Section 12- Custodial Investigation

1. Gamboa vs Cruz

FACTS:
Petitioner alleges that on 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was
arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest. He was brought to Precinct 2, Manila,
where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several
others.
The following day, during the lineup of five detainees, including petitioner, complainant
pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the
other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on.
While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was
told to sit down in front of her. An information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
He was arraigned and hearings were held. Subsequently, the prosecution formally
offered its evidence and then rested its case.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested
in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. He filed
said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to,
and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to
due process. The respondent court issued an order denying the Motion to Acquit.

ISSUE
WON the assailed order is violative of the petitioner’s rights to counsel and to due
process.
HELD
The Court finds no merit in the contentions of petitioner.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

This Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any
person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver
shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to
those under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than
any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a
suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or
even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver
shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived
of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He
was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate
his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after
the prosecution had rested its case.

2. People vs Macam
FACTS
In a criminal case, Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque, together with Eduardo Macam,
Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., were accused of Robbery with Homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged
that they conspired to rob the residence of the offended party, their loot valued in the
total amount of P454,000.00, more or less, and by reason of the crime of Robbery, said
accused, killed one Leticia Macam, and others sustained serious physical injuries.
Another case was filed against Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law.
Upon being arraigned, all the accused pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. After
the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro
and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., assisted by their respective counsels, changed their plea
from "not guilty" to "guilty". Consequently, a separate judgment of conviction was
rendered.
The trial proceeded with respect to Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. and appellants. Of the latter,
only Danilo Roque testified. The trial court rendered its judgment finding appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.

ISSUE
WON there was violation of Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution
HELD
The Court previously held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information, confessions or admissions from the accused. As a result of the changes in
patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and
the judicial system well before his trial begins. It is therefore appropriate to extend the
counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law
enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's
fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a
"critical" stage of the proceedings.
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at
bench where the police officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was
held. The circumstances were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of
the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were handcuffed and
had contusions on their faces.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at
the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence
of custodial identification of an uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the other
hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made by the prosecution
witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the
police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did
not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the
absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that said identifications were
of independent origin.
3. BENJAMIN JESALVA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 187725,19 JANUARY 2011,
NACHURA, J.
Facts:
On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a criminal
complaint for Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days thereafter, or on
September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging petitioner with the crime of
Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo (Leticia) died on September 14, 1992. After
conducting a hearing on the bail application of petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992, granted him bail. On January
11, 1993, the MTC recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and then
ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of
Sorsogon.

Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information dated January
26, 1993, which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in the Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with
treachery and evident premeditation with the use of motor vehicle and during night time,
did then and there [wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, manhandle and
use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal
wounds which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice
of her legal heirs. CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.

HELD:
Custodial investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.”
There can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator
of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict,
the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner’s mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive
declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused. The
evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the CA to be sufficient and
credible, while petitioner’s defense of denial was weak, self-serving, speculative, and
uncorroborated. Petitioner’s silence as to the matters that occurred during the time he
was alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can only be exonerated if the
prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. We find that the prosecution has met this quantum of proof
in this case.

4. People vs Ayson

FACTS
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. Having alleged irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986.

On the day before the investigation, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes
which stated his willingness to settle the alleged irregularities in a certain amount. At the
investigation conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, in the presence
other PAL employees, Ramos was informed of the finding of the Audit Team. Ramos'
answers were to the effect that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets
mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him,
that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from
doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and
proferred a "compromise to pay on staggered basis.

About two months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him
with the crime of estafa. Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter
ensued. The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence which included "the
above mentioned statement of Ramos. The defendant's attorneys filed
"Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence", the objection was that "said document,
which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by
a lawyer.

The respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses
who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A
(Ramos’ answers during the investigation) and K (his handwritten notes).

