Criminal Procedure Jurisdiction

I.
Distinguish the following from each other and illustrate with examples:
a. Constitutional, Statutory, and Constitutionally mandates courts

Constitutional Statutory Constitutional Mandate
A constitutional court is one A statutory court is one created A speCial court which shall have
created by a direct by law other than the jurisdiction over criminal and
Constitutional provision. Constitution. civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other
Those which owe their creation Those created, organized and offenses committed by public
and existence to the with jurisdiction exclusively officers and employees,
constitution and therefore determined by law including those in government-
cannot be legislated out of owned or controlled
existence or deprived by law of All courts except the SC are corporations, in relation to their
the jurisdiction and powers statutory courts. office as may be determined by
unqualifiedly vested in them by law. (Art. XIII), 1973
the Constitution. Constitution.
Example of this court is the SC, One whose existence is provided

which owes its creation from the for in the Constitution but its
Constitution itself. Only the SC is creation by statutory enactment
a Constitutional court.
Sandiganbayan was not directly
created by the Constitution but
by law pursuant to a
constitutional mandate.
b. Civil and Criminal Courts

Civil Courts Criminal Courts
In civil court, one person sues (files a case) against In criminal court, the government files a case
another person because of a dispute or problem against someone for committing a crime. The
between them. A business or agency can also file person accused of committing the crime is called
a case in civil court or be sued in civil court. If the defendant. The government must prove that
someone loses a case in civil court, that person the defendant is guilty “beyond a reasonable
may be ordered to pay money to the other side or doubt,” which is a very high standard. If the
return property, but that person does not go to jail defendant is found guilty, they may go to jail or
just for losing the case. prison.
one which determines controversies between one which is charged with the administration of
private persons. criminal laws, and the punishment of wrongs to
the public.
Example:
defamation (including libel and slander), breach of Example:
contract, negligence resulting in injury or death, Violent crimes, Drug and alcohol-related crimes,
and property damage. (including DUI cases), Sex crimes, White collar
crime, Appeals/post-conviction relief, Juvenile
law, Other crimes.
c. Regular Courts and Court Martial

Regular Courts Court Martial
Regular Courts are for civilians under the Republic A court martial is a trial in a military court of a
of the Philippines; uses rights and laws established member of the armed forces who is charged with
in the Constitution. breaking a military law. There is a summary court
martial, a special court martial, and a general
Example: A murderer might plead guilty and court martial.
accept life imprisonment to avoid the death
penalty, saving the courts both time and money. a military court pertaining to the executive
department of the government for trying and
punishing offenses committed by members of the
armed forces.
Casifernfransati2022
Example:
The defendant isn't allowed to plead guilty if the
prosecution is trying to secure the death penalty.
d. Inferior and Superior Court

Inferior Court Superior Court
A court NOT of record. A court of record.
The decisions of an inferior court are subject to The decisions of a superior court may only be
collateral attack. In other words, in a superior challenged in a court of appeal.
court one may sue an inferior court directly, rather Decision of a court of record may not be appealed.
than resort to appeal to an appelate court. It is binding on ALL other courts.
“Inferior courts” are those whose

jurisdiction is limited and special and However, no statutory or constitutional court
whose proceedings are not according to (whether it be an appellate or supreme court) can
the course of the common law.” Ex Parte second guess the judgment of a court of record.
Kearny, 55 Cal. 212; Smith v. Andrews, 6 “The judgment of a court of record whose
Cal. 652 jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all the world
as the judgment of this court would be. It is as
Criminal courts proceed according to statutory conclusive on this court as it is on other courts. It
law. Jurisdiction and procedure is defined by puts an end to inquiry concerning the fact, by
statute. Likewise, civil courts and admiralty courts deciding it." Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193,
proceed according to statutory law. Any court 202-203 (1830). [cited by SCHNECKLOTH v.
proceeding according to statutory law is not a BUSTAMONTE, 412 U.S. 218, 255 (1973)]
court of record (which only proceeds according to
common law); it is an inferior court.
e. Court of General Jurisdiction and Courts of Special or Limited Jurisdiction

