SUBJECT MATTER:
Jurisdiction in General
Jurisdiction in General
· "Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial
proceedings. The word "jurisdiction" is derived from two
Latin words "juris" and "dico" — "I speak by the law" —
which means fundamentally the power or capacity given
by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and
determine certain controversies. Bouvier's own
definition of the term "jurisdiction" has found judicial
acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to
pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue
before him, acquired through due process of law;" it is
"the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance
of and decide cases."
1.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMOGENES
MARIANO and HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch V G.R. No. L-40527 June
30, 1976 MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
FACTS:
Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa
before the CFI of Bulacan because of misappropriating
and converting for his own personal use, power cord and
electric cables being the person in authority to receive
the same in behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan.
Respondent Mariano then moved to quash the
information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed
that the items were the same items used against mayor
Nolasco before the Military commission for Malversation
of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found
guilty, hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the court has jurisdiction over the
Estafa case against Mariano.
RULING:
YES. The CFI has jurisdiction “In all criminal
cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more
than two hundred pesos” Section 44, paragraph E,
Judiciary reorganization act of 1948. The offense of
estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from
four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four
(4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which
exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense
alleged to have been committed by the accused, now
respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction
of courts of first instance.
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled
that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against
respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation
charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military
Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate
and distinct offenses and in this case , the accused in
one is different from the accused in the other.
“Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority
to hear and try a particular offense and impose the
punishment for it.
2.Conde vs. Mamenta, Jr. 142 SCRA 504
Facts: Sangguniang Bayan of Masinloc passed
Municipal Ordinance No. 3-A, series of 1980 which
increased Conde’s rental rate (market stalls) from
P27.00 to P104.02. The Municipal Treasurer tried to
collect the new rental fees from petitioner but she
refused to pay because the increased rate was
excessive. The Trial Court considered petitioner’s refusal
to pay the monthly stall rentals and to vacate the space
as "tantamount to economic sabotage to the Municipal
Government of Masinloc, Zambales.
Issue: Whether MCTC has jurisdiction to criminally
convict Conde for violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
3-A, series of 1980?
Ruling: No. The surcharge imposed by Section 5 B.05
for late or non-payment of monthly rentals is not a
penalty under criminal law but an additional amount
added to the usual charge. It is more of an administrative
penalty, which should be recoverable only by civil action.
There being no offense defined nor punishment
prescribed, a criminal action will not lie, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court was without criminal
jurisdiction over the matter. Criminal jurisdiction is the
authority to hear and try an offense and impose the
punishment provided by law.
3.PHILIP GUEVARRA vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO
ALMODOVAR, G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
Facts:
John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was
playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three
other children in their backyard in the morning of 29
October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap
(tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters
away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the
course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his
left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
Guevarra contended that the case against him
should have first been brought before the Lupong
Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his
entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating
circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his
case because the penalty imposable is reduced to not
higher than arresto menor from an original arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as
prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC.
Issue:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the
case notwithstanding the fact that it did not pass thru
barangay lupon?
Held:
Yes, the court has jurisdiction over the case. The
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined
by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense
and not the penalty ultimately imposed. Section 2(3) of
P.D. 1508, which states that offense punishable by
imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P
200.00. Expounding on the above provision, a member
of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said that the
law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should
therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or
ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually
imposed in particular cases after considering the
attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability.
4.Aranes vs. Judge Occiano, AM MTJ-02-1390, April
11, 2002
5.Pp vs. Marlene Olermo, GR 127848, July 17, 2003
Facts:
Separate informations were filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against
Marlene Olermo a.k.a. Marlene Tolentino who was
accused of illegal recruitment in large scale and five
counts of estafa. The accused represented herself that
she has capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers
for emplyment abroad. She then recruited Ariston
Villanueva, Mary Jane Villanueva, Alfred Berador,
Frennie Majarucon and Wilfredo Tubale without first
securing the necessary license or authority to engage in
recruitment activity rfom the Philippine Overseas
Emplyment Administration (POEA). For her part, Olermo
denied all the charges against her. She alleged that she
was engaged only in visa assistance. She denied ever
having represented herself as possessing authority to
deploy workers for overseas employment. She thus
explained that she only offered complainants Villanueva,
Aquino-Villanueva, Aparicio and Majarucon assistance in
processing their tourist visas. With respect to the
accusation of complainant Berador, appellant alleged
that she was only helping him process his trainees visa.
Issue:
Whether Olermo may be convicted of large scale illegal
recruitment because the alleged prohibited acts against
complainants were committed beyond the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela.
Held:
Yes. The Rules of Court provide that in all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or province wherein the
offense was committed or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place. In the case at bar, the
prosecution proved that the element of offering,
promising, and advertising overseas employment to the
complainants took place in appellants office in
Valenzuela. Furthermore, it is elementary that jurisdiction
in criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the
information. In this case, the information filed against
appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale clearly
placed the locus criminis in Valenzuela. As stated earlier,
it was in Valenzuela where the complainants were
offered or promised overseas employment by appellant.
Furthermore, based on the prosecutions evidence, the
Court is sufficiently convinced that at least one element
of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale took
place in Valenzuela. Where some acts material and
essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province or city and some in another, the
court of either province or city has jurisdiction to try the
case, it being understood that the court first taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others.
