ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

By: Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW is that branch of public law under which the executive branch of the
government, acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial function, interferes with the conduct of the
individual for the purpose of promoting the common good or general welfare. It fixes the organization of the
government and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to the individual
remedies for the violations of his rights.

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OR AGENCIES

An administrative agency is a body, other than the courts and the legislature, endowed with quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it for
enforcement or execution. In Metro Construction Inc., vs. Chathau Properties Inc., 365 SCRA 697, the
Supreme Court defined a quasi-judicial agency or body as an organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking.
Manner of Creation
1.
by constitutional provisions (Office of the President, COMELEC, COA, CSC);
2.
by legislative enactment (NLRC, SEC, NAPOLCOM); and
3.
by authority of law (EIIB, TFA).
The President can validly reorganize his office even without congressional authority because the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) has empowered the President continuing authority to reorganize his
office in order to achieve economy and efficiency.
1.

2.
3.

The continuing power of the President to reorganize includes:

Restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President, including its immediate offices
by abolishing, consolidating or merging units therefor, or transferring functions from one unit to
another;
Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well
as transfer functions to the Office of the President from departments and agencies; and
Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well
as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other department or agencies. (Sec. 31,
Chapter 10 Book III, EO 292)

Thus, the EIIB is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. As far as bureaus,
agencies or offices in the executive department is concerned, the Presidents power of control may
justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office, or certain law may grant him the broad authority to
carry out reorganization measure.(Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718)
However, the legislature has the concurrent power to reclassify or redefine the executive
bureaucracy, including the relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus and departments
and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive departments and their components, subject only by
constitutional limitations. Hence, the same Congress, which has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff
Commission and the Department of Trade and Industry, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its
functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure.
Assuming there is a conflict between the specific limitation in Section 28(2), Article VII of the Constitution
and the general executive power of control and supervision, the former prevails in the specific instance to
safeguard measures such as tariff and imports. (Southern Cross Cement, supra)

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Constitutional objections to the creation of administrative agencies

1.
possible violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
2.
possible violation of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.
3.
possible violation of due process and equal protection clauses.
The equal protection clause was violated when the Philippine Truth Commission singled out only
the officials and employees of the Arroyo Administration but not the other officials of previous
administrations who are similarly situated. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, GR No.
192935, December 10, 2010)
Types of administrative bodies as to hierarchy
1.
Office of the President and Cabinet
2.
Independent constitutional commissions COMELEC, CSC, COA, Ombudsman
3.
Other constitutional bodies Office of the Special Prosecutor, Central Monetary Authority,
Economic and Planning Agency, Commission on Human Rights, National Language Commission,
NaPolCom, Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities
4.
Regulatory Commissions SEC, NLRC, Office of the Insurance Commissioner, Bureau of
Customs, BIR, LTFRB
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
1.
Quasi-legislative or rule making power;
2.
Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power; and
3.
Determinative powers.
Scope of power of administrative agencies
Generally, administrative bodies, as mere creations of Congress, can only perform powers and
duties as are conferred to them by the Constitution and statutes and those which are necessarily implied in
the exercise thereof. (Republic vs. CA, 200 SCRA 226) The extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provision of the statute creating or empowering such
agency. (City of Baguio vs. Nino, 487 SCRA 216) While Congress may delegate powers to administrative
bodies, such delegation must respect constitutional restrictions like the doctrine of separation of powers
and the non-delegation of power principle.
A.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE-MAKING POWER

Nature and scope of the power

The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make , alter and repeal laws.
The details and manner of carrying out the law are left to the administrative agency charged with its
implementation in this sense, the rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative agency are the
product of delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that will have the effect of law.
Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and
regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers
flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. (Abellar vs. CSC, 442 SCRA 507) The
grant of express power to formulate implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the power
to amend, revise, alter or repeal the same. (Yazaki vs. Torres Manufacturing, Inc. vs. 493 SCRA 86)
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make
rules or regulations. Delegated rule-making power has become a practical necessity in modern governance
due to increasing complexity and variety of public functions. In the exercise of delegated legislative power,
administrative bodies have no discretion to determine what the law shall be. They have merely the authority
to fix details in execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Thus, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No.308 as it did not merely implement the Administrative
Code. It established a national computerized identification reference system which requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies, the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy against dossier-gathering by the government, and choices of policies. It deals with a subject that
should be covered by law. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141)
The express grant of rule-making power to an administrative agency necessarily includes the
power to amend, revise, alter or repeal the same. It is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior

issuances of administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
(Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III,535 SCRA 265)
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Kinds of administrative rules and regulations
1.
Legislative regulation
a.
Supplementary or detailed legislation, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION affects the substantial rights of the general public and
has the force and effect of a law.
b.
Contingent regulation
2.
Interpretative legislation or internal rules, e.g., BIR Circulars
INTERPRETATIVE RULE merely clarifies the meaning of a pre-existing law by inferring its
implication. the court may review the correctness of the interpretation of the law given by the
administrative body, and substitute its own view of what is correct to that of the administrative body.
It does not have to be published because it is not a law itself.
INTERNAL RULE is only an instruction from a higher officer to a lower officer within the
same office concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance
of their duties. It has no effect of law because no clear legal right which can be invoked by a third
person emanates from it. It does not have to be published to be effective.
Subordinate Legislation
This is the power of administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations with force and effect
of a law on matters of their own specialization. Administrative authorities are vested with the power to make
rules and regulations because it is impracticable for lawmakers to provide general regulations for various
varying details of management. PNOC vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32)
As subordinate legislation, the power to make rules and regulations so passed by administrative
agencies are only of the nature of implementing rules and regulations, which are tested by their conformity
to the standards set by, and their ability to carry out the legislative intent contained in the primary law.
Subordinate legislation, a principle practiced by advanced and developed countries, means that the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature to administrative bodies is demanded by the growing
complexities of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of the regulatory power of the State and
compounded by the increasing difficulty of administering the affairs of the State. (Pangasinan
Transportation Co. vs. PSC, 70 Phil 221)
In Commission on Internal Revenue vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., 496 SCRA 176, it was held that
Revenue Regulations No 2-94 is still subordinate to RA7432 and in cases of conflict, the implementing rule
will not prevail over the law it seeks to implement. Thus, the said regulation is null and void for failing to
conform to the law it sought to implement. Administrative rules, regulations and orders have the efficacy
and force of law so long as they do not contravene any statute or the Constitution.
Requisites for valid exercise of rule-making power
1.
the rule must be issued under the authority of law or its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature;
The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the
authority given to it by Congress or the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Hence, the Department of Agrarian reform has
no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the
coverage of agrarian reform. (DAR vs. Sutton, 473 SCRA 392)
2.

the administrative issuance must be within the scope and purview of the law; or authority given by
the legislature
RA 8177 authorized the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health
and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to issue the implementing rules and regulations
which, in turn, authorized the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare a manual setting
forth the details of the proceedings prior to, during and after the administration of the lethal
injection. The regulation does not provide for approval by the Secretary of Justice. Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice , the Bureau of Corrections cannot promulgate a
manual that does not bear the approval of the Secretary of Justice as to the rule-making authority

under RA 8177. Such abdication of authority renders the regulation invalid. (Echegaray vs.
Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA 754)
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals 240 SCRA 368, the Supreme
Court held that administrative rules and regulations must not override but must remain consistent
and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.
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Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13 th month Pay Law is
void, because it unduly expanded the concept of basic salary as defined in PD 851. Basic salary is
the rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of additional payment as bonuses and
overtime. The DOLE order included the commission paid its sales representatives in the
computation of the 13th pay due them. (Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. De la Serna, 228 SCRA
329)
The HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 5 of RA7742 and Section
13 of PD 1752. However, rules and regulations which are the products of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law should be within the scope of
the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the object and purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. (Romulo, et al vs. HDMF, GR No. 131082, June
19, 2000, 333 SCRA 37)
It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot supersede,
abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. Hence, the Local Budget Circular issued by the Department
of Budget outrightly prohibiting local government units from granting allowances to
judges whenever such allowances are also granted by the national government, violates Section
447 (a) (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code. (Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180)
It is well settled that rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of
the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and that it be not in contradiction to,
but in conforminty, with the standards prescribed by law. (Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix
Feeds Corporation, GR No. 179579, February 1, 2012)
3.