Court of General Jurisdiction Courts of Special or Limited Jurisdiction
Courts of general jurisdiction are courts that have Limited jurisdiction means that the court can only
the authority to hear and pass judgment upon all hear and pass judgment upon cases that are
types of cases and are not limited to a specific type limited to specific types of issues. A court of
of case introduced and heard legally. limited jurisdiction is the lowest court in the
hierarchy of courts.
General jurisdiction means that when a person is
a resident of a state, that state has general These courts deal with minor disputes, such as
jurisdiction over said person in any court in that traffic tickets, small claims, or family issues such as
state regarding the legal matter. Cases will divorce or child custody.
typically reside in courts of general jurisdiction,
but there is a hierarchy to where a case might Limited jurisdiction courts, however, are more
ultimately land in terms of specificity regarding specific.
the subject matter.
Example: Shariah Courts, family law court that
General courts of jurisdiction, may hear and deals with matters directly related to the subject
decide on cases that are on appeal from courts of matter, such as divorce, custody, etc.
limited jurisdiction.
Courts of general jurisdiction handle larger cases
over minor disputes. These cases can range from
drug offenses to murder, assault, and breaking
and entering among other serious offenses.
Example: Supreme Court, any state or federal

court that takes on criminal and civil cases.
Limited jurisdiction courts
one which has the power to adjudicate all

controversies which may be brought before it
within the legal bounds of rights and remedies
except those expressly withheld from its plenary
powers. Example: RTC
A case that moves from the court of limited jurisdiction to the general court of jurisdiction to be reheard
and reintroduced from the beginning is called trial de novo.
f. Court of Original Jurisdiction and Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction

Court of Original Jurisdiction Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction
A court exercising original jurisdiction is the first Appellate jurisdiction refers to the power to
court to hear the case. review the decisions of other courts that have
already issued rulings in a given case.
Those which under the law, actions or
proceedings may originally be commenced. One which has the authority to review the final
order or judgment of a lower court with the power
One which has the power to take judicial to modify, reverse, sustain or remand, or affirm
cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action the same.
for the first time under conditions provided by
law. Example: Shari’a District Courts. Example: Regional Trial Court
Example: Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial

Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
g. Courts of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Courts of Exclusive Jurisdiction

Courts of Concurrent Jurisdiction Courts of Exclusive Jurisdiction
The opposite situation is concurrent jurisdiction Exclusive jurisdiction exists in civil procedure if
(or non-exclusive jurisdiction) in which more than one court has the power to adjudicate a case to
one court may take jurisdiction over the case. the exclusion of all other courts.
Example: MTC, RTC Example: Shariah Court, Sandiganbayan, CA
II. What confers jurisdiction upon the courts? Why is jurisdiction imprescriptible?
Article 8 of the 1987 constitution is the one that confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court. The BP 129 specifically
provides a composition jurisdiction and the creation of these three courts (the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court; and the Municipal Trial Court).
It is imprescriptible, because it is required by public policy and the state could not have intended to defeat the
same by applying thereto the statute of limitation of actions (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479).
Jurisdiction is conferred by law.

Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and
decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not
by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action." Perforce, it is important
that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before
it, considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effects.
GENERAL RULE: Jurisdiction, once acquired, continues until the case is finally terminated.
EXCEPTIONS:
1) When a subsequent law provides a prohibition for the continued exercise of jurisdiction;
2) Where the law penalizing an act as punishable is repealed by a subsequent law;
3) When the accused is deprived of his constitutional rights such as where the court fails to provide counsel for the
accused who is unable to obtain one and does not intelligently waive his constitutional right;
4) Where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it intended to operate as to actions pending
before its enactment;
5) When the proceedings in the court acquiring jurisdiction is terminated, abandoned or declared void;
6) Once appeal has been perfected.
III. Discuss the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Region Trial Courts and MeTC,
MCTC, MTC
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
1) Exclusive original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the CA, COMELEC, COA,
CTA, Sandiganbayan, NLRC
2) Concurrent original jurisdiction
a. With Court of Appeals in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the RTC, CSC, Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, Quasi-judicial agencies, and writ of kalikasan, all subject to the doctrine of
b. With the CA and RTC in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts and
bodies and in petitions for quo warranto, and writs of habeas corpus, all subject to the doctrine of
c. With CA, RTC and Sandiganbayan for petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
d. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the RTC in cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls.
3) Appellate jurisdiction by way of petition for review on certiorari (appeal by certiorari under Rule 45) against CA,
Sandiganbayan, RTC on pure questions of law; and in cases involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
treaty, international or executive agreement, law presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance
or regulation, legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll or penalty, jurisdiction of a lower court; and CTA in its
decisions rendered en banc.
4) Exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by the Supreme Court:
a. When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
b. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
c. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
d. When the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
e. When the findings of facts are conflicting;
f. When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
g. When the findings are contrary to the trial court;
h. When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
i. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent;
j. When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and
k. When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, could justify a different conclusion.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in actions for the annulment of the judgments of the RTC
2. Concurrent original jurisdiction
a) With SC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the RTC, CSC, CBAA, other quasi-
judicial agencies mentioned in Rule 43, and the NLRC, and writ of kalikasan.
b) With the SC and RTC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts and
bodies and writs of quo warranto, habeas corpus, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and
writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases.
c) With SC, RTC and Sandiganbayan for petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
3. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction
a) by way of ordinary appeal from the RTC and the Family Courts.
b) by way of petition for review from the RTC rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
c) by way of petition for review from the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the CSC, CBAA and other
bodies mentioned in Rule 43 and of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.
d) over decisions of MTCs in cadastral or land registration cases pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction; this is
because decisions of MTCs in these cases are appealable in the same manner as decisions of RTCs.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (under RA 9282 and Rule 5, AM 05-11-07-CTA)
1. Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal
a) Decisions of CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered
by BIR;
b) Inaction by CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of IR taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by BIR,
where the NIRC or other applicable law provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction
shall be deemed an implied denial;
c) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local taxes originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
d) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
1. In cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other charges, seizure, detention or release
of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or
2. Other matters arising under the Customs law or other laws, part of laws or special laws
administered by BOC;
e) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city
board of assessment appeals;
f) Decision of the secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the government under Sec. 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;
g) Decisions of Secretary of Trade and Industry in the case of non-agricultural product, commodity or article,
and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving
dumping duties and counter veiling duties under Secs. 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs
Code, and safeguard measures under RA 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or
not to impose said duties.
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) Over all criminal cases arising from violation of the NIRC of the TCC and other laws, part of laws, or special laws
administered by the BIR or the BOC where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties claimed is less that P1M or where there is no specified amount claimed (the offenses or penalties shall
be tried by the regular courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate);
(b) In tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties where
the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties claimed is less than P1M tried by the
proper MTC, MeTC and RTC.
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction
(a) In criminal offenses (1) over appeals from the judgment, resolutions or orders of the RTC in
tax cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction, and (2) over petitions for review of
the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs in their respective
jurisdiction;
(b) In tax collection cases (1) over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in tax collection
cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) over petitions for review of the
judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases
originally decided by the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs in their respective jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

1. Original jurisdiction in all cases involving
a) Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
b) Violations of RA 1379 (Anti-Ill-Gotten Wealth Act)
c) Bribery (Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II, RPC) where one or more of the principal accused are occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time
of the commission of the offense
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (RA 6758)
2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as G-27 and up under RA 6758
3. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution
4. Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under RA 6758
d) Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Sec. 4(a) of RA
7975 as amended by RA 8249 in relation to their office
e) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO Nos. 1, 2, 14-A (Sec. 4, RA 8249)
2. Concurrent original jurisdiction with SC, CA and RTC for petitions for writs of habeas data and Amparo.
Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) matters incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as rescission of contract
(b) title to, possession of, or interest in, real property with assessed value exceeding P20,000 (outside
Metro Manila), or exceeds P50,000 in Metro Manila
(c) probate proceedings where the gross value of the estate exceeds P300,000 outside MM or exceeds
P400,000 in MM
(d) admiralty or maritime cases where the demand or claim exceeds P300,000 outside MM or exceeds
P400,000 in MM
(e) other actions involving property valued at more than P300,000 outside MM or more than P400,000 in
MM
(f) criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
2. Original exclusive jurisdiction over cases not falling within the jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
3. Original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate controversies:
(a) Cases involving devises or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business
associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be
detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or
organizations registered with the SEC
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation , partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or
right to exist as such entity
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such
corporations, partnerships or associations
(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of
payments in cases where the corporation, partnership of association possesses sufficient property to
cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in
cases where the corporation, partnership of association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but
is under the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee.
4. Concurrent and original jurisdiction
(a) with the Supreme Court in actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
(b) with the SC and CA in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts and
bodies in petitions for quo warranto, habeascorpus,and writ of continuing mandamus on environmental
cases
(c) with the SC, CA and Sandigabayan in petitions for writs of habeas data and amparo
5. Appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by lower courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions
6. Special jurisdiction over JDRC, agrarian and urban land reform cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of quasi-
judicial agencies when so designated by the SC.
Jurisdiction of the Family Courts
Under RA 8369, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases:
(1) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children and habeas corpus involving children
(2) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof
(3) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to status and
property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and
petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains
(4) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment
(5) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of EO 209 (Family Code)
(6) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for
voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, the suspension, termination or restoration of parental authority
and other cases cognizable under PD 603, EO 56 (1986) and other related laws
(7) Petitions for the constitution of the family home
(8) In areas where there are no Family Courts, the above-enumerated cases shall be adjudicated by the RTC (RA
8369)
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts / Municipal Trial Courts

