G.R. No.

L-20213             January 31, 1966

MARIANO E. GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF and THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES and/or THE CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BOARD and/or THE
AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES,defendants-appellees.

Tiangco and Millosa for the plaintiff-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for the defendants-appellees.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of dismissal.

It appears that on December 1, 1961, the plaintiff-appellant, Mariano E. Garcia, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against the Chief of
Staff and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chairman of the
Philippine Veterans Board and /or the Auditor General. The complaint alleged: that sometime in
July, 1948, the plaintiff suffered injuries while undergoing the 10-month military training at Camp
Floridablanca, Pampanga; that sometime thereafter he filed his claim under Commonwealth Act
400 and in April, 1957, he submitted some papers in support of his claim to the Adjutant
General's Office upon the latter's request; that on May 2, 1957, he received a letter from the said
Adjutant General's Office disallowing his claim for disability benefits; that on November 24, 1958,
after further demands of the plaintiff, the Adjutant General's Office denied the said claim, alleging
that Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by Republic Act 610 which took effect
on January 1, 1950; that by reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff he was deprived of his sight
or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and that by reason of the unjustified refusal by
defendants of plaintiff's claim, the latter was deprived of his disability pension from July, 1948
totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20 a month and suffered thereby moral damages
and attorney's fees the amount of P2,000.00.

The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces filed separate
motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action
is barred by the statute of limitations.
1äwphï1.ñët

Acting on the said motion, the court, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the action has prescribed.

Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this
appeal.

Without need of discussing the various questions raised, We have to uphold the order of
dismissal, not necessarily on the same ground as found by the lower court; but for the simple
reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a
money claim against the government.

This Court has already held (New Manila Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14248, April
28, 1960) that a claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the
Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent.
Commonwealth Act 327 provides:
 SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those
of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty
days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. . . .

SEC. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement
of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal
in writing:

x x x           x x x           x x x.

(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative remedies
had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if
superior administrative officers could grant relief is squarely applicable to the present case.

In view therefor, the order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement
as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-5156             March 11, 1954

CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante-apelante, 
vs.
ISAIAS FERNANDO, Director de Obras Publicas, demandado-apelado.

D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.

El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Diaz y el Procurador Sr. Antonio A. Torres en
representacion del apelado.

DIOKNO, J.:

Carmen Festejo, dueña de unos terrenos azucareros, de un total de unas 9 hectareas y media
de superfice, demando a "Isaias Fernando Director, Bureau of public Works, que como tal
Director de Obras Publicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas y proyectos de irrigacion y es el
funcionario responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en el pais," alegando
que —

The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first
from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and
without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection
unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land described above, and
caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on
or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to
the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ----- R. on A., p. 3.

causando a ella variados daños y perjuicios. Pidio, en su consecuencia, sentencia condenando

el demandado:
 . . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully
occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square meters and to return
the land to its former condition under the expenses of the defendant. . . .

In the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated can
not be returned to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum
of P19,343.20 as value of the portions totalling an area of 24,179 square meters; ---- R.
on A., p. 5.

y ademas a pagar P9,756.19 de daños y P5,000 de honorarios de abogado, con las costas R.
on A., pp. 5-6.

El demandado, por medio del Procurador General, presento mocion de sobreseimiento de la

demanda por el fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene jurisdiccion para dictar sentencia valida
contra el, toda vez que judicialmente la reclamacion es contra la Republica de Filipinas, y esta
no ha presentado su consentimiento a la demanda. El Juzgado inferior estimo la mocion y
sobreseyo la demanda sin perjuicio y sin costas.

En apelacion, la demandante sostiene que fue un error considerar la demanda como una contra
la Republica y sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.

La mocion contra "Isaias Fernando, Director de Obras Publicas, encargado y responsable de la

construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en Filipinas" es una dirigida personalmente contra el,
por actos que asumio ejecutar en su concepto oficial. La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por
las extralimitaciones que cometa o haga cometer en el desempeño de sus funciones oficiales.
Un caso semejante es el de Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933) 18 minn. 584, NW 49, 90 ALR 1472. Alli
el Comisionado de Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la carretera ocupo o se apropio de
terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal Supremo del Estado declaro que
espersonalmente responsable al dueño de los daños causados. Declaro ademas que la
ratificacion de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era equivalente a una orden a los mismos. He
aqui lo dijo el Tribunal.

We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the
trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority.
When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and
damaged it or destroyed its former condition an dusefulness, he must be held to have
designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that
he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys
clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway
before construction began. . . .

"Ratification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be inferred from

acquiescence where there is power to restrain." It is unnecessary to consider other cases
cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the jury could find or infer that, in so far as there was
actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's land as a dumping place for the rock to be
removed from the additional appropriated right of way, defendant planned, approved, and
ratified what was done by his subordinates. — Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A.L.R., 1472,
1476, 1477.

