Albert v.
Sandiganbayan
Topic: Conditional Arraignment; When Valid
Facts
 Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao charged Ramon Albert, President of the National Home
Mortgage and Finance Corporation, of violation of RA 3019 for
making it appear in his tax declarations that 2 parcels of real property
are residential land in order to acquire a higher loanable amount of
of P4,535,400.00 from the NHMFC when in truth, the said parcels of
land are agricultural land
 A Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner and his co-accused.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the
following grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due
process of law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional
rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a
speedy trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February
1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 is not supported by evidence.
 Pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a
Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel.
 The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition
that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned
 Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not
guilty” and granted petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift
Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel but denied his
Motion to dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner.
 The Arraignment was set to on October 2, 2003 and on October 7,
2003 the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Information. The amended information included changing “gross
neglect of duty” to “gross inexcusable negligence” in the information.
Sandiganbayan granted the amendment.
 Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on
the information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after
arraignment.
 Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s Motion to Admit Amended
Information and explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls
under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable
negligence" under Section 3(e), and that allegations of gross neglect
of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal causes
undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable
negligence where undue injury is a constitutive element. A change to
this effect constitutes substantial amendment considering that the
possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally
intended.
 Sandiganbayan held that even granting that the amendment of the
information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect
the same in the event that the accused had not yet undergone a
permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on
13 March 2001 was merely "provisional," then the prosecution may
still amend the information either in form or in substance.
 Petitioner contends that under Section 14, Rule 110 of the rules, only
a formal amendment of the information may be made after a plea
and the rule does not distinguish between a plea made during a
"provisional" or a "permanent" arraignment. Since petitioner already
entered a plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March 2001 arraignment,
then the information may be amended only in form.
o Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters
his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when
it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
Issue:
 Whether the sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the amended information
Ruling: No.
 An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required
by the rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity
to know the precise charge that confronts him.The accused is
formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a
plea of guilty or not guilty.
 The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or
"conditional" arraignments is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Court.
However, in People v. Espinosa, this Court recognized such practice,
provided that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." Moreover, the
conditions must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the
arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple
and unconditional
 In the case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in
of the Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense.
merely states that the "[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea of
not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms  The inclusion of "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information,
and conditions imposed on accused persons travelling abroad.” which merely alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as
Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and granted modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA
his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and 3019, is an amendment in form.
to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto
which, however, were limited only to petitioner’s itinerary abroad; the
setting up of additional bailbond; the required appearance before the
clerk of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the
Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or
conditional nature of the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine
laid down in Espinosa, the arraignment of petitioner should be
deemed simple and unconditional.

 The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal

amendment of the Information may be made but with leave of court
and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.

 The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted

with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross
neglect of duty." The amended information, on the other hand,
alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest
partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence." Simply, the
amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross
inexcusable negligence." Given that these two phrases fall under
different paragraphs of RA 3019—specifically, "gross neglect of duty"
is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under
Section 3(e) of the statute—the question remains whether or not the
amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.

 The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the

amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under
the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence
the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which
merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an
amendment to form that can be made at anytime.

 Despite being substantial, the change made is allowable even after

arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. As a

People v. Gonzaga
FACTS
 In an information dated November 3, 1977,
accused Gonzaga was indicted for the crime of
murder for fatally stabbing with a jungle bolo one
Amparo M. Quilatan, allegedly attended by the
aggravating circumstances of "evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength deliberately making use of
drunkenness or after having taken liquor, armed
with an illegally-possessed 27 inches jungle bolo
(accused has been separately charged for this
offense), without due regard to the profession of a
public school teacher." Five days later, or on
November 8, 1977, accused Gonzaga appeared
for arraignment without counsel. The trial court
thereupon issued an order appointing Atty.
Crisanto Saruca as counsel de oficio "for the
purpose of arraignment only." Immediately
thereafter, Atty. Saruca manifested that the
accused was ready for arraignment and the
accused pleaded guilty to the offense charged.
 The trial court then ordered the presentation of
evidence but the prosecution was not ready for
trial. The prosecution witnesses had not been
notified because the prosecution did not expect
that the accused would plead guilty and that trial
would continue thereafter. The case was then set
for hearing the next day, November 9, 1977, and
for purposes of trial Attys. Leonardo Rodriguez
and Felimon Koh were appointed as counsels de
oficio.
Issue of Arraignment
 The records of the case, particularly the
transcripts of stenographic notes of the
proceedings taken during the hearing, amply show
the inordinate haste with which accused was
charged, arraigned and convicted. The information
was filed on November 3, 1977. On November 8,
1977, accused was immediately arraigned and
pleaded guilty to the offense charged with the
assistance of a counsel de oficio who had just
been appointed then and there. The case was set
for trial the next day, November 9, 1977,
notwithstanding counsel de oficio's request that
he be given two days to prepare for trial.
