CORINNE SALCEDO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Other rights

A. Liberty of Abode and of Travel

Rights guaranteed under Section 6 of the Bill of Rights:

1. Freedom to choose and change one’s place of abode; and

2. Freedom to travel within the country and outside.

LIBERTY OF ABODE

Right of a person to have his home or to maintain or change his home, dwelling, residence or habitation in any
place he has chosen, within the limits prescribed by law.

LIMITATIONS

The liberty of abode may be impaired only:

a. Upon lawful order of the court and;

b. Within the limits prescribed by law.

(Under Sec. 6, Art. III of the Constitution, a lawful order of the court is required before the liberty of abode and of
changing the same can be impaired.)
LIMITATIONS

RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Right of a person to go where he pleases without interference from anyone.

The limitations on the right to travel

a. Interest of national security;
b. Public safety;
c. Public health.

(With respect to the right to travel, it is settled that only a court may issue a hold departure order against an
individual addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, administrative authorities, such as
passport-officers, may likewise curtail such right in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law.)
Villavicencio vs. Lukban
G.R. L-14639
March 25 1919
MALCOLM, J.

FACTS:

The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their houses
in the district by the police. The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for
sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to
orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and Mayor Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were
given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being
taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation.

Attorneys for the respondents, recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons
involved in the habeas corpus. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,
through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao
and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The
application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally
restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made
returnable before the full court.

ISSUE:

Whether the Liberty of abode or the power of the executive of the Municipality has the right in deporting the
women without their knowledge?

HELD:

When the writ was prayed for, the parties in whose behalf was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is
claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city
limits. In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so
deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional
sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has
often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either
inherent or express. Therefore, the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the
mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the
liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of
the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official
can do the same. Wherefore, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila.
Marcos vs. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989
CORTES, J.

FACTS:

Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced
into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.

Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The nation was awakened to the capacity
of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the
country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of people power and also clearly reinforced
the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency.

Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from
various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to
bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order
the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:

In the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, Can President Corazon Aquino prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines?

RULING:

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return
may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the
law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.

President Aquino has residual and discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized
by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws.

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part
of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
 B. Non-Impairment Clause

The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against
unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that
would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. Impairment is anything that diminishes the
efficacy of the contract. There, and impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the
parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of
the rights of the parties.

Section 10 dissected

a. Law. It includes statutes enacted by the national legislature, executive orders and administrative
regulations promulgated under a valid delegation of power, and municipal ordinances passed by the
local legislative bodies (Lim vs. Register of Deeds, 46 OG 3665). It does not include judicial decisions or
adjudications made by administrative bodies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers. (Justice
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 Edition, 253)
b. Impairment. It is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract (Clements vs. Nolting, 42 Phil.
702)
c. Obligation. The obligation of a contract is the law or duty which binds the parties to perform their
undertaking or agreement according to its terms and intent. (Sturgees vs. Crownshields, 4 Wheat. 122)
d. Contracts. It refers to any lawful agreement on property or property rights, whether real or personal,
tangible or intangible. The agreement may be executed or executory. (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law,
2000 Edition, 252) it does not include licenses and public office.
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co.
G.R. No. L-24670
December 14, 1979
SANTOS, J.

FACTS:

On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered
into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of
the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their
rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the
purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the
agreements of sale on installment and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:

1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes, and
she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.

2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must
be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either
to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from
its boundary lines.

Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092 issued in its name,
respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated therein. Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5
directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', while Lot No. 6 was
acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". TCT No. 101719 in the name of
Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that Republic
Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith. free from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in the Deed
of Sale, Annex "F" between it and Emma Chavez.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the non-impairment clause was violated.

RULING:

No, it was not violated.

With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant-appellee, referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee, it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power.
BPI vs. SEC
G.R. No. 164641
December 20, 2007
TINGA, J.

FACTS:

The Bank of the Philippine Islands, through its predecessor-in- interest, Far East Bank and Trust Company,
extended credit accommodations to the ASB Group with an outstanding aggregate principal amount of
P86,800,000.00, secured by a real estate mortgage over two (2) properties located in Greenhills, San Juan. On 2
May 2000, the ASB Group filed a petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payments before the SEC. Thereafter,
on 18 August 2000, the interim receiver submitted its Proposed Rehabilitation Plan for the ASB Group. The
Rehabilitation Plan provides, among others, a dacion en pago by the ASB Group to BPI of one of the properties
mortgaged to the latter at the ASB Group as selling value of P84,000,000.00 against the total amount of the ASB
Group’s exposure to the bank. In turn, ASB Group would require the release of the other property mortgaged to
BPI, to be thereafter placed in the asset pool.

