REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I – CASE DIGEST COMPILATION BASED ON ATTY.

BRONDIAL’S 2017 SYLLABUS

COMPILED & UPDATED BY: REYNALDO DALISAY JR., MARIANNE SERRANO (The Poypis’)

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE

I. JURISDICTION

DUERO VS. CA
373 SCRA 11

Topic:

Jurisdiction and the application of estoppel

FACTS:

Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax
Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an
assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the land was his, and requested the latter to vacate the land.
However, despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.

On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.

Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a partial
judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the
ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared
in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his
favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land
as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in
the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on
it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in
his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the Petition.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC denied the
MR.

Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the latter granted.

Issues:

1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case

2) Whether the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC after he has
successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom

RULING:

1
 1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129.

2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if
misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late
Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who
did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed before the RTC a Motion for
Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but
when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from
judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or
even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of
the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the
RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action

Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court)

Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and its Order that private respondent turn over the
disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are annulled and set aside.

DONATO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

417 SCRA 216

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located in Manila, covered by a TCT. On
June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint before the MeTC of Manila for forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43
named defendants and “all unknown occupants” of the subject property. Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had
oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere
acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written
demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the ejectment case against them.

Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents) filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they
denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees
security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase of the
lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and
tendered payment to petitioner’s counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in a civil case while
they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.

On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a MR attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed
by petitioner himself and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. Five days later, or on April
22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement to his MR submitting the duly authenticated original of the certification of non-forum
shopping signed by petitioner.

On June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioner’s MR and its supplement, ruling that “petitioner’s subsequent compliance did not
cure the defect in the instant petition.”

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which justifies
relaxation of the rule. YES

2) Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append
to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the petition, justifies the
outright dismissal of the petition. NO

HELD:

1) YES. The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before the CA and the
corresponding sanction for noncompliance thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 2891. It provides that
the petitioner himself must make the certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification
by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar
actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled
that with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because
the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with.

We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to have been prepared and sent to the
petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington,
D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the
Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to
personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.

We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly
signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.

2) NO. The failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his
petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the petition, does not justify
the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to
require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3,
paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary,
and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for
under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other material
portions of the records below with his motion for reconsideration. In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the
doctrine laid down in Cusi- Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission that subsequent
submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which calls for
the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.

3. GONZAGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

394 SCRA 472

FACTS: In 1970, spouses Gonzaga bought a parcel of land from Lucky Home Inc. Said lot was specifically denominated as
Lot No. 19 and which the spouses mortgaged to the Social Security Commission as a security for their housing loan.
Meanwhile, the spouses started to construct their house on Lot No. 18, and not on Lot No. 19. They mistakenly identified Lot
No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Lucky Homes then informed them of such mistake but the spouses instead offered to buy Lot No. 18 to
widen their premises, thus they continued building their house thereon. However for failure on the part of the spouses to pay
their obligation to the SSS, Lot No. 19 was consequently foreclosed. The title thereto was cancelled and a new one was issued
in the name of SSS. After such foreclosure, the spouses offered to swap Lot Nos.18 and 19 and demanded from lucky homes
to reform their contract. Lucky home however refused. This prompted the spouses to file an action for reformation of
contract with damages before the RTC. The RTC however dismissed the action for lack of merit and awarded lucky homes
moral damages and attorney’s fees. Subsequently then, a writ of execution was issued. Spouses urgently filed a motion to
recall such writ, questioning now the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the
Housing and land use regulatory board. Subsequently, the spouses went to the CA to annul RTC’s decision. CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the spouses were estopped from question RTC’s jurisdiction pursuant to the case of Tijam.. On the
other hand spouses contended that the doctrine in Tijam case has been abandoned.

ISSUE: Whether the spouses Gonzaga is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court?

HELD: Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam
vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in
the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners
vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction
during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a
writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the
case they themselves filed.

4. ESCOBAL VS. GARCHITORENA

G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004

TOPIC: Jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and
the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof.

FACTS: Petitioner is a graduate of PMA and a member of AFP, PH Constabulary, and the Intelligence Group of PNP. A
shootout occurred during a surveillance operation conducted by him and his team. Petitioner and one
 Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias “Jun Bombita” were then indicted for murder before the RTC. RTC then issued a warrant and
petitioner posted bail. RTC also issued an order preventively suspending petitioner. He was then arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Petitioner, after arraignment, filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the court martial, not the RTC,
has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.

Pending the resolution of said motion, petitioner filed another motion for the lifting of his suspension. He also filed an MD
averring that since the offense was committed in the performance of his duties, it was the Sandiganbayan which had exclusive
jurisdiction over the same.

RTC à denied motion to lift suspension. RTC initially denied MD upon preliminary investigation, finding that the offense was
not committed in the performance of petitioner’s duties. However, upon MR, RTC reversed itself and declared that based on
the petitioner’s evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to
adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nueca’s admission in her complaint before the
PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened. RTC then issued an order directing the
prosecutor to transmit the case to the SB

Presiding Judge of Sandiganbayan ordered the remand of the case to the RTC on the ff grounds:

1. considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of “23.”

2. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the
RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment
therein after trial

ISSUE: Which court/ tribunal has jurisdiction over the murder charge against petitioner?

HELD: RTC.

The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the
Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. Such jurisdiction of the
court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public
officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the FACTS showing the intimate relation between the office of the
offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the
Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion
of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the
intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged
when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re- amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the
petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of
the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade “27” or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below “27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade
“23.” He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that
R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.

AGAN JR. vs. PHIL. INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINAL, CO. INC

420 SCRA 575

TOPIC: Jurisdiction and Hierarchy of Courts

FACTS: Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted a proposal to the DOTC for the development of NAIA Terminal
3. After a careful examination, the DOTC created the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the
implementation of the project. PBAC however, awarded the project to Phil. International Air Terminals Co (PIATCO). AEDC
filed before the RTC of Pasig a Petition for Nullity of the Proceedings and for Prohibition. The other air service providers
of MIAA also claimed that the awarding of the project to PIATCO would somehow jeopardize their employment or
concession-contracts. PIATCO commenced an arbitration proceeding before the International Chamber of Commerce against
the Gov’t of the Philippines acting through the DOTC and MIAA and alleged that Philippine courts are without jurisdiction to
review its case against the government and that the submission of the case to the SC is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of
courts as trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC with respect to a special civil action for prohibition, thus,
resort must first be had before the trial courts.

ISSUE: Whether the arbitration proceedings availed of by PIATCO deprived the SC of its jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: No. After a careful examination of the FACTS of the case, the controversy involves significant legal questions
which the SC cannot just ignore. The rule on the hierarchy of courts will also not prevent the SC from assuming jurisdiction
as the rule may be relaxed when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts and where exceptional and
compelling reasons justify the availment of the remedy.

In the present case, It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the relaxation of
the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are of transcendental importance as they involve the
construction and operation of the country’s premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution
are of first impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court, procedural bars
may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant cases.

It is also established that petitioners in the present case who have presented legitimate interests in the resolution of the
controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly, they cannot be bound by the arbitration clause and hence,
cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. A speedy and decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the
present controversy, including those raised by petitioners, cannot be made before an
arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an expeditious determination of a dispute. This objective would
not be met if this Court were to allow the parties to settle the cases by arbitration as there are certain issues involving non-
parties to the PIATCO Contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve.

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL VS. ATIENZA, JR.

420 SCRA 562

FACTS: Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to

Section 492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC), constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the
metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

Section 493 of that law provides that “the liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and 5 members of the board of directors.” All other matters not
provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of LGUs shall be governed by their respective
constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. Liga adopted
and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization. Liga adopted and ratified its own Election
Code. Liga came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,
setting the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with
independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.

Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the election of representatives
of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the barangay
elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it
encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the
ambit of the powers of the City Council. Mayor signed and approved the city ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme Court.

Held: No. Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in certain cases.

SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced because the non-observance
of the hierarchy-of-courts rule wa

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SARDILLO

401 SCRA 583

TOPIC: Jurisdiction
FACTS: Judge Sardido decided a case involving Falsification of Documents. Since one of the defendants in a case is an RTC
judge, he removed the name of the RTC judge from the roster of the defendants. Judge Sardido's basis for removing the name
of the RTC judge is Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89. The Circular says that "the IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court
for appropriate action, all cases involving judges of lower courts and justices xxx"

In the case, Judge Sardido referred the criminal aspect together with the administrative aspect to the SC.

ISSUE: whether the criminal aspect of the case is cognizable by the SC.

RULING: No. Only the administrative aspect of the case is what must be forwarded to the Supreme Court. The trial courts
retain jurisdiction to try the criminal aspect of a case involving judges. SC Circular 3-89 refers to administrative cases not to
criminal cases.

KATON VS. PALANCA

437 SCRA 565

TOPIC: DISMISSAL; MOTU PROPRIO; RESIDUAL JURISDICTION; RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE

FACTS: On August 2, 1963, herein petitioner George Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of
Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island, located in
Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion or reclassification from forest to agricultural land, and
thereafter for Katon to apply for homestead patent.
Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed the Director of Lands, that since the subject land was no longer
needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act.
However, there were also several favorable endorsements that were made to survey the island under the request of
herein respondents. Then, the records show that, on November 8, 1996, one of the respondents Juan Fresnillo filed a
homestead patent application for the portion of the island consisiting of 8.5 hectares and the respondent Jesus Gapilango filed
a homestead application on June 8, 1972. The respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No. 14527 and
OCT No. G-7098 on March 3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions of
Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for
the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
The petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents
covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner
claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who
requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful
possessors of their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully
paying taxes thereon for twenty years.
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an
action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of
estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999,
they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend
his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.The Motion
to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29,
1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion.
In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that
the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking residual prerogative.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?"

RULING: Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia,
(3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained
thus:

"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the
filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

"A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39,
and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied) The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in
which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to
the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction
under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual
powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental
grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.

FIGUEROA VS. PEOPLE

558 SCRA 63

TOPIC : JURSDICTION / ESTOPPEL BY LACHES

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In
his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case .The CA in affirming the
decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to
the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioner’s appeal to the CA.

RULING: No. Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,
that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years
and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of
the presence of laches. In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty.
Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance
with the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of
pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case
within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire
consequences that impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack
thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.

Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.

HANNAH SERANA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

653 SCRA (7/6/11)
TOPIC: Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as student regent of UP to serve a
one-year term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her siblings and relatives, registered
with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects of the OSFRI was the
renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave P15M as financial assistance for the said project. The
source of funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and system-wide alliances of students
conseguently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Ombudsman. After due
investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a criminal case against Serana and her brother, charging them of Estafa.

Serana moved to quash the Information, contending that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the offense
charged nor over her person in her capacity as UP student regent. She contends that Estafa falls under Crimes Against
Property and not on the chapter on Crimes Committed by Public Officers, only over which, she argues, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it was not the governement that was duped, but Pres. Estrada, because the
money came from the Office of the President and not from government funds. As to jurisdiction over her person, she
contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer since she merely represents her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity.

The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE/S: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and over Serana

RULING: YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.

It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes
one a public officer.

A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed or enduring at the pleasure of the power, an individual is interested with some portion of
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the other officers
enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials
with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of
Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.

PAT-OG, SR. VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

765 SCRA JUNE 2013
 FACTS: Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school student of the Antadao National High
School in Sagada, Mountain Province, filed an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of the same
school, before the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) for misconduct and a criminal
case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injury with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc,
Mountain Province. Ruling of the CSC-CAR: In its Decision, dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty
of Simple Misconduct. On December 11, 2006, the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit.

The Ruling of the CSC: In its Resolution, dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed with
modification the decision of the CSC-CAR and adjudged Pat-og guilty of grave misconduct. Pat-og filed a motion for
reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He contended that administrative charges
against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers. CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CSC as the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og. Hence, the present petition with the following

ISSUE: WON CSC has jurisdiction over the administrative case filed against Pat-og?

HELD: In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional
Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public
school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and
administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with
it or brought to it on appeal.

Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all
members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the
same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO
G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013

TOPIC: JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PARTIES

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against
Sps. Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Lolita in her answer alleged that her husband Manuel is already dead. During the trial,
respondent Lolita moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Complaint failed to plead an indispensable party;

2. Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691;
3. Trial court erred in ordering substitution of deceased Manuel by his heirs;
4. Trial court must also dismiss case against Lolita in accordance to Section 6, Rule 86;
 RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time (after 6 years). Respondent appealed to the CA which granted the
petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Manuel;
2. Whether or not respondent may still assail the question of jurisdiction of Manuel on her motion to dismiss?
RULING:

1. NO, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case
against him when he receives summons. “Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person.” In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid
service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was
filed in the trial court.
2. NO. Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was the court’s jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in his case. Instead the
principles relating to jurisdiction are pertinent therein.Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a
case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when
an answer or a motion to dismiss if filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If thee objection is not raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above quoted Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
As a question of jurisdiction raised here is that over the person of Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in
the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since “ lack of jurisdiction over the
person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can
thereby waive it by silence.”

PEOPLE VS. HENRY T. GO

MARCH 25, 2014

FACTS: A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals
for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (anti-graft).

Among those charged was herein Henry T. Go, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among
others, herein Henry T. Go for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause
against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause. Thus an information was filed against Henry before the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan however ordered the
prosecutor to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.

On the other hand, Henry filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative
FACTS adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

Citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, Henry, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority
as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The prosecution however argued
that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over Henry’s case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer.SB granted Henry’s motion to quash.
ISSUE: Whether Henry, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.

HELD: Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent
can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.

The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime
nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3
(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such
private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may
no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.

CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE CUERDO

FEBRUARY 4, 2014

FACTS: The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for
the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private respondents. Because payment of the taxes assessed was
a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77
assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as
one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction".

In its Order dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its Order 5 dated October 15, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004
Orders of the RTC.

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax
refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order
issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 RULING: The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the
authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA,
it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable,
in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not
total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et
al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or
judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This
principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that “a
court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ
of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ST. MARY CRUSADE FOUNDATION, INC. VS. RIEL

745 SCRA 73

FACTS: The petitioner claimed in its petition that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt and lost in the fire that
gutted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds. Respondent Judge initially gave due course to the petition, but after the
preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution.

The petitioner moved for a MR but was denied by the RTC. Hence the petitioner came to the court alleging that the
respondent judge had unfairly abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which is specifically
enjoined upon him under Rule 7, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court; that the judge acted without and in excess of his
authority and with grave abuse of discretion to the further damage and prejudice of herein petitioner, thus, the present petition
for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE:Whether or not the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus is proper

RULING: NO.

justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertine

Finally, the land covered by the petition for judicial reconstitution related to the same area that formed the UP
campus. The UP’s registered ownership of the land comprising its campus has long been settled under the law.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the petition for judicial reconstitution by respondent Judge only safeguarded the UP’s
registered ownership.

DUNCANO VS SB
G.R. NO. 191894

TOPIC: Jurisdiction of the SB does not cover “Reg. Directors” below SG 27

 Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution and Order of respondent Sandiganbayan Second
Division, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS: Danilo A. Duncano is, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade
26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed
a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713. Duncano filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest contending that the SB has no jurisdiction to try and hear
the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a
compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

ISSUE: WON petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the SB considering he is a Reg. Director with SG 26.

RULING: Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). Jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional Trial Court.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless
committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or
higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

FERRER JR. VS. BAUTISTA

760 SCRA 652

FACTS:On October 16, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance which provides for the imposition of a
special assessment equivalent to one-half (0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess of one Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php
100,000.00. The tax shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the socialized housing programs of the
Quezon City Government.

sidential properties. Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in Quezon City which is covered by Transfer C
wlibrary

We issued a TRO on February 5, 2014, which enjoined the enforcement of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and required respondents to comment on the

ISSUE:Whether or not the petition for a writ of certiorari is proper even if the respondents are not tribunals, boards or
officers exercising judicial or quasi judicial function

RULING: Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to Us should be allowed. Aside
from presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances adversely
affect the property interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test case for the
guidance of other local government units (LGUs). Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a
relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim,24 the Court cited
the case of Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:
 Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance with the well- entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.26

PCGG VS DUMAYAS

765 SCRA 524

FACTS: In 1971, RA 6270 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF) which was to be sourced from a Php 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. copra.