 The constitutional rights of the accused are for the
protection of the guilty and of innocent alike. Only
the assurance that even the guilty shall be given
the benefit of every constitutional guaranty can
the innocent be secure in the same rights. 2 Thus,
this Court has always stressed its constant
concern in due observance of the fundamental
requirements of fairness and due process that the
most meticulous care be exercised by the trial
court before acceptance of an accused plea of
guilty in a capital case. 3 Sec. 1, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court prescribes that "the arraignment
must be made by the judge or clerk and shall
consist in reading the complaint or information to
the defendant and delivering to him a copy
thereof, including a fist of witnesses and asking
him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty as
charged." In the instant case, records confirm the
fact that the accused was not adequately
informed of the nature of the crime imputed
against him and the consequences of his plea. Nor
does it appear that the averments in the
 information, including the qualifying and guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and
aggravating circumstances were explained to him form in which it is charged, his plea of guilty should not
No dialogue whatsoever transpired between be accepted and if accepted it should not be held to be
accused and the trial judge. The transcript of the sufficient to sustain a conviction.
stenographic notes taken during the arraignment Finally, the fact that immediately after the prosecution
on November 8, 1977 shows: had rested its case in the last hearing held on November
16, 1977, the trial court read a "ready made" decision of
ISSUE- When arraignment was properly made conviction shows that the accused was meted the death
RULING – NO – FAILED TO ADHERE OF THE REQUISITES penalty without due process of law. With the perfunctory
OF A PROPER ARRAIGNMENT- arraignment of the accused and the undue haste with
Under See. 5, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, whenever an attorney de oftcio is  which the hearing was held, the Court sees that
employed or assigned by the court to defend an accused either at the arraignment or  accused's fate was predetermined from the start. Even
at the trial he should be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and 
before the termination of the sentence of death had
prepare his defense before proceeding further in the case which should not be less 
than two (2) hours in case of arraignment and two (2) days in case of trial. These  already been prepared. At the last page of the transcript
requirements were not complied with. After accused's arraignment on November 8,  of stenographic notes taken by stenographer Luisa S.
1977, the court immediately set the case for trial the next day, November 9, 1977,  Golla, a note appears which states: "NOTE: Sentence
disregarding counsel de oficio's manifestation that he be allowed the required two­ already attached to the original records of the cage."
day period within which to prepare for trial. The transcript of the stenographic notes 
taken during the arraignment shows:

RATIO - In a long line of cases, this Court has repeatedly

enjoined trial judges to refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice
demands a speedy administration judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in to it that when an
accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning
of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction. The essence of a plea of guilty in a criminal
trial is that the accused on arraignment admits his guilt
freely, voluntarily and- with full knowledge of the
consequences and meaning of his act. If the accused
does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the
offense charged, if he is not advised as to the meaning
and effect of the technical language so often used in
formal complaints and informations in qualifying the
acts constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly
understand the consequences by way of a heavy and
even a capital penalty flowing from his admission of his
People vs. Gambao [2013]
Facts:
Lucia Chan was kidnapped by the accused-appellants, and
asked for P400,000 ransom for her liberty. Shortly after the
transaction b/w the accused appellants and Chan’s son, the
police were able to arrest the former. Lucia then was rescued.
The accused-appellants, along with 10 others, were charged
with Kidnapping for Ransom.
During the hearing, the accused-appellants all manifested their
desire to change their earlier plea of “not guilty” to “guilty”. The
presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change
of plea to each of them, stating: "It would mean the moment you
withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of
guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, xxx, will
outrightly sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the
prosecution shall have finished the presentation of its evidence.
Now that I have explained to you the consequences of your
entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea
of ‘guilty’?" All of them answered in the affirmative.
TC convicted them; penalized w/ death. CA affirmed. Hence,
this pet.
Issue: W/n the accused-appellants improvidently plead,
therefore, entitled to be acquitted
Held: Yes. But they were still convicted based on the strength of
the evidence presented against them
Jurisprudence laid down the duties of the trial court when the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is
mandated:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire w/n the accused wishes to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irreversible. Moreover, the requirement of taking
further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines
whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed
judgement – the ff. guidelines should be observed:
- Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to
whether he had conferred with, and completely explained
to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea
of guilty.
- Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
- Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that
he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment
or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse.
- Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the
crime which is the basis of his indictment.
- All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter.
- The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be
required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.
The records show that accused-appellants had the mistaken
assumption that their plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable
penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain
to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty. They
were not warned by the judge that in cases where the penalty is
single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court
judge’s seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is
not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of
guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the
trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must
be sustained.
People vs. Uy
Facts:
 A female confidential informant personally informed the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the PNP Malabon City that Ramon Uy (alias Chekwa) asked her to
look for a buyer of shabu at a price of P1,000.00 per gram.
