G.R. No.

L-32166 October 18, 1977

79 scra 450

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA,
GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL
ROSARIO, accused-appellees.

FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.

It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to
electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz which destroy any aquatic
animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case
No. 5429).

Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No.
SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No.
5440.

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it
is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower
court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and
judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of
any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.

On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation
of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section
2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water
fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resourcesand the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries
AdministrativeOrders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the
FisheriesCommission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not
expresslyprohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary
ofAgriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless
topenalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing,are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or
poisonoussubstance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3)
unlawful takingof marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen
to report thekind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically punished.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur.
965 on p. 11 32).

Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban
against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the
impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters.
That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro
fishing.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries
Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree
No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and
fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes
electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.

G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADRIANO PANLILIO, defendant-appellant.

28 phil 608

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga convicting the accused of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P40, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the above-
named accused having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as
rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of
Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico,
Province of Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and
voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos
was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they
were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of
the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them
from one place to another for the purpose of working them.
The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did not
constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded
not guilty.
The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not
constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture
prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall,
upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and
pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them.
A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a
violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a
violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way
therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal Code which punishes any
person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among
animals.

G.R. No. L-44291 August 15, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
AUGUSTO A. SANTOS, defendant-appellee.

63 PHIL 300

FACTS: On June 18, 1930, the provincial fiscal of Cavite filed against the accused -appellee
Augusta A. Santos an information which reads as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Augusta A. Santos of violation of section 28 of

Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 and penalized by section 29 thereof
committed as follows:

That on or about April 29, 1935, within 1,500 yards north of Cavalry Point, Corregidor
Island, Province of Cavite, P.I., the said accused Augusta A. Santos, the registered owner
of two fishing motor boats Malabon IIand Malabon III, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally have his said boats, manned and operated by his fishermen,
fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce within three (3) kilometers from the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over
which the naval and military authorities of the United States exercise jurisdiction.

Contrary to law.

Cavite, Cavite, June 18, 1935.

Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, provides as follows:

28. Prohibited fishing areas.

The above quoted provisions of Administrative, Order No. 2 were issued by the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, now Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of the
authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No. 4003

The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his
fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon Ill registered in
his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of
Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United
States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
ISSUE: WON THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE HAS JURISDICTION
TO CHARGE THE ACCUSED.
HELD: NO.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of
section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2. issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred
upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been
and cannot be delegated to him.

Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is charged do
not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts,
the information filed against him is dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing
within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is
exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and naval
authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce.

The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as

the Secretary of the Department of Energy,
Petitioner,

- versus -
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATIONOF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 159149
June 26, 2006
FACTS: Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for
trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders.[3] The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a
maximum of P50,000.[4]

On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33.
The law sets a minimum of P20k and a maximum of P50k as penalties.
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the
Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of merit.

Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new
offenses not included in the law.[6] The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on
a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under the law.

The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: won the circular is valid?

HELD: yes.
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law,
(1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute
itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.[16]

The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading,
adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg.
33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is
limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum
pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000,[17] an amount within the range allowed by
law. However, for the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum
monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the aforesaid
statutory maximum limit. Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute
punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for
the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the
maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular
contravenes the law.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to
provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively
curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products,
which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile
government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of
some unscrupulous LPG traders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of DOE is
declared valid.

G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner,

Vs ca
171 scra 348

FACTS: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm
assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country (per
Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to
hold as null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987.
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of
convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the
petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans
Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development
Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino),
Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan
of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the
said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the
PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported
deposition to support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in
this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M.
Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. 5
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court
on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. 6 On March 13,
1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5) days
notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.
Thereafter, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to
be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender
immediately all the personal properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by
virtue of the aforementioned search warrants.
On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of
Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court.
In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD
1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and
the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and
void.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its
Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988,
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolution(s) above-
mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted
in excess of its appellate jurisdiction,
Further, the petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial
Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in
question null and void.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body
and it isone co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond
thelatter's jurisdiction; and
(b) Whether or not such presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution
HELD:
No.
It is the basic function of quasi-judicial bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and
unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain
and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act,
Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the
Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and
decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice
of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, 32 it is tasked alone by
the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

No.
when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest
and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the
license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself
makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible".
According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973
Constitution was founded on the requirements of due process, notably, the assurance to the
respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person or
seizure of his property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C.

Santiago, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC,
ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD
FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS: appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named
Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end,
the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers
concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class.
With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda
Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as
members, the above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina,
Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The
school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that
date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the
above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in
Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with the honor rank of third place,
which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose
the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave abuse of official discretion is
the subject of suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and
Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil
from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in
the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before, except in
Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest rival
had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached
and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both
pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that
the committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed
of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of
Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be
composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial matters,
which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of
discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of
Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a
starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there has already an intention to pull him to
a much lower rank at the end of the school year; that several district examinations outside of
teachers' daily units and other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which were heavily
considered in the determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the Academic
Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations
were not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the
respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro
Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's
certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second place", which is an
instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the
disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that petitioner personally appealed the matter to
the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials
"passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities
will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and,
that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00.
They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of
the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the
suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the
said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to hold on
the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court in its
order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then
already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be
shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward
to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero
Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested
list of honor students.

, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a
Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating
honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it
was proper, the question has become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also
argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is
not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy
against judicial function

ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.

RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial
function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for
certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for
hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a
decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at
least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

Judicial power is defined:

• as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
• authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights
of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
• The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
• The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies
in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to
some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with
power and authority to determine

[G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003]

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO

TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC), respondent.

FACTS: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating
rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law
Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000.[2] Meanwhile,
the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and
the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of
the Memorandum Circular.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service
(CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of
stealing of cellular phone units.

On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph
A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C.
Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the
Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.[5]

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the
sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment
of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of
the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers
and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular
be declared null and void ab initio.
Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention.[6] This was granted by the
trial court.
On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from
implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the Memorandum dated October 6,
2000.[7]

In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Subsequently, after hearing petitioners application for preliminary injunction as well as
respondents motion to dismiss, the trial court issued on November 20, 2000 an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack
of merit.
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals.
Petitioners motions for reconsideration were denied .
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON The CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedies?
HELD: dministrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order
for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect
to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is
its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an
act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice
has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question
by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.