4.

the rule must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, including public
participation, filing and publication; Interpretative rules and those merely internal in nature are not
required to be published and filed with the UP Law Center. (ASTEC v. ERC, GR No. 192117,
September 18, 2012) As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
rules and regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. (Abella vs. CSC, 442 SCRA 507); and
the rules must be reasonable (KMU vs. Director-General, NEDA, GR No.167798, April 19, 2006) .

Additional requisites if rules contain penal sanctions

1.
Law itself must declare as punishable the violation of administrative rule or regulation (People vs.
Maceren, 79, SCRA 450); and
2.
Law should define or fix penalty therefor.
In Perez vs. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, 492 SCRA 638, the Supreme Court cited
two requisites for an administrative regulations to have force and effect of penal law, to wit:
1.
the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself,
2.
the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
Publication, filing and effectivity
a.
Publication is essential to the effectivity of any law or regulation as a requirement of due process.
Publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the
contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the
same. (Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177)
b.
What must be published: rules and regulation of administrative agencies which have the force and
effect of law. All legislative rules and regulations, not only those of penal character, must be
published. (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446)
c.
Where published: Either in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation. (EO 200,
amending Art. 2 of the Civil Code) Hence, DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM
pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA 6758 is of no force and effect due to the absence of publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. (PITC vs. COA, supra)

d.

How published: In full, not just the title but the entire rule, if it is to serve the purpose of due
process.

e.

Filing: administrative rules and regulations must be filed with the National Administrative Register
(UP Law Center) as required by Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII, EO 292.

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Effectivity: If a rule or regulation does not provide for a date of effectivity, it shall become effective
15 days after publication. If it provides otherwise, then the period provided applies, but in no case
before publication. Exception: in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the
existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule.

Necessity of Publication. DOLE Order No. 16-91 and POEA MC Nos. 30 and 37, suspending
temporarily the deployment of OCWs abroad until better working conditions are made by employers, while
recognized as valid exercise of police power as delegated to the executive department,
were
declared legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office
of the National Administrative Register. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, 212 SCRA
298)
Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 Series of 1983, which enumerated the
allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, has not yet been published or filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. An Administrative Circular that
was never filed with the NAR cannot be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions. The
fact that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 is addressed only to specified group-namely private
employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of the ruling in Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, which is clear and categorical administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. (Philsa
International Placement and Service Corporation vs. Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)
Since the Electric Cooperative Election Code applies to all electric cooperatives in the country, and
it is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinate, then it should
comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and Administrative Code of 1987 relative to the publication
requirement. (Nea vs. Gonzaga, 539 SCRA 388)
Publication Not Necessary. Memorandum Order No. 20-87, which provided for the automatic
review of the decisions of the Collector of Customs if it is adverse to the government, does not require
publication. It is merely in the nature of an internal rule, since it is only an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates. (Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs, 180
SCRA 591)
Where petitioners challenged the validity of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 30-67, which
interpreted the Tobacco Inspection Law, on the ground that it was not published in the Official Gazette, the
Supreme Court ruled the same is for the internal administration of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
It also interpreted the law. No publication is necessary for its validity. (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette
Factory vs. CA, 134 SCRA 29)
Likewise, OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among
prosecutors of the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. The
circular DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public in general. Internal regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by
administrative superiors concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. (Honasan vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, GR no. 159747,
April 13, 2004)
In Veterans Federation of the Philippines vs. Reyes, 483 SCRA 526, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of Department Circular No. 04 despite its lack of publication, the same being an internal regulation.
It is meant to regulate a public corporation under the control of the Department of National Defense, and
not the public in general. What has been created as a body corporate by RA 2640 is not the individual
membership of the affiliate organizations of the VFP, but merely the aggregate of the head of the affiliate
organizations. Consequently, the individual members of the affiliate organizations who are not public
officers, are beyond the regulation of the circular. Sections 2, 3, and 6 of the assailed circular are

additionally interpretative in nature. They add nothing to the law. They do not affect substantive rights of
any person, whether he is a party to the case at bar or not.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity
of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of
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this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not meet out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining
behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
characterized as ex post facto laws. (Salvador vs. Mapa, GR 135080, November 28, 2007)
Notice and Hearing Not Necessary. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to
the validity of rules and regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. (Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs.
DFA, 502 SCRA 295)

B.

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Quasi-judicial power is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature. Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other
than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial or adjudicatory. (Patalinghug vs. COMELEC, 543 SCRA
175)
In administrative law, a quasi - judicial proceedings involves: (a) taking and evaluation of
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decisions supported by the facts proved. (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160)
The action of an administrative agency in granting, or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a
license, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial.
(Sanado vs. CA, 356 SCRA 546)
Investigation and adjudication
That an administrative agency has the power to conduct investigations and recommendations
thereon, is a settled point, since these are inherent in their functions as administrative agencies. What is
not inherent, and therefore require an explicit grant from law, is their adjudicative power, that is the power to
decide controversies involving rights and obligations of third persons appearing before them, or the power
to pass upon legal questions, which involves the application of the law to the facts .
The investigatory power of administrative agencies consist of a) the issuance of subpoena, b)
swearing in of the witnesses, c) the interrogating of witnesses, d) the calling for production of books,
papers and records,
e)
requiring that books, papers and records be made available for
inspection, f) inspecting premises, requiring written answers to questionnaires, g) requiring reports, periodic
or special, and h) requiring the filing of statements. The authority to take testimony shall include the power
to administer oath, summons witnesses and issue subpoena duces tecum. (Book I, Sec. 37)
An administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or
investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports on the basis of which the agency shall
render its decision. The term administrative body or agency includes subordinate official upon whose
hand the body or agency delegates a portion of its authority. (Mollaneda vs. Umacob, 358 SCRA 537)
Except in the case of agencies with specific grant of adjudicative power (NLRC, COMELEC,
CBAA) most other administrative agencies only have the power to investigate and not of adjudication.
Investigation and adjudication distinguished
INV: mere ministerial and may be delegated by an officer to a hearing officer who shall receive testimonial,
documentary and other evidence and submit findings of facts and recommendations.
ADJ: it involves decision-making which is discretionary in nature and cannot be delegated; the decision
remains with the agency.
Administrative interpretation of the law