6.Purita Lim vs. Judge Dumlao AM MTJ-04-1556,
March 31, 2005
FACTS: Purita Lim filed two criminal cases and theft with
the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela against one Medina.
After being apprehended and detained, Medina posted
bail with Judge Dumlao’s court which was MTC of San
Mateo, Isabela. Judge Dumlao granted the bail.
ISSUE: WoN Judge Dumalo’s court has the territorial
jurisdiction over the said cases.
HELD: No. Respondent Judge Section 17, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount
fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with any regional trial court judge, metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge in the province, city or municipality. If the accused
is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than
where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with
any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by
complainant against Herman Medina were pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela,
Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by
Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said
court. The order of release therefore, on account of the
posting of the bail, should have been issued by that
court, or in the absence or unavailability of Judge
Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In
this case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid
was absent or unavailable at the time of the posting of
the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the
day respondent judge ordered the release of Medina,
Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago
City, Isabela were at their respective posts.
It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no
authority to grant bail to an accused arrested outside of
his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section
17(a), Rule 114 as quoted above must be complied with
before a judge may grant bail.14 The Court recognizes
that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, but only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment.15 Where,
however, the law is straightforward and the facts so
evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
6.LUTGARDA CRUZ, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 123340 August 29, 2002
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the
crime of "Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document"
before the Manila Regional Trial Court. 3 Cruz executed
before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land in Bulacan stating
that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered
owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving
heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve the right
to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal
offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The trial court acquitted Cruz of the crime
charged. The acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt,
but did not extinguish the civil liability.
Cruz maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to render
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case.
because the parcel of land in Bulacan is outside the trial
court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Issue:
 Whether or not Manila RTC has no jurisdiction on
the civil aspect of the criminal case?
Held:
Yes. There are three important requisites which must be
present before a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction.
First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the
territory where the offense was committed. Third, the
court must have jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.18 In the instant case, the trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide
cases involving estafa through falsification of a public
document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the
offense charged since the crime was committed within
its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired
jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner
because she voluntarily submitted to the court’s
authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the accused, and
the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction,
the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all
issues that the law requires the court to resolve. One of
the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the
accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "[E]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Article
104 of the same Code states that "civil liability x x x
includes restitution." The action for recovery of civil
liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless
reserved by the offended party. 19 In the instant case, the
offended party did not reserve the civil action and the
civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action.
Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the
civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even
if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
8 Orosa Jr. vs CA 193 SCRA 97
FACTS:
On December 6, 1984, private respondent FCP Credit
Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner
Jose S. Orosa and one John Doe to recover possession
of a 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan with Motor and Serial
No. SUNKBT-14584. The complaint alleged that on
September 28, 1983, petitioner purchased the subject
motor vehicle on installment from Fiesta Motor Sales
Corporation. He executed and delivered to Fiesta Motor
Sales Corp. a promissory note in the sum of
P133,824.00 payable in monthly installments. To secure
payment, petitioner executed a chattel mortgage over
the subject motor vehicle in favor of Fiesta Motor Sales
Corp. On September 28, 1983, Fiesta Motor Sales
assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to
private respondent FCP Credit Corporation. The
complaint further alleged that petitioner failed to pay part
of the installment which fell due on July 28, 1984 as well
as three (3) consecutive installments which fell due on
August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984.
Consequently, private respondent FCP Credit
Corporation demanded from petitioner payment of the
entire outstanding balance of the obligation amounting to
P106,154.48 with accrued interest and to surrender the
vehicle which petitioner was allegedly detaining. Ella
The trial court ruled that private respondent FCP had
no reason to file the present action since petitioner
already paid the installments for the months of July to
November 1984, which are the sole bases of the
complaint. The lower court declared that private
respondent was not entitled to the writ of replevin, and
was liable to petitioner for actual damages under the
replevin bond it filed.
Ruling on petitioner's counterclaim, the trial court stated
that there was no legal or factual basis for the writ of
replevin and that its enforcement by the sheriff was
"highly irregular, and unlawful, done, as it was, under
shades of extortion, threats and force. The trial court
ordered private respondent to pay the sum of
P400,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Private respondent was also ordered to return to
petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan, or its
equivalent, in kind or value in cash, as of date of
judgment and to pay the costs of the suit. rodoflo
On June 7, 1988, a "Supplemental Decision" was
rendered by the trial court ordering private respondent's
surety, Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. to jointly and
severally [with private respondent] return to petitioner the
1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan or its equivalent in kind or in
cash and to pay the damages specified in the main
decision to the extent of the value of the replevin bond in
the amount of P210,000.00.
The surety company filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari to annul the Order of the trial court
denying its motion for partial reconsideration, as well as
the Supplemental Decision. On the other hand, private
respondent appealed the decision of the RTC Manila to
the Court of Appeals.
The surety company's petition for certiorari was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals' First Division which
upheld the trial court's order of execution pending
appeal.
On November 6, 1989, this Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals decision, but deleted the order for the issuance
of a writ of execution pending appeal.