P.D. 961 was likewise enacted empowering the PCA to impose Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy (CCSF). The
funds shall be used by UCPB, as the investment arm of coconut farmers, to invest on behalf of the latter in private corporations.

o, Jr. Agreement, President Marcos issued, on July 29, 1975,

o use the CCSF and CIDF to acquire a commercial bank to provide coco farmers with “readily available credit facilities at preferential rate,” and PCA “to distri

he priorities of then President Corazon C. Aquino’s revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos family an

Apropos thereto, she issued Executive Orders 1, 2 and 14 creating the PCGG and conferring on the Sandiganbayan exclusive
and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth. Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued numerous orders of
sequestration, among which were those handed out, as earlier mentioned, against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned
by or registered in the names of (a) more than a million coconut farmers and (b) the CIIF companies, including the SMC
shares held by the CIIF companies.

milar claims of ownership in the subject companies and shares of stock by virtue of its being a stockholder, owning 146,610,567 UCPB shares independently of it

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

In PCGG v. Peña,28 we made the following clarification on the extent of the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x Under section 2 of the President’s Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission
regarding “the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates,
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees” whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the “exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan” and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by the Supreme Court.29 (Emphasis supplied)

In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC
that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case
involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no importance. The
benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all
incidents affecting the UHC shares and PCGG’s right of supervision or control over the UHC must be
addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multi

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT INC. VS. DE LA CRUZ

781 SCRA 607

FACTS:

The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan Apartments) located at San Juan Street, Pasay City. Antonio dela
Cruz (respondent) leased two units (Unit 2002-A and Unit 2002-B) of the San Juan Apartments in 1993 and 1994.

The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to
vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint 3 for ejectment before MTC Pasay City. The MTC resolved the case in the
petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals due until the respondent
actually complies.

The respondent appealed to the RTC. Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the
petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by the defendant-
appellant as lessee) praying for the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by the respondent with the RTC.

In an order dated July 25, 2003, the RTC granted the petitioner’s motion. As a result thereof, RTC issued a writ of
execution. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before CA but the CA affirmed RTC’s orders. SC affirmed
said resolution.

Petitioner then returned to RTC for an issuance of a writ of execution againt the supersedeas bond representing rentals for the
leased property. RTC granted the motion. By virtue of insufficiency thereof, the petion filed for a motion to levy the
respondent’s property which was also granted IN AN ORDER DATED JUNE 30, 2008. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
RULING: The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.42

On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given
situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution.43

The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the subject units were
issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.

The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not
have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed
ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and
cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on
the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.

The RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to order the levy of the respondent's real property.

Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1,45 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with
jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders.

Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondent's real property before
the RTC as the court of origin.

LOMONDOT VS. BALINDONG

762 SCRA 494

FACTS: In 1991, Omaira and Lomondot filed with SDC Marawi City a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
with prayer for mandatory injunction and TRO against respondents Pangandamun and Diaca, claiming they are the owners by
succession of parcel of land on which Pangandamun and Diaca illegally entered and encroached 100 sqm and 200 sqm
respectively. The SDC in 2005 rendered a decision declaring plaintiffs owner of the subject land and ordering defendants to
vacate portions illegally encroached. Respondents appealed with SC but the latter dismissed the petition. The SDC Decision
became final and executory on October 31, 2007 and an entry of judgment was subsequently made. Petitioners filed a motion
for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a writ of demolition which the SDC granted. However, after hearing, the
SDC issued a resolution that the motion for issuance of a Writ of Demolition should be held in abeyance and provided that
while the decision has become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are instances when a Writ
of Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that prevents the Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution.
The fact that the defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of Execution
and their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs is, according to SDC, a supervening event. After attempts
for settlement failed, plaintiffs asked anew for a writ of demolition. At this point in time, the court cannot issue a special
order to destroy, demolish or remove defendants' houses, considering their claim that they no longer encroach any portion of
plaintiffs’ land. Motion for issuance of a writ of demolition was denied. Petitioners filed with the CA-CDO petition for
certiorari assailing the Orders issued by the SDC. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction saying that, under
RA 9054, it is the Shari’a Appellate Court
 (SAC) which shall exercise jurisdiction over petition for certiorari; that, however, since SAC has not yet been organized, it
cannot take cognizance of the case as it emanates from the Shari’a Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or
tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended, over which it can exercise
appellate jurisdiction. Under Republic Act No. 9054, the Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District Courts.

ISSUE:

have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of Execution and their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs is a supe

HELD:

rendered on April 27, 2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision came from SDC which the CA has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous
ent rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the e

II. RULES 1-5

ALDAY VS. FGU INSURANCE

350 SCRA 113

Topics: Jurisdiction, docket fees, permissive counterclaim, compulsory counterclaim

FACTS: Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati alleging that petitioner
Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other
charges incurred by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent for respondent. Respondent also prayed for
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right
for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses earned from 1
July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated premium reserves amounting to P500,000.00.In addition, petitioner
prayed for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed
by respondent.
 Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default
because petitioners answer was allegedly filed out of time. However, the trial court denied the motion similarly rejected
respondents motion for reconsideration. A few weeks later, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim,
contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by
petitioner. In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees
since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer such counterclaim.

The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim and consequently, denied petitioners motion.
The court found petitioners counterclaim to be merely permissive in nature and held that petitioner’s failure to pay docket fees
prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The trial court similarly denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court, finding that petitioners own admissions, as contained in her answer,
show that her counterclaim is merely permissive.

ISSUES:

1. Is the counterclaim of petitioner permissive or compulsory?

2. Is the counterclaim of petitioner exempt from the payment of docket fees and therefore the court acquired
jurisdiction over the same?

RULING:

1. The counterclaim of petitioner is PERMISSIVE. In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria
or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:

1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendants counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the compelling test of
compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court.

Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioners counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated
premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioners claims differs from that needed to
establish respondent’s demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs
of premiums. The recovery of respondent’s claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioners counterclaim,
such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the
parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical connection between the parties’ claims. This conclusion is further
reinforced by petitioners own admissions since she declared in her answer that respondents cause of action, unlike her own,
was not based upon the Special Agents Contract. However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of
the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.

2. NO. The counterclaim being permissive, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the same, petitioner is
bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an
allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent. If
respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the same
FACTS raised in its complaint.

KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. VS. HON. ALBERT A. LERMA, ET AL. ,

G.R. NO. 143581. JANUARY 7, 2008

TOPIC: Requirement of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping in respondent’s Answer with
counterclaim.

FACTS: Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG
Cylinder Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had
altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered.

Petitioner opposed informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the
machineries and equipment on mere imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance against respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it
had the full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in
the contract. KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondent’s counterclaims arguing that when PGSMC filed the
counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so
was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s motion to dismiss respondent’s counterclaims as these counterclaims
fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.

ISSUE/S: WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the respondent’s Answer
with counterclaim?

RULING: NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance
with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with
Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, “A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim
that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.” As to the failure to submit a certificate
of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a certification against forum shopping
under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo
did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims. At the time
PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said
counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as
amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.

MERCADO VS. CA
569 SCRA
TOPIC: Jurisdiction, Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaim

FACTS: Leonides Mercado had been distributing respondent San Miguel Corporation’s (SMC’s) beer products in Manila.
SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to withdraw goods on credit.

Mercado failed to pay for the items he withdrew on credit. Citing the continuing hold-out agreement (which allows SMC to
encash China Banking Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit assigned by Mercado), it asked CBC to release the proceeds
of the assigned certificates of deposit.

Mercado filed an action to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila.

SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. SMC sought payment of the lees products he withdrew (or
purchased on credit) worth P7,468,153.75.

During trial, Mercado acknowledged the accuracy of SMC’s computation of his outstanding liability. Thus, the RTC
dismissed the complaint and ordered Mercado and Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation (EASCO) (to the extent of P2.6
million or the value of its bonds) to jointly and severally pay SMC the amount of P7,468,153.75.The CA affirmed the RTC
decision in toto.

Mercado passed away and was substituted by his heirs who filed the petition asserting that the CA erred in affirming the RTC
decision in toto. The said decision (insofar as it ordered Mercado to pay SMC P7,468,153.75) was void. SMC’s counterclaim
was permissive in nature. Inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over the counterclaim.

ISSUE/S: Whether SMC’s counterclaim was permissive in nature, whereby payment of docket fees is necessary for the RTC
to acquire jurisdiction.

RULING: No. A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party) may be compulsory or
permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a
counterclaim is merely permissive.

When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment (which he executed as security
for his credit purchases), he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he admitted having outstanding obligations, he
nevertheless asserted that those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts. For its part, aside from invoking the
validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased on
credit. Thus, Mercado’s complaint and SMC’s counterclaim both touched the issues of whether the continuing hold-out
agreement and deed of assignment were valid and whether Mercado had outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same evidence
would essentially support or refute Mercado’s claim and SMC’s counterclaim.

Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be
duplicated. Clearly, SMC’s counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado’s claim, was compulsory in nature.
Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.

PROTON PILIPINAS V BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS

460 SCRA
 TOPIC: Commencement of Action. Payment of the correct docket fees.

FACTS: Proton availed of the credit facilities of BNP and executed a corporate guarantee of the extent of US$2 million to
guarantee its obligation. Under their trust agreement, Proton would receive imported motor vehicles and hold them in trust for
BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it in case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP with the
documents of title.

Proton failed to deliver the proceeds and to return the unsold motor vehicles. Proton’s guarantors refused to pay its
obligation so BNP filed a complaint ordering them to pay the initial amount of US$2 million with accrued interest and
other related charges. RTC Makati Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees at P352,000. The petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint by BNP for failure to pay the correct docket fees thus preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case. In addition, the petitioners allege the prematurity of the complaint since BNP did not priorly send a demand
letter.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent MR. The CA denied the appeal by way of certiorari stating that
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the principal amount being claimed in the
pleading in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. CA denied their MR.

The petitioners argue that pursuant to Administrative Circular 11-94, interests claimed should be included in the computation
of the docket fees. Thus since BNP underpaid, RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUES:
1. Should the computation for payment of docket fees have included the interest claimed by the complainant?
2. Did the trial court fail to acquire jurisdiction over the case for insufficient docket fees?

RULING:

1. Yes. The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration "the total sum claimed,
inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the
property in litigation. In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient.
2. No. When the complaint was filed in 1998, Rule 141 had been amended by Administrative Circular 11-94. In
Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, this Court held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment
of the prescribed docket fees. However, that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd vs. Asuncion
when this Court held that in the former there was an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket
fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.

The ruling in Sun Insurance Office was echoed in the 2005 case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles
Melicor:

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of
filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

Respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of Court which turned out to be incorrect. Respondent prayed
for “accrued interest subsequent to August 15, 1998 until finally fully paid.” The complaint having been filed on September 7,
1998, respondent’s claim includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing. Respondent did not, however,
pay the filing fee corresponding to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on September
7, 1998. As priorly discussed, this is required under Rule 141, as amended by Administrative Circular 11-94, which was the
rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands, respondent cannot claim the interest from August 16,
1998 until September 7, 1998,
unless respondent is allowed by motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of
interest petitioners owe from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 1998 and pay the corresponding docket fee.

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS vs. HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III

G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009

TOPIC: Payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional

FACTS: Ruby Shelter Builders filed a complaint with the RTC against Tan. It paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and
other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered the case as an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

Tan filed an Omnibus Motion contending that the case involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be
computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Thus, since
petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent
Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees pursuant to
Section 7(a), Rule 141;.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No.

In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court explicitly pronounced that "[t]he court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee." Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its previous
pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered
filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

In the Petition at bar, petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance
with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the
RTC, instead of dismissing outright petitioner’s Complaint, granted petitioner time to pay the additional docket fees. Despite
the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional
docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule
141.

The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of the same:
the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed
or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In order to resolve the issue of whether petitioner paid the correct amount of docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true
nature of its Complaint. The dictum adhered to in this jurisdiction is that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. Petitioner persistently avers that
its Complaint is primarily for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Based on the allegations and reliefs in the
Complaint alone, one would get the impression that the titles to the subject real properties still rest with petitioner; and that
the interest of respondents Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds of Absolute Sale sought to be annulled. What
petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint was that respondents Tan and Obiedo already had the Memorandum of
Agreement, which clearly provided for the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, registered on the TCTs over the five
parcels of land, then still in the name of petitioner.

Petitioner never expressed surprise when such FACTS and circumstances were established before the RTC, nor moved to
amend its Complaint accordingly. Even though the Memorandum of Agreement was supposed to have long been registered on
its TCTs over the five parcels of land, petitioner did not pray for the removal of the same as a cloud on its title. In the same
vein, although petitioner alleged that respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly took physical possession of the subject real
properties, petitioner did not seek the restoration of such possession to itself. And despite learning that respondents Tan and
Obiedo already secured TCTs over the subject properties in their names, petitioner did not ask for the cancellation of said
titles. The only logical and reasonable explanation is that petitioner is reluctant to bring to the attention of the Court certain
FACTS and circumstances, keeping its Complaint safely worded, so as to institute only an action for annulment of Deeds of
Absolute Sale. Petitioner deliberately avoided raising issues on the title and possession of the real properties that may lead the
Court to classify its case as a real action. No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and
reliefs it sought in its Complaint appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its
title to and possession of the five parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo.

A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now Section
1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.

Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, had a specific paragraph
governing the assessment of the docket fees for real action, to wit:

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.

While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action
for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which,
under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent
doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental
and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.

A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance
with the value of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In
computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated
value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in
the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof,
the stated value of the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 22 November
2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94800, which affirmed the Orders dated 24 March 2006 and 29 March 2006
of the RTC, Branch 22, of Naga City, in Civil Case No. RTC-2006-0030, ordering petitioner Ruby Shelter Builders and
Realty Development Corporation to pay additional docket/filing fees, computed based on Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY INC. VS. EVANGELINE COBARRUBIAS

626 SCRA 649

TOPIC: DOCKET FEES; APPEALS; PERFECTION; NON-PAYMENT-EFFECTS

FACTS: Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the union of faculty and employees.
The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the following provision that for teaching employees in college who fail the
yearly evaluation, who are retained for three cumulative years in five years, shall be on forced leave for one regular semester
during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for failing to
achieve the required rating points (85, 77, and 72.9, below the required rating of 87).
To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery but the parties
failed to settle their dispute. Cobarruubias filed a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension with DOLE but circulation
and mediation again failed.
Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, CA-G.R. SP
No. 90596,8 ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period
should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year period. On the other hand, Petitioner argued that said
CA decision is not yet final for there is still a pending appeal.
The VA dismissed the complaint, then Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, but failed to pay the required filing fees and to attach to the petition copies of the material portions of the record. The
CA responded by dismissing the petition for procedural lapses. Nevertheless, Cobarrubias filed a motion for
reconsiderationand attached copies of the material portions of the record and the postal money orders.
She maintained that the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits. The CA
reinstated the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in reinstating the petition despite the failure of Cobarrubias to pay the appeal docket fees
on time.

HELD: Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the
provision set by law.25 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be
taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen days from the receipt of the notice of judgment.Upon the
filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance
with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees
within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the
decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's
substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as:
(1) Most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) To relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) Good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) The existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) The merits of the case;
(6) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) A lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) The other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
(9) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault;
(10)Peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
(11)In the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12)Importance of the issues involved; and
(13) Exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances.

Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules, in this case, no explanation has been given.

GIPA VS. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE

G.R. NO. 177425

TOPIC: “Concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules." Those who seek exemption from
the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reasons
warranting such departure.”

Parties to a Civil Action; Rule 3, Sections 2 and 3.

FACTS: On February 26, 1996 respondent Southern Luzon Institute (SLI) filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioners Gipa and others defendants including a certain Rosita Montalban (Rosita).
During trial, defendant Rosita executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of her sister Daisy M. Placer (Placer) authorizing
the latter to represent her in the case and to sign any and all papers in relation thereto.

SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in Bulan, Sorsogon. However, petitioners and co-
defendants who had been informally occupying portion of the said property refused to vacate premises despite demand.
Petitioners and co-defendants asserted that they did not heed SLI’s demand to vacate as they believe that they have the right to
stay on the said property relying on the fact that they and their predecessors in interest occupied the property since the 1950s.

The RTC ruled in favor of SLI having proven its ownership of the property by preponderance of evidence. The said court
gave weight to the Miscellaneous Sales Application over the property which became the basis of the issuance of title under its
name and testimony of the draftsman of the National Housing Authority. It rejected the claim of petitioners and co-defendants
which only relied on documentary evidence consisting mostly of tax declarations and other documents which are self-serving
and could not be conclusive evidence of ownership. Petitioners and co-defendants filed a notice of appeal before the CA.