 Acting on the given information, the members of the unit subsequently
planned a buy-bust operation against the accused. The confidential
informant told Uy that there is a prospective buyer (to be delivered in front
of Justice Hall of Malabon City). One police acted as poseur buyer. Then,
they were able to obtain shabu from him.
o Police yielded more shabu packets from his attache case
 When he was brought to the office for investigation, it was learned that
there was still an undetermined amount shabu that is left at his home.
o SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant
to lawfully search the said premises of the accused for shabu. They
were able to obtain shabu.
UY’S VERSION
 He just got home from tending to his garments business and was carrying a
large amount of money, P132,000 to be exact from his collections for the
sales of the day.
 He said that he saw a white Toyota car outside his residence, the same being
offered to him for sale.
 He allegedly refused but agreed to test-drive the said car. It was then that he
was allegedly stopped by the police and was ordered to give up his attaché
case and forcible taken to the police station. It was there that he was
accused that said case contained the illegal substance.
TC DECISION: The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s story of a
legitimate buy bust operation and testimony of witnesses despite the non-
presentation of the NBI forensics chemist who tested and confirmed that substance
found in the accused possession is indeed shabu. The accused interposed the defense
of frame-up and alleged that the evidence was merely ‘planted.’
ISSUE: W/N the prosecution’s evidence should be admitted – YES
 It may at once be noted that neither accused nor his counsel made express
admission that the contents of the plastic bags to “be marked” as Exhibits
contain methamphetamine hydrochloride.
o Based on the joint order, it is clear that accused and his counsel
merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause
“thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist Bravo.
o The admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the
Joint Order was not signed. Nevertheless, Uy cannot take
advantage of the absence of his and his counsel’s signatures on the
pre-trial order.
o When the prosecution formally offered in evidence what it had
marked in evidence during the pre-trial, Uy did not object to the
admission of Bravo’s Preliminary Report.
 The issue of non-presentation of evidence of Forensic Chemist Bravo was
never raised in the lower courts. This is for the first time, on appeal.
o Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal;
when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
 The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain
documents upon the ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below
CANNOT, for the first time, be raised on appeal. Finally, as to the reports
of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI Forensic
Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his function and duty.
 In People vs. De Vera: the prosecution’s evidence more than proved beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the
illegal sale of shabu, to wit:
o (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and
o (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The
delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of
the marked money successfully consummated the “buy-bust”
transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. What
is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
 There is also no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in
Criminal Case No. 16200-MN was proven beyond reasonable doubt since
accused knowingly carried with him more than 400 grams of shabu without
legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation.
Decision of CA affirmed in toto.
On the validity of the buy bust operation
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted
for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has
consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers,
and unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and credit. 18 As has been
repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the
contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious
crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall
prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been
framed.
FULE vs. CA
Topic: Effect of non-appearance
FACTS:
1. A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of
respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of
the RTC Lucena convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant)
of Violation of BP Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the
basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the
prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference
in the TC.
2. The facts stipulated upon read:
a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and
subject matter of this case; b) That the accused was an
agent of the Towers Assurance Corpon or before January
21, 1981; c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued
and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24, 1981 in
the sum of P2,541.05; d) That the said check was drawn in
favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera; e) That the
check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in
remittance of collection; f) That the said check was
presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same
was dishonored for the reason that the said checking
account was already closed; g) That the accused Manolo
Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in
this case.
3. At the hearing, only the prosecution presented its evidence
consisting of Exhibits “A,B,C”. At the subsequent hearing,
petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence
and, instead, submitted a Memo confirming the Stipulation
of Facts. TC convicted the petitioner.
4. On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the
Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction. Hence, this recourse.
5. Petitioner-appellant contending that: Honorable Respondent
CA erred in the decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner
of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis
of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation
of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985,
which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his
counsel.
6. CA - Petition meritorious. It gave due course.
7. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became
effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since
the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. —
No agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced
to writing and signed by him and his counsel.
(Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
8. Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above
rule is applicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the
Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. YES
HELD:
Judgment of Appellate Court is REVERSED and RE-OPENED and
REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of RTC Lucena for further
reception of eveidence.
RATIO:
1. By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule
of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to
be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory. The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced. And more importantly, penal statutes whether
substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated
 rule, to be strictly applied against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused.
2. The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission
of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the
Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact
that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum,
confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the
defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused
and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What
the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the
accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by
Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements
of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed
admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without
said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the
accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable
doubt.
3. Thus, under the circumstances, the ends of justice require
that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of
the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent
of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be
set aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613
[1928]).
Jimenez v. People
Topic: Discharge of accused to be a State Witness
Facts:
1. Montero (a former employee of the Jimenezes) confessed his
participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda, and naming Manuel
Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Manuel’s younger brother), Lennard Descalso,
Robert Ponce, and Eric Fernandez, as his co-conspirators.
2. The statements of Montero are the details on where the alleged steel
casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped. It led to the
recovery of a cadaver.
3. People filed an Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez et al. of
murder.
4. Montero filed a motion for his discharge of the witness as accused
pursuant to the Witness Protection Program, RA 6981. The People also
filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state witness for the
prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions.
