Stat. Con. Digest Cases

Corinne Salcedo BL-5A
CALTEX VS. PALOMAR
G.R. No. L-19650, 29 September 1966
FACTS:
In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground
work for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
products. The contest was entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”, which calls
for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the
media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities
for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a
letter sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and
endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the “The
Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law”.
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied

Caltex’s request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of
the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatex’s request for
clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no

consideration involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not
commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view
that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any
consideration it still falls as “Gift Enterprise”, which was equally banned by
the Postal Law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory

relief?
2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?
HELD:
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals
with the applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: “Declaratory
relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a statute, to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute
and for a declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid

down certain conditions:
1. There must be a justiciable controversy.

2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellee’s bent to hold the contest and the appellant’s threat to issue
a fraud order if carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow
of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and
stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant,
the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee’s
“desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others” — which
admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has
ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was
translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.
Construction
– Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and

intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given
case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein
just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19
N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional
advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales
promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales
promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal

prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a
declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the
legality of its sales promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?
Lottery
– Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance
e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as
well as various forms of gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. 3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a

lottery but it appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in
the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought,
any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station,
request for the entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and
submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest
fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a
lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by
chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party
receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable
consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to
draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of
increased patronage be considered as a consideration and thus violates the
Postal Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the

benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether
or not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning
and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of
value for the distribution of the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly,

there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities
that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are
sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product,
the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the

case at bar since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is
attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee’s products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is
that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of
the Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied
the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.
AISPORNA VS. CA 113 SCRA 459
113 SCRA 459
FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance
Act.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the

Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12-
month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M.
Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was

issued with her active participation, which is not allowed because she did not
possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission.
Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him
in his work, and that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued because
her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant
left a note on top of her husband’s desk.
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s
decisions was affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding petitioner guilty
of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph
of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph
of the same section.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused

is acquitted of the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof
prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation
or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its
second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of this
section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be
imposed for its violation.
REPORT THIS AD
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section

189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent
is within the intent of Section 189.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the

agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the
aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all
its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated
words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in
which it is found or with which it is associated.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second

paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to
receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of

the first paragraph of the aforesaid section.
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an
insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation.
This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to
warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
CHINA BANK VS. ORTEGA
49 SCRA 335
FACTS:
Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest
Development Corporation. To satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the
garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest Development Corporation
with the China Banking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of garnishment
was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank
through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court
whether or not there is a deposit in the CBC of B & B Forest Development
Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow
any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to
comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by
invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information concerning to
bank deposits.
ISSUES: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with
a court processes garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking
the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
RULING: NO. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into
deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It
merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant
B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the
bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against examination of or
inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished
to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such
a case, and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever
within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their
just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting
their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
PVA BOARD VS. BAUTISTA
112 SCRA 59
Facts:
Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last world war that took
active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy. But due to his
military service, he was rendered disabled. The Philippine Veterans
Administration, formerly known as Philippine Veterans Board, now Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office, is a government agency charged with the administration
of different laws giving various benefits in favor of the Veterans and their
orphans, widows or parents.
On July 23, 1955, petitioner filed a claim for disability pension under Section
9 of R.A. 65 with the Philippines Veterans Board, alleging that he was suffering
from PTB. Due to his incomplete supporting documents, his application was not
approved.
On August 8, 1968, petitioner was able to complete his supporting papers and
the board found out that his disability was 100%. Thus, he was awarded the full
benefits of Section 9, R.A. 65.
R.A. 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969 providing for an increase in the basic
pension to P100 a month and the additional pension to P30 a month for the wife
and each of the unmarried minor children.
Petioner claims that he was deprived of his right to the pension from October
19, 1955 to June 21, 1957.
The lower court’s decision was in favor of Gasilao. However, the Philippine
Veterans Board insisted that the lower court erred in ordering the board to
retroact the effectivity of the award to Gasilao.
Issue:
Whether or not Gasilao pension benefits shall start from 1955, the year he filed
his first application.
Rulings:
Yes. Pension / veteran statutes shall be construed liberally in favor of the
pensioners / veterans. Veterans and pension laws are enacted to compensate a
class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the
dangers they encountered in the line of duty. They are expression of gratitude
to and recognition of those who rendered service to the country. For these
reasons, such statues are construed liberally to the end that their noble
purpose is best accomplished.
PCFI VS NTC
G.R. NO. L-63318, November 25, 1983
FACT:
Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of
a revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an
ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however, was
set aside by this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that “there
was a necessity of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on
the application of the PLDT”. On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the
questioned decision permanently approving PLDT’s new and increased SIP rates.
It is the submission of the petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the
PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC has
not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2
of Presidential Decree No. 217.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved
the Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence
of specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217.
HELD:
There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent
NTC to promulgate rules and regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice
Abad Santos, it is said that the case involves a simple problem of statutory
construction – that of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision
sustained the petitioner’s contention that it is the duty of NTC to first
promulgate rules and regulations. The resolution does not subscribe to the view
that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because the decree
must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive “may” and
not the mandatory “shall.” The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the
canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba
legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no
departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory
construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned
we have the following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent

inservire (words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent
to the words). It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word
“may” in a statute is permissive while the word “shall” is mandatory. The rule,
however, is not absolute. The literal interpretation of the words of an act
should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of
the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a
construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. In the case at
bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be
construed as mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no justification
for the rate increase of the revised schedule of PLDT’s SIP. It is untimely,
considering the present economic condition obtaining in the country. The
approved rate defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread ownership
among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the decision of NTC is annulled
and set aside.
NFL VS. EISMA
127 SCRA 419
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment(Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition
for direct certification as the sole exclusivecollective bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing
plantof the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such
employees charged the firmbefore the same office for underpayment of monthly
living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued anotice of strike against
the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of
the said localunion; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances;
and “employment of oppressive alienmanagement personnel without proper permit.
The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint
with the trial court against the officers and members of theunion, for “damages
for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/orrestraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the
dissolution of the restrainingorder, and opposition to the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas
Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance.
The motion was denied. Hence, the petition forcertiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation comeonly after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in
a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority whichorganizes
the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must
be conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction
of courts and judicial tribunals is derivedexclusively from the statutes of the
forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statutein force.
Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested the
labor arbiters with jurisdiction;since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted
the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers orclaims for damages
arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after
PresidentialDecree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts,
and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 madeno change with respect to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to moneyclaims of workers
or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is
to beapplied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a
labor arbiter is therein provided forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean,
that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judgenow,
certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when
he entertained thesuit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a
strike.The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and
nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 orderissued by the court a quo. It
granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, orwhoever
acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any
further action on thecivil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose
of dismissing it. It also made permanent therestraining order issued on 5 August
1982.
PAAT VS. CA
266 SCRA 167
FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by
the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the
truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck
and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required
explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained
Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck.
Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal,
private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner
Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action
for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied
their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver
that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because
the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such
remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon

by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of
a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture
proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of
the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course
of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
PEOPLE VS. MAPA (20 SCRA 1164)
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692
of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and
further amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to
have in its possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license
permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and
affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret
agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment.
In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang,
stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may
qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by
Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper

defense to illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated
that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it
shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts
of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use
in the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including
it in the list therefore the accused is not exempted.
LEVERIZA VS. LAC

157 SCRA 369
FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant
case:
Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and.
Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for
25 years.
Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between
Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but
reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff
Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for
25 years.
There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three
contracts of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is
the same parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A,
the area leased is 4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area
has been reduced to 3,000 square meters.
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that

it appears that defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for
durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil
Oil, and the latter, as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors,
to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of time that also overlapped.
Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased.
This is the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For
purposes of brevity, these defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as
Defendants Leveriza.
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on

the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has
already been cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with
the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the
parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned.
Defendants Leverizas’ claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA
has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is
Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.
CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its
cancellation by Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A
because of the violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to
plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further
asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public Works
and Communications is not valid.
After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:
1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and
has therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;
2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June
28, 1966 because of the cancellation of Contract A;
3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that
it is still valid and subsisting;
CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was
properly registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only
the President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could
execute the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative
Code; that the Airport General Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A,
the contract entered into between the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C
between the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been approved by the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however denied.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this
petition for Review on certiorari.
ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was
a valid contract. The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still
subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed

by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the
execution of another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of
Contract A
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court
of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
YES
Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee
specifically “for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by
the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.”
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased
premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises
but in such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first
be secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the
terms and conditions of this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms
and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms
and conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this
contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of
sublease (Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The
cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General
Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation,
claiming that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the
cancellation. They maintain that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, acting for the President, or by delegation of power, the
(2)Director of CCA who could validly cancel the contract. Petitioners argue
that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in
effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the
Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation
or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in
Contract “A” which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is
evident that in the implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said
Department Head is no longer necessary if not redundant
NOTES:
1. It is further contended that even granting that such cancellation was
effective, a subsequent billing by the Accounting Department of the CAA has in
effect waived or nullified the rescission of Contract “A.”
The billing of the petitioners by the Accounting Department of the CAA if indeed
it transpired, after the cancellation of Contract “A” is obviously an error.
However, this Court has already ruled that the mistakes of government personnel
should not affect public interest.
2. Petitioners further assail the interpretation of Contract “A”, claiming that

