FORONDA-CRYSTAL

VS. LA WAS,
G.R. NO. 221815, NOVEMBER 29, 2017.

FACTS:

Eddie Foronda was granted with Free Patent of a parcel of land located in Compostela,
Cebu.

Aniana Lawas Son instituted an action for reconveyance and damages against Glynna
Foronda-Crystal (Eddie’s daughter) alleging that, for twelve and a half years, she has been
the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same
from a certain Eleno T. Arias (Arias) for a sum of P200,000.00. According to her, since her
acquisition, she has been religiously paying real property taxes thereon as evidenced by
Tax Declaration.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Upon reconsideration, it reversed its
decision for the following accounts: (1) the Complaint stated that the property was worth
P200,000.00; (2) the Court has "judicial knowledge the property located at Magay,
Compostela, Cebu carries the value that may summed up to more than P20,000.00 for the
property with an area of 1,570 square meters; and (3) the tax declaration, sometimes being
undervalued, is not controlling.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction?

RULING:

SC ruled in the negative.

The rule on determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as the identification
of the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:
First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real
property as alleged in the complaint; and Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the
assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the complaint, could still be identified
through a facial examination of the documents already attached to the complaint.

The complaint in the present case did not aver the assessed value of the property. However,
a liberal interpretation of this law, would necessitate an examination of the documents
annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the complaint referred to Tax Declaration which
naturally would contain the assessed value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal
that the property was valued at P2,826.00. Thus, it is the MCTC that has jurisdiction. The
decision of the RTC, in effect is null and void.
Shuley Mine v. DENR, et. al.
G.R. No. 214923, August 28, 2019

FACTS:

The Philippine Government and Philnico entered into a Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA/SMR) for the exploration, development and commercial utilization of
nickel ores covering Surigao Mineral Reservation. The mining rights in the MPSA was
assigned by Philnico to Pacific Nickel which in turn entered into a mining agreement (MOA)
with Shuley Mine.

Due to the non-payment of the amount of US$263,762,000.00 to the government under the
ARDA. The DENR suspended the acceptance of applications for, and issuance of the same
permits for the minerals and ore extracted from the contract area under the subject MPSA.

Aggrieved, Pacific Nickel filed with the RTC of Surigao City separate petitions for injunction
seeking to enjoin the implementation of MGB's directives which was docketed separately.
The trial courts, in both cases, issued temporary restraining orders (TROs). The TROs were
later converted to writs of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, Dir. Jasareno informed the
petitioner that its MOA with Pacific Nickel had already expired on April 27, 2013.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC can rule on the Injunction filed?

RULING:

The RTC's act of granting the petitioner's application for a preliminary injunction is a
patent violation of existing laws and jurisprudence which amounted to grave abuse of
discretion thereby effectively divesting itself of jurisdiction.

In this case, the petitioner had no more right to speak of when it filed a complaint with
prayer for the issuance of an injunction on May 25, 2013 to enjoin the respondents from
suspending the issuance of the OTPs and MOEPs before the RTC. The records show that the
petitioner and Pacific Nickel's April 27, 2009 MOA had already expired as early as April 27,
2013. It is obvious that, at the time of seeking an injunction, the MOA had already expired
and the petitioner had no more right to perform any act agreed or even contemplated in
such agreement.

As regards the petitioner's claim that the registration on December 20, 2010 of its
Supplemental Agreement seeking for the extension of the April 27, 2009 MOA was "deemed
approved" by the respondents, the Court rejects the same contention as mere act of
registration is not tantamount to approval.
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC.,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 173946. June 19, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the spouses Toledo. The latter filed an answer, then
subsequently, a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged that her
husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Substitution praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-
defendants. This motion was granted by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court can order substitution of the deceased by his heirs.

RULING:

In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal
existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as
either a natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the
name of such a person. The same rules applies with the defendant.

Here, a dead person no longer has legal personality. Thus, cannot be impleaded as a party
as the court can no longer acquire jurisdiction over his person. Indeed, where the
defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the
complaint may be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action.

Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-
defendant is the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it
ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party
to be substituted died during the pendency of the case.
MARTINEZ v. HEIRS OF LIM
G.R. No. 234655, September 11, 2019

FACTS:

Respondents are the heirs of Remberto who, during his lifetime, owned, possessed, and
cultivated a parcel of land located in Coron, Palawan. Adjoining Remberto's land is the land
of his brother - Jose. It is worthy to note that per the technical description in said title, the
property is bounded on both the east and west by the properties of the Heirs of Socorro
Lim, which were later on acquired by Remberto.

Jose sold his land to a certain Dorothy and Alexander Medalla who, thereafter, subdivided
the same into two (2) smaller lots, as further subdivided into nine (9) smaller lots, one of
which was sold to Martinez.

Martinez and her father entered into the property and uprooted some of the acacia
mangium trees that were previously planted thereon by the late Remberto Lim and his son.
To further delineate their claimed property, petitioner fenced the same and placed signs
thereon that read "NO TRESPASSING" and "NOTICE THIS PROPERTY IS OWNED BY THE
MARTINEZ FAMILY." Because of this, Respondents were constrained to file a case for
Forcible Entry with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the MCTC.
The MCTC took cognizance of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the MCTC has the jurisdiction to decide the case?