The CA dismissed the appeal in its resolution since the it was not shown that appellate court docket fees and other
lawful fees were paid. Petitioners and co-defendants promptly filed a motion for reconsideration to which they attached a
certification from the RTC that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of P3000. The CA granted the motion and reinstated the
appeal. Subsequently, the CA through a resolution further required petitioners and co-defendants to remit within ten days
from notice the amount of P30 for legal research fund which was apparently was not included in the P3000 appeal fee
previously paid by them. Despite the lapse of nine (9) months from their counsel’s receipt of said resolution, petitioners
failed to comply. Hence, the CA dismissed the
 appeal for nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Placer should be included as a petitioner.

2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in dismissing the appeal for the failure of petitioners to remit the P30 for legal
research fund after having advanced a substantial portion of docket fees.

RULING:

1. The Court in accordance with the disquisition made in this decision impleaded Placer but did not consider her as petitioner:
“The caption of the present Petition includes Placer as one of the petitioners. In fact, the other petitioners even authorized her
to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in their behalf. A review of the records, however, shows that
she was not one of the defendants before the RTC. Her only participation therein was that she represented her sister Rosita as
one of the defendants by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney which the latter executed in her favor. Notably in the present
Petition, Placer appears to have been impleaded in her personal capacity and not as Rosita’s representative. This cannot be
done. It bears emphasizing that an appeal on certiorari, as in this case, is a continuation of the original suit. Hence, the parties
in the original suit must also be the parties in such an appeal. Placer, therefore, not being a party in the complaint before the
RTC has no personality to continue the same on appeal and cannot be considered as a petitioner. At the most, her only role in
this Petition was to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping for and in behalf of petitioners.”

2. The petition fails. Petitioners concede to the fact that payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is
not a mere technicality of law or procedure but a jurisdictional requirement they nevertheless they are praying for the
relaxation of the application of the rule on the payment of the appeal fee in the name of substantial justice and equity. The
Court held that "concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.” Those who seek exemption from the application of
the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. Petitioners’
failure to advance any explanation as to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same
within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on the payment of the appeal
fee is unwarranted.

REYES VS. PEOPLE

763 SCRA 226

FACTS: Petitioner, in a complaint filed by private respondent Salud M. Gegato, was charged with Grave Threats
before MCTC Bayugan, Agusan Del Sur.

Before arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash based on the ground of jurisdiction and that the crime is not Grave
Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, but Other Light Threats under Article 285, paragraph 2 of the same
Code.
MCTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner
guily beyond reasonable doubt of Light threats. Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of
Time to File a Petition for Review. However, instead of filing a petition for review within the 15- day period allowed by the
CA, petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension of Time asking for another 15 days within which to file his petition for
review. Afterwhich, petitioner filed his petition.
 Thereafter, the CA, in its Resolution8 dated August 2, 2007, dismissed the petition. The petioner filed three Motions for
Reconsiderations before the CA, all of which were denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the right of the petitioner to file an appeal under Rule 45 may be barred by filing three motions for
reconsiderations
2. Whether or not the right to appeal may be barred by failure to pay correct docket fees on time
RULING:
YES.

on 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained

neral rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court dec

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities
were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we
hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy
balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity
for the just and proper disposition of his cause.

es of procedure. The CA ruled that, “[t]he petitioner's attribution to inadvertence (as the cause) of his failure to indicate a complete statement of material dates

2. YES. The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory.24 In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case
of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.27 Thus, in the more recent
case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros,28 the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud
the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when
required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply.

Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared that in appealed cases, failure to pay the
appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the
appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, and with
great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.
 In that connection, the CA, in its discretion, may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit
for costs before the expiration of the reglemetary period and that no further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Petitioner now begs this Court for leniency in the interest of justice. While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets, on
the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, for it is far better to
dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.33 However,
[i]t is only when persuasive reasons exist that the Rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.34 In the present case, petitioner failed to convince this Court of the
need to relax the rules and the eventual injustice that he will suffer if his prayer is not granted.

DYNAMIC BUILDERS VS PRISBITERO

755 SCRA 90

DOCTRINE:

ance of the injunctive relief; and (5) when there are public interest at stake in restraining or enjoining the project while the action is pending that far outweighs

FACTS:
On December 28, 2005, the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and Awards, published an
invitation to bid for the construction of a 1, 050 lineal meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality’s shoreline. It is
known as the Construction Shoreline Protection Project.

ospective contractors including Dynamic Builders. Yhree (3) out of the seven (7) contractors that had secured bidding documents in order to bid "submitted lett

On April 21, 2006, the Bids and Awards Committee issued Resolution No. 7 affirming the award of contract to HLJ
Construction and Enterprise for the construction of the 1,050-lineal-meter Construction Shoreline Protection Project
amounting to P31,922,420.37

On September 4, 2006 and pursuant to Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act, Dynamic Builders filed the Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Bago City,
Negros Occidental, assailing Mayor Presbitero's Decision and Resolution

Simultaneously, Dynamic Builders filed a dated September 4, 2006 for prohibition with application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
 Petitioner Dynamic Builders submits that Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 implicitly allowed it to
simultaneously file a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court assailing the protest case on the merits, and another
Petition before this court for injunctive remedies.32

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has violated the rules on forum shopping by instituting two suits before the RTC and
SC

RULING:Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action." Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that "if two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others." The splitting of a cause of action "violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits,
whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts."59

protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence, petitioner seeks the same relief th

re this court.61
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.62 However, parties must adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
e to focus on its constitutional tasks without the need to deal with causes that also fall within the lower courts' competence.65 This court acts on petitions for e

public Act No. 9184 is either an action under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court or the proper action filed before this court. However, direct resort to this co

RELUCIO VS. LOPEZ

373 SCRA 578

TOPIC: REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; NECESSARY PARTY

FACTS: Angelina Meija Lopez filed a petition for Appointment as Sole Administratix of Conjugal Partnership of Properties,
Forfeiture, etc. against her husband Alberto Lopez and Imelda Relucio, for Alberto abandoned Angelina and her four children
and maintained an illicit relationship with Relucio.

A motion to dismiss was filed by Relucio on the ground that Angelina Lopez has no cause of action against her. The judge of
the RTC denied her Motion to Dismiss on the ground that some of the properties are registered in her name. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by Relucio but the same was denied by the RTC. Relucio then filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA which denied the same.
Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Relucio is an indispensable party or only a necessary party.

HELD: Neither.
“A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit." In this
case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom
there can be no final determination of an action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not
indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal
partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co- owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment
would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special
Proceedings M-3630.

A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief
is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action. In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J.
Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and
her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent.

DE CASTRO V. CA
JULY 18, 2002 G.R. NO. 115838

TOPIC: REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; AGENCY

FACTS: Petitioners De Castro were co-owners of four (4) lots located at EDSA corner New York and Denver Streets in
Cubao, Quezon City. In a letter, Francisco Antigo was authorized by the De Castros to act as real estate broker in the sale of
these properties for the amount of P23,000,000.00, five percent (5%) of which will be given to him as commission.

Antigo found Times Transit Corporation, represented by its president Mr. Rondaris, as a prospective buyer which desired
to buy two (2) lots only, specifically lots 14 and 15. Eventually, the sale of lots 14 and 15 was consummated.

Antigo however received only P48,893.76 as commission. He asserted that his total commission should be P352,500.00
which is five percent (5%) of the agreed price of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation to the De Castro for the
two (2) lots. Francisco Artigo then sued petitioners Constante A. De Castro and Corazon A. De Castro to collect the unpaid
balance of his broker’s commission from the De Castros. One of the defenses advanced by the De Castro is that complaint
failed to implead their other siblings who were co-owners as well.

CA: The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed

The De Castros argue that Artigo’s complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead all the co-owners
of the two lots. The De Castros claim that Artigo always knew that the two lots were co-owned by Constante and
Corazon with their other siblings Jose and Carmela whom Constante merely represented. The De Castros
contend that failure to implead such indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo, as agent of all the
four coowners, would be paid with funds co-owned by the four co-owners.

HELD: No. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot
proceed without their presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding
that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such
party.

However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case. Under the note/letter sent
by the De Castro to Antigo, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante
appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante’s individual or representative capacity, or both, the De Castros cannot seek the
dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties.

The De Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of agency, citing Article 1915 of
the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1915. If two or more persons have appointed an agent for a common transaction or
undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of the agency. The solidary liability of the four
co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable
parties. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of
agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation from any
one of the co-principals, as in this case.

ORQUIOLA VS. CA
389 SCRA 461

TOPIC: RULE 3 - Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded?

FACTS: Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689 located in Tandang Sora, QC. This parcel of land was
adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro. Pedro sold Lot
707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and
subdivided them into smaller lots. Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein
petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola (1964).

Sometime in 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the
action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by
Ledesma in favor of said corporation.

On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching
on plaintiff’s land.

To prohibit Judge Baclig of the RTC-QC from issuing a writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing
the alias writ of execution, petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998 on the ground that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value,
and since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot
be enforced against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
CA dismissed the petition and held that the petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by
virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order

ISSUE/S: WON the decision in the Civil Case Q-12918 can be enforced against petitioners even though they were not
impleaded thereto?

RULING: NO, petitioners are not privies (interested in the outcome of the action) and cannot be bound by the judgment
against Lising and his predecessors-in-interests.
The Medina doctrine relied upon by the CA is markedly different from the one before the court. In the present case,
petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918 and petitioners acquired the registered title
in their own names.

In other words, the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely
on Mariano Lising’s Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS. MERCEDES OLIVER

390 SCRA 263

Topic: RULES 1-5, Specifically in this case Rule 3, Sec . 7

FACTS: In August 1995, Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M. Oliver opened a joint account in China Banking
Corporation (hereinafter Chinabank) at EDSA Balintawak Branch. Lim and Oliver applied for a P17 million loan, offering
as collateral a 7,782 square meter lot located in Tunasan, Muntinlupa and covered by TCT No. S-50195 in the name of Oliver.
The bank approved the application. On November 17, 1995, Lim and Oliver executed in favor of Chinabank a promissory
note for P16,650,000, as well as a Real Estate Mortgage on the property. The mortgage was duly registered and annotated on
the original title under the custody of the Registry of Deeds of Makati and on the owners duplicate copy in the banks
possession. The mortgage document showed Mercedes Oliver’s address to be No. 95 Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City.
For brevity, she is hereafter referred to as OLIVER ONE.

On November 18, 1996, respondent claiming that she is Mercedes M. Oliver with postal office address at No. 40
J.P. Rizal St., San Pedro, Laguna, filed an action for annulment of mortgage and cancellation of title with damages against
Chinabank, Register of Deeds, and Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati. Respondent, whom we shall call as OLIVER TWO,
claimed that she was the registered and lawful owner of the land subject of the rea l estate mortgage; that the owners duplicate
copy of the title had always been in her possession; and that she did not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank.[2]
She prayed that: (1) the owners duplicate copy surrendered to Chinabank as well as the original title with the Registry of
Deeds be cancelled; (2) the mortgage be declared null and void; and (3) the Registry of Deeds be ordered to issue a new and
clean title in her name.

On January 31, 1997, Chinabank moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and non-joinder of an indispensable
party, the mortgagor. On March 13, 1997, Judge Norma C. Perello issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. On April 7,
1997, Chinabank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin enforcement of the March 13, 1997 order and further action on the case. The
Court of Appeals directed respondent Oliver Two to file her comment and deferred action on the prayer for the issuance of the
preliminary injunction pending submission of the comment.

On June 30, 1997, respondent Oliver Two moved to declare petitioner Chinabank in default. She pointed out that since
petitioner received the order denying the motion to dismiss on March 21, 1997, it had only until April 7, 1997 to file its
answer to the complaint. However, until the filing of the motion for default, no answer had been filed yet. The trial court
granted the motion and declared petitioner in default in its order dated July 17, 1997. Accordingly, the Defendant Bank is
declared in default as summons was served on It as early as December 16, 1996, but until date they have not filed an Answer
nor any responsive pleading and instead, It filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by this Court on March 13, 1997.

The filing of a CERTIORARI to question the Orders by this Court did not toll the period for Defendants to answer the
complaint. Therefore, the reglementary period for the filing of responsive pleading has long expired. Consequently, petitioner
Chinabank filed a supplemental petition on August 11, 1997, seeking annulment of the
July 17, 1997 order. It argued that the special civil action for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals interrupted the
proceedings before the trial court, thereby staying the period for filing the answer.

On June 1, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the trial judge in ruling that the Rules of Court provided the manner of impleading parties to a case and in suggesting that
petitioner file an appropriate action to bring the mortgagor within the courts jurisdiction. As to the judgment by default, the
Court of Appeals said that an order denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and may not be questioned through a
special civil action for certiorari. In this case, petitioner Chinabank should have filed its answer when it received the March
13, 1997 order denying the motion to dismiss. The special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals did not
interrupt the period to file an answer, there being no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgagor Mercedes Oliver, referred to as OLIVER ONE, is an indispensable party to the case
without whom no final determination could be had of an action.

RULING: No. Petitioners contention is far from tenable. An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom
no final determination can be had of an action. However, mortgagor Oliver One’s absence from the case does not hamper the
trial court in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A perusal of Oliver Twos allegations in
the complaint below shows that it was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioners negligence in not determining the actual
ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgages annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the Registry of Deeds custody. To
support said allegations, respondent Oliver Two had to prove
(1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that she is not the same person using that name who
entered into a deed of mortgage with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint without necessarily
impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver Two.

Further, a declaration of the mortgages nullity in this case will not necessarily prejudice mortgagor Oliver One. The bank
still needs to initiate proceedings to go after the mortgagor, who in turn can raise other defenses pertinent to the two of them.
A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to
the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank and mortgagor Oliver One. The latter’s
participation in this case will simply enable petitioner Chinabank to make its claim against her in this case, and hence, avoid
the institution of another action. Thus, it was the bank who should have filed a third-party complaint or other action versus the
mortgagor Oliver One.

LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC V DELA CRUZ ET.AL

G.R. NO. 166302 JULY 28, 2005

TOPIC: INDISPENSIBLE PARTY; NON-JOINDER – EFFECTS

FACTS: On December 14, 1995 and yearly thereafter until the year 2000, 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services (7J)
entered into a contract with petitioner Lotte Phil Co Inc(Lotte) to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial
and other services to the latter. In compliance with the terms and conditions of the service contract, and to accommodate the
needs of Lotte for personnel/workers to do and perform piece works, respondents Dela Cruz, Mamauag, Cauba, etc,, among
others, were hired and assigned to Lotte as repackers or sealers. However, either in October, 1999 or on February 9, 2000,
Lotte dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of the service contract by Lotte with 7J.
Respondents were never called back again

A labor complaint was filed by respondents against both Lotte and 7J, for illegal dismissal, regularization, payment
of corresponding backwages and related employment benefits, 13 th month pay, service incentive leave, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees based on total judgment award. Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr. rendered judgment
declaring 7J as employer of respondents and finding 7J guilty of illegal dismissal.
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying that Lotte be declared as their direct
employer because 7J is merely a labor-only contractor. NLRC affirmed the ruling that 7J is the employer of respondents and
solely liable for their claims. NLRC denied respondent’s MR.
Lotte prayed that the petition for certiorari filed by respondents in the Court of Appeals be dismissed for failure to
implead 7J who is a party interested in sustaining the proceedings in court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and declared Lotte as the
real employer of respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte.
Respondents who performed activities directly related to Lottes business were its regular employees under Art. 280 of the
Labor Code. As such, they must be accorded security of tenure and their services terminated only on just and authorized
causes.

ISSUE: WON 7J is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondent’s petition in the Court of
Appeals?
HELD: YES
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause,
the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court
cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected by the outcome of
the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents. The Court of Appeals
however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real
employer of respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J.
Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, respondents failed to include it in
their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final
ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the effective and complete resolution
of the case and in order to accord all parties with due process and fair play.

In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.

CARABEO VS. DINGCO

647 SCRA 200
TOPIC: DEATH OF PARTY - EFFECTS

FACTS: On July 10, 1990, petitioner) entered into a contract denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"
with Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter
parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for P38,000.
Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that petitioner
had caused its registration in his name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They thereupon offered to pay the
balance but petitioner declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was
reached, however, hence, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan.

After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31, 2001, petitioner passed away. The records do not show that
petitioner’s counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper
substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court. Petitioner’s counsel filed a Notice of Appeal
with the CA but the latter affirmed the RTC Decision. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, the present
petition for review was filed by Antonio Carabeo, petitioner’s son.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s death rendered respondents’ complaint against him dismissible.

RULING: NO. The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. In the present case, respondents
are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect
his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of
petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives.

