RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES & SEIZURES

Definition and Scope

● Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
Facts:
Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to have
committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally,
and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank
Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and
the Rules of court by:
(1) not describing with particularity, the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal
in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law;
The defects of said warrants were cured by petitioner’s consent; and in any event, the effects
are admissible regardless of the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a
resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the
offices of the corporations.

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD:
No, the search warrant is invalid. The SC ruled in favor of petitioners. The constitution protects
the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case
at bar, none of these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference
to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be
seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued
against their corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.
The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of
the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that
the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.

NOTES:
SAID WARRANT
- NO PARTICULARITY

RESULT TO GENERAL WARRANT

HOW THE COURT CHARACTERIZE THE WARRANTS? – GENERAL WARRANT

KUNG PWEDE ISEARCH- AUTHORITIES CAN PLANT SOMETHING

WHY VIOLATIVE TO THE CONSTITUTION? – PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 

Lessons Applicable: Right against warrantless searches and seizures

Laws Applicable: bill of rights

● Parulan v. Directors of Prisons, G.R. No. L-28519, February 17, 1968

Facts:
Parulan was serving life imprisonment (commuted to 20 years by the President) in Muntinlupa.
In Oct 1964, he was transferred to Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the same month, but was
recaptured in Manila. He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under Art. 157 of the RPC.
The CFI in Manila found him guilty and sentenced him accordingly.
He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the Director of Bureau of Prisons,
praying that the latter be ordered “to release immediately and without delay the body of the
petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement.” Parulan contended that his confinement was
illegal because the sentence of conviction imposed upon him for the crime of evasion of service
of sentence was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense
with which he was charged.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the
sentence upon Parulan for evasion of service of sentence.

HELD:
Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
          Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In transitory crimes or continuing offenses, acts material to the crime occur in one province and
some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of
the essential ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. In some crimes,
although the elements thereof for its consummation occurred in one place, yet by the very
nature of the offense committed, the violation is deemed to be continuing. Crime is not
consummated after the convict has escaped from confinement, for as long as he continues to
evade the service, he is deemed to continue committing the crime and may be arrested without
warrant at any place where he may be found.

Note:
 the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and
operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the
convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as
long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the
crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof,
one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from
confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at
the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime — evading the
service of his sentence.

Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under
section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is
where he has escaped from confinement.  Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is
founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime — evading the service of his sentence.

Habeas Corpus
- writ requiring a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court,
especially to secure the person's release unless lawful grounds are shown for
their detention.
-  the judge or court should (and must) have any person who is being detained brought
forward so that the legality of that person's detention can be assessed.

Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief
by habeas corpus.
● Bache & Co. v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-32409, February 27, 1971 (PROBABLE CAUSE
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Misael Vera, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache& Co., herein
petitioner corporation for violation of Section 46(a) of the NIRC in relation to all other pertinent
provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209.
Vera authorized, Rodolfo de Leon, his Revenue Examiner, to make and file the application of
search warrant which was attached to the letter.  
In the afternoon of the following day, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the CFI of Rizal. They brought the following:
1. Vera’s letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by
respondent De Leon;
2. An affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon;
3. A deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him
but not yet subscribed; and
4. A search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
When the respondents arrived at the court, the respondent Judge Ruiz, was still hearing a
certain case.
So, by means of a note, the judge instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of
respondents De Leon and Logronio.
When the session was adjourned, the deputy clerk informed the judge that the depositions
were taken then the stenographer read to the judge her notes; and thereafter, respondent
Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for a search warrant and
respondent Logronio’s deposition, and the Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by
respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, the agents of BIR served the warrant and seized 6 boxes of documents.
The petitioners moved to quash the search warrant, filed for an injunction, and other reliefs
prayed for but the respondent judge dismissed the petition.
The Bureau made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97,
partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant was validly issued.

HELD:
NO. The Court found three (3) defects in the search warrant issued.