Rule. Administrative bodies may interpret the law they are tasked to implement. To otherwise deprive
administrative bodies the duty, at the first instance, to interpret the laws which they are mandated to
execute would make them impotent bodies. The construction and interpretation given by administrative
officers possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and experience of what the law is
deserves greatest respect and can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion. (PLDT vs. NTC,
190 SCRA 717).
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Rationale. It is the general policy of the Supreme Court to sustain the decision of administrative
authorities not only on the basis of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability
and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. (Santiago vs. Dep. Exec. Secretary, 192
SCRA 199)
Use. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a
statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. When an
administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means. (Melendres, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262 and Baltazar vs.
COMELEC, 350 SCRA 518)
Administrative searches & seizures; warrant of arrest
The constitutional requirements for search and seizure also apply even to administrative searches.
This means that explicit provisions of laws authorizing inspection, notwithstanding, a warrant would still be
necessary in those cases where no consent to the inspection is given.
The rule has been that an administrative agency cannot arrest an individual. Only a judge can
order the arrest of a person, at least the arrest for the purpose of making him answer a charge against him.
The Commissioner of Immigration has no power to issue warrants of arrest ordering an alien to appear and
show cause why he should not be deported, although he has the power to issue an order of arrest to carry
out an order of deportation. The arrest for the purpose of carrying out a deportation order is another matter.
Award of damages
Powers of administrative agencies are limited and usually administrative in nature. In case of injury
or inconvenience suffered by a person because of breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence,
the proper forum for him to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages should be in the
courts and not in administrative agencies. Being a creature of the legislature, administrative agencies can
exercise only such jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it
by statute. (RCPI vs. Board of Communications, L-43653, L-45378, November 29, 1977)

Exceptions. However, the National Housing Authority (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board) has been conferred by PD 1344, the competence to award damages including attorneys fees which
are recoverable either by agreement of the parties or under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. (Solid Homes vs.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72) And so with the National Labor Relations Commission in labor cases, by virtue of
the provisions of the Labor Code.
While regular courts are possessed of general jurisdiction over action for damages, where wrongful
acts complained of and upon which the damages prayed for are based have to do with the operation and
ownership of cable companies, these factual matters undoubtedly pertain to the National
Telecommunications Commission and not the regular courts. Thus, it would be proper for the courts to
yield its jurisdiction in favor of an administrative body when the determination of underlying factual issues
requires the special competence or knowledge of the latter. (GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corp. 470 SCRA727)
Imposition of fines and penalties
Rules penalizing certain acts are valid only if the primary law pursuant to which the rule was issued
also provides that the act be penalized. But if the primary law does not make the act criminal, then the rule
which makes it criminal is void. (People vs. Maceren, 79, SCRA 450) The penalty for such violation must
also be provided by the statute itself. (Perez vs. Refillers Association of the Philippines, 492 SCRA 638)
Power to grant immunities from criminal and civil prosecutions

The rule is that administrative bodies in the performance of their quasi- judicial functions cannot
grant criminal and civil immunities to persons unless the law explicitly and specifically confers such
prerogative or power. However, insofar as the Presidential Commission on Good Government is concerned,
it is conferred such power under Sec. 5 of EO No. 14. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 72)
Also, the COMELEC may give transactional immunity to those who have committed election
offenses but volunteer to give information and testify on any violation of said law in any official investigation,
or proceeding. The testimony of a voluntary witness in accord with his sworn statement operates as a
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pardon for the criminal charges to which it relates. If such witness later refuses to testify or testifies but
contrary to his affidavit, he loses his immunity from suit and may be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 261 (a)
and (b) of the OEC, perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, or false testimony under Art. 180 of
the same Code. (COMELEC vs. Espanol, 417 SCRA 554)
Such power to grant exemption is vested solely on the COMELEC. This power is concomitant with
its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute those committing the
same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may the Supreme
Court interfere with the COMELECs exercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the
law, unless the COMELEC commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
(Ibid.)
Likewise, the Commission on Human Rights, in the course of its investigation, may grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. (Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483)

C.

DETERMINATIVE POWERS

1.
2.

Enabling permits the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate.
Directing - orders the doing or performance of particular acts to ensure compliance with the law
and are often exercised for corrective purposes.
Dispensing to relax the general operation of a law or exempt from general prohibition, or relieve
an individual or a corporation from an affirmative duty.
Examining also called investigatory power.
Summary power to apply compulsion or force against persons or property to effectuate a legal
purpose without judicial warrants to authorize such action.

3.
4.
5.

Fixing rates, wages, prices; double nature of rate-fixing

Rate is defined as a charge, payment, or price fixed according to ratio, scale, or standard, or an
amount paid or charged for a good or service; Rates are fixed on the basis of the investment amount or
property value that the public utility is allowed to earn an amount value otherwise called rate base.
(NPC vs. PEPOA, 468 SCRA 577)
The grant of the power to fix rates, wages and prices is allowed because this function usually
requires technical knowledge which the legislature does not have. But the administrative agency cannot
further delegate this to another entity. (Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, 239 SCRA 386)
Rate fixing calls for the technical examination and specialized review of specific details which the
court are ill-equipped to enter such matters are primarily entrusted to the administrative or regulating
authority. (MERALCO vs. Lualhati, 510 SCRA 455)
Generally, the power to fix rate is a quasi-legislative function. But if the rate is applicable only to an
individual, then the function becomes quasi-judicial. When an administrative body performs rate-fixing
in a quasi judicial capacity, the valid exercise of this power demands previous notice and hearing. The rate
fixing order, even if temporary, is not exempt from the requirements of notice and hearing (PHILCOMSAT
vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218)
The function of prescribing rate by an administrative agency may either be legislative or an
adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected
parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
Where the rules and the rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative character. But if they apply exclusively to a particular party, based
upon finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Hence, the necessity of prior notice and
hearing. (The Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. Secretary, DECS, 153 SCRA 622)

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

A.

PROMULGATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Filing. Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified
copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force not filed within three months from the date of effectivity of
this Code shall not be the basis of any sanction. (Book VII, Sec. 3) (See also Philsa International
Placement and Service Corporation vs. Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)
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Publication.
The University of the Philippines Law Center shall publish a quarterly bulletin
setting forth the text of rule filed with it. (Book VII, Sec. 5) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an
act subject to a penalty shall be published in full. [Book VII, Sec. 6 (2)]
Public Participation. If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
published notice of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their view, [Book
VII, Sec. 9 (1)]

B.

ADJUDICATION

Notice & Hearing; Records of Proceedings. In any contested case, all parties shall be entitled to
notice of hearing. The notice shall be served at least five days before the date of the hearing. [Book VII,
Sec. 11(1)] The parties shall be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. [Book
VII, Sec. 11 (2)] The agency shall keep an official records of its proceedings. [Book VII, Sec. 11 (3)]
Two necessary conditions
1.
Jurisdiction; and
2.
Due Process
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of quasi-judicial bodies (administrative
authorities.) Without jurisdiction, their acts are void and open to collateral attack. Any decision rendered
without justification is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time even on appeal. The only
exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel. (Solid Homes vs. Payawal, supra)
Nature of proceedings
Quasi-judicial proceedings have been held to partake of the nature of a judicial proceedings. A
proceeding requiring the taking and weighing of evidence, the determination of facts based upon the
consideration of evidence, and the making of an order supported by findings and quality resembling that of
a judicial proceeding.
Procedure before a quasi-judicial body
In the administration of the quasi-judicial power of a body, the strict rules of evidence are not
applicable. However, in disregarding the rules of evidence, the body should be guided by the criteria of fair
play, justice and accountability. A reading of Section 1, Article III on Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the
observance of due process in all cases either judicial, legislative or administrative must not be denied to
any person.
Procedures are adopted for safeguarding the rights of parties to a complaint so that the
investigation will separate the innocent from the guilty. Investigation and hearing are conducted to look into
the facts of each alleged violation, and then the law applicable is applied to the facts as found by the
investigator or hearing officer. The environment of a quasi-judicial bodies may be of expeditiousness,
expertise, or liberally conceived remedies and generally unrestricted by the technical rules of procedure
which govern trials before courts.
Administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules of evidence, but the liberality of
procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirements of
due process. (Limbona vs. Limbona, 404 SCRA 6)
The Administrative Code does not require that the investigation of the quasi-judicial body be in the
nature of a court trial. In deciding administrative cases in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power, the
bodies or officials generally enjoy wide discretion. Technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and
due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable. It is sufficient that the substantive due
process requirement of fairness and reasonableness be observed.
Rules of procedure; rationale; how interpreted

