APOE

DIGEST POOL

MANEZ [PAGE 4. “2. Inherent or Implied Powers”]

Masangcay v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-13827, 28 September 1962.

(okay na, wala talaga comment yung
respondents. Hehe - Lissa)
FACTS: On October 24, 1957, Benjamin Masangacay—then provincial
treasurer of Aklan designated to take charge of the receipt and custody of the
official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution,
among the different municipalities of the province—with several
others, was charged before the COMELEC with contempt for having opened
three boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities
of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said
Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on September 2,
1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated March 5,1957, inasmuch as
he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools of Aklan, the province auditor, and the authorized representatives of
the alista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens’ Party, as required,
which are punishable under Sec. 5 of the Revised Election Code and
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Masangcay brought the

present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Sec. 5
of the Revised Election Code which grants the COMELEC as well as its
members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the
same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in
that the portion of said section which grants the Commission and members the power to
punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the
separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of
government.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt

RULING: No. COMELEC lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to
petitioner in the decision subject of review. When the Commission exercises a ministerial
function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is
inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice.

Under the law and the constitution, the COMELEC has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of the elections. But also the power to try, hear
and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. The
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its
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jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE: An administrative agency has no inherent powers,

although implied powers may sometimes be sabolpoken of as
“inherent.” Thus, in the absence of any provision to punish for contempt
which has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute
of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably
limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the
exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid.

PRUDENCIADO Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, 17 April 2018.

DOCTRINE: Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative

issuance is ultra vires.

FACTS: DOJ Secretary Bello III issued DOJ Circu/lar No. 17, prescribing
rules and regulations governing the issuance of Hold Departure Orders
(HDO). The said issuance was intended to restrain the indiscriminate
issuance of HDOs which impinge on the people's right to travel. Former DOJ
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez issued DOJ Circular No. 18, prescribing rules
and regulations governing the issuance and implementation of
watchlist orders against persons with criminal cases pending preliminary
investigation or petition for review before the DOJ.

Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular
No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18. Criminal complaints were filed against
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo before the DOJ. Following the filing of criminal
complaints, De Lima issued a watch list order against GMA and Miguel Arroyo. GMA requested
for the issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so that she may be
able to seek medical attention from medical specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and
metabolic bone mineral disorder. GMA filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, to annul and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and Watch List order issued
against her for allegedly being unconstitutional. Court likewise resolved to issue a TRO in the
consolidated petitions, enjoining the respondents from enforcing or implementing DOJ Circular
No. 41 and Watch List Orders. Petitioner GMA opined that DOI Circular No. 41 was validly
issued pursuant to the agency's rule-making powers.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: There is no law particularly providing for the authority

of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health.

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RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: DOJ Circular 41 was validly

issued pursuant to the agency’s rulemaking powers provided in
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the “Administrative
Code of 1987.” The DOJ stresses the necessity of the restraint imposed in
DOJ Circular No. 41 in that to allow the petitioners, who are under
preliminary investigation, to exercise an untrammelled right
to travel, especially when the risk of flight is distinctly high will
surely impede the efficient and effective operation of the justice
system.The absence of the petitioners, it asseverates, would mean that the
farthest criminal proceeding they could go would be the filing of the
criminal information since they cannot be arraigned
in absentia.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ has the power to issue a Hold Departure
Order

RULING: NO. the Court is in quandary of identifying the authority from

which the DOJ believed its power to restrain the right to travel emanates.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rulemaking powers,
among others. It is the “power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.” In the exercise of this power, the rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency.
It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with
the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. It is,
however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there
must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if
there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the executive department to
adopt rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not the DOJ’s business.
As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in
itself, conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its
own, the DOJ cannot make rules, its authority being confined to execution of laws. This is the
import of the terms “when expressly provided by law” or “as may be provided by law” stated in
Sections 7(4) and 7(9), Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of E.O. 292. The DOJ is confined to filling
in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect the law as enacted.

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Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an administrative

issuance is ultra vires. Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an
enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its life.
Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied upon by the
DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The DOJ
miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling law that will
justify the issuance of the questioned circular.
BARACHINA Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, 3
August 2006

DOCTRINE: In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a

rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however,
applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

FACTS: A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A.

No. 9207, authorized the creation and development of what is now known as
the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President
Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of
land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares
as a national government site to be known as the NGC.

On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding
150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and
authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide
residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel
Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development
of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become
beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program.

On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the
West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-
petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents
from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,

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otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and

Land Utilization Act of 2003."

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded
to qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in
harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot
allocation to qualified
beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona
Gde
residents without limitation to the area . The argument is utterly baseless.

Court Ruling 1st contention: The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the

NGC may be classified into two groups, namely, the urban poor or the
bona Gde residents within the NGC site and certain government
institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207
mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for
disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by which this area may
be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on
the other hand, governs the lot disposition to government
institutions.

Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1 ) of the IRR Gxes the
selling rate of a
lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price.
They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1 ) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a
contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision
plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty
imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed
provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The
argument deserves scant consideration.

Court Ruling 2nd contention: Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated
or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict
the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement
a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. The Committee's
authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of
administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which
the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just.

Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a
procedural Naw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by several
representatives of people's organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A. No.
9207 that only two representatives from duly recognized peoples' organizations must
compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner
association is not a duly recognized people's organization.

Court’s Ruling 3rd Contention: In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule
or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed

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complied with. That there is observance of more than the minimum

requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is
not a ground to invalidate the same. aDSIH c

ISSUE: Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function
and should be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious
and whimsical.

HELD: Administrative agencies possess quasi- legislative or rule-

making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of non- delegability and
separability of powers.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by

an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only
where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi- legislative power of
the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests
mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is
invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to
implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by
the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its
validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not
give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
RIVAZ Republic v. Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 190837, 5 March 2014.

DOCTRINE: Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers

only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so
promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion

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as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the
execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to
conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power

FACTS: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as

the “Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act” primarily in order to establish safety or
efficacy standards and quality measure of foods, drugs and devices and
cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health,
thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled
Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical
products. Among others, it required drug manufacturers to
register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before they may
release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory
bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to
secure a CPR for these products. However, the implementation of the
BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local
facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of
1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the
country. Thereafter, the FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided
additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing
requirement on drug products.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
FDA contends that it has the authority to issue Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 as it
is the agency mandated by law to administer and enforce laws, including rules and
regulations issued by the DOH, that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical
products.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Respondents maintain that under RA 3720, the power to make rules to implement
the law is lodged with the Secretary of Health, not with the FDA. They also argue
that the assailed circulars are void for lack of prior hearing, consultation, and
publication.

ISSUE: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.

HELD: Yes.
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by
Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on
prior notice, hearing, and publication in order to be valid and binding, except when the same is
merely an interpretative rule. This is because when an administrative rule is merely interpretative
in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.

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A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is

actually the rule that originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as
a component of applications for the issuance of CPR covering certain
pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an administrative
regulation – a legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health
in consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to
implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be
registered with the FDA prior to their manufacture and sale. Considering that
neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the court deems that AO
67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice and publication
pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded to the govt in the exercise
of its official duties.

On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered

as administrative regulations because they do not: a.) implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or
explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA operates and/or; c.)
Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement
of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to
administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s.
of 1989 including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement consistent
with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to
issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights
of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking,
administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation and publication are
needed for their validity.
OCENAR Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, G.R. No. 101279, 6 August 1992

DOCTRINE (1): The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative

bodies is not unconstitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of modern society.

DOCTRINE (2): Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is
to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

FACTS: The DOLE Sec. issued DO No. 16 to temporarily suspend the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong in order to establish
mechanisms that will enhance their protection. The POEA issued circulars pursuant to the DO,
vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying
such workers.

PASEI, a private employment and recruitment agency engaged in the business of obtaining
overseas employment for Filipino workers, including domestic helpers, filed a petition for the
annulment of the DOLE and POEA circulars.

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PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS: Respondents acted with grave abuse of

discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing the
circulars; that they were unconstitutional, unreasonable, unfair
and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing
with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied
with.

ISSUE: WON the DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, unreasonable, unfair and oppressive?

RULING: No. The Court held that the vesture of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. It is
necessitated by the growing complexities of modern society. More and
more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of
society’s ramified activities. “Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more
expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the
courts of justice.”

In this case, the circulars issued merely restricted the scope or area of the
agency’s business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong until after the establishment
of the ‘mechanisms’ that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for HK, it may still deploy other
classes of Filipino workers either for HK and other countries and all other
classes of Filipino workers for other countries. The administrative
issuances intended to curtail the rampant violations in the recruitment and
deployment of domestic helpers to HK. Thus, they are reasonable, valid and
justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the
recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.

However, although acted with authority, the circulars were still invalid and unenforceable due to
lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Registrar as required in Art. 2
of the Civil Code, Art. 5 of the Labor Code, and the Administrative Code, which provide that
rules and regulations of government agencies allowed to promulgate the necessary IRRs shall
become effective fifteen days after completing publication in the Official Gazette or newspapers
of general circulation, unless the otherwise is provided. The SC reiterated its rule in Tanada:
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
PERALTA Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 118712, 6 October 1995.

DOCTRINE: The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature
of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did
not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation
before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

FACTS: Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform

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(DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
(G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals,
granting private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were
ordered consolidated. Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the
Resolution, denying their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were

acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP with respect to the
valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with the Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990
was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it
permits the opening of trust accounts by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in
cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the
compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as
provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail
the fact that the DAR and the LBP merely "earmarked",
"deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of
the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. The
respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private
respondents. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same,
hence, the instant petitions.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioner contended that Admin Order No. 9 is

a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9

(1990) was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting excess in
jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank,
in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the
DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP bonds.

HELD: In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules
and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the

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opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for

his property because Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit that
should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is
allowed.
ALCALA Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998.

Doctrine: An administrative order shall be in harmony with the law and shall
only be for the sole purpose of implementing an existing law to carry
out its legislative policy. Although administrative regulations are entitled
to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws.

Facts: Senator Blas Ople filed a petition praying for the invalidation of
Administrative Order No. 308, otherwise known as the “Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System.” The order
was issued for convenience and efficiency on transactions involving
basic services with various government agencies. Senator Ople contends
that AO 308 is not just a mere administrative order but a law and is beyond
the power of the President.

Issue: Whether the issuance of AO 308 is within the power of the President

Ruling: No. There is a distinction between the lawmaking powers of

the Congress and the President. The President has the authority to assume the
functions of the bureaus and offices it has control over. The bureaus and offices have
administrative power that is concerned with the application and enforcement of policies and
orders according to their field of scope. An administrative order is an act of the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. The said order shall be
in harmony with the law and shall only be for the sole purpose of implementing an existing law
to carry out its legislative policy.

Respondents contend that the said order implements the legislative policy of the Administrative
Code of 1987. However, the said Code is merely a general law that incorporates the major
structural, functional, and procedural principles of governance. The said order does not
implement the Code. The respondents also contend that AO 308 is not a law because it confers
no right and imposes no duty. However, not having the said ID will make it difficult for people
to exercise their rights and enjoy their privileges. Hence, AO 308 shall be declared null and void.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and

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regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.

MENDENILLA Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 116356, 29 June
1998.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: EO 1088 is unconstitutional,

because (1) its interpretation and application are left to private respondent,
a private person, and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of powers.
Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and
on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA, the
administrative body vested under PD 857 with the power to regulate and
prescribe pilotage fees.

RESPONDENT COURT’S CONTENTION: Petitioner failed to

show any proof to support its position that EO 1088 is unconstitutional.

Facts: On September 25, 1989, plaintiff [herein private respondent]

elevated a complaint against defendant [herein petitioner] for sum of
money and attorney's fees alleging that plaintiff had rendered pilotage
services to defendant between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with
total unpaid fees of P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, defendant
failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed to pay.

On November 18, 1989 defendant answered vigorously disputing

the claims of plaintiff. It assailed the constitutionality of the Executive
Order 1088 upon which plaintiff bases its claims; alleged that there is a pending case before
the Court of Appeals elevated by the United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines of
which plaintiff is a member[;] whereas defendant is a member of the Chamber of Maritime
Industries of the Philippine[s] which is an Intervenor in CA-G.R. SP No. 18072; that there
therefore is lis pendens that Executive Order No. 1088 is an unwarranted repeal or
modification of the Philippine Ports Authority Charter. At the Pre-Trial Conference, the only
issue raised by plaintiff is whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the money
claims alleged in the complaint.

After due trial, the trial court rendered its ruling. The factual antecedents of the controversy
are simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars because
EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Respondent Court pointed out that
petitioner, during the pre-trial, limited the issues to whether: (1) EO C88 is unconstitutional;
(2) EO 1088 is illegal; (3) private respondent itself may enforce and collect fees under EO
1088; and (4) petitioner is liable and, if EO 1088 is legal, to what extent. It then affirmed the
factual findings and conclusion of the trial court that petitioner "fail[ed] to show any proof"
to support its position. Parenthetically, Respondent Court also noted two other cases decided
by the Court of Appeals, upholding the constitutionality of EO 1088.

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Issue: Whether Executive Order 1088 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: EO 1088 Is Valid.

In assailing the constitutionality of EO 1088, the petitioner repeatedly

asks: "Is the private respondent vested with power to interpret Executive
Order No. 1088? The Court is not persuaded. In Philippine
Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court, through, upheld the validity and constitutionality of
Executive Order 1088 in no uncertain terms. We aptly iterate our
pronouncement in said case.

What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative

issuance is not its form but its nature. Here as we have already said,
the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including pilotage
service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.

It is worthy to note that E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage
service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose,
prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is
because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates.
Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service
charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for
foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. We conclude that
E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to
comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may
not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.

"Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be

valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As
stated by this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
"the conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute.
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department
if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law. It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not.
Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA
circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

Based on the foregoing, petitioner has no legal basis to refuse payment of pilotage fees to
private respondent, as computed according to the rates set by EO 1088. Private respondent
cannot be faulted for relying on the clear and unmistakable provisions of EO 1088. In fact,
EO 1088 leaves no room for interpretation.

BAQUIRAN [PAGE 5]

Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 114714, 21 April 1995.

FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated

association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning
agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-

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owner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the

Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 05 which increases the compensation and benefits of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract to Seafarers specifically death benefits will now
equivalent to $50,000 and an additional $7,000 for each child under 21
but not exceeding four children. Petitioners contend that POEA does not
have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death
and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-
going vessels; and only Congress can.

ISSUE: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of

legislative power.
Petitioner:
1. The POEA does not have the Authority to fix and promulgate rates
affecting death and workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels
2. Even granting such, violated the standards for its exercise
3. The resolution and memorandum are unconstitutional
because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligations of contracts clauses of the Constitution
4. The resolution and the memorandum circular arenot, valid acts of
the Governing Board because the private sector representative
mandated by law has not been appointed by the President since the
creation of the POEA
Respondent:
1. The issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a valid
exercise of the POEA’s rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation
which has already been discussed in Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
2. The “non-appointment” of the 3rd member of the Governing BOard bees not
necessarily invalidate the acts of the Board, for it has been functioning under the
advisement of the Tripartite Technical Working Group which is incidentally
constituted by the private sector
3. THe consensus on the increase in the rates of compensation and other benefits was
arrived at after appropriate consultations with the shipowners and the private sector;
the Board therefore soundly exercised its discretion.

RULING: YES. Under Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, The State shall afford
full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on impermissible

13
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delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the

public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA. The governing Board of the Administration
(POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration(POEA). To many of the problems attendant upon
present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. While the
making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable,
if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law
into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. That the
challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further
amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the
sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices"
prescribed in E.O. No.797 can no longer be disputed.

MENDOZA Osmena v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, 31 March 1993

FACTS: On October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956
creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil
companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products
resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world
market prices of crude oil.

Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in

virtue of E.O 1024,7 and ordered released from the National Treasury to the
Ministry of Energy. The same Executive Order also authorized the investment
of the fund in government securities, with the earnings from such placements
accruing to the fund.

President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated

Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for

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reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under

recovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices
of petroleum products, the amount of the under recovery
being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

The petitioner seeks the corrective, prohibitive and

coercive remedies provided by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
upon the following posited grounds, viz.:

1) the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of

account of the Ministry of Energy (now, the Office of Energy
Affairs), created pursuant to § 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No.
1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being
contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the . . Constitution;4

2) the unconstitutionality of § 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No.

1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137, for "being an
undue and invalid delegation of legislative power . . to the
5
Energy Regulatory Board;"

3) the illegality of the reimbursements to oil companies, paid

out of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund, because it
contravenes, paragraph 2 (2) of P. D. 1956, as amended; and

4) the consequent nullity of the Order dated December 10, 1990 and the
necessity of a rollback of the pump prices and petroleum products to the levels
prevailing prior to the said Order.

· The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to ** P.D.

1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust
account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific
purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall be treated as a special fund' to
be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another
government objective."

· Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of
monies, collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to

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the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special

purpose/objective for which it was created."

· He also contends that the "delegation of

legislative authority" to the ERB violates § 28 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution and, inasmuch as the delegation relates
to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits, limitations
and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not
only specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is
for, but also impose a specific limit on how much to tax."

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:
· Now, the petition alleges that the status of the
OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a "Terminal Fund
Balance deficit" of some P12.877 billion;8 that to abate the
worsening deficit, "the Energy Regulatory Board . . issued an
Order on December 10, 1990, approving the increase in pump
prices of petroleum products," and at the rate of recoupment, the
OPSF deficit should have been fully covered in a span of six (6)
months, but this notwithstanding, the respondents —
Oscar Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Jesus
Estanislao, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance;
Wenceslao de la Paz, in his capacity as Head of the Office
of Energy Affairs; Chairman Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy Regulatory
Board — "are poised to accept, process and pay claims not authorized under
P.D. 1956."

The petition further avers that the creation of the trust fund violates § 29(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated
as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which
a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

COURTS CONTENTIONS:

The Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be
no ground upon which to sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law

16
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sets forth a determinable standard which guides the exercise

of the power granted to the ERB. By the same token, the proper
exercise of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It seems
obvious that what the law intended was to permit the additional
imposts for as long as there exists a need to protect the general
public and the petroleum industry from the adverse
consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where the
standards set up for the guidance of an administrative
officer and the action taken are in fact recorded in the
orders of such officer, so that Congress, the courts and the
public are assured that the orders in the judgment of such
officer conform to the legislative standard, there is no failure
in the performance of the legislative functions."

This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the

validity of the legislation; the express purpose for which
the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and
purposes of the fund are readily discernible, and they
constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of
power may be justified.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the PD 1956 partakes the nature of the

taxation power of the State?

(2) Whether or not there is an invalid delegation of legislative power under PD

1956, hence, unconstitutional?