RULING:

A proper reading of the allegations of the complaint shows that the case revolved around
the actual metes and bounds of the parties' respective properties. What the MCTC should
have quickly seen was that the dispute did not concern mere possession of the area in
litis but the supposed encroachment by the petitioner on the portion of the respondents.

We reiterate that a boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily through the action for
forcible entry covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, the possession of
the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between
the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto. If the petitioner had
possession of the disputed areas by virtue of the same being covered by the metes and
bounds stated and defined in her Torrens titles, then she might not be validly dispossessed
thereof through the action for forcible entry. The dispute should be properly threshed out
only through accion reivindicatoria. Accordingly, the MCTC acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and resolving the dispute as one for forcible entry.
PERKINS v. DIZON
G.R. No. 46631, November 16, 1939

FACTS:

Respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for dividends registered in his
name, payment of which was being withheld by the company. The company filed its answer
alleging that the withholding of such dividends and the non- recognition of plaintiff's right
to the disposal and control of the shares were due to certain demands made with respect to
said shares by the petitioner herein, including defendant petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins,
and George H. Engelhard in his amended complaint, respondent Perkins prayed that they
be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any
claim they assert thereon. Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon these two
nonresident defendants pursuant to the order of the trial court. Engelhard filed his answer
to the amended complaint while petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins, through counsel,
challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over her person.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the present petitioner as a non-resident defendant

RULING:

Section 398 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a non-resident defendant is
sued in the Philippine courts and it appears, by the complaint or by affidavits, that the
action relates to real or personal property within the Philippines in which said defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding such person from any interest therein, service of
summons maybe made by publication.

The action being in quasi in rem, The Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over
the person of the non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process, summons has been served upon her by publication.

There is no question as to the adequacy of publication made nor as to the mailing of the
order of publication to the petitioner's last known place of residence in the United States.
But, of course, the action being quasi in rem and notice having be made by publication, the
relief that may be granted by the Philippine court must be confined to the res, it having no
jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the non-resident.
GENESIS INVESTMENT INC.
VS. HEIRS OF EBARSABAL,
G.R. NO.181622NOVEMBER 20,2013.

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC of Barili, Cebu for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against
Respondents. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction as the case involves title to or possession of or interest in real property with an
assessed value of P11,990.00. As it does not exceed P20k, the action allegedly fell within
the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Respondents filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing that their complaint consists of several causes
of action, including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC grants the motion.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

Contrary to petitioners contention, the principal relief sought by petitioners is the

nullification of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale entered into by and between
some of their co-heirs and respondents, insofar as their individual shares in the subject
property are concerned. Thus, the recovery of their undivided shares or interest over the
disputed lot, which were included in the sale, simply becomes a necessary consequence if
the above deed is nullified. Hence, since the principal action sought in respondents
Complaint is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and, thus, cognizable by the RTC. Well entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether
the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.

Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the
causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein. Thus, as shown above,
respondents complaint clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

MONTERO VS. MONTERO

G.R. NO. 217755, SEPTEMBER 18, 2019.

FACTS:

Elmer filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Affidavit of Adjudication, Cancellation

of Tax Declaration and Original Certificate of Title, Reconveyance, and Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction before the RTC, against Santiago, Charlie, and Elpidio,
Teresita, and Atty. Danilo, the latter three in their official capacities as Local Assessors and
Registrar of Deeds of Abra.

The complaint alleges the assessed value of the property at P3,010.00. Santiago and Charlie
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE:

Whether RTC has jurisdiction?

RULING:

None. The Complaint involves title to, possession of, and interest in real property, i.e., the
subject property, which indisputably has an assessed value of below P20,000.00. Hence, the
RTC had no jurisdiction to hear case.

Even if the action is supposedly one for annulment of a deed, the nature of an action is not
determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to
obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the assessed value of the property subject thereof, the MTC/MCTC, as the case may be.

GABRILLO VS. HEIRS OF PASTOR,

G.R. NO. 234255, OCTOBER 2, 2019.

FACTS:

Petitioner claimed that she is the lawful and rightful owner of a parcel of in Davao City,
with a market value of P50,000.00, originally owned by Olimpio and Cresenciana Pastor.
Spouses Pastor executed a Transfer of Rights and Sale of Improvements over the subject
property, then consisted of 10,000 square meters, before the Bureau of Lands
Investigation/Inspector in favor of Ernesto A. Cadiente, Sr. A conflict between spouses
Pastor and Cadiente arose and a compromise agreement was forged to reduce Cadiente’s
lot to 9,000 square meters to devote the 1,000 square meters to a barangay site. Petitioner
maintained that when the respondents registered the subject property in their names, an
implied trust was created warranting reconveyance as well as the cancellation/annulment
of the OCT. Thereafter the RTC dismissed the case declaring that it has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case because the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the
land in dispute.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction?