La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos parecidos se resume

como sigue:

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and
may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage
results from his tortious act. — 49 Am. Jur. 289.
 . . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred
on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent. — 43
Am. Jur. 86.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or

otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law
may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the
power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public
agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his
acts then are wholly without authority. — 43 Am. Jur. 89-90.

El articulo 32 del Codigo Civil dice a su vez:

ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxx     xxx     xxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

xxx     xxx     xxx

In any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right ot commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The inmdemnity shall include moral damages Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.

Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda, No. L-1648,
Agosto 17, 1947; Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412, Septiembre 1950.

Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuacion de la tramitacion de la demanda

conforme proveen los reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas. Asi se
ordena.

Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, MM., estan conformes.

Separate Opinions

CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:

To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee Isaias
Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the
Government. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of
Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:
 4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, is in charge of irrigation
projects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system
in the Philippines;

5. That the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority
obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right
of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express
objection, unlawfully took possession of portions of the three parcels of land described
above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three
parcels of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179
square meters to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied.)

The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were performed by
said defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly shows that the designation of
his office was included in the title of the case to indicate that he was being sued in his official
capacity. This conclusion is bolstered up by the fact that, among other things, plaintiff prays, in
the complaint, for a judgment

Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession of the portions
of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179 square
meters and to return the land to its former condition under the expense of the defendant.
(Paragraph a, of the complaint).

We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system reffered to in the
complaint — of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same pleading, is "in
charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works — are
established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must be
appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been
undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the
Government. Consequently, in praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the
irrigation canal involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff therein, and that said land be
restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its possession of said
irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the Government to be removed or
destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez (47 Off. Gaz., 665), the Government is, accordingly, "the
real party in interest as defendant" in the case at bar. In other words, the same partakes of the
nature of a suit against the state and may not be maintained without its consent.

Hence I am constrained to dissent.

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set
aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.

The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil
Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied the motion for
reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.

Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
(Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.

Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent
to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific
performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).

The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the
PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square
meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00
be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then
occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month,
Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the sellers of the
said assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers
fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed
private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that
private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6)
private respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the
purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter; (7)
Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it
seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8) private
respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30,
1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as
evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D;
and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and
registered in the name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots
to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent; (10) private respondent
demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail;
and (11) private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and
has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers'
breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.

Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner
and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in
question; (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots;
and (4) damages.

On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint —
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for
being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.

On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the
business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).

On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991,
petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for
claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense
of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish
certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as
well as the motion for reconsideration.

On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for
reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p.
22).

Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of
sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal
Nuncio.

On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations contained in
the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign
immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87).

Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance
with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted
their respective memoranda.

II

A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his
answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of
exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no
alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582
[1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a
sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of
the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp.
186-190).

In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign
state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State
to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds
that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the
court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is
followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a
"suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign
Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to
first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how
the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International
Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court
a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander
of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent
Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum
as amicus curiae.

In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs
moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the
said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by
the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945];
Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v.
Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass
the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to
the nature of the acts and transactions involved.

III

The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a
foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the
doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a
cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of
land located in the Philippines.

A. The Holy See

Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a
sovereign state is in order.

Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as
the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States
and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the
Holy See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law
36-37 [1992]).

In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the
exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also
recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to
foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and
Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to
the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable
sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).

In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is
vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty
created two international persons — the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra,
37).

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of
"sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states
(Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community
of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for
ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City
has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman
Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the
demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican
City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen,
Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication
— that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by
states to be invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in
International Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).

Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy
See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is
the Holy See that is the international person.

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with
the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.

B. Sovereign Immunity

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally
accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of
International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182
SCRA 644 [1990]).

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public
International Law 194 [1984]).

Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination
when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the
law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in
Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or
conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial
character."

The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the
issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions
in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract
of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.

The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is
particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business
activities and international trading.

This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as
acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its
military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the
repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and
(3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88
[1988]).

On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with
private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting
of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay
Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States
of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber
shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
[1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is
undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the
employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States
government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered
"commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own
guidelines, tentative they may be.

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by
its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an
act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):

 There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will
be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves
its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation
was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts.
20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the
Philippines on November 15, 1965.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the
sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy,
with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in
this case is the Holy See.

The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact
that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to
leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).

The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in
the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege
of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of
the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the
Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the
Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the
Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities
of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the
executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic
immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations
(World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic
Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs.

Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of said certification, such
procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v.
Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994).
 IV

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under
both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts
of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic
channels.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its
claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up
with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government
and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected
Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the
Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International
Court of Justice:

By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own rights — its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules
of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World
Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183
against petitioner is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.