DE LA CRUZ VS JOAQUIN
373 SCRA 11

TOPIC: DEATH OF A PARTY

DOCTRINE: Formal substitution of heirs is not necessary when theyappear, participated, and presented evidence in the
defense of the deceased. When the party to a pending action dies, the claim is not extinguished. It requires substitution of the
deceased.

FACTS: The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and
damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent ordering herein
petitioners to reconvey the property upon his payment. Petitioners assert that the RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of
jurisdiction claiming that respondent died during the pendency of the case and there being no substitution by the heirs, the
trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.

ISSUE/S: WON the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin?

RULING: NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require a
substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3. The rule on the substitution of
parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when as
in the present case, they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the
deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated. The records of the present case
contain a “Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff” filed before the CA. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a
matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect
the validity of a
 promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s
decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

NAVARRO VS ESCOBIDO
606 SCRA 1

TOPIC: Real Parties in Interest, Indispensable Parties

on to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) — the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside the

ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.

benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect

thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even with

except as provided by law. Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complain

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDUARDO M. CACAURAN

G.R. No. 191667, April 22, 2015

TOPIC: Indispensable party

FACTS: The Municipality of Agoo entered into two loans with LBP in order to finance a Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo
Public Plaza. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality authorized the mayor Eufranio Eriguel to enter into a P4M loan
with LBP for the Public Plaza and again for the amount of P28M to construct a commercial center
called Agoo People’s Center within the Plaza’s premises. The Municipality used as collateral a 2,323.75 sqm lot at the
south-eastern portion of the Plaza. acayuran and other residents opposed the redevelopment of the Plaza as well as the means
of the funding. They claim that these are highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interest resulting in
the desecration of the public plaza. Cacayuran’s request for the documents relating to the plaza’s redevelopment was not
granted. Cacayuran invokes his taxpayer right and files a complaint against LBP and officers of the municipality but does not
include the municipality itself as party- defendant. He questioned the validity of the loan agreements and prays that the
redevelopment is enjoined.
The municipal officers moved for the dismissal but were denied. LBP asserted that Cacayuran did not have any cause of
action because he was not privy to the loan agreements.

RTC RULING: Subject loans are null and void. Resolutions approving the procurement were passed irregularly and are thus
ultra vires. Municipality is not bound so it is the officers that will be held liable. Plaza lot is property for public use and not
valid as collateral.
LBP and the officers appealed to the CA. The municipal officers’ appeal is deemed abandoned for failing to file an appellants’
brief. LBP was given due course.

CA RULING: RTC decision affirmed with modification: Vice-Mayor Antonio Eslao is free from personal liability.
Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and the issue is of transcendental importance to public interest. Resolutions approving
the loan are invalidly passed. Plaza lot is invalid as collateral. Procurement is ultra vires LBP files petition for certiorari with
SC.

Proceedings Before the SC: LBP petition is denied and CA decision affirmed. LBP moves for reconsideration,
Municipality of Agoo files a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Pleading-In-Intervention Attached praying to be included as
party litigant. It contends that being a contracting party to the subject loans, it is an indispensable party. Cacayuran insists that
they are not real party in interest because the complaint is against the municipal officers in their personal capacity for their
ultra vires acts not binding to the municipality.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Agoo should be deemed an indispensable party to the case

RULING: YES it is an indispensable party under Sec 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

Sec 7, Rule 3 mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it is the party whose interest will be affected
by the court’s action and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. His legal presence is an absolute
necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act.
Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. The proper remedy is to
implead them. In this case, Cacayuran failed to implead the Municipality, a real party in interest and an indispensable party
that stands to be directly affected by any judicial resolution. It is the contracting party and the owner of the public plaza. It
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the case.
The decision of the RTC, affirmed with modification by the CA, and finally affirmed by the SC is not binding upon the
Municipality as it was not impleaded as defendant in the case.

Subject motions are PARTLY GRANTED. Previous decisions are SET ASIDE. Instant case is REMANDED to the RTC and
Cacayuran is DIRECTED to implead all indispensable parties.

DIVINAGRACIA VS. PARILLA

753 SCRA 87

FACTS: Conrado Sr. owns a 313-square parcel of land in Delgado Streets, Iloilo City. During his lifetime, he contracted two
marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and
(b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children,
 namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo,and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3)
illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo.Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his
children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and
was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.

According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of his father, Mateo,
Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the
subject land to Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not
sell their respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in
representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children).

use of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the subjec

partition nor compel them to surrender the TCT because, inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not failure to plead indispensable parties in an action renders all actions of the court null and void

2. Whether or not failure to implead may cause the dismissal of the complaint.

RULING:

nextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a res

With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the
property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable
parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The aforementioned heirs – whether
in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant – have vested rights over the subject land and, as such,
should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint
shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-
representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife,
Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 35 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his
children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition
defective.

2. NO.

In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.,39 the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable
parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a
judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the
tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may
dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. x x x40(Underscoring supplied; emphases in the original)

In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of
those indispensable parties who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.41

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA V. SCHONFELD

516 SCRA (G.R. NO. 166920; FEBRUARY 19, 2007)

Topics: Jurisdiction, venue, forum non conveniens

FACTS: Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New Westminster, British Columbia, Canada. He had
been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering and water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is
a corporation duly established and incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The president of PPI, Jens
Peter Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ, was based in Tokyo, Japan. Henrichsen commuted from Japan to Manila
and vice versa, as well as in other countries where PCIJ had business.

Respondent was employed by PCIJ, through Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department.
However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.
Henrichsen transmitted a letter of employment to respondent in Canada, requesting him to accept the same and affix his
conformity thereto. Respondent made some revisions in the letter of employment and signed the contract. He then sent a copy
to Henrichsen.

Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector Manager. He was accorded the status of a
resident alien. Respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment had been terminated
effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that PCIJ and PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the
Philippines. However, on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by electronic mail, requested respondent to stay put in his job after
August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and discuss all the opportunities he had
developed.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor
Arbiter found, among others, that the January 7, 1998 contract of employment between respondent and PCIJ was
controlling; the Philippines was only the "duty station" where Schonfeld was required to work under the General Conditions
of Employment. PCIJ remained respondent’s employer despite his having been sent to the Philippines. Since the parties
had agreed that any differences regarding employer-employee relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
of arbitration in London, this agreement is controlling.

On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed the latter’s decision in toto.

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On the issue of venue, the appellate court
declared that, even under the January 7, 1998 contract of employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case
related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between the parties were to be resolved in
the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in
any other forum other than in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over respondent’s claim despite the fact that respondent, a
foreign national, was hired abroad by a foreign corporation, executed his employment contract
abroad, and had agreed that any dispute between them "shall be finally settled by the court of arbitration in London.

RULING: The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a
rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be
accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated
only at the place named by them.

In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —,"
"particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.33 It cannot be said that the
court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.

Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or where the
PCIJ holds its principal office, at the place where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in their
contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent could have filed his complaint, however, petitioners themselves
admitted that the provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely permissive.

Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact that
respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following
reasons:

First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint.34

Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is properly
considered as defense.35

Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,36 this Court held that:

x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites
are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in
a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the FACTS; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision. x x x

Admittedly, all the foregoing requisites are present in this case.

BIACO VS. COUNTRY SIDE RURAL BANK 515 SCRA 106

FACTS: Biaco vs Countryside Rural Bank Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. Ernesto
obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced by promissory notes. As security for the payment of the said
loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land described in Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto
failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand . The
written demand, however, proved futile prompting respondent bank to file a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against
the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco
through Ernesto at his office. Ernesto
received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in
default upon motion of the respondent bank. The respondent bank was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before
the Branch Clerk of Court who was then appointed by the court as Commissioner.

RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent. In case of non-payment within the period, the Sheriff of this Court is ordered
to sell at public auction the mortgaged Lot, a parcel of registered land to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the surplus if there be
any should be delivered to the defendants spouses ERNESTO and MA. THERESA [CHAVES] BIACO. In the event
however[,] that the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgage[d] property is not enough to pay the outstanding obligation,
the defendants are ordered to pay any deficiency of the judgment as their personal liability. Petitioner sought the annulment of
the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure
proceedings. According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6)
months after its finality. . She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were
served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. Petitioner further
argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her
person.

CA ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Noting that the spouses Biaco were not
opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that there was no fraud perpetrated by respondent upon her thereby violating her right to
due process?

HELD: The appellate court acted well in ruling that there was no fraud perpetrated by respondent bank upon petitioner,
noting that the spouses Biaco were co-defendants in the case and shared the same interest. Whatever fact or circumstance
concealed by the husband from the wife cannot be attributed to respondent bank.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against
the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either
(1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result
of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not
acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res.
Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of
judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioner’s personal
liability. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated
her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. V. SPS. BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015

Doctrine: An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a personal action
because it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
 FACTS: In 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation of 5 parcels of land in
Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondents. 2 of the parcels of land were mortgaged to the petitioner. In 2000,
the Manila RTC rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The petitioner
subsequently filed a Motion to, but the RTC denied the motion for having been "filed out of time." Hence, the petitioner
decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the respondents' loan.
After holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder. Claiming a deficiency,
the petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC. The respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint on several grounds. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, while in CA, it granted the petition, opining “Thus, a
suit for recovery of the deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action because its
purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract; it is upon a written contract and upon an obligation of the mortgage-
debtor to pay the deficiency which is created by law. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency must
necessarily be the same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.”

Issues: Whether or not the venue for the collection of deficiency is properly laid.

Held: Yes. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. According to Section 1,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.
The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the
Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of
personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.The venue of a personal action is the place where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is
considered a transitory one. Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency
after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein. Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought the case in the Makati RTC
because Makati was the place where the main office of the petitioner was located. We underscore that in civil proceedings,
venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

III. RULES 6-9

ALBA VS. MALAPAJO

779 SCRA 534

FACTS:
1. On October 19, 2009, petitioner Arturo Alba, Jr., duly represented by his attorneys-in-fact, Arnulfo and Alexander Alba, filed
with the Roxas City RTC a Complaint against Raymund and Ramil Malapajo and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City for the
Recovery of Ownership and/or Declaration of Nullity or Cancellation of Title and Damages alleging that:

 He was the previous registered owner of a parcel of land consisting of 98,146 sqm. situated in Bolo, Roxas City;
 His title was subsequently cancelled by virtue of a Deed of Sale he allegedly executed in favor of herein private
respondents for P500,000.00;
 A new TCT was issued in the name of Respondents Malapajo; and
 The Deed of Sale was a forged document which Respondents Malapajo were the co-authors of.

2. Respondents’ Answer with Counterclaim:

 They were innocent purchasers for value and that the deed was a unilateral document which was presented to them already
prepared and notarized;
 Before the sale, Petitioner had obtained loans from them (P600,000.00) and their mother which were secured by separate
real estate mortgages (both evidenced by a Promissory Note) covering the subject property; and
 The two real estate mortgages had never been discharged.
 Respondents counterclaimed for Damages and for reimbursement of Petitioner’s loan from them plus the agreed monthly
interest in the event that the Deed of Sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery.

3. Petitioner’s Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stated that:

 The Court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of Respondents’ permissive counterclaim; and
 Assuming without admitting that the two real estate mortgages are valid, the rate of 5% per month is unconscionable and
must be reduced.

4. Respondents filed their Rejoinder.

5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss had been filed, alleging that:

 Respondents’ Counterclaims are in the nature of a Permissive Counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of Docket
Fees and filing of a Certification Against Forum Shopping; and
 The supposed loan extended by Respondents’ mother to Petitioner, must also be dismissed as Respondents are not the real
parties-in-interest.

6. Respondents filed their Opposition.

7. Roxas City RTC

 Order (June 4, 2010) – denied petitioner’s Motion finding that respondents’ Counterclaims are
Compulsory;
 Order (September 30, 2010) – denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration

8. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which sought the annulment of the RTC Orders.

9. Court of Appeals

 Resolution (February 28, 2011) – dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground that there was no proper proof
of service of the petition to the Respondents and only the last page of the attached copy of the RTC Order was signed and
certified as a true copy.
 Resolution (August 31, 2011) – denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration finding that Petitioner still failed to
comply with the proper proof of service requirement. Post office receipt is not the required proof of service by registered
mail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondents’ Counterclaim, i.e., reimbursement of the loan obtained from them in case the Deed of Absolute
Sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery, is Permissive in nature.
 RULING: NO, Respondents’ Counterclaim in not Permissive in nature.

A Counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A Compulsory Counterclaim is
one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a Counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as
to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, necessarily connected
with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A
Compulsory Counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action.

A Counterclaim is Permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.

To determine whether a Counterclaim is Compulsory or Permissive, the Supreme Court have devised the following tests:

a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the Counterclaim largely the same?
b) Would Res Judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’ claims, absent the Compulsory Counterclaim rule?
c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the defendants’ Counterclaim?
d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the Counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is Compulsory.

In the case at bar, applying the tests devised by the Supreme Court in determining whether a Counterclaim is Compulsory or
Permissive, herein Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property by assailing the validity of the Deed of Sale on the
subject property which he allegedly executed in favor of Respondents Malapajo on the ground of forgery. Respondents
counterclaimed that, in case the Deed of Sale is declared null and void, they be paid the loan petitioner obtained from them
plus the agreed monthly interest which was covered by a real estate mortgage on the subject property executed by Petitioner
in favor of Respondents. There is a logical relationship between the claim and the Counterclaim, as the counterclaim is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. Notably, the same
evidence to sustain respondents’ Counterclaim would disprove Petitioner’s case. In the event that Respondents could
convincingly establish that Petitioner actually executed the Promissory Note and the Real Estate Mortgage over the subject
property in their favor then Petitioner’s complaint might fail. Petitioner’s claim is so related logically to respondents’
Counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials for the claim and the Counterclaim would result in the substantial
duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.

Since the Respondents’ Counterclaim is Compulsory, it must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it would be barred
forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground of
litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate on the ground of Res Judicata. There is, therefore, no need
for Respondents to pay Docket Fees and to file a Certification Against Forum Shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the said Counterclaim.

The Supreme Court agree with the RTC’s disquisition in finding that Respondents’ Counterclaim is Compulsory, to wit:

“The arguments of the Plaintiffs that this transaction is a Permissive Counterclaim do not convince.

By the manner in which the answer pertaining to this transaction was phrased, the Real Estate Mortgage was the origin of the
Deed of Absolute Sale after the loan of P600,000.00 using the same property as security for the payment thereof was not
settled. In short, it is one of Defendants’ defenses and controverting evidence against
 Plaintiffs’ allegations of falsification of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the property subject of the Deed of Sale being one and the
same property subject of the mortgage.”

SUPREME COURT:
 Resolutions dated February 28, 2011 and August 31, 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and denying the Reconsideration thereof for failure to show proper proof of service of the petition to Respondents
are SET ASIDE:
 Acting on the Petition for Certiorari, SC resolve to DENY the same;
 AFFIRM the Order of the Roxas City RTC denying Petitioner’s Motion to Set the Case for Hearing as if a
Motion to Dismiss had been filed and the Order denying the Reconsideration thereof.

LIM TECK CHUAN VS. UY

752 SCRA 268

FACTS:

Antonio Lim Tanhu sold Lot 5357 to the spouses Cabansag. The latter, however, failed to transfer the title of the property to
their names because of their work and travel abroad. In 1988, spouses Cabanag sold the lot to Serafin as evidenced by a Deed of
Sale.
To pave the way for the transfer of title to Serafin’s name, Spouses Cabansag attempted to have the same transferred under
their names first. However, Francisco failed to do so as he lost the owner’s copy of TCT No. T- 0500 together with other
documents pertaining to the sale of the subject lot. This prompted Serafin to exert efforts to secure copies of the lost
documents himself. On May 15, 1996, Serafin filed a petition before the RTC praying for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate TCT in his name and thereby cancel the title in the name of Antonio.

The Cadastral Court issued an order to issue a new owner’s duplication in favor of Serafin. However, the order was nullified
on the ground that the petitioner filed an opposition stating that he is one of the legitimate descendants of Antonio and that the
original owner’s copy of the title was in his custody.

Inthe meantine, a certain Lim Sing Chan has executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming that he is the sole heir of
Antonio. In the same document, he sosld the lot to Leopolda in the amount of P 500, 000.

Serafin then filed a complaint for quieting of title and surrender of owner’s copy of certificate of title. Impleaded as defendants
were Leopolda, Henry and the herein petitioner.

e petitioner averred in his answer that the lot was never transferred nor encumbered to any person during Antonio’s lifetime. The deed of sale in favor of Spou
n heir of Antonio, much less the only surviving heir of the latter. Corollarily, the petitioner questioned the validity of Henry’s Affidavit of Self- Adjudication and L

A pre-trial conference was held. Thereafter, Serafin and Leopolda both filed a Join Motion to Dismiss signifying the
latter’s intent to waive her counterclaim for damages.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint, specifically upon motion of the plaintiff under Section 2 of Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court also calls for the dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim
RULING:NO.
As can be gleaned from the assailed orders, the RTC erred when it dismissed the case when the present rules state that the
dismissal shall be limited only to the complaint. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere
dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant in
spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.