1. First, there was no personal examination of the judge.

2. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
3. Third, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null
and void

RATIO DECIDENDE:
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant (respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio).
The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge
did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and
to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training,
was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on
the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause. This is pursuant to Art.
III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after
a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any
rule to the contrary.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax
Code.
1. The first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. T
2. he second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
3. The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and
4. The fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or
gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon).

Hence, it is a clear violation of Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the RRC which states:

“Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.”

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 in this manner:

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts

and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of
stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded
messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs;
records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the
years 1966 to 1970."

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec.
3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.

1. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow ; or
2. When the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or
3. When the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court).

The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests.

If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said
offense; and

the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence.

In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned,
at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of
payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale,
messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign
remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.

Note:
it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.

require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit
the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be
made, — that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of
this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities." cralaw virtua1aw library

● Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the
warrant were real properties.

 Issue: 
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

 Held:
No. The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court
as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place
sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two
distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrants.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not
claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
 Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
 The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy
the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere
generalizations.
 Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.
(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be
searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

Note:
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped
from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents.
These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he
pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not
and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this
petition.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
● People v. Burgos, G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
Summary: 
An informant identified a certain person as a member of a subversive group who forcibly
recruited him and based on this information, the police went to arrest the suspect. At the time
of the arrest, the suspect was merely plowing his field.

Rule of Law: 
In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.

Facts: 
Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA, threatening him with
the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members
went to the house of the Burgos (D) and saw him plowing his field when they arrived. One of
the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm. At first, Burgos (D)
denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house
where a gun was buried in the ground.

After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers
recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the firearm was
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.

Issues: 
Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling: 
No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the wife of Burgos (D).

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is
an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were
still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject
firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest
lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted.

● Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Association filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same
or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation
of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit
of a search warrant and/or court order. The petitioners averred that there’s a recent incident
happened, where a certain Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing
to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioners further contend that the said
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without
search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution;  and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE:
WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search
and seizures.

HELD:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in
other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing an effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the
benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may
take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement,
so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most
likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner, that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure
in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure.

Hence, petition dismissed.

NOTE:
Mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes
a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 
for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds,  or simply looks into a vehicle,  or flashes a light therein,  these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
ALLOWABLE EXTENT- VISUAL SEARCH
SUSCEPTIBLE
● Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991
FACTS:
Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed
to be one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was
being treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.
Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is
Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons.
Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
In these 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the
military on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's
Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:
YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized
and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing
offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined
in the St. Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant,
at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural
had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere
as agents or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing an organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers
of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence
of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant.
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be
held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
Note:
Commission under continuing crimes-
Did the personal knowledge constituted- complied, because
2nd exception

● Paper Industries Corporation vs. Asuncion, G.R. No. 122092, May 19, 1999
FACTS:  On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its]
control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense,
or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any
agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding
several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search
warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound
and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the
search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a «Motion to Quash» before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a «Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash» and a «Motion
to SuppressEvidence.» On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which
denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested
Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are:  (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.  In the present case,
the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the
complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the
hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners
were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not
described with particularity.