1. Criminal cases
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction
1. Summary proceedings for violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction, including traffic laws
2. Offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of the kind, nature, value or amount thereof; provided
however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof (Sec. 2, RA 7691).
2. Civil actions
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction
1. Civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies
in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount the demand does not exceed
P200,000 outside MM or does not exceed P400,000 in MM, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney‘s fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
2. Summary proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, violation of rental law
3. Title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property
or interest therein does not exceed P20,000 outside MM or does not exceed P50,000 in MM
3. Special jurisdiction over petition for writ of habeas corpus and application for bail if the RTC Judge in area is not
available
4. Delegated jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases where there is no controversy
provided the value of the lad to be ascertained by the claimant does not exceed P100,000
Jurisdiction of the over small cases

1. MTCs, MeTCs and MCTCs shall have jurisdiction over actions for payment of money where the value of the claim
does not exceed P100,000 exclusive of interest and costs (Sec. 2, AM 08-8-7-SC, Oct. 27, 2009).
2. Actions covered are
a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is soley for payment or
reimbursement of sum of money, and
b) the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved
upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 (Sec. 4, AM 08-8-7-SC). These claims
may be:
(a) For money owed under the contracts of lease, loan, services, sale, or mortgage;
(b) For damages arising from fault or negligence, quasi-contract, or contract; and
(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim
pursuant to Sec. 417 of RA 7160 (LGC).
IV. Write the summary of the following cases and the decision or jurisprudence on procedural issues:
a. Miranda, et al. vs. Aguirre, et al., G.R.No. 133064, September 16, 1999
FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA
No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from
an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper
plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified
the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned
the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over
which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition
because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide
whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of
Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were
all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city
through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives
them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.
b. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Macalintal filed an undesignated petition questions challenging the constitution of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution.
Arguments of Macalintal: (1) The creation of a “separate tribunal” complemented by its own budget
allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, violates Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; (2) The constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as
Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits
the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the creation of PET, with its own budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and
confidential employees, violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;
(2) Whether or not the PET performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
RULING:
(1) No. The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar
only to the Tribunal. x x x x
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have
affirmed on numerous occasions. x x x x
The PET, as a constitutional body, is independent of the three departments of government – Executive,
Legislative, and Judiciary – but not separate therefrom.
(2) PET performs judicial functions.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. x x x x
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court. x x x x
The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall
sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in
Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same
prohibition.
c. People v Mateo, GR No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004

FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and
to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General
assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express
provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious
offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice
finds justification in the 1987 Constitution –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does
not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate
appeal or review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily
factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
d. Ruel Francis M. Cabral v Chris C. Bracamonte, GR No. 233174, January 23, 2019
FACTS:
In 2009, Chris S. Bracamonte and Ruel Francis Cabral executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in
Makati City for the purchase of shares of stock in Wellcross Freight Corporation (WFC) and Aviver
International Corporation (AVIVER). Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA, Bracamonte issued a
postdated check to Cabral. When the check was presented for payment, however, the drawee bank in
Makati City dishonored the same for lack of sufficient funds. Consequently, for failure to settle the
obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against Bracamonte in Parañaque City. Finding
probable cause, the prosecutor filed an Information with the RTC of Parañaque City.
After arraignment and presentation of prosecution evidence, Bracamonte moved to quash the
Information contending that the venue was improperly laid in Parañaque City, because the postdated
check was delivered and dishonored in Makati City. Thus, the prosecution failed to show how the
supposed elements of the crime charged were committed in Parañaque City. In contrast, Cabral
maintained that the averments in the complaint and Information are controlling to determine jurisdiction.
Since the complaint affidavit alleged that negotiations on the MOA were conducted in a warehouse in
Parañaque City where Cabral was convinced to sell his shares in the two corporations, then the RTC of
Parañaque City properly had jurisdiction. Moreover, Cabral contented that Bracamonte’s motion should
be considered barred by laches as it took him four (4) years before he raised the issue of jurisdiction,
actively participating in the proceedings by cross- examining the prosecution witness.
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash explaining that it has jurisdiction over the case because Bracamonte
employed fraudulent acts against Cabral in Parañaque City prior to the issuance of the postdated check.
According to the trial court, based on the complaint affidavit, Cabral narrated that it was during their
meeting in the old warehouse of AVIVER and WFC in Parañaque City that Bracamonte was able to
persuade and convince him to sell his entire shares of stock. There, they triumphed in misleading and
fooling him until he finally accepted their offer. Thus, since the complaint affidavit and the Information in
the instant case duly alleged that Bracamonte deceived Cabral in Parañaque City, the Parañaque RTC
appropriately had jurisdiction over the instant case.
In an appeal, however, the CA set aside the RTC Order and dismissed the Information against Bracamonte.
Cabral moved for Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Aggrieved by the CA’s denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Cabral filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether Cabral, a private complainant in a criminal case has the authority to file appeal in CA and SC?
(2) Whether the RTC Parañaque City has jurisdiction over the estafa case filed by Cabral.
RULING:
(1) In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
Here, Cabral filed the present petition without the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that
the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme
Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the
Government.
Thus, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended
party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned
[Chiok v. People, 774 Phil. 230, 245, (2015)].
The rationale behind is that, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not
the private complainant. The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited
only to the civil liability. In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a
witness for the prosecution.
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a
decision of a lower court, when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or
its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, when
there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so requires [Morillo
v. People, et al., 775 Phil. 192, 210-211 (2015)].
In the instant case, however, the petition before the Court essentially assails the criminal, and not only
the civil, aspect of the CA Decision. Thus, the petition should have been filed only by the State through
the OSG and not by Cabral who lacked the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision.
(2) Nevertheless, even assuming the procedural propriety of the instant petition, the Court still resolves
to deny the same. Time and again, the Court has held that “territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential
ingredients took place.” [Brodeth v. People, G.R. No. 197849, November 29, 2017].
Moreover, it has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction [Treñas v. People, 680 Phil.
368, 380 (2012)].
Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of such crime consists of the following: (1) the offender has postdated
or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at
the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds
deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.
In the present petition, Cabral vehemently insists that since he alleged in his complaint affidavit that the
business transactions with regard to the terms and conditions of the subject MOA were conducted in a
warehouse in Parañaque City, the element of deceit definitely occurred therein, and as such, the RTC of
Parañaque City has jurisdiction over the case. The Court, however, cannot subscribe to said contention.
It was merely stated in the Information, and alleged by Cabral in his complaint affidavit, that the crime of
estafa was committed in Parañaque City because it was there that he was convinced to sell the subject
shares of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did not present any evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would support or corroborate the assertion.
On the contrary, and as the appellate court pointed out, what were actually proven by the evidence on
record are the following: (1) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2) Bracamonte
issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the signing of the agreement; (3)
the check was presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati City. As such, the Court
does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court. Not only were the
MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, it was even expressly
stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as venue for any action arising from the
MOA because that was where it was executed. It is clear from the foregoing that the element of deceit
took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and delivered, while the damage was
inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
While Cabral is not wrong in saying that the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and may
be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place, the pieces of
evidence on record point only to one place: Makati City. Time and again, the Court has ruled that “in
criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements of the crime or offense was committed must
be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing
a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be
made equivalent to proof.”There being no showing that the offense was committed within Parañaque
City, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.
e. Danilo Lihaylihay vs. The Treasurer of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment praying that
former Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan (Treasurer Tan), former Secretary of Finance Margarito
B. Teves (Secretary Teves), the Governor of BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas, and the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (collectively, respondents) be ordered to deliver to