The case of Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago is quite instructive which this Court finds worth reiterating. In Pinga, the
Court clearly stated that the dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily result to the dismissal of the counterclaim,
abandoning the rulings in Metals Engineering Resources Corporation v. Court of Appeals,International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and BA Finance Corporation v.
Co. The Court held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At present, even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion of the plaintiff, now recognizes the right of the defendant to
prosecute the counterclaim either in the same or separate action notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, and
without regard as to the permissive or compulsory nature of the counterclaim.

METROBANK VS. CPR PROMOTIONS

760 SCRA 59

FACTS: From February to October 1997, respondent CPR PROMOTIONS obtained several loans from METROBANK. These
loans were covered by fifteen (15) promissory notes all signed by the respondents spouses Reynoso as Treasurer and President
of CPR Promotions.

To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage on said dates. The first mortgage, securing
the amount of Php 6.5Mand the other was executed over three more properties to secure the amount of Php 2.5M.

Thereafter on December 1997, the respondents executed a continuing surety agreement binding themselves with the CPR
PROMOTIONS for all and any loans the latter has obtained from METROBANK.

Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted prompting METROBANK to file a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgages. METROBANK won as the highest bidder in the public auction sale of the two properties. However,
petitioner alleged that there remains a deficiency balance of Php 2.6M. Despite repeated demands, respondents failed to pay
for such deficiency hence,
Filed an action for collection of sum of money against respondents.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA, however, reversed its decision and granted a refund valued at Php 722,
602.22 plus legal interest. METROBANK filed its petition for certitiorari arguing that the the respondents never set a
counterclaim for refund of any amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have timely set up their counterclaim.
RULING:
No. Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim

Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to
its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory
regardless of the amount.27chanrobleslaw

In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, We have, in several cases, utilized the following
tests:28chanrobleslaw

(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?

(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
 (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim?

(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test
is the "compelling test of compulsoriness."29chanrobleslaw

Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount due should
be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the
debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim.
Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are absolutely incompatible with
each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the
same set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a
substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same
parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence. The only difference here would be in the findings of the courts based on
the evidence presented with regard to the issue of whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts due.

claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, We rule that responden

It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his Answer,30 and
that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. 31 As it appears from the records, what respondents initially claimed
herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. 32 Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it
should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their
Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. 33 Unfortunately, respondents' belated (assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not
cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess, if any, is
already barred. With this, We now resolve the substantive issues of this case.

A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015

NELSON P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: Nelson filed a disbarment case against Atty. Dabon for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with his
wife, Sonia which was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation . He averred that
Sonia worked as Court Stenographer and admitted that she had an immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to
2006.

In her own Affidavit, Sonia claimed that sometime in 2000, she was invited to lunch by Atty. Dabon but was instead, drugged
and brought to Victoria Court Motel where she was molested. From that point on, Atty. Dabon had repeated carnal
knowledge of her once or twice a week through intimidation and threats.

In his Comment, Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual assaults, abuses, threats
and intimidation. He contended that it was highly improbable for him, a married lawyer at that, to suddenly turn crazy and
abandon all cares just to satisfy his purported lustful hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia, "an ordinary plain-looking 43-
year old woman with two (2) teen aged children. He also added that the cards expressing Sonia's affection towards him as
well as the expensive gifts she gave him belied her claim that she was sexually assaulted and that she resisted his alleged
sexual advances.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case against Atty. Dabon, Jr. should prosper on the ground of gross immorality.

RULING: YES.

To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether or not he
would admit his extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in his report, Atty. Dabon
interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit
affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted
considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or
intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.

nd favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are l

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

406 SCRA 190

DOCTRINE: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things: (1) that the document was signed; (2) that the
document complied with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that when the document was signed, it was in the original
form without any alteration; and (4) that the document was delivered.

DENIALS; NEGATIVE PREGNANT; SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FACTS: On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, represented by the OSG, filed a petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his
Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos. In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356
million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million
and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property.

On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement
of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion for the approval of said
agreements and for the enforcement thereof. Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the
General/Supplemental Agreements.

On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs.
Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment." Respondent
Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the
Compromise Agreement and that she owned
90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-
trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated, the case was set for trial.

After several resettings, petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356
million. The Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON Summary Judgment is proper; WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify
or negate summary judgment.

RULING: YES. Summary Judgment is proper.

The SC finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer
to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished
from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it
happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to
tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the
issues.
Moreover, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the
manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not
recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the
basis of such assertions.

If an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the
latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. Here, despite the serious and
specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations.
Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the FACTS alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise
an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the FACTS
alleged.

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a
denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial FACTS in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a
form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial FACTS alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356
million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure: Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall
be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.

Further, when matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are
plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific
denial. An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is
insufficient to constitute an effective denial. Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and
necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. Thus, the general
denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
they were not privy to the transactions" cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and
successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a- vis the Swiss funds.

Furthermore, their opposition to the motion for Summary Judgment was not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or
admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure: x x x The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before hearing.
After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republic's motion
only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief. In sum, mere
denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine
issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.

A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions
or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have
pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or
other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no
genuine issue between them.

Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: SECTION 1.
Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross- claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory of
summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by
affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in
dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner

CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION VS. ALON

533 SCRA 28

TOPIC: Negative Pregnant

FACTS: On July 15, 1999, Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Silay City,
Branch 40, a complaint for damages, injunction, and nullity of mortgage against the Land Bank of the Philippines
(respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera, praying for the following reliefs: issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any
foreclosure sale to be held; declaration of nullity of the mortgage constituted over petitioners property in favor of respondent;
and award of damages.
On July 21, 1999, the RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the auction sale set on July 23, 1999, as agreed upon by the
parties. Notwithstanding said directive, another foreclosure sale was scheduled on October 15, 1999. Per RTC Order dated
October 14, 1999, the October 15 scheduled sale was held in abeyance; but re-scheduled the sale on November 15, 1999 for
the following reasons:
However, P.D. 385 provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial institution to foreclose collaterals and/or
securities for any loan, credit accommodations and/or guarantees granted by them whenever the arrearages on such account,
including accrued interest and other charges amount to at least 20% of the total outstanding obligation as appearing in the
books of the financial institution. Moreover, no restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the
court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory
foreclosure provided by said law. x x x The defendant Land Bank of the Philippines and Eric B. De Vera, Sheriff of this
Court, are hereby authorized to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on November 15, 1999.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Order, but this was denied. Petitioner then filed with the Court
of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction which it denied due course and dismissed for lack of
merit. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, which was eventually denied by the CA. Hence, the present Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not enjoining the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties subject of this case.

HELD: Without first resolving the foregoing issue, the Court finds that the petition should be denied for the sole reason that
the act sought to be enjoined by petitioner is already fait accompli. In Transfield Philippines, Inc. v.
Luzon Hydro Corporation, the Court held that

[I]njunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined have already become fait accompli or an accomplished or
consummated act. In Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc. this Court ruled that where the period within which the former
employees were prohibited from engaging in or working for an enterprise that competed with their former employer the very
purpose of the preliminary injunction has expired, any declaration upholding the propriety of the writ would be entirely
useless as there would be no actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the preliminary injunction is concerned.

Records show that the foreclosure sale which petitioner sought to be enjoined by the RTC has already been carried out by the
Sheriff, and in fact, a Certificate of Sale dated June 26, 2000 was issued to respondent. There is, therefore, no more actual
case or controversy between the parties insofar as the RTCs refusal to enjoin the sale is concerned, and any resolution by
the Court of the impropriety or propriety of the RTCs refusal to issue any restraining or injunctive relief against the
foreclosure sale will serve no purpose but merely lend further addle to Civil Case pending before the RTC.

Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioners bone of contention before the RTC is that the
promissory notes are silent as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on
its property. It does not categorically deny that these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These vague
assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial FACTS in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant
is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial FACTS alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied,
has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

ALMA JOSE VS. JAVELLANA

664 SCRA 1
 APPEALS; FORUM SHOPPING; FRESH PERIOD RULE

FACTS: On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to
respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters
located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the
deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration
being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son
and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the
payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendor’s undertaking fell on
the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to
cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping
filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.

Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC). Javellana prayed
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling
materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final
deed of sale in his favor.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action, which was initially denied. However, upon her MR RTC reversed its decision and
granted the motion to dismiss, opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her not being bound to comply
with the terms of the deed of conditional sale for not being party thereto.

Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to
disturb the order of the RTC was not appealable; that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of
forum shopping. It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24,
1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. As to the notice on
appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and remanded the records to the RTC.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Priscilla.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the order of the RTC on June 21, 2000 was not appealable?
2. Whether or not the notice of appeal was belatedly filed?
3. Whether or not Javellana was guilty of forum shopping?

HELD:

1. Yes. The denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and appealable. First of
all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.

The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise: The
distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order
or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A
final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a
special civil action for certiorari.

2. Yes.

The appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA

The Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party
desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Under
the rule, Javellana’s notice of appeal filed on July 19, 2000 was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

3. No.

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is
identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia
are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping.

For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least
such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential FACTS and
circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different
orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No.
79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in due course by the
RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective "to prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property
and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved," as the CA explicitly determined in its
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.

Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against forum shopping designed to prevent or to
eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not
materialize considering that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court or judge
to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

MEDADO VS. HEIRS OF ANTONIO CONSUING

665 SCRA 534

TOPIC: Verification and Certification

FACTS: (Spouses Medado) and Estate of Consing executed Deeds of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the
property identified as Hacienda.

As part of the deal, Spouses Medado undertook to assume the estate's loan with (PNB). Subsequent to the sale, however, the
Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the government. Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC, an action for
rescission and damages against Spouses Medado due to the alleged failure of the spouses to meet the conditions in their
agreement.

In the meantime while the case for rescission was pending, Land Bank issued in favor of the Estate of Consing a certificate of
deposit of cash as compensation for the lots. Spouses Medado feared that LBP would release the full proceeds thereof to
the Estate of Consing, they institute an action for injunction to restrain LBP from releasing the remaining amount of the
proceeds of the lots to Estate of Consing, and restraining the Estate of Consing from receiving these proceeds

RTC granter the injunction (Medado) and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued. The writ was implemented 1 day
before the hearing for the motion for reconsideration filed by Heirs of Consing. Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late
Antonio Consing (Consing) questioned the RTC's order via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. They sought,
among other reliefs, the dismissal of the complaint for injunction for violation of the rules on litis pendentia and
forum shopping.

On the matter of the absence of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order before resorting to a petition for
certiorari, the heirs explained that the implementation of the questioned writs rendered their motion for reconsideration moot
and academic. The heirs argued that their case was within the exceptions to the general rule that a petition under Rule 65
will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed.

CA NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE the ruling of RTC.

The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case for injunction
during the pendency of Civil Case for rescission and damages as this violates the rule against forum
shopping.

ISSUES: Whether or not the requirement for verification and certification against forum shopping complied with by
the heris of consing when the same is solely signed by Soledad- administratix?

RULING: The requirements for verification and certification against forum shopping in the CA petition were substantially
complied with, following settled jurisprudence. Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in
the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum
shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.

The Court has consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended
to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations
 in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
or are true and correct. It was based on this principle that this Court had also allowed herein petitioner, via our Resolution
dated April 22, 2009, a chance to submit a verification that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, instead of the Court dismissing the petition outright.

COA VS. PALER

614 SCRA

Topic: Authority to file petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping / appeal despite having
been filed beyond the reglementary period

FACTS: Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II with the Technical Support Service of the COA. Mr.
Paner submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days then left for the U.S. without verifying whether the
application for leave was approved. Comm. Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of
employees due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, s.
1999. Mr. Paner moved for MR with the Comm. Chairman, was denied; on appeal, CSC reversed and set aside the Comm.
Chairman's decision. (Rule 43) CA affirmed CSC resolution; hence Rule 45.

Issue/s:

1. WON Commission Secretary may file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in behalf
of the Commission Chairman;
2. WON appeal may prosper despite having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Ruling/s:

1. Representatives, lawyers or any person who personally knew the truth of the FACTS alleged in the petition could sign the
verification. However, as to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. Lack of authority, (certification of non- forum shopping)
dismissible.

2. Procedural rules need not be strictly observed if appeal is meritorious. “it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid
rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed,
courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules
are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection
of substantive rights of the parties.”

BASAN VS. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS

749 SCRA 541

FACTS:
ON FEBRUARY 18, 1998, petitioners Basan among others, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phillippines alleging that the respondent dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice.

Respondent Corporation on the other hand argues that it hired petitioners as temporary route helpers for a period in
anticipation of the volume of work in their plants or sale offices.

LA ruled in favor of petitioner finding that they are performing activities necessary and desirable to the usual business of the
petitioner for more than the period for regularization. NLRC affirmed LA decision only to be reversed by the CA. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should fail on the ground that its verification and non-forum shopping has been signed by only
one of the petitioners

RULING:
NO.
On the procedural issue, We hold that while the general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this
case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings th

UY VS. CA
770 SCRA 513

FACTS:
In 1979, private respondent Naval-Sai acquired ownership of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 54-B (LRC) from her
brother. The land was later subdivided and registered in Naval-Sai’s name in the Register of Deeds North Cotabato.

Subsequently, Naval-Sai sold a part of the land to a certain Boby Adil. Adil failed to pay the amortization forcing him to sell
his unfinished building to spouses Omandac.

Meanwhile, Naval –Sai borrowed money from Grace Ng. As security, Naval-Sai delivered her two portions of the land he
owns. Ng, on the other hand, borrowed money from petitioner and delivered to the latter two titles to guarantee the payment
of the load.

Thereafter, Naval-Sai was informed that petitioner filed a case for recovery of possession against Omandac. RTC KIdapawan
City ruled in favor of petitioner. Naval –Sai filed a motion for new trial before CA, arguing that her signature was forged in
the purported deed of sale between her and petitioner. However, it became final and executor in 1991.

In July 1999, Naval-Sai filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed with Damages before the same court against petitioner.
spurious. aval-Sai argued that she never sold the lots and that her signature in the purported deed of sale is

Naval-Sai filed an Amended Complaint 13 dated July 29, 1999. She asserted that the subject TCTs were already cancelled
by virtue of the deed of sale. Unlike the original complaint, however, the Amended Complaint was not signed by Naval-
Sai, but by her counsel.

In his answer with counterclaim, petitioner raised special and affirmative defenses, among others, non- compliance with the
requisite certification of non-forum shopping and prescription. He asserted that jurisdiction has never been acquired over the
parties and the subject matter because the certification against forum shopping in the Amended Complaint was defective, for
having been merely signed by Naval-Sai's counsel. He further
 claimed that the action for annulment of deed of sale is already barred by the statute of limitations and that Naval- Sai is
guilty of estoppel and laches.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the requirements on certification for non-forum shopping.

RULING: A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to
thcourt or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action.28 It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign
on his behalf.

amended complaint, Atty. Ela specified that it should be taken and read together with the original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this as a cautionary mov

In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we recognized the flaw in the certification against forum shopping which was signed only
by the counsel, and not by the party. In LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter,35 there was initially no proof that the one who
signed the certification was authorized to do so in behalf of the corporation. In these two cases, we nonetheless chose to
overlook the procedural lapses in the interest of substantial justice and the existence
of prima facie merit in the petitions.

substantial compliance, the presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons.The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the o

BANDILLON VS. LFUC

770 SCRA 624
FACTS:
Petitioners Eduardo Bandillion, et al. (employees) are truck drivers and employees of respondent La Filipina Uygongco Corporation (LFU

The employees filed an appeal with the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE Secretary). Thus, on June 4, 2003,
Acting DOLE Secretary Imson issued an Order overturning the previous order of the DOLE-VI Regional Director. Upon a
denial of its motion for reconsideration by DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, LFUC filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition, however, and affirmed the decision of the DOLE Secretary. The
motion for reconsideration filed by LFUC was likewise denied by the court. A petition for certiorari was filed before SC which
was likewise denied.

Consequently, the employees filed a Motion for Execution before the DOLE Region VI to enforce the DOLE Secretary's Order
of June 4, 2003. After being served with the writ, LFUC filed a Petition 14 for certiorari and injunction dated August 15, 2008
with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the writ of execution.
 In 2011, the CA rendered its decision remanding the case to DOLE VI Regional Director for re-computation of awards and
reception of evidence of the parties on the ground that that the office of DRD arrived at its computation without any
evidence from the parties.