Meanwhile, in private respondent's appeal, the Court of
Appeals' Eighth Division partially affirmed the ruling of
the trial court, in a Decision dated April 19, 1993
Petitioner filed a petition for review. that the Eighth
Division of the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
review the present case since the First Division of the
Court of Appeals already passed upon the law and the
facts of the same. Petitioner alleges that the present
appeal involves the same causes of action, same
parties, same facts and same relief involved in the
decision rendered by the First Division and affirmed by
this Court in G.R. No. 84979.
Issue: Whether the decision of the CA First Division
constitutes res judicata and thus bars the CA Eighth
Division from reviewing the decision of the RTC
HELD: NO. Petitioner's argument is untenable.
Jurisdiction is simply the power or authority to hear a
case. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to review decisions and orders of lower courts is
conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. More
importantly, petitioner cannot now assail the Court of
Appeals' jurisdiction after having actively participated in
the appeal and after praying for affirmative relief. Neither
can petitioner argue that res judicata bars the
determination of the present case. The two cases
involve different subject matters, parties and seek
different relief.
9 Dela Cruz vs. Moya 160 SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, petitioner, Dela Cruz was
charged with a case of homicide for killing an operator of
illegal cockfight when an encounter ensued upon them
during their operations. While the case was pending trial,
Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were
promulgated by the President of the Philippines on
January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction
over crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces
or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their
duties.
Claiming that the crime for which he was
charged was committed in relation to the performance of
his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance
of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military
authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The
motion was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether the court martial have jurisdiction over
the case
Decision:
Yes, the court martial have jurisdiction over the
case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action and once jurisdiction is
vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the
litigation.
In the instant case, the information was filed on
August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General
Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, military tribunals
created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive
jurisdiction over "all offenses committed by military
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in
the performance of their official duty or which arose out
of any act or omission done in the performance of their
official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of
determining whether an offense was committed while in
the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of
an act or omission done in the performance of official
duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National
Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless
modified or revoked by the President.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense, Dela Cruz
was a member of the Philippine Constabulary, and that
the shooting of the deceased Cabilto was committed
while Dela Cruz was executing the Mission Order.
The proviso merely states that the certificate
issued by the Secretary of National Defense is
conclusive for the purpose of determining whether an
offense was committed while in the performance of
official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in
the performance of official duty. It does not in any way
preclude the courts from making any finding as to
whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make
the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by
either civilian courts or military tribunals of their
jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the
AFP.
In the instant case, even as no certificate issued
by the Secretary of National Defense was presented in
court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order of
Dela Cruz. The evidence of the prosecution presented in
court likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while
petitioner was executing the mission order. These
undisputed facts compel this Court to declare that
respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case
against petitioner Dela Cruz.
The Solicitor General points out that at the time
the information was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos.
1822 and 1822-A which vest in the courts-martial
jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the
AFP in the performance of their duties were not yet in
effect, the same having been promulgated only in 1981.
Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to
the case at bar. However, General Order No. 59 cited
above applies.
Therefore, the petition was granted.
10 Sumawang vs. Guzman 437 SCRA 622
SUBJECT MATTER: Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused
11RASMIA U. TABAO, complainant, vs. ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE ACMAD T. BARATAMAN, MTCC,
Branch 1, MARAWI CITY, respondent.
FACTS:
The administrative case stems from the complaint filed
by Complainant Tabao against Judge Barataman for
gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion.
Tabao was a complainant on a previous case handled by
Judge Barataman. In that case, Respondent Judge
issued an order granting the motion for Bail on
Recognizance while the accused was still at large.
ISSUE: WON THE COURTS MAY GRANT
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY TO ONE WHO IS NOT
UNDER ITS CUSTODY
HELD: NO,
Respondent judge does not deny that the accused in
Criminal Case No. 9106 was at large when the motion
for bail on recognizance was filed and subsequently
granted. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law. Section 15, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “the
court may release a person in custody on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person”.
It is a basic principle that bail is intended to obtain
provisional liberty and cannot be granted before custody
of an accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender. It is self-
evident that a court cannot grant provisional liberty to
one who is actually in the enjoyment of his liberty for it
would be incongruous to give freedom to one who is
free. Thus, we have held that it is premature to file a
motion for bail for someone whose liberty has yet to be
curtailed.
In the case at bar, respondent judge was fully cognizant
that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused who was still at large and yet, he
entertained and granted his motion for bail. In doing so,
respondent judge violated a tenet in criminal procedure
which is too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the
law. When the law violated is elementary, a judge is
subject to disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Acmad
T. Barataman liable for gross ignorance of the law and
imposes upon him a fine of P20,000.00 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely.
12.WILFREDO M. TALAG, complainant, vs. JUDGE
AMOR A. REYES, Regional Trial Court, Manila
Branch 21, respondent. [A.M. No. RTJ-04-1852. June
3, 2004] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint filed against Judge
Amor A. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court, Manila for
partiality, grave abuse of authority and oppression in
connection with entitled “People of the Philippines v.
Wilfredo Talag.” Wherein Talag was charge for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa occasioned by
the dishonor of four checks.