Danilo A. Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay) the amounts of P11,875,000,000,000.00 and P50,000,000,000.00, and
several government lands as informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's alleged instrumental role in the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos), his family,
and their cronies. Lihaylihay identified himself as a "Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to
Republic Act No. 2338, duly accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)." Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two
(2) letters, both dated March 11, 1987, to Atty.Eliseo Pitargue (Atty. Pitargue), the former head of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task Force, concerning
information on former President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006,
Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Jose Mario C. Buñag (Commissioner Buñag),
demanding payment of 25% informer's reward on the P118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered by the
Philippine government through compromise agreements with the Marcoses. He also insisted on the need
for the government to collect Fortune Tobacco Corporation's tax deficiencies. On January 10, 2008,
Lihaylihay wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo), insisting on
the need to recover the Marcos' wealth that he identified and his corresponding entitlement to an
informer's reward. Lihaylihay wrote to then Department of Finance Secretary Teves on August 11, 2009,
reiterating his entitlement to an informer's reward.
On May 31, 2010, without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official actions on his letters,
Lihaylihay filed the present Petition, dubbed a Petition for "Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a
Writ of Garnishment." Insisting on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan and
Secretary Teves be ordered to deliver to him the amount of P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources be ordered to transfer to him several government lands; and that
the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be ordered to garnish in his favor P50,000,000,000.00 worth
of jewelry recovered from former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondents
then Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Governor of BangkoSentral
ng Pilipinas to deliver to him proceeds and properties representing 25% informer's reward pursuant to
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338?
RULING:
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for
mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without exhausting administrative remedies,
in violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their
filing amounts to an act of forum shopping.
This Petition should clearly be denied. Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spells out
the parameters for the issuance of a writ of mandamus:
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It
cannot be a prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals, this Court
emphasized that "mandamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is already
established."Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform the act mandated
by law. Clear in the text of Rule 65, Section 3 is the requirement that respondents "unlawfully neglect"
the performance of a duty. The mere existence of a legally mandated duty or the pendency of its
performance does not suffice.
The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary. This Court distinguished
discretionary functions from ministerial duties, and related the exercise of discretion to judicial and quasi-
judicial powers. In Sanson v. Barrios: Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or
right conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the
dictates of their own judgments and consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others.
A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. Mandamus will
not lie to control the exercise of discretion of an inferior tribunal, when the act complained of is either
judicial or quasi-judicial. It is the proper remedy when the case presented is outside of the exercise of
judicial discretion.
f. Miranda, et al. vs. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006.
FACTS:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under
the witness protection program. Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including
SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC
convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the
ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the
petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and
to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
RULING:
No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the defendant where by mere application, thereof,
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.
g. Binay vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, October 1, 1999 and Magsaysay et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. ,
G.r. No. 128136, October 1, 1999
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an Anti-
Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has undergone
various changes, the most recent of which were affected through Republic Act Nos. 7975 and 8249. In
G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite
the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case
No 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws( RA 7975 and RA 8249), exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019
and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995. While
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took
effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997.
According to Mayor Binay when the offense was charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower
than Grade "27".
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades. The grade depends upon
the nature of one's position — the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements
thereof — relative to that of another position. It is the official's Grade that determines his or her salary,
not the other way around. It is possible that a local government official's salary may be less than that
prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her
respective local government unit. Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the official's grade. Municipal
Mayors are classified as Grade "27" under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of
1989.Therefore, when the offense was charged against Mayor Binay the Sandiganbayan exercised
exclusive original jurisdiction over it.
The effects of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 may be summarized as follows:
a) If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
b) If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975,
then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
c) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the cases shall be referred to the
Sandiganbayan.
d) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be referred to the
regular courts.
---next case
On July 27, 1988 charges were filed against Mayor Binay with the Office of the Ombudsman. On
September 7, 1994, the informations were filed by the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan. But Mayor
Binay was not yet arraigned when RA 7975 took effect. On the case of Mayor Magsaysay the law was
already in effect when the information was filed against him in RTC of Batangas.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of R.A. No.
7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975
should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. — This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has
not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature's intent and in any event should be applied
in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then
said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be referred to the
regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter loses
jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Both laws RA 7975 and RA 8249 retains jurisdiction over Binay’s cases.
Mayor Magsaysay’s case:
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the same facts
with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering that they
had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