HELD:

(1) No. while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted
in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a
special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers
to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the
scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures
comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the

17
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practice is not without precedent.

(2) No. For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the

law delegating the power must be (1) complete in itself,
that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the
delegate and (2) it must fix a standard— limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate
must conform.

The proper exercise of the delegated power may be tested with

ease. It seems obvious that what the law intended was to
permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a
need to protect the general public and the petroleum industry
from the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations.

This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the

validity of the legislation; the express purpose for which
the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and
purposes of the fund are readily discernible, and they
constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of
power may be justified.

DOCTRINE: "Where the standards set up for the guidance of an

administrative officer and the action taken are in fact
recorded in the orders of such officer, so that Congress, the courts and the
public are assured that the orders in the judgment of such officer conform to
the legislative standard, there is no failure in the performance of the legislative
functions."

GATZ Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Garcia, G.R. No. 115381, 23 December 1994.

FACTS: On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of Transportation

and Communications Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the
LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption of rules and procedures to implement above-
quoted Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down deregulation and other liberalization
policies for the transport sector. Attached to the said memorandum was a revised draft of the
required rules and procedures covering (i) Entry Into and Exit Out of the Industry and (ii) Rate
and Fare Setting, with comments and suggestions from the World Bank incorporated therein.

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Likewise, resplendent from the said memorandum is the statement of the

DOTC Secretary that the adoption of the rules and procedures is a pre-
requisite to the approval of the Economic Integration Loan from the World
Bank.5

On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular

No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of
DOTC Department Order No. 92-587.

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the

deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect
plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having
filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said
increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB
opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares.

On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not DO. 92-587 is valid.

Ruling: No. Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in

order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental
regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even
in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters
as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is
entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body
and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in"
the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to provide. However,
nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB
alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public
service.

In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a
fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to
an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has
been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through

19
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the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the

intervening mind of another.10 A further delegation of such power would
indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the
delegate mandated to discharge it directly.11 The policy of allowing the
provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would
result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This
would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may
increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever
it pleases them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so.

ROJAS Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, 31 July 1987

Doctrine: The general principle of non- delegation of

legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the
more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of
powers among the three great departments of government,
must be applied with circumspection in respect of
statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects
as obviously complex and technical as medical education
and the practice of medicine in our present day world.

Facts: Tablarin et.al, sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine

for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did
not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by
the Board of Medical Education.
Tablarin et.al, filed with the RTC, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. Tablarin et.al. sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking
the NMAT and from administering the NMAT. The trial court denied said petition.
In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by
the delegate, the Board of Medical Education.

Petitioner’s Contention: petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative

20
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power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be

followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical
Education.
Respondent’s Contention: The State is not really
enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education
"accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to
enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements." cralaw v

ir

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional principle

of violation of undue delegation of legislative power by Sec. 5 (a) and (f) of
RA 2382?

Ruling: No.
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule
making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr.
Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta —
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v.
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and
7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
LOO EMMANUEL PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. L-23825. December 24, 1965.

FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and

21
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constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”

PETITIONER:

● alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground
that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic
Act 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
● argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"

RESPONDENT:

● answers by saying that upon the theory that a new municipality can
be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old
barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality.

MAYORS: of several municipalities adversely affected by the

aforementioned executive orders intervened in the case — because the latter
have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new
political subdivision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President, who under this new law cannot even
create a barrio, can create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities

HELD: NO. Barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered

nor their names be changed by the President but only by the act of congress or of the
corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities
in which the proposed barrio is situated. The supreme court further said that the
authority to create municipal corporations is legislative in nature.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid
or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is “strictly a legislative
function” or “solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power”

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate2 — and
(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate

22
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such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well
settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could,
in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and
including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for
his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually
creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby,
in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.

VARGAS Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, 18 October 1988.

Doctrine: Supplementary regulations promulgated by administrative bodies

have the force and effect of law. Administrative agencies are vested
with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to
promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and
apply such regulations.

Facts: Vitaliano Saco died in an accident in Tokyo, Japan while on board a vessel owned by
Eastern Shipping Lines in which he served as its Chief Officer. His widowed wife, sued for
damages under EO No. 797 (the order which created the POEA) and it’s Memorandum Circular
No. 2 which prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment, and was subsequently
granted by the same. This was opposed by the petitioner by questioning the validity of MC No. 2
as it violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative power and that they have been denied
due process because the POEA who issued the questioned MC has also sustained and applied it.
It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and
even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. It contended further that legislative
discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is

23
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the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be.

Issues: Is Memorandum Circular No. 2 a valid delegation of

Legislative Power? Does it violate the petitioner’s right to due process?

Held: Yes, it is a valid delegation of Legislative Power. And no, it does

not violate the petitioner's right to due process. There are two accepted tests
to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and
more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies
may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in'
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations. These regulations have the
force and effect of law. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such
administrative regulation. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in
requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate
in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself
which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect
the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-
judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the
second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Such an arrangement has been
accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due
process
BUGAYONG Jaworski v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, 14 January 2014.
Ginawa ko na po.
- Lissa. FACTS: On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument
denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gaming”, which granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting
station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and

24
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international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate

safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness
of the games.

On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll.

Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr.,
and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named
document.

Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its

operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making
pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo
Bonanza outlets.

Petitioner Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman

of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant
petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of
SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that
PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869,
to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said
decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the
time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and
gambling activities were confined exclusively to real- space. Further, he
argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet
gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No.
1869.

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of
the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants
PAGCOR the “right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs,
and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines.” He contends that internet gambling could not have been
included within the commonly accepted definition of “gambling casinos”, “clubs” or “other
recreation or amusement places” as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where
people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.

Petitioner’s contention: According to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the
categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869

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which grants PAGCOR the "right, privilege and authority to operate

and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines."

Respondent’s contention: Respondents urge the dismissal of the

petition for certiorari and prohibition because under Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies should be directed to
any tribunal, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in exercising its
legally-mandated franchise to grant authority to certain entities to operate a
gambling or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not performing a judicial
or quasi-judicial act. Neither should the act of granting licenses or authority to
operate be construed as a purely ministerial act.

ISSUES:

Whether Pagcor acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it
authorized respondent Sage to operate internet gambling on the basis
of its right “to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other
amusement places” under Section 10 of PD 1869?

RULING: A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to

corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure,
but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly,
or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on
them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant
of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be
granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be
rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always
defined in clear and unequivocal language.

After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the contending positions of the
parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or
shared its franchise to SAGE.

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less
grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power

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in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest,

inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly
authorized to do so.

In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby

the former grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting
stations and Internet gaming operations. The petition is GRANTED. The
“Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet
Gaming” executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and
VOID.
TRILLANA Abakada v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, 14 August 2008.

FACTS: RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the

revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The
law intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board. The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their
respective Commissioners, DOF, DBM, and NEDA, were tasked to
prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service
officials and employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target; and
further, to issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA
9335, subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee (JCOC) created solely for the purpose of approving the formulated IRR.
Later, the JCOC ceased to exist. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from
implementing and enforcing said law. Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers, as it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law,
when legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation
of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation
of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. WhileSection 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOCofficials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue

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targets to be achieved.Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been

delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOCpersonnel.

RESPONDENT’S (OSG) CONTENTION:

the law provides a sufficient standard that willguide the executive in the
implementation of its provisions.

ISSUE: W/N there was undue delegation of Legislative powers

from Congress

HELD: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:

(1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate.

It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or

limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of thedelegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.

To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s

authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the
provisions of the law.

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of
the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC) and stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress.
Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the
conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target
by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due
process is accorded the employee.
In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors

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affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to

inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, aground
for disciplinary action under civil service laws.
The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
“public interest,” “justice and equity,”“public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”
In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation
capability andcollection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.

Doctrine: Administrative Law; To be effective, administrative rules

and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

VOLANTE People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, 18 December 1977.

FACTS:
● On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes,
Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were
charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84-1.
● It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the
waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by “using their own motor banca,
equipped with motor;
● The accused used a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or
somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as ‘senso’ with a somewhat
webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire
attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices
or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals
within its currect reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace.
● Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
prosecution appealed.
● The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal.
● The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is
not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section 11 of the Fisheries
Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted
by substances.

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● The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments
cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should
be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits “the use of
any obnoxious or poisonous substance” in fishing.
● The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84- 1, amending section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro
fishing to fresh water fisheries
● The Court of First Instance and the prosecution assumed
that electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the
Fisheries Law (not under section 76).

ISSUE: Whether or not the assumption of The Court of First Instance and
the prosecution that electrofishing is punishable under section 83 of the
Fisheries Law is correct.

RULING: No. The assumption of Court of First Instance and the

prosecution that electrofishing is punishable under section 83 of the
Fisheries Law which provides that any other violation of that law “or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.” Is incorrect.

The Fisheries Law does not expressly punish “electro fishing.” Notwithstanding the silence of
the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84-1 restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.

That assumption is incorrect because section 3 of the Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a
fine of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount exceeds the
maximum fine of P200 fixed in section 83. It seems that the Department Secretary and the
Commissioner of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for electro fishing, which penalty is less
than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not identical to the light penalty
imposed in section 83.

The prosecution’s reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing
under Administrative Order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.

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The Court is of opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and
that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic
Act No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal
basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal

provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old
Fisheries Law.

That law punishes

(1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing;
(2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries;
(3) unlawful taking of marine mollusca,
(4) illegal taking of sponges;
(5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught,
and
(6) other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.

Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban
against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the
impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters.
That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro
fishing.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries
Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive regulation because Presidential Decree

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No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries, expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh
water and salt water areas.

The rule-making power of executive officials and administrative

agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the
Fisheries Law sustains the view that he exceeded his authority in penalizing
electro fishing by means of an administrative order.

WHEREFORE, the lower court’s decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for
lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed.

DOCTRINES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Administrative

agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to
the standards that the law prescribes.

The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the
enforcement of a particular statute.

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of “the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law”

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must

be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended.

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

GRAJO Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, G.R. No. 164171, 20 February 2006.

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FACTS:

On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued Executive
Order No. 156 entitled "Providing for a comprehensive
industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development
program and its implementing guidelines."

Said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country,

INCLUSIVE of the Special Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic
Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a
few exceptions.

The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for

declaratory relief before Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases were filed by
herein respondent entities, who or whose members, are classified as Subic
Bay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the business of, among
others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles.

ISSUE: Is EO 156 is a Valid Delegation to Administrative

Bodies?

HELD: No. The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative
only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition
is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative
issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the
issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable.

Note and Doctrines:

> legislative rules: is the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary
legislation.
> interpretative rules: to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is
in charge of enforcing.
> RA 7227: The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate
customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and
exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax
and duty-free importations of rawinternal reve materials, capital and equipment.
> Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, and Commissioner of Internal

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Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.,: the Court enunciated the

doctrine that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render less
cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord
at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and,
thereafter, to be duly informed, before the issuance is given the force and
effect of law.
> United BF Homeowner’s Association v. BF Homes, Inc.: The
rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated
legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority
given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such
a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation
by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in
derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.
SOTO Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 5
November 1997

Doctrine/s: (1) There are two accepted tests to determine whether or

not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

(2) The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set
for it has no power to make laws.The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by
courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency.

Facts: The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An
Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes". R.A. No. 8180 ends
twenty-six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners claim that section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define
when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable to
declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when
the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange
rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

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Petitioners also aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because
it was enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund — a condition
not found in R.A. No. 8180. Petitioners posit the thesis that the Executive
misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF
fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in
February 1997.

Respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not
justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further
aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will
they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of
R.A. No. 8180.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of power.
(2) Whether or not E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full
deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF
fund as a factor.

Ruling:
(1) No. The attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the
ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15
can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be
noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full
deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final
date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance
the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President — he is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

(2) Yes. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two
factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1)
the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining,
and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section
15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show
that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that
the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that the Executive department failed to
follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the
Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. In the cases at bar, the
Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the
price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis
of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive
department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the
early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be
nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes
a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

As to the respondent's claim that petitions failed to raise a justiciable controversy, respondents'
joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the
duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

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excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty
of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must

also fall on barren ground. The Court has bright-lined its liberal stance on a
petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people.

MESTIDIO Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, 17 July 2007

FACTS: On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric

Power Industry Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and
company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for
being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides
for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users
after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of the EPIRA Law. The
universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for
government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes
and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy,
environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross
subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge
shall be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users
and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation
of a special trust fund.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioners contend that the

Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of
the NPC. They argue that the case invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory
purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases,
the respective funds were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and
sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso
devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the
legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to administrative bodies.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondent contends that unlike a tax which is

imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as support of the government,
administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is
levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's
electric power industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police
power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power to the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to

36
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the execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the

power to tax on the part of the ERC

HELD: No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax
but an exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state.
The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory
duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of
revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution
of the states police power thru regulation.

Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by
the legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it
therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from the
ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative
agency which is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by
congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness test
and the sufficiency of standard test. The court in appreciating Section
34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions
free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and
sufficient in form.

SALAMIDA Department of Health v. Philip Morris Philippines, G.R. No. 202943, 25

March 2015.
Doctrine: General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and
generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not
applicable. In other words, where two statures are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one specially designed should prevail.

Facts: On 2008, Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc. (PMPMI), through the
advertising agency PCN Promopro, Inc. (PCN), by virtue of the "Consumer Act of the
Philippines," applied for a sales promotion permit at the Bureau of Food and Drugs for its
Promotional Activity. The application included the mechanics for the promotional activity, as
well as relevant materials and fees.

On 2008, PMPMI, through another advertising agency, Arc Worldwide Philippines Co.
(AWPC), filed another application for a sales promotional permit, this time for its Golden Stick
Promotional Activity (Golden Stick Promo) which the BFAD outright denied to a directive of
the BFAD Director that all permit applications for promotional activities of tobacco companies

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will no longer be accepted. Despite inquiries, the BFAD merely advised

AWPC to await the formal written notice regarding its application.

Eventually, the BFAD denied PMPMI's Gear Up Promo application in

accordance with the instructions of the Undersecretary of Health for
Standards and Regulations, directing that as of July 2008, "all promotions,
advertisements and/or sponsorships of tobacco products are already
prohibited," based on the provisions of the "Tobacco Regulation Act of
2003."

On January 19, 2009, PMPMI filed an administrative appeal before the DOH
Secretary, assailing the BFAD's denial of its Gear Up Promo application, as
well as its refusal to accept the Golden Stick Promo application. In its
appeal, PMPMI maintained that under RA 9211, promotion is not
prohibited but merely restricted, and that while there are specific provisions
therein totally banning tobacco advertising and sponsorships, no
similar provision could be found banning promotion.

Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of

discretion to the DOH when the it held that RA 9211 has also completely
prohibited tobacco promotions as of July 1, 2008.

Ruling: No. In fine, the Court agrees with the CA that it is the IAC-Tobacco
and not the DOH which has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales
promotion activities as explained in the foregoing discussion. As such,
the DOH's ruling, including its construction of RA 9211 that it completely banned tobacco
promotions is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship, are declared null and void, which, as
a necessary consequence, precludes the Court from further delving on the same. As it stands, the
present applications filed by PMPMI are thus remanded to the IAC-Tobacco for its appropriate
action. Notably, in the proper exercise of its rule-making authority, nothing precludes the IAC-
Tobacco from designating any of its pilot agencies.

MANEZ SM Land v. Bases Conversion Development Authority, G.R. No. 203655, 18 March 2015.

Facts: Pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7227 or the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," the BCDA opened for disposition and development its
Bonifacio South Property, a 33.1-hectare expanse located at Taguig City that was once
used as the command center for the country's military forces. Jumping on the
opportunity, petitioner SM Land, Inc. (SMLI), on December 14, 2009, submitted to the
BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the development of the lot through a public-private
joint venture agreement. The proposal guaranteed the BCDA secured payments

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amounting to PhP 15,985/sqm or a total of PhP 8.1 billion.

Thereafter, the BCDA The said committee recommended the

acceptance of the unsolicited proposal, which recommendation
was favorably acted upon by the BCDA. Through a letter dated May
12, 2010, the BCDA communicated to petitioner its acceptance of
the unsolicited proposal. Despite its acceptance, however, the BCDA
clarified that its act should not be construed to bind the agency to
enter into a joint venture agreement with the petitioner but only
constitutes an authorization granted to the JV-SC to conduct detailed
negotiations with petitioner SMLI and iron out the terms and
conditions of the agreement.

In an attempt to comply with its obligations, the BCDA prepared for

the conduct of a Competitive Challenge to determine whether
or not there are other Private Sector Entities (PSEs)that can
match the proposal of SMLI, and concurrently ensure that the joint
venture contract will be awarded to the party that can offer the most
advantageous terms in favor of the government. In furtherance
thereof, the agency issued Terms of Reference (TOR), which
mapped out the procedure to be followed in connection with the
Competitive Challenge. Consequently, SMLI was required, as it did, to
post a proposalsecurity in the amount of PhP 187 million, following
the prescribed procedure outlined in the TOR and the NEDA JV
Guidelines.

Afterwards, the BCDA set the Pre-eligibility Conference on

September 3, 2010. Invitations to apply for eligibility and to submit comparative
proposals were then duly published on August 12, 16 and 20, 2010. Hence, the pre-
eligibility conference was conducted as scheduled. The companies that participated in
the conference included SMLI, as the Original Proponent, and three (3) PSEs, namely
Ayala Land, Inc., Rockwell Land Corp., and Filinvest Land, Inc.

Without responding to SMLI’s new proposal, the BCDA sent a memorandum to the
Office of the President (OP) dated February 13, 2012, categorically recommending the
termination of the Competitive Challenge. The memorandum, in part, reads:

In view of the foregoing, may we respectfully recommend the President’s approval for
BCDA to terminate the proceedings for the privatization and development of the
BNS/PMC/ASCOM/SSU Properties in Bonifacio South through Competitive Challenge
and proceed with the bidding of the property. Alarmed by this development, SMLI, in a
letter dated August 10, 2012, urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive
Challenge as agreed upon. However, the BCDA, via the assailed Supplemental Notice
No. 5, terminated the Competitive Challenge altogether. Said Supplemental Notice

39
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pertinently reads:

This Supplemental Notice No. 05 is issued to inform the [PSEs]

that the Competitive Challenge for the Selection of BCDA’s Private
Sector Partner for the Privatization and Development of the
approximately 33.1-hectare
BNS/PMC/ASCOM/SSU Properties in Bonifacio South is hereby
terminated. BCDA shall not dispose the property through Competitive
Challenge. The BCDA reserves the right to call off [the] disposition
prior to acceptance of the proposal(s) and call for a new
disposition process under amended rules and without any liability
whatsoever to any or all the PSEs, except the obligation to return
the Proposal Security. Thereafter, the BCDA informed SMLI of
the OP’s decision to subject the development of the subject
propertyto public bidding. When asked by SMLI, the JV-SC
manifested its conformity with the actions thus taken by the BCDA
and OP.