On May 12, 2003, complainant filed a verified complaint
before the Office of the Court Administrator charging
respondent Judge with partiality, grave abuse of
authority and oppression allegedly committed. That the
Information was filed on May 7, 2002 while the warrant
of arrest was issued May 23, 2003 despite complainant’s
pending omnibus motion to defer issuance of warrant of
arrest. Also, when the matter was elevated to the Court
of Appeals and a temporary restraining order was
issued, respondent seemed to have waited for the TRO
to expire and for the dismissal of complainant’s petition
before the Court of Appeals because she did not resolve
the motion for inhibition, and she immediately issued a
warrant of arrest against him after said petition was
dismissed. And Respondent had a predisposition to deny
the motions filed by complainant since, although she
was in haste in issuing the warrant of arrest, she
nonetheless dilly-dallied in resolving the motions filed by
complainant
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge show partiality, grave
abuse of authority and oppression?
Held:
No.
The Information was filed on May 7, 2002 while the
warrant of arrest was issued May 23, 2003. When
complainant filed the omnibus motion on May 7, 2002,
the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over his
person. With the filing of Information, the trial court could
then issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused as
provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The issuance of the
warrant was not only procedurally sound but it was even
required considering that respondent had yet to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of complainant.
Other discussions:
Complainants charge that respondent Judge failed to act
on the omnibus motion before issuing the arrest warrant
is untenable. Whether respondent correctly disregarded
the omnibus motion in view of the alleged fatal defects is
a judicial matter, which is not a proper subject in an
administrative proceeding. It bears noting that
respondent court immediately deferred the execution of
the warrant of arrest upon issuance by the Court of
Appeals of the TRO. Incidentally, although the Court of
Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, it
eventually sustained the issuance by respondent of the
arrest warrant and dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Neither can we ascribe partiality nor grave abuse of
authority on the part of respondent for issuing anew an
alias warrant after the expiration of the Court of Appeals
60-day TRO. With the lifting of the retraining order, no
legal obstacle was left for the issuance of the arrest
warrant and thus set in motion the stalled prosecutorial
process by acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
13.CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C.
MARQUEZ, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TOPIC : JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER
FACTS:
Manuel Dy Awiten filed a omplaint against Mina
Tan Hao, Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan for
syndicated estafa. The report shows that Hao induced
Dy to invest more than a hundred million pesos in State
Resources Development Management Corporation, but
when the latter’s investments fell due, the checks issued
by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his investments
were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
funds or that the account was closed.Supplemental
Affidavit of private complainant to include the
incorporators and members of the board of directors of
State Resources Development Management Corporation
as participants in the conspiracy to commit the crime of
syndicated estafa. Among those included was petitioner
Chester De Joya, subsequently, a warrant of arrest were
issued against them after finding probale cause. De
Joya asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the
existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to seek
relief from Supreme Court nor from the trial court as he
continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the
court’s jurisdiction .
HELD:
NO. It may not be amiss to note that petitioner is
not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the
trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and
submit to the court’s jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of
jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction,
thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how
the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is
acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or
petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:
This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the
court or by coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred
by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be
conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement
of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is
determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the
case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial
order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent
as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an
issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec.
5, Rule 10.
Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to
allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without
submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his
continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction
should give this Court more reason to uphold the action
of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of
arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the
law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His
evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and
frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be
remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction
must first submit to its jurisdiction. Case dismissed.
SUBJECT MATTER: Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
14.PP vs Montejo 108 Phil 613
FACTS:
Leroy S. Brown, Mayor of Basilan City, Detective
Joaquin R. Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacerna
(aliasDodong) and Mohamad Hasbi, Special Policemen
Dionisio Dinglasa, Moro Yakan, Hadjaratil, Moro Alo and
several John Does are charged with murder. Mayor
Brown allegedly "organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandoes" consisting of armed regular and
special policemen and then "established a camp", called
sub-police headquarters at Tipo- Tipo, Lamitan which
was placed under his command, orders, direct
supervision and control, and in which his codefendants
were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and
conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons
without due process of law and without bringing them to
the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor, and acting upon his orders,
his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag,
who died in consequence thereof.
ISSUE: WoN the crime committed is related to the
discharge of the public functions by the accused. -
HELD:
YES. The Constitution provides that no Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives shall "appear
as counsel
... in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee
of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation of his office ... (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Const. of the
Phil.). The issue, therefore, is whether the defendants
are "accused of an offense committed in relation" to their
office.
A mere perusal of the amended information readily elicits
an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended
information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan
City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen
and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by
him with pistols and high power guns" and then
"established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his
"command, ...supervision and control,"
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public
office is not an element of the crime of murder in
abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein,
according to the amended information, the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with their
respective offices and was perpetrated while they
were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would
not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their
superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
15. [G.R. No. L-62075. April 15, 1987.]
NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE
PERALTA, CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR
BAUTISTA, LEOLA NEOG, EPIFANIO CASTILLEJOS
AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS, Petitioners, Vs.
TANODBAYAN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FISCAL JUAN
L. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND ESTEBAN MANGASER,
Respondents.
1. COMELEC; JURISDICTION; EXCLUSIVE IN ALL
ELECTION OFFENSES. — An examination of the
provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of
1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the
COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses committed by any person,
whether private individual or public officer or employee,
and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his official duties or
not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not
the personality of the offender that matters. As long as
the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the
same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its
all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.