Decision:
Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented jurisdiction
from attaching in the first instance." They claim that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan
was a "subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust the RTC of its jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was
already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Office of the Ombudsman is not estopped to file the case in the Sandiganbayan after already filing it with
the RTC because it merely made a mistake in the choice of the proper forum. Jurisdiction is determined
by law and not by the consent or agreement of the parties.
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though
they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never
attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction.
h. Corazon Macapagal vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193217, February 26, 2014;
FACTS:
In the instant case, the RTC rendered a decision finding Petitioner Corazon Macapagal guilty of the crime
of Estafa. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then timely moved for reconsideration but
was denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She
supposedly filed a notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009 but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for
having been filed out of time. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner appellant.
RULING:
No. The SC held that petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice
of appeal. Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and
when appeal is taken. The disallowance of the notice of appeal disallows the appeal itself. A petition for
review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the SC.
However the questioned order denying the notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an
appeal may be taken. The petitioner should have availed of a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in
availing the wrong mode of appeal under Rule 45 instead of Rule 65, the petition merits an outward
dismissal. Even if the petition was treated as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC
and CA to issue writs of certiorari, the petitioner has no absolute freedom of choice of court to which the
application is directed. Direct resort to the SC is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling
reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.
i. People vs. Cawaling, et al., G.R. No. 117970, July 28, 1998
FACTS:
Former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario
Cajilo were convicted of murder. Hence, this appeal arguing that the trial court erred when it assumed
jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insisted that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had
jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public officers at the time of the
killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any
subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another
tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise
when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to
actions pending before its enactment.
The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended; and PD 1850, as amended by PD 1952 and
BP 129.
Section 4 of PD 1606 reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
However, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees placing the members of the
Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section 1 of PD 1952, amending Section
1 of PD 1850, reads:
SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding -- (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National
Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried
by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise
known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subjects to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited
Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case
disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the
case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction
over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or
court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel
can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having
duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law:
PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY
TIME BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police
officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129,
the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. -- Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling
under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively
taken cognizance of by the latter.
In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two
requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction
over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b)
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher
than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000).Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that murder or homicide may
be committed both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive
element of said crime, viz.:
The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct
and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal
sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether
done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being
a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is
increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating
circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the
criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or
was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
j. Alfredo Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His
services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime
Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its
Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla,
a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to
and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit
to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as
custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made
representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever
responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him.
In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did
not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation
of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its
maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial
which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Azarcon is a public officer.
RULING:
No. SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Sec. 4 of PD 1606
provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when
the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the
private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has
been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory
to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the
petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt
for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public
functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by
direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a
receipt for the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint
Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
k. People of the Phil. vs. Metropolitan trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah Red, G.R. No. 123263,
December 16, 1996.
FACTS:
Private respondent, Isah V. Red, was charged with the crime of libel before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Thereafter, Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the Regional
Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion and
remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The prosecution, citing the provision
of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code filed a manifestation and motion to remand praying that the case
be returned to the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of libel falls on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
RULING:
Yes, the crime of libel falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code pertinently provides that:
“The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense…”
Republic Act 7691, placing the exclusive and original jurisdiction of offenses punishable by not more than