The dacion would constitute full payment of the entire obligation due to BPI because the balance was then to be
considered waived, as per the Rehabilitation Plan.

ISSUE:

Does the requirement for Security and Exchange Commission approval of the Rehabilitation Plan impair the
obligations of contract?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that it does not impair the obligations of contract.

Private respondents maintain that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution relied on by BPI is a limit on the
exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SEC’s approval of the Rehabilitation
Plan was an exercise of adjudicatory power by an administrative agency and thus the non-impairment clause does
not apply. In addition, they stress that there is no coercion or compulsion that would be employed under the
Rehabilitation Plan. If dacion en pago fails to materialize, the Rehabilitation Plan contemplates to settle the
obligations to secured creditors with mortgaged properties at selling prices. They claim that BPI failed to submit
any valuation of the mortgage properties to substantiate its objection to the Rehabilitation Plan, making its
objection thereto totally unreasonable.

The Court reiterates that the SEC’s approval of the Rehabilitation Plan did not impair BPI’s right to contract. As
correctly contended by private respondents, the non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative
power and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the hearing panel that heard the petition for
approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was acting as a quasi-judicial body and thus, its order approving the plan
cannot constitute an impairment of the right and the freedom to contract. Besides, the mere fact that the
Rehabilitation Plan proposes a dacion en pago approach does not render it defective on the ground of impairment
of the right to contract. Dacion en pago is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing to the
creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The essential elements of a contract of
sale, namely; consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. Being a form of contract, the
dacion en pago agreement cannot be perfected without the consent of the parties involved.
C. Access to courts
In re: Mr Roger Prioreschi A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc. wrote for exemption from payment of docket fees granted to indigent litigants. Mr.
Prioreschi said that Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. was reaching out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly
born and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford
a few pesos to pay for common prescriptions, and to broken families who returned to a normal life. The Good
Shepherd have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society cannot reach
to, or have rejected or abandoned them.

ISSUE:

Whether the court may grant to foundations like Good Shepherd Foundation Inc. the same exemption from
payment of docket fees who works for indigent and underprivileged people?

RULING:

The Supreme Court cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from
payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in
Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, whereas, Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance
cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was
already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such
specific protection of the poor.

The Good Shepherd, being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of
all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations
of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees
granted to indigent litigants.

To sum it all up, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition
that only a natural person can suffer.
D. Prohibited Punishment
People vs. Estoista
G.R. L-5793
August 27 1953
TUAZON, J.

FACTS:

The appeallant was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under
one information,that the appellant was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for which he
was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence raising factual legal and constitutional
questions.

Estoita’s which firearms was charged on having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno
Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. They lived in the same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate.
From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit
Diragon Dima a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was not
perceived by the accused.

The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the time of the
accidental killing. The constitutional question, set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the objection
that the penalty from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines provided by RA No. 4 is cruel and unusual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty imposed to appeallant from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines was cruel and
harsh form of punishment?

HELD:

The Court’s opinion is that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or
unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant
lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large
measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal
circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case
in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases.
People vs. Esparas
G.R. No. 120034
August 20 1996

FACTS:

This case involves the first imposition of the death penalty on a woman, Josefina A. Esparas. Her crime is bringing
to the country shabu whose street value at that time was estimated at P30 Million. Accused Josefina Esparas
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on August 26, 1994. She absconded after the prosecution presented its key
witnesses. Accused Rodrigo Libed has remained at large.

The trial court found accused Esparas guilty as charged and sentenced her to suffer the death penalty and pay a
fine of P10 Million and the costs of suit. It found that accused Esparas belongs to an organized group or syndicated
crime group 16 and that she conspired with accused Libed in smuggling almost 20,0000 grams of shabu to the
country. The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review of her death penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether a decision of conviction could be validly rendered while she was at large?