5. RTC: Judge Almeyda denied the motions.
6. Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure; it failed to clearly show that Montero was not the
most guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The
prosecution also failed to present evidence to sustain the possibility of
conviction against Jimenez.
7. Montero and the People filed separate MR.
8. The July 30, 2010 order
o Judge Docena reversed previous order and ruled that the
prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence showing compliance with the said Rules.
o The crime would have remained undiscovered and unsolved had
it not been for Montero’s extrajudicial confession.
o RTC further ruled that Montero does not appear to be the most
guilty although he is a principal by direct participation. The
principals by inducement are more guilty because, without their
orders, the crime would not have been committed.
o During the pendency of MR, Jimenez filed a motion for inhibition,
praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from hearing the case
on the ground of bias and prejudice- DENIED
9. Jimenez filed with CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Issuance of
a TRO and WPI- GRANTED.
10. MR filed by the People, the CA REVERSED its earlier ruling.
o Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
Montero’s discharge to become a state witness because the
prosecution had complied with the requirements of Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
o Montero is not the most guilty among the accused because the
principals by inducement are more guilty than the principals by
direct participation.
o It should still be raffled to another sala for trial on the merits to
avoid any claim of bias and prejudice.
11. G.R. No. 209195 (The Jimenez Petition)
o Jimenez raises the following errors:
i. There is no necessity to discharge Montero as a
state witness because the voluntary extrajudicial
confessions of Montero are all in the possession of the
prosecution which they could readily present in court
without discharging Montero;
ii. Inconsistencies with Montero’s statement. Jimenez
argued that these inconsistencies would require a
thorough scrutiny; hence, the immediate discharge is
suspicious.
iii. Montero appears to be the most guilty.
iv. RPC imputes on the principal by direct participation the
heavier guilt; without the latter’s execution of the crime,
the principal by inducement cannot be made liable.
v. The discharge of Montero was irregular because
Judge Docena failed to conduct a prior hearing.
o Comment of the People
i. Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of
hearing since he raised this issue only after the motion to
discharge was granted and not after it was previously
denied.
ii. The availability of the extrajudicial statements in the
prosecution’s possession is not a ground to disqualify an
accused from being a state witness.
iii. Material allegations of Montero on the identity of the
victim and the manner of her killing were substantially
corroborated by evidence.
12. G.R. No. 209215(The People’s Petition)
o The People, through OSG, argue that the CA’s order to re-raffle
the case to another sala is not supported by Sec 1, Rule 137 of
the ROC, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition.
o To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must
be proven.
Issue:
1. WON the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge Montero as a
state witness- NO
 2. WON the CA erred in ordering the re-raffle of the case to another
RTC for trial on the merits. – YES. No reason for inhibition.
Ratio:
1. Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the
motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.
2. The prosecution has complied with the requisites under Sec 17, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that:
“In the discharge of an accused inorder that he may be a state
witness, the following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of
an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge isfiled by the prosecution before it rests
its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.”
3. 5(a) Absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero
o Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought
to be discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the
crime. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of
a state witness depends on the circumstances of each case
regardless of the number of the participating conspirators.
4. 5 (b) Not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing to
testify on the alleged murder and their participation. He alone is
available to provide direct evidence of the crime.
o To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court
cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a state witness,
save only when the legal requirements.
o The prosecution’s right to prosecute gives it a wide range of
discretion.
o Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the court is given the power to discharge a state
witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the
crime and the accused.
5. 5 (c) Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated
o The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on
the height and dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that
should properly be dealt with during the trial proper.
o To resolve a motion to discharge, the Rules only require that that
the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be
substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points.
6. 5 (d) Montero is not the most guilty
o By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the
offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the
penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to
have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of
participation in the commission of the offense.
7. To correct the rulings of the CA.
o A principal by inducement is not automatically the most guilty in a
conspiracy.
o What are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in
relation to the crime committed.
8. A state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he
or she should not only "appear to be the most guilty."
9. It appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and
execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct
participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. It was done by
Lennard. Montero’s participation was limited to providing the steel box
where victim’s body was placed, welding the steel box, operating the tug
boat, and dropping the steelbox containing the cadaver into the sea.
10. The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because
he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature.
11. Other issues:
o Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack of hearing prior
to the discharge of Montero as a state witness.
o Notice of withdrawal filed by Montero is considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to
reject the testimony taken before a court simply because the
witness who gave it later changed his/her mind. The appreciation
of the notice of withdrawal properly belongs to the trial court.
12. Roles of the prosecution and the trial court judge in the resolution of a
motion to discharge an accused as a state witness.
o It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s
preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a
state witness satisfies the procedural norms.
 o In requiring a hearing in support of the discharge, the essential
objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence for or against
the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court’s basis –
independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions – in
granting or denying the motion for discharge.
o Actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have both
presented their sides on the merits of the motion.