Issue: whether or not the BCDA gravely abused its discretion in issuing
Supplemental Notice No. 5, in unilaterally aborting the Competitive Challenge,
and in subjecting the development of the project to public bidding.

Ruling: BCDA gravely abused its discretion when it issued Supplemental

Notice No. 5 in breach of its contractual obligation to SMLI

"Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise

of judgment as is equivalent tolack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. While it is the general policy of the Court to
sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce, when said decisions and orders are tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion, the Courts are duty-bound to entertain petitions questioning
the former’s rulings or actions.

PRUDENCIADO GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357, 2 September 2014.

DOCTRINE: There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and
statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without
limitations — or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because

40
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it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It

does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised
within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free
to simply \change the rules especially if it has consistently
interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has
to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with
sufficient basis.

FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes,
respectively. The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper
interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that
candidates may use for television and radio advertisements, as
provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise
known as the Fair Election Act.

Petitioners ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC Development

Corporation (ABC), GMA Network, Incorporated ( GMA), Manila
Broadcasting Company, Inc. (MBC), Newsounds Broadcasting Network,
Inc. (NBN), and Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) are
owners/operators of radio and television networks in the Philippines, while
petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the national organization of
broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio and television stations
and said stations themselves. They sent their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the
provisions of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held public hearings.
Thereafter, on February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of
Resolution No. 9615.

PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: Petitioners posit that Section 9(a) of the assailed

Resolutionprovides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for a
proper computation of “aggregate total” airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee,
thereby defeating the intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006. Also, it is a cruel and oppressive
regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost impossible burden on broadcast mass media
of monitoring a candidate’s or political party’s aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur
administrative and criminal liability. Further, petitioners claim that Section 7(d) is null and void
for unlawfully criminalizing acts not prohibited and penalized as criminal offenses by R.A. No.
9006.

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RESPONDENTS: Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total

aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as this would
truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during
elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the playing
field between candidates/political parties with enormous resources
and those without much. Moreover, the COMELEC’s issuance of the
assailedResolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX(C) of
theConstitution which vests on the COMELEC the power to supervise and
regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Comelec resolution is valid.

RULING:
No. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from
the previous COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on
political advertisements.
This essentially consists in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis
involving all the media of broadcast communications compared to the past
where it was done on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately
obvious that there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes
within which candidates and political parties would be able to campaign
through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the
power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds that it is not within the power of the
COMELEC to do so.
.—There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations — or
reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is
the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such
discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The
COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a
legal provision in a particular manner in the past.If ever it has to change the rules, the same must
be properly explained with sufficient basis.
BARACHINA Romulo Mabanta Law Office v. HDMF, G.R. No. 131082, 19 June 2000.
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., C.J :
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated
power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It
is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in

42
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contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a

regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 21 Only Congress can
repeal or amend the law.

FACTS: Pursuant to Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No.

7742, petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los
Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law Firm, was exempted for the
period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag- IBIG Fund coverage
by respondent Home Development Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF)
because of a superior retirement plan.

On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5

of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of
1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides
that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund
coverage, 3it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement
and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER Aled with the respondent an

application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan.
In support of said application, PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the
1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid.

In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF
disapproved PETITIONER's application on the ground that the requirement that there should be
both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or,"
and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752 but merely implement the law.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the 1996 Amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption
granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the
exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HDMF?

HELD: Yes.. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in
Section 5 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752.

43
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However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product
of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not
in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by law.

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in
Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to
qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of
P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that
exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both
invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF
cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not
consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 21 Only Congress can
repeal or amend the law.

Sec. 19. Existing Provident/Housing Plan — An

employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes
effective have their own provident and/or employee-housing plans, may
register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes:

(a) For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage

or participation in the Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of
verification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any
effective collective bargaining agreement and that the features of
the plan or plans are superior to the Fund or continue to be so; or

(b) For integration with the Fund, either fully or partially.

The establishment of a separate provident and/or housing plan after the

effectivity of this Decree shall not be a ground for waiver of coverage in the
Fund; nor shall such coverage bar any employer and/or employee-group
from establishing separate provident and/or housing plans

RIVAZ NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010.

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PONENTE: CORONA, J

DOCTRINE: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in

nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published.

FACTS: The National Power Corporation assails the RTC resolution

denying its motion of reconsideration finding items 3 and 3.1 of NPC
Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional. NPC Circular No. 99-755 set the
guidelines in the "disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-
reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good
housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate additional income for
NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provided for the qualification of its
bidders. NPC published an invitation for the pre- qualification of
bidders for the public sale of its scrap ACSR7 cables. Respondent Pinatubo
Commercial, submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC. but was
subsequently denied.

Respondent Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of
NPC Circular No. 99-75 argued that the circular was unconstitutional as it
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution
because it was not published. RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position and declared
items 3 and 3.1 unconstitutional.
Petitioner NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular
since it was not of general application. It was addressed only to
particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal committees, heads of offices, regional
and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it
was not of general application. It was addressed only to particular persons or class
of persons, namely the disposal committees, heads of offices, regional and all other
officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs. NPC also contends that there was a
substantial distinction between manufacturers and traders of aluminum scrap
materials specially viewed in the light of RA 7832. According to NPC, by limiting
the prospective bidders to manufacturers, it could easily monitor the market of its
scrap ACSRs. There was rampant fencing of stolen NPC wires. NPC likewise
maintains that traders were not prohibited from participating in the pre-
qualification as long as they had a tie-up with a manufacturer.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Pinatubo’s argument that items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 deprived it of
its "right to bid" or that these conferred such right in favor of a third person is
erroneous. Pinatubo also contends that the condition imposed by NPC under items
3 and 3.1 violated the principle of competitiveness advanced by RA 9184

45
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(Government Procurement Reform Act)

ISSUE: WN NPC Circular No. 99-75 have to be published for its

effectivity?

HELD: No.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an
internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an
existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his
subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap
ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the
responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-
qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for the
deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the
award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All these
guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding
and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the
public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process.
Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly
and incidentally.
OCENAR De Jesus v. COA, G.R. No. 109023, 12 August 1998.
PONENTE: J. Purisima

DOCTRINE: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published

if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.

FACTS: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) who
received honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and Pre-
Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee.

Later, RA 6758 (“An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government for Other Purposes'') took effect. Sec. 12 of the law provides for the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates.
However, certain additional compensations were exempted from consolidation. To implement
RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) discontinuing without qualification all allowances and
fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT: In their appeal to the COA, petitioners questioned the validity
and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10, that it is inconsistent with the provisions of the RA
itself and because it was not published in the Official Gazette.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT: DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is merely an

interpretative regulation of a law already published.

However, COA upheld the validity of the issuance and sanctioned the disallowance of the

46
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honoraria. Thus, petitioners filed the present petition to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its

lack of publication in the Official Gazette?

RULING: No. The Court held that there was a need for requisite
publication of the DBM-CCC No. 10 to be effective and enforceable.
Following the doctrine in Tañada v. Tuvera, publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an
administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement
an existing law.

In the present case, the DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows
payment of allowances and other additional compensation to
government officials and employees, is not a mere interpretative or
internal regulation. At the very least, before DBM- CCC No. 10 may be
permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials
and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the
publication of subject circular in the OG or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines to give them the amplest opportunity to voice
out any opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the
matter.
PERALTA Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association, G.R. No. 111953, 13
December 1997

PONENTE: ROMERO, J.

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental

requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi- judicial function. In the performance of its executive or
legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not
comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. Upon the other hand, it is also contended
that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue.
Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be withdrawn or shortened by
observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from
the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the
condition set by the organic law.

FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)issued an Administrative Order PPA-AO NO. 04-
92 which provided that that all appointments for harbor pilots made by the PPA will have to be
renewed every year, and that the existing appointments made will only be valid until December
1991.

-train as probationary pilots for 3 months it is only then they are given a permanent appointment
-PPA issues AO with the avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby afford

47
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better protection to the port users through the improvement of

pilotage services.
-all appointments is subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the
Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance
-Thus, respondents sought to have the implementation of this order
suspended.
- In the meantime, the PPA issued the guidelines for the issuance of new
appointments.
-Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation
of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the
matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA.
-These issuances were thus brought before the courts by the respondents on
the question of their constitutionality based on violation of their right
to exercise their profession and on due process grounds.
-board of directors of PPA concluded that the law has been sufficiently
complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioners correctly

argued that, there being no matters of naval defense
involved in the issuance of the administrative
order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be
consulted.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondents sought to have the

implementation of this order suspended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Order is Constitutional?

HELD: NO, the Administrative Order is not Constitutional. The Court ruled that PPA-AO No.
04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right against deprivation of property without
due process of law.

RA 7654 (Act Revising the Encise Tax Base) was enacted by Congress, partly amending Sec.
142(c) of the NIRC. Fortune Tobacco manufactured cigarette brands: Hope, More, and
Champion. Prior to RA 7654, these brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax of 20-45%. Applying the amendment, the 3 brands should fall under Sec. 142(c)(2)
of the NIRC and be taxed at 20-45%.

However, the CIR issued Revenue Memorandum Circular 37-93 which reclassified the 3 brands
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.
Notably, there was no notice and hearing. The BIR sought to collect tax deficiency.

Fortune filed a petition with CTA, who ruled in its favor stating that the RMC is invalid and
unenforceable because prior to the effectivity of RA 7654, the brands were still classified as
locally-manufactured cigarettes and taxed at 20/40%.

48
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Before the CA, CIR argued that the RMC is an interpretation of the
Tax Code; and being an interpretative ruling, it became effective without need
for notice, hearing or publication.

WON RMC 37-93 is valid and enforceable? – NO. The lack of notice and
hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules. The memo was
not a mere interpretative rule but rather a legislative rule in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. Promulgated legislative rules must be
published. Interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
ALCALA Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000.

Facts: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD No.
1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country.” On June 18, 1999, the Department
of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Private respondent requested
copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well
as its supporting documents and papers.

Issues:

(1) During the evaluation stage of the extradition

proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process
rights of notice and hearing?

(2) What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice

at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?

Ruling:

(1) Yes. Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early
as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one. Because of these possible consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which
are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. True to
the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not
only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well.

(2) A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary
of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are

49
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forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The duty of

the Secretary of Justice is ministerial in nature.

The evaluation process, just like the extradition

proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself (sui generis). At such
stage, the executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) has
the power to: a) make a technical assessment of the completeness and
sufficiency of the extradition papers; b) outrightly deny the request if on
its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and c) make a determination whether
or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable under non- military penal
legislation. Said process may be characterized as an investigative or
inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the
exercise of an administrative body’s quasi-judicial power.

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing,

and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency’s performance of its rule- making or quasi-
judicial functions.

The Court laid down the test of determining whether an

administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the
parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to
evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it,
and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

In this case, the 2 Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and
authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The
Department of Justice received the request without the Department of Foreign Affairs
discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.

MENDENILLA Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335, 1 July 2003.

Ginawa ko na po.
- Lissa FACTS: In this petition for review, the petitioner assailed the decision of the Office of the
Sa wakas nakita ko din ito. President which ordered his dismissal as Regional Director of the DPWH for unexplained
Thank you Lissa. Edit ko wealth, as a result of an investigation conducted by the PCAGC which arrived at the conclusion

50
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na lang po. that the real property he had acquired in California, U.S. was unlawfully
- mark acquired for it was manifestly out of proportion to his salary.

Petitioner’s dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint,

addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent
accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the
DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8
of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner
and his wife purchased a house and lot at Los Angeles, California, making a
down payment of US$100,000.00. Private respondent accused petitioner of
amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.

Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit

before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was
his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. And that desiring to migrate in the US, they
were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if they
had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested
in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that
time as there was a prohibition in her mortgage contract. Fajardo
offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of
petitioner.

Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of
similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He attached to his counter-affidavit
the Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman
dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.

The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioner’s counsel exerted more effort in
filing pleadings and motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. Thus, it recommended
petitioner’s dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. The OP concurred
with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC.

ISSUE: (1) whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence; and, (2) whether the earlier
dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the
PCAGC moot and academic.

HELD:

(1) The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling: that PCAGC had authority to investigate
the case despite the lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the complainant’s
non-appearance at the investigation; that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; that petitioner’s active participation in every step

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of the investigation satisfied the due process requirement; that the

findings of facts made by administrative agencies when supported by
substantial evidence are respected on appeal.

(2) Morevoer, the SC did not cannot sustain petitioner’s stance that
the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered
the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic.
To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata
in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for
his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal
Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee,
was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power
and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s
investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application in the case at bar.

BAQUIRAN [PAGE 6]
Patranco South Express, Inc. v. Board of Transportation, G.R.
Nos. 49664-67, 22 November 1990.

Justice Medialdea

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order seeking to annul the order of public respondent Board of Transportation dated 4
January 1979.

On 5 August 1971, the then Public Service Commission granted certificates of public
convenience to respondent Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. for the operation of 12 bus
units on the Pasay City – Legaspi City line; 6 for the Pasay – Bulan, Sorsogon line, and 10 for
the Pasay – Sorsogon line.

Petitioner filed a complaint against BLTB charging it with abandonment of services

from August 1971 to April 1975 and praying for the cancellation of their certificates.

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The Respondent rationalized the non- cancellation of the

certificates:

Cancellation of the certificate is a penalty of the severest degree. Its

consequences are suffered not exclusively by the operator; it extends to
the travelling public whose needs for transportation facilities would further
be aggravated by a diminution of needed services. Where such a penalty
is prayed for, the Board REQUIRES the evidence to be strong.

Provisions of the Public Service Law show that failure to comply

with the term and conditions of any certificate of public convenience is
basically punished with a fine, unless the violation is willful or
contumacious, in which case the penalty of suspension or cancellation may be
imposed.

1.

ISSUE:

Pantranco contends that there is a grave abuse of discretion due to:

1. Refusal to cancel the certificates despite BLTB’s

abandonment

2. Using as basis for its question order BLTB’s letter

where it justified its non-operation on account of unfinished
portions of the road which is not part of the records of the case

3. Resorting to extraneous facts not supported by competent evidence as basis

for its conclusion that the demand of public need would be more paramount than
the need to penalize BLTB.

Respondent:

2. The cancellation or non-cancellation of its certificates of public convenience is

addressed to the sound discretion of the BOT
3. The letter dated 18 September 1972 forms part of the BOT’s records
4. The BOT acted correctly in the exercise of its sound discretion and within its
jurisdiction when it found that the demand of public need would be paramount than the
need to penalize it.

HELD:

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Section 16 of the Public Service Act gives the BOT ample power
and discretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a certificate of public
convenience as long as there is evidence to support its action.

All the alleged acts of the Petitioner are void of merit because the
BOT is particularly a fact-finding body whose decisions on questions
regarding the certificates are influenced not only by the facts as disclosed by
the evidence in the case before it but also by the reports of its field
agents and inspectors that are periodically submitted to it.

Likewise, the BOT has the power to take into consideration the
result of its own investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision.

MENDOZA Carmelo v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-17778, 30 November 1962.

FACTS:

The Mayor of Manila issued an E.O. creating a committee that

investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other
personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City
Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of the office of the
Mayor. He Named Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of the said
committee.
In a statement given to the investigators of the Office of the Mayor,
Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba,
admitted having misappropriated sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de
Alba for the payment of the latter’s taxes and that he us used to entertain certain
employees in the City Treasurer’s office. With the information, the committee issued
subpoenas to Ramos, in connection with an administrative case against

Crisanta Estanislao but however, Ramos refused to appear.

Claiming that Ramos’ refusal to appear tended to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administrative proceedings, the petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt.

The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal
mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. And to
compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain
employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony
that could be used against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa

54
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de Alba was the offended party. From that decision, the

petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

The petitioner invokes Sec. 580 of the Revised Administrative code

which provides for Powers incidental to taking testimony of
Administrative Authorities.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade

the administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt.

Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to
investigate city officials and employees appointed by him to the end
that the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such
officials of employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be justly
and fairly exercised.

Petitioner contends that "the power of the investigation

committee to issue compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses undoubtedly exists since only complimentary to the
power of the mayor to investigate, suspend and remove city officers
and employees, supra, is the recognized rule that where the statute
grants a right, it also confers by implication every particular power
necessary for the exercise thereof.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:

It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos
admitted having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him by
the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that
this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees
in the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as
stated above.

COURT’S CONTENTIONS:

After hearing, during which petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, the trial
court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering
committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that

55
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witnesses testify under oath.

It also held that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right
against self-incrimination.

It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the

Office of the Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated on
several occasions, sums of money given to him by the owner of
Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and
that this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos
used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer's office at
Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. The
trial court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the
administrative case against certain employees in the Office of the City
Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could
be used against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner
of Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that decision,
petitioner appealed to this Court.

We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite

witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case
of refusal. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for Us to pass upon
the other error assigned by petitioner as having been allegedly
committed by the trial court.

We do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such

power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or
evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of
subpoena.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUE:

The main issue in this case is WON the power, if any, of committee, like the committee
of which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to
ask for their punishment in case of refusal?

RULING:
The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts
and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies

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like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered
and expressly defined as contempt of court, as
is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as

follows: Powers incidental to taking of testimony. — When authority to
take testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer
or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such
authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer
oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require
the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he
has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply
to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.

There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the
committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to
this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city
employees. SC does not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of
such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the
power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance
may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena.
Furthermore, it is testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be
required by the compulsory process of subpoena. Also, it is doubtful whether the
provisions odds Section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the City of
Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government.

GATZ Masangcay v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-13827, 28 September 1962

Facts: Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the
Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial numbers l-
8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the
province of Aklan, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not the presence of the division
superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of
the alista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions,
which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission in
its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody

57
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of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their

distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.

Accordingly, after investigation and proceedings, the Commission rendered

its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged
and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay
a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of
insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan.

Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue
the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which
grants the Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to
punish acts of contempt.

Issue: Whether or not the decision was valid and enforceable.

Ruling: No.