six years of imprisonment under the Municipal Trial Court did superseded Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as there is no manifest legislative purpose to do so or an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist between them.
l. People of the Phil., and AAA vs Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., G.R. No. 183652,
February 25, 2015
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with the crime of rape of a 16-year
old girl. The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporto guilty as principals and Alquizola as an accomplice
while the CA acquitted the, hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the CA act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private respondents?
HELD:
The Supreme Court (SC) held that the Court of Appeals (CA) violated the prosecution’s due process and
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion when its judgment of acquittal relied merely on the defense
evidence by simply lifting and/or parroting the testimony of the accused.
The SC castigated the CA for merely relying on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly
disregarded that of the prosecution. The SC said:
“The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly those as to the
specific events that transpired during the crucial period… As a result, it presented the private respondents’
account and allegations as though these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently
utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.”
Lecturing the CA, the SC went on further: “(D)ue process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal
must consider the entire evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.
It simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside… Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material
prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of
discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.”
V. TRUE OR FALSE AND EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER IN NOT MORE THAN TWO (2) SENTENCES
1. Jurisdiction over subject matter may be questioned at any time even on appeal.
i. True - According to Riano, subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of the court to hear and
determine the particular case; it is basically jurisdiction over the offense charged. One of our most
ingrained beliefs is that if a court lacks jurisdiction, the case is dismissed. The claimed judgment
or decree of the subject matter of an action is void. Thus, an issue of subject matter jurisdiction
can be questioned at any time during the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. It can be
addressed in collateral processes, which implies that the nullity of the judgment or decree does
not bar a future legal action.
2. The criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount of the fine and the imprisonment
provided by law for the offense charged at the time of the commission thereof.
i. True - Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the AUTHORITY OF THE COURT TO
IMPOSE THE PENALTY IMPOSABLE GIVEN THE ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION. Not
determined by the penalty that may be meted out to the offender after trial but to the extent of
the penalty which the law imposes for the crime charged in the complaint
3. All criminal cases wherein the penalty provided by law is higher than 6 years are cognizable by the
Regional Trial Courts
i. True - All criminal cases where the penalty is higher than 6 years, including government-related
cases wherein the accused in not one of those falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
4. The MeTC, MTC and MCTC have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses involving damage to
property where the value of the property does not exceed P300,000.00.
i. True - Republic Act No. 7691 amended Section 19(2) adjusting jurisdictional amounts further to
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro
Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the
effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
5. The Supreme Court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public minister and consuls.
i. True – According to Article VIII Sec. 5(a) The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
6. The court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case when it has jurisdiction over the offense charged,
jurisdiction over the person of then accused and territorial jurisdiction.
i. True - There are three requisites for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction: subject matter; person,
and; territory
7. The Court of Appeals exercises exclusive jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus and quo warranto.
i. False – it is the Court of Appeal’s Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court also has Appellate Jurisdiction in the
said matters.
8. An offense is committed in relation to office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender.
i. True – The Court ruled in the case of ROLANDO GANZON vs. FERNANDO ARLOS, G.R. No. 174321,
October 22, 2013, to wit;
“it did not matter that his acts were committed outside of office hours, because they were
intimately connected to the office of the offender. An act is intimately connected to the office of
the offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if
it cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element of the crime in the
abstract. “
9. The Supreme Court exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases decided by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction only over offenses committed by government
officials and employees, where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
i. True - Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme
Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court
10. The Metropolitan Trial Courts Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over simple seduction with accessory penalty of acknowledgement of the offspring.
i. True - Under the Expanded Exclusive Original Jurisdiction of the municipal trial court,
MTC, MCTC and MeTC has jurisdiction over a case of simple seduction (Art. 338, RPC),
as amended, with arresto mayor, regardless of the civil liability, such as the support
and acknowledgment of the offspring that may be imposed under Article 345 of the
same Code.
11. The Regional Trial Court have concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
i. True – has concurrent original jurisdiction with the SC and CA in petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus against lower courts and bodies in petitions for quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases
12. The appeal of a General of the AFP convicted of plunder by the Sandiganbayan and meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall filed with the Court of Appeals.
True– The procedure prescribed in BP 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Criminal Procedure Jurisdiction

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Criminal Procedure Jurisdiction

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I.

a. Constitutional, Statutory, and Constitutionally mandates courts

Example of this court is the SC, One whose existence is provided

b. Civil and Criminal Courts

c. Regular Courts and Court Martial

d. Inferior and Superior Court

“Inferior courts” are those whose

e. Court of General Jurisdiction and Courts of Special or Limited Jurisdiction

Example: Supreme Court, any state or federal

one which has the power to adjudicate all

f. Court of Original Jurisdiction and Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction

Example: Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial

g. Courts of Concurrent Jurisdiction and Courts of Exclusive Jurisdiction

Example: MTC, RTC Example: Shariah Court, Sandiganbayan, CA

Jurisdiction is conferred by law.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court

Jurisdiction of the Family Courts

(4) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment

(7) Petitions for the constitution of the family home

Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts / Municipal Trial Courts

Jurisdiction of the over small cases

c. People v Mateo, GR No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004

The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:

Mayor Magsaysay’s case:

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