Peoplev.QuePoLay,G.R.No.

L-6791,March29,1954

The appellant was charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section
34 of the RA no 265 that it was alleged he was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of
U.S dollars, U.S checks and U.S money orders amounting to about 7,000 dollars failed to sell the
same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such
foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20.

The appellant contends that the said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official
Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said
circular had no force and effect it further claims that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and
Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an
order or notice of general applicability.

Issue
Whether or not the appellant can be penalized despite lack of publication

Ruling
No.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year
1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's
conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did
not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or
after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation,
for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange
in his possession thereof.

Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the
eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant
committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may
be said to have had no jurisdiction.
People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977
The accused were charged for having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.

It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969
resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is
not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries
Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by
substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit
electro fishing, the executive and judicial cannot consider it unlawful

section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous
substance" in fishing.

Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous
substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five
thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.

It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing."
Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all
Philippine waters.

On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against
electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was
changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the
Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of
fresh water."

The Court of First Instance and the prosecution assumed that electro fishing is
punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof),
which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court."
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84
imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which
amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for
swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and
which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.

Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the
crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior
court

In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1
were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above,
punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is
not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order
No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an
obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.

The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under
section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to
enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder
and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of
the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h]
Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and
conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the
Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in
the discretion of the court."

As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place
because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same
as the penalty fixed in section 83.

Issue.
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the secretary of agriculture and natural resources and the commissioner
of fisheries is valid.

Ruling
No. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos.
84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.
In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.

the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the
use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as
the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the
Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what
acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
 [G.R. No. L-46158. November 28, 1986.]

TAYUG RURAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Defendant-Appellant.

Bengzon, Bengzon, Villaroman & De Vera Law Office for Plaintiff-

Appellee.

Evangelista, Bautista & Valdehuesa Law Office, for Defendant-Appellant.

Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., a banking corporation obtained thirteen (13) loans
from Defendant-Appellant, Central Bank of the Philippines, by way of
rediscounting, at the rate of 1/2 of 1% per annum from 1962 to March 28,
1963 and thereafter at the rate of 2-1/2% per annum. The loans, amounting
to P813,000.00 as of July 30, 1963, were all covered by corresponding
promissory notes prescribing the terms and conditions of the aforesaid loans.

thru the Director of the Department of loans and Credit, issued

Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8, informing all rural banks that an
additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum
would be assessed on all past due loans beginning January 4, 1965.
Said Memorandum Circular was actually enforced on all rural banks effective
July 4, 1965.

Appellee Rural Bank sued Appellant to recover the 10% penalty imposed by
Appellant amounting to P16,874.97, as of September 27, 1968 and to
restrain Appellant from continuing the imposition of the penalty.

Appellant justified the imposition of the penalty by way of affirmative and

special defenses, stating that it was legally imposed under the provisions
of Section 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural
Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on September 5, 1958, under
authority of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended

It is undisputed that no penal clause has been included in the promissory

notes. For this reason, the trial court is of the view that Memorandum Circular
DLC-8 issued on December 23, 1964 prescribing retroactive effect on all past
due loans, impairs the obligation of contract and deprives the plaintiff of its
property without due process of law.

Whether or not the Central Bank has the authority to impose a 10% penalty on past
due loans of rural banks.

the purpose of implementing a nationwide program of agricultural and

industrial development, Rural Banks are hereby authorized under such terms
and conditions as the Central Bank shall prescribe to borrow on a medium or
long term basis, funds that the Central Bank or any other government
financing institutions shall borrow from the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development or other international or foreign lending
institutions for the specific purpose of financing the above stated agricultural
and industrial program. Repayment of loans obtained by the Central Bank of
the Philippines or any other government financing institution from said foreign
lending institutions

Section 10 of R.A. 720

The power to supervise the operation of any Rural Bank by the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank as herein indicated, shall consist in placing limits to
the maximum credit allowed any individual borrower; in prescribing the
interest rate; in determining the loan period and loan procedure; in indicating
the manner in which technical assistance shall be extended to Rural Banks; in
imposing a uniform accounting system and manner of keeping the accounts
and records of the Rural Banks; in undertaking regular credit examination of
the Rural Banks; in instituting periodic surveys of loan and lending
procedures, audits, test check of cash and other transactions of the Rural
Banks; in conducting training courses for personnel of Rural Banks; and, in
general, in supervising the business operation of the Rural Banks." cralaw virtua1aw library

Nowhere in any of the above quoted pertinent provisions of R.A. 720 nor in
any other provision of R.A. 720 for that matter, is the monetary Board
authorized to mete out on rural banks an additional penalty rate on their past
due accounts with Appellant. As correctly stated by the trial court, while the
Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the
retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a
measure supervisory in character.

Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative

agencies. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress
authorizes promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement
given legislation, all that is required is that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes
(Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183). The rule delineating the
extent of the binding force to be given to administrative rules and regulations
was explained by the Court.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued
to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law
Republic of the Philippines vs. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.