HELD:

Yes. The jurisdiction of this Court to review her conviction and the Court issued an extended resolution upholding
the power of this Court to review all death penalty cases regardless of the escape of the accused from confinement
prior to the judgment of the trial court. It is urged that appellant should not have been penalized with death
because the prosecution failed to establish that she is a member of an organized or syndicated group. Allegedly,
there is no proof that conspiracy existed between her and accused Libed. To support this claim, the defense points
to a resolution of State Prosecutor Macapagal recommending the dismissal of the case against Libed for lack of
conspiracy.

Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the state to take life must be as error-free as
possible. It is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this
power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to
assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight, but even more, in
crimes that shock the conscience.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
October 12 1998
PUNO, J.

FACTS:

On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10
year old daughter of his common law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 2 (the
death penalty law and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.

Petitioner also filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin
respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal
injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE:

Is Death by lethal injection is unconstitutional for being cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment?

HELD:

No. Lethal injection, not cruel and degrading or inhuman punishment under Section 19, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into the execution room. A
trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline
solution. At the warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous line. The deadly
concoction typically includes three drugs, The first two drugs are commonly used during surgery to put the patient
to sleep and relax muscles, the third is used in heart bypass surgery.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. The implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and
expertise of administrative officials.

What is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. Indeed, The primary indicator of society's standard of decency with regard to
capital punishment is the response of the country's legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as long as the death
penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we
must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of
petitioner's challenge. We find that the legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein.
 E. Non-imprisonment for Debt

Sec. 20, Art. III of the Constitution:

No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

Debt - Any civil obligation arising from contract.

Poll tax - A specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class without regard to property or
occupation (e.g. Community tax).

A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law. Hence, its non-payment maybe validly punished with
imprisonment. Only poll tax is covered by the constitutional provision. If an accused fails to pay the fines imposed
upon him, this may result in his subsidiary imprisonment because his liability is ex delicto and not ex contractu.

Generally, a debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt. However, if he contracted his debt through
fraud, he can be validly punished in a criminal action as his responsibility arises not from the contract of loan but
from commission of a crime. (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, Dec.18, 1986)
Lozano vs. Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419
January 21 1993
YAP, J.

FACTS:

The constitutionality of BP 22 or Bouncing Check Law is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision.
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases
moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which
is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.

The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the
most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the
highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government."

Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict
between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.

ISSUE:

Whether BP 22 have conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

HELD:

The Court held that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be
imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to
penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is within the prerogative of the
lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not
the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not
malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished
as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating
from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations
to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and
welfare. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
 F. Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

An ex post facto law is any law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal, and punishes such action. (United State v. Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. DeConde, G.R.
No. L-18208, Feb. 14, 1922)

Kinds of ex post facto law

It can be a law that:

1. Makes an act, which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action
2. Aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only. In effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

Bill of attainder
A legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial, its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat for a
judicial determination of guilt. (People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, Dec. 27, 1972)

NOTE: It is only when a statute applies either to a named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial that it becomes a bill of attainder.

Two kinds of bill of attainder

1. Bill of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the death penalty)
2. Bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty)
United States vs. Conde
G.R. No. L-18208
February 14, 1922
JOHNSON, J.

FACTS:

It appears from the record that on the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was presented in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, charging the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said
complaint they were each arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. The cause was finally brought on for trial on
the 1st day of September, 1921. At the close of the trial, and after a consideration of the evidence adduced, the
Honorable M. V. del Rosario, judge, found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and
sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P120 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court.

The appellants now contend: (a) That the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was
executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted; (b) that at the time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there
was no usury law in force in the Philippine Islands; (c) that said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the 1st
day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract in question was executed; (d) that said law could
have no retroactive effect or operation, and (e) that said law impairs the obligation of a contract, and that for all of
said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed,
and that they should each be discharged from the custody of the law.

The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not in dispute, and may be stated as follows: (1)
That on the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco
executed and delivered to the defendants a contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed
from the latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said contract, the said Bartolome Oliveros
and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per
month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day of
January, 1916. There were other terms in the contract which, however, are not important for the decision in the
present case

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the defendants are guilty in violation of Act. No. 2655 or Usury Law?

HELD:

The Court held that the acts complained did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed.

The law, we think, is well established that when a contract contains an obligation to pay interest upon the
principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is included within the promise to pay. In other
words, the obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract, be it express or implied, is a part of the
obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or altering the rate of interest,
cannot be made to apply to such contract without violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the
adoption of a law "impairing the obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12 Corpus Juris, 1058-105
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