The quasi-judicial body may promulgate its own rules of procedure as they may see them fit and
proper to govern their proceedings, provided they do not increase, diminish or modify substantive rights,
and subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court. The adoption of certain rules of procedure by a body is
necessary to govern their proceedings on cases filed before them for disposition. Procedural law has its
own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality
in the settlement of disputes. Hence rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. (PNOC-EDC vs. Veneracion, 509 SCRA 93)
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Rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their objective and to assist in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determinations of the respective claims and defenses .
Subdelegation of authority
Nature. Subdelegation of authority is the transmission of authority from the heads of agencies to
subordinates.
Rationale. This is permissible in administrative proceedings because subdelegation of power is
dictated by sound management principles and the exigencies of the service. By subdelegation of authority
which is demanded by administrative efficiency, the leaders in the hierarchy of an organization must be able
to concentrate their attention upon a larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their
time free, as much as possible, from the consideration of a smaller and far less matters of details unless by
provision of law it is withheld. (American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287)
Subdelegation of authority is permissible in order to achieve prompt and expeditious discharge of
public functions and responsibilities. To withhold such power to subdelegate the authority would be to
impair administrative efficiency.
Settled is the rule that a delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to assist
him in the performance of his functions as long as the decision remains within the scope of his jurisdiction
and is made by said officer. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution commands public officers and employees to
serve with utmost efficiency, hence to insure compliance with this constitutional mandate, subdelegation
must, perforce, be allowed to attain prompt and efficient service.
a)

b)

The following instances of subdelegation of power have been sustained as valid:

the President under the doctrine of qualified political agency delegates power and authority to the
members of his official family who are considered as his alter ego. (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary,
206 SCRA 290) and
The Securities and Exchange Commission may delegate to subordinate officials the authority to
exercise the specific powers assigned to it by law. (Skyworld Condominium Owners Association vs.
SEC, 211 SCRA 565)

Delegation to division
A division of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not necessarily by the board en banc,
can render a valid decision pursuant to its adjudicative powers. Nothing in EO 648 denies the regulatory
agency the power to delegate its adjudicatory functions to a division. It may do so since it is authorized to
adopt rules on procedure which authorizes to delegate its adjudicative powers to a division. (Realty
Exchange Venture Corp. vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA 655)
Concept of due process
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such
as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. (CSC vs. Lucas, 301 SCRA 560)
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied in administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. (Arboleda vs. NLRC, 303 SCRA 38 and Adiong vs. CA, 371 SCRA 373)
Where the party has the opportunity to appeal, or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, defects in procedural dues process may be cured. (Autencio vs. Manara, 449 SCRA 46)
Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also and perhaps even many

times more creditably and practically through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to
explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
an action or ruling. (Garcia vs. Pajaro, GR No. 141149, July 5, 2002)
Administrative due process is recognized to include the right to:
A.
Procedural Due Process
1.
Notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons
legal right;
2.
Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor;
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B.
3.

4.

Substantive Due Process

A tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one
of competent jurisdiction;
The POEA is vested with both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Hence, its
adjudication on the basis of its own regulation does not violate due process. (Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533)
And a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. (Air Manila, Inc. vs.
Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489; Fabella vs. CA, 282 SCRA 256; Domingo vs. Ryala, 545 SCRA 90 )

Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing, except when it involves revocation of a license. (Corona vs. United
Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, 283 SCRA 31)
General Rule. Due process in administrative context does not require trial type-proceedings similar
to those in the courts of justice. (UP Board of Regents, vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404) Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense since it is enough that the
party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. (Ocampo vs . Office of
the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17; Ledesma vs. CA, 541 SCRA444) A formal trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on
which a fair decision can be based. (Melendres vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262)
The requirement of hearing is complied with as long as there is opportunity to be heard, and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense, and not necessarily that an actual hearing
was conducted. (Busuego vs. CA, 304 SCRA 473)
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to
be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also perhaps many times more
creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings xxx. A formal type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The requirement are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the
absolute lack of notice and hearing. (Barot vs. COMELEC, 404 SCRA 352) It is not legally objectionable for
being violative of due process for an agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony. (Lastimoso vs. Asayo, 539 SCRA 381)
Where the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Domingo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 313 SCRA 311;
Ablera vs. NLRC 215 SCRA 476) A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges
cannot complain of denial of due process. (Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, supra) There can be no
denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed do so.
(DBP vs. CA, 302 SCRA 362; Tiomico vs. CA, 304 SCRA 216)
Exceptions. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full
adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when
there is a need to profound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. (Artezuela vs.
Maderazo, 381 SCRA 49) Also in labor cases, actual adversarial proceedings becomes necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to profound searching questions to unclear witnesses, a procedural

right which the employee must ask for. It is not an inherent right. If petitioner requested that an investigation
be conducted but respondents vehemently refused, clearly the petitioner was deprived of his right to due
process. (Lavador vs. J Marketing Corporation, 461 SCRA 497)
Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted by the persons whose
rights have been allegedly violated. (Napere vs. Barbarona, 543 SCRA 376)
In judicial proceedings, when from a consideration of the pleadings it appears that there are
ISSUES OF FACT which cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits, and no trial is had,
there is denial of due process. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitute a denial of due
process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there are issues that cannot be
decided without a trial of the case on the merits. (Robern Devt Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150)
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In quasi-judicial proceedings, the counterpart rule is that when an ADJUDICATIVE FACT IS AT
ISSUE, a trial-type hearing ought to be held. (Mabuhay Textile Mills Corp. vs. Ongpin, 141 SCRA 437)
Evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings
As a matter of general rule, quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the strict or technical rules of
evidence governing court proceedings. They are given macro leeway in hearing and considering a variety
of material evidence and the receipt and consideration of incompetent evidence do not constitute a denial
of due process. However, the exemption from strict rules of evidence does not empower a quasi-judicial
body to act arbitrarily.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish the administrative liability
of a respondent is substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Mariano
vs. Roxas, 385 SCRA 500)
Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material matter.
Material matter means a matter the existence or non-existence of which is provable in action
according to substantive law and the pleadings.
Evidence may be said to be relevant when it
relates directly to a fact from which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence
of the fact in issue.
Rules of evidence under EO 292
*The agency may admit evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men. [Book VII,
Section 12 (1), EO 292]
*Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts is the original is not
available, a certified true copy of documents in the official custody of a public officer may be accepted.
[Book VII, Section 12 (2), EO 292]
*Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit
rebuttal evidence. [Book VII, Section 12 (3), EO 292] But disciplinary cases involving students need not
necessarily include the right to cross- examination. (UP Board of Regents vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404)
*The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and generally cognizable technical or
scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to
contest the facts so noticed. [Book VII, Section 12 (4), EO 292]
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint. (Lorena vs. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632 and Sinott vs. Barte, 372 SCRA
282) In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has
regularly performed his duties. (Tan Tac Chiong vs. Cosico, 385 SCRA 509)
The rules of evidence in administrative agencies are more relaxed than in judicial tribunals, in at
least three areas:
1.
Admissibility: Generally, administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of
admissibility.
2.
Judicial Notice: Administrative bodies may take into account not only such evidence as may be
presented by the parties in the determination of the case. They may also make their own inquiry
into facts at issue, and take judicial notice of certain other matters.
3.

Quantum of Evidence: Only substantial evidence is required to support a decision.