We had occasion to stress in the case of Guevara v. The Commission on

Elections 1 that under the law and the constitution, the Commission on
Elections has only the duty to enforce and administer all laws to the conduct
of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that
may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the
meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasi- judicial functions
insofar as controversies that by express provision law come under its
jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which
inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-
judicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the
Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt
because such power is inherently judicial in nature

In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose
violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the
exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be
followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different
municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated
to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was
charged with having opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among
several municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the
same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division superintendent of schools, the

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provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the alista Party, the
Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and
distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in
said resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt
of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the
Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and
so its decision is null and void.

ROJAS Carino v. Commission of Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, 2 December

1991

Doctrine: But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to

the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It does not however grant it
the power to resolve issues.

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA
and ACT undertook "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting
of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The
"mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at
the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assembly. Secretary of
Education issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply. After
failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively
charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension
of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application
for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied. The
respondent staged a walkout. The case was eventually decided ordering the dismissal of Esber
and suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed. Petition for
Certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint with the Commission of Human Rights alleging they
were denied due process and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order to
Cariño to appear and enlighten the commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter.
Cariño filed a petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the
Commission has the jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process
and whether or not grievances justify their mass action or strike.

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Petitioner’s Contention: Commission on Human Rights have no such

power as provided by the Constitution to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.

Respondent’s Contention: striking teachers were denied due process

of law and should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to
the administrative charges. There had been a violation of civil and
political rights which the Commission was empowered to
investigate.

Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction to adjudicate, try and
hear the issue?

Ruling: No.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It does not however grant it the
power to resolve issues. The Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" of the matters involved. These
are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and lastly, the Supreme Court.

CHR cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
LOO Sec. Quirico P. Evangelista v. Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, as Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII

G.R. No. L-29274, November 27, 1975

FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge
Jarencio Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on

60
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Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4

of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following
functions and responsibilities:
To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices,
graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical),
lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines. To investigate cases of
graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019,
and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth. To receive and evaluate, and to
conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the
acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file
and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the

Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and
580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as

Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas,
then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad
testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office
of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a
certain investiga
tion pending therein."

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION (AGENCY): they have power to issue

subpoena pursuant to the the EO issued by the President creating
them, under their INVESTIGATORY FUNCTION.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Fernando Manalastas contends that the subpoena power of

the Agency is confined to mere quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions.

ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in
its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if
anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations,
not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may
be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory
nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to
appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from

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Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood,

empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production
of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in
all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character."

Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the

Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is
not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would
have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The
functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or
intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very
purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode
nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the
subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency
in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). Morethan that,
the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no
distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be
exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule
that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the

Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the
City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the
Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be.

VARGAS Midland Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.

71905, 13 August 1986

Doctrine: Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

Facts: A judgment was rendered by the Insurance Commission in favor of Sisenando Villareal
(complainant-appellee ) and against Midland Insurance Corporation. Petitioner received a copy
of the decision on October 5, 1984 and it filed an MOR on October 17, 1984. Said motion was
denied. Petitioner then filed with the Insurance Commission its notice of appeal to the IAC.
Petitioner's appeal was initially-accepted by the IAC. However, a Motion to Dismiss appeal
dated March 1, 1985 was filed by the complainant-appellee on the ground that the petitioner
herein failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period. IAC granted the said Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that by its computation of the elapsed period from the date of receipt by
herein petitioner of the decision of the Insurance Commission to the time the notice of appeal
was filed before said Commission on December 5, 1984, it would appear that petitioner's appeal
was belatedly made. The petitioner's case, however, rests on the assumption that it had timely

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filed its appeal on November 7, 1984 because Section 2 of Republic Act No.
5434 which governs appeals originating from quasi- judicial bodies grants a
party ten (10) days from notice of the resolution denying a Motion for
Reconsideration. As notice of the denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration by the Insurance Commission was received by petitioner
on October 30, 1984, the latter maintains that it had ten (10) days thereafter or
until November 9, 1984 within which to file its appeal and this was filed with
the IAC on November 7, 1984. Petitioner's submission is that the appeal was
thus filed within the reglementary period.

Issue: Did the petitioner timely file its appeal?

Held: Yes. It can be gleaned from the powers and duties of the Insurance
Commissioner enumerated in Sections 414-416, 187, and 241 of the
Insurance Code performs quasi-judicial functions a term which applies to
the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. It is paragraph 22(c) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines, relative to the Implementation of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) which
prescribes the procedure to be taken in the Appellate Court with respect to
appeals originating from Quasi-Judicial Bodies. It reads as follows:
>Paragraph 22(c) Appeals from Quasi-Judicial Bodies.-The appeals to
the Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue
to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not
inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
>Section 2 of R.A. 5434 explicitly provides: Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment or from the
date of its last publication if required by law for its effectivity or in case a motion for
reconsideration is filed within that period of fifteen (15) days, then within ten (10) days from
Notice or publication when required by law, of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. No more than one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed by any part.

We find that petitioner herein is correct in maintaining that its appeal was timely filed.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Insurance Commission and advice of
such denial was received by petitioner on October 30, 1984. As petitioner would then have ten
(10) days from October 30, 1984 or until November 9, 1984, its appeal was well within the ten
day period within which an appeal can be made to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
BUGAYONG Sandoval v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 133842, 26 January 2000.
Ginawa ko na po. FACTS:

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- Lissa Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the
congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the
elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates
of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly
elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day.
Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the
annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal
order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and
proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers
proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order.
He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the
canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns.
The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of
petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void: (1) it was made in defiance
of the verbal order by the COMELEC Chairman relayed through
Executive Director Resurrection Z. Borra to suspend the proclamation of the
winner in the congressional election until the Commission has
resolved private respondent's petition for correction of manifest error in the
certificate of canvass; and (2) it was based on an incomplete canvass.
Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and
reversal of the Comelec order.

Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner contends that Respondent

COMELEC's annulment of petitioner Sandoval's proclamation as
winner in the election for congressman of Malabon- Navotas, without the
benefit of prior hearing, is grossly indecent and violates his right to due process of law.

Respondent’s contention: Respondent COMELEC contended that it committed no

jurisdictional error in declaring void ab initio the proclamation of petitioner Sandoval as
Congressman-elect for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district.
a. The premature and hasty proclamation of respondent Sandoval made by the District Board on
the basis of an incomplete canvass is illegal, hence, null and void.
b. Respondent COMELEC substantially complied with the requirements of due process in
declaring the proclamation of respondent Sandoval an absolute nullity.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.

DECISION: No

RATIO DECIDENDI: COMELEC’s order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid
for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior

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notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation
of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered
the questioned order based solely on private respondent's
allegations.
TRILLANA Ang Tibay vs. Commission on Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-46496, 27
February 1940

FACTS: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a

shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off
members of the National Labor Union. According to the Union however,
this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the employees from
work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay
is guilty of unjust labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is
discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the
National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the
employer. The Court of Industrial Relation decided the case and elevated it to
the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU.
But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are
documents that are so inaccessible to them that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That these
documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in
the Court of Industrial Relations",and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such
far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein."

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

OTHERS? LIKE OSG, IF ANY:

ISSUE: W/N the union was denied due process by the CIR?

HELD: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a
special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated

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judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ

of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants
or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views

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of a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial

questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.

SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to
failure to receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial
was granted and the entire record of this case is remanded to the CIR.

VOLANTE Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, G.R. No. 127838, 21 January

1999.

FACTS: Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the

Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for
brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint
against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for
misconduct.

Raquel described the incident in the following manner:

“While standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose J. Lucas,
Raquel noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. Jose Lucas, at that
very instant used to sit upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his
shoe. At that moment she felt Mr. Lucas’ hand touching her thigh and
running down his palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and
admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she
hit Mr. Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying ‘lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka
nang papasok dito kahit kailan.’ A verbal exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed
Raquel by the arm and shoved her towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands
protected her face from smashing upon the door. Mr. Lucas, bent on literally throwing the
affiant out of the office, grabbed her the second time while she attempted to regain her posture
after being pushed the first time. x x x while doing all this, Mr. Lucas shouted at the affiant,
saying, ‘labas, huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan.’ ”

The Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued a summons requiring respondent to answer the
complaint, not to file a motion to dismiss, within five (5) days from receipt.

After a formal investigation by the BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution finding respondent
guilty of simple misconduct5 and recommending a penalty of suspension for one (1) month and
one (1) day. The Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation.

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Lucas appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The CSC issued a resolution finding Lucas guilty of grave misconduct and
imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Lucas moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion. Lucas
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of
the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA. The Court of
Appeals ruled that “a basic requirement of due process on the other hand is
that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him In the
instant case however, Lucas came to know of the modification of the
charge against him only when he received notice of the resolution dismissing
him from the service.”

ISSUE: Whether or now Lucas was denied due process when the CSC
found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct.

HELD: Yes. Lucas was denied due process.

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental

procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and
hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in
administrative proceedings.

The Court does not in any way condone Lucas’ act. Even in jest, he had no right to touch the
complainant's leg. However, under the circumstances, such an act is not constitutive of grave
misconduct, in the absence of proof that Lucas was maliciously motivated. We note that Lucas
has been in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas, 301 SCRA
560, G.R. No. 127838 January 21, 1999

GRAJO Carbonell v. CSC, G.R. No. 187689, 7 September 2010.

ISSUE: Was her right to due process violated because she was not afforded the right to counsel
when her statement was taken?

FACTS: Petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer
Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999,
because she lost the original copy of her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating. The

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Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that the petitioner's

personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the
examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It
was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form was
different from that appearing on the verification slip. Because of these
discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted
an investigation. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner voluntarily
made a statement before Atty. Rosalina admitting that, she obtained a Career
Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an
application form and paying the amount of ₱10,000.00 to a certain Ms.
Navarro.

HELD: No. Admissions made by petitioner during the administrative

investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be

akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to
represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative
in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely
to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
SOTO Ocampo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683, 18 January 2000. (LAST CASE)

Doctrine: The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.

Facts:
Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National
Irrigation Administration. K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN)
sent a letter to NIACONSULT requesting a training proposal on small-scale community
irrigation development. Petitioner as the training coordinator of the NIACONSULT, sent a
letter-proposal requested by ABDN confirming the availability of NIACONSULT to conduct the
training program and formally requesting advance payment of thirty (30%) percent of the
training fee in the amount of US $9,600.00 or P204,960.00.

NIACONSULT conducted the training program and petitioner received the agreed training fee.
NIACONSULT wrote a letter to petitioner demanding the turn-over of the total training fee paid
by ADBN which petitioner personally received. Despite receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to
remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its president, Maximino Eclipse, to
file an administrative case before respondent OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or
fraud or willful breach of trust.

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Finding enough basis to proceed with the administrative case,

Ombudsman issued an order requiring petitioner to file his counter-affidavit
with a caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a waiver of his
right to present evidence. Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with
the said order.

A year later, OMBUDSMAN issued another order giving petitioner

another chance to file his counter-affidavit and controverting
evidence. Again, petitioner failed. Thus, private respondent was
required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN to present evidence to
support its complaint. Thereafter, OMBUDSMAN issued the assailed
Resolution recommending Ocampo be discharged from the service, with
forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold
office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporation.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case.

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process in that the administrative
case was resolved on the basis of the complainant's evidences, without
affording him the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and to present his
evidence. Petitioner likewise contends that he was not given access to the
records of the subject transaction vital to his defense and in the preparation
of his counter-affidavit despite his verbal requests to the graft investigator.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.

Ruling:
No. Ocampo has been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was
required to answer the complaint against him. In fact, Ocampo was given
considerable length of time to submit his counter- affidavit. It took more
than one year before Ocampo was considered to have waived his right to file
his counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of the complainant’s
evidence was set. The second order was issued to give Ocampo a last chance
to present his defense, despite the private Niaconsult’s objections. But
Ocampo failed to comply.

Ocampo’s failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and cannot escape his own
remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the Ombudsman has shown
forbearance, Ocampo has not displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore cannot validly
claim that his right to due process was violated. A party who chooses not to avail of the
opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of due process.

The orders of the Ombudsman requiring Ocampo to submit his counter-affidavit and which was
admittedly received by the latter explicitly contain a warning that if no counter-affidavit was
filed within the given period, a waiver would be considered and the administrative proceedings
shall continue according to the rules. Thus, the Ombudsman need not issue another order
notifying Ocampo that he has waived his right to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way,
Ocampo need not be notified of the ex-parte hearing for the reception of NIAConsult’s evidence.
As such, he could not have been expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.
MESTIDIO
Vivo v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 187854, 12 November 2013. - baka dito po start/april 24-

DOCTRINE: In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to

include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard

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personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and

evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.

FACTS: Petitioner was employed by PAGCOR as its Managing Head of its

Gaming Department. On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from
Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCORs Human
Resources Department, advising that he was being administratively
charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to
the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence; that he
should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same
time being placed under preventive suspension.

On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the summons for him to
attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before
PAGCORs Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002. At
the petitioner request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his
residence on said date.

He was also furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the

accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting
his alleged offenses. However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the
statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already been afforded the
sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him during the
administrative inquiry.
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in
order to address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the
meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied
the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings.
The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the resolution
of the PAGCOR Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being
dismissed from the service.
After the petitioner motion for reconsideration vis-vis the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of
Directors dismissing him from the service was denied, he appealed his dismissal to the CSC.
CSC found that petitioner was denied due process. PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA where
it reversed and set aside CSCs decision.

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PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioner contended that his

right to due process was violated and that CSC ruling shall be affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in its decision and that petitioner was denied
administrative due process.

HELD: No. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. The essence of
due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative
proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not
strictly applied.
In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due
process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be
heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.

SALAMIDA
PAGCOR v. Marquez
G.R. No. 191877, 18 June 2013.

Doctrine: Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact

relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of his duty. Under the Civil Service
Rules, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal, which carries the accessory
penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits except leave credits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

Facts: Ariel R. Marquez and Ireneo M. Vedillo are dealers at PAGCOR. Mr. Chengbegan
playing at the table of Verdillo and Marquez. While doing her rounds, the Acting Pit Supervisor
noticed that on several occasions Verdillo made a "good dice" call even though not one of the
dice from the players throw hit the tables rubber wall. Thereafter, the Acting Casino Shift
Manager, requested to review the CCTV footage of the incident.

After watching the footage, the Casino Management and the investigators from the Corporate
Investigation Unit were convinced that several void throws were declared as "good dice" in their

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table. Marquez admitted that he was aware of several erroneous calls made
by Verdillo on the dice throws, but he still paid out winnings. Meanwhile,
Verdillo denied the accusations against him.

After investigation, the BMPs approved the Adjudication

Committees recommendation to dismiss them from the service due to
"Dishonesty, Grave violation of company rules and regulations, Conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the company, and Loss of trust and
confidence" for conspiring with a co-dealer and a customer in defrauding
the house on numerous occasions.

Aggrieved, they appealed their dismissal from the service to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). However, the CSC held that it has reasonable
ground to believe that Marquez and Verdillo were involved in a
conspiracy to manipulate the game.

Not satisfied, Both Marquez & Verdillo filed a petition for review with the CA
arguing that he was not accorded his right to due process and that there
was no substantial evidence to support a finding of his guilt in the
administrative charge.

The CA held that there is no administrative charge of conspiracy under the

Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It found
Marquezs testimony credible and ruled that there was no dishonesty on his
part, much less a conspiracy with Verdillo and Cheng to defraud PAGCOR.
The CA observed that the fact that as stated in his sworn statement,
Marquez called Verdillos attention to his erroneous call only on the second
time that Verdillo made an erroneous call, cannot be interpreted that he was
dishonest or engaged in a conspiracy. Rather, it shows that he was negligent
in the performance of his duties.

PAGCOR then filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the CA erred in finding that
the notice of charges against Marquez was not in accordance with the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases.

Issue: Whether or not Marquez and Verdillo are guilty of dishonesty, violation of office rules
and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service to justify their dismissal
from service.

Ruling: No. The case against Marquez is reversed and set aside. The Civil Service Commission
decision dismissing Marquez from service are reinstated. As regards Verdillo, the Court of
Appeals decision dismissing him is affirmed

The circumstances in this case all point to the conclusion that Verdillo conspired with Marquez
and Cheng. Verdillo declared several dice throws of Cheng as "good dice" even if they were
void. Marquez then paid Cheng his winnings in huge amounts. Whenever a customer or
employee would pass the Craps table, Cheng would change his dice throws and would even
comment "may multo" when Acting Pit Supervisor Yang would approach the craps table. These
anomalous transactions were not only witnessed by Acting Pit Supervisor Yang, but were also

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confirmed by the CCTV footage.

MANEZ
Casimiro v. Tandog
G.R. No. 146137, 8 June 2005.
FACTS: On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M.
Andres, submitted a report based on an investigation he conducted into
alleged irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimero. The report
spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No. 0236
in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name
of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380
and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of
new ones in favor of petitioner’s brother-in-law Marcelo Molina.
Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum
Order No. 13[3] dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under
preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Three (3) days later, Mayor
Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer
the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer, [4] petitioner denied
the alleged irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of the tax
declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her
assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax
declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a
deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molina’s favor.

On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17, respondent Mayor

extended petitioner’s preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days
effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate
evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. On 28 October 1996,
Memorandum Order No. 18[6] was issued by respondent Mayor
directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit- complaint of Noraida
San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano.

Noraida San Sebastian Cesar[7] alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380
and No. 0376 covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a
certain Marcelo Molina, petitioner’s brother-in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida
Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land
covered by the said Tax Declarations.

In response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter[9] dated 29 October
1996, stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar, she had already
explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996.

Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After
a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November 1996, submitted its report[10]
recommending petitioner’s separation from service, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor Haydee
Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the prejudice of the
taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon who are making possible the payments of her salary and other
allowances. Consequently, we are unanimously recommending her separation from service.

Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 1[11]
dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she
was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.

HELD: SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely,

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that there is deprivation of life, liberty and property and such deprivation is
done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due
process, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure
and matters of substance.

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement

of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[18] In administrative
proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means
the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

“To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be
heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to

include the following: (1) (2) (3)

the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of

proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel,
to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford
a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty
as well as impartiality; and

(4)

a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence

submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected

In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was conducted
on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered
questions propounded by the members of the fact- finding committee.
Records further show that the petitioner was accorded every opportunity to
present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge against her. After a careful evaluation
of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the
Court of Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she has even
brought the matter to this Court for final adjudication.

Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof
beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon an
employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation
therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position

Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein petitioner: 1. The
cancellation of complainant Teodulo Matillano’s tax declaration and the issuance of a new one in
favor of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling; and 2. The cancellation of the tax declaration in
the name of complainant Noraida San Sebastian Cesar’s parent in favor of petitioner’s brother-
in-law, Marcelo Molina.