ISSUE

WON the rights of Ramos granted by the constitution during his custodial investigation
were violated

HELD
Section 20 states that whenever any person is under investigation for the commission of
an offense, he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right, nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him; and any confession obtained in violation of these
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

These rights exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of

accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

Respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights
set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as
applying to the same juridical situation. In so doing, he has grossly erred. It is clear that
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he
appeared to have had a hand. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9,
1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter
been marked during the trial (Exhibit A), just as it is obvious that the note (Exhibit K) that
he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous
act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

5. People vs Pinlac

FACTS
The accused was charged in two different Informations of the crimes of robbery against
two different Japanese nationals. It was alleged that Sato thereafter went to the Makati
Police Station to report the robbery. He requested some policemen to repair to his
residence to investigate. It was when the police investigators had already reached his
residence that he learned about the death of Osamu.

Police detectives took photographs from different angles of the scene of the crime.
Several footprints were found in the backyard; these correspond to the impressions of
the soles of Pinlac's shoes One of the victim’s maid revealed that she saw Pinlac enter
the house of Sato at seven o'clock in the evening, although she did not see him leave
thereafter. Her statements were introduced in evidence. Subsequently, the policemen
went to Taguig and, finding Pinlac thereat, invited him to the police station. Detective
Samson opined that the killer made his entry by removing the panels of jalousies at the
rear of the house and that fingerprints were lifted from the victim's house. Policemen
Mallari submitted his final report regarding this incident. Later on, Sgt. Flores extracted
the extra-judicial confession of Pinlac.
After said accused entered a plea of not guilty, the cases proceeded to trial. The trial
court rendered its now assailed decision finding the accused guilty as charged.
ISSUE
WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession, which
was allegedly obtained thru force, torture, violence and intimidation, without having
been apprised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.
HELD
Numerous factors combine to make the appeal meritorious. No direct evidence or
testimony of any eyewitness was presented Identifying the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime charged. The only evidence furnished by the police authorities were merely
circumstantial evidence regarding the fingerprints of the accused found in the window
stabs of the maid's quarters and in the kitchen cabinet in the house of Mr. Sato. But this
was satisfactorily explained by the accused to the effect that aside from being a
frequent visitor in the house of Mr. Sato where his wife works as a cook wherein at
those times he could have unknowingly left his fingerprints, but most especially during
the time when he was arrested and ordered to reenact. The only evidence presented by
the prosecution which could have been fatal, is the extra-judicial confession of the
accused, which is now being assailed as violative of the Constitution.
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right
to remain silent and to counsel, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not
only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also
explain their effects in practical terms
The Court finds that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with
these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and
his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case
is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution,
that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed
the prepared extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court acquitted the accused.
6. People vs Bolanos
FACTS
Two policemen (Alacantara and Dayao) testified that they proceeded to the scene of the
crime of Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival, they saw the deceased
Oscar Pagdalian lying on a improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then
inquired about the circumstances of the incident and were informed that the deceased
had a drinking spree with the deceased and one Cluadio Magtibay the other night till
wee hours the following day. They then apprehended the accusd-appellant, they found
the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was alegedly seated.
Afterwards, they boarded Bolanos and Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought them
to the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, accused Bolanos
admitted that he killed the deceased because he was abusive.
ISSUE
Whether or not the acts of the policemen constitute a violation of the accused's
constitutional right.
HELD
The acts of the policeman violated the constitutional rights of the accused, thus he is
acquitted. Being already under the custodial investigation while on board the patrol jeep
on the way to the police station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Considering the clear requirements of the
Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can be admissible in
evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the
police vehicle was the only reason for the convtiction, besides appellant's conviction
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no recourse but to reverse the
subject judgment under review.
7. People of the Philippines vs. Pablito Andan y Hernandez
GR No. 116437, March 3, 1997