The fact that administrative bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure in adjudicating
cases does not mean that basic rules of proving allegation should be entirely dispensed with any decision
based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process. (Aya-ay Sr. vs. Arpaphil
Shipping Corporation, 481 SCRA 282)
Power to issue subpoena
and cite for contempt
Subpoena. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at
the hearing or trial of an action or at any
investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. A subpoena ad
testificandum is used to compel a person to testify, while a subpoena duces tecum is used to compel the
production of books, things or documents therein specified.
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Well settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be
satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) books, documents or other things requested must
appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books
must be reasonably described by the arties to be readily identified (test of definiteness) (Roco vs.
Contreras, 461 SCRA 505)
As a general rule, the power to issue subpoena and cite a person in contempt is not inherent to an
administrative agency and thus depends on a statutory grant. To allow administrative bodies to issue
subpoenas without express legislative authority violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The usual
procedure is for these administrative bodies to apply to a court for an order enforcing an administrative
order or subpoena. EO 292 grants administrative agencies in general the power to issue subpoenas by
requiring the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents. (Book VII, Sec. 13), but only as an
incident of their power to investigate.
The power of an agency to issue a subpoena is not confined solely to quasi-judicial functions as
this will nullify the investigatory function of the agency An administrative subpoena differs from a judicial
subpoena. Its purpose is not to prove a pending charge but to discover evidence on the basis of which a
charge may be filed if the evidence discovered so justifies. A subpoena may be enforced if the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too definite, and the information is reasonably
relevant. (Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99)
Contempt. The power to punish persons for contempt is essentially a judicial power. The power to
punish contempt must be expressly granted to the administrative body; and when so granted may be
exercised only when the administrative body is actually performing quasi-judicial functions. The COMELEC,
SEC and the Insurance Commissioner are granted these powers by special statutory grant. The COMELEC
has the power to cite for contempt,
but this power may be exercised only while the COMELEC is engaged in the performance of quasi-judicial
functions. (Guevara vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269) However, the Commission on Human Rights, an
agency without
quasi-judicial power, in cases of violation of its rules of procedure may cite a person for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. (Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483) Likewise, the authority to conduct
hearings or inquiries and the power to hold any person in contempt may be exercised by another agency
not conferred with quasi-judicial power, the Cooperative Development Authority but limited only in the
performance of its administrative functions. (CDA vs. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative Inc,
382 SCRA 552)
However, a committee of a sanggunian panlungsod cannot issue a subpoena to the chairman and
general manager of an electric cooperative ordering them to testify during the investigation of inefficient
power lines, nor cite them for contempt for their failure to appear. There is no provision in the Constitution
or in the Local Government Code granting local legislative bodies the power to issue subpoena and the
power to cite them for contempt. Such powers cannot be implied from the grant of legislative power.
Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. Since the existence of
the power of contempt in connection with the power to issue subpoena poses a potential derogation of
individual rights. Besides, inquiry upon the efficiency of the service of the electric cooperative is beyond the
jurisdiction of the sanggunian. Such power is within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification
Administration. (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. Vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,
155 SCRA 421)

Purpose. The power to cite for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive
principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment The courts and other tribunals vested
with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judge as persons but for the
functions that they exercise. In this case, the charge of contempt partakes the nature of a criminal offense.
The exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not
lie. (Yasay vs. Recto, 313 SCRA 739)
Form and promulgation of quasi-judicial determination
Form and Content. Every decision of an agency shall be in writing and shall state the facts and the
law on which it is based. (Book VII, Section 14) The mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
requiring courts to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the legal basis of their decisions is equally
applicable to administrative bodies. (Naguiat vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564 and Pilipinas Kao Inc. vs. CA, 372
SCRA 548))
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In order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be
simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with
references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal
assessments and conclusion on the case. (People vs. Baring, GR No. 137933, January 28 2002)
Rationale. This vital requirement is similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or
judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code whose roots may also be traced to the constitutional
mandate. This practice would better enable the courts to make an appropriate consideration of
whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts
and conclusions of law by the tribunal that rendered the decision. (Id.)
Likewise, the requirement is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution, and of fair
play. It is also designed to enable an appellant to pinpoint the possible errors of the tribunal for review by a
higher tribunal. It also gives assurance to the parties that in reaching judgment, the tribunal did so through
the processes of legal reasoning.
The decision shall become final 15 days after receipt of the party unless an administrative appeal
or judicial review is perfected. One motion for reconsideration, which shall suspend the said period, may be
filed. (Book VII, Section 15, EO 292)
Licensing procedure under EO 292
a.
The procedure concerning contested cases shall apply. [Book VII, Section 17(1), EO 292]
b.

Except in cases of willful violation of laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health or
safety require otherwise, no license may be suspended or revoked without notice and hearing.
[Book VII, Section 17(2)]
Thus, the administrative order of the Philippine Ports Authority which provided that all
licenses of harbor pilots shall be for a term of one year only subject to yearly renewal after an
evaluation of performance will unduly restrict the harbor pilots to practice their profession before
their compulsory retirement. Under the order, their appointment ipso facto expire at every year.
Renewal is dependent on evaluation of performance after the license have been cancelled.
Pilotage as a profession is a property right. Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice
their profession, they have to pass five examinations, each followed by training and practice.
Their appointment allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of seventy. This is a
vested right. The pre-evaluation cancellation makes the order unreasonable. It is a deprivation of
property without due process. (Corona vs. UHPAP, 283 SCRA 31)
Administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims, may still
be properly imposed by the POEA despite findings in another case absolving the recruitment
agency from the money claims. The fact that the claims for salary deduction was not raised by
complainants for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or
cancellation of a recruitment agencys license. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA,
on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of
the license of any private placement agency or any of the grounds mentioned therein. (Philsa
International Placement and Service Corp. vs. Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)

c.

Where the license made a timely and sufficient application for renewal, the existing license shall
not expire until the application has been finally determined by the agency. (Book VII, Section 18,
EO 292)

Administrative determinations
where notice and hearing are
NOT necessary for due process
1. Grant of provisional authority for increased rates (only pursuant to quasi-legislative power), or to
engage in a particular line of business;
2. Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of a delinquent taxpayer;
3. Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the Foreign Secretary;
4. Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of persons or property.
5. Summary sequestration of ill-gotten wealth by the PCGG.
6. Preventive suspension of a public officer pending investigation.
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CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Right to Notice
Due process does not require sending of notice of the board meeting to respondent college student
who was ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents. University rules do not require the
attendance in board meeting of individuals whose cases are included in the agenda of the Board. (UP
Board of Regents vs. Telan, 227 SCRA 342)
Right to Notice and Hearing in Labor Cases
The law requires that employers must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written
notices before termination of an employee can be legally effected:
1.
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
is sought; and
2.
the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.
Apart from this, a hearing where the employee can explain his side is also necessary. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing are indispensable for a dismissal to be validly effected. However, when
the dismissal is effected for a just and valid cause, the failure to observe procedural requirements does not
invalidate or nullify the dismissal of an employee. Hence, if the dismissal of an employee is for a just and
valid cause but he is not accorded due process, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be
sanctioned for noncompliance of the requirements of due process (30-day notice requirement). Such
sanction will make him liable for indemnity in the form of nominal damages but not to render his act void
since no reinstatement is required. The measure for damages is the amount of wages (backwages) the
employee should have received were it not for the termination of his employment without prior notice.
(Dayan vs. DBP, 369 SCRA 712, GR No. 140692, Nov. 20 2001 and Lavador vs. J Marketing Corporation,
461 SCRA 497)
The decision of the Labor Arbiter not to schedule the case for another hearing cannot be
considered arbitrary. The holding of a hearing is discretionary with the Labor Arbiter and is something which
the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. It is entirely within the bounds of the Labor Arbiters
authority to decide a case based on mere position papers, affidavits and supporting documents without a
formal trial or hearing. The affidavits of witnesses in such case may take the place of their direct testimony.
The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit
position papers where they are supposed to attach all
documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was
necessary. (Mark Roche International vs. NLRC, GR No. 123825, August 31, 1999) The filing of position
papers and supporting documents fulfills the requirements of due process. (Damasco vs. NLRC, GR No.
115755, December 4, 2000)
Opportunity to be heard
A decision is void for lack of due process, as when a party is deprived of the opportunity of being
heard. A void judgment never acquires finality. (The Summary Dismissal Board vs. Torcito, GR No. 130443,
April 6, 2000)
Right to Formal Investigation