Dishonesty is considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. It is beyond cavil that petitioner’s acts displayed want of
honesty.

PRUDENCIADO
Gannapao v. CSC

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G.R. No. 180131, 13 May 2011.

DOCTRINE: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be

heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is
sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. As long as aparty was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.

FACTS: UWTC started operating MMTCs buses. At about the same time,
petitioner was allegedly employed by Atty. Gironella, the general manager
appointed by the Board of Directors of UWTC, as his personal bodyguard.
Respondents further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses
regularly driven by them were confiscated by a group led by
petitioner.Armed with deadly weapons petitioner and his group intimidated
and harassed respondents. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive
suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his termination.
The complaint passed an investigation with The Inspector General,
Internal Affairs Office (TIG-IAO) of the PNP. In his answer, petitioner
denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that it was his twin brother,
Reynaldo Gannapao, who worked as messenger at UWTC.In a
memorandum, it was recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
Subsequently,National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
Memorandum was issued, and a summary hearing on the complaint was
conducted.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The same was denied.

PNP Chief Sarmiento rendered his Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and suspending
him for three months from the police service without pay.
Petitioners MR was likewise denied, thus, he elevated the case to the NAPOLCOM National
Appellate Board.His appeal, however, was dismissed.
Aggrieved, petitioner brought his case to the DILG but his appeal was denied.
Petitioner then appealed to the CSC, it was dismissed but the penalty of suspension was
increased to dismissal from service.
Petitioner thus filed with the CA a Petition for Review but it was later on denied because
petitioner cannot claim denial of due process since he was given ample opportunity to present his
side.
CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

PETITIONER: Petitioner contends that he was denied due process in the proceedings before

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the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP sinceno notice and summons
were issued for him to answer the charges and no hearing was
conducted. He claims that his dismissal was not proper and legal as there was
no introduction and presentation of evidence against him and he was not
given the opportunity to defend his side.

RESPONDENTS thru OSG: On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG),representing public respondent CSC, maintains that
petitioner was not denied due process. The OSG points out that petitioner
answered the complaint during the pre-charge investigation and when
the case was heard at the Office of the Legal Service, petitioner was given
the opportunity to answer the charges or to submit his supplemental answer
or counter-affidavit, but he instead moved for the dismissal of the case.
Atty. Sierra, the hearing officer of the Office of theLegal Service, also
issued a subpoena for petitioner to appear on February 10, 1997, but he failed
to appear on the said date.Moreover, petitioner’s culpability was proven
by substantial evidence through the documentary evidence consisting of
individual sworn statements from all the complainants, the police blotter of
the incident involving Atty. Gironella and the UWTC drivers and conductors
which also established that petitioner was present there and his firearm
identified, and the photocopies of documents signed by Atty. Gironella
showing payments to petitioner as security personnel. In addition, a
document changing the name of the payee to ‘Reynaldo’ instead of
‘Rimando’ also signed by Atty. Gironellawas presented to prove that
petitioner’s claim that it was really his ‘twin brother’ who was employed at
UWTC is just an alibi. Lastly,the OSG is of the view that the penalty of dismissal was correctly
imposed on petitioner, stressing that his act of serving as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and
harassing the bus drivers of UWTC is a grave offense.

ISSUE: Was petitioner denied due process?

HELD: NO. We have held that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.

Here, it is clear that the petitioner was afforded due process since he was given his fair
opportunity to present his case. As a matter of fact, petitioner actively participated in the
proceedings thus negating his contention that he was unfairly deprived of his chance to present
his case.
BARACHINA Arroyo v. Rosal Homeworkers Association, G.R. No. 175155, 22 October 2012.

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PONENTE: MENDOZA, J: DOCTRINE: True enough, the RHAI was

purposely formed to enable the dwellers, including petitioners, to purchase
the lots they were occupying, being the ultimate beneficiaries of the
CMP of the NHMFC. Petitioners, however, must be reminded that they
have to comply with certain requirements and obligations to qualify
as beneficiaries and be entitled to the benefits under the program. Their
unreasonable refusal to join RHAI and their negative response to comply
with their obligations compelled RHAI to either expel them or declare them
as non-members of the association. Petitioners cannot now claim that they
were denied the right to own the portions of land they were occupying for
their homes under the CMP. It should be noted that petitioners were never
prevented from becoming members of RHAI. In fact, they were strongly
encouraged to join and comply with the requirements of the CMP, not only
by the RHAI, but also by the BHA.

FACTS: Respondent Rosal Homeowners Association, Incorporated (RHAI)

is a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines. Its membership is composed mainly of occupants of
a parcel of land with an area of 19,897 square meters, situated in Brgy.
Rosal, Taculing, Bacolod City, and formerly owned by Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIB).

Petitioners Jasmin Alipato, Primitivo Belandres, Nestor Leduna, Anita

de los Reyes, and Gina Caballero (petitioners) were among the actual
occupants of the subject land. They occupied the land by mere tolerance long
before the said land was acquired by PCIB in 1989.

To evade eviction from PCIB and in order to avail of the benefits of acquiring land under the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC), the said occupants formally organized themselves into an association, the RHAI.

With the aid and representation of the Bacolod Housing Authority (BHA), RHAI was able to
obtain a loan from the NHMFC and acquired the subject land from PCIB.

As a consequence, the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City issued a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-202933, covering the 19,897 square-meter land, in the name of RHAI. By virtue of
the land acquisition by RHAI, all the occupants of the land became automatic members of
RHAI.

To fully avail of the benefits of the CMP, the NHMFC required the RHAI members to sign the
Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) and to maintain their membership in good standing in

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accordance with the provisions of the By-Laws of RHAI.

Petitioners, however, refused to sign the LPA as a precondition under the

CMP. They likewise failed to attend the regular meetings and pay their
membership dues as required by the RHAI By-Laws. As a result, RHAI
through its Board of Directors, approved a resolution to enforce the eviction
of petitioners and recover possession of the portions of land which they were
occupying. Pursuant to the said resolution, RHAI, through written letters
of demand, called for petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver
possession thereof to RHAI.

In their Answer, petitioners denied RHAI's claim that they were illegal
occupants of the subject land. They argued that they could not be ejected
from the said property because they were entitled to own the land that they
had occupied for several years prior to RHAI's acquisition of title
therein. They also claimed that RHAI sought their ejectment to
accommodate other persons who were not qualified beneficiaries of the
CMP.

ISSUE: :
1) Whether due process was observed in this case; and
2) Whether petitioners were denied of their right to own a piece of land for
their homes under the socialized housing program of the government

HELD: (1) Yes. It is basic that, as long as a party is given the opportunity
to defend his interest in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this
opportunity to be heard that makes upon the essence of due process. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral argument or pleadings is accorded, there can be no denial of
procedural due process.

In the case at bar, the record reveals that, during the trial on the merits of Civil Case No. 98-
10388, the defendants-appellants were accordingly represented by their counsel on record, Atty.
Allan Zamora. The said counsel was able to cross-examine the witnesses for the plaintiff-
appellee association.

When the RTC rendered its decision adverse to petitioners, the latter were able to seek
reconsideration and avail of their right to appeal to the CA. The CA then required the parties to
Ble their respective pleadings before it rendered a decision denying petitioners' appeal. They
even moved for the reconsideration of the denial of their appeal. Having been able to appeal and
move for a reconsideration of the assailed rulings, petitioners cannot claim a denial of due
process.

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(2) No. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence
thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.

The records of this case disclose that there was a board resolution issued for
the expulsion of the erring or defaulting members of RHAI. The latter were
duly informed that they were already expelled as members of the
association through notices sent to them. These notices, however, were
refused to be received by petitioners. Their expulsion was made pursuant to
the By-Laws of RHAI as shown by the testimony of Mildred de la Peña
(Dela Peña), President.

There is nothing irregular when they were expelled for non-payment of dues
and for non-attendance of meetings. This is expressly sanctioned by the By-
Laws of RHAI.

Petitioners' refusal to sign and submit the LPA, the most important
requirement of the NHMFC for the acquisition of the land, disqualified them
as loan beneficiaries. As such, they acquire no better rights than mere
occupants of the subject land.

In any case, the due process guarantee cannot be invoked when no

vested right has been acquired. The period during which petitioners
occupied the lots, no matter how long, did not vest them with any right to
claim ownership since it is a fundamental principle of law that acts of possessory character
executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the
running of the period of acquisitive prescription.
RIVAZ Ombudsman v. Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, 22 June 2010.
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE: In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual

administratively liable is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean
preponderant proof as in civil cases, but such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.

FACTS: Zaldarriaga was the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Lemery, Iloilo.
November 16, 1998, the COA conducted an audit examination of the accountabilities of
respondents cash and accounts covering the period 1997 to 1998. Based on the audit conducted,
the COA auditors prepared a report showing a deficiency of 4.7 million pesos. Respondent was

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asked to restitute the deficiency but he failed to do so. Subsequently, COA

filed a Letter-Complaint. respondent contested the findings of the COA
auditors alleging that it was inaccurate, incorrect, and devoid of merit.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Treasurer also conducted its own
investigation. Its findings did not indicate any shortage but, instead, pointed
out that had the mayor, treasurer, and accountant observed COA Rules
and Regulations in the proper disbursement of funds, the irregularity would
not have been committed. Respondent then sought for the dismissal of the
complaint filed against him on the ground that the latest COA report
dated May 25, 2000 indicated that there was no shortage. However, the
Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing respondent
from government service for dishonesty. The CA reversed the decision
of the latter hence the said petition for review on certiorari.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner argues that the COA findings that respondent
failed to account for the shortage and his unjustified release of
cash advances constitute sufficient basis for his dismissal.
These findings were duly supported by records from
respondent’s own office, and, as such, could not have been
merely contrived in order to implicate him. Petitioner insists that
respondent was given ample time and opportunity to refute
and rebut the charges against him and was provided documents
supporting the audit findings. Despite being fully apprised
of the details of the charges against him, respondent failed to
present countervailing evidence in his favor; instead,
respondent was content on simply denying the adverse findings
of the COA.

Petitioner maintains that the zero-balance reflected in State Auditor Melocoton’s

report, which was prepared two years after the first COA audit, cannot negate the
latter’s finding of cash shortage, considering that Melocoton’s report is defective.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Respondent argued, among other things, that the Office of the Ombudsman erred
(1) in ruling that the amount of ₱4,711,463.82 was lost, despite the absence of
substantial evidence on how the COA Auditors reached the conclusion; (2) in
failing to declare that the audit conducted by the COA Auditors was incomplete,
inaccurate, replete with errors, and in violation of the COA Rules and Regulations;
and (3) in dismissing him from the service notwithstanding the absence of
substantial evidence.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in holding that the Ombudsman’s dismissal was not based on sufficient
evidence?

HELD: NO.
Petition is bereft of merit. In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an
individual administratively liable is substantial evidence.

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evidence lacked that degree of certainty because the entries in the two audit
examinations yielded conflicting results. In the first report, the alleged
shortage is 4.7M. However, in the succeeding report it was reflected that there
was no balance during the last (the first) audit. These discrepancies cannot
be ignored. Evidence of shortage is imperative to hold respondent. Here, the
evidence could not be relied upon. The second report puts into question the
reliability of the first. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the
second audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated, the
credibility and accuracy of the two reports were already tarnished. A
separate and more thorough audit would be required to dispel any
uncertainties and to arrive at respondent’s true and correct accountability.
The shortage of funds was clearly not indubitably established. Until such
audit is conducted, the two audit reports cannot be used to prove or disprove
any shortage in respondent’s cash and accounts.

Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary

to support a finding of liability. In the instant case, the evidence submitted to
conclude that respondent was administratively liable is sorely wanting.
OCENAR Nacion v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204757, 17 March 2015.
PONENTE: J. Reyes

DOCTRINE: In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process

is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have
in support of his defense.

FACTS: The FAIO (Fraud Audit and Investigation Office) was conducting an inquiry upon
MWSS personnel in the agency of a certain employee. Later, the COA Chairman filed an
administrative charge against petitioner Atty. Janet Tan for acts committed by her when she was
still assigned to COA-MWSS (Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System) for the following:
(1) receiving benefits and/or bonuses through unrecorded checks and irregularly issued
disbursement vouchers, (2) availing of the MWSS Housing Project which awarded her a lot at
the MWSS Employees Housing Project, and (3) availing of the car loan. Notably, did not
request for a formal investigation. She admitted availing the latter two but claimed that she was
in honest belief that she was not prohibited from doing so. The COA later found her guilty of
grave misconduct and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. The penalty was
mitigated by her not requesting a formal investigation and admittance of the two charges.

PETITIONER’s ARGUMENTS: argued that the COA acted beyond its jurisdiction and in
violation of her right to due process when the records during her tenure with the MWSS were
included by the audit team in its investigations, when it should not have been. Thus, she claimed
that she was deprived of her right to due process when the investigating team acted beyond its
jurisdiction in including the benefits she received during her term.

The COA found guilty and denied her motion to reconsider. Hence, she filed the present petition
to the SC.

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ISSUE: WON was deprived of her right to due process?

RULING: No. Contrary to ’s claim, the COA did not act beyond its
jurisdiction. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is the
opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have
in support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met
when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered.

Thus, given this and the circumstances under which the rulings of the COA
were issued, the Court held there was no violation of ’s right to due process.
As the OSG correctly argued, the constitution of a separate fact-finding
team specifically for ’s case was not necessary for the satisfaction of such
right. Further, , despite a chance, did not request for a formal investigation;
but in any case, she was still accorded before the COA a reasonable
opportunity to present her defenses, through her answer to the formal
charge and eventually, motion for reconsideration of the COA’s decision.
PERALTA Cabal v. Kapunan, G.R. No. L-19052, 29 December 1962.
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, J.

DOCTRINE: Proceedings for the forfeiture of property are deemed

criminal and penal and hence, the exemption of the defendants in criminal
cases from the obligation to be a witness against themselves are
applicable thereto.

FACTS: Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National

Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of
Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth,
and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created
a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner
herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for
Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to
the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to
refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner
respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.

Respondent filed a motion to quash upon the ground that the Committee had no power to order
and require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col.
Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner’s constitutional
right against self-incrimination.

The judge denied said motion to quash. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and
prohibition in the SC. In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation

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being conducted by the Committee above referred to is administrative, not

criminal, in nature.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Petitioner objected to the

order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Respondent filed a motion to

quash upon the ground that the Committee had no power to
order and require petitioner to take the witness stand
and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as
witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates
petitioner’s constitutional right against self- incrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order requiring petitioner to take the witness
stand violates his constitutional right against self- incrimination.

HELD: Yes, Although the said Committee was created to investigate the
administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the
charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law,
which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been
held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence,
proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and,
hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against
themselves are applicable thereto.

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This
prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to
criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for
forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which
the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.

ALCALA Mendoza vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 195395, 10 September 2013.

Doctrine: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Facts: The Commission on Audit ordered petitioner Mendoza, the general manager of Talisay

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Water District, to refund to the government amounts he had received as salary

in violation of the Salary Standardization Law. The said law grants water
districts the power to fix the compensation of their respective general
managers, but it should be consistent with RA 6758 or the “Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.” The Commission found
that the petitioner's salary as general manager was not in consonance with the
rate prescribed under RA 6758.

On July 6, 2009, the COA issued the “Notice of Finality of COA

Decision” informing Mendoza of the finality of the Notice of
Disallowance/s. Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
assailing the finality of the said notice. He argued that he had not personally
received a copy of the said notice. This deprived him of the opportunity to
answer the Notice immediately.

Issues:

(1) Whether the Notice of Disallowance/s became final and

executory despite lack of personal service on petitioner Mendoza

(2) Does this violate his right to due process?

Ruling:

(1) Yes. It was found that the Notice of Disallowance/s had

been received by Mendoza’s employee and is thus deemed to have been received
constructively. The service of the Notice of Disallowance/s can be likened to that of a
service of summons. As a general rule, summons must be personally served on the
person to whom it is directed, but substituted service is allowed in certain cases. In
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. Substantial compliance is sufficient.

(2) No. Under Sec. 5 of Rule IV of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Audit, the notice of disallowance shall be given to the ff: (1) original
to the head of agency being audited; (2) one copy to the Auditor for his record; (3) one
copy to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency of the government under
audit; (4) other copies to the agency officials directly affected by the audit findings.
Under Sec. 6, the said order or decision shall become final upon the expiration of 6
months after notice unless a request for reconsideration or an appeal is filed. All of
these were complied with as copies of the Notice of Disallowance/s were received on
May 29, 2007. After the receipt of the Notice of Finality of COA Decision on August

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27, 2009, petitioner Mendoza filed the Motion for

Reconsideration dated September 10, 2009. The Commission on
Audit gave due course to the Motion for Reconsideration and
issued the assailed Decision 2 years after the issuance of the Notice
of Disallowance/s. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard. In the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous
notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he was not denied due process.

MENDENILLA Civil Service Commission vs. Almojuela, G.R. No. 194368, 2 April
2013.

DOCTRINE:
The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings (such as the BJMP investigation) is
simply the opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Where a party has been given the opportunity to
appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, defects in procedural due process may be
cured.

FACTS:

The present administrative case, filed against Desk Officer/ Supervisor SJO2
Almojuela, sprang from the escape of a detention prisoner in the Makati City Jail. A
BJMP Investigation Report conducted on the incident concluded that SJO2 Almojuela
and the rest of the jail officers on third shift custodial duty all colluded to facilitate
Lao’s getaway. SJO2 Almojuela and JO1 Loyola moved for the reconsideration of
Director Walit’s decision, which the latter denied for lack of merit in a Joint Resolution
dated June 21, 2006. In Administrative Case No. 04-11, CESO IV Director Arturo
Walit, the BJMP hearing officer, rendered his decision dated December 13, 2005,
finding SJO2 Almojuela guilty of Grave Misconduct and were meted the penalty of
dismissal from the service. SJO2 Almojuela then appealed his conviction before the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed Director Walit’s decision in its
Resolution No. 080701. The CSC subsequently denied SJO2 Almojuela’s motion for

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reconsideration. SJO2 Almojuela’s next recourse was a petition for

review before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
partially granted SJO2 Almojuela’s motion for reconsideration, and
lowered his liability from grave to simple misconduct. CSC
appealed to the SC the decision of the CA. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether SJO2 Almojuela had been deprived of due process
when he was not allowed to present his evidence and
witnesses during the BJMP investigation.