RULING:

RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Traversing the complaint, the primary objective of petitioner is to secure her claimed
ownership by recovering the subject property from respondents and have the certificate of
title under their name cancelled. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an
action involving title to real property, jurisdiction over which rests on the assessed value of
the real property in question as alleged in the initiatory pleading, not even a single
document reflecting the assessed value of the subject property was annexed to petitioner's
complaint. The attachment of the sworn declaration of real property to the complaint
would have triggered the liberal application of the rule since it bears the assessed value of
the property at issue. Petitioner, however, failed to adduce the tax declaration which could
have shown that the RTC indeed had jurisdiction over the case.
QUINOGARAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 155179, AUG. 24, 2007.

FACTS:

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz represented by Senen dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Recovery
of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino
Quinagoran before the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan. They alleged that they are the
co-owners of a parcel of land containing 13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan,
which they inherited from the late Juan Dela Cruz. Petitioner started occupying a house on
the north-west portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of respondents.
Petitioner was asked to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial
building on the property petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot and that they
suffered damages for their failure to use the same. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The RTC denied petitioner's Motion
to Dismiss. The Court finds the said motion to be without merit. The present action on the
basis of the allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature of action publicciana and
jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial Court, regardless of the value of the
property.

ISSUE:

Whether RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the
value of the property involved

RULINGS:

No. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as
affirmed by the CA that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property no longer holds true.

Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned.
There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation in the
complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC
or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. The courts
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of
the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.
Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming
the RTC.
YAP VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 186730, JUNE 13, 2012.

FACTS:

Jesse Yap filed a complaint against respondents Eliza Chua and Evelyn Te with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City principally praying for the cancellation or discharge of several
checks that he drew against his account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Yap alleged
that he purchased several real properties through Te, a real estate broker, and as payment,
delivered to her a number of checks either payable to her, the property owners or to the
various individuals who agreed to finance his acquisitions. He agreed to effect payment in
such manner on Te’s claim that this will expedite the transfer of the titles in his favor.

Chua, one of those who funded his purchases, asked him to issue checks with her as payee
to replace the checks he delivered to Te. Obliging, he drew six (6) checks payable to her
against his account with BPI. He stopped payment on the above checks and closed his
account when Te failed to deliver the titles on the properties. He also did the same on the
following checks that Te endorsed to Chua for rediscounting without his consent.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

RULING:

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test
for determining forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. This Court takes note of the
fact that Yap filed his complaint for the annulment of the checks he issued to Chua after he
was adjudged by the RTC of General Santos City liable. Chua’s complaint is anchored on the
amounts Yap received from her and the RTC of General Santos City decided in her favor on
the strength of the checks that Yap issued and endorsed to her. By seeking to cancel or
discharge such checks, Yap attempted to use the RTC of Makati City to destroy the
evidentiary foundation of the decision of the RTC of General Santos City. In doing so, Yap
trifled with court processes and exposed the courts to the possibility of rendering
conflicting decisions. Worse, Yap sought to accomplish the prohibited, a court reversing a
decision rendered by a court of co-equal rank. Thus, it matters not that the factual findings
and conclusions of law of the RTC of General Santos City, the RTC of Makati City, the CA and
even of this Court may concur. It is the fact that our judicial system is rendered vulnerable
to such uncertainties and vexations that any and all efforts to forum shop should be treated
with aversion.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC. VS. STANDARS INSURANCE CO.INC.

G.R. NO. 140746, MARCH 16, 2005

FACTS:

In the afternoon of October 28, 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney
owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. It was then raining. While driving
north bound along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned
by Pantranco North Express, Inc. driven by Alexander Buncan, was trailing behind. When
the two vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook
the jeepney. In so doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped
away. Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard
Insurance Company Inc. insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00,
but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance
of P13,415.00. Thereafter, respondents demanded reimbursement from petitioners
Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents
to file with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, a complaint for sum of money.

In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and
averred that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the
case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the action which did not arise out of the
same transaction nor are there questions of law and facts

RULING:

Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of
action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no
common questions of law and fact common to both parties. Permissive joinder of parties
requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or
defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules
on jurisdiction and venue.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the
rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether
petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents,
consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.

PAMPLONA PLANTATION CO. INC. VS. TINGKIL,

G.R. NO. 159121FEBRUARY 3, 2005
FACTS:

Pamplona Plantations Company, Inc. was organized for the purpose of taking over the
operations of the coconut and sugar plantation of Hacienda Pamplona located in Pamplona,
Negros Oriental. It appears that Hacienda Pamplona was formerly owned by a certain Mr.
Bower who had in his employ several agricultural workers. When the company took over
the operation of Hacienda Pamplona in 1993, it did not absorb all the workers of Hacienda
Pamplona. Some, were hired by the company during harvest season as coconut hookers or
‘sakador,’ coconut filers, coconut haulers, coconut scoopers or ‘lugiteros,’ and charcoal
makers. Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation was established for the purpose of
engaging in the business of operating tourist resorts, hotels, and inns, with complementary
facilities, such as restaurants, bars, boutiques, service shops, entertainment, golf courses,
tennis courts, and other land and aquatic sports and leisure facilities.

