ILOILO CHINESE COMMERCIAL SCHOOL v.

WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-16600 December 27, 1961

Facts:

Santiago Fabrigar had been employed as a janitor-messenger of the respondent Iloilo Chinese
Commercial School. His work includes sweeping and scrubbing the floors, cleaning the
classrooms and the school premises, and other janitorial chores. On March 11, 1956, in
preparation for the graduation, he carried desks and chairs from the classroom to the
auditorium, set curtains and worked harder and faster than usual. Although he felt shortness of
breath and did not feel well, he continued working. On March 13, he spat blood and stopped
working. From April 29 to May 15, 1956, he received treatment for “far advanced pulmonary
tuberculosis and for heart disease” from Dr. Quirico Villareal. On June 28, 1956, Santiago
Fabrigar died of “beriberi adult”.

His common-law wife, Leonora Fabrigar with his heirs filed claim for compensation with the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission wherein it was alleged that the cause of death was
“pulmonary tuberculosis contracted during and as a result of his employment as janitor”. The
hearing officer denied the claim and dismissed the case. He concluded that there was no causal
connection between the cause of death and the said employment. The decision was appealed.
The Workmen’s compensation Commission concluded that he had been suffering from such
disease and his employment as a janitor aggravated his pre-existing illness. And although there
was a discrepancy between the cause of death “beriberi adult” and the testimony of Dr. Villareal,
the latter was given credence. The commission ordered Chinese Commercial School, Inc. to pay
the claimant. The decision was appealed. Petitioner contended that the Commission erred in
finding that the cause of death was tuberculosis and as a result of his employment; holding that
the petitioner was the employer of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether there is an employee-employer relationship when the former is employed and paid by
its Board of Directors that would warrant the heirs of the deceased employer compensation
under Workmen’s compensation law?

Held:

Yes. There was an employee-employer relationship between the respondent school and the
deceased. Although it is true that the Board of Directors, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce
was the one who pays for the janitorial service of the school, it was still the latter who exercised
supervision and control over the performance of the deceased. And the court held that power to
control employee’s conduct is the most important test of employer-employee relation. The
records disclose that the person in charge (encargado) of the respondent school supervised the
deceased in his work and had control over the manner he performed the same. The decision
appealed from was dismissed.

DY KEH BENG V V INTERNATIONAL LABOR & MARINE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, AT

AL.
GR NO. L-32245; MAY 25, 1979

Recit-Ready Case Summary

Dy Keh Beng, proprietor of a basket factory was charged with unfair labor practice for dismissing
Solan and Tudla for their union activities. He contended that he did not know Tudla and that
Solan was not his employee because the latter came to the establishment only when there was
work which he did on "pakiaw" basis. The issue in this case lies on the question whether or not
there was an employer-employee relationship between Dy Keh Beng and the respondents.

Pakiaw – it is generally a practice in our country, is, in fact a labor contract between employer
and employees between capitalists and laborers. (Penned by Justice Perfecto ad Justice Paras)

General Rule of Law/Doctrine:

Republic Act 875, where an employee is referred to as - shall include any employee and shall
not be limited to the employee of a particular employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise
and shall indude any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained
any other substantially equivalent and regular employment. While an employer, includes any
person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly but shall not include any labor
organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of
officer or agent of such labor organization.

Control Test - "where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control
not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. It should
be borne in mind that the control test calls merely for the existence of the rights to control the
manner of doing the work not the actual exercise of the right.

Facts:

A charge of unfair labor practice was filed against Dy Keh Beng, proprietor of a basket factory,
for discriminatory acts within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraph (1) and (4). Republic
Act No. 875, by dismissing on September 28 and 29, 1960, respectively,Carlos N. Solano and
Ricardo Tudla for their union activities. After preliminary investigation was conducted, a case
was filed in the Court of Industrial Relations for in behalf of the International Labor and Marine
Union of the Philippines and two of its members, Solan and Tudla In his answer, Dy Keh Beng
contended that he did not know Tudla and that Solano was not his employee because the latter
came to the establishment only when there was work which he did on "pakiaw" basis, each
piece of work being done under a separate contract. Moreover, Dy Keh Beng countered with a
special defense of simple extortion committed by the head of the labor union, Bienvenido
Onayan.