Note:
Rationale (Place)
- Prone to abuse

Sketches
- Not sufficient
- Not part of the warrant

● People v. Robles, G.R. No. 101335, June 8, 2000

Facts:
On January 30, 1987, at around 1:00 P.M., Patrolmen Rey Cocson, Edgar Amurao, and C.
Tabanera were on board a police vehicle patrolling the vicinity of Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila.
The police car came alongside a taxicab with two male passengers. When the policemen
noticed that the passengers were acting suspiciously and could not look directly at them, they
signaled the taxicab driver to stop for routine inspection. The policemen asked the names of
the passengers. They were identified as Manas and appellant Robles. The policemen saw two
bags on the floor of the back of the taxicab. Robles broke down and admitted that they had
robbed the house of one Jose Macalino in Makati. Manas remained silent. Patrolman Cocson
frisked Robles and found a .38 cal. revolver. Patrolman Tabanera frisked Manas, and recovered
a fan knife (balisong) from him.
In the bags were shoes, cameras, watches, and assorted items. Robles admitted taking them
from the residence of Jose Macalino. After apprising them of their constitutional rights, the
policemen brought Robles and Manas to the police headquarters. Since Patrolman Cocson
noticed a bag with the nametag Beth M. Puzon and a telephone number, he called up the
number and spoke with Beth M. Puzon, a daughter of Jose Macalino. Subsequently, Robles and
Manas were turned over to the Makati Police Department.
Detective Ernesto Gatpayat of the Makati Police Station proceeded to the house of Jose
Macalino and found the house ransacked. He discovered two dead persons inside the house,
later identified as Marilou Dalugdugan and Diego Limato, household helpers of Macalino.
After apprising Robles and Manas of their constitutional rights and in the presence of counsel,
Patrolman Celso Noriega, Makati Police station investigator, took down their statements.
In his statement Robles admitted that he participated in the robbery, but not in the killing. He
stated that on the night of January 29, 1987, Manas, Antonio, and one Jun planned the robbery.
Manas and Antonio pushed through with their plan. They were proceeding to Tondo when
apprehended by the police officers.
Manas, in his statement that he stabbed Dalugdugan with a screwdriver to stop her from
screaming when she saw Antonio stabbing Limato. Manas claimed that Robles was with them
inside the house, not waiting at the nearby Shakey's.
On February 5, 1987, the following Information for Robbery with Double Homicide was filed
against Robles and Manas.

Issue:
1. WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is admissible.
2. WON there is sufficient evidence to convict him beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:
1. Yes. Appellant's contentions as well as those of the OSG, in the light of the testimonies
and other pieces of evidence submitted and on record, the court hold that first, the
extrajudicial confessions of appellant and his co-accused are admissible against them.
The allegation that they were not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation is
belied by the records, which clearly show that Atty. Eugenio C. Macababayao Jr. was
present during the entire investigation. Further, the same lawyer acted as counsel for
appellant Robles during trial. Atty. Macababayao did not dispute that he was present
and he assisted the appellant and his co-accused at the time they executed their
confessions. Neither did he deny his signatures attesting that he was present in the
 preparation of the extrajudicial confessions and assisted appellant and his co-accused.
As pointed out by the trial court, appellant Robles never brought to the attention of his
counsel that he was threatened by the policemen into making his extrajudicial
confession.

Appellant makes a belated attempt to question the validity of his arrest because of the
police's failure to inform him of his Miranda rights at the time of arrest. But, however,
any objection involving the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, said objection is deemed waived. 
The defects in the arrest, if any, were cured by appellant's voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, when he entered his plea during arraignment and when he
actively participated in the trial, without raising those defects. 

2. Yes. Sec. 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court  provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to convict (1) when there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the following circumstances prove the culpability of appellant for the crime
charged: (1) He planned the robbery of the house of Mr. Macalino with accused Manas
and Ric. (2) He acted as look-out while accused Manas and Ric entered the house. (3) He
participated in the looting of the house after the two victims were killed. (4) He left the
house with accused Manas carrying the proceeds of the robbery with them.

The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft, unless
it is proved that the owner of the articles was deprived of possession by violence or
intimidation, in which case, the presumption becomes one of robbery.  In robbery with
homicide cases, the prosecution need only prove these elements: (a) the taking of
personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person;
(b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the
crime of homicide, here used in its generic sense, is committed.  The homicide may
precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery. What is essential is that there is an
intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
Notes:
In robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution need only prove these elements: (a) the taking
of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b)
the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain
or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, here used in its generic sense, is committed.  The homicide may precede the robbery
or may occur after the robbery. What is essential is that there is an intimate connection
between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or
whether both crimes be committed at the same time. 
We note that Section 3 of Rule 133 of the Rules 30 requires that an extrajudicial confession
made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body of the crime and, in its primary sense,
means a crime has actually been committed.  Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged.  In this case, aside from the
extrajudicial confessions, the police found the stolen goods, the murder weapons, and the dead
bodies, thereby conclusively establishing the needed corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.

Was the arrest lawful?

- No.

How was the arrest affected?

-

● People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003

Facts:
The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for
illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the
court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of
allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his
right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear
during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure. 