FACTS:
Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to
her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan alias “Bobby”
asked her to check the blood pressure of the grandmother of Andan’s wife but there
was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan and was
brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet until it was dark and
was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the
adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete
block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow portion of the lot and
abandoned it. The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted
Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case.
Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched Andan’s nearby house and found
evidences linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were interviewed and
learned that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police
team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters
where he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three were then
brought to Andan’s house where he showed the police where the bags of Marianne
were hidden. They were then brought back to the police station while waiting for the
result of the investigation. The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they
were gathered at the police headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor
Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to which the
mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell the truth
and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door
of the room to let the public and the media representatives witness the
confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the appellant but
since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives, Andan admitted to the
crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated Larin and
Dizon because of ill-feelings against them. However, appellant entered a plea of “not
guilty” during his arraignment. He provided an alibi why he was at his father’s house at
another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the
crime but the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel
is in violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.
RULING: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellant’s
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has “operational
supervision and control” over the
local police and may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, Andan’s confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the
mayor did not question appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to
talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought
the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law
enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold
that appellant’s confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
8. Navallo vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS
An information charging petitioner with having violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed. It was alleged that the accused, who is the Collecting
and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, misappropriated to
his benefit the public funds he was holding in trust in the total sum of P16,483.62. He
failed to account such amount during an audit and to restitute despite demands by the
office of the Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.

A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused still then could not be found. Meanwhile,
Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on
it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced
in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.

On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released
on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. He pleaded not guilty
during arraignment. The RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor opined that since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should
continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman which held otherwise. After the trial, the accused was found guilty as
charged.

ISSUE

WON petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification
prepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.

HELD
The Court sees no merit in the petition. Accused was not deprived of his constitutional
rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that
such rights can be invoked only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or
is "in custody investigation," which has been since defined as any "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit
examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly
be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any
case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report
prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENNY DY, accused-

appellant.

Benny was reported as suspect in a shooting incident which caused the death of Christian Langel.
Suspect Benny Dy voluntarily surrendered to the sub-station commander with his caliber 38. No
warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already
under police custody before the filing of the complaint. The Accused posted the required bail on
13 June 1984, which was approved by Judge Tonelon the same. However on appeal, the defense
assailed its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing
and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.
Issue: whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution e admissible to warrant guilt of
the accused.
Held: An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar
which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is
because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not
under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke
compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule
on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy
the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be
repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession
made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and
was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.
People vs. Alicando

Facts:

Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during the
interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his uncounselled
confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the victim’s personal things like
clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the
arraignment and was convicted with the death penalty.

Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.

Held:

No. He was not informed of his right to counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession against him was written in
a language he could not understand and was not explained to him. Also, he court violated Sec. 3 of Rule 116 when it
accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full
understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. The decision of imposition of penalty was annulled
and remanded to the lower court.
People vs. Mojello
Facts:

Respondent was charged of the crime of rape with homicide. The accused, succeed in having carnal
knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will
and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, On an
investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the
dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. He
testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later on
voluntarily signed it. Appellant avers that the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently
and voluntarily entered into.He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his
constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him. Hence, his confession, and admissions
made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

Issue: WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was admissible.

Held:

The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain
silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk
to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if
he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.

The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par.
1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional
requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid
and therefore admissible in evidence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of
his Miranda rights under the Constitution.18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly
states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights.19 As further proof of the same, Atty.
Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by
the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant.20 Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty.
Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted
and appellant's statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told
appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his
answer.21 Atty. Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Basco vs. Rapatalo

Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent for granting a bail to an accused in a murder case without
receiving evidence and conducting a hearing. Roger Morente , one of the accused filed for a petition for a bail.
Petitioner allegedly saw Morente in La Union and later learned he latter’s petition for bail was granted despite such
petition was not heard at all. Respondent alleged that he granted petition based n the prosecutor’s option not to
oppose he petition thus, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not.

Issue: Whether or not Judge can grant a petition for bail without a trial.

Held:

No. The SC then reiterated the following rules outlining the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is set:

1. Notify the prosecution of the hearing of the application for bail or acquire him to submit his
recommendation.
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for hearing regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its discretion.
3. Decide whether he evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence f the
prosecution
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond.
Otherwise, petition should be denied.