HELD:
No, SJO2 Almojuela was afforded due process in the
BJMP investigations. The SC support the CA’s conclusion
that SJO2 Almojuela was accorded the right to due process
during the BJMP investigation. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings (such as the BJMP
investigation) is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side,
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Where a party has been given the
opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured. In SJO2
Almojuela’s case, he was informed of the charges against him, and was given
the opportunity to refute them in the counter-affidavit and motion for
reconsideration he filed before the BJMP hearing officer, in the appeal and
motion for reconsideration he filed before the CSC, in his petition for review on
certiorari, in his memorandum on appeal, and, finally, in the motion for
reconsideration he filed before the CA. In particular, SJO2 Almojuela admitted
in his comment that he narrated in his counteraffidavit the circumstances that,
to his knowledge, transpired immediately before Lao’s breakout. The Motion
for Reconsideration to the CA’s original decision contained the additional piece
of evidence that SJO2 Almojuela claimed would have exculpated him from

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liability: Captain Fermin Enriquez’s testimony during his cross-

examination in Criminal Case No. 3320236, filed against SJO2
Almojuela for conniving with or consenting to evasion under
Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. This piece of evidence
was reiterated in the comment SJO2 Almojuela filed
before this Court. Notably, SJO2 Almojuela repeteadly
mentioned ‘other witnesses and other documentary
exhibits’ that he would have presented to absolve him from
liability,68 but the only piece of evidence he submitted in his
Motion for Reconsideration and Comment was Captain
Enriquez’s testimony. These circumstances sufficiently
convince us that SJO2 Almojuela had been given ample
opportunity to present his side, and whatever defects might
have intervened during the BJMP investigation have
been cured by his subsequent filing of pleadings before
the CSC, the CA, and before SC.

BAQUIRAN Globe Telecom v. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004.

Globe Telecom Inc. vs. The National Telecommunications

Commission and Smart Communications Inc.

G.R No. 143964 26 July 2004

Justice Tinga

FACTS:

Globe and private respondent Smart are both grantees of valid and subsisting
legislative franchises, authorizing them to operate Cellular Mobile Telephone System utilizing
the Global System for Mobile Communication technology. Among the inherent services
supported by the GSM networks is the Short Message Services also known as “texting”, which
has attained immense popularity in the Philippines as a mode of electronic communication.

On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with the NTC, praying that the NTC order
the immediate interconnection of Smart’s and Globe’s GSM networks, particularly their
respective SMS services. The Complaint arose from the inability of the two leading CMTS

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providers to effect interconnection. Smart alleged that globe maliciously

refused to grant Smart’s request for the interconnection of SMS.

On 7 June 1999, the NTC issued a Show Cause Order,

informing Globe of the Complaint. Globe filed its Answer with Motion
to Dismiss, interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smart’s
failure to comply with the condition precedent required in Sec 6 of NTC
Memo Circular 9-7-93, and its omission of the mandatory
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

The NTC declared that both Smart and Globe have been
providing SMS without authority from it, in violation of Section 420(f) of
MC 8-9-95 which requires PTEs intending to provide value-added services
to secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative process.
The NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease-and-
Desist Order, and instead directed the parties to secure the requisite authority
to provide SMS within 30 days, subject to the payment of fine in the amount
of Php 200 from the date of violation and for every day during which violation
continues.

Globe filed with the CA to nullify the Order and to prohibit the
NTC from taking any further action in the case.

ISSUE:

Globe contends that the CA erred in holding that the NTC has the
power under Sec 17 of the Public Service Law to subject Globe to an administrative sanction and
a fine without prior notice and hearing in violation of the due process requirements.

Petitioner:

1.

Respondent:

1.

HELD:

1. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars

promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent

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determination should be made with proper regard for due

process and in conformity with the PTA.

2. The assailed Order violates due process for failure to

sufficiently explain the reason for the decision render, for
being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for
imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on
Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which
would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its
behalf.

The Petition is GRANTED.

MENDOZA Heirs of Derla vs. Derla vda. De Hipolito, G.R. No. 157717,
13 April 2011.

FACTS:

PETITIONERS are surviving heirs of Maximino Derla,

RESPONDENT CATALINA is cousin of Derla. RESPONDENT

owned 23.9 ha fishpond area. 20.5 ha was originally maintained by Derla.
Derla subsequently executed a SPA to Catalina wherein his rights are
recognized and that Catalina owns one half of the fishpond. Derla soon
sold all his interests to CATALINA for 10k. The fishpond application for the 20.5 ha fishpond
bought from Derla was soon filed.

Derla filed his own application over a 7.5 ha fishpond area adjoining HIPOLITO’S fishpond
area. On November 21, 1960, Catalina charged Derla with Qualified for gathering and
carrying away fish from Catalina’s fishpond.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS

Derla, in his defense, claimed that he was still part-owner of the fishpond when he harvested
the fish. On the strength of the "Transfer of Rights in Fishpond Permit" and Hipolito’s Affidavit
that he and Derla are co-owners of the fishpond and that he promised to pay Derla after the
settlement of the fishpond boundary conflict, the court acquitted Derla on November 29,
1960.

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Director of Fisheries approved the application but was reversed by Sec.

of Agri due to appeal by Catalina.

Derla now sought the CFI for a “Declaration of Nullity of Transfer of Right in
a Fishpond Permit” but was dismissed on the grounds of
prescription and estoppel, since it has now been 10 years, action to annul
contract has prescribed and estoppel because that document was used
to acquit him in the earlier criminal case.

CFI’S CONTENTIONS

The CFI held that the prescriptive period to bring an action to annul a
contract based on fraud, mistake or want of consideration should
be counted from the date of discovery, and in case of public documents, the
date of discovery is the date the public document was executed. The
CFI held that since the Transfer of Rights in Fishpond Permit was
executed in 1953, the action to annul has prescribed.

Office of the President affirmed the decision by the Agri Sec. on the
fishpond application. But the application for the fishpond area was
opposed by Panabo, saying this will affect their development as
directed by RA 5743. This claim was denied by the Office of the
President.

Appeal by Derla to the CA and SC denied.

COURT’S CONTENTIONS
SC decision became final and executory. (RULED IN FAVOR OF CATALINA-
RESPONDENT)

Panabo filed for Certiorari w/ Prelim Injunction to assail the application of Catalina. In the
midst of the case, President Marcos commented via a letter to Sec. Zamora that the sale of
the fishpond area will affect the developments in Panabo. OP revoked its former decisions on
granting the application to Catalina. Catalina then filed for Certiorari w/Preliminary Injunction.
Latter relied was granted.

After EDSA, she filed a petition with the OP saying she was a victim of the Marcos regime’s
schemes, as to her fishpond application. It was referred to the Sec. of Agri who found for
Catalina, saying that she was not afforded due process in denying her the sales application.

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S CONTENTIONS

November 11, 1991 Order by the OP: Deciding in Catalina’s favor, the
Office of the President held that the late Hipolito, having complied with
all the terms and conditions for an award of the subject fishpond area,
had already acquired a vested right therein. The Office of the
President also applied the doctrine of res judicata as its February 5, 1974
decision rejecting Hipolito’s fishpond sales application was based
on then President Marcos’ marginal note, which it found to be legally
and constitutionally suspect for having been issued after the February 11
and November 2, 1972 decisions had become final and executory. The
Office of the President also ruled on the prohibition under Presidential
Decree No. 43, saying that the SANR at that time directed the
continuance of the processing of the pending fishpond sales
application subject to a final inspection and verification.

Petitioners once again came into the picture but BOTH THE RTC
AND COURT OF APPEALS denied the petitioners’ claims on the ground
of res judicata. The lower courts have similarly held that the annulment of
the titles, as sought by the petitioners, relied on the same facts and
evidence that were already presented and passed upon in the earlier
O.P. Case No. 4732; thus, barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

ISSUE: WON the action for annulment of title of the petitioners can still
prosper

HELD – No.
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we enumerated the elements of res judicata as follows:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration
of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially
between the same parties.

The petitioners assert that there can be no res judicata as the November 11, 1991 decision
in O.P. Case No. 4732 is null and void for having overturned an earlier final and executory
decision and for not giving them an opportunity to be heard. Instead of explaining to this
Court why the elements of res judicata are not present in this case, the petitioners decided to
once again reiterate their worn-out arguments, discussed above, on why the November 11,
1991 decision should not be accorded validity.

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The November 11, 1991 Decision in O.P. Case No. 4732 has attained
finality twenty (20) years ago. It is valid and binding. In fact, on April 27,
1995, the Office of the President issued an Order for the sole purpose of
declaring its November 11, 1991 decision final and executory.
This Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment,
no matter how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court:
There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res
judicata in this case. The parties, although later substituted by their
respective successors-in-interest, have been the same from the very
beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the subject fishpond area.
The concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly ruled on the
rights to the subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents covering
it, and even the actions associated and related to it. The subject fishpond
area is undoubtedly the same subject matter involved in O.P. Case
No. 4732 and the petition now before us. With regard to the identity of the
causes of action, this Court, in Mendiola v. Court of Appeals held that:
The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but
on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former
and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in the
aforesaid cases is of no moment. x x x.
While it is true that this Court has declared that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not
to the exercise of administrative powers,we have also limited the latter
to proceedings purely administrative in nature. Therefore, when the
administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the
doctrine of res judicata certainly applies.
As this Court held in Fortich v. Corona:
The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive
or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of
courts having general judicial powers.

GATZ Encinas vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 187317, 11 April 2013.

Facts: Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They
claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner – who was then Provincial Fire
Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos
(₱5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-
flung areas. Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be transferred to the
Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug Fire
Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000,
in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came up short and managed to give only two

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thousand pesos (₱2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with

the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner
issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang
to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.3

Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed with

the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP Complaint) on
27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Act of 1990. However, this complaint was later dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.

On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts, respondents

likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga
(CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City,6
their Joint Affidavit/Complaint (CSCRO Complaint).7 This time, they
accused petitioner of violation of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Subsequently, the CSCRO issued its Decision dated 30 July 2004, finding
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from
service. Later, the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.

Petitioner argues that respondents are guilty of forum- shopping for filing two
allegedly identical Complaints in violation of the rules on forum-shopping.76 He explains that
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service—
charges included in the CSCRO Complaint—were charges that were equivalent to the BFP
Complaint, the subject of which was his alleged violation of R.A. 6975 or illegal transfer of
personnel

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not there is forum shopping.

Held: No.

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed

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for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.79 (Emphasis
supplied)

Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of
the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO
Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.

The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of
administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely
administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take
on a quasi-judicial character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking

and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the
evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a
determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what
the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending
parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the
adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.

In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were
purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against
petitioner.

ROJAS Globe vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152063, 12 August 2003

Doctrine: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-

judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

Facts: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications

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Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular 13- 6-2000, promulgating

rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications
services. The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15
days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation newspaper.
Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to
the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile
telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the
Memorandum Circular.Then the NTC issued a Memorandum to all
cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing
of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum
addressed to all public telecommunications entities reminding them that
the validity of all prepaid cards and SIM packs sold and used by
subscribers of prepaid cards, respectively, sold on 7 October 2000 and
beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use.

Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as

unconstitutional with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. A motion to dismiss was filed by
the NTC on the ground of petitioner’s to exhaust administrative
remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA
reversed RTC.

Petitioner’s Contention: The NTC has no jurisdiction to

regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law.

Respondent’s Contention: Filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of

petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether or not CA gravely erred in holding that petitioners failed to exhaust an available
administrative remedy?

Ruling: Yes.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of

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the granting statute and the doctrine of non- delegability and

separability of powers.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by

an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of
the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-
judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut
Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, 20 it was held:

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a

party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor
General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The
resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-
making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of
administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function
is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners
sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and
deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular
No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their protests to the
proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position
papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. 21
After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 2000 22 and July 5,
2000, 23 asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. These
letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the second
assailed Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken
by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting
them to seek judicial relief.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

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However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a

rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of
its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of
rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts.

LOO [PAGE 7]
C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. V. HIBIONADA, G.R.
NO. 80916, 9 NOVEMBER 1990.

FACTS: The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville

Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private
respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments having been
completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to
the subject land. When neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville
complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance
and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental.

The two defendants each filed an answer with cross- claim and
counterclaim. The plaintiff filed a reply and answered the counterclaims. Pre-
trial was scheduled and heard and trial briefs were submitted by
Pleasantville and Diongon. The case was set for initial hearing.

It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
contending that the competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. The motion was heard and Diongon later filed an opposition. On September
17, 1987, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: The competent body to hear and decide the case was the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

CONTENTION OF THE DEFENDANT:

- the complaint for specific performance with damages was justiciable under the Civil
Code and so came under the jurisdiction of the regular courts under B.P. 129;
- supposing that only the regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the
Civil Code, to the exclusion of the quasi-judicial bodies.

ISSUE: Whether or not Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has the proper jurisdiction
over the case.

HELD: YES. The complaint for specific performance and damages was improperly filed with
the respondent court, jurisdiction over the case being exclusively vested in the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board.

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It is clear from Section 1(c) of PD No. 1344 that the complaint for specific
performance with damages filed by Diongon with the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Occidental comes under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking
specific performance of the seller's obligation to deliver to him the
corresponding certificate of title.

P.D. No. 1344, SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate

the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and

statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under
the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times.
There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this
function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-
judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the
principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under
their particular expertise.

VARGAS Radio Communication of the Philippines v. National

Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 93237, 6 November 1992.

Doctrine: Jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, are limited to

those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and
ineffective

Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two rush telegrams
through petitioner RCPI to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-
law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte regarding the death of one Manong Poling, including the day of
interment. Said telegrams failed to reach their destinations on the expected dates and so the
petitioner filed a complaint in the NTC for the latter’s alleged poor service. RCPI contends that
NTC has no jurisdiction over the case and sought the complaint’s dismissal but was denied. The
NTC then ruled in favour of the private respondent and imposed a fine against RCPI. The latter
filed this petition for review on the ground that the NTC does not have the power to impose fines
and that its power is limited to the fixing of rates. The Office of the Solicitor General claims that
the power and authority of the NTC to impose fines is incidental to its power to regulate public
service utilities and to supervise telecommunications facilities which are stated in Executive
Order No. 546.

Issue: Does the NTC have the power to impose fines?

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Held: NTC has no jurisdiction to impose fines. No substantial change has

been brought about by EO No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's
Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit
grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities,
including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate
service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the
supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no
alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law
that: Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the
rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like
respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any
order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective .
BUGAYONG Suntay v. People
G.R. No. G.R. No. L-9430, 29 June 1957.

Facts: On 26 June 1954, a certain Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla,
a minor of 16 years, filed a complaint for seduction against petitioner,
Emilio Suntay, in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City. The
petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A.,
where he is at present enrolled in school. After preliminary
investigation had been conducted, private prosecutor filed a motion praying
the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be
concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused
brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The Court
granted the motion, and the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the
petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against
him. In his answer, counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that
the action taken by him be reconsidered.

Petitioner’s Contention: The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court
directing the department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the" petitioner
"may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law,"
may be carried out only "through the cancellation of his passport," the said order is illegal
because while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a
passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first
instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be
cancelled." The petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has
discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after

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hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within
the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be
deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not there is abuse of discretion in the part of respondent

Secretary in cancelling the passport of petitioner.

Ruling: No. True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised
at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal
charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant City Attorney
recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed
and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no
final action had been taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the
case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly
leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be
interpreted to mean as a deliberate attemption his part to flee from justice,
and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the
law should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in
question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice
would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound
discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.

Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But
where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts
and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it
upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his
passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution;
and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of
because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with
the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex
parte would be violative of the said clause.

Doctrine: When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically

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pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding

may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules.
(Section 6, Rule 124.)

TRILLANA Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 112024, 28 January 1999.

FACTS: Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), settled its

total income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985 by
applying its tax credit memos. However, it incurred losses so it declared no
tax payable for the year when it filed its year-end Annual Income Tax
Returns. Nevertheless in 1985 and 1986, PBCom earned rental income
from leased properties in which the lessees withheld and remitted to the
BIR withholding creditable taxes
On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the CIR for a tax credit for the
overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on
July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes
withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 and 1986. Pending the
investigation, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA which denied
the claims of the petitioner for tax refund and tax credits for 1985 for
filing beyond the two-year reglementary period. CTA also denied the claim
for refund for 1986 on the speculation that petitioner had automatically
credited against its tax payment in the succeeding year. CA affirmed CTA’s
decision. Hence, this petition for review.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet
barred by prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-
85issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by
the two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or
tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under
Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner argues that the government is barred from asserting a position contrary to its
declared circular if it would result to injustice to taxpayers.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through the Solicitor General, argues that
the two-year prescriptive period for filing tax cases in court concerning income tax payments
of Corporations is reckoned from the date of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax Return,
which is generally done on April 15 following the close of the calendar year.

Further, respondent Commissioner stresses that when the petitioner filed the case before the
CTA on November 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such
failure is fatal to petitioner’s cause of action.

OTHERS? LIKE OSG, IF ANY:

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ISSUE

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for
tax refund or tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite petitioner's
reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to
ten years?

2.Whether or not CA erred in affirming CTA’s decision denying its

claim for refund of tax overpaid in 1986, based on mere speculation,
without proof, that PBCom availed of the automatic tax credit in 1987.

HELD:

1. It is the Tax Code which provides for the prescription for claims
for refund or tax credit. RMC 7-85 changed the prescriptive period of
two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments.
This circular is inconsistent with the provision of Sec 230, NIRC of 1977.
The BIR, in issuing said circular did not simply interpret the law;
rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.
Rules and regulations issued by the administrative officials to implement
a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. Since RMC 7-
85 issued by the BIR is an administrative interpretation which is contrary to
the provision of the statute, it cannot be given weight and the State cannot be
put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.

2. Sec. 69 of the 1977 NIRC 29 (now Sec. 76 of the 1997 NIRC) provides
that any excess of the total quarterly payments over the actual income tax
computed in the adjustment or final corporate income tax return, shall
either(a) be refunded to the corporation, or (b) may be credited against the
estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the quarters of the
succeeding taxable year.

The corporation must signify in its annual corporate adjustment return (by marking the option
box provided in the BIR form) its intention, whether to request for a refund or claim for an
automatic tax credit for the succeeding taxable year. To ease the administration of tax collection,
these remedies are in the alternative, and the choice of one precludes the other.

The CTA examined the adjusted final corporate annual income tax return for taxable year 1986
and found out that petitioner opted to apply for automatic tax credit. This was the basis used
together with the fact that the 1987 annual corporate tax return was not offered by the petitioner
as evidence by the CTA in concluding that petitioner had indeed availed of and applied the
automatic tax credit to the succeeding year, hence it can no longer ask for refund, as the two
remedies of refund and tax credit are alternative.

DOCTRINE: Basic is the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the nation. The primary
purpose is to generate funds for the State to finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the
common weal. Due process of law under the Constitution does not require judicial proceedings
in tax cases. This must necessarily be so because it is upon taxation that the government chiefly

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relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost

importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of taxes
levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible.