Issue:
Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the
hearing of the case.
Held:
The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not
violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal
cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is deemed
violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.

It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to
compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several
factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct
of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such
delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to
constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to
the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of
delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the
State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused.

● People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007

Facts:
Police officer received information that a certain male person a man would make a delivery of
marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the
description, carrying a plastic bag, who was Nuevas.
They confronted the latter and ask.
Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened,
contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Nuevas disclosed where
the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less
five (5) kilos.
The police officers together with Nuevas, then proceeded the place where according to Nuevas
was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw
and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police
officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag
belonged to Nuevas. Officers then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana
packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." are violated.
All of the said materials are confiscated and the 3 are arrested. The trial court found them guilty
with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article Il of Republic Act No. 6425
as amended. Nuevas, by manifestation, waived his right of appeal. The appellate court found
Fami and Cabling's version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear.
However, the other filed there recourse in the Court of Appeals base on their allegations that
they are not guilty and their constitutional rights against warrantless arrest. However, the
appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of
a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and Fami testified that Din
voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus,
in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not apply. Hence, the petition.

Issue:
WON the warrantless searches and seizure are valid?

Ruling:
NO.
The Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception,
warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence
holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case
where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
"
Note:
Not valid, because

● People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004

FACTS:
Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki (respondents) seek the reversal of the decision finding them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of RA No. 7659 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay P 50,000.00.
On June 27, 1994, the two were accused to transport and deliver 40,768 grams of Indian hemp
(marijuana) in Cash & Carry, Makati City. Kimura and Kizaki entered separate pleas of NOT
GUILTY. The version of prosecution maintains that in the morning of June 27, 1994, Maj. Anso,
head of Delta Group, Narcotics Command received information from a confidential informant
that a certain Koichi Kishi and Rey Plantilla were engaged in the selling of illegal drugs at the
Cash and Carry Supermarket, Maj. Anso organized a team composed of SPO4 Baldovino, Jr.,
SPO1 Cabato and PO3 Cadoy to conduct surveillance of the area. A buy-bust operation was
launched. 3:00 in the afternoon, the informant was able to contact the targets who told him
that they will be arriving at 8:00 in the evening at the parking area. After handing to him the
marijuana, the operatives approached, PO3 Cadoy held Koichi by the hand while Rey
scampered away to the direction of the South Superhighway. They learned from Koichi that his
friends/suppliers will arrive the same evening to fetch him. Several minutes later, a white
Nissan Sentra car driven by appellant Kimura with his co-appellant Kizaki seating at the
passenger seat arrived at the parking area. Koichi pointed to them as the ones who will fetch
him.
A certain Boy driving a stainless jeep, without a plate number, arrived and parked. Boy
approached the Sentra car and opened its trunk. Appellant Kimura got a package wrapped in a
newspaper and gave it to Boy who walked back to his jeep. While Maj. Anso and SPO4
Baldovino, Jr. were approaching, appellant Kimura ran but was apprehended while Boy was
able to board his jeep and together with a Kizaki who was seated at the passenger
seat sped off towards South Superhighway. Police found 3 Sacks of marijuana. They
brought Koichi and Kimura to the headquarters and turned over the seized marijuana to the
investigator who made markings thereon.
Kimura’s testimony explains that on June 27, 1994, Kimura was in the house of his co-appellant
Kizaki at Dian Street, Makati City, together with Koichi Kishi, Luis Carlos and a certain "Sally" and
"Boy". Kimura borrowed the car of Kizaki in order to get his television from his house in
Evangelista to bring it to a repair shop. Koichi requested Kimura to pass by Cash and Carry
Supermarket because he needed to meet a certain "Rey" who was borrowing money from him.
When they alighted from the car and Koichi handed something to Rey. Shortly thereafter, Koichi
and Carlos were grabbed by two men from behind. Then four men approached the car and one
guy ordered him to sit at the back and together with Koichi and Carlos, they were all brought to
Camp Karingal allegedly for violating Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425.32 Kimura was asked
questions about the address and business of Kizaki. Kimura denied that there was marijuana in
the car on the night of June 27, 1994 but claims that he saw marijuana placed at the car trunk
the following day at Camp Karingal.
Kizaki was not with him at Cash and Carry on the night of June 27, 1994. There was no stainless
jeep near the car on the same night. Carlos was released and was not charged because Kimura’s
girlfriend, Sally, served as Carlos’ guarantor.
Kizaki testified that Kizaki testified that on the date that the alleged crime was committed, he
was in the company of his friends, Mr. and Mrs. Takeyama, Kimura, and his driver Boy and maid
Joan at his house in Dian Street, Makati City; Kimura borrowed his car on the night of June 27,
1994 to pick up Kimura’s broken TV and bring it to the repair shop. Appellant Kizaki’s alibi was
corroborated by Rosario Quintia, his former housemaid, and his friend, Akiyoshi Takeyama,
who both testified that they were at Kizaki’s house on the night of June 27, 1994 from 7:00 to
10:00 in the evening and never saw Kizaki leave the house.
Kizaki was arrested on June 29, 1994, two days after the Cash and Carry incident, in the Nippon
Ichi Restaurant located at Mabini, Manila. He was having dinner with Lt. Col. Rodolfo Tan,
Masami Y. Nishino, Anita Takeyama and Akiyoshi Takeyama. These witnesses executed a joint
affidavit and testified that while they were about to leave the restaurant, a man got near Kizaki
and asked for his passport whom they thought was from the Immigration. Later, they learned
that Kizaki was brought to Camp Karingal.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrests of the respondents valid.