FACTS:
Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie
Peralta, Cresencia Padua, Dominador Bautista and
Leola Neog were members of the Citizens Election
Committee of Caba, La Union in the January 30, 1980
elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of
the Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar
Castillejos was then a candidate and later elected mayor
in the same election. Private respondent Esteban
Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice-mayor of
the same municipality sent a letter to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos charging the petitioners with
violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for
electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting
centers during the election. On instruction from the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional
Election Director of San Fernando, La Union, conducted
a formal investigation and on September 29, 1981
submitted its report recommending to the COMELEC the
dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981,
private-respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his
charges filed with the COMELEC stating his intention to
refile it with the Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981 the
COMELEC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence.
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a
preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by
Mangaser with the Tanodbayan against the same parties
and on the same charges previously dismissed by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office
entered its appearance for the respondents and moved
for dismissal of the complaint. The motion was denied.
The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive authority to
prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC
Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly
deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority
to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute
offenses committed by COMELEC officials in relation to
their office. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the Jurisdiction over
the said complaint
HELD:
This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other
than the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, thus:]1aw library
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others,
to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of election and the concomitant authority to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is not without
compelling reason. The evident constitutional
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is
to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration
of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified
citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority
to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by
public officials in relation to their office would thus
seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions
relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither
explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the
Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute
and hear election offenses committed by public officers
in relation to their office as contradistinguished from the
clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first
instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of
the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and
the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to
place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offenses committed
by any person, whether private individual or public officer
or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of
whether the offense is committed in relation to his official
duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the
offense and not the personality of the offender that
matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the
COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the
conduct of elections.
WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of
electioneering filed against the petitioners had already
been dismissed by the COMELEC for insufficiency of
evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the
complaint filed by private respondent being investigated
anew by the Tanodbayan charging the petitioners with
the same election offense, DISMISSED.
16 Sanchez vs Demetriou, 207 SCRA 627
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
Olaco
Facts:
· -Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna,
who stands accused for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and
the killing of Gomez.
· -Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio
Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both
executed confessions implicating him as a principal.
· -Secretary of Justice expressed his apprehension
that the trial of the said cases might result in a
miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan
atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the
relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of
the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer
of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila,
where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet
Demetriou.
· PET argues that the seven informations filed
against him should be quashed because: 1) he was
denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the
competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his
warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore
not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged
with seven homicides arising from the death of only two
persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because
they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo
Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the
offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction of this case.
Held: YES.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended
by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00
· The crime of rape with homicide with which the
petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under
paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption
cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it
is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the
petitioner.
· The relation between the crime and the office
contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion,
direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the
Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal
sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In
other words, the office must be a constituent element of
the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance,
the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six,
Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
· There is no direct relation between the
commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public
office is not an essential element of the crime charged.
The offense can stand independently of the office. It
follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is
triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
17Bondoc vs Sandiganbayan November 9, 1990
Facts:
Two Central Bank employees were charged with
estafa thru falsification of public documents in 3 separate
informations through the Sandiganbayan. As the case
was already submitted for decision, the investigation
found out that Bondoc and Vicente were also principals
by indispensable cooperation. Bondoc and Vicente were
private individuals who connive with the Central Bank
Employees in the said offense. As it would be impossible
for the case to be jointly tried, they were filed separate
information under a different branch of the SGBN. It was
contended by Bondoc that the SGBN lost jurisdiction to
their persons as they were not Public Employees. AND if
they were to be tried under the SGBN, it should be jointly
with those Public Employees.
Issue:
Whether Sandiganbayan lost jurisdiction over
Bondoc
Held:
NO. There is nothing so sacrosanct or important
about a joint trial as to justify a radical deviation from
ordinary, orderly court processes in order to have it, or
as to affect the very jurisdiction of the Court required to
conduct it. The evidence of the State or of the accused
does not become weaker or stronger whether presented
at a joint or separate trial; the rights of the accused are
not enhanced or diluted by the character of a trial as joint
or separate; the procedure prescribed in either situation
is essentially the same. Indeed, it is a gauge of the
importance of a joint trial, in the eyes of trial attorneys
and of the law itself, that there are as many lawyers
moving for a separate trial as there are, for a joint trial,
and that courts are granted the discretion, in cases
where two or more accused are jointly charged with an
offense, to order separate trials instead of a joint trial, on
motion of the fiscal or any accused.
Furhermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
Bondoc's cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction
over the offenses.
18.Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan 268 SCRA 747
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated
an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His
services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime
Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal
Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its
Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a
sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent
taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and
subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him
to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon
then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck
owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of
BIR stating that while he had made representations to
retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said
property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his
equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said
that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the
warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before
the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum
period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was
subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over a private individual designated by BIR as a
custodian of distrained property.
Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was
null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction
over a private individual is when the complaint charges
the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer or employee who has
been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of
becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a
public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner
be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no
jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are.
Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the
truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to
take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular
election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of
law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority
to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained
truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant
it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s
power authorizing a private individual to act as a
depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a
public officer.
19. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
Martinez, J.:
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate
involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group
(ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were
petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo
delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary
execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to
investigate the said incident. Said panel found the
incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a
review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against
twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner,
charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors,
charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as
an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law
limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or of the “principal accused” are government
officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials
with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
the approval hereof.
Issues:
Whether or not the multiple murder of the
alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers which is essential to the determination whether
the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional
Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
Held:
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an
offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if it is intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate
relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific allegation of
facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal
accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not
indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with
such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the
amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
20.Binay vs Sandiganbayan GR 1206681, October 1,
1999
Facts:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the
Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against Mayor Binay of
Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’ (RPC A220) and
‘Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act’ (RA
3019) on September 1994. The informations filed
constituted crimes which were committed by the
petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging
that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a
violation of his constitutional right of due process. His
arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the
resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash and
further the latter’s motion for reconsideration. In the
meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the
accused ‘pendente lite’ (benefits) which was later
granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in
the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was
denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered
even before he could file his reply to the petitioner’s
opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner
to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its
previous resolutions and order after the submission of
the reply.
Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction
of SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the
petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to
the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB has no
jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions
and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-
up resolution denied the petitioner’s motion.
Hence this present petition, prohibition and
mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the
criminal cases.
Issue:
WoN SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the
passage of RA 7975.
Held:
YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249
states that the SB shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic
Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense: 1.
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989
Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as Grade
‘27’ and higher.
21.Magsaysay vs. Sandiganbayan GR 128146,
October 1, 1999
Facts:
Cusi, then Vice Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas
charged Mayor Magsaysay with violation of RA 3019 for
overpaying De la Rosa of TDR Construction for the
landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School.
The Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon filed the information
in Sandiganbayan. Magsaysay moved to quash the
information on the ground that SB has no jurisdiction
over the case because at the alleged time of the
commission of the crime, Magsaysay was not receiving
salary equivalent to SG 27 and Municipal Mayors are not
included in the enumeration in Sec. 4a(1) of PD 1606 as
amended by RA 7975.
Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction
over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of
Republic Act No. 7975
Ruling:
No. RA No. 7975 was already in effect when the
information against Mayor Magsaysay was filed on
August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City. The nature
of an official's position should be the determining factor
in the fixing of his or her salary. The grade, therefore,
depends upon the nature of one's position — the level of
difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements
thereof — relative to that of another position. It is the
official's Grade that determines his or her salary, not the
other way around. It is possible that a local government
official's salary may be less than that prescribed for his
Grade since his salary depends also on the class and
financial capability of his or her respective local
government unit.
Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the official's grade.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore,
reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An
official's grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of
law, of which the Court must take judicial notice.
Magsaysay is classified as a local official with Salary
Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. Furthermore, even if
Municipal Mayors were not included in the enumeration,
the law is clear in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975, the phrase "specifically
including" after "officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989"
necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of
the enumeration.
22.Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan GR No. 122297-98,
January 19, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner was elected municipal mayor of Sindangan,
Zamboanga in 1988 and 1992. On May 8, 1995, he
elected as a congressman of second district of
Zamboanga del Norte.
On August 6, 1993, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
filed with the Sandiganbayan an information against
Petitioner et al. for violation of Section 3 (e), RA No.
3019, as amended.
On March 31, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
with the Sandiganbayan another information against
petitioner for violation of Section 3 (f), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended.
On May 16, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7975 amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606, providing: Mani kx
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in cases involving:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director or higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the
sangguniang panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
On July 10, 1995, Sandiganbayan, denied the motion to
dismiss or transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the RTC,
Sindangan, Zamboanga and a motion to refer Criminal
Case No. 22655 to the RTC, Sindangan, Zamboanga.
On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 8249, an act redefining the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Republic Act No. 7975 divested
the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against municipal
mayors.
Held:
The cases against petitioner as municipal mayor for
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
To determine whether the official is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference
should be made to Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index
of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades.
Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides
that "the municipal mayor shall receive a minimum
monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under Republic Act No.
6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto." Additionally, both the 1989 and 1997 versions
of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades list the municipal mayor under Salary
Grade 27.
23.INDING VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 143047
Facts:
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (SB) charging petitioner Inding, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
City, with violation of Sec. 3 of RA 2019 (Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act)
It was alleged that petitioner, in the performance of his
official functions, particularly in the operation against
drug abuse, faked buy-bust operations against alleged
pushers or users to enable him to claim or collect from
the coffers of the city government a total amount of
P30,500 as reimbursement of actual expenses incurred
during the alleged buy-bust operations
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged
or, in the alternative, for the referral of the case either to
the RTC or the MTC for appropriate proceedings. The
petitioner alleged that under Admin. Order No. 270
(Rules and Regulations Implementing Local Govt.), he is
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan
City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. Petitioner asserts that
under RA7975, which amended PD 1606, the
Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try
cases involving crimes committed by official of local
government units only if such officials occupy positions
with SG 27 or higher
Therefore, petitioner contends that the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over the crime
charged against him
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod who was charged with
violation of RA 3019—YES
Held:
GENERAL RULE: The jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action o EXCEPTION:
RA 7975, as well as RA 8249, constitutes an exception
thereto as it expressly states that to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of RA 3019, the reckoning period is the TIME
OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE o In the
case at bar, the crime charged was committed from the
period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The
applicable law, therefore, is RA 7975
· RA 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as defined in Sec. 4 of PD 1606 o
Violations of RA 3019 x x x (1) Officials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING:
-Provincial governors, vice governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan,
24.Geduspan vs People GR 146646-49, March 11,
2005
25.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and EFREN L.