INHIBITION
1. CA did not provide factual or legal support when it ordered the inhibition
of Judge Docena.
2. 2 par. of Sec. 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unlimited
nd

discretion to decide whether or not to desist from hearing a case. The

inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias
or partiality is not enough ground for their inhibition, especially when the
charge is without basis.
Merciales vs. CA (2002)
Facts:
On Aug. 12, 1993, criminal case nos. 6307, 6308, 6309, 6310,
6311 and 6312 for rape with homicide were filed against private
respondents (Nuada, Moral, Nieves, Lobete, Grageda and Flores)
before the RTC for the death Maritess Merciales. During trial, after
presenting 7 witnesses, the public prosecutor filed a motion for the
discharge of Nuada to be a state witness. However, the prosecutor
contended to the court that it was no longer required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of Nueada because he was already in
the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Because of this, the
respondent judge denied the motion for failure to of the prosecution to
present evidence, pursuant to sec. 9 of Rule 119.
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari to the SC,
questioning the denial of the motion to discharge Nuada. The said
petition did not have a prayer for a temporary restraining order, but the
trial court still did not set the trial for hearing to give the prosecution
time to secure such TRO. Subsequently, Private respondents filed a
motion to set the case for hearing, alleging their constitutional right to
a speedy trial. It was granted by the court, which set the hearing for
July 29, 1994. On the same day, instead of presenting more evidence,
the prosecution filed an MR. the respondent judge then re-set the
hearing to Aug 9, 1994.
On Aug 9, 1994, the prosecution filed an MR, alleging the
pending petition before the SC. Private Respondents objected to it,
invoking again their right to a speedy trial. The trial court then called
for a recess, in order to let the prosecution decide if they were going to
present the NBI agent, who was present at the hearing, to prove the
due execution of the accused Nuada’s extrajudicial confession. After
the recess, the prosecution declined to present the NBI agent, and
instead manifested that he was not presenting any further evidence.
The defense then moved that the case be deemed submitted and ask the
court for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
On Aug 29, 1994, the Solicitor General filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO before the SC to
enjoin the respondent judge to proceed with the resolution. However it
was denied. The Trial Court subsequently issued the assailed order,
which acquitted all the accused. Petitioner, Leticia Merciales who was
the mother of the victim, filed before the respondent CA a petition to
annul the decision of the trial court. The CA dismissed the said
petition. An MR was subsequently filed, but it was denied. Hence this
instant petition.
Issue: WoN the public prosecutor committed error when it refused to
present evidence to support/justify the discharge of Nuada as a state
witness?
Ruling: Yes, the public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance.
It is the duty of the public prosecutor to bring the criminal
proceedings for the punishment of the guilty. Same with this obligation
is the duty to pursue a criminal proceeding and to represent the public
interest. A crime is an offense against the state. At the present case, the
public prosecutor knew that he has not presented sufficient evidence in
order to convict the accused. Yet, despite all the motion of the defense
to continue with the hearing, the prosecutor deliberately failed to
present an available witness and thereby allowing the court to declare
the case rested. At this instance, the public prosecutor was remiss of
his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties. The mother’s
victim could do nothing but to watch helplessly as the public
prosecutor, who was under the legal obligation to pursue the action on
their behalf, renege on that obligation and refused to perform his
sworn duty.
It is true that Rule 119, sec. 9 expressly provides the
presentation of evidence to support the discharge of an accused to be a
state witness. It states that:
“When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission
of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when after
requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement
of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, xxx xxx xxx.”
By refusing to comply with the trial courts order to present
evidence, the public prosecutor grossly violated the above-quoted
rule. Moreover, the public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to
protect the interest of the offended party, at least insofar as the criminal
aspect is concerned. After the trial court denied his motion to
discharge Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to
complete the evidence of the prosecution by other means. Instead, he
willfully and deliberately refused to present an available
witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on that date and
time. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available
proofs to establish the guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for
their offense against the injured party.
Ampatuan v. De Lima
Topic: R.A. No. 6981 - ("Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act")
Author: Lemonade
Facts: (MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE) - long digest
1. 57 innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of
Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner,
then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest
proceedings were conducted against petitioner before he was flown to Manila and
detained at the main office of NBI.
2. Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Devanadera
constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.
3. DOJ resolved to file the corresponding informations for murder against
petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. Cases were filed with the RTC
of Cotabato City.
4. The Secretary of Justice Devanadera wrote to Chief Justice Puno requesting
the transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato
City to Metro Manila, either in QC or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice –
Granted.
5. However, prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the
Prosecution filed a manifestation regarding the filing of 15 additional informations
for murder against petitioner in Cotabato City RTC. Additional informations for
murder were also filed against petitioner in QC RTC, the new venue of the trial
pursuant to the resolution of the Court.
6. Petitioner pleaded not guilty.
7. The Panel of Prosecutors, relying on the affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag,
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre.
8. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was listed as one of
the Prosecution witnesses.
9. Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent to request the inclusion of
Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already
confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations.
However, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request.
10. Accordingly, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC of Manila
seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various
murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
11. RTC of Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify.
12. Respondents moved to quash the subpoena, to which petitioner opposed.
13. RTC of Manila issued the assailed order dismissing the petition for mandamus.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
Held: NO.
Ratio:
1. Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department,
through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is
clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.
2. The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors
committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted
for the Maguindanao massacre.
3. Sect. 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint
or information shall be against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions,
one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state
witness. The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may
become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case
pursuant to Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of
his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in
accordance with RA 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
4. Under Sec. 17, Rule 119 of ROC, the discharge by the trial court of one or
more of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State
is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. On the other hand,
Sec. 10 of RA 6981, which allows any person who has participated in the commission
of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as
determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program
whenever the following circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under
the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws; (NOTE: same requisites
under both laws except this; I did not see this in Sec. 17, Rule 119 - VEAC)
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
5. An accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to
Sec. 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the
DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of RA 6981.
6. A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a
state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the
criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged accused and
shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless he fails or refuses
to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting
the basis for his discharge. The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions
prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist. However, such discretion is not
absolute. Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the
suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor.
7. On the other hand, there is no requirement under RA 6981 for the Prosecution
to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify
for admission into the Witness Protection Program. It also operates as an acquittal
and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except
when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by
the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court
as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of
admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the
discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of
said accused from the information.
8. The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the
Government as a state witness was warranted by the absolute necessity of his
testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the
conditions prescribed by RA 6981 were met in his case. His admission of his
participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no
hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state
witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty.
Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the
Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal,
unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn
statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for
the crimes.
9. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only
be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. As such, respondent
Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner,
but may not be compelled to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that
respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus
was no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
Quarto v Ombudsman (Oct 5, 2011) (sorry mahaba, haba ng discussion on
immunity, pls check full text. - izzy)
Topic: Discharge of accused to be state witness & Effect ; RA 6770, Sec. 17
Petitioner: Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division as well as the
head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) (he approves the job orders and signs
the inspections reports made by the SIT)
Respondents: Members of the SIT (they are the ones who make the inspection
reports)
 The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous
transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH
service vehicles with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the
actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to
December 2001, several emergency (pre-repair and post repair inspections)
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service
vehicles, which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually
take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million
for this ten-month period alone.
 The Atty Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS then filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman complaints charging the petitioner, the respondents, who are
officials and employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals who
purportedly benefitted from the anomalous transactions.
Atty Ofilada imputed the acts to petitioner:
 approving 4 job orders for the repairs and purchase of spare parts for the
service vehicle to which such job orders concurred with the pre-repair and
post repair inspection reports by the respondents
Atty. Olifada charged respondents with the following:
 as members of the SIT they accomplished & signed pre and post repair
inspection reports in support of the 4 job orders
 they made it appear that the vehicle was inspected prior and after the
alleged repair even if they knew that the vehicle was never turned over to
them for inspection
 the accomplishment of the inspection reports were the bases for preparation
of the disbursement vouchers and then authorizing the payment of the said
repairs thru reimbursement scheme to the damage and prejudice of the
DPWH.
Petitioner denied the allegations, he claimed that he only relied on his subordinates
when he signed the job orders and inspection reports
Respondents admitted the irregularities in the repairs and purchase of spare parts and
offered to testify to prove evidence against the DPWH officials and employees
involved in exchange for their immunity. According to them:
 In most instances, service vehicles are immediately brought to a car repair
shop of the end-user’s choice without bringing it first to the [Motorpool
Section, CESPD, BOE] for the preparation of the required job order by
[Gayya] of the Motorpool Section and the pre-repair inspection to be
conducted by the SIT. After the purported repairs are done, SIT members
are made to sign a post-repair inspection report which already includes a
typed-in recommendation for the payment of repairs, and the signature of
the Head of the [SIT] indicating his alleged concurrence with the findings of
the SIT despite the absence of an actual inspection.