Pamplona Plantation Labor Independent Union (PAPLIU) conducted an organizational

meeting wherein several who are either union members or officers participated in said
meeting. Upon learning that some of the [respondents] attended the said meeting, Jose Luis
Bondoc, manager of the company, did not allow respondents to work anymore in the
plantation.

Thereafter, respondents filed their respective complaints with the NLRC, Sub-Regional
Arbitration, Dumaguete City for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment,
overtime pay, premium pay for rest day and holidays, service incentive leave pay, damages,
attorney’s fees and 13th month pay.

ISSUE:

Whether the case should be dismissed for the non-joinder of the Pamplona Plantation
Leisure Corporation.

RULING:

Granting for the sake of argument that the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation is an
indispensable party that should be impleaded, NLRC’s outright dismissal of the Complaints
was still erroneous. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned.
If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the NLRC did
not require respondents to implead the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation as
respondent; instead, the Commission summarily dismissed the Complaints.
ANG VS. PACUNIO,
G.R. NO. 208925, JULY 8, 2015.
FACTS:

The instant case arose from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Reconveyance,
and Damages filed by Pedrito N. PaGunio, Editha P. Yaba, and herein respondents Severino
Pacunio, Teresita P. Torralba, Susana Loberanes, Christopher N. Pacunio, and Pedrito P.
Azaron against petitioner before the RTC involving a 98,851 square meter parcel of land
originally registered in Udiaan's name as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. T-3593 (subject land). In their Complaint, respondents alleged that they are the
grandchildren and successors-in-interest of Udiaan who died on December 15, 1972 in
Cagayan de Oro City and left the subject land as inheritance to her heirs. However, on July
12, 1993, an impostor falsely representing herself as Udiaan sold the subject land to
petitioner. Petitioner entered the subject land and used the same in his livestock business.
Respondents then informed petitioner that he did not validly acquire the subject land, and
thereafter, demanded for its return, but to no avail. Hence, they filed the aforesaid
complaint, essentially contending that Udiaan could not have validly sold the subject land
to petitioner considering that she was already dead for more than 20 years when the sale
occurred.

After the pre-trial conference, the parties submitted the case for summary judgment on the
basis of the documents and pleadings already filed. The RTC then ordered the parties to
simultaneously submit their memoranda in support of their respective positions

ISSUE:

Won the respondents are real parties in interest to the instant case

RULING:

No. The rule on real parties in interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an
action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no
material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action. In the instant case, respondents claim to be the successors-in-
interest of the subject land just because they are Udiaan's grandchildren.1â wphi1 Under
the law, however, respondents will only be deemed to have a material interest over the
subject land - and the rest of Udiaan' s estate for that matter

Hence, the RTC and the CA correctly found that respondents are not real parties in interest
to the instant case.

COLMENAR VS. COLMENAR,

G.R. NO. 252465, JUNE 21, 2021
FACTS:

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court against the assailed Order dated May
22, 2020. He faults Judge Gill for applying the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure to the case,
and based thereon, motu proprio acted on the affirmative defenses of respondent
companies despite the clear injustice it caused to him. He asserts that although admittedly
procedural rules may be applied to actions already pending prior to their effectivity, the
2019 Amendments expressly proscribe their application to pending actions when "in the
opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in
which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern. Judge Gill motu
proprio acted on and granted the affirmative defenses of respondent companies despite
previously denying them through her Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020. Petitioner
further posits that Judge Gill had earlier ruled on the affirmative defenses through her
Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020. Judge Gill gravely erred when she decreed that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action as against respondent companies in view of
the absence of a material allegation that they were purchasers in bad faith or had notice of
a defect in the sellers' titles. In truth, the complaint bears the material allegations that
petitioner is the heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, the registered owner of the properties
which were sold to respondent companies by Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria, who were not
heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint fail to state a cause of action against respondent companies

RULING:

A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of

another. A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the
three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or
omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. The allegations in the complaint
do not speak of co-ownership between petitioner and the individual respondents insofar as
the subject properties are concerned.

It held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against respondent companies,
and based thereon, the court dismissed the complaint against them.

GUY v. GUY
G.R. No. 189486 & 189699, September 5, 2012
FACTS:

Gilbert was made in-charge of a GoodGold, majority of shares of which is owned by his
parents Simny and Francisco. The aging Francisco instructed Lim, a nominal shareholder of
GoodGold and his trusted employee, to collaborate with Atty. Paras, to redistribute
GoodGold’s shareholdings evenly among his children, namely, Gilbert, Grace, Geraldine, and
Gladys, while maintaining a proportionate share for himself and his wife, Simny.

The shares were eventually re-distributed. Gilbert contests the validity of the redistribution
on the ground of fraud. He sued his siblings and Simny, without including his father,
Francisco.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the suit may prosper without impleading an indispensable party?

2. Whether alleging fraud sufficiently constitutes a valid cause of action?

RULING:

1. No. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present. It baffles the Court that Gilbert omitted Francisco as defendant in his
complaint. The transfer of the shares cannot be, as Gilbert wanted, declared entirely
fraudulent without including those of Francisco who owns almost a third of the total
number.