The employees filed an MR to no avail Hence the petition for review on certiorari filed by the employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition must fail on the ground that several employees concerned did not sign the SPA
authorizing their union president and co-petitioner Payda to file this petition and to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping

RULING:
This contention lacks merit. According to prevailing jurisprudence, neither the fact that Payda alone signed the petition's verification and c

n Altres, et at. v. Empleo, et al.49 regards the same as already in substantial compliance with the rules. In that case, it was held that in certain instances, the s

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected
above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against
forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification,
and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground
of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however,
for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party- pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf, x x x
 PEOPLE VS. ARROJADO
774 SCRA 193

FACTS:
In an Information dated March 23, 2009, herein respondent was charged with the crime of murder by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz. The case was raffled to RTC Roxas City. On June 16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Information filed against him on the ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the said Information
failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of
Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No.
1922) which was promulgated by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3, 2008.4

f proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against p

RTC dismissed the case and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to indicate the date and number of his MCLE Compliance Certificate in the
information would result to its dismissal

RULING: In this case, YES. But for the next cases, the trial court should not dismiss but simply require the investigating
prosecutor to number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance.

il suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,

he Rules." The prosecution has never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even when the motion for re

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her
pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane
Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with
"Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus,
under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his
or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings
from the records.
Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
 In light of the above amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time that the subject Information was filed, the
more prudent and practical thing that the trial court should have done in the first place, so as to avoid delay in the disposition
of the case, was not to dismiss the Information but to simply require the investigating prosecutor to indicate therein the
number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance.

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES INC. VS. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

781 SCRA 508
FACTS:
From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and
supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's hospital under the following contracts:

a. Memorandum of Agreement dated January 9, 2006 for the supply ol' medical equipment in the total
amount of P18,625,000.00;3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

b. Deed of Undertaking dated July 5, 2006 for the installation of medical gas pipeline system valued
at P8,500,000.00;4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

c. Deed of Undertaking dated July 27, 2006 for the supply of one unit of Diamond Select Slice CT and
one unit of Diamond Select CV-P costing P65,000,000.00;5 and

d. Deed of Undertaking dated February 2, 2007 for the supply of furnishings and equipment worth
P32,926,650.00.6

total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.7 However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent, respective
,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

d had found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the February 11, 20

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Due to the respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC,

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, 14 namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis
pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009
agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the petitioner's
action for collection.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, 16 the respondent filed its answer denying paragraph 6,7,8 of the
complaint alleging that he lacks “knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof,
inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan
University-Philippines.”
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent’s denial may be considered “specific denial” within the purview of the Rules of Civil Procedure

RULING:

We answer the query in the negative. Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the respondent's total obligation as of February 15, 2009
was P123,901,650.00, but its balance thereafter became only P54,654,195.54 because it had since then paid P67,357,683.23 to
the petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that the petitioner had agreed with the respondent on February 11, 2009 to reduce the
balance to only P50,400,000.00, which the respondent would pay in 36 months through 36 postdated checks of P1,400,000.00
each, which the respondent then issued for the purpose. Paragraph no. 8 averred that after four of the checks totalling
P5,600,000.00 were paid the respondent stopped payment of the rest, rendering the entire obligation due and demandable
pursuant to the February 11, 2009 agreement. Considering that paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that
the respondent ought to know or could have easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such material averments. It is
settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known
to it, or could have easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective 36 or sham
denials.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

mative defenses, by their nature, involved matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner's claim, and thus did not negate the material averments of the compla
h the ultimate FACTS alleged in the complaint. The defending party's answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate FACTS in the complaint or other

The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate FACTS of the adverse party's pleadings not only when it expressly
confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it omits to deal with them at all. 29 The controversion of the ultimate
FACTS must only be by specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by the defending
party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth
the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending party who desires
to deny only a part of an averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material
allegation of ultimate FACTS as is true and material and denying only the remainder. The third is done by the defending party
who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted
except an averment of the amount of unliquidated damages.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK

760 SCRA 486

FACTS:
On October 4, 2002, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners Go Tong Electrical and its President Ho, seeking that the
latter be held jointly and severally liable to it for the payment of their loan obligation in the aggregate amount of Php 87 M.
 As early as 1996, Go Tong had applied for and was granted financial assistance by the then Bank of South East
Asia (BSA). Subsequently, DBS Bank of the Philippines, INc. (DBS) became the successor-in-interest of BSA. It was
renewed on January 6, 1999 through a Credit Agreement.

On even date, Go Tong Electrical, represented by Go, obtained a loan from DBS in the principal amount of P 40M for which
Go Tong Electrical executed a Promissory Note for the same amount. Under the PN’s terms, the Petitioner bound itself to pay
default penalty interestand attorney’s fees. Go also executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement (CSA) covering any and all
obligations undertaken by Go Tong Electrical, including the aforesaid loan. Upon default, DBS then its successor-in-interest
BPI demanded payment to no ava, hence the complaint.

is their denial of the execution of the loan agreement, the PN, and the CSA "for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit [respondent's] purposes
titioners further interposed counterclaims for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation and attorney's fees in the total amount of P1,2

nts as its witness. Sunio attested to the existence of petitioners’ loan obligation in favor of respondent. On cross examination, Sunio nonetheless admitted that h

ISSUE:
Whether or not the genuineness and due execution of the document shall be deemed admitted RULING:

YES.
In Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde47 (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank), citing the earlier case
of Songco v. Sellner,48 the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document,
viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise
false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent
representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of
the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.49

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the defendant "sets forth what he claims to be the FACTS,"
which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in this case.

Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the "specific denial under oath" requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the
Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the documents evidencing their loan obligation to respondent.

To this, case law enlightens that "[t]he admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon
it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity
and due execution of the document, e.g., that the
 document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the
signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized."50ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

BENGUET EXPLORATION INC. VS. CA

351 SCRA

DOCTRINE: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things: (1) that the document was signed; (2) that the
document complied with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that when the document was signed, it was in the original
form without any alteration; and (4) that the document was delivered.

FACTS: Petitioner Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against SeawoodShipping and
Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd.

nion. It was insured by Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked. When the cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao received
o Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to determine how much was loaded on the ship. Cayabyab stated th

Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of
Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate’s Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab,
and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that their contents are true.

ISSUE: Whether the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented were properly established by the testimony
of the plaintiff’s witness, resulting to prima facie presumption that their contents are true.

RULING: This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means
that “the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that
at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading
of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.” Genuineness and due execution of the instrument
means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one
executed.

It is equally true, however, that ¾ execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other
matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima
facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not
contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.

Respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of these documents. Switzerland Insurance presented
Export Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioner’s own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, prepared, in which it was stated that the
copper concentrates to be transported to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10
percent more or less. On the other hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioner’s
claim, prepared a report which showed that a total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at
Poro Point. As the report stated: It is to be pointed out that there were no actual weighing made at Benguet Exploration’s site.
The procedure done was that after weighing the trucks before and after unloading at Poro Point, the weight of the load was
determined and entered on “Philex” Trip Ticket which was later on copied and entered by the truck driver on Benguet
Exploration, Inc.’s Transfer Slip.

Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the actual amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro
Point and loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of copper concentrates shipped.

Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution of the
Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mate’s Receipt was successfully rebutted by the evidence
presented by Switzerland Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro Point and
loaded on the vessel. This fact is compounded by the admissions made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no personal
knowledge of the actual amount of copper concentrates loaded on the vessel.

In the face of these admissions, appellant’s claim of loss or shortage is placed in serious doubt, there being no other way of
verifying the accuracy of the figures indicated in appellant’s documentary evidence that could confirm the alleged loss of
355.736 MT. Notwithstanding the figure stated in Bill of Lading No. PP/0-1 that 2,243.496 WMT of copper concentrates
was loaded by appellant at the port of origin, it should be stressed that this is merely prima facie evidence of the receipt by the
carrier of said cargo as described in the bill of lading. Thus, it has been held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods
shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment and as between the consignor and a
receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital. Resultingly, the admissions elicited from appellant’s witnesses that they
could not confirm the accuracy of the figures indicated in their documentary evidence with regard to the actual weight of the
cargo loaded at the port of origin and that unloaded at the port of destination, in effect rebuts the presumption in favor
of the figure indicated in the bill of lading.

ASIAN CONST. & DEV. CORP. VS. CA

458 SCRA

DOCTRINE: There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for
contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.

FACTS: The original plaintiff in this case, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC), filed a collection suit with damages
against Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) for non-payment of rentals of the
several leased equipment amounting to P5,071,335,86. ACDC, on the other hand, filed a motion to file and admit answer with
third-party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corporation (BOC) alleging by way of special and affirmative defense that
while it is true ACDC is indebted to MEC in the amount of P5,071,335,86, the same cannot be complied with because
BOC is yet to pay ACDC the contracted services it rendered which includes the use of the subject equipment at its project site
and therefore, as a result, BOC should be impleaded as a third- party defendant in this case. MEC opposed it by filing a
motion for summary judgment alleging that since there was no genuine issue as to the monetary obligation of ACDC to MEC,
the only issue left for the trial court to resolve is the amount of attorneys fees and cost of litigation. Furthermore, MEC also
added that the demand set forth by ACDC in its special and affirmative defense partook the nature of a negative pregnant and
that there was a need for a hearing in its claim for damages.

Both the RTC and CA ruled denying the motion filed by ACDC and in favor of MEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in denying the third-party complaint filed by ACDC

RULING: No. There is no showing in the proposed third-party complaint that the respondent knew or approved the use of
the leased equipment by the petitioner for the said project in Quezon. BOC cannot invoke any defense the petitioner had or
may have against the claims of the respondent in its complaint, because the petitioner admitted its liabilities to the respondent
for the amount of P5,075,335.86. The barefaced fact that the petitioner used the equipment it leased from the respondent in
connection with its project with BOC does not provide a substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint against the
latter. There is no causal connection between the claim of the respondent for the rental and the balance of the purchase price
of the equipment and parts sold and leased to the petitioner, and the failure of BOC to pay the balance of its account to the
petitioner after the completion of the project in Quezon.

The controversy between the respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and BOC, on the
other, are thus entirely distinct from each other. Hence, the denial of the third-party complaint by the courts were proper.

SALVADOR VS. RABAJA

749 SCRA 654

FACTS:

Sometime in July 1998, Spouses Rabaja learned that Spouses Salvador were looking for a buyer of the subject property.
Petitioner Herminia Salvador (Herminia) personally introduced Gonzales to them as the administrator of the said property.
Spouses Salvador even handed to Gonzales the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the subject property. On July, 3,
1998, Spouses Rabaja made an initial payment of P48,000.00 to Gonzales in the presence of Herminia. Gonzales then
presented the Special Power of Attorney 3 (SPA), executed by Rolando Salvador (Rolando) and dated July 24, 1998. On the
same day, the parties executed the Contract to Sell4 which stipulated that for a consideration of P5,000,000.00, Spouses
Salvador sold, transferred and conveyed in favor of Spouses Rabaja the subject property. Spouses Rabaja made several
payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by Gonzales pursuant to the SPA provided earlier as evidenced by the
check vouchers signed by Gonzales and the improvised receipts signed by Herminia.

Sometime in June 1999, however, Spouses Salvador complained to Spouses Rabaja that they did not receive any payment
from Gonzales. This prompted Spouses Rabaja to suspend further payment of the purchase price; and as a consequence, they
received a notice to vacate the subject property from Spouses Salvador for non- payment of rentals.

Thereafter, Spouses Salvador instituted an action for ejectment against Spouses Rabaja. In turn, Spouses Rabaja filed an
action for rescission of contract against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales, the subject matter of the present petitio
 In an action for ejectment,the complaint was filed before MeTc of Mandaluyong City. The court ruled in favor of Spouses
Salvador finding that valid grounds existed for the eviction of spouses Rabaja from the property. . Spouses Rabaja appealed to
RTC Mandaluyong City which reversed the MeTC Ruling as it was found that there is no lease agreement between parties.

A rescission case has likewise been filed by Sps. Rabaja against Spouses Salvador and Gonzales. After filing their
answer, Sps. Salvador failed to attend the pretrial conference.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-tral conference warrants the presentation of evidence ex-
parte by Spouses Rabaja

RULING:

YES.

On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of a

likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence.31 The s

There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005
despite proper notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the fault of their counsel as he forgot to
update his calendar.34 This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be
considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer
present any evidence in their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex
parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants. Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to attend the pre-trial
conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment based on the evidence presented
during the trial.

BANCO DE ORO VS. TANSIPEK

593 SCRA 456

TOPIC: Motion to lift order of default

FACTS: The Complaint alleges that J. O. Construction, Inc (JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. as
actual construction went on, progress billings were made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein
respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek were initially remitted to
JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check in the amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI but instead,
Tansipek deposited the same to his account in PCIB. PCIB allowed the said deposit, despite the fact that the check was
crossed for the deposit to payee’s account only, and despite the
alleged lack of authority of Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the check
despite demands made by the latter.

PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC denied PCIB’s Motion to Dismiss.

PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to file
his Answer to the Third-Party Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to Reconsider
the Default Order was denied. Upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed
for failure to attach the assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals was
denied for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the correct remedy

HELD: NO. Respondent Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent
Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3 (b),
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must
show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must concur.

It is important to note that a party declared in default – respondent Tansipek in this case – is not barred from appealing from
the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless
of the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the Decision’s being contrary to
law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.

BITTE VS. JONAS

777 SCRA 489

FACTS:

This controversy stemmed from a purported contract of sale involving a piece of property situated at 820 corner Jacinto Street
and Quezon Boulevard, Davao City (subject property). It was initially under the name of Rosa Elsa Jonas and presently
under the name of Ganzon Yap, married to Haima Yap (Spouses Yap).

Before Rosa Elsa went to Australia, she had executed a Special Power of Attorney ( SPA)authorizing her mother, Andrea C.
Serrano (Andrea), to sell the property.

Sometime in May 1996, Cipriano Serrano (Cipriano),son of Andrea and brother of Rosa Elsa, offered the property for sale to
Spouses Bitte showing them the authority of Andrea. He received Php 200, 000 then Php 400,000 in consideration thereof.

Spouses Bitte sought a meeting for final negotiation with Rosa Elsa. On October 10, 1996, shortly after her arrival here
in the Philippines, Rosa Elsa revoked the SPA, through an instrument of even date, and handed a copy thereof to Andrea.
The next day, on October 11, 1996, the parties met at Farida Bitte’s office, but no final agreement was reached. The next day,
Rosa Elsa withdrew from the transaction.

On October 17, 1996, Spouses Bitte filed before the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages seeking to
compel Rosa Elsa, Andrea and Cipriano to transfer to their names the title over the subject property.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Bitte, demanding that they pay for the balance remaining for the acquisition of property.
Spouses Jonas appealed before CA. Judgment was reversed. After the denial of their MR, Spouses Bitte filed a petition
for certiorari.

In their Comment,13 Spouses Jonas called the attention of the Court to the fact that Spouses Bitte had been declared in
default by the RTC. Spouses Jonas contended that, being in default, Spouses already lost the legal personality to resort to this
petition. They also averred that the questions presented in this petition are one of FACTS and not of law. Not being a trier of
FACTS, this Court must deny the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Bitte my avail themselves of the right to appeal despite being declared in default

RULING:
The rule is that “right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done on grounds that the amount of the
judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations
of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law.” If a party who has been declared in default has in his arsenal the
remedy of appeal from the judgment of default on the basis of the decision having been issued against the evidence or the law,
that person cannot be denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court. Despite being burdened
by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all other remedies available to question not only the judgment of
default but also the judgment on appeal before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

RULES 10-14

YUJUICO VS. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MGT. CORPORATION 760 SCRA

FACTS:

Stockholders of STRADEC, a domestic corporation engaged in business development and investment, executed Pledge
agreements where they pleadge a certain amount of stocks in favor of URAMI, the respondent. These pledges serve as
securities to the loan obtained by STRADEC from URAMI. One of the stockholders who so pledged his shares is Yujuico.

STRADEC failed to comply with its payment obligations. It received a notice informing them of an impending auction sale of
the stocked pledges to satisfy STRADEC’s outstanding loan obligations. Notice was sent by a certain Atty. Nethercott.

