traffic congestion, the streets in Bel-Air Village should be opened for public
use. The other streets in Bel-Air Village were voluntarily opened except Jupiter Street. The
Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised the latter to open for
vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire portion of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to
Reposo Street. Finally, the municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed
and removed the gates constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as
well as the gates/fences located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and
then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic.
Petitioners brought the present action for damages against the defendant-appellant Ayala
Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict.
After trial on the merits, the then Court of First Instance favored the petitioners and awarded
damages. Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at its original
position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, at its own expense,
On appeal, CA reversed the lower court, finding the decision appealed from as not supported
by the facts and the law on the matter, it was set aside and another one entered dismissing the
case for lack of a cause of action.

Issue:
WON Ayala Corporation is liable for damages as a result of the destruction of the perimeter
wall.

Held: 
1. NO. Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's
commercial section, it had been considered as a boundary not as a part of either the residential
or commercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects, hence it cannot
be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village residents.
Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by the authorities of Makati and
the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the records themselves reveals, by the
petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association itself would
confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use by both -the commercial
and residential blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore, for the exclusive use of
either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as
distinguished from the general public. When the wall was erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in
1970 and 1972, it was not for the purpose of physically separating the two blocks.
According to Ayala Corporation, it was put up to enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better
control of the security in the area, and as the Ayala Corporation's "show of goodwill". That
maintaining the wall was a matter of a contractual obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure
conjecture. In fine, we cannot hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment
it did not make, much less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it.

2. Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not

absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people.' 
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense,
the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be
judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guarantee. Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and
commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the
exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality.

● Harrison Motors v. Navarro, G.R. No. 132269, April 27, 2000

Facts:
Harrison Motors Corp. sold 2 Isuzu Elf trucks to private respondent Navarro, owner of
RNFreight Lines, a franchise holder operating and maintaining a fleet of cargo trucks all over
Luzon. Petitioner assembled 2 trucks using component parts. Before the sale, all BIR Taxes and
customs duties for the parts used on the two trucks had been paid for. Subsequently, BIR, BOC,
and LTO entered into a tripartite MOA that before registration in the LTO of any locally
assembled vehicle using imported parts, a Certificate of Payment should first be obtained from
BIR and BOC for proof that all taxes and custom duties have been paid. Government agents
seized and detained the two trucks of Navarro after discovering that there were still unpaid
taxes. Wanting to secure immediate release of trucks, Navarro paid the assessed BIR taxes and
customs duties and ask for reimbursement but Claros again refused.
Issue:
W/N the 2 MOA’s impair the contract of sale between petitioner and private respondent.
 
Ruling:
The Memorandum of Agreement does not impose any additional taxes which would unduly
impair the contract of sale between petitioner and private respondent. Instead, these
administrative orders were passed to enforce payment of existing BIR taxes and customs duties
at the time of importation. Petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious. What Sec. 10 Art. III of the
Constitution prohibits is the passage of a law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner
changes the intention of the contracting parties.

● Ortigas & Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000
Facts:  
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted an Ordinance reclassified
as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of
Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located. In 1984, private respondent leased the lot and
constructed a single-story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company. In 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against the owner of the lot with the RTC, the
complaint sought the demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms
and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a TRO and
injunction to prohibit petitioner from in engaging a commercial activity on the lot while the trial
court issued and denied the MR of the private Respondent. Private Respondent filed with the
CA a special civil action for certiorari, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion which
the appellate court granted. Complainant seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the
appellate court denied it, hence this petition.
Issue: 
Whether the retroactive effect of the assailed ordinance violates the Right to Non-Impairment
of Contracts of the complainants?
Held: 
No, in general, the court agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective
operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself
and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts.
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions
could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police
power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the
superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in
exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. The contractual stipulations
annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that
stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a
commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the
contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to
single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of
the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the
sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,
nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene “law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.” Otherwise, such stipulations would be deemed null and void.

● Republic v. Tancinco, G.R. No. 139256, December 27, 2002

Facts:

 The National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA), a domestic corporation created for the
purpose of engaging in the trading of sugar, and a subsidiary of the Philippine Sugar
Commission (Philsucom), an entity owned and controlled by the Philippine government, leased
the warehouse of Sulpicio Tancinco in Cagayan de Oro City. The contract was for a period of 3
months starting November 23, 1984 renewable for another 3 years. On December 29, 1984, the
eastern wall of the warehouse collapsed causing death and injuries to several persons and
damage to houses within the area. Tancinco was constrained to incur expenses for the repair
and restoration of the warehouse and indemnity for the victims. Due to NASUTRA’s refusal to
reimburse Tancinco, the latter filed on March 28, 1985 a complaint for Damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City (Branch 23). NASUTRA filed its Answer disclaiming
any liability. In the meantime, NASUTRA was converted into a private corporation called the
Philippine Sugar Marketing Corporation (Philsuma), the sole marketing agency for the sugar
industry to be owned completely by sugar producers. Thereafter, Philsucom was phased out by
Executive Order No. 18 in 1986, at same time creating petitioner SRA. NASUTRA substituted
petitioner SRA and filed on February 8, 1988, an Answer putting up the defenses that it cannot
be liable for NASUTRA’s obligation as it was created after the incident took place and that it is a
separate and distinct entity from the former.

Issue: Whether or not Tancinco or his heirs may recover NASUTRA’s adjudged liability from SRA.
 
Ruling:
 
 YES. There is no question that Executive Order No. 18 abolished the Philippine Sugar
Commission (Philsucom) and created the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA). However, the
abolition of NASUTRA and eventually Philsucom did not abate the pendency of the suits filed
against them. The termination of the life of a juridical entity does not by itself cause the
extinction or diminution of the rights and liabilities of such entity; specially in this case where,
pursuant to the transitory provision of E.O. No. 18, Philsucom, under the supervision of SRA,
was allowed to continue as a juridical entity for 3 years for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and
convey its property; and to distribute its assets. If and when a pending action cannot be
terminated within said 3-year period, SRA, which has been appointed by law to supervise the
closing affairs of Philsucom, is considered a trustee which shall continue to prosecute and
defend suits filed by or against it. It being the trustee, SRA must therefore continue the legal
personality of the defunct NASUTRA and Philsucom until final judgment and execution stage of
the case.

● Phil. Rural Electric Cooperatives v. DILG Secretary, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003
Facts:

On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other
electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other petitioners,
electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1)
are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as
amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National
Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling
recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any court
or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now
National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements with
the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions
have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of
the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to all
persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, while
Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.

Issue:
WON there is an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into
between the Philippine and the US Governments.

Held:
No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the
prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the
impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a
change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-
parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption in
favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply
shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower
and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec.
193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the
obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact,
no tax exemption is granted therein.
● United BF Homeowners v. Mayor of Paranaque, G.R. No. 141010, February 7, 2007
● The Learning Child v. Ayala Alabang Village Association, G.R. Nos. 134269/134440/1445,
July 7, 2010
● Express Investments v. Bayan Telecommunications, G.R. Nos. 174457-59/ 175418-20 &
177270, December 5, 2012