According to Dy Keh Beng, however, Solano was not his employee for the following reasons:
1 Solano never stayed long enough at Dy's establishment;
2 Solano had to leave as soon as he was through with the
3 order given him by Dy;
4 When there were no orders needing his services there was nothing for him to do;
5 When orders came to the shop that his regular workers could not fill it was then that Dy
went to his address in Caloocan and fetched him for these orders; and
6 Solano's work with Dy's establishment was not continuous.

Issue:

Whether there existed an employee-employer relation between petitioner Dy Keh Beng and the
respondents Solano and Tudla

Held:

YES. An employee-employer relationship was found to have existed between Dy Keh Beng and
complainants Tudla and Solano, although Solano was admitted to have worked on piece basis.
According to the Hearing Examiner, the evidence for the complainant Union tended to show that
Solan and Tudla became employees of Dy Keh Beng from May 2, 1953 and July 15, 1955,
respectively, and that except in the event of illness, their work with the establishment was
continuous although their services were compensated on piece basis. Evidence likewise
showed that at times the establishment had eight (8) workers and never less than five (5);
including the complainants, and that complainants used to receive P5.00 a day,sometimesless.
Petitioner really anchors his contention of the non-existence of employee-employer relationship
on the control test. While the Court upholds the control test under which an employer-employee
relationship exists "where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to
control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end,“It
finds no merit with petitioner's arguments. It should be borne in mind that the control test calls
merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual
exercise of the right. Considering the finding by the Hearing Examiner that the establishment of
Dy Keh Beng is "engaged in the manufacture of baskets known as kaing, it is natural to expect
that those working under Dy would have to observe, among others, Dy's requirements of size
and quality of the kaing. Some control would necessarily be exercised by Dy as the making of
the kaing would be subject to Dy's specifications. Parenthetically, since the work on the baskets
is done at Dy's establishments, it can be inferred that the proprietor Dy could easily exercise
control on the men he employed.

Thus, having met the Control test, it goes to show that there existed an employer-employee
relationship between the parties.

PETROPHIL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL COMMISSION, ANSELMO B.

ENCARNACION AND GERSHER ENGINEERING WORKS,respondents.
G.R. No. L-64048 August 29, 1986

Facts:

LABOR RELATIONS

Anselmo B. Encarnacion, had been working as a casual employee of various job contractors in
Petrophil's premises. Respondent Gersher Engineering Works entered into a service contract
with Petrophil and thereafter placed respondent Encarnacion in its payroll. Respondent Gersher
received a letter from Petrophil Corporation complaining about the unsatisfactory performance
of respondent Encarnacion. As a result, respondent Gersher decided to re-assign Encarnacion
to Caltex Phil. Inc. with whom said respondent Gersher had also a contract. Respondent
Encarnacion refused to be reassigned to Caltex unless he was made to occupy the same
position of warehouseman as in Petrophil Corporation and since the position available at Caltex
was that of equipment maintainer, respondent Encarnacion refused to be transferred. Instead he
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Gersher and in the alternative, against
petitioner Petrophil Corporation. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment holding that respondent
Encarnacion was the employee of respondent Gersher Engineering Works and not of petitioner
Petrophil Corporation; that respondent Encarnacion was not illegally dismissed; but that he is
entitled to receive from respondent Gersher the 13th month pay of P340.00 covering the year
from March 15, 1976 to March 26, 1977 and the emergency monthly living allowance of P100.00
for the same period. The claim for holiday and vacation leave pay was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. The judgment further ordered respondent Gersher to accept
respondent Encarnacion back to work to be assigned as helper in any of its contractual jobs
(except Petrophil Corporation) with the same salary and without loss of seniority and other
benefits appurtenant to his position. On appeal, the NLRC rendered judgment modifying the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and holding that Encarnacion was the employee of Petrophil
Corporation and not of respondent Gersher and that he had been illegally dismissed.

Issues:

1. Which was the employer of respondent Anselmo B. Encarnacion-petitioner Petrophil

Corporation or respondent Gersher Engineering Works?
2. Was Anselmo B. Encarnacion illegally dismissed?