Contract “B” was a mere sublease to Mobil Oil and requires no prior consent of
CAA to perfect the same. Citing Article 1650 of the Civil Code, they assert
that the prohibition to sublease must be expressed and cannot be merely implied
or inferred.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in asserting the non-

necessity for a prior consent interprets the first sentence of paragraph 7 of
Contract “A” to refer to an assignment of lease under Article 1649 of the Civil
Code and not to a mere sublease. A careful scrutiny of said paragraph of Contract
“A” clearly shows that it speaks of transfer of rights of Rosario Leveriza to
the leased premises and not to assignment of the lease.
2. Petitioners likewise argued that it was contemplated by the parties to

Contract “A” that Mobil Oil would be the owner of the gasoline station it would
construct on the leased premises during the period of the lease, hence, it is
understood that it must be given a right to use and occupy the lot in question
in the form of a sub-lease.
In Contract “A”, it was categorically stated that it is the lessee (petitioner)

who will manage and operate the gasoline station. The fact that Mobil Oil was
mentioned in that contract was clearly not intended to give approval to a
sublease between petitioners and said company but rather to insure that in the
arrangements to be made between them, it must be understood that after the
expiration of the lease contract, whatever improvements have been constructed
in the leased premises shall be relinquished to CAA. Thus, this Court held that
“the primary and elementary rule of construction of documents is that when the
words or language thereof is clear and plain or readily understandable by any
ordinary reader thereof, there is absolutely no room for interpretation or
construction anymore.
3. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of

CAA cannot execute without approval of the Department Secretary, a valid
contract of lease over real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines,
citing the Revised Administrative Code, which provide that Under 567 of the
Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed:
(1) by the President of the Philippines, or
(2) by an officer duly designated by him or
(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.
On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the
authority to lease real property belonging to the RP under its administration
even without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
which authority is expressly vested in it by law, more particularly Section 32
(24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. — Subject to the general
control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have,
among others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila
International Airport and all government aerodromes except those controlled or
operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such power and duties
as: … (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person,
firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold,
purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and easements
which may be proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired
and any other real property of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be
sold without the approval of the President of the Philippines. …
There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while
Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real property subject
of the lease in Contract “C” is real property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to
enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the third category (Art.
567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the power
to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real properties belonging
to the RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President but
because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in
it, which in this case is RA 776.
Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the
Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and existence,
administers properties belonging to the RP and it is on these properties that
the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter
into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or
private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any
personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or
necessary. (The exception, however, is the sale of properties acquired by CAA
or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the
President of the Philippines.) The Court of appeals took cognizance of the
striking absence of such proviso in the other transactions contemplated in
paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that the Director of the CAA does
not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretaryof Public Works
and Communications in the execution of Contract “C.”
In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory
construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace
only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable; that specific
statute prevails over a general ; and that where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor
specially should prevail.
DAONG VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE

159 SCRA 369
Facts:
Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private

respondents filed a petition before the MTC of San Nicolas seeking adoption of
two minors. Petitioners filed an opposition to the adoption invoking the
provisions of the Civil Code. That the respondents have a legitimate child, the
mother of the petitioners, now deceased, as such they are not qualified to adopt
as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The petition for adoption was granted.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under

paragraph 1 of Art. 335.
Held:
No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous.

Therefore, no construction or interpretation should be made. To add
“grandchildren” in this article where no such word is included would be in
violation to the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally
exclude what is not included.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

127 SCRA 419
Facts:
Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private

respondents filed a petition before the MTC of San Nicolas seeking adoption of
two minors. Petitioners filed an opposition to the adoption invoking the
provisions of the Civil Code. That the respondents have a legitimate child, the
mother of the petitioners, now deceased, as such they are not qualified to adopt
as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The petition for adoption was granted.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under

paragraph 1 of Art. 335.
Held:
No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous.