In an administrative disciplinary case against a lawyer where no hearing was conducted pursuant
to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court ordered an administrative case remanded to the
IBP for further proceedings. A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be done
away with except for valid and cogent reasons. (Baldomar vs. Paras, 348 SCRA 212)
The right of petitioner Governor to formal investigation as spelled out in Administrative Order No.
23 was not satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers. Under the order, he
has the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the witnesses
against him and the right to compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary
evidence. (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279)
Likewise, the 1999 Uniform Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Commission guarantees the
right to formal investigation to a respondent employee in the career service. But such right is applicable
only to administrative cases filed with the Civil Service Commission. (Medina vs. COA, 543 SCRA 684)
Right to Assistance of Counsel
The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As
such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of criminal prosecution. The right to
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counsel attaches only upon the start of a custodial investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation
but not to those made in an administrative investigation. (Remolana, vs. CSC, GR No. 137473, August 2,
2001)
In Ledesma vs. CA, 541 SCRA 444, reiterated its ruling in Remolana that counsels participation is
a proceeding similar to that of a courtroom trial is not required it is sufficient that he is allowed to submit in
writing his observation on the investigation.
The Court amplified the above-cited ruling in Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532. Thus the Court
said:
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted
by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that
assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings.
While investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by
such proceedings the assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession
was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.

Right to Cross-examination
An employee, upon being notified of her termination has the right to demand compliance with the
basic requirements of due process, and compliance entails the twin requirements of procedural and
substantial due process. Ample opportunity must afforded the employee to defend herself either personally
and/or with assistance of representative; to know the nature of her offense; and to cross examine and
confront face to face the witnesses against her. (Gonzales vs. NLRC, 313 SCRA169) However, the
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary in nature but it does not include the right to cross
examination. Due process in administrative context does not require trial type proceedings similar to those
in the courts of justice. (UP Board of Regents vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404 and DLSU vs. CA, 541 SCRA 22)
A party cannot argue that she has been deprived of due process merely because no crossexamination took place due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. (Casimiro vs.Tandog, 459 SCRA 624)
Right against self-incrimination

The right against self-incrimination is available in all kinds of proceedings, whether civil, criminal or
administrative or even legislative proceedings. (Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294) Thus, in Standard
Charter Bank (Philippine Branch) vs. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies,
541 SCRA 456, the Court reiterated its ruling in Galman, that the right of the accused against selfincrimination is extended in administrative proceedings that partakes of the nature of or analogous to
criminal proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a
witness, whether a party or not.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
General Rule: Before a party can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to
have exhausted all means of administrative redress afforded to him by law. The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative
step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. (CSC vs. DBM, 464 SCRA 115) Thus, a detainer suit
is premature if it fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, such as compliance with Section 412 of the
Local Government Code on the need for prior barangay conciliation proceedings. (Villadar vs. Zabala,545
SCRA325)
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Applicability. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the

part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. In Regino vs.
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, GR No. 156109, November 18, 2004, the Supreme Court
ruled that the petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the
Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts and not the CHED. Hence, petitioner
could not have commenced her case before the Commission.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. Where the act assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation is issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its
quasi-legislative functions, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. (Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor, 497 SCRA 581)
Rationale. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
separation of powers which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters
coming primarily within the competence of other department. The legal reason is that the courts should not
act and correct its mistakes or errors and amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly.
(Lopez vs. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448) And the practical reason is that the administrative process is
intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solution to disputes. However, only those decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are subject to the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies. (Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PCA, GR No. 110526,
February 10, 1998)
Effect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not affect the jurisdiction of the courts. Noncompliance with the doctrine will deprive the complainant of a cause of action which is a ground for a
motion to dismiss the case. However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is deemed to be a
waiver. (Rosario vs. CA, 211 SCRA 384 and Baguioro vs. Basa, 214 SCRA 437)
Under the Doctrine of Primacy of administrative remedies, an error in the assessment must be
administratively pursued to the exclusion of ordinary courts whose decision would be void for lack of
jurisdiction. (MERALCO vs. Barlis, 317 SCRA 832)
Exceptions to the Doctrine
1.
doctrine of qualified political agency, when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter.
No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a department
head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former. There is greater reason for not
requiring prior resort to the Office of the President in this case since the administrative decision

sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself. (Secretary of Justice vs. Bacal, GR No.
139382, December 6, 2000)
Exception to the exception: where the law expressly provides for exhaustion. Hence, the
failure of the petitioner to appeal the order to the Secretary of Natural Resources to the President
was deemed fatal to the petition. The Supreme Court ruled that even if the respondent was a
Department Secretary, an appeal to the President was proper where the law (Executive
Proclamation No. 238) expressly provided for exhaustion. (Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA
302)
Likewise, in Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666, the Supreme Court ruled that an appeal to
the Office of the President from the Department Secretary pursuant to DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3,
series of 1994 is proper under the doctrine of administrative remedies. The said circular, which
expressly provides for an appeal to the Office of the President, is a valid exercise of the DAR
Secretarys rule-making power to issue internal rules of procedure.
issue involved is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court (Regino vs.
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, GR No. 156109, November 18, 2004)
3.
administrative remedy is fruitless;
4.
where there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency;
5.
administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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2.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction;

where there is irreparable injury, or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is immediately made
in land cases, where the subject matter is a private land, including those acquired by purchase or
resale to individuals;
where law does not make exhaustion a condition precedent to judicial recourse;
where observance of the doctrine will result in nullification of claim;
where there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate court action;
when due process of law is clearly violated;
When, in extreme cases, there is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy available except to seek
judicial protection;
when the issue is rendered moot and academic (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
318 SCRA 144)
when public interest is involved. (Indiana Aeronautics University vs. CHED, 356 SCRA 367)

Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort

The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies when a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of technical issues which, under
a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of the issues to the administrative body for
resolution.
In other words, primary jurisdiction means that judicial action of a case is deferred pending the
determination of some issues which properly belong to an administrative body because their expertise,
specialized skills, knowledge and resources are required for the resolution of factual and non-legal
matters. In such a case, relief must first be sought and obtained in the administrative body concerned
before the remedy will be supplied by the Court. Where a statute lodges exclusive original jurisdiction in an
administrative agency, the courts will refuse to take up a case unless the agency has finally completed its
proceedings. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426)
Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (Mita Pardo de Tavera vs. Philippine
Tuberculosis society Inc. 243 SCRA 112 cited in Paloma vs. Moral, 470 SCRA 711)
Where jurisdiction has been correctly assumed by the Director of Lands over the parties conflicting
claims, the case should, in accordance with law, remain there for final adjudication. While title issued on
the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an
investigation conducted by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of
such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order

that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government. The courts cannot and will not
resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the special knowledge, expertise and services of the tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sto. Nino
Residents Association, 461 SCRA 517)
The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Roxas & Co.
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106 and Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. Court of Appeals, 342
SCRA)
Effect of Failure to Avail of the Doctrine. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not call for the immediate dismissal of the case pending before the court. The case is merely suspended
until the issues resolvable by the administrative body are threshed out and fully determined. (Industrial
Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426)
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction administrative remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not
been resolved with finality. Thus, complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages
filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the quasijudicial power of the Housing Land Use Regulatory Board. (Larucom vs. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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The DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION postulates that no resort to courts

will be allowed unless administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in
administrative structure. (Sta. Rosa Mining vs. Leido, 156 SCRA 1) Because the petitioner did not
take an appeal from the order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, but went directly to court, it was held that the court action was made prematurely
and the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (SSS Employees Association vs. BathaVelasco, GR No. 108765, August 27, 1999)
An administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. The power of judicial review may therefore be
exercised only if an appeal is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive
branch of the government. Hence, an appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the
Department Secretary in an administrative case is the last step that an aggrieved party should take in the
administrative hierarchy, as it is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. (Valencia
vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666)
A party seeking an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly
and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to court action. (CIR vs. Acosta, 529 SCRA 177)
Administrative appeal and review
Pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party litigant can seek
judicial intervention, he must exhaust all means of administrative redress available under the law, subject to
the exceptions provided for by law or jurisprudence.
Nature of the Right to Appeal. Right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right- it is a
statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute.
(Dela Cruz vs. Ramiscal, 450 SCRA 449). Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative
determination may be made to a higher or superior administrative officer or body.
By virtue of the power of control of the President over all executive department, the President, by
himself or through the Department Secretaries (pursuant to the alter ego doctrine), may affirm, modify,
alter, or reverse the administrative decision of subordinate officials and employees. Unless otherwise
provided by law, an appeal from a decision of an agency may be taken to the Department Head (Book VII,
Sec. 20, EO 292) The President has the power to review decisions of department heads pursuant to the
Presidents power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. (Land Car, Inc. vs.
Bachelor Express, 417 SCRA 307)

Reglementary Period and General Administrative Appeal Procedure. shall be perfected within
fifteen days after receipt of the copy of the decision by filing with the agency a notice of appeal, serving
copies of it upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency, and paying the required fees. If motion for
reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal within the remainder of the period for appeal.
If the decision is reconsidered, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen days from receipt of the reversal within
which to appeal. [Book VII, Sec. 20 (2), EO 292]
The appellate agency shall review the records and may on its own initiative receive additional
evidence (Book VII, Sec. 22, EO 292). The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional
hearings in the appealed case, if deemed necessary. But just like in the appellate courts, appellate
administrative bodies may only pass upon errors assigned. (Diamonon vs. DOLE, GR No. 108951, March
7, 2000)
Effect of Pendency of Appeal; Finality of Decision. Appeal shall stay the decision appealed from
unless the law otherwise provides or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal. (Book VII,
Sec. 21, EO 292) The decision of an administrative agency shall become final fifteen days after receipt of a
copy of the parties. (Book VII, Sec. 23, EO 292)
Denial of Substantive Due Process. But a cabinet secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reviewing his decisions as Director of the Bureau of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer may not be a farce, the reviewing officer must be other than the one whose decision is
under review. Being human, he would not admit he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Petitioners
were deprived of due process when the Secretary reviewed his own decision. (Zambales Chromite Mining
Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261)
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Failure to Observe Proper Appeal Procedure. A direct resort to the Supreme Court questioning the
Arbiters refusal to issue writ of execution is improper and premature. The 1996 Rules of Procedure of the
HLURB provides that the decision of the Arbiter is reviewable by the Board of Commission. In
turn, any party may appeal the Board of Commissioners decision to the Office of the President. From the
decision of the Office of the President, the aggrieved party can resort to the Court of Appeals. (Atty. Cole
vs. CA, GR No. 137551, December 26, 2000) The decisions of the HLURB are appealable to the Office of
the President within 15 calendar days from receipt thereof. (SGMC Realty Corp. vs. Office of the President,
GR No. 126999, August 30, 2000) However, in Maxima Realty Management and Development Corp. vs.
Parkway Real Estate Development Corp, 422 SCRA 572, the Supreme Court ruled that the period within
which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB to the Office of the President,
must be made pursuant to Section 15 of PD 957 and PD 1344. Special laws providing for the remedy of
appeal to the Office of the President must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure.
Appeals from the decisions of the NAPOLCOM should be lodged first with the DILG and then with
the CSC. An appeal is not a natural but a statutory right, and one who seeks to avail oneself of it must
comply with the statute or the rule in effect when the right arose. (Miralles vs. Go, 349 SCRA 596) Failing to
do so, the right to appeal is lost. However, under exceptional circumstances delay in the filing of appeal
may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. Where a rigid application of the rule will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case.
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Since
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice
must always be avoided. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. (Tan Tac Chiong vs. Cosico, 385 SCRA 509)
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
When made:
1.
to determine constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order or regulation;
2.
to determine jurisdiction of any administrative board, commission or officer;
3.
to determine any other questions of law; and
4.
to determine questions of facts when necessary to determine either:
a.
b.

constitutional or jurisdictional issue;

commission of abuse of authority; and

c.

when administrative fact finding body is duly restricted by an error of law.

Requisites of judicial review of administrative action

1.
Administrative remedies must have been exhausted or the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
2.
Administrative action must have been completed or the principle of finality of administrative action.
Lacking the essential attribute of a decision, the acts in question were at best interlocutory
orders that did not attain finality nor acquire the effects of a final judgment despite the lapse of the
statutory period of appeal. (Pilipinas Kao vs. CA, 372 SCRA 548)
Availability of judicial review
The general rule is that a party pained by a decision of an appellate administrative body may
elevate his case to the proper judicial forum for redress, unless the Constitution or the law withholds from
him such rights.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly empowers the Judiciary, under the expanded scope of judicial
review, to take cognizance of actual controversies brought before it involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Phil. Const.)
Rationale. Since an administrative agency has a narrower view of the case, and its existence
derogates the judicial prerogative lodged in the courts by the Constitution, judicial review is needed to offset
these considerations.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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The Administrative Code expressly provides that decisions of administrative agencies shall be
subject to judicial review. [Book VII, Sec. (25)]
Courts have the power to scrutinize the acts of administrative agencies even though no right of
review is given by statute. Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion,
error of law, fraud or collusion. (Dabuet vs. Roche Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 149 SCRA 386)
Decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still
subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law. (De Jesus vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 536 SCRA 547)
Any agreement stipulating that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable and
that no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or in any part of the arbitrators
award may be availed of can be held to preclude in proper cases the power of judicial review which is
inherent in courts. (ABS CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. World Interactive Network System (WINS) Japan Co.
& Ltd., 544 SCRA 308)
Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional question. (Sanlakas vs.
Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 565)
Generally, only the proper party whose legal rights have been adversely affected by and who
stands to suffer a legal injury or wrong from the administrative action has standing to seek judicial
intervention. The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure, hence can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, or of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interests. Hence, the rule on
standing has been broadened to allow the following:
a.

Taxpayers standing
A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. (Francisco vs. Fernando, GR 166501,
November 16, 2006)

A taxpayers suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise of the spending or
taxing power of Congress. A taxpayers suit is generally allowed to restrain the government from
spending public funds in the following cases:
(1)
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed;
(2)
or that public money is being deflected to any improper or illegal ,or improvident or
misapplication of funds; or
(3)
there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Makalintal vs. COMELEC, 405 SCRA 614)
But a taxpayers suit is not allowed to compel the spending of public funds. Also, a
taxpayers suit presupposes that the person has faithfully paid his taxes.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or
Constitution. Thus, a taxpayers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, GR. No. 140835, August 14,
2000 and AIWA vs. Romulo, 449 SCRA 1)
b.