Held:

1. On the first issue raised, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that
respondent Encarnacion was the employee of respondent Gersher and not petitioner Petrophil
Corporation. This fact was admitted by no less than Gersher in its position paper which it filed
with the Labor Relations Division. The payrolls of respondent Gersher also show that
respondent Encarnacion was its employee.
2. Anent the issues of his alleged illegal dismissal and his entitlement to benefits from his
employer, We likewise agree with the decision of the Labor Arbiter that respondent Encarnacion
was not dismissed but was only demoted and transferred to Caltex Phil. Inc. because of his
failure to observe proper diligence in his work, and also because of his indolence, habitual
tardiness and absences. But following his demotion and transfer, Encarnacion refused to report
for work anymore. Reinstatement of respondent Encarnacion and payment of his money claims
should be made by respondent Gersher Engineering Works, his employer
ABOITIZ SHIPPING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LAZARO ABAIGAR, VICTORIANO
ANIBAN, FELIPE BATERZAL, RUFINO YAGUIT, JONNIE YAGUIT and EUGENIO BALBUENA,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ABOITIZ SHIPPING
CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 78711 June 27, 1990

Facts:

Petitioners herein claimed that they were employed as carpenters by respondent corporation,
ABOITIZ, until their illegal dismissal. They alleged that they were all allegedly dismissed by
spouses Baguio just a day after an inspection was made on respondent ABOITIZ in connection
with a labor case which same complainants filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
According to the complainants, said act of the Baguios constitute unfair labor practice.
Respondent ABOITIZ denies that the petitioners were their employees at the time of their
dismissal but are employees of respondent Ben Baguio by virtue of a Service Contract.
Spouses Baguio aver that they are the proprietors of Narben's Service Contractor engaged in
contracting carpentry jobs and has a service contract with respondent Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation. Spouses Baguio admit that the petitioners were indeed their employees whose
duties were to do carpentry work, subject to the condition that the moment their works were
finished, their employment would end, and that they would be re-hired once respondent
ABOITIZ would enter into another contract.

Issue:

Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between respondent Aboitiz and the
workers at the time of their dismissal.

Held:

No. Records reveal that petitioners are not regular employees of the Aboitiz at the time of their
alleged illegal dismissal. It was held in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople, 70 SCRA 139
(1976), the existence of employer-employee relationship is determined by four (4) elements,
namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the
power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control employees' conduct. From a reading of the
provisions of the aforesaid service contract, the concurrence of these four elements on
NARBEN's will easily be noted. For NARBEN's had the right to hire the necessary number of
carpenters to accomplish the carpentry requirements of Aboitiz and to fire them. It had charge of
the payment of wages of its laborers and the power of administrative supervision and general
control as to the time, manner and method of performance of work.

All the above evidences constitute positive proofs that the petitioners-workers were, at the time
in question, in the employ of NARBEN's and not anymore of Aboitiz.
PERPETUAL HELP CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs. BENEDICTO FABURADA,
SISINITA VILLAR, IMELDA TAMAYO, HAROLD CATIPAY, and the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, Fourth Division, Cebu City, respondents.

G.R. No. 121948 October 8, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner PHCCI, through Mr. Edilberto Lantaca, Jr., its Manager, hired private respondents to
work for it. They worked regularly on regular working hours, were assigned specific duties, were
paid regular wages and made to accomplish daily time records just like any other regular
employee. They worked under the supervision of the cooperative manager. But unfortunately,
they were dismissed. All of them were given a memorandum of termination on January 2, 1990,
effective December 29, 1989.

Petitioner PHCCI contends that private respondents are its members and are working for it as
volunteers. Not being regular employees, they cannot sue petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties.

Held:

Yes. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following

elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the worker or the power to hire;
(2) the power to dismiss; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to
control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. No
particular form of proof is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Any competent and relevant evidence may show the relationship. The above elements are
present here.

Article 280 of the Labor Code provides for three kinds of employees: (1) regular employees or
those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer; (2) project employees or those whose employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to
be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season; and
(3) casual employees or those who are neither regular nor project employees. The employees
who are deemed regular are: (a) those who have been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer; and (b) those
casual employees who have rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. Undeniably,
private respondents were rendering services necessary to the day- to-day operations of
petitioner PHCCI. This fact alone qualified them as regular employees.