Therefore, no construction or interpretation should be made. To add
“grandchildren” in this article where no such word is included would be in
violation to the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally
exclude what is not included.
PARAS VS. COMELEC
264 SCRA 49
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the
incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s
opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within
one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may
be instituted.
ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its
context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its
general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par.
(b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its
construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase “regular local election”
to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never
be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a
statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law. An interpretation should
be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is def
eated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
PERFECTO VS. MEER

85 PHIL 552
FACT
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the Court during the
year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of
First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in
violation of the Constitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that
the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount
to a diminution.
HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount
to a diminution thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting
words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one
purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit
diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence
of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come
from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge as a part of his
income is a violation of the Constitution.
ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

93 PHIL 696
Facts: This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and
ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-
fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income
tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in
1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the
income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December
31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify
and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in the case
of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the
salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. It is further held that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction
of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in
their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
NITAFAN VS. CIR

152 SCRA 284
FACTS:
Petitioners are qualified judges of the Regional Trial Court. They sought to
prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of
the Supreme Court from making deductions of withholding taxes from their
salaries.
According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as

judicial officers is a violation of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which states that:
“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased”.
In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that

their salaries are being decreased, citing Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs.
David as their legal basis.
In particular, since the 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision

similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973 Constitution, petitioners
claimed that the intent of the framers was to revert to the original concept
of “non-diminution” of salaries.
The Chief Justice had actually dealt with this matter previously in response
to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue
the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. While the
question has been resolved, the Court decided to settle the legal issues
through a judicial pronouncement.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax – YES
RATIO:
Members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax
This payment of income tax does not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
Further, the deletion of the grant of exemption from payment of income tax to
members of the Judiciary was a way of ensuring the equality of the three
branches of government.
Based on jurisprudence, it was concluded that the true intent of the framers
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable, as is
applicable to all income earners.
The course of deliberations, debates, and amendments on the draft proposal of

Section 10, Article VIII further clarified the issue:
Commissioner Cirilo Rigos’s proposal, that the term “diminished” be changed

to “decreased” and that the word “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted,
was accepted.
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas announced that by putting a period after

“decreased”, it is with the understanding that the salaries of justices are
subject to tax. He cited that this is based on the understanding that there
will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV,
the General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which states that no salary
of any public officer shall be exempt from payment of income tax.
Due to these issues, Fr. Bernas stated that the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer
and Dencia vs David were not applicable anymore.
FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING
136 SCRA142
FACTS:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining

Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its
copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as
a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government
rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground.
Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also
petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages.
Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time
sue.
HELD:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed
for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a
civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil
courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA.
The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due
to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not
availed of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court
whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be
deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this
case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the
letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures
man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law
killeth but its spirit giveth life.
SARMIENTO VS. MISON
156 SCRA 549
Facts:
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau

of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito
Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional
law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for
approval. Sarmiento insists that under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus
require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin
Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of
Mison’s appointment.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation

by the Commission on Appointment.
Held:
No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as

one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the
president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth
group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head
of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not
need to be confirmed by the COA.
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
GR 160261
FACTS:
In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress adopted its
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. The new rules superseded
impeachment Rules of the 11th Congress. Secs. 16 and 17 of these Rules state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on
Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself
affirms or overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the
substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR
Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.
A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the Committee on Justice
to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by Chief Justice Davide of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).”
In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and 7 Associate Justices of SC for “culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.”
The complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the first impeachment
complaint “sufficient in form.” However, it also voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Ten days later, on October
23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a second impeachment complaint against
CJ Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the
JDF. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar, members of the
House of Representatives, as well as private individuals, all asserting their
rights, among others, as taxpayers to stop the illegal spending of public funds
for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. The petitioners
contend that Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution bars the filing
of the second impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision states that
“(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.”
Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating that the