On June 21, 2004, petitioner filed before RTC Pasig City an injunction complaint to enjoin the sale of public auction. One of
the issues raised is Atty. Nethercott’s lack of authority to represent URAMI for any purpose. RTC did not act upon the
complaint, and the public auction pushed through. On July 5, 2004 , RTC issued a writ of preliminary injuction preventing
URAMI from appropriating the stocks it purchased from sale. More than a year later, respondent filed a motion for leave to
file an answer. In its answer, URAMI admitted that the auction was void and that it never authorized Atty. Nethercott to
cause the sale thereof.

Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment since there is no longer any genuine issue left by reason of respndent’s
admission. The resolution was deferred because of a TRO issued by the court.
In 2009, URAMI changed counsel and subsequently filed an amended answer with compulsory counterclaim in 2009.
URAMI still vouched for the dismissal of the injunction complaint but reneged from its previous admissions under the
original answer. This time, URAMI claimed that the 23 June 2004 auction sale was valid and that it duly authorized Atty.
Nethercott to initiate such sale on its behalf.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amended answer may be allowed even if it was filed more than a year after the original answer has
been submitted

RULING:

Our case law had long taught that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that every
case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real FACTS and the multiplicity of suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long
as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are
justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading,
the same becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.

The mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for leave years after the original answer is also not reason enough in itself to
discredit the amended answer as a sheer dilatory measure. Readily observable from the established FACTS is that the
perceived delay between the filing of the motion for leave and the filing of the original answer is not purely attributable to
URAMI. It must be remembered that some time after the original answer was filed, we issued a temporary restraining order in
G.R. No. 177068 that effectively suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 for more than a year. Thus, even if it
wanted to, URAMI really could not have filed a motion for leave to file amended answer sooner than it already had. On this
score, we note that it only took URAMI a little over three months after the lifting of the temporary restraining order to
replace its previous counsel of record in Civil Case No. 70027 and to file its amended answer.

LISAM ENTERPRISES VS. BANCO DE ORO

670 SCRA 310

TOPIC : RULE 10 ( AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING )

FACTS : Lisam Enterprises filed an action before the RTC of Legaspi City against respondents for annulment of mortgage
with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with damages . Respondents Lilian S. Soriano and
the estate of Leandro A Soriano jr. filed for their answer, stating that they were duly authorized by Lisam to mortgage the
subject property and that the proceeds of the loan were all for the benefit of Lisam and that the documents presented were
signed by Lolita Soriano.

Respondent PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss on 3 grounds; lack of legal capacity to sue , failure to state cause of action , and
litis pendencia . Respondent PCIB’s co-defendants filed a Motion to suspend action. The RTC then issued a resolution
dismissing the complaint. Petitioners filed for a MR. During the pendency of the resolution on said MR , petitioners filed a
Motion to Admit amended Complaint , amending paragraph 13of the original complaint.

RTC denied BOTH MR and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint .The trial court held that no new argument had been raised
by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration to address the fact of plaintiffs' failure to allege in the complaint that
petitioner Lolita A. Soriano made demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc. to take steps to protect
the interest of the corporation against the fraudulent acts of the Spouses Soriano and PCIB. The trial court further ruled that
the Amended Complaint can no longer be admitted, because the same absolutely changed petitioners' cause of action.
 ISSUES:

1. Whether Lolita Soriano is a real party in interest.

2. Whether the present case was correctly dismissed by RTC on the ground of litis pendetia
3. Whether the present case was correctly dismissed by RTC on the ground of failure to state COA.
4 Whether RTC should have granted the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint.
5 Whether RTC should have suspended the action instead of dismissing it.

RULING :
The Court shall first delve into the matter of the propriety of the denial of the motion to admit amended complaint. Pertinent
provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. − A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served x x x.

Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court. − Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be
made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent
to delay. x x x
It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to
petitioners' complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed,
amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.However, in
Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications,[4] the Court discussed this rule at length , to wit:

x x x [A]fter petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by
leave ofcourt. The said Section states:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.
Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such
leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an
opportunity to be heard.
Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus: Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially
altered" was stricken off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that
under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true,
however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made
shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules
which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.” The granting of leave to file
amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad,
subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory
of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher
interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without
unnecessary delay.

This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the
trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial .Furthermore,
amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every
case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real FACTS and in order to speed
 up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such
as inexcusable delay or the taking of
the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.

Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend
such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the
original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing
the amendment would not have caused anydelay. Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this
would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties
finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial court's denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and
orders the admission of the same. With the amendment stating “that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made demands upon
the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect the interest of the corporation from said
fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the
benefit and in behalf of the corporation,” does the amended complaint now sufficiently state a cause of action? In Hi Yield
Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the requisites for filing a derivative suit, as follows:

a. the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of
his shares not being material;
b. he has tried to exhaust intracorporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate
relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
c. the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the
corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.

A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been alleged therein. Hence, the amended
complaint remedied the defect in the original complaint and now sufficiently states a cause of action. Respondent PCIB
should not complain that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed out a defect in the original complaint would be
unfair to them. They should have been well aware that due to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a surprise to them that
petitioners would redress the defect in the original complaint by substantially amending the
same, which course of action is now allowed under the new rules.

The next question then is, upon admission of the amended complaint, would it still be proper for the trial court to dismiss the
complaint? The Court answers in the negative. The foregoing pronouncements of the Court are exactly in point with the
issues in the present case. Here, the complaint is for annulment of mortgage with the mortgagee bank as one of the
defendants, thus, as held in Saura, jurisdiction over said complaint is lodged with the regular courts because the mortgagee
bank has no intracorporate relationship with the stockholders. There can also be no forum shopping, because there is no
identity of issues. The issue being threshed out in the SEC case is the due execution, authenticity or validity of board
resolutions and other documents used to facilitate the execution of the mortgage, while the issue in the case filed by
petitioners with the RTC is the validity of the mortgage itself executed between the bank and the corporation, purportedly
represented by the spouses Leandro and Lilian Soriano, the President and Treasurer of petitioner LEI, respectively. Thus,
there is no reason to dismiss the complaint in this case.

TIU VS. PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS

596 SCRA 432

TOPIC: Amendment of pleadings

FACTS:
 1. PBCOM filed a complaint for collection against herein petitioners-representatives of Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI)
due to the latter’s failure to pay loans after several demands made by PBCOM.

2. Pursuant to said loans, a duly notarized Surety Agreement was executed by AWRI’s Directors, before the controversy arose.

3. In their Answer, petitioners-representatives ofAWRI alleged, among other things, that they were not personallyliable on the
promissory notes, because they signed theSurety Agreement in their capacities as officers of AWRI.They claimed that the
Surety Agreement attached to thecomplaint as Annexes “A” to “A2”were falsified,considering that when
they signed the same, the words “Inhis personal capacity” did not yet appear in the documentand were
merely intercalated thereon without theirknowledge and consent.

4. PBCOMadmitted its mistake in making the insertion andexplained that it was made without the knowledge andconsent of the
notary public. PBCOM maintained that theinsertion was not a falsification, but was made only tospeak the truth of the parties’
intentions. PBCOM alsocontended that petitioners were already primarily liable onthe Surety Agreement whether or not the
insertion wasmade, having admitted in their pleadings that theyvoluntarily executed and signed the Surety Agreement inthe
original form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application ofthe Rules, emphasized that the motion incorporated
in thepleading can be treated as a motion for leave of court toamend and admit the amended complaint
pursuant toSection 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.

RTC- RTC issued an Orderallowing the substitution of the altered document with theoriginal Surety Agreement.
- Denied subsequent MR

CA (on Petition for Certiorari) – Dismissed Petition!

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RTC committed reversible error when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety
agreement with that of the original.

RULING: NO. Petitioners argue that the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the Order of the RTC allowing the
substitution of the document by relying on Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the Rules do not
allow the withdrawal and substitution of a "falsified document" once discovered by the opposing party. PBCOM argues that
since the complaint is based on an actionable document, i.e., the surety agreement, the original or a copy thereof should be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed part of the pleading. Considering that the surety agreement is
annexed to the complaint, it is an integral part thereof and its substitution with another copy is in the nature of a substantial
amendment, which is allowed by the Rules, but with prior leave of court. Moreover, PBCOM alleges that since the Rules
provides that substantial amendments may be made upon leave of court, the authority of the RTC to allow the amendment is
discretionary. Thus, the CA correctly held that the act of granting the said substitution was within the clear and proper
discretion of the RTC. As to the substitution of the earlier surety agreement that was annexed to the complaint with the
original thereof, this Court finds that the RTC did not err in allowing the substitution. The pertinent rule on actionable
documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a
document, its substance must be set forth, and the original or a copy thereof "shall" be attached to the pleading as an exhibit
and deemed a part thereof, to wit: Section 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based
upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and
the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed
their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. “SECTION 3.
Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals,26 thus: Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the
new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial
justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court;
and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of
action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela,
even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it
is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of actions and proceedings. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in
this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by
law to answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order
that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real FACTS and in order to speed up the trial of the case or
prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense. In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of
PBCOM in submitting the altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have
submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy that was
attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words "IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" were inserted to conform to the
bank’s standard practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOM’s counsel had no
idea that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement with the
original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved. Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of
technicality but of substance, that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. The original surety agreement
is the best evidence that could establish the parties’ respective rights and obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the
amendment of the complaint, which consequently included the substitution of the altered surety agreement with a copy of the
original.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ contention, they could not be prejudiced by the substitution since they can still present the
substituted documents, Annexes "A" to A-2," as part of the evidence of their affirmative defenses. The substitution did not
prejudice petitioners or delay the action. On the contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy. Besides,
the petitioners are not precluded from filing the appropriate criminal action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of
the surety agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would not, in any way, erase the existence of
falsification, if any. The case before the RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is criminal, which is separate
and distinct from another. The present case failed to comply with the above-stated requisites. In the instant case, the
soundness of the RTC’s Order allowing the substitution of the document involves a matter of judgment and discretion, which
cannot be the proper subject
 of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This rule is only intended to correct defects of jurisdiction and not to correct errors
of procedure or matters in the

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. VS. CA

382 SCRA 499

TOPIC: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending
proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court? Sec 2, rule 10 – pleadings may only be amended as a matter of right
before a responsive pleading is served.

FACTS: Petitioner (Remington Industrial Sales Corp) filed complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of
contract against Industrial Steels with Ferro Trading GMBH as principal defendant, and respondent British Steel as alternative
defendants. ISL and BS separately moved for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions and the
MR. ISL filed answer.

British Steel separately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA claiming that complainant failed to show that
it had commited any act or ommission violating Remington’s rights. Complaint only stated that BS and Ferro were just mere
suppliers of goods for ISL.

Remington then sought to amend the complaint by incorporating additional FACTS to have a cause of action against BS by
using Sec 2, Rule 10, stating that it can amend its complaint as a matter of right because respondent (BS) has not yet filed a
responsive pleading.

RTC RULING: Amended Complaint is noted and other proceedings were held in abeyance until CA decides on the petition
for certiorari and prohibition of BS.

CA RULING: Granted BS writ of certiorari, ordered judge to dismiss without prejudice the Complaint against BS. MR was
also dienied.

ISSUE:

1. WON CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint agasint BS for lack of cause of action under the original complaint
even if it was already amended as a matter of right, and sufficient causes of action are averred in the amended complaint.
2. WON CA erred in holding if Remington wants to pursue its case against BS, it has to refile complaint, pre-empting the right
of the lower court to rule on amended complaint.

HELD: YES. CA erred in dismissing the complaint because it the amendment made by Remington was done in a timely
manner and as a matter of right, which was before BS gave its answer in accordance to Sec 2, Rule 10 of the ROC. The
decision of the CA will result into multiple suits. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF IT BEING
DISMISSED.

Sec 2, rule 10 - Before the answer, a complaint may be amended as a matter of right. It can amend to introduce a new cause of
action or change in theory. During this time, rights of defendant have not yet been violated because he hasn’t filed an answer
yet. Considerable leeway is given the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PRIOR the filing of
answer.

Sec 3, rule 10 - After the answer, subtantial amendment of complaint is not allowed without leave of court. RATIONALE:
any material change in the allegations already contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of defendant who has
alerady set up his defense in the answer.
 ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS VS. CITY OF URDANETA
566 SCRA

TOPIC: AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

FACTS:
This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and TRO filed
by respondent Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and Capalad doing business
under the name JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners APP and APP Construction and Dev’t. Corp. (APPCDC).

Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor entered into 5 contracts for the preliminary design, construction
and management of a 4-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel amounting to P250M, funded by a loan from
the PNB. For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly paid P95M. Del Castillo claimed that all the contracts are void
because the object is outside the commerce of men, which is a piece of land belonging to the public domain and which
remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. He also claimed that the contracts are void because they
were all awarded solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer, APP and APPCDC, and Urdaneta City asserted that the contracts were valid.
Respondent Capalad, through counsel, likewise filed an Answer with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on
the ground that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.

After pre-trial, Urdaneta City filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta City’s Answer;
(2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City’s complaint; and (4) conduct a
new pre-trial, which the RTC granted.

The RTC also granted Capalad’s motion to expunge all pleadings filed by his counsel. Capalad was dropped as
defendant, and his complaint was admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.

Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was dismissed. APP and
APPCDC’s subsequent MR was likewise denied.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the CA erred in denying reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and APPCDCs subsequent
compliance.
(2) WON the RTC erred and commited grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from
being defendants to becoming complainants.

HELD:
(1) Yes, it was thus error for the CA to deny reinstatement of the petition. Indeed, proof of authority to sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping in behalf of a corp. must be attached; otherwise, the petition is subject to dismissal. However, it must be
pointed out that the SC had considered as substantial compliance with the procedural requirements the submission in the MR
of the authority to sign the verification and certification, as in this case. Similarly, the SC considered as substantial
compliance petitioners’ submission in the MR of the certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders. Petitioners also included
in the MR their explanation that copies of the petition were personally served on the Lazaro Law Firm, and mailed to the RTC
and Atty. Peralta because of distance, as supported by the affidavit of service.
(2) No, the court may allow amendment of pleadings. Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence
is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre- trial Order already
defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties’ evidence on the issue.
Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and
admissible. Note also that under Sec. 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform
to the evidence. In addition, despite Urdaneta City’s judicial admissions, the RTC is still given leeway to consider other
evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts
assailed. A party’s testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.

PALILEO VS. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

738 SCRA

TOPIC: Effect of failure to timely file an appeal

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages with prayer for the issuance
of writs of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction against Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Planters Development
Bank (defendant Bank), Arturo R. Delos Reyes, Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad, and Emmanuel Tesalonia on 22 December
1998.

After summons together with the verified Complaint and its annexes were duly served upon defendants, the latter answered.
In the last pre-trial hearing dated 17 November 2000, only plaintiffs and their counsel appeared, thus, the latter moved for the
presentation of evidence ex-parte, which was granted by the Court with the reservation of verifying the return card to
determine whether the order for the pre-trial was indeed received by defendants. Finally, at the 21 November 2001 hearing,
defendants again failed to appear and their failure to file pre-trial brief was noted; thus plaintiffs were allowed to present
evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of Court.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, defendants were ordered to jointly and severally pay: Actual Damages; George Philip
Palileo - P2,605,972.92, Jose R. Dela Cruz - P1,529,508.80; Moral Damages P500,000.00 each; Exemplary Damages
P500,000.00 each; Attorney’s P500,000.00 each and to pay the costs.

On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service specifically LBC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial. Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by
courier service through LBC, but in their address of record Tupi, South Cotabato there was no LBC service at the time. On
August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial via
registered mail; another copy thereof was simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.

Petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal. In an August 30, 2006 Order, the RTC denied the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, while it granted petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal,
which it treated as a motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment.

Records show that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial dated 28 July 2006 was initially filed via
an LBC courier on 28 July 2006 and was actually received by the Court on 31 July 2006, which was followed by filing of the
same motion thru registered mail on 2 August 2006. Said motion was set for hearing by the movant on 18 August 2006 or
16 days after its filing.

Section 5, Rule 159 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended is pertinent thus:

Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. The aforesaid provision requires
[that] every motion shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing NOT later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. Being a litigated motion, the aforesaid rule should have been complied
with. Its noncompliance renders it defective.

CA initially upheld RTC’s ruling but later reversed itself, hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s motion should be heard despite having been filed beyond the period prescribed by the
rules.

RULING: No. Since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the 15-day period
within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been
foreclosed; it may no longer question the trial court’s Decision in any other manner. "Settled is the rule that a party is barred
from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him." The "presumption that a party who did not
interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court" applies to it. There being no appeal taken by
PDB from the adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less
reversed, by this Court. "Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if
no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter which the parties might
have litigated and have x x x decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation,
and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of
defense."

HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA VS. MIRANDA

700 SCRA

TOPIC: The Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed.