END OF FIRST
BATCH

STILL ON PAGE 7
8. Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power distinguished from Quasi-Legislative and Investigative Powers.

9. Doctrine of Separation of Powers.

Cases:

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Belgica v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati

FACTS: Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that
the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

DECISION: Partly Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the constitution. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional.

Neri v. Senate Committees

G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2007 & 4 September 2008.

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for

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his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when
they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in- chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself.
The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials”
necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

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Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from
the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

Burca v. Republic
G.R. No. L-24252, 30 January 1967.
Facts:
Zita Ngo is a Chinese national born in Surigao in 1933 from Chinese parents. In 1961, she married Florencia Burca, who is a
native Filipino. She filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen claiming that her
subsequent marriage to a Filipino makes her eligible for naturalization under CA 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law. The
Solicitor General opposed the granting of said petition . The lower court granted Burca’s petition, hence this appeal.

Issue:
W/N the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or official, to determine the citizenship of an
alien wife

Held:

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No. The proper forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the
province where the petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition".
It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given the status of a citizen
should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this is so, is exemplified by the fact that this
Court has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the court of first instance, where an
alien woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor. And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization
Law empowers any other office, agency, board or official, to determine such question, we are persuaded to
say that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the competent courts. We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien
woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a
petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed
in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of
the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or
otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien
wife of a Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

Lambino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006

D. Remedies against Administrative Actions

1. Administrative Appeals and Review:

APPEALS AND REVIEW
Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the administrative agency may
be taken to the Department Head, whose decision may further be brought to the regular courts of justice, in accordance
with the procedure specified by the law. The appellate administrative agency may even conduct additional hearings in
the appealed case, if deemed necessary.

PERIOD: Sec. 7 of Article 9 (A) of the 1987 Consti., in part substantially provides that any decision, order, or ruling of
any Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the SC on CERTIORARI within 20 days from the
receipt of a copy.

If issued by COMELEC en banc - must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.
(Sec. 1, Rule 64 - governs the review of final judgment and orders of the COMELEC or Commission on Audit.)

(a) where provided by law;

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(b) by virtue of the power of control by the President;

(c) appellate administrative agencies; and

(d) judicial review.

2. Doctrine of Administrative Res Judicata. Decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

Cases:

Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 79538, 18 October 1990.

Magalang v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 190566, 11 December 2013.

FACTS: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In December 2008, he committed an error
counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension that arose between the two, they were invited to the casino’s Internal
Security Office in order to air their respective sides. He was required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009, he was issued a
memo charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day suspension was imposed. He filed
MR seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for Production to be furnished with documents relative to the case. Both
were denied. He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper
procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he
did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not

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within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being
premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA.

ISSUE: WON CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

RULING: CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non- exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her.

Exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the
subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review
is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative
cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension
for not more than 30 days.

The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. An appeal and a special civil
action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as
the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive.

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Heirs of Derla vs. Derlavda. De Hipolito

G.R. No. 157717, 13 April 2011.
Case intro (not that important but may be asked):
Maximo Derla(Respondent Catalina’s cousin) and Ricardo Hipolito (Catalinas husband) entered into
several agreements regarding the subject fishpond maintained by Derla. Derla acknowledges the right
of Hipolito over the subject property wherein Hipolito bears all the expenses in relation to the fish pond.
Thereafter, Derla trainsfered all his rights to Hipolito for P 10, 000.00. Hipolito filed Fishpond application
on the aforementioned property. Derla also filed his own over a fishpond adjoining Hipolito’s. Hipolito
charged Derla with Qualified Theft before the then Justice of the Peace Court of Panabo for gathering
and carrying away fish from Hipolito’s fishpond. Derla, in his defense, claimed that he was still part owner of
the fishpond when he harvested the fish. The court acquitted Derla. The Director of Fisheries approved
Derla’s application. Hipolito appealed with the Secretary of Agriculture to include Derla’s property to his
pond. The petition was granted. Derla filed a complaint for “Declaration of Nullity of Transfer of Right in a
Fishpond Permit'' against Hipolito before the Court of First Instance but this was dismissed on the
ground of estoppel and prescription.
Facts:
Pursuant to RA 5743, Hipolito filed Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands over the subject fishpond.
The Municipality of Panabo opposed Hipolito’s application on the ground that it would disrupt the
development of Panabo. The Sec of Agri and Natural Resources however, recommended the
denial of this opposition. The Office of the President ruled in favor of Hipolito. The Motions filed by the
Municipality were dismissed. The Municipality of Panabo (MoP) filed with CFI of Tagum for Certiorari.
The Office of the President (Marcos) then revoked the ruling on Hipolito’s application and ordered the
transfer of the subject fishpond area to the Municipality of Panabo upon payment of the expenses incurred by
Hipolito. Hipolito’s motion to reconsider this decision was denied. Hipolito filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CFI of Davao, praying for the declaration of nullity of the order. Despite this injunction, the MoP leased the portions of
the subject property. Subsequently, the CFI of Davao dismissed Hipolito’s petition. The case was also dismissed by the CA.
After the EDSA Revolution, Catalina filed a petition with the Office of the President for the Revival of the Fishpond Sales
Application of her late husband alleging that she was a victim of the Marcos Regime and her fishpond was taken away from her
despite a final and executory decision in her favor. The OP ruled in her favor but ordered her to pay the P100,000 reimbursement
from MoP.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the Annulment and Cancellation of Original Certificates of Title. The was dismissed by RTC and
CA on the basis of Res Judicata.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the Hipolitos were not accorded due process when they were deprived of the subject fishpond area in favor
of the Municipality of Panabo.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were accorded due process.
3. Whether or not Res Judicata applies in the case.

Held:

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1. Yes. The Ministry found that Hipolitos were not accorded due process when the OP revoked the ruling
on Hipolito’s application and ordered the transfer of the subject fishpond area to the Municipality of
Panabo.
2. Yes. The petitioners cannot deny the fact that though initially, they were not able to participate in O.P.
Case No. 4732, the fact that they were able to file a motion for reconsideration not once, but twice, and
these motions were resolved by the Office of the President, meant that they were given ample opportunity to
be heard. Moreover, a careful reading of the November 11, 1991 Resolution in O.P. Case No. 4732 itself
will show that in resolving Catalina’s petition to revive her late husband’s fishpond sales application, the
Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, had carefully studied the
antecedent facts of the case, and passed upon the rights of all the parties involved, including those of the
petitioners, even before they participated in the said case.
3. Yes. Literally, res judicata means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment.” It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we enumerated the elements of res judicata as follows:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and

d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same parties.

While it is true that this Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
and not to the exercise of administrative powers, we have also limited the latter to proceedings purely administrative in nature.
Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies.

The November 11, 1991 Decision in O.P. Case No. 4732 has attained finality twenty (20) years ago. It is valid and binding. In
fact, on April 27, 1995, the Office of the President issued an Order for the sole purpose of declaring its November 11, 1991
decision final and executory. This Court has held time and again that a final and executory judgment, no matter how erroneous,
cannot be changed even by this Court:

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land. x x x.

There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res judicata in this case. The parties, although later substituted
by their respective successors-in-interest, have been the same from the very beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the

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subject fishpond area. The concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly ruled on the rights to the
subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents covering it, and even the actions associated and related
to it. The subject fishpond area is undoubtedly the same subject matter involved in O.P. Case No. 4732 and the
petition now before us.

Burca v. Republic
G.R. No. L-24252, 30 January 1967.
Facts: Zita Ngo is a Chinese national born in Surigao in 1933 from Chinese parents. In 1961, she married Florencia Burca, who is
a native Filipino. She filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen claiming that her
subsequent marriage to a Filipino makes her eligible for naturalization under CA 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law. The
Solicitor General opposed the granting of said petition . The lower court granted Burca’s petition, hence this appeal.

Issue: W/N the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or official, to determine the citizenship of
an alien wife

Held: No. The proper forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where the
petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition". It is quite plain that the determination of
whether said alien wife should be given the status of a citizen should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That this

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is so, is exemplified by the fact that this Court has taken jurisdiction in one such case originating from the
court of first instance, where an alien woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor. And, as nothing
in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other office, agency, board or official, to determine
such question, we are persuaded to say that resolution thereof rests exclusively with the competent courts. We
accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country
must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth
in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2)
Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year
immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or
official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or
declaring that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma

G.R. No. 122226, 25 March 1998.

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata applies to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers. Thus, proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in nature and, therefore, decisions rendered
in such proceedings can attain finality.

FACTS: Petitioner, a union of route managers, filed a petition for certification election. It was denied by the Med-Arbiter and
affirmed on appeal by the Secretary of Labor and Employment on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees
disqualified from union membership under the first sentence of Article 245 of the Labor Code. The ruling was based on several
previous administrative findings of the DOLE that route managers are managerial employees. Petitioner questions the ruling of

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the DOLE on the ground that administrative determinations do not have the effect of res judicata and that
the ban against managerial employees from forming unions is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative determinations have the effect of res judicata.

RULING: YES. The doctrine of res judicata applies to adversary administrative proceedings. As early
as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, the Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court on the
basis of a prior administrative determination of the same case by the Wage Administration
Service, applying the principle of res judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRC, the Supreme Court applied
the related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that certain jobs at the Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co. were project employments was binding in another case involving another group of
employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., the Supreme Court clarified toward the
end of its opinion that “the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings
and not to the exercise of administrative powers.” Now proceedings for certification election are quasi
judicial in nature and, therefore, decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.

B.F. GoodrichPhilippines, Inc. v. Workmen’s

Compensation Commission
G.R. No. L-38569, 29 March 1988.
The case stemmed from a claim for disability benefits under Workmen’s Compensation Act as amended by Republic Act No.
4119 filed by private respondent Leandro Castro against petitioner company for pulmonary tuberculosis alleged to have been
contracted in the course of his employment resulting in disability for labor.

Facts:
● In 1968, The private respondent filed a claim for Workmen’s Compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation
Section. Thereafter, the private respondent received from the petitioner the sum of P1,327.35 in full payment of his Workmen’s
Compensation claim.
● In 1969, the private respondent filed another claim for Workmen’s Compensation on the basis of the same illness. The
petitioner, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the claim on the ground of res judicata.

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○ The Department of Labor dismissed the claim on the ground of res judicata.
● In 1973, the private respondent filed his third claim for Workmen’s Compensation on the
basis of the same illness with the Department of Labor, Workmen’s Compensation Section.
○ In 1974, the Department of Labor issued an award in favor of the private respondent Leandro
Castro, ordering the petitioner to pay the claimant. However, the award was rendered without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to be heard in a public hearing, thereby barring it from presenting its evidence.
● The petitioner appealed the said award to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission praying
that the same be reversed and rendered null and void and the said claim be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
○ However, the appeal was dismissed by the Commission on the ground that the appeal should have
been filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit.
○ The petitioner moved for reconsideration thereof but the same was dismissed by the Commission.

Issue:
● Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to workmen’s compensation cases.

Held:

● No. The doctrine of res judicata may not be applicable to workmen’s compensation cases.
● According to the Supreme Court, the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with
power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of
error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.
● However, in this case, the former judgement is based on a prohibited or null and void contract.
Therefore, there is no valid judgement which can be predicated on res judicata.
○ While it may be true that respondent claimant Leandro Castro received the sum of P1,377.00 from petitioner which the
former acknowledged as full payment of his Workmen’s Compensation, on a Stipulation of Facts, Agreement and Releases,
nonetheless, such is not his full compensation under the law and the aforesaid document is null and void under Section 7 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.
○ Although as a general rule, admission by the prevailing party of satisfaction of the judgment of the court a quo would
be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the claim, the rule is different in Workmen’s Compensation cases for the law protects the
workingman, his family and his dependents by providing safeguards against dubious agreements. The law does not consider as
valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover under the Act.
Note:
Workmen’s Compensation Law should be construed fairly, reasonably, or liberally in favor of and for the benefit of employees
and their dependents and that all doubts as to rights of compensation should be resolved in their favor and all presumptions
should be indulged in their favor.

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PAGE 8
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or the Alter Ego Doctrine:

Teotico v. Agda
G.R. No. 87437, 29 May 1991.
FACTS: Petitioner, Administrator of the Fiber Industry Development Authority filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition urging to annul the Orders issued by Respondent Judge to prohibit Respondent Judge
from hearing Civil Case No. 88-577. On 2 January 1984, Honorable Cesar Lanuza, then Administrator of
FIDA, an agency attached to the Department of Agriculture, appointed Agda as CHIEF FIBER
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER. The appointment does not indicate any specific station or place of assignment.
The Orders designated Agda as Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA in Charge of FIDA Region I. Order
219 stated that Lanuza temporarily re-assigned Agda in the interest of the service at the main office of the
Administrator to perform special functions which may be assigned to Him. On 9 December 1987, Agda
prepared for filing with the CSC and the Commission on Audit an Urgent Petition to stop the
implementation and Nullify Order 219 alleging that the Special Order is:
a. Devoid of Legal basis as it does not preserve and maintain a status quo before the controversy
b. It is against the interest of public service considering that Lanuza has been cited for 2 cases both involving
dishonesty and abuse of privileges unbecoming a government official.

ISSUE:
A. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered petitioner, to reinstate Agda to his
previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator FIDA Region I.

HELD: A. Agda was not appointed as Administrator but as Chief Development Officer, he was not appointed to any specific
station. He was merely designated as Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II.

a. Since the Order merely designated Agda as Acting Regional Administrator. The rule is that they are terminable at the pleasure
of the appointing authority. He can neither claim a vested right to the station he was not assigned thereat.

Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Chinese General

Hospital and Medical Center
G.R. No. 163123, 15 April 2005.

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Republic v. Lacap
G.R. No. 158253, 2 March 2007.
FACTS: A bidding for a contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare was being held. Lacap, being the
lowest bidder, was awarded with the contract. Upon execution of the contract, Lacap proceeded to with the
project. Lacap was able to fulfill the project and was approved by the Office of the District Engineer when
it issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance. Lacap now sought for the payment for the
completion of the project. However, DPWH withheld the payment after the District Auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that Lacap’s license had
expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The District Engineer sought the legal advice of the
DPWH Legal Department. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department opined that although Lacap’s
license was expired at the time of the execution of the contract, there is no law stating that such facts would
merit nonpayment. Thus, payment should be made to Lacap. However, Lacap’s payment was still
withheld.

Aggrieved, Lacap filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against the petitioner before
the RTC RTC ruled in favor of Lacap. Payment of P457,000 with 12% interest CA affirmed RTC’s ruling
with modification on the interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum computed from June 21, 1995. Hence,
the case at bar.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether Lacap failed to follow the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies? NO, exceptions c. and e. were present

SECONDARY ISSUE: Whether Lacap, a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution
of the contract, is entitled to be paid for completed projects? YES

HELD: (MAIN ISSUE) Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of its contract is
entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply,
because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. Thus, while it is undisputed that the District
Auditor of the COA disapproved respondent’s claim against the Government, and, under Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the
administrative remedy available to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor to the COA itself, the
Court holds that, in view of exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for specific performance and damages was not
prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

(SECONDARY ISSUE) The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine
prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice
to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law. Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim Nemo ex
alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury) states: Art. 22. Every person who

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through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad

G.R. No. 85502, 24 February 1992.
Doctrine: One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other
departments.

Facts: Petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area
covering 29, 500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur for 10 years. Private respondents, Isidro Gilbolingo and
Robustiano Bugtai, filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel the TLA on the
ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. They also filed charges in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss the case on 3 grounds: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had
not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605. Judge

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Abad denied the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration which prompted the petitioner
to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals. However, the same was denied.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the situation falls under one of the exceptions on the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The following are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion:

1. When the question raised is purely legal

2. When the administrative body is in estoppel
3. When the act complained of is patently illegal
4. When there is urgent need for judicial intervention
5. When the claim involved is small
6. When irreparable damage will be suffered
7. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
8. When strong public interest is involved
9. When the subject of the controversy is private land
10. In quo warranto proceedings

Petitioner’s Contention: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied.

Private Respondents’ Contentions: Their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws
do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are
raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public
interest is involved.

Answers to Respondents’ Contentions: The charge involves factual issues that still need gathering of
evidence and investigation; the Court said that the situation does not justify deviation from the doctrine;
determination of this question lies on responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petitioner’s motion?

Ruling: Yes. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers—it illustrates
the trust that shall be placed on such departments for their competence. The DENR is vested with the power and function to
regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forests and to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. The Forest Management Bureau (formerly the
Bureau of Forest Development) has the responsibility to enforce the forestry laws being alleged to be violated by the petitioner in
this case.

Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103953, 25 March 25 1999.

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Nazareno v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000

University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Rasul

G.R. No. 91551, 16 August 1991.

FACTS: On June 26, 1986, plaintiff Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., was appointed by the defendant Board of Regents as Director of
the PGH; that the defendant U.P. Board of Regents intended to have the plaintiff serve his full term, as Director, since any other
arrangement would impede the hospital's development, not to mention the continuity of its service operations. On September 16,
1987, barely two (2) weeks after assuming the presidency of the University of the Philippines defendant Jose V. Abueva
submitted a memorandum to the Board of Regents to reorganize the U.P. Manila including the Philippine General Hospital with a
draft resolution for approval of the Board of Regents, recommending that certain key positions of UP Manila including that of
plaintiff be declared vacant.

On April 29, 1988, defendant Dr.Domingo acting on instruction of defendant Dr. Jose v. Abueva, U.P. President, issued a
memorandum creating the Nomination Committee for the UP-PGH Medical Center Director; that on May 10, 1988, defendant-

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members of the Nomination Committee thus created, are scheduled to nominate plaintiff s replacement
as Director; that consequently on May 2, 1988, plaintiff filed with this Court, his complaint for
Injunction with Preliminary Injunction of temporary restraining Order, seeking to enjoin defendants
Abueva, Domingo, the Nomination Committee and the ITP Board of Regents from proceeding with the
nomination of UP PGH medical Center Director, in order to forestall the consequent removal/dismissal of
the plaintiff Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., incumbent PGH Director, even before the expiration of his term
of office on April 30, 1992 without any cause provided by law.

ISSUE: Whether there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD: No. Because this case has special circumstances that made it fall under the
jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. As the facts show, respondent Dr. Estrella was
about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must have believed that airing his
protest with the Board of Regents would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts,
irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the implementation of the proposed
reorganization.
Respondent Judge, based on the evidence presented, concluded that the reorganization of
PGH was done in bad faith. Accordingly, the lower court ruled that respondent Dr. Estrella
cannot be removed from office as a result of such defective abolition of the position to which he
was appointed. Respondent Judge did not commit any reversible error much less grave abuse
of discretion. The facts as supported by evidence established may no longer be disturbed.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 112708-09, 29 March 1996.