Although he Judge set the application for bail for hearing 3 times thus showing lack of malice or bad faith n granting
bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing has
not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is
strong for purposes of bail. Respondent is reprimanded with a warning.
People vs. Judge Donato

Facts:

Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion for acts committed before and after
February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished. This was denied. Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the
respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942
and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. The President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the
RevisedPenal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail,
which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two
months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition
of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when
arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's
License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and
paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that
the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from
30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the
crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeascorpus). Agreements were
made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in
the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another
of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.

People vs. Fortes

Facts:
Agripino Gine filed on behalf of his daughter a complaint for rape against Fortes . Finding probable cause
to exist after a preliminary examination was conducted, the court order for the arrest of the latter. When
the case was finally called for prelim. Investigation, Fortes, through his counsel de officio informed the
court that he was waiving his right thereto. Fortes pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The court
promulgated its decision convicting Fortes of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of Rec. Perp. and damages. Fortes applied for bail on appeal for his provisional liberty but was denied on
the ground that the accused has already been found guilty.
Issue: Whether Fortes is entitled to bail on appeal.
Held:
It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, that: ". . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It
is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right|. In the instant case,
the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It
is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the
appeal.

Commendador vs. De Villa

Facts:
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in
person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for
reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by
GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However
he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court
martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding
after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the
pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial
of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-
affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit
counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting
evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of
G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of
the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere
with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and
quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right
to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was
substantial compliance with therequirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of
peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are
hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
Baylon vs. Judge Sison
Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged with double
murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in
violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-
working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that they
were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent
judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution did not interpose
objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the
accused.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting bail to the
accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately
conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the
3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well established rule of law that
bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully
scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion.

17. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc. He went back to the Philippines from United States
and filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the appointment of a
management committee for both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, SEC requested
Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure which was granted. When a Torrens
title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients
filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner, president and vice-president of Manotoc
Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed. In all cases, petitioner
has been admitted to bail.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after
due hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty,
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel?

HELD: No. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. The constitutional right to
travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
states that the liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court,
or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.

18. Government of the U.S. v. Judge Purganan

FACTS: This Petition is a sequel to G.R. No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government a request for the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila. The TRO prohibited the
Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO
was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a petition to which the court dismissed the petition.

Petitioner US government filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the procedure adopted
by the trial court of first hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez, before issuing a warrant for his
arrest under Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Petitioner contended that the procedure gives Jimenez notice to
escape and to avoid extradition. Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting of Jimenez's prayer for
bail, which allows him to go on provisional liberty while extradition proceedings are pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not right to bail can be availed in extradition cases.

HELD: No. The Court held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is available only in criminal proceedings, when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt". IIt follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is
available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

19. Government of Hong Kong v. Hon. Olalia

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three counts of the
offense of accepting an advantage as agent and seven counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. The Department of Justice received a request from Hong
Kong Department of Justice for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. RTC issued an Order of Arrest and NBI
arrested and detained him. Respondent filed a complaint questioning the validity of the arrest. The
Court of Appeals declared the arrest as void. DOJ filed a petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region then filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed in the same case a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing,, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."

ISSUE: Whether or not right to bail can be availed in extradition cases.

HELD: Yes. In Purganan case, it was held that the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases..
However, the Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance
of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3)
the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

Tthe right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

20. Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). He filed an Omnibus Motion
and Supplemental Opposition that he be allowed to bail, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On
July 3, 2014, a warrant of arrest was issued against Enrile, leading to his voluntary surrender. Thereafter,
Enrile filed his Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of
the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight
risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Enrile should be granted bail.

HELD: Yes. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. The
Constitution provides that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until
after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.

21. Tatad v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public
Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with
the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner Francsico Tatad, who was
then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The report was made to
"sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then
Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet.

The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 — which was around two months after
petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS,
Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.

Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process"
and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation
and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission
of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations.

ISSUE: Wether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights of criminal due process.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law.

22. Galman v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: President Marcos created a Fact Finding Board to investigate the treacherous and vicious
assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos
become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early distortions and
exaggerations in both foreign and local media. Both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting
that accused Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that the evidence shows to the
contrary that Galman had no subversive affiliations, and that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a
military conspiracy, not a communist plot.