Legislators standing
Legislators have legal standing to sue to question the validity of any official action or law
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in his office. Likewise a Senator possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the petitions are directed. (Guingona vs.
PCGG, 207, SCRA 659; Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141; Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na
mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. 415 SCRA 44)
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To extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act
of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such case, any member
of Congress can have a resort to the courts. (Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 565)
c.

Concerned citizens standing

A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) favorable action will
likely redress the injury. (Francisco vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173)
Concerned citizens have legal standing if the constitutional issue raised is of
transcendental importance needing its early resolution. Transcendental importance are those
matters addressed to situations or issues which critically affect the life of the people and the nation
as a whole creating a scenario where a general situation of uncertainty, pregnant with grave
dangers, is developing into confusion and chaos with severe harm to the nation or creates
crippling effects on the life of the people. The transcendental importance exception to the
standing requirement must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition. (Ibid.)
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive
determinants formulated by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
(1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
(2)
the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3)
the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised. (Francisco, Jr. supra)
Jurisdiction
General Rule: It is the Court of Appeals that is conferred with the power of judicial review over the
decisions of administrative agencies. except COMELEC, COA, Ombudsman in criminal cases in which
case the Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction.

BP 129 provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise xxx exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution.
Likewise, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Court of Appeals shall
have appellate jurisdiction over awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency
in the exercise of its quasi- judicial function.
Thus, if a party disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should elevate the
matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latters exercise of judicial review, pursuant
to Sec. 9(3) of BP 129. (Sanado vs. CA, 356 SCRA 546 and Serondo vs. CA, 375 SCRA 167)
As with other administrative agencies discharging quasi-judicial functions, recourse must first be
had through the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the orders,
resolutions or decisions of the following: (1) the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) (Republic vs. Damayan ng Purok 14, INC., GR No. 143135, April 4, 2003), (2) the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration (Agus Dwikarma vs. Domingo, GR No. 153454, July 7, 2004),
(3) voluntary arbitrators (Silver Trading Co. vs. Semana, GR No. 152456, April 28, 2004), (4) National Labor
Relations Commission (St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494), (5) Secretary of Labor
(National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma, 304 SCRA 407), (6) Director of Bureau of Labor Relations
(Abbot Laboratories Phil. Vs. Abbot Laboratories Employees Union) and (7) DOJ Secretary in petitions for
review (Public Utilities Department, Olongapo City vs.Guingona, 365 SCRA 467)
Exceptions: The Supreme Court, however, exercises appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions or orders of the COMELEC, Commission on Audit and Ombudsman in criminal
cases in accordance with the Constitution. (Garcia-Rueda vs. Pascasio, 278 SCRA 769)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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However, under EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 , and under RA 6770, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 both of which granted the right to appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions
and final orders of the Board of Investment and the Ombudsman in administrative cases, respectively, were
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as it expanded the Supreme Courts jurisdiction without its
advice and concurrence. (Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998.)
Rationale. The provision of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution is intended to give the Supreme
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby
undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.
Under RA 9282, the Court of Tax Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction over the decisions or
ruling of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Customs Commissioner, BIR, and the Secretaries of
the DOF, DA and DTI.
Nevertheless, in cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be
filed in the Supreme Court to set aside the Ombudsman order or resolution. (Mendoza-Arce vs.
Ombudsman, GR No. 149148, April 5, 2002)
Decisions of the three Constitutional Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Sec. 7, Art. IX,
Philippine Constitution.) But Rule 43 of Rules on Civil Procedure provides that final resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission shall be appealable by certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
As a general rule, an administrative order of the COMELEC is not a proper subject of a special civil
action for certiorari. But when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing such order, the aggrieved party may seek
redress from the Supreme Court via special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(Macabago vs. COMELEC, 392 SCRA 178)
Extent of judicial review
The enabling law determines whether the judicial review of the decision of an administrative
agency covers only questions of law, or whether it also covers questions of facts or mixed questions of law
and facts. The Administrative Code provides that review shall be made on the basis of the record. Findings

of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically
otherwise provided by law. [Book VII, Sec. 25 97)]
In the case of the Constitutional Commissions, only questions of law are reviewable by the
Supreme Court. The same is true with the decisions of the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, the
provisions of the Social Security Act and the Patent Law expressly allow a review of facts of its decision.
The safe rule is to refer to the relevant provisions of the enabling law to avail of appeal. But note
that certiorari under Rule 65 is always available.
1.
Questions of Law
All errors or decisions involving questions of law are always subject to judicial review. Sec
5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases in which only an error or question of law
is involved. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on certain state of
facts while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. (Suarez vs. Villarama, 493 SCRA 74)
2.

Factual Decisions
An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation. (Citibank, N.A. vs.
Jimenez, 540 SCRA 573)
Findings of facts of administrative bodies are, as a rule, not subject to judicial review. In a
long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently laid down the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies are to be accorded not only utmost respect but even finality by the courts
because of the special knowledge and expertise, as long as such decisions are confined to matters
within their respective jurisdiction and are supported by substantial evidence. (International
Container Service, Inc. vs. NLRC, 256 SCRA 124, Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Bumolo, 348
SCRA 656 and Calvo vs. Vergara, 372 SCRA 650)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.

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However, there are exceptions to the rule. Judicial power asserts itself whenever the:
decision is not supported by substantial evidence;
findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
procedure which led to the findings is irregular;
palpable or serious errors have been committed by the administrative body;
The interpretation of an administrative agency, which is tasked to implement the
statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.
However, courts will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation when it is clearly
erroneous. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bicolandia Drug Corporation,496 SCRA
176)
when grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest; or
Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a
determination of whether it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (De Guzman vs.Perez, 496 SCRA 474)
law explicitly authorizes review of factual matters.

3.

Mixed Questions of Facts and Law

Apply the Brandies Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts. This doctrine posits the rule that
when a finding of fact is so intimately involved and dependent upon the question of law, the Court
will, in order to resolve the question of law, examine the factual setting including the evidence
adduced thereto.
Differently stated, the more important issue which is the law,
assimilates the facts. Thus, both questions of facts and of law, are subject to judicial review.

4.

Questions of Discretion
Discretion vested in administrative agencies should not be disturbed by the reviewing court
because of the formers expertise, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The discretion could be in the area of granting licenses and franchises,
deciding what aliens are to be allowed entry, or what evidence to consider vital in the resolution of
a case.

Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies an action of an administrative agency may be set aside
by the judicial department only if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. (Hydro Resources
Contractors Corporation vs. NIA, 441 SCRA 614)
Res Judicata
Res Judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment, and lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
(Khemani vs. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, 540 SCRA 83)
Thus, the rule of res judicata forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent
authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction. The principle of res judicata is also available in
administrative proceedings, the laudable purpose of which is to put final rest a decision which has become
final and executory. (Nasipit Lumber vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93) These decisions and orders are as
conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction. (Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673)
Applicability. The Doctrine of Res Judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings not
to the exercise of administrative powers. (Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 and Hilado vs.
Reyes, 496 SCRA 282))
Exception. However, the doctrine does not ordinarily apply in administrative adjudication relative to
questions of citizenship except when: (a) a persons citizenship is resolved by a court or
administrative body as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing; (b) with the active
participation of the Solicitor General or his representative; and (c) the finding of his citizenship is affirmed
by the Supreme Court. (Board of Commissioners, CID vs. dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853)
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