High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case as it would mean an
encroachment on the power of HoR, a co-equal branch of government.
ISSUES/HELD:
1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates Sec. 3(5),
Article XI of the Constitution—YES
2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings approved by the HoR are unconstitutional – YES
3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked –
YES
RATIO:
1. The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar under the
Constitution.
2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:
1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning (verbal egis);
2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the

intent of the framers; and
3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation means

simply to begin. The records of the debates by the framers affirm this textual
interpretation. From the records of the Constitutional Convention and the amicus
curiae briefs of its two members (Maambong and Regalado), the term “to initiate”
in Sec 3(5), Art. XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the complaint.
By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are deemed

initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in
substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the
House Committee on Justice on the substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing
or endorsement before the HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of
the House.
In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for Impeachment
are unconstitutional because the rules clearly contravene Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI
since the rules give the term “initiate” a different meaning from filing and
referral.
Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the
constitutional one-year ban.
3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.
The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial review, only
carried out its duty as stated in Section 1, Article VIII, which mandates the
judicial department to look into cases where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the different branches of government. Here, it only
reviewed the constitutionality of the Rules of Impeachment against the one-year
ban explicitly stated in the Constitution. Consequently, the contention that
judicial review over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.
The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter,
effectively checks on the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law. It must declare executive and legislative acts void if they
violate the Constitution. The violation of Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution is thus within the competence of the Court to decide.
CHAVEZ VS. JBC
GR NO. 202242
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the
JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy
is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two
houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of
its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate.
Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a
representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of
the JBC is unconstitutional?
Held:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,

namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief
Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post
of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for
being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of
the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not
at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A
vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected
by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all
citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of
legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision
of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned
that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the
creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then
it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of
the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies
the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special
members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is

unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress
may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention
that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used
in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a

practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate
in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of
Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. This
unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the
JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid
purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which
the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that
the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that
they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as
including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that
it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the
Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the
Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the
Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to

its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing
a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot
be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department.
4. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no

rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule,
however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of
fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only

applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this
case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in
the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
nonetheless valid.
CHAVEZ VS. JBC

GR NO. 202242 APRIL 16 2013
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having
one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in
2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the
House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase
“ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have
one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII
Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members
only with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as
provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a
representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of
the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to
its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing
a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot
be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
The motion was denied.

MACALINTAL VS. PET
GR 191618
FACTS:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the

previous ruling of the SC that found the creation of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal by the SC as constitutional. In his motion, Macalintal contended that
the creation of the PET by the SC did not fall within the ambit of the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He also contended
that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power, and thus, its members violate
Section 12, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PET is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, the Court held that PET is constitutional. A look at the deliberations of
the framers reveals that the exclusive authority granted to the SC in judging
cases relating to the elections of President and Vice-President does not impinge
on the supposed separation of power between the judiciary and the executive
departments, even if the said provision can be found in Art. VII.
The Court held that election issues are adversarial and judicial proceedings,
and are essentially justiciable questions.
Similarly, the Court held that in creating PET, it merely constitutionalized

what was statutory. The last paragraph of Section 4, Art. VII bestows upon the
SC the power to hear questions relating to the election of the President and
Vice-President. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, the creation
of PET should be seen as the means necessary to carry said constitutional
mandate into effect.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ

64 PHIL 201
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of

prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter
from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes
that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil.
Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular
sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is

constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but
the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’
and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the
separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious
freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence
for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing
that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR
A.M. NO. P-02-1651
FACTS:
Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation

of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is
living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to
twenty years old. He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she
is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.
ISSUE:
What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto?

Is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise
clause?
RULING:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals
and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although
the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is
entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has
demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent,
thus the case is remanded to the RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as

it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the
respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable
as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court
prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at

respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling
state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not
been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s
compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief and
practice.
IMBONG VS. OCHOA

GR. NO. 204819
Facts:
The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the

executive and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not
adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to
the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make
effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population
control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law,

claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for
reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents
insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that
the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.
Issue:
Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the
Constitution
Ruling: NO
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees
it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to

save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-
preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to
information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared
towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying
objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The
Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one

title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows
that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination
of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and
the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law
must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where

another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible

parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable
human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect
to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante
Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A.
No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
GAMBOA VS. FINANCE SEC
GR 176579
FACTS
Movants Philippine Stock Exchange’s (PSE) President, Manuel V.

Pangilinan, Napoleon L. Nazareno, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) contend that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution has long been settled and defined to refer to the total outstanding
shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. In fact, movants claim that the
SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various
statutes, has consistently adopted this particular definition in its numerous
opinions. Movants point out that with the 28 June 2011 Decision, the Court in
effect introduced a “new” definition or “midstream redefinition” of the term
“capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether the term “capital” includes both voting and non-voting shares.
RULING
NO.
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an

economy “effectively controlled” by Filipinos. Consistent with such State
policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of
public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos.
The FIA’s implementing rules explain that “[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and
held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not
enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the
stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential.” In effect, the
FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the term
“capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares
with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely
because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full
beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a

corporation.
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP
(GR 195580)
Facts: Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp.