The petitioners filed an action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed
serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against
him.

HELD: No, the Court held that in rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the
presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. The record shows suffocatingly that
from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources
of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process
in the Aquino- Galman murder cases.

23. Alonte v. Savellano

FACTS: Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion were
charged with rape based on the complaint of Juvielyn Punongbayan. During the pendency of the petition
for change of venue, Juvielyn, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance.
The petition for change of venue was granted and the case was raffled to respondent judge who issued
warrants of arrest for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her "decision to abide by her Affidavit of
Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not guilty when arraigned and waived pre-trial. Immediately following
arraignment the prosecution presented Juvielyn who testified to the validity and voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance and that she has no interest in further prosecuting the action. The Prosecution
then manifested that the State had no further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the
accused. She then moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both accused-petitioners. The two
accused did not present any countervailing evidence, did not take the witness stand nor admitted the
act charged in the information. Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for
decision." On December 18, 1997, a decision was rendered convicting petitioners of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied of criminal due process.

HELD: Yes. Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particularp, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only
upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable.
In the case at bar, (1) petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses
nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose, (2) the parties have not been given the
opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the
purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no
excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied
even to the most undeserving.

24. People v. Dramayo

FACTS: Pableo Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in a
robbery case. Together with Paterno Ecubin and five other men, they conspired and successfully killed
the victim. Dramayo and Ecubin were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Nogaliza. They
claim that because the information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with only the
two appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and the other three having
been acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to their culpability, the judgment of
conviction against the appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD: Yes. The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply
demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than
sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution.

DUMLAO VS COMELEC

FACTS: Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from office.
Thereafter, he filed for re-election to the same office. However, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted
which provides that “ Retirees from public office are disqualified to run office.” He averred that such is
unconstitutional and contrary to equal protection in the eyes of the law, thus this petition. With it were
Atty. Romero and Alfred Salapatan Jr., they contend that BP 152 regarding the term of office of the
elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision which bars person charged for crimes
from running for public office as well as the provision which provides that mere filing of complaints
against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: WON Dumlao, Atty. Romero and Salapatan have cause of action.

HELD: Such case of the parties should not be consolidated and such does not meet all the requisites to
be eligible for judicial review.

(1) the existence of an appropriate case;

(2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question;

(3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In the case at bar, only 3rd requisite was met.

For the contention of Atty. Romero and Salapatan, barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office as null and void.

For the contention of Patricio Dumlao, for purposes of public service, candidates should not be more
than 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. In respect to age
at the time they assume office, it is applicable to everyone despite if it is a reasonable classification.
Solicitor General has intimated a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our local governments. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may
also be good elective local officials. etirement from government service may or may not be reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao),
who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Therefore, batas pambasa 152 is valid.

Marquez vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995]
FACTS: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position in the Province of
Quezon questioned private respondent, Eduardo Marquez’ victory as the Governor of Quezon.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge
against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still
pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on
private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country. Petitioner then filed for petition
to suspend the candidacy of Marquez with the COMELEC which was dismissed. The matter
elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy which was later dismissed.
ISSUE: WON Marquez should be disqualified.
HELD: Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact,
private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the
light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed
outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual
matter.

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to
proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the foregoing opinion. No special
pronouncement on costs.

Corpus vs. People

[G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 1991]
FACTS: Petitioner Generoso P. Corpuz, was a Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said
Office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and
withdrawals pertaining to government accounts.
Thereafter, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated and a Transfer of
Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor during which revealed that
there was a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08.
A letter of demand required the petitioner to produce the missing amount but he was able to pay only
P10,159.50. Subsequent letter of demands was sent but such amount was not sufficient to cover the
shortage. The demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said amount was
filed against him.
He did not deny such facts ,however, he insisted that he is not guilty because the shortage imputed
to him was malversed by other persons.
He contend that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda
thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their
Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the
amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of
the charge against him
HELD:
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is
evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution
and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he
malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached.
His conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

Feeder International Line vs. CA [G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991]
FACTS: The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder
International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons
of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of
Zamboanga, Philippines.Thereafter, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo
without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area which
was verified. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship
and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the
vessel for "Zamboanga." Because of such, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of
Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The court found M/T "ULU
WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Such
filed for petition for motion for consideration but was found no merit.
ISSUE:
WON the corporation can invoke the right to be presumed innocent.
a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature.