Francisco is an indispensable party without whom no final determination can be had for
the following reasons: (a) the complaint prays that the shares now under the name of the
defendants and Francisco be declared fraudulent; (b) Francisco owns 195,000 shares some
of which, Gilbert prays be returned to him; (c) Francisco signed the certificates of stocks
evidencing the alleged fraudulent shares previously in the name of Gilbert. Moreover, the
pronouncement about the shares of Francisco would impact on the hereditary rights of the
contesting parties or on the conjugal properties of the spouses. In his absence, there cannot
be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable.

2. No. Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats

are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the
allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action.

CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS

G.R. NO. 170631, FEBRUARY 10, 2016.
FACTS:

On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes was walking along the west-bound lane of
Sampaguita Street, United Parañ aque Subdivision IV, Parañ aque City. A Mitsubishi L-300
van with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes.
To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa, a
witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told
the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista, to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so,
Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still
in the van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to
the hospital. Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was
Caravan. Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours.
Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver. Caravan
shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died
two (2) days after the accident.

Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised
her since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañ aque a
Complaint[25] for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged
that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the
van that hit Reyes.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent is a real party in interest who may bring an action for damages
against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc.

RULING:

Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus,
a real party in interest in this case.

In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for damages:
that she exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes' death was caused
by the negligence of petitioner and its driver; and that Reyes' death caused her damage.
Respondent properly filed an action based on quasi-delict. She is a real party in interest.

Article 1902 does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation that must
exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person who may recover damages,
thus warranting the inference that, in principle, anybody who suffers any damage from
culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the
person responsible therefor.
CABRERA VS. P.S.A.
G.R. NO. 241369, JUNE 3, 2019
FACTS:

Petitioner alleged that she was born on July 20, 1989 at Zuba Estate, Lahad Datu Sabah,
Malaysia. However, due to the distance between their house and the Philippine Embassy in
Kuala Lumpur, it was only on August 27, 2008 that her mother reported her birth. The
National Statistics Office in Manila, now the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), received
her first Report of Birth on January 29, 2009. Subsequently, petitioner discovered that her
date of birth was wrongfully entered as July 20, 1980. However, instead of correcting the
said error with the Philippine Embassy, petitioner's mother registered her birth for the
second time. Thus, petitioner had a second Report of Birth recorded in March 2010.
Because she had two (2) Reports of Birth, petitioner encountered difficulties in securing
official documents, prompting her to file a petition for cancellation of her first Report of
Birth before the RTC of Davao City.

After due proceedings where the publication and jurisdictional requirements were shown
to have been complied with, and with the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General,
the RTC granted the petition, it ordered the cancellation of petitioner's first Report of Birth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the re-filed petition on the ground of improper
venue

RULING:

Venue is the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should
be brought. In civil cases, venue is a matter of procedural law. A patty's objections to venue
must be brought at the earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer;
otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is
improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.

Clearly, therefore, it was erroneous for the RTC to motu proprio dismiss the re-filed
petition before it on the ground of improper venue. Since convenience is the raison
d'etre of the rules on venue, and as it was established that Davao City is the residence of
petitioner, and as further pointed out by the OSG, PSA has a field office located at Ango
Building, Cabaguio Avenue, Davao City, then Davao City is the most convenient venue for
the parties. Thus, the RTC should have taken cognizance of and heard petitioner's re-filed
petition in order to promote, not defeat, the ends of justice.

In sum, the RTC erred in motu proprio dismissing petitioner's re-filed petition on the
ground of improper venue. Accordingly, the same must be reinstated, and thereafter,
remanded to the RTC-Br. 14 for further proceedings.

B.P.I. VS. HON. HONTANOSAS

G.R. NO. 157163, JUNE 25, 2014
FACTS:

Respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad,
and XM Facultad and Development Corporation filed a complaint to seek the declaration of
the nullity of the promissory notes, real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing surety
agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner. They further sought damages and
attorney’s fees, and applied for a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages against their
properties. The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the
petitioner, and had executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and severally, to
pay the sum borrowed; that as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted
real estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had
been made to sign a continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their
Mitsubishi Pajero.

It appears that the respondents’ obligation to the petitioner had reached ₱17,983,191.49,
but they had only been able to pay ₱13 Million because they had been adversely affected by
the economic turmoil in Asia in 1997. The petitioner required them to issue postdated
checks to cover the loan under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages. Thus, the complaint
sought a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the threatened foreclosure. On June
6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, as well
as its opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the
foreclosure of the mortgages was within its legal right to do.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be dismissed for (a) non-payment of the correct amount of
docket fee; and (b) improper venue

RULING:

Yes, the case was a personal action hence, the venue was properly laid.

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the
subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional Trial Court denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

BRIONES VS. COURT OF APPELAS,

G.R. NO. 204444, JANUARY 14, 2015
FACTS:

Virgilio C. Briones filed a complaint for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan
Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), and
Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC. In his complaint, Briones alleged that he is the
owner of a property covered by TCT (subject property), and that, his sister informed him
that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of possession had already been issued in
favor of Cash Asia.