Gabrito v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77976, 24 November1988.

PAGE 9
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Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports

G.R. No. 87687 26 December 1989.

Rullan v. Valdez, G.R. No. L-20031, 28 November 1964.

Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.

G.R. No. 74930, 13 February 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote to respondent GSIS General Manager Belmonte requesting for the list of, or access to, the names of
the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan on P2 million each on guaranty of then-
First Lady Imelda Marcos. The request was made pursuant to the constitutional right of the people to information of public
concern. However, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS denied the request on the ground that it was a confidential matter

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between the GSIS, a financial institution, and all those who borrow from it, and that doing so would be a
breach of confidentiality between GSIS and its customers.

However, since Valmonte had not yet received the reply, petitioners filed the instant special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction, invoking their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed:
(a) To furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) To furnish petitions with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or
(c) To allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT: In his comment, respondent stated that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. The actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees
of the GSIS; however, petitioners did not seek relief from them. Thus, since administrative
remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners had no cause of action.

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT: Petitioners claimed that they raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or
not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence,
the present case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

ISSUE:
WON the present case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING:
YES. Since the issue involved here is the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information which is purely a
legal question, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
warranted.

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to
have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and
convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is
involved.

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The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its
Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the
application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.

Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad

G.R. No. 85502, 24 February 1992
Doctrine: One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other
departments.

Facts: Petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA) to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area
covering 29, 500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur for 10 years. Private respondents, Isidro Gilbolingo and
Robustiano Bugtai, filed a petition with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel the TLA on the
ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. They also filed charges in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss the case on 3 grounds: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had
not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605. Judge

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Abad denied the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration which prompted the petitioner
to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals. However, the same was denied.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the situation falls under one of the exceptions on the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The following are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion:

11. When the question raised is purely legal

12. When the administrative body is in estoppel
13. When the act complained of is patently illegal
14. When there is urgent need for judicial intervention
15. When the claim involved is small
16. When irreparable damage will be suffered
17. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
18. When strong public interest is involved
19. When the subject of the controversy is private land
20. In quo warranto proceedings

Petitioner’s Contention: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied.

Private Respondents’ Contentions: Their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws
do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are
raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public
interest is involved.

Answers to Respondents’ Contentions: The charge involves factual issues that still need gathering of
evidence and investigation; the Court said that the situation does not justify deviation from the doctrine;
determination of this question lies on responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petitioner’s motion?

Ruling: Yes. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers—it illustrates
the trust that shall be placed on such departments for their competence. The DENR is vested with the power and function to
regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forests and to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain. The Forest Management Bureau (formerly the
Bureau of Forest Development) has the responsibility to enforce the forestry laws being alleged to be violated by the petitioner in
this case.

Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 103953, 25 March 25 1999.

Facts: Macario Aro was the former owner of 2 parcels of agricultural land in Barangay Malinta, Dasmarinas, Cavite where the
members of petitioner Samahang Magbubukid Ng Kapdula, Inc. were the tenants. The tenants were evicted when Mr. Aro sold
the said land to Ricardo Silverio for the establishment of a car assembly plant but said plant never materialized.

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The lands were later leased to the spouses, Ruben Rodriguez and Gloria Bugagao, for a term of 7 years and
were then developed into a sugarcane plantation, with the herein private respondents as the regular
farmworkers. PNB acquired the same parcels of land at a Sheriff’s auction sale in 1984.

In 1986, the members of petitioner sought the assistance of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform MAR, through
then Minister Heherson Alvarez, for their reinstatement as farmworkers thereon, but nothing came out of
such efforts. Later, the ownership was transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (―APT‖) which
conveyed the same to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DAR. In furtherance of its
objective of instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR issued CLOA Nos. 1116 and 1117 for the
said parcels of land in favor of the petitioner.

On Petition for Certiorari, which was granted, private respondents assailed the issuance of said CLOAs. The
CA directed DAR to conduct a hearing and/or investigation to determine the rightful beneficiaries of the
subject parcels of land and to cause the cancellation of the CLOA-1116 and 1117 should petitioners be
found not entitled to the subject parcels of land.

Issue: Whether there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

Held: From the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, it can be gleaned that decisions of the DAR Secretary
cannot be questioned before DARAB. Pertinent rules, provide:

―SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and
their implementing rules and regulations.Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the
following:

xxx

(c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary,
lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;‖
(Rule II, DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure)

It is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of DAR officials other than the Secretary.
It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject CLOAs constituted a decision of the Secretary, who issued and signed the same.

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Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private respondents to the respondent court on a petition for
certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is beyond cavil. Under Section 54 of
RA 6657, decisions and awards of the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari.

Time and again, this court has ruled that in cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of available
administrative remedies is unnecessary. The aggrieved party may seek judicial relief outright.

Nazareno v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000

University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Rasul

G.R. No. 91551, 16 August 1991.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 112708-09, 29 March 1996.

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Gabrito v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77976, 24 November1988.

Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports

G.R. No. 87687, 26 December 1989.

FACTS: Sabello was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High
School of the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay highs school was in deficit due to the fact that the students could hardly
pay for their monthly tuition so the barrio council authorized the Sabello to withdraw an amount from the barrio to be deposited
to the City Treasurer’s Office in the name of Talisay Barrio High School. That was a grave error of Sabello as it involves

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disbursement of government funds and its technicalities so Sabello together with the barrio captain, were
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019 and both were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year
and disqualification to hold public office. Sabello appealed his case to the Court of appeals which then
modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-
half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a
lawyer to proceed to the highest court of the land. Sabello was then granted an absolute pardon by the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With the absolute pardon,
Sabello applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a
mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former position after the President’s absolute
pardon.

HELD: Yes, the petition is granted. The question whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his
former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority. RATIO: Taking into consideration that
this petition is filed by a non-lawyer, who claims that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, We also
set aside the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of
the petition. In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the absolute disqualification from
office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that
pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic
reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office. As there are no circumstances that
would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position
of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher. However, the Court cannot grant
his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto this Court
said he is not entitled to automatic reinstatement.

Rullan v. Valdez
G.R. No. L-20031, 28 November 1964.

Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.

G.R. No. 74930, 13 February 1989
TOPIC: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte wrote to respondent GSIS General Manager Belmonte requesting for the list of, oraccess to, the
names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan on P2 million each on guaranty

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of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos. The request was made pursuant to the constitutional right of the people to
information of public concern. However, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS denied the request on
the ground that it was a confidential matter betweenthe GSIS, a financial institution, and all those who
borrow from it, and that doing so would be a breach of confidentiality between GSIS and its customers.
However, since Valmonte had not yet received the reply, petitioners filed the instant special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction, invoking their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed:

(a) To furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

(b) To furnish petitions with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans;
and/or

(c) To allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT: In his comment, respondent stated that petitioners failed to
exhaust
administrative remedies. The actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the
Board of Trustees of the GSIS; however, petitioners did not seek relief from them. Thus, since
administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners had no cause of action.

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT: Petitioners claimed that they raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or
not
they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, the present case falls under
one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

ISSUE: WON the present case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING: YES. Since the issue involved here is the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information which is
purely a legal question, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is warranted. Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the
courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of
law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a
question of law is involved. The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional
right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of
Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.

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RE: RIGHT TO INFORMATION

WON petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS? – YES.
The right to information is not absolute; thus, before the mandamus based on the right to information to
issue, the information sought must be (1) of public interest or public concern, and (2) not exempted by law
from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

As to the first, the information being sought is the truth of reports that certain members of the BP belonging to
the opposition were able to secure clean loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986
election through the intercession of former First Lady Imelda Marcos. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions
from the government and its employees and the administrators of various insurance programs for the
benefit of said employees. Its funds assume a public character; and therefore, there is a legitimate concern
which is to ensure that the funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the
benefits that accrue to the insured government employee. Thus, the public nature of the loanable funds of GSIS
and the public office held by the borrowers make the information sought a matter of public interest and
public concern.
As to the second, the respondent failed to cite any law that grants the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the petition, but instead brought up the right to privacy.
However, the GSIS does not enjoy the right to privacy as it belongs to an individual in his private capacity,
not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right is purely personal in nature and
may only be invoked by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. Even if the borrowers (Batasang
Pambansa members) did invoke the right to privacy, they are considered to be public figures, who enjoy a
more limited right to privacy compared to ordinary individuals. Since they held public offices while the loans
were allegedly granted, they should be subjected to some level of public scrutiny.

DISPOSITION: The petition is granted, and respondent GSIS General Manager is ordered to allow
petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former BP, as petitioners may specify,
subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not compatible with this decision, as the GSIS may
deem necessary.

NOTE: Clean loan – a type of personal loan that banks offer to the citizens without any security measures (i.e. security,
collateral)

Aklan v. Jody King Construction

G.R. No. 197592, 27 November 2013.

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Bernardo v. Abalos
G.R. No. 137266, 5 December 2001.

Shell Philippines v. Jalos

G.R. No. 179918, 8 September 2010.

Doctrine: Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control
Commission provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D. 984. These empowered the PAB to "determine the location, magnitude,
extent, severity, causes and effects" of water pollution. Among its functions is to "serve as arbitrator for the determination of
reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution." In this regard, the PAB has the power to conduct
hearings,impose penalties for violation of P.D. 984, and issue writs of execution to enforce its orders and decisions. The PAB's
final decisions may be reviewed by the CA under Rule 43 of the rules of court.

Facts: On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines entered
into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. Two years later, Shell
discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of the well under the Malampaya Natural

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Gas Project. This entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline from Shell's production platform to
its gas processing plant in Batangas. The pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro
Sea.

On May 19, 2003, respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 other individuals
(Jalos, et al.) filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. Jalos, et al., claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen from the
coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and
operation of Shell's natural gas pipeline.

Jalos, et al., claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the pipeline. As a result,
their average net income per month fell from a high of P4,848.00 to only P573.00. They said that "the
pipeline greatly affected biogenically hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to] stress to
the marine life in the Mindoro Sea." They now have to stay longer and farther out at sea to catch fish, as the
pipeline's operation has driven the fish population out of coastal waters. HDIATS Instead of filing an
answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint. It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
action, as it is a "pollution case" under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 984 or the Pollution Control Law. Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related damages.

Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the State's
consent. Shell said that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine government
in the development of the Malampaya gas reserves.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the
PAB;

HELD: Yes, Section 2 (a) of P.D. 984 defines "pollution" as "any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of
any water . . . as will or is likely to create or render such water . . . harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or
welfare or which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other
legitimate purposes."|||

It is clear from this definition that the stress to marine life claimed by Jalos, et al., is caused by some kind of pollution emanating
from Shell's natural gas pipeline. The pipeline, they said, "greatly affected" or altered the natural habitat of fish and affected the
coastal waters' natural function as fishing grounds. Inevitably, in resolving Jalos, et al.'s claim for damages, the proper tribunal
must determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters' properties and negatively
affected its life sustaining function. The power and expertise needed to determine such an issue lies with the PAB.

Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control Commission
provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D. 984. These empowered the PAB to "determine the location, magnitude, extent,
severity, causes and effects" of water pollution. Among its functions is to "serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation,

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or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution." In this regard, the PAB has the power to
conduct hearings,impose penalties for violation of P.D. 984, and issue writs of execution to enforce its
orders and decisions. The PAB's final decisions may be reviewed by the CA under Rule 43 of the rules of
court.

The laws creating the PAB and vesting it with powers are wise. The definition of the term "pollution" itself
connotes the need for specialized knowledge and skills, technical and scientific, in determining the
presence, the cause, and the effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not within the competence
of ordinary courts. 18 Consequently, resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency possessed of
expertise in determining pollution-related matters.

To this extent, the failure of Jalos, et al. to allege in their complaint that they had first taken resort to PAB
before going to court means that they failed to state a cause of action that the RTC could act on. This
warranted the dismissal of their action

Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science

G.R. No. 156109, 18 November 2004.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first-year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science
and Technology (PCST). During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under
Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
• PCST held a fund-raising campaign, the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball
courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the
opportunity to take the final examinations.
• Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused
to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers - respondents Gamurot
and Baladad - allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to the petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic

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class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the
entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations
for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas
ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCST's policy.
• Petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her
Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as
exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney's fees.
• Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of the PCST; the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative
body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
• Petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary, because her action was
not administrative in nature, but one purely for damages arising from respondents' breach of the laws on
human relations. As such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.
• The RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. RTC noted that Section 54 of the Education
Act of 1982 vested in the CHED the supervision and regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the
CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on
pure questions of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable.

RULING:
• No. Petitioner is correct in its argument that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she
is praying for damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the
courts.
• First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. Petitioner is not asking for the
reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled
in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the
circumstances, the consequences of respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
• Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to
act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are
they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not
have commenced her case before the Commission.
• Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil
Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

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Universal Robina Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development

Authority, G.R. No. 191427, 30 May 2011.
FACTS: Universal Robina Corp. is engaged in the manufacture of animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog,
Pasig City. Laguna Lake Development Authority conducted a laboratory analysis of petitioner’s corn oil
refinery plant’s wastewater and found that it failed to comply with government standards provided
under Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and
35, series of 1990. Petitioner’s wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned
DAOs. Petitioner notified LLDA of its plan to upgrade the wastewater treatment facility of its corn oil
refinery plant in an effort to comply with environmental laws and upon their request, a re-sampling of their
wastewater was conducted which showed that their plant finally complied with government standards.
Petitioner requested for a reduction of penalties. Petitioner contends that it should be ordered to pay only
accumulated daily penalties in the sum of Five Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos on grounds that the LLDA
erred in first, adopting a straight computation of the periods of violation – based on the flawed assumption that
petitioner was operating on a daily basis. LLDA claimed that the computation of accumulated daily
penalties was reckoned period from the date of initial sampling to the date when its letter request for re-
sampling was received which covers 932 days computed at 6 days per week operation as reflected in the
Reports of Inspection. Respondents also contend that the documents submitted are self- serving and held that
petitioners is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater from March 14, 2000 – November 3, 2003
covering 932 days and from March 15, 2006 – April 17, 2007 covering 342 days for a total of 1,274 days.
After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay PHP 1,247,000.00 for a total of 1,247 days.
The appellate court affirmed both LLDA orders, which it found to be amply supported by substantial
evidence, the computation of the accumulated daily penalties being in accord with prevailing DENR
guidelines. The appellate court held that the LLDA has the prerogative to disregard the same for being
unverified and that the petitioner’s petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal
from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first
been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application of doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was satisfied.

HELD: No. There was still an available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a cornerstone of the judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. This entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. EO 192 was issued charging
DENR with the task of promulgating rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution as well as of
promulgating ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and
radiations. EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which took over the
powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including
the latter’s role as arbitrator for determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
Petitioner still had available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. The Court denied the petition and affirmed
the CA’s decision.

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Dioces of Bacolod v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015.
FACTS:
• Dioces of Bacolof posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
• The first tarpaulin contains the message“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive HealthLaw of 2012 or Republic Act
No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
• This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote”and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay”with a check
mark, or “(Pro- RH) Team Patay” with an “X”mark.
• The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,otherwise known as
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those
who voted against itform “Team Buhay”
• The Election Officer of Bacolod City issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to Bishop Navarra.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the exhaustion of COMELEC’s administrative remedies violates the freedom of
speech of the Dioces of Bacolod and Most Rev. Bishop Navarra?

HELD: Yes. The exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech. The Dioces’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable
infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners
speech. Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current
controversy is within the exceptions to the principle. On the other hand, prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately:
(a) when there is a violation of due process;
(b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
(c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
(d) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
(e) when there is irreparable injury;
(f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;
(g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(h) when it would amount to nullification of a claim;
(i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
(j) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or
(k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.” The circumstances
emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allege that the assailed issuances
violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question.
Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH
Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would be
unreasonable.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut

Authority,G.R. No. 110526, 10 February 1998.

Smart Communication v. National Telecommunication Commission, G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003.

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Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, 1 December 1995.

Cabada v. Alunan, G.R. No. 119645, 22 August 1996.

Maglalang v. PAGCOR, 190566, 11 December 2013.

Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 85439, 13 January 1992.

Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 131641, 23 February 2000.

4. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or the Doctrine of Prior Restraint.

Where there is competence or jurisdiction vested upon an administrative body to act upon a matter, no resort to the
courts may be made before such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.

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Cases:

University of Santo Tomas v. Sanchez, 29 July 2010.

Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, 18 April 1990.

Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100579, 6 June 2001.

Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125339, 22 June 1998.

Philrock v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, G.R. 132848, 28 June 2001.

Crusaders Broadcasting System v. NTC

G.R. No. 139583, 31 May 2000
Doctrine: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.

Facts: The petitioner, Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. (Crusaders) was the grantee of a temporary permit
to broadcast at a frequency of 97.9 Mhz. On July 12, 1994, Mr. Cesar A. Dumlao, the Chairman of
Crusaders, sent a request letter that they be permitted to stop the broadcast for a month to give way to
renovations in their station. Thereafter, they continued to operate with two more renewals of their
temporary permits. In 1997, the station of the Crusaders was found inoperative through an inspection
conducted by the NTC-National Capital Region. The Broadcast Service Division of the NTC then recommended that the
Crusaders’ permit be cancelled and revoked.

The Crusaders presented a motion for reconsideration, explaining that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has issued an order of
injunction enjoining them from operating their radio station because of the institution of Civil Case No. 64739 by Conamor
Broadcasting Corporation.

The NTC withdrew the Crusaders from their assigned frequency and denied their request for renewal of temporary permit. The
Crusaders elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which dismissed their petition for lack of merit. The matter was then
brought up to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner’s Contention: NTC committed a grave reversible error in considering untenable the temporary stoppage of
Crusaders’ broadcast. They also contend that the CA erred in upholding the NTC decision under the so-called “doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.”

Respondent’s Contention: Their decision was anchored on substantial evidence.

Issue: Did the CA err in upholding the NTC decision under the so-called “doctrine of primary jurisdiction?”

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Ruling: No. The NTC’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are thus, entitled to respect from
the courts. The NTC found that the case for injunction wouldn’t have been filed against the Crusaders if they
had not entered into a programming and marketing agreement with Conamor. They also found that the
Crusaders could have resumed broadcasting had it complied with the Order of the RTC-Pasig to observe
the formal requirements for a motion to lift the order of injunction on the basis of a counterbond.

Sarne v. Maquiling, G.R. No. 138839, 9 May 2002.

Shell Philippines Exploration v. Jalos, G.R. No. 179918, 8 September 2010.

Sps. Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 214241, 13 January

Basiana Mining Corporation v. HLURB, G.R. No. 191705, 7 March 2016.

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