 they said that the post - repair inspection report is accompanied by the (a)
falsified job order signed by the head of the SIT (b) an empty/falsified pre-
repair inspection report
 they said that they have photocopies of these sets of falsified documents
because those documents were presented to them before they affix their
signatures
 they also said that the post-repair inspection report is accomplished only
after the preparation and approval of the job order but what is being done is
that the documents are dated much later than the post-repair inspection
report. And since there was no actual pre-repair and post-repair inspection,
it paved way for ghost repairs of the DPWH service vehicles
 they also said there are more instances wherein they are willing to testify to
in exchange for immunity from prosecution
The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several information charging the said
DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of
official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the
other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request for immunity in
exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
Petitioner then filed for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan questioning that grant of
immunity by the Ombudsman but this was demised due to lack of jurisdiction as was
advised to file a petitioner before the SC. Hence the petition for certiorari and
mandamus
Petitioner’s argument:
 Ombudsman should have included respondents since it was their inspection
reports that paved way for the commission of the alleged irregularities
 due to respondent’s criminal complicity, no repair could have started and no
payment for repairs could have been made without their respondent’s pre-
repair and post-repair inspection reports
 there was selective prosecution which is clear GAD
 before Ombudsman may avail respondents as state witness, they must be
first included in the informations filed with the court and after that, the
Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they could be used
s state witness under the conditions laid down in Sec 17 Rule 119 of the
 ROC since, as petitioner alleged, the court has the “sole prerogative” to
determine if these conditions exits (conditions: there should be absolute
necessity for testimony of the proposed witness AND he should not appear
to be the most guilty)
 he alleged that respondent’s testimony is not absolutely necessary and the
manner of respondent’s participation proves that they are the most guilty
Ombudsman and Respondents argument:
According to the Ombudsman, RA 6770 expressly grants him the power to
grant immunity from the prosecution of witnesses. And the ROC is inapplicable
because the decision on whom to prosecute is an executive not judicial prerogative. It
also invoked the Court’s policy of non-interference in the Ombdusman’s exercise of
his discretion regarding his investigatory and prosecutorial powers. He also claimed
that the matter as to the “most guilty” is a defense which should be raised in the trial
proper (factual)
According to the respondents, Ombudsman has the discretion who should be
included in the information as to his basis of finding probable cause. And the courts
could only interfere if there is clear showing of GAD which petitioner failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity from
prosecution to witnesses?
HELD: YES. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant
immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of
its constitutional functions and statutory objectives." Mandamus will not lie. In
the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the same
latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
finding of probable cause and the degree of participation of those involved or the
lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject
to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, which the
petitioner has failed to establish in this case. SC is not a trier of facts, the
Ombudsman is in a better position to know the strength and weakness of evidence
presently in his possession, the kind, tenor and source of testimony he needs to
enable him to prove his case. The grant if immunity effectively but conditionally
results in the extinction of the criminal liability the accused-witnesses might have
incurred, as defined in terms of the grant. The grant directly affects the individual
and enforces his right against self-incrimination. But if on the basis of the same
evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some individuals
while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as
a rule, to include in the information all persons who appear responsible for the
offense involved.
Sec 17 of Ra 6670:
“Sec. 17. Immunities.—x x x.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity
from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and
production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth
in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under
its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions
and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately
preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for
perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from
office.”
 The Ombudsman is granted a broad discretion that allows the Ombudsman’s
consideration of factors other than those outlined under Sec 17 of Rule 119
 The rationale for this provision: the power to compel testimony from its
residents; this power enables the government to secure vital information
necessary to carry out its myriad functions. This power though is not
absolute.
 Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives
of an individual’s constitutional right against self- incrimination (considered
the fount from which all statutes granting immunity emanate) and the
legitimate governmental interest in securing testimony. By voluntarily
offering to give information on the commission of a crime and to testify
against the culprits, a person opens himself to investigation and prosecution
if he himself had participated in the criminal act. To secure his testimony
without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the
witness can be given immunity from prosecution. In this manner, the state
interest is satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
Other discussions (take time to read)
a. As to non-exhaustion of remedies by petitioner
 the pre-condition for certiorari and mandamus is that they are only availed
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law
 in this case, petitioner did not file MR nor file a motion for inclusion of the
respondents in the informations before filing the present petitioner (those
are the adequate remedies they did not avail of)
 they did not file within the 60 day reglementary period before the SC
because they initially and erroneously filed the certiorari with the
Sandiganbayan
b. Nature of grant of immunity:
 The power to grant is essentially legislative. Congress has broad discretion
and can lay down conditions and extent of immunity to be granted. The
number granting immunity escalated to secure vital information for
purposes of prosecution. It considered the importance of the testimony and
the character of some offences and of some situations where the criminal
participants are in the best position to give useful testimony
RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was formulated of making
Ombudsman the protector of the people against inept, abusive and corrupt
government officers and employees. Congress saw it fit to grant the
Ombudsman the power to directly confer immunity to enable his office to
effectively carry out its constitutional and statutory mandate of ensuring
effective accountability in the public service.
c. Consideration in the grant of immunity:
 While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the
authority to implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose the
individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of the
process and is essentially an executive function.
 It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for
government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of
the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having
committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to
obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will
probably elude the long arm of the law.
RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the
Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to “such terms and conditions” as he
may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the
need to take “into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,”—i.e.,
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.64 This provision requires that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
 Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state
witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and
the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of
jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. these
guidelines are necessarily implied in the discretion granted to the courts.
 RA No. 6770 recognizes that these same principles should apply when the
Ombudsman directly grants immunity to a witness. The same consideration
(that is the achieve greater purpose of securing conviction of the most guilty
and greatest number among the accused)is involved whether the grants is by
the public prosecutor w/ court intervention or by the Ombudsman
 Distinction b/w public prosecutor and Ombdusman: it is the higher priority
given by law to the Ombudsman to focus on offences committed by public
officers & employees to ensure accountability in public service. Which
accounts for the Ombudsman’s unique power to grant immunity by itself
and even before filing of the information in court (a power which the public
prosecutor generally doesn’t enjoy)
Petition dismissed, SC did not interfere with the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity
since petitioners did not clearly and convincingly show that there was grave abuse of
discretion.