HELD:
The settled jurisprudence is that alibi is inherently a weak defense. Denial by the accused of the
offense charged against him is also inherently a weak defense. For alibi to prosper, the accused
must show that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the commission of the
crime at the time of its commission. Cash and Carry Supermarket is walking distance from the
house of Kizaki. It was not therefore impossible for accused to have been present at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.
The illegality of warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to their culpability. Appellants claim that although the
defense of alibi and denial are weak, it is still the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt to support a judgment of conviction; that the trial court
mainly relied on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence for
the prosecution. They argue that appellant Kizaki’s claim that he was not at the Cash and Carry
Supermarket on the night of June 27, 1994 was corroborated by three independent witnesses
including appellant Kimura who testified that he was not with appellant Kizaki at Cash and Carry
Supermarket. Appellants further question how the trial court could have been certain that the
marijuana presented in court are the same articles confiscated from the appellants when the
arresting officers did not place identifying marks on the confiscated items. Appellant Kizaki
further contends that he was arrested two days after the alleged buy-bust operation without a
valid warrant of arrest.
He points out that although the trial court expressed doubts as to the legality of his arrest, it
nevertheless convicted him of the crime charged, which is in violation of the Constitution. Kizaki
argues that he could not have been caught in flagrante delicto to justify the warrantless arrest
when he was arrested two days after the alleged Cash and Carry incident while he was only
having dinner with his friends at a restaurant.
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the exceptions enumerated above was present to justify appellant Kizaki’s warrantless
arrest.
This deviation from the standard procedure in the antinarcotics operations produces doubts as
to the origins of the marijuana.
Prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody. The prosecution
witnesses PO2 Supa and SPO2 Madlon admitted they did not write their initials on the brick of
marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing from accused appellant outside the grocery store
but only did so in their headquarters.
 The item allegedly seized from accused is the same brick of marijuana marked by the
policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for examination.
The denial of appellant Kimura that he was caught in the Cash and Carry Supermarket
delivering marijuana on the night of June 27, 1994 may be weak but the evidence for the
prosecution is clearly even weaker.
The constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome by the prosecution. In
fine, for failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of both appellants beyond reasonable
doubt, they must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability.
DECISION: REVERSED and ACQUITTED

● Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those
who are charged with offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of
imprisonment.
On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the
mandatory drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and
employees concerned to submit two separate lists of candidates: one for those who complied
with the mandatory drug testing and the other of those who failed to comply.
It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was
unconstitutional as it imposes an additional qualification for senators.