For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss dated August 25, 2010, praying for the
outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint on the ground of improper venue. In this regard,
Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating that all legal
actions arising out of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof
shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City.
In view thereof, it contended that all actions arising out of the subject contracts may only
be exclusively brought in the courts of Makati City, and as such, Briones’s complaint should
be dismissed for having been filed in the City of Manila. In response, Briones filed an
opposition, asserting, inter alia, that he should not be covered by the venue stipulation in
the subject contracts as he was never a party therein. He also reiterated that his signatures
on the said contracts were forgeries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the outright dismissal of
Briones’s complaint on the ground of improper venue

RULING:

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in
nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to
the courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones' s complaint
directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution.
Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue
stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their
validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his
complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.

In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Briones's complaint on the ground of improper venue

CAPARINO VS. CENTURY LIMITLESS CORP.

G.R. NO. 248722 SEPTEMBER 7, 2020.
FACTS:

PHILITRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES INC. VS. PARAS,

G.R. NO. 161909 APRIL 25, 2012.
FACTS:

Paras, engaged in the buy and sell of fish products, was on his way home to Manila from
Bicol Region boarding a bus owned and operated by Inland Trailways and driven by Calvin
Coner. While traversing the Maharlika Highway, the bus was bumped at the rear by another
bus owned and operated by Philtranco. Said accident bought considerable damage to the
vehicles involved and caused physical injuries to the passengers and crew of the two buses,
including the death of Coner.

Paras filed a complaint for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against Inland.
Inland denied responsibility, invoking the Police Investigation Report which established
the fact that the Philtranco bus driver was the one which violently bumped the rear portion
of the Inland bus. I filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and its driver for the
exoneration of his liability to Paras.

ISSUE:

Can Inland be exonerated of his liability by its filing of interpleader against Philtranco?

RULING:

The requisites for a third-party action are, (1) that the party to be impleaded must not yet
be a party to the action; (2) the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to the
original defendant;(3) the claim of the original defendant against the third-party defendant
must be based upon the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and, (4) the
defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted
against him by the original plaintiff.

It is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff
before the third-party defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory
of defendant is that it is the third-party defendant, and not he, who is directly liable to
plaintiff. The situation contemplated by appellants would properly pertain to situation (a)
above wherein the third-party defendant is being sued for contribution, indemnity or
subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant's "remedy over". It is worth adding that
allowing the recovery of damages by Paras based on quasi-delict, despite his complaint
being upon contractual breach, served the judicial policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits
and circuity of actions by disposing of the entire subject matter in a single litigation.

Vda. De Rojales v. Dime

G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016.

FACTS:
Dime filed a case to consolidate his title over the property sold by Vda. De Rojales, which
was denied by the latter. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed that petitioner is the
registered owner of the subject property, and that she once mortgaged the property with
the Batangas Savings & Loan Bank in order to secure a loan of P200,000.00 from the bank.
Respondent passed away and was substituted by his wife and children.

The heirs of Dime filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground
that it was Rufina Villamin, respondent's common law wife, who was the source of the fund
in purchasing the subject Lot. They alleged that the consolidation of ownership and title to
respondent would be prejudicial to Villamin and would unjustly enrich them. The RTC
Ordered the case be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that the case was not filed by
an indispensable party, Villamin.

ISSUE:

Whether Villamin is an indispensable party?

RULING:

The parties to a contract are the real parties-in-interest in an action upon it.

As evidenced by the contract of Pacto de Retro sale, petitioner, the vendor, bound herself to
sell the subject property to respondent, the vendee, and reserved the right to repurchase.
Therefore, in an action for the consolidation of title and ownership in the name of vendee in
accordance with Article 1616 of the Civil Code, the indispensable parties are the parties to
the Pacto de Retro Sale - the vendor, the vendee, and their assigns and heirs.

Villamin, as the alleged source of the consideration, is not privy to the contract of sale
between the petitioner and the respondent. Therefore, she could not maintain an action for
consolidation of ownership and title of the subject property in her name since she was not
a party to the said contract. Where there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no
obligation or liability to speak about. Since she is not privy to the contract, she cannot be
considered as indispensable party. A cursory reading of the contract reveals that the
parties did not clearly and deliberately confer a favor upon Villamin, a third person.

Datem Inc. v. Alphaland

G.R. Nos. 242904-05, February 10, 2021.

FACTS:
Alphaland, entered into a construction agreement with DATEM for the performance of civil,
structural, and architectural works on Towers 1, 2, and 3 of Alphaland Makati. Alphaland
refused to settle its financial obligations to DATEM, hence, the latter was constrained to file
a complaint before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).

While in the course of the Judicial Proceedings, Alphaland's asserted that DATEM attached
a defective verification to the petition: the verification was dated 28 November 2018.
However, the petition itself was filed on 17 December 2018. Thus, Alphaland claims the
petition is fatally defective because DATEM's representative cannot "validly certify the
truth of a FUTURE event.

ISSUE:

Whether the verification is defective?

RULING:

It is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional

requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are
true and correct.