 Petitioner simply concluded that the requirement of “absolute necessity”
does not exist based on the Ombudsman’s “evidence,” without even
attempting to explain how he arrived at this conclusion.
 In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, the respondents narrated the accused
DPWH officials/employees’ flagrant disregard of the proper procedure and
the guidelines in the repair of DPWH service vehicles which culminated in
losses to the government.
 Particularly telling is the respondents’ statement that a number of pre-repair
inspection reports for a particular month in 2001 bear the petitioner’s
signature despite the fact that these reports are not supported by findings
from the respondents as SIT members.
 This kind of statement cannot but impact on how the Ombudsman viewed
the question of “absolute necessity” of the respondents’ testimony since this
testimony meets the defense of good faith head-on to prove the
prosecution’s allegations. Under these circumstances, we cannot preempt,
foreclose, nor replace with our own the Ombudsman’s position on this point
as it is clearly not without basis.
 Valencia v. Sandiganbayan (2005)
FACTS:
 Valencia was the Governor of Oriental Mindoro. He was elected in 1992.
Information was filed charging Valencia w/ violation of RA 3019. The prosecution
contends that the appointment gives unwarranted benefit to Umbao who is
disqualified to be appointed w/in 1 year after losing the 1992 election. Valencia
pleaded not guilty.
 The parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts (JSF) which stated that Councilor
Mercene died in 1992 so there was a permanent vacancy in the Sanguniang Bayan
of Pola, Oriental Mindoro. Valencia appointed Umbao who ran for the same
position but lost earlier that year.
 In March 2003, Sandiganbayan directed the parties to sign the JSF. Signed only by
the Special Prosecutor and petitioner’s counsel.
 In Jan 12 2004, Prosecutor Salindong rested the case based on the JSF and waived
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
 Jan 19: Valencia filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence because
the prosecution failed to present, mark and offer evidence that would
substantiate the charge against him. JSF lacks his signature. Prosec failed to submit
evidence establishing injury and presence of partiality.
 Pros. Autencio-Daquis (pinalitan yung una) filed an opposition contending the
demurrer is premature because they have yet to formally offer the JSF.
 Sandigan directed them again to sign the JSF.
 Valencia filed MR, claiming that his former counsel was not authorized to enter into
any agreement and he only found out about the JSF in Jan.
 Sandigan issued a pre-trial order, embodying the JSF.
 Sandigan issued then issued another order recalling the pre-trial order, denying the
motion for leave to file demurrer and setting the case for presentation of
prosecution’s evidence. MR denied.
 Prosecution proceeded with the presentation since there’s no TRO or PI.
ISSUE:
 W/N Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence was premature;
 W/N Sanidganbayan committed GAD in setting case for presentation of evidence;
HELD:
 Under R119: Demurrer is filed after the prosecution rests its case. It tests the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
 R132: Before evidence may be admitted, it must be formally offered.
 The motion for leave to file demurrer was premature. Prosec had yet to formally
rest its case. The JSF was not yet offered as evidence although Valencia did
receive by mail a motion and formal offer of evidence dated Jan 20. The filing
shall be proved by its existence in the case records. The records of the
Sandiganbayan bear no such offer filed by the prosecution.
 Assuming it was formally offered, the motion was still premature because it was
filed a day before the date of the offer. Valencia himself said the prosecution
failed to mark and offer evidence.
 No GAD. The court may grant parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence
in furtherance of justice. The trial procedure in R119 depends upon the
circumstances of each case at the discretion of the trial judge.
 The reception of additional evidence is not technically a reopening of the case as the
prosec had yet to formally rest its case. A motion to reopen presupposes that
parties have formally offered and closed their evidence. If the admission of add’l
evidence is sanctioned before judgment, with more reason that it should be
allowed when the prosec had not yet concluded its presentation of evidence. His
refusal to sign the JSF is justification to recall the pre-trial order set the case for
presentation of evidence.
 Valencia can’t claim denial of due process. He can still contest the evidence adduced
against him and prove his own defenses after prosecution concludes its
presentation of evidence.
 The State is entitled to due process. Pros. Salindong committed GAD by resting the
case without adducing evidence for the State and without ensuring that Valencia
signed the JSF before submitting it to the Sandigan.
 He can’t invoke the right to a speedy trial. Since the first anon complaint in 1994
before the Ombudsman, Valencia never contested the prosecutorial proceedings
nor the pendency of the case. Right is deemed waived.
 R119 provides that an order denying motion to file demurrer is not reviewable by  Valencia’s remedy is to proceed with the presentation of his evidence and appeal
appeal or certiorari before judgment. from any adverse decision that may be rendered.