HELD:
Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention
that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed
innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the argument
advanced by Feeder International. in relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure
and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not
result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section
3601 of the Code. seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character, the main
purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of
goods or their deliberate possession. the Court finds and so hold that the Government has
sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed
with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo
pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder International is guilty of illegal
importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence.

People vs. Holgado [G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950]

FACTS: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously
and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero
Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty."
Thereafter, Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty without a counsel and said that he was
just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.
ISSUE: WON there was an irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.
HELD: Yes. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have
attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
The court has four important duties to comply with when a defendant appears without attorney
which the following are:

1 .It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;

3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him;
4 .If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable
time therefor.
In such case, not one of which was complied with. The record discloses that said court did not inform
the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial
court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him
reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. In the case at bar, he accused who was
unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following qualification: "but I was instructed by one
Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this qualification. the record
does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. The court should have seen to it that
the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for
a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be
assisted by counsel.
People vs. Agbayani [G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998]
FACTS: Eduardo Agbayani was sentenced to death for raping her 14-year old daughter, Eden. The
conviction was based on the testimony of Eden, which she narrated the incident despite the painful
and humiliating secret which brought about a traumatic experience which she may be psychological
and emotional impediment to a blissful union. The testimony of Dr. Florante Baltazar, , a colonel,
who, accordingly, prepared the corresponding Medico-Legal Report. And the testimony of SPO1
Salavador Buenviaje who narrated the events leading to and occurring after the incident.
The defense, on the other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi, and one of the evidence
presented was the affidavit of desistance of the victim. However, it was retracted by the victim during
the presentation of the rebuttal evidence claiming that she was only pressured by her mother and
sister to sign it because of what it can do to the reputation of their family.
ISSUE: WON such testimonies are sufficient than affidavits.

HELD: The court held that affidavits are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court;[56] and affidavits or recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable,
since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. t is settled that the failure of the
record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not
sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to
have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such
a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been
held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court
failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was
informed by the court of such right.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Amion vs. Judge Chiongson [A.M No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999]

FACTS: Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the
person of Atty. Manuel Lao Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the scheduled
hearing of the aforecited criminal case. It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not
represented by defense lawyer in the scheduled hearing which prompted respondent judge to
appoint Free Legal Aid Lawyer Atty. Manuel Lao Ong. Notwithstanding complainant-accused's
vehement opposition, respondent judge proceeded with the triat with Atty. Ong representing the
complainant-accused as counsel de oficio. He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have sufficient
knowledge of the case and that no prior conference was held between said counsel de oficio and
himself. Consequently, complainant-accused filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion 2 stating
therein that he is not accepting the legal services of counsel de oficio Atty. Ong since he can afford
to hire a counsel de parte of his own choice. He further states that respondent judge is not fair and
just and does not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. He likewise asseverates that
respondent judge is ignorant of the basic law which makes him unfit to be a judge in any judicial
tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by
the accused in the case at bar.
HELD: The court find this administrative complaint devoid of merit. Verily, the facts and
circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and prevaricated procrastination of the
proceedings undertaken by the accused-complainant and his counsel. Contrary to what accused-
complainant would want to impress upon this Court, it seems that he has been the oppressor while
respondent judge Roberto Chiongson appears to be the oppressed. As to the charges of oppression
and gross ignorance of the law against respondent judge relative to cases under him while he was
still in the Municipal Trial Court, the same have been sufficiently answered in the Comments
submitted in this case. The explanation by the respondent judge indicate that the aforesaid
allegations have neither legal nor factual basis and that the conclusions made therein are merely
conjectural. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should administer justice
impartially and without delay. 18 A judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. 19
It was the strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the
need of appointing him counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to
speedy disposition of a case and causes delay in the administration of justice.