Issues:
1. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator?
2. Is RA 9165 unconstitutional?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides. The COMELEC resolution
effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for senator, enumerated under Section 3,
Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section 36[b]) are
constitutional as long as they are random and suspicionless. This is because schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students, and schools have the right
to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.
The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private
offices (Section 36[d]) are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. To the
Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.
On the other hand, the Court finds no justification in the mandatory drug testing of those
prosecuted for crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years and 1 day (Section
36[f]). The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless.
In this case, it cannot be said that the drug testing is random. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.

Note:
Reasonable even in the administrative
Searching person

● Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

Warrantless arrest and search and seizure warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari wherein the petitioner assails the decision of the CA affirming his
conviction for the crime off illegal possession of dangerous drugs. According to the prosecution,
they a concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as Veridiano,
was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. P03 Esteves relayed this info to the
police on duty. Subsequently, they to set up a checkpoint. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced
upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down
the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the
passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing
what appeared to be marijuana." POl Cabello confiscated the tea bag Veridiano was arrested
and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station. The "tea
bag" were examined and the contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.
The defense of the petitioner refuted the prosecution's version. Petitioner contended that he
was illegally arrested He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in
evidence for being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree. RTC convicted the petitioner for the crime
charged. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA denied his appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition. According to CA, petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto thus the search
was incidental to the lawful arrest.

ISSUE:
W/N there was a valid warrant of arrest and search warrant against petitioner.

RULING:
NO, SC ruled that the warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid.
Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must
be acquitted.

NOTE:
Consider to be personal knowledge:
- Tip
- Overt act in order to ascertain

No overt act
Main Ratio
- In order to have a warrantless arrest, apprehending officer must make an arrest before
a warrant. There must be a personal knowledge.

Personal Knowledge
- facts and circumstances

● Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under
the parameters of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in
flagrante delicto. To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically, with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. In this light, the determination of the existence or absence of
probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents. Accordingly, after a valid
warrantless arrest is effected, the officer may also conduct a valid warrantless search, which is
in incidental to such arrest.
A search of a moving vehicle may either be a mere routine inspection or an extensive search.
The search in a routine inspection is limited to the following instances: 

(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds; 
(2) simply looks into a vehicle; 
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; 
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
 (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
On the other hand, an extensive search of a moving vehicle is only permissible when there is
probable cause.

FACTS:
P01 Falolo who was not on duty, boarded a Bing Bush bus bound for Bontoc, Mountain
Province. At Botbot, Macad boarded the bus.
When Macad threw his carton box, PO1 Falolo already suspected that it contained marijuana
because of its distinct smell and irregular shape.
When the tricycle reached the Community Police Assistance Center (COMPAC) circle, P01 Falolo
stopped the tricycle and called SPO2 Gaspar Suagen ( SPO2 Suagen), who was then on duty.
While SPO2 Suagen approached them, PO1 Fallo asked Macad if he could open his baggage, to
which the latter replied in the affirmative. However, Macad suddenly ran away from the tricycle
towards the Pines Kitchenette. Both police officers ran after him and apprehended him
ISSUE:
WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming Macad's conviction.

HELD:
• PO1 Falolo had probable cause to conduct a valid warrantless arrest and a valid incidental
search.
• Evidently, Macad hailed the same bus that PO1 Falolo was riding on the way to Bontoc,
Mountain Province. He then threw his carton baggage to PO1 Falolo who was then seated on
the roof and was toting a Sagada woven bag as well. Immediately, PO1 Falolo smelled the
distinct scent of marijuana emanating from the carton baggage and noticed its irregular shape.
He also noticed that the Sagada woven bag of Macad was rectangular instead of an oval and,
upon touching it, he noticed that it was hard.
Accordingly, PO1 Falolo had probable cause that Macad was committing the crime of
transporting dangerous drugs, specifically marijuana bricks, due to the unique scent of
marijuana emanating from the bag and the unusual shapes and hardness of the baggage. As
PO1 Falolo was not in uniform at that time, he intended to inform his colleagues at the PHQ
Barracks to conduct a check point so that they could verify his suspicion about the transport of
illegal drugs. [30] As seen in his testimony, PO1 Falolo already had probable cause to conduct
an extensive search of a moving vehicle because he believed before the search that he and his
colleagues would find instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, particularly
transportation of marijuana, in the vehicle to be searched.
When Macad saw SPO2 Suagen approaching the tricycle, he suddenly ran away towards the
Pizza Kitchenette and left his baggage.
At that moment, PO1 Falolo also acquired probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest on
Macad. There were numerous circumstances and overt acts which show that PO1 Falolo had
probable cause to effect the said warrantless arrest: (1) the smell of marijuana emanating from
the carton baggage; (2) the irregular shape of the baggage; (3) the hardness of the baggage; (4)
the assent of Macad in the inspection of his baggage but running away at the sight of SPO2
Suagen; and (5) leaving behind his baggage to avoid the police officers.