ALAS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 147706-07. February 16, 2005
FACTS:
Two separate informations for violation of
Section 3 € of RA 3019 were filed with the
sandiganbayan on Nov 17, 1999 against Efren L Alas.
The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous
advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity
as President and Chief Operating Officer of the
Philippine Postal Savings Bank with Bagong Buhay
Publishing Company wihich purportedly caused damage
and prejudiced to the Government.
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction which motion was
vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After
considering the arguments of both parties, the
respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private
corporation and that its officers, particularly herein
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction.
The People, through the office of the Special Prosecutor,
filed this petition arguing, in essence that the PPSB was
a government-owned or controlled corporation as the
term was defined under Section 2 (13) od the
Administrative Code of 19887.
RA 8249 (an act defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan) did not make a distinction as to the
manner of creation of the government- owned or
controlled corporations for their officers to fall under its
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan have
jurisdiction over officers of government-owned or
controlled corporations under RA 3019.
HELD:
Yes, more the 99% of the authorized capital
stock of PPSB belongs to the government while the rest
is normally held by its incorporators who are themselves
officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was
expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7345, for our
purposes of, among others, to encourage and promote
the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the
general public, especially the youth and the marginalized
sector and to facilitate postal service by receiving
collections and making payments, including postal
money orders.
The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to
be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offense committed
by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation
to their office as may be determined by law.
26 Barriga v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court for the nullification of the Resolution[1] of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27435 to 27437
denying the motion to quash the Informations filed by
one of the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the
Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration
thereof.
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
motion with the Sandiganbayan for the admission of the
three Amended Informations appended thereto. The first
Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
27435, charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and Virginio
E. Villamor, the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal
Mayor, respectively, of Carmen, Cebu, with malversation
of funds. The second information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 27436, charging the said accused with illegal
use of public funds. the third Amended Information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27437, charged the
same accused with illegal use of public funds.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted
the Amended information. The petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the said Amended information on the ground that
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes
charged. She averred that the Amended information
failed to allege and show the intimate relation between
the crimes charged and her official duties as municipal
accountant, which are conditions sine qua non for the
graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense.
She averred that the prosecution and the Commission
on Audit admitted, and no less than this Court held in
Tan v. Sandiganbayan,[5] that a municipal accountant is
not an accountable officer. She alleged that the felonies
of malversation and illegal use of public funds, for which
she is charged, are not included in Chapter 11, Section
2, Title VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code; hence,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the said
crimes. Moreover, her position as municipal accountant
is classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24.
Issue: graft court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the resolutions.
Held: No.
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the
public office of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio E.
Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and
illegal use of public funds or property. Accused mayor’s
position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended
information alleged that the petitioner conspired with her
co-accused, the municipal mayor, in committing the said
felonies, the fact that her position as municipal
accountant is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an
accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan
still has exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases
lodged against her.
It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in
charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official
position, or even a private individual, may be liable for
malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if
such public officer or private individual conspires with an
accountable public officer to commit malversation or
illegal use of public funds or property
JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN
27.JULIAN A. ALZAGA, MEINRADO ENRIQUE A.
BELLO, and MANUEL S. SATUITO vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd Division) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 169328 October
27, 2006 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
October 7, 1999, there was a case filed against the
petitioners regarding alleged irregularities which
attended the purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas
by the AFP-RSBS. Being vice presidents and assistant
vice president of the AFP-RSBS, the petitioners claim
that they are not under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan since AFP-RSB is a private entity.
ISSUE:
(1) WON AFP-RSBS is a government entity.
(2) WON the petitioners are under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:(1) Yes. Considering that the character and
operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public
interest and its fund are in the nature of public fund, it is
indeed a government entity.
(2) Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
“presidents, directors, trustees, or managers of GOCCs,
state universities, or educational institutions or
foundations.” The positions of the petitioners being vice
president and assistant vice president are not
specifically enumerated in RA 8249 but it is clearly
higher than managers. Thus, considering them under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
28 Balaba vs People GR 169519, July 17, 2009
Facts: Balaba (Asst. Municipal Treasurer) of Bohol was
charged and convicted with Malversation of Public
Funds by the RTC due to misappropriation of
P114,186.34 worth of public funds. He filed his notice
before the CA which was dismissed on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because
Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the case.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Yes. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of RA 8249
provides that SB shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction
as herein provided. An error in designating the appellate
court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction
in designating the proper appellate court should be
made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made
within the said period, the designation of the correct
appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the
case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise
the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court would apply. “An appeal erroneously taken to
the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.”
Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the
appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error
when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of
jurisdiction.
29.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 167304 August
25, 2009
Facts:
Victoria Amante was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14,
1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the
amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in
order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on
Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed.