(Redmont), a domestic corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws,
took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the province of Palawan.
After inquiring with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
it learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining
activities where already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Petitioner McArthur,
through its predecessor-in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an
application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines and Geo-
Sciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Subsequently, SMMI was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153
covering an area of over 1,782 hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of
Bataraza, Province of Palawan and EPA-IVB-44 which includes an area of 3,720
hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan. The MPSA and EP were then
transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and, on November 6, 2006,
assigned to petitioner McArthur. Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha
Resources and Development Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining & Development
Corporation (PLMDC) which previously filed an application for an MPSA with the
MGB, Region IV-B, DENR on January 6, 1992. Through the said application, the
DENR issued MPSA-IV-1-12 covering an area of 3.277 hectares in barangays
Calategas and San Isidro, Municipality of Narra, Palawan. Subsequently, PLMDC
conveyed, transferred and/or assigned its rights and interests over the MPSA
application in favor of Narra. Another MPSA application of SMMI was filed with
the DENR Region IV-B, labeled as MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA-IVB-47) over
3,402 hectares in Barangays Malinao and Princesa Urduja, Municipality of Narra,
Province of Palawan. SMMI subsequently conveyed, transferred and assigned its
rights and interest over the said MPSA application to Tesoro. On January 2,
2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3)
separate petitions for the denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA
designated as AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154 and MPSA IV-1-12. In the petitions,
Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian
corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of
petitioners, it was the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the MPSAs
over the areas covered by applications since it knows that it can only
participate in mining activities through corporations which are deemed Filipino

citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly
owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining
activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner corporations are Filipino and can validly
be issued MPSA and EP.
Held: No. The SEC Rules provide for the manner of calculating the Filipino
interest in a corporation for purposes, among others, of determining compliance
with nationality requirements (the ‘Investee Corporation’). Such manner of
computation is necessary since the shares in the Investee Corporation may be
owned both by individual stockholders (‘Investing Individuals’) and by
corporations and partnerships (‘Investing Corporation’). The said rules thus
provide for the determination of nationality depending on the ownership of the
Investee Corporation and, in certain instances, the Investing Corporation.
Under the SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the
Investee Corporation. The first case is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the
SEC as the Control Test in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion
in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, ‘(s)hares belonging to
corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality.’ Under the
liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace the ownership of the
60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing Corporation since a
corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is considered as Filipino.
The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains
to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, “but if
the percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less
than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be
counted as of Philippine nationality.” Under the Strict Rule or Grandfather
Rule Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the Investee
Corporation must be traced (i.e., “grandfathered”) to determine the total
percentage of Filipino ownership. Moreover, the ultimate Filipino ownership of
the shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and
added to the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation.
In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather
Rule or the second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-
foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture
corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino
stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is
either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently,
where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the
Grandfather Rule will not apply.

Stat. Con. Digest Cases

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Corinne Salcedo BL-5A

CALTEX VS. PALOMAR

G.R. No. L-19650, 29 September 1966

Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied

Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no

1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory

In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid

1. There must be a justiciable controversy.

– Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and

promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal

Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

– Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

Three Essential Elements:

No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a

No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the

Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?

Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly,

And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the

AISPORNA VS. CA 113 SCRA 459

113 SCRA 459

Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was

The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second

receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of

CHINA BANK VS. ORTEGA

PVA BOARD VS. BAUTISTA

G.R. NO. L-63318, November 25, 1983

we have the following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent

NFL VS. EISMA

127 SCRA 419

Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon

PEOPLE VS. MAPA (20 SCRA 1164)

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper

LEVERIZA VS. LAC

It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that

Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on

After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:

subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed

2. Petitioners further assail the interpretation of Contract “A”, claiming that

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in asserting the non-

2. Petitioners likewise argued that it was contemplated by the parties to

In Contract “A”, it was categorically stated that it is the lessee (petitioner)

3. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of

(2) by an officer duly designated by him or

(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.

DAONG VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE

Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private

Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under

No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous.

National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private

Whether or not private respondents are disqualified to adopt under

No. The provision invoked by the petitioners is clear and unambiguous.

PARAS VS. COMELEC

PERFECTO VS. MEER

ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

NITAFAN VS. CIR

According to the petitioners, the tax withheld from their compensation as

In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that