Note:
What made the warrantless arrest valid? 1st exception
What constitutes probable cause? When Falolo came into possession and smell the marijuana
(sufficient, because )

● Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019

FACTS:
Chief Inspector Beniat arrested petitioner Manibog without a warrant for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code (Gun Ban) based on a tip and upon seeing a bulge on petitioner's waist,
which the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour. In his defense,
petitioner did not deny that he was carrying a gun when the police officers arrested him.
However, he claimed that while Chief Inspector Beniat was frisking him, the police officer
whispered an apology, explaining that he had to do it or he would get in trouble with the police
provincial director.
The RTC- Laoag City, locos Norte found Madamba guilty of the crime charged. The CA upheld
the assailed decision that the search made on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest being
caught in flagrante delicto and failed to show a permit allowing him to carry his firearm.
Consequently. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless search was valid.

HELD:
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must
have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must
have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense.
Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes, or is
substantially contemporaneous, with the search.
The CA erred in ruling that the search conducted on petitioner fell under the established
exception of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. The tip on petitioner, coupled
with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in
his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun
ban. However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonvmous with the personal knowledge required
under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
Nonetheless, the search falls under the "stop and frisk" search. For it to be valid, the totality of
suspicious circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a
genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless
arrest not based on this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.HELD:
YES.
For an arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been judicially issued or there was a
lawful warrantless arrest as provided for in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must
have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must
have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense.
Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes, or is
substantially contemporaneous, with the search.
The CA erred in ruling that the search conducted on petitioner fell under the established
exception of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. The tip on petitioner, coupled
with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in
his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun
ban. However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonvmous with the personal knowledge required
under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
Nonetheless, the search falls under the "stop and frisk" search. For it to be valid, the totality of
suspicious circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a
genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless
arrest not based on this constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.

● People v. Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020

Facts:
The appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. At around 1:20
in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Tabuk City, Kalinga and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of marijuana leaves,
with a total net weight of 3,9563.11 grams and transport in transit through a passenger
jeepney, the said marijuana without license, permit or authority from any appropriate
government entity or agency.
The next day, accused-appellant Sapla was committed to the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) at Tabuk City, Kalinga. Upon his arraignment, accused-appellant Sapla pleaded
"not guilty" to the crime charged against him. In the court a quo's Pre-Trial Order, the
Prosecution and the Defense stipulated their respective legal issues to be resolved by the
court a quo. Also, the Prosecution identified and marked its pieces of evidence, while the
Defense made no proposals nor pre-marked any exhibits.

ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT

1. When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. (IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO)
 2. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it. (HOT PURSUIT ARREST)

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (ESCAPING PRISONERS)

VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST (SEC. 5(a) OF RULE 113)

1. Person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
2. Overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

(b)
1. The crime should have been just committed
2. The arresting officer’s exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to
be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge.

PROBABLE CAUSE
- Actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.

RIGHTS OF PERSON DETAINED

1. Informed of the cause of his detention.
2. Allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney or
counsel.
2 Aspect of Probable Cause:
Judge- determines the existence of probable cause, whether to issue warrant or warrant of
arrest
Prosecutor- filing of cases before the prosecutor (prelim investigation
Application in the issuance of a warrant- find evidence