International Communications Corporation (now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. or

Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and
maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA)

Thereafter, NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the
Commission on or before February 15, 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any
application filed after said date until further orders.2

Extelcom likewise contended that there were no available radio frequencies that could
accommodate a new CMTS operator as the frequency bands allocated in NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-99 were intended for and had in fact been applied for by
the existing CMTS operators. The NTC, in its Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93, declared
it its policy to defer the acceptance of any application for CMTS. All the frequency bands
allocated for CMTS use under the NTC's Memorandum Circular No. 5-11-88 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2-12-92 had already been allocated to the existing CMTS
operators. Finally, Extelcom pointed out that Bayantel is its substantial stockholder to the
extent of about 46% of its outstanding capital stock, and Bayantel's application
undermines the very operations of Extelcom.

Furthermore, Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have
applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own
initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper
motion before the Commission.

In answer to this argument, the NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a
certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been
published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978
Rules.

Issue
 Whether the archiving of Bayantel's application was a valid act.

Ruling

ooooooooooooooo.
ppppppppppppppp.
qqqqqqqqqqqqqqq. In the case at bar, the said application was ordered archived
because of lack of available frequencies at the time, and made subject to reinstatement
upon availability of the requisite frequency. To be sure, there was nothing irregular in the
revival of the application after the condition therefor was fulfilled.

While, as held by the Court of Appeals, there are no clear provisions in the Rules of the
NTC which expressly allow the archiving of any application, this recourse may be justified
under Rule 1, Section 2 of the 1978 Rules, which states:

Sec. 2. Scope.--- These rules govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the Board
of Communications (now NTC) in all matters of hearing, investigation and proceedings
within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice and in
order to best serve the public interest, the Board may, in any particular matter, except it
from these rules and apply such suitable procedure to improve the service in the
transaction of the public business. (underscoring ours)

The Court of Appeals ruled that the NTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
revived Bayantel's application based on an ex-parte motion.
The question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to
Thecandidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as
the need to report the same, and the sanctions imposed for violations.

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast
and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred
eighty (180) minutes, respectively.

They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates
freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth
coming elections.
The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on
the number of minutes that candidates may use for television and radio advertisements,
as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise known as
the Fair Election Act.

For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to
the COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the
review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements
broadcast for any candidate or political party.

During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued
Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime
limitations

however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15,
2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime
limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to a "total
aggregate" basis.

Petitioners
ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN),
ABC Development Corporation (ABC),
GMA Network, Incorporated ( GMA),
Manila Broadcasting Company, Inc. (MBC),
 Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (NBN),
and Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) are owners/operators of radio and
television networks in the Philippines,
while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the national
organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators
of radio and television stations and said stations themselves

They sent their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the provisions of the
aforementioned Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held public hearings. T
hereafter, on February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631 amending
provisions of Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions
objectionable and oppressive, hence, the present petitions.

Petitioners assail:
a) Section 7 (d), which provides for a penalty of suspension or revocation of an
8

offender's franchise or permit, imposes criminal liability against broadcasting entities and
their officers in the event they sell airtime in excess of the size, duration, or frequency
authorized in the new rules
b) Section 9 (a), which provides for an "aggregate total" airtime instead of the previous
9

"per station" airtime for political campaigns or dvertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio guestings and appearance
c) sec 14 candidate's "right to reply."

In addition, petitioner ABC also questions Section 1 (4) thereof, which defines the
11

term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda," while petitioner GMA further

assails Section 35, which states that any violation of said Rules shall constitute an
12

election offense.

Senator Peter Alan Cayetano assails Section 9 (a) of the Resolution changing the
interpretation of candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns
or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to a "total aggregate" basis. Petitioners
allege that Resolutions No. 9615 and 9631, amending the earlier Resolution, are
unconstitutional and issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, for the reasons set forth hereunder.
On section 9
1. provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for a
proper computation of "aggregate total" airtime, and violates the equal protection
guarantee, thereby defeating the intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006.
2. vague and infringes on the constitutionally protected freedom of speech, of the press
and of expression, and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern
3. cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost
impossible burden on broadcast mass media of monitoring a candidate's or political
party's aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur administrative and criminal liability.
Section 7 (d) is null and void for unlawfully criminalizing acts not prohibited and penalized
as criminal offenses by R.A. No. 9006.

Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, providing for a candidate's or political party's "right to
reply," being an improper exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers; for constituting
prior restraint and infringing petitioners' freedom of expression, speech and the press;
and for being violative of the equal protection guarantee. In addition to the foregoing,
petitioner GMA further argues that the Resolution was promulgated without public
consultations, in violation of petitioners' right to due process. Petitioner ABC also avers
that the Resolution's definition of the terms "political advertisement" and "election
propaganda" suffers from overbreadth, thereby producing a "chilling effect," constituting
prior restraint.

the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX

(C) of the Constitution which vests on the COMELEC the power to supervise and
regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass
media