One's regularity of employment is not determined by the number of hours one works but by the
nature and by the length of time one has been in that particular job. Petitioner's contention that
private respondents are mere volunteer workers, not regular employees, must necessarily fail.
The valid causes are categorized into two groups: the just causes under Articles 282 of the
Labor Code and the authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. The just
causes are:
(1) serious misconduct or willful disobedience of lawful orders in connection with the employee's
work;
(2) gross or habitual neglect of duties;
(3) fraud or willful breach of trust;
(4) commission of a crime or an offense against the person of the employer or his immediate
family member or representative; and, analogous cases.
The authorized causes are:
(1) the installation of labor-saving devices;
(2) redundancy;
(3) retrenchment to prevent losses; and
(4) closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of law.

Article 284 provides that an employer would be authorized to terminate the services of an
employee found to be suffering from any disease if the employee's continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health or to the health of his fellow employees6

Private respondents were dismissed not for any of the above causes. They were dismissed
because petitioner considered them to be mere voluntary workers, being its members, and as
such work at its pleasure. Petitioner thus vehemently insists that their dismissal is not against
the law.
ARIEL L. DAVID, doing business under the name and style "YIELS HOG DEALER," v. JOHN G.
MACASIO,

G.R. No. 195466 July 2, 2014

FACTS:

Macasio filed before the LA a complaint against petitioner for non-payment of overtime pay,
holiday pay and 13thmonth pay. He also claimed payment for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees, and payment for service incentive leave (SIL). Macasio alleged that he had
been working as a butcher for David since January 6, 1995.That David exercised effective
control and supervision over his work, pointing out that David:

(1) set the work day, reporting time and hogs to be chopped, as well as the manner by which he
was to perform his work;
(2) daily paid his salary of P700.00, which was increased from P600.00 in 2007, P500.00 in
2006 and P400.00 in 2005; and (3) approved and disapproved his leaves.

Macasio added that David owned the hogs delivered for chopping, as well as the work tools and
implements; the latter also rented the workplace.

David’s defense:
He claimed that he hired Macasio as a butcher or chopper on "pakyaw" or task basis who is,
therefore, not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay pursuant to the
provisions of the IRR of the Labor Code.

LABOR ARBITER :

The LA dismissed respondent’s claims for lack of merit and gave credence to David’s claim that
he engaged Macasio on "pakyaw" or task basis. The LA noted the following facts to support this
finding:

(1) Macasio received the fixed amount of P700.00 for every work done, regardless of the
number ofhours that he spent in completing the task and of the volume or number of hogs that
he had to chop per engagement;
(2) Macasio usually worked for only four hours, beginning from 10:00 p.m. up to 2:00 a.m. of the
following day; and
(3) the P700.00 fixed wage far exceeds the then prevailing daily minimum wage of P382.00. The
LA added that the nature of David’s business as hog dealer supports this "pakyaw" or task basis
arrangement concluded that as Macasio was engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis, he is not
entitled to overtime, holiday, SIL and 13th month pay.
The LA concluded that as Macasio was engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis, he is not
entitled to overtime, holiday, SIL and 13th month pay.

NLRC:

Affirmed the LA ruling.

CA:

The CA reversed the NLRC’s ruling for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion and
awarded Macasio’s claim for holiday, SIL and 13th month pay for three years, with 10%
attorney’s fees on the total monetary award. The CA, however, denied Macasio’s claim for moral
and exemplary damages for lack of basis.

ISSUES:

Whether the CA correctly found the NLRC in grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Macasio is
entitled to these labor standards benefits.

(The issue revolves around the proper application and interpretation of the labor law provisions
on holiday, SIL and 13th month pay to a worker engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis. In the
context of the Rule 65 petition before the CA, the issue is whether the CA correctly found the
NLRC in grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Macasio is entitled to these labor standards
benefits.)

RULING:

We partially grant the petition.

ON THE ISSUE IF THERE IS ER-EE RELATIONSHIP:

YES, Engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis does not characterize the relationship that may
exist between the parties, i.e., whether one of employment or independent contractorship.
A distinguishing characteristic of "pakyaw" or task basis engagement, as opposed to straight-
hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a task-basis work,
the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is reckoned in terms of
completion of the work, not in terms of the number of time spent in the completion of work.
the work or task is completed, the worker receives a fixed amount as wage, without regard to the
standard measurements of time generally used in pay computation.