FACTS: In 1994, petitioners Cirila, Cornelio, Numeriano, Jr., Erlinda, Lolita, Rufina, Danilo, AlejandroP Felimon, Teresita,
Elizabeth, and Analiza, all surnamed Miranda, representing themselves as the heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, a Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-612, against the heirs of Pedro Miranda, namely: Pacita and Oscar Miranda; the heir of Tranquilino
Miranda, Rogelio Miranda; and the spouses respondent Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo. Petitioners did not file any appeal
hence the Decision became final and executor.

On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, which was not implemented. On July 8, 2005, respondent filed
an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and Demolition Order” in order to compel the petitioners to
vacate his property. But since more than five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been
enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order dated August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a
Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 05-131. Petitioners opposed the revival of judgment
assailing, among others, the jurisdiction of the RTC to take cognizance of the Petition for Revival of Judgment.

On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the ground that the
Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the
original records of the case to the CA, insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit.

Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its Order.Feeling aggrieved, petitioners
filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course.On June 14, 2007, the CA
denied the Petition for Mandamus on the ground that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was perfected on time.

RULING: NO. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.”
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the
first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.

In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not
provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via
LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is
not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed
the date of filing of that pleading.” Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received
by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of
Appeal was filed out of time.

Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal because work in
government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006, the day petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed
via LBC.

And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still be the
same. The appeal would still be denied for lack of merit.

VALMONTE VS. CA
252 SCRA

TOPICS: Service of Summons

FACTS: Lourdes Valmonte is a foreign resident. Lourdes Valmonte is married to Alfredo Valmonte who is a member of the
Philippine Bar and practices his profession in the Philippines. Lourdes’ sister, Rosita Dimankanta, filed an action for the
partition of real property and accounting of rentals against Lourdes and Alfredo. She alleged that while Lourdes and Alfredo
are spouses, of legal age and at present, residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive, South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A., but, for
purposes of the complaint, may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila
where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be
found.

Lourdes Valmonte through a letter, referred Rosita’s counsel to her husband as the party to whom all communications
intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo
D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the
process on her behalf. Then, the summons of Lourdes were not served upon her.

On one hand, Alfredo Valmonte file his answer with counterclaim, and on the other hand, Lourdes Valmonte did not file her
answer. This prompted Rosita to file a motion to declare Lourdes in default. Thereafter, Alfredo made a special appearance
in behalf of his wife and opposed the motion filed by Rosita. The RTC denied Rosita’s Motion to Declare Lourdes in default,
then the latter moved for a reconsideration, which was again denied by the RTC. Rosita then filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition. Accordingly, the CA declared Lourdes in Default.

ISSUE: Whether Lourdes Valmonte was validly served with summons.

HELD: No.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the action filed against petitioners Lourdes
A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private respondent, whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
This is because the rules on service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the other
of these actions.
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally served,
substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons
because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be
made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served with
summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as
provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule.

In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in personam
cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding decision.

On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for
giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is
not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17, which provides:

17. Extraterritorial service. – When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under Section 7; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less
than sixty
(60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.

In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res,
i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached. Service of
summons in the manner provided in 17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.

As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must
be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either
(1) by personal service;
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case
a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or
(3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL & COMM. CORP VS. TAN

326 SCRA

FACTS: Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[1] over its real property in
favor of respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed to secure payment of petitioner’s indebtedness to respondent.

Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the RTC. Summons and a copy of
the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff’s return, as “a
Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the highest ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge
of defendant’s Corporation, to receive processes of the Court.”

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service of summons upon it, as
a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, §13 of the 1964 Rules of Court
and contended that service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff’s return, was invalid as he is not one of the
authorized persons on whom summons may be served and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons upon a mere draftsman was valid

HELD: NO. Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, §13 is exclusive and that service of summons upon one who is not enum
summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown.

E.B. VILLAROSA VS. BENITO

312 SCRA

FACTS: E.B. Benito is a limited partnership with principal office at Davao City and with branch offices at Parañaque City
and Cagayan De Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent, Imperial Development Corporation, executed a Deed of Sale
with development agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land belonging to Imperial. On April 3,
1998, Imperial filed a complaint for breach of contract against E.B. Benito before the RTC Makati. Summons, together with
the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its BRANCH MANAGER Engy. Sabulbero at Cagayan De Oro City
Branch. E.B. Benito moved to dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons thus, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner. On the other hand, Imperial contended that the service is valid alleging that
there was a substantial compliance with the rule as it was served through its branch manager.

RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and held that there was a valid service of summons. Hence, this petition was filed by EB
Villarosa contending that the trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its
Branch Manager.

RULING: No. Sec 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or
in-house counsel.

This provision revised the former Sec 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that:

If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be
made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.
 The rule now states “general manager” instead of only “manager”. As held by Justice Regalado, the aforesaid terms were
obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word “agent”. Service
of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Sec 13 of Rule (old rule) has been held improper. The purpose
of which is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against
it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know
what to do with the legal papers served on him. Accordingly, the service of summons upon the branch manager at its branch
in CDO, instead to the general manager at its principal office in Davao City is improper.

MASON VS. CA
413 SCRA

TOPIC: Summons, Default

FACTS: Spouses Mason owned two parcels along EDSA in Pasay City. Petitioners and private respondent Columbus
Philippines Bus Corporation entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth ten
million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end of the third year of the lease. Private respondent failed to comply with this stipulation,
petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private respondent before the RTC of Pasay City.
Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons
described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s return described Rejalde as a secretary to the corporate president,
duly authorized to receive legal processes.

Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading. The private respondent was declared in default and
the petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte.The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. That
decision became final on May 12, 1999. The following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default. The trial
court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, the trial court on May
26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default since according to the court, the incidents can be resolved based on the
records.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted, private respondent filed a
manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution which was also denied for being dilatory.

Private respondent appealed to the CA, which ruled in its favor.

The CA held that private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an
Answer. Consequently, the subsequent proceedings, including the order of default, judgment by default and its execution,
were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, and

2. Whether private respondent’s motion to lift order of default was in order.

RULING:

1. None. Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly specifies
the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render
inapplicable the substantial compliance rule. Petitioners stress that even though the summons was received by a mere filing
clerk in private respondent’s corporation, there was substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 because the summons
actually reached private respondent.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now
limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general
manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The
phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a
manifest intent to liberalize the rule, there should be strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Neither can herein petitioners invoke the ruling in Millenium. Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still
in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where the
Court upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.

Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality. The service of
summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process.

2. Moot and Academic. Petitioners claim that private respondent’s motion to lift order of default was not in order for it was
filed late, contrary to the provision in sub-paragraph (b), Section 3,17 Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires filing of the motion after notice but before judgment. Also, the motion was (a) not under oath; (b) did not show the
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect that caused private respondents’ failure to answer; and (c) did not show private
respondent’s meritorious defense.

Since service of summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk cannot be considered valid, it necessarily follows
therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all
the subsequent proceedings held before it, including the order of default, are null and void.

JOSE VS. BOYON

414 SCRA

TOPIC: Summons, Kinds of Summons

FACTS: Petitioners lodged a complaint before the RTC for specific performance against respondents to compel them to
facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. Respondent judge, through the acting
Branch Clerk of Court issued summons to the [respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to
by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents] failed. Petitioners filed
before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication, which was granted. The
respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file their
respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit their evidence ex-
parte. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the
questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents
because of the invalid service of summons upon them.

ISSUE: WON there was valid service of summons?

HELD: NO. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where
the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted
service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. As can be gleaned
from the rules, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made
promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;
(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the
defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent FACTS proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or
in the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted
service renders the service of summons ineffective. In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and
capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents.
Summons by publication in this case was also improper. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or
summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.

MANOTOC VS. CA
499 SCRA 21

TOPIC: Substituted service of

summon.

FACTS: Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the US District Court of Hawaii against
Ma. Imelda Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for the wrongful death of Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence in the
Philippines allegedly working for Manotoc. RTC issued summons for Manotoc addressed at Alexandra Homes, Pasig. It was
served on a Macky dela Cruz described as a caretaker of her unit. Manotoc failed to file her answer and was declared in
default.

Manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person, stating that she is not a resident of the
said condo and that she does not hold office there, and dela Cruz is not her representative or employee. Thus no valid service
was made. Further, she states that she is a resident of Singapore.

RTC denied the motion and the subsequent MR. Manotoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, that was
denied. MR was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether there was valid substituted service.

RULING: No. In actions strictly ‘in perosnam’ jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory and can be
complied with valid service of summons. If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason, within a reasonable time,
substituted service can be resorted to. It is extraordinary in character and a derogation of the usual method of service thus
rules for such must be faithfully complied with.

The requirements of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of prompt personal service which is 15-30 days for the
sheriff are:

1) By leaving copies of summons at defendant’s residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or by
leaving copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge.

2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person became impossible.
3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least 3 times. The person of suitable age and discretion must be at least 18 years
old, able to read the summons written in English, and must be with confidential relation to defendant. A competent person in
charge can be the president or manager.

The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not comply with the requirements. Dela Cruz was not a
representative of Manotoc. Therefore, since there was no valid service of summons, there was no jurisdiction acquired.

DOLE PHIL. VS. QUILALA

557 SCRA 433

TOPIC: Service of Summons on Corporations Sec. 11, Rule 14; Voluntary Appearance Sec. 20, Rule 14

FACTS: Private respondent All Season Farm Corporation (ASFC) filed a complaint with the Makati City RTC presided by
Hon. Judge Quilala which sought the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and damages from petitioner Dole Philippines
Inc. (Dole) and several of its officers.

Dole stated that an alias summons was served upon it through Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific
General Services, Ltd., separate from Dole. Subsequently, Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
following grounds: (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over Dole due to improper service of summons; (b) the complaint filed
failed to state a cause of action; (c ) ASFC was not the real party in interest and
(d) the officers of Dole cannot be sued in their personal capacities for alleged acts performed in their official capacities as
Dole corporate officers.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by Dole. Thereafter, Dole filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending
that the alias summons was not properly served. The CA ruled that Dole’s president had known of the service of the alias and
summons although he did not personally receive and sign it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dole was validly served with summons.

RULING: The Court held that summons was validly served. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic
corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.

In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant, received the alias summons. There was no
evidence that she was authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the president. Considering that the service of
summons was made on a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under
Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.

However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of
summons. As held previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not a conditional appearance
entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading.

Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the
RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this Court. The RTC
therefore properly took cognizance of the case against Dole Philippines, Inc., and we agree that the trial and the appellate
courts committed no error of law when Dole’s contentions were overruled.

SANTOS VS. PNOC EXPLORATION

566 SCRA 272

TOPIC: Service of summons by publication, service of summons by registered mail, voluntary appearance

FACTS: On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complained for a sum of money against
petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the RTC of Pasig City. The complaint sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10
representing petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its
board of directors.

Personal service of summons failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts
to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication.

Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
on May 20, 20003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate and an
affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to the effect that the sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to
petitioner’s last known address.

Petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period so respondent moved that the case be set for the
reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated September 11, 2003.

Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the case was
deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.

On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer. He
sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed
to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he
was denied due process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondents evidence ex
parte be stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted.

Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on service by publication and
pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in default for failure to file an answer within the
prescribed period.

In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 11,
2003 order. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be
executed by the clerk of court, and that due process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually
mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was
filed way beyond the reglementary period.

Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He contended that the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. He imputed
the following errors to the trial court: taking cognizance of the case despite lack of
jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes, particularly
the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity and justice.

During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision. It ordered petitioner
to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit.

Meanwhile the Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004
orders of the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied reconsideration. Thus, this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether Sec. 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of court on service of summons by publication applies only to
actions in rem and not actions in personam like a complaint for a sum of money.

(2) Whether or not the affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of
court.

(3) Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

RULING:

(1) NO. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate
his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.

Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that substituted
service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was
significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this
silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.

This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

(2) Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court simply speaks of the following:

an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.

Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the
editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by
publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendants last known address. This
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication
in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
 The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary
service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

(3) Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. In this
connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer. This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE CO. vs. COA 708 SCRA 286

FACTS:

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning
the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the
premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit. The
latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its
decision denying the petition, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal
or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting
the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, and filed its motion for reconsideration on
January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as
earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-
submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioner comply with the rule on proof of service

2. Whether or not the fresh period rule under Neypes would apply to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64
RULING:

1. The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Courtconcerns two
types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz:

Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.

Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the
person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance
with the rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not
submitted.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared
that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail “under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and
70524 attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition.”14 The petition only bore, however, the cut
print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves.
The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially
comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not
comply with the requirement of proof of service.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2. As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed
question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an
error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order.17 In contrast, the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final
order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to
correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether
the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to
file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file
the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of
denial.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed
decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.21 Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14,
2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days
too late.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections22 that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the
belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same
fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only
to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying.

ONG VS. CO
FEBRUARY 25, 2015

TOPIC: SERVICE OF SUMMONS

In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the right of every litigant to be given an opportunity to be heard.
This right begins at the very moment that summons is served on the defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost importance
in ensuring that the defendant personally grasps the weight of responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only in exceptional
circumstances that constructive notification, or substituted service of summons, is allowed. If the server falls short of the
rigorous requirements for substituted service of summons, then the Court has no other option but to strike down a void
judgment, regardless of the consequences.

FACTS: Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and Benjamin Co, a Filipino citizen, were married. Co filed two
petitions for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity on two different occasions. Co stated in the first
petition that Ong’s address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. Co indicated in the second petition that Ong’s address was
23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. The RTC issued summons. In the Server’s Return,
process server stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after
several futile attempts to serve the same personally on Ong. The said documents were received by a security officer.

On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding Co’s marriage with Ong as void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that summons was served on Ong but she failed to
file her responsive pleading within the reglementary period.

Sometime in November 2008, Ong, received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) directing her
to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings.

When Ong appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the copies of the following documents: (1) petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage; (2) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; (3) Decision dated December 11, 2002
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and (4) their marriage contract with the subject
decision annotated thereon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

RULING: Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or
nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other processes on the
petitioner.

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in
court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of
summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14.

The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of
summons, to wit: xxx

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the FACTS and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the
Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of
the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what
the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Pascual v. Pascual, the return of summons did not show or indicate the actual exertion or positive steps taken by the officer
or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. Similarly, in Spouses Afdal v. Carlos, the process
server’s indorsements therein failed to state that the personal service on the defendants was rendered impossible and that
efforts were made to find them personally. In both those cases, the Court ruled that the meticulous requirements for
substituted service of summons were not met.

In the case at bench, the summons was issued on July 29, 2002. In his server’s return, the process server resorted to
substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted
service of summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons. The server’s return stated the following:

SERVER’S RETURN

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with copy of petition, were effected to
respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden Homes,
Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The said documents were
received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat.

Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of summons, Duly Served, this 2nd day of August, 2002.

The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the
summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts
to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal
service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each
unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in
the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify
substituted service.

The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated
that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat." It did not
expound on the competence of the security officer to receive the summons.

Also, aside from the server’s return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records which would describe the specific
attempts to personally serve the summons. Co did not even claim that Ong made any voluntary appearance and actively
participated.

The presumption of regularity was never intended to be applied even in cases where there are no showings of substantial
compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is patent that the
sheriff's or server's return is defective. As earlier explained, the server's return did not comply with the stringent requirements
of substituted service of summons.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the decision must be declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City is hereby declared VOID.

NATION PETROLEUM GAS, INC.VS. RCBC 766 SCRA 653

FACTS: On October 16, 2006, RCBC filed against petitioner corporation and its directors/offiers a complaint for civil
damages arising from estafa in relation of violation of Trust Receipts Law. After an ex parte hearing was conducted,
respondent’s prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was granted and the corresponding writ was issued.

Sheriff Leodel Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint application for attachment, reespondent’s
affidavit and bond and the order and writ of attachment.

The Sheriff’s report stated, among others, that he served the summons and all pertinent papers to Clauddia Abante, the
defendants’ liaison officer upon telephone instruction of the company secretary, Melinda Ang at Nation Petroleum Gas et al,
at BPI Building, Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon. He also served copies to other defendants at their given addresses, but they
refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.

Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss 8 on November 15, 2006. They asserted that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly served upon Claudia
Abante (Abante), who is a mere liaison officer and not one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules. Likewise, the individual petitioners argued that the
sheriff and/or process server did not personally approach them at their respective address as stated in the Complaint. Neither
did he resort to substituted service of summons, and that, even if he did, there was no strict compliance with Section 7, Rule
14 of the Rules.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant corporation by service of summons
upon its mere employee.

2. Whether or not