The variance between the dates of the verification and the petition does not necessarily
contradict the categorical declaration made by petitioners that they read and understood
the contents of the pleading. A variance in their dates is a matter that may satisfactorily be
explained. To demand the litigants to read the very same document that is to be filed in
court is too rigorous a requirement since what the Rules require is for a party to read the
contents of a pleading without any specific requirement on the form or manner in which
the reading is to be done. What is important is that efforts were made to satisfy the
objective of the Rule, that is, to ensure good faith and veracity in the allegations of a
pleading.

MALIXI VS. BALTAZAR,

G.R. NO. 208224, NOVEMBER 22, 2017

FACTS:
In their Complaint, petitioners prayed before the Civil Service Commission that respondent
Dr. Baltazar be held administratively liable for gross misconduct and that she be dismissed
from service. Petitioners were employees of Bataan General Hospital holding the following
positions
Meanwhile, Dr. Baltazar was the Officer-in-Charge Chief of Bataan General Hospital.

Petitioners questioned the validity of Dr. Baltazar's appointment and qualifications. They
alleged that her appointment was without any basis, experience or expertise.They claimed
that she was appointed only by virtue of an endorsement of the Bataan Governor and
without the prescribed Career Service Executive Board qualifications. A year after Dr.
Baltazar's secondment, the Commission did not issue any authority for her to continue to
hold office as Officer-in-Charge of the hospital. Hence, her assumption without the required
authority was deemed illegal. The Civil Service Commission rendered a Decision dismissing
the Complaint on the ground of forum shopping.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review against Dr. Baltazar before this Court. They pray for
the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals and of the Decision and
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition based on procedural
grounds

RULING:

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will
to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in insuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed, to
provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner and
at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge. The other alternative is the settlement of their conflict through the barrel of a
gun.

Technical rules serve a purpose. They are not made to discourage litigants from pursuing
their case nor are they fabricated out of thin air. Every section in the Rules of Court and
every issuance of this Court with respect to procedural rules are promulgated with the
objective of a more efficient judicial system.

ISLA LPG CORP. VS. LEYTE DEV'T. COMPANY INC.

G.R. NO. 220262AUGUST 28, 2019

FACTS:
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) and Leyte Development Company, Inc. (LDCI)
entered into a Distributorship Agreement sometime in 2005. Under said Agreement, the
former appointed the latter to be its distributor. Pursuant to said Agreement, the
agreement became effective on February 1, 2001. Under the same terms, the contract was
renewed for another three years. Before the expiry of the renewed contract, LDCI assumed
the distributorship of a certain Dondon Chua for a buy-out goodwill of about P5 Million
which covered the areas of Ormoc, Isabel, Merida, Palompon and Biliran. Considering the
further extent of LDCI's business, it was certified by Shell as its exclusive authorized
distributor in the whole of Leyte. Asserting that it lost its established business opportunity
consisting of purchases of LPG products in the average of P5 Million to P15 Million per
month, as well as its good name and the goodwill attached to the product, LDCI filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Application for a 72-Hour Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC-Makati. However, as the
Distributorship Agreement has already been terminated, the petition was dismissed
without prejudice.

ISSUE:

Should the case before RTC-Makati be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia

RULING:

It is clear that any judgment rendered by the RTC-Makati amounts to res judicata in the
case before RTC-Tacloban. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the issues in both cases are
the validity of the termination of the Distributorship Agreement and the consequential
damages that may arise in case of any breach. Thus, while forum shopping exists in this
case, this Court does not agree that the filing of the second complaint is willful and
deliberate. Hence, it is necessary to rule on which of the two cases must be dismissed.
Generally, the first action which was filed should be retained in accordance with the
maxim qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. However, this rule is subject to exceptions: (a)
the first action may be abated if it was filed merely to pre-empt the later action or to
anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal or the anticipatory test; and (b) the
first action may be abated if it is not the more appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues
between the parties or the more appropriate action test.

In this case, this Court deems it proper to apply the general rule, there being no showing
that the first complaint was filed to simply pre-empt the second complaint or anticipate its
filing nor any indication that the second complaint was the more appropriate case.
Noteworthy is the fact that the first complaint delves into the validity of the contract itself,
which would determine whether or not the award of damages is in order. Hence, it is but
proper to allow the first complaint to proceed for the determination of the rights of all the
parties.

MANDAUE GALLEON TRADE VS. ISIDRO,

G.R. NO. 181051 JULY 5, 2010.

FACTS:

Respondents, alleging that they were employees of petitioners, filed a case for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteenth (13th) month pay, and
service incentive leave pay against petitioners, Manuel Jose Oyson III and Simonette C.
Abao before the Regional Arbitration Branch VII, Cebu City of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Petitioners are engaged in making rattan furniture in Mandaue
City. Respondents averred that they started working at Gamallo Sons, Inc. the firm name
was changed to Gamallosons Traders, Inc. and eventually it became Mandaue Galleon
Trade, Inc. They claimed that, in order to ensure their availability for possible twenty-four
hour service, respondents were extended loans to build their houses in petitioners’
compound. Thus, they were on call any time, day or night. They were dismissed from
employment without just cause and without due process. On the other hand, petitioners
averred that respondents were not their employees but were independent contractors who
received various orders from many other furniture manufacturers, and that respondents
constructed their houses and workplaces in the compound owned by another corporation.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, finding respondents illegally dismissed from
employment

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the
decision of the NLRC

RULING:

The filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory in initiatory pleadings. The

subsequent compliance with the requirement does not excuse a party’s failure to comply
therewith in the first instance. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance
with the requirement to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special
circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of the Circular
clearly unjustified or inequitable. In this case, however, the petitioners offered no valid
justification for their failure to comply with the Circular.