Once In Macasio’s case, the established facts show that he would usually start his work at 10:00
p.m. Thereafter, regardless of the total hours that he spent at the workplace or of the total
number of the hogs assigned to him for chopping, Macasio would receive the fixed amount of
₱700.00 once he had completed his task. Clearly, these circumstances show a "pakyaw" or task
basis engagement that all three tribunals uniformly found.

In sum, the existence of employment relationship between the parties is determined by applying
the "four-fold" test; engagement on "pakyaw" or task basis does not determine the parties’
relationship as it is simply a method of pay computation. Accordingly, Macasio is David’s
employee, albeit engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis.

ON THE ISSUE OF MACASIO’S ENTITLEMENT TO HOLIDAY, SIL AND 13TH MONTH PAY:

Whether respondent Macasia is a Field personnel:

NO, Based on the definition of field personnel under Article 82, we agree with the CA that
Macasio does not fall under the definition of "field personnel." The CA’s finding in this regard is
supported by the established facts of this case: first, Macasio regularly performed his duties at
David’s principal place of business; second, his actual hours of work could be determined with
reasonable certainty; and, third, David supervised his time and performance of duties.
Since Macasiocannot be considered a "field personnel," then he is not exempted from the grant
of holiday, SIL pay even as he wasengaged on "pakyaw" or task basis.

Whether respondent Macasio is entitled to 13th month pay:

NO , That the CA erred in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in denying this
benefit to Macasio.The governing law on 13th month pay is PD No. 851.5313th month pay
benefits generally cover all employees; an employee must be one of those expressly
enumerated to be exempted.

Section 3 of the IRR of P.D. No. 851 enumerates the exemptions from the coverage of 13th
month pay benefits.Under Section 3(e), "employers of those who are paid on xxx task basis, and
those who are paid a fixed amount forperforming a specific work, irrespective of the time
consumed in the performance thereof" are exempted.

Note that unlike the IRR of the Labor Code on holiday and SIL pay, Section 3(e) of the IRR ofPD
No. 851 exempts employees"paid on task basis" without any reference to "field personnel." This
could only mean that insofar as payment of the 13thmonth pay is concerned, the law did not
intend to qualify the exemption from its coverage with the requirement that thetask worker be a
"field personnel" at the same time.

Whether respondent Macasia is entitled to Service Intensive Leave, Holiday pay:

YES, The payment of an employee on task or pakyaw basis alone is insufficient to exclude one
from the coverage of SIL andholiday pay. They are exempted from the coverage of Title I
(including the holiday and SIL pay) only if they qualify as "field personnel."
The IRR therefore validly qualifies and limits the general exclusion of "workers paid by results"
found in Article82 from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay. This is the only reasonable
interpretation since the determination ofexcluded workers who are paid by results from the
coverage of Title I is "determined by the Secretary of Labor inappropriate regulations."
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y
GO @ "PERCY", accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994

Facts:

Accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. went to Pangasinan to recruit workers for

employment abroad. He was able to convince complainants to apply as janitors in Saudi Arabia.
He told them to bring all the necessary documents for the processing of their applications to his
office in Manila. Complainants went to accused-appellant's in Manila and paid him the
necessary expenses. When complainants failed to leave for Saudi Arabia, they verified with the
POEA whether Manungas was licensed to recruit workers for abroad and subsequently learned
that he was not. Thereafter, complaints for estafa and llegal Recruitment on a Large Scale were
filed against Manungas. On the other hand, accused-appellant maintained that he was the
operations manager of the ZG Recruitment and Placement Agency, a duly licensed recruitment
agency.

On the other hand, Manungas contended that the job order for the janitorial services was
awarded to Express Placement Agency instead of ZG Recruitment and Placement agency.
Thereafter, accused-appellant transferred complainants' application for overseas employment to
Nora Cunanan of Express Placement Agency. Accused-appellant also turned over the fees paid
by the complainants to Nora Cunanan as evidenced by the receipts.

Accused-appellant maintains that he did not make false representations to the complainants
when he requited the latter for employment abroad as he had told complainants that he is only
an employee of a licensed recruitment agency in Manila. He further claims that he was not
motivated by any deceitful intentions and had not caused any damage to the complainants
because the amounts of money given to him by the latter were actually spent for their medical
tests and other documents necessary for their overseas employment.

Issues:

Whether or not Manungas is guilty of illegal recruitment.

Held:

Yes. In the instant case, Manungas told complainants to submit to him the necessary
documents for the processing of their employment in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, he collected from
each of the complainants payment for their respective passport, training fee, placement fee,
medical tests and other sundry expenses which unquestionably constitutes acts of recruitment
within the meaning of the law. Besides, there is illegal recruitment when one gives the
impression of his ability to send a worker abroad and there is evidence that accused had
represented to the complainants that he could send them abroad as janitors in Saudi Arabia.
And because of his representation, complainants gave their hard-earned money to accused-
appellant in consideration of the same representation.
Thus accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment. Under Article
38 of the Labor Code, as amended, the crime of illegal recruitment is qualified when the same is
committed against three (3) or more persons.

A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code
can be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [Revised Penal Code,
Article 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum in se where criminal intent
of the accused is necessary for a conviction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE
and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused- appellant.

G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995

Facts:

An information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale was filed
against spouses Goce and Nelly Agustin. The complainants testified that Agustin represented
herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency. One of the applicants, testified that she
was offered a job as a cutter by Agustin the first time they met, while another applicant,
remembered that when he first met Agustin, the latter represented herself as "nagpapaalis
papunta sa Oman.” It was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of
working overseas and it was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well
as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the
spouses Goce who owned the placement agency. Agustin also received from complainants
various sums of money for purpose of their applications.

When it was discovered that all the accused in this case were not authorized to engage in any
recruitment activity, Agustin denied any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintained
that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple. Agustin contended that all she did
was to introduce complainants to the Goce spouses. Being a neighbor of said couple, and owing
to the fact that her son's overseas job application was processed and facilitated by them, the
complainants asked her to introduce them to said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her
heart, she complied with their request. Such an act, appellant argues, does not fall within the
meaning of "referral" under the Labor Code to make her liable for illegal recruitment.

However, the trial court found Agustin guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale. Appellant Agustin then raises the following arguments:

(1) her act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall within the meaning of
illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the Goce
spouses; and
(3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised overseas employment to the
complainants.

Issue:

Whether or not Agustin is guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

Held:

Yes. Herein appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of
the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment
activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 thereof. The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a)
when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another; or (b) when illegal recruitment
is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three or more persons individually or
as a group. Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. 25
On the other hand, referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for
employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected
employer, placement officer or bureau. Being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical
for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency.
As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She
was therefore engaging in recruitment activity. Indeed, Agustin played a pivotal role in the
operations of the recruitment agency, working together with the Goce couple.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker
abroad." It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had
the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give
her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. Her act of collecting from each of the
complainant’s payment for their respective passports, training fees, placement fees, medical
tests and other sundry expenses unquestionably constitutes an act of recruitment within the
meaning of the law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TAN TIONG MENG alias "TOMMY TAN", accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 120835-40 April 10, 1997

Facts:

Six (6) complainants went to Borja's house to meet accused, Tan Tong Meng, allegedly a job
recruiter. Accused promised to complainants that they could get jobs as factory worker in
Taiwan with a monthly salary of P 20,000. Accused required them to submit their passports, bio-
data and their high school diploma as well as to pay P 15,000 each for placement and
processing fees. Accused kept on promising to complainants that they would be able to leave,
but the promises were never fulfilled. When complainants knew that accused was not a licensed
or authorized overseas recruiter, they filed for complaints for illegal recruitment and estafa
against accused.

Accused contend that he merely acted as a collector of money for the principal recruiter Boria
who made the representations that he (accused could give the applicants jobs in Taiwan.

Issue:

WON accused is guilty of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale and 6 counts of estafa.

Held:

Yes, Circumstances belie the version of accused: (1) Mascardo(one of the complainants)
testified that accused could no longer return the money because he had already sent it to his
brother-in-law in Taiwan; (2) all the receipts issued to complainants were signed by accused; (3)
Accused admitted that he and his wife are respondents in about 70 cases of estafa and illegal
recruitment; (4) complainants pointed to Tan and not Boria as the one who had represented to
them that he could give them jobs in Taiwan.