As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years
since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation
was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City
Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to
respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her
unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours
from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission
on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation
report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that
respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain
whether appropriate charges could be filed against her
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise
known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999,
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
Information for Malversation of Public Funds against
respondent Amante. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'
Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum
finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged
with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines
falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Yes. The present case falls under Section 4(b)
where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are
involved. Under the said provision, no exception is
contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the
time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense applies in this present case.
Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004,
the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the
pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by
R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in
 a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under
Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically
enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to
acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter
must be committed by, among others, officials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by
the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated
are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers , and other city department heads;
officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection
therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to
their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the
pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
30 Magno vs People GR No. 171542, April 6, 2011
Dela Serna
31 Ambil vs SB, GR No. 175457, July 6, 2011
Delfin
FACTS: An information was filed before the Ombudsman
against petitioners Ambil and Apelado, Governor of
Eastern Samar and Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar ,respectively, for allegedly ordering and causing
the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner
Mayor Francisco Adalim in violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the
allegations in the Information reasoning however that
Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent
threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his
detention at the provincial jail. After trial, the
Sandiganbayan found them guilty of the offense
charged.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over petitioners?
HELD: The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true
as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification from the Provincial Government Department
Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial
Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it
is only when none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher
shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts.
Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-
principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was
correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper
court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them
– the Sandiganbayan.
32.Billedo vs. Judge Wagan, GR No. 175091, July 13,
2011
FACTS:
A criminal case were filed against petitioner police
officers before the City Prosecution Office and the Office
of the Ombudsman for unlawful arrest and violation of
RA 7438 or the Act Defining Rights of Persons under
Custodial Investigation. Previously, a civil case was also
filed for damages against the same.
The Criminal case was dismissed.
The petitioners police officers invoked Section 4, R.A.
No. 8249, otherwise known as the "Sandiganbayan Act,"
which provides:
“.................where the civil action had heretofore been
filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise, the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned."
No transfer was done.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OR ANY OTHER COURTS HAS THE
JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVIL CASE NO. 00-0089
GIVEN THE MANDATORY SIMULTANEOUS
INSTITUTION AND JOINT DETERMINATION OF A
CIVIL LIABILITY WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND
THE EXPRESS PROHIBITION TO FILE THE SAID
CIVIL ACTION SEPARATELY FROM THE CRIMINAL
ACTION AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 4 OF
REPUBLIC ACT 8249?
HELD: Yes. The subject civil case does not fall within the
purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part
of this provision contemplates only two (2) situations.
First, a criminal action has been instituted before the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the
requisite preliminary investigation, and the
corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously
instituted with it; and
Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case,
is still pending upon the filing of the criminal action, in
which case, the civil case should be transferred to the
court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint
determination.
Evidently, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no
application in this case. No criminal action has been filed
before the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate court.
Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject
civil case can be transferred or consolidated as
mandated by the said provision.
33.Torres vs People, GR No. 175074, August 13, 2011
34 People vs. Bello GR No. 166948-59, August 29,
2012
FACTS: In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the
Committee) inquired into alleged anomalies at the AFP-
RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that
when acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two
sets of deeds of sale. The first would be kept by the
AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would
be held by the vendors. The latter would then use these
unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of
AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee,
to enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its
funds and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes.
The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman
(OMB) the prosecution of General Jose Ramiscal, Jr.
(Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands
in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for
falsification of public documents or violation of Article
172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 4
to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,1 Sections 3(e) and 3(g).
Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the OMB
filed with respect to the acquisition of lands in Iloilo City
informations before the Sandiganbayan against
respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S.
Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa,
Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel,
Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for
six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six
counts of falsification of public documents under Article
171, RPC.
Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion
to quash the informations on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan
does not exercise jurisdiction over him because his rank
at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of
Police Superintendent in the Philippine National Police.
On February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the
motions and ordered the remand of the records to the
proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the
Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges
such order.
Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction over
the case
HELD:
The criminal information does not charge Bello for
offenses relating to the regular police work of a police
officer of his rank. He is rather charged for offenses he
committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a
"manager" of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation.
What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by
law must commit the offense described in Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in
relation to the office being held. 7 Here, the OMB charged
Bello of using his office as Legal Department Head to
manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS land
acquisitions to the prejudice of the government.
What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by
law must commit the offense described in Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in
relation to the office being held.7 Here, the OMB charged
Bello of using his office as Legal Department Head to
manipulate the documentations of AFP-RSBS land
acquisitions to the prejudice of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition,
REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision dated
February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2,
2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31, and
DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these
cases, immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and
resolve accused Raul Aposaga’s motion for
reinvestigation.
35.People vs. Mangulabnan
G.R. No. L-8919, September 28, 1956
Felix, J.:

Facts:
Defendant Mangulabnan entered the house of
Sps. Pacson to rob from the residents therein.
Mangulabnan decided to shoot the ceiling where Vicente
Pacson was allegedly hiding which resulted to his death.

Issue:
Whether the complex crime of robbery with
homicide can be charged against the defendants.

Held:
Yes. As a co-principal due to conspiracy.
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides – the
crime of robbery with homicide, any persons guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation
by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed.

36.People vs. Dicto, April 25, 1969