Finally, it bears stressing that while it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities
and that rules of procedure shall not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice, it
does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution.
It must be emphasized that procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance might have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive
of reasons.

ANDERSON VS. HO,

G.R. NO. 172590, JANUARY 7, 2013.

FACTS:

Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. She alleged that through her mere tolerance, Ho is
in possession of her parcel of land at Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. As she was already in
need of the said property, Anderson served upon Ho a Demand Letter to Vacate but despite
receipt thereof, Ho refused. Because of this, Anderson prayed that the MeTC order Ho to
vacate the Roosevelt property and pay her damages and attorney’s fees. In his Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, Ho denied that his occupation of the Roosevelt property is
through Anderson’s mere tolerance. He claimed that since Anderson is an American citizen,
he managed her affairs in the Philippines and administered her properties in Quezon City
and Cebu. When Anderson sought his assistance in ejecting her relatives from the
Roosevelt property and in demolishing the St. Anthony de Padua Church built thereon, Ho
(1) secured the services of a lawyer to file an ejectment case against the occupants of the
property; (2) dutifully appeared in court on Anderson’s behalf who was then in the United
States of America and (3) was able to secure a judgment from the court in favor of
Anderson. For all these, Anderson did not pay Ho a single centavo and instead executed a
written document which states that as partial payment for Ho’s services, Anderson is
authorizing him "to make use of the Roosevelt property as his residence free of charge
provided he vacates if there is a buyer for the lot" and "that the balance of Ho’s
compensation shall consist of 10% of the proceeds of the sale of any or all of her properties.

ISSUE:

Whether the rules on certification against forum shopping may be relaxed in this cased?

RULING:

The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a peculiar personal
representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other
tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues
and causes of action. In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed
Anderson’s Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping
attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do so. While
the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an SPA and by
explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not
automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective
certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction. And while it is true that
in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it
"did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while
avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping.

PEOPLE VS. LEE JR.

G.R. NO. 234618, SEPTEMBER 16, 2019

FACTS:

That from February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused MATEO A. LEE, JR. a public officer, being the Deputy Executive Director of the
National Council on Disability Affairs, committing the offense in relation to this official
functions and taking advantage of his position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
criminally demand, request or require sexual favor from Diane Jane M. Paguirigan, an
Administrative Aide VI in the same office and who served directly under the supervision of
accused, thus, accused has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over her, by asking Ms.
Paguirigan in several instances, when they would check in a hotel, sending her flowers,
food and messages of endearment and continuing to do so even after several protests from
her, visiting her house and church and inquiring about her from her family, relatives and
friends, and even following her on her way home, which sexual demand, request or
requirement resulted in an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment to Ms.
Paguirigan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in its decision

RULING:

Yes. 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or

submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3)Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged
in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification
against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." 5) The certification against
forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally,
the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign
on his behalf.

PHIL. COMM. INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. ALEJANDRO,

G.R. NO.175587,SEPTEMBER 21, 2007.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed against respondent a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Respondent, a resident of Hong Kong,
executed in favor of petitioner a promissory note obligating himself to pay
₱249,828,588.90 plus interest. In view of the fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates
which resulted in the insufficiency of the deposits assigned by respondent as security for
the loan, petitioner requested the latter to put up additional security for the loan. In
praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Section 1 paragraphs (e)
and (f) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleged that (1) respondent fraudulently
withdrew his unassigned deposits notwithstanding his verbal promise to PCIB Assistant
Vice President Corazon B. Nepomuceno not to withdraw the same prior to their assignment
as security for the loan; and (2) that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. The
application for the issuance of a writ was supported with the affidavit of Nepomuceno.

The trial court issued an order quashing the writ and holding that the withdrawal of
respondent’s unassigned deposits was not intended to defraud petitioner. It also found that
the representatives of petitioner personally transacted with respondent through his home
address in Quezon City and/or his office in Makati City. It thus concluded that petitioner
misrepresented and suppressed the facts regarding respondent’s residence considering
that it has personal and official knowledge that for purposes of service of summons,
respondent’s residence and office addresses are located in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner bank is liable for damages for the improper issuance of the writ of
attachment against respondent.

RULING:

Notwithstanding the final judgment that petitioner is guilty of misrepresentation and

suppression of a material fact, the latter contends that it acted in good faith. Petitioner also
contends that even if respondent is considered a resident of the Philippines, attachment is
still proper under Section 1, paragraph (f), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court since he is a
resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines upon whom service of summons may be
effected by publication.

Finally, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the instant case for damages by reason of the
invalid issuance of the writ, survives the dismissal of the main case for sum of money.
Suffice it to state that the claim for damages arising from such wrongful attachment may
arise and be decided separately from the merits of the main action.