The accused' acts of accepting placement fees from job applicants and representing to said
applicants that he could get them jobs in Taiwan constitute recruitment and placement under the
Labor Code and is deemed illegal and punishable under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.

The offense committed against the 6 complainants is illegal recruitment in large scale. Accused
is also guilty of 6 separate crimes of estafa. It was held in the case of People vs Calonzo that a
person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of
the RPC provisions on estafa provided the elements are present: (1) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 146964 August 10, 2006

Facts:

Rosa Rodolfo approached the private complainants and invited them to apply for overseas
employment in Dubai. Rosa being their neighbor, the private complainants agreed and went to
the Rosa’s office bearing the name, Bayside Manpower Export Specialist. In that office, the
applicants who are now the complainants in this case gave certain amounts to Rosa for
processing and other fees. She then told private complainants that they were scheduled to leave
for Dubai on September 8, 1984. However, the applicants were not able to depart on the said
date as their employer allegedly did not arrive. Their departure was rescheduled, but the result
was the same. Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, the complainants demanded Rosa
to return their money. Rosa was not able to return all the complainant’s money. Tired of
excuses, they filed the present case for illegal recruitment against Rosa.

An officer of the POEA proved that Rosa had no authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment. For her defense, Rosa denied ever approaching the complainants to recruit them
for employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was the private complainants who asked her help in
securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private complainants to
the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency because she knew the owner of the said
agency. While Rosa admitted that she received money from the private complainants, she was
quick to point out that she received the same only in trust for delivery to the agency. She denied
being part of the agency either as an owner or employee thereof.

Further, Rosa assailed that the court failed to consider that the provisional receipts she issued
indicated that the amounts she collected from the private complainants were turned over to the
agency. She cited People v. Seoron wherein this Court held that the issuance or signing of
receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment.

Issue:

Whether or not Rosa Rodolfo is guilty of illegal recruitment.

Held:

Yes. The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Labor Code. If another element is present, that is, the accused commits the act
against three or more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a
large scale.

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as [a]ny act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not.

That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Article 38 (a) clearly shows
that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially committed by a non- licensee or non-
holder of authority. A non-licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the labor
secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or
whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the labor
secretary. A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private employment agency,
while authority is given to those engaged in recruitment and placement activities.

The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in
recruitment, is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an
initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer
or bureau. Rosa’s admission that she brought private complainants to the agency whose owner
she knows and her acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays her guilt. That
petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the private
complainants were turned over to the agency does not free her from liability. For the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee
employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. As the appellate court stated: x x x Sec.
13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives and keeps the
placement money for himself or herself. For as long as a person who has no license to engage
in recruitment of workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an employment to two or
more persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal recruitment. Why petitioner accepted the
payment of fees from the private complainants when, in light of her claim that she merely
brought them to the agency, she could have advised them to directly pay the same to the
agency, she proferred no explanation. On petitioners reliance on Seoron case, true, this Court
held that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment.
But it went on to state that it is rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority that makes a case for illegal recruitment.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION V TORRES

G.R. NO. 93666. 22 APRIL 1991

Facts:

On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment
issued Alien Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a
United States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling
Corporation ("GMC"). On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract
of employment whereby the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team. On 15 January
1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation approved
petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor to
prearranged employee. On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner
Cone's alien employment permit. GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-
pledged coach. The DOLE Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the request on 15 February
1990. On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903- 881, valid until 25
December 1990, was issued.

Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the
issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April
1990, issued a decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the
ground that there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent,
able and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would
redound to the national interest. Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2)
Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration but said Motions were denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the revocation of the Alien Employment Permit was justified

Held:

Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:

"ART. 40. Employment permit of non-resident aliens. — Any alien seeking admission to the
Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to
engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the
Department of Labor.

The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after
a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and
willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired. For an
enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment permit may be
issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged with the supervision of said
registered enterprise.

The Court considers that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any act
without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his
decision, dated 23 April 1990, revoking petitioner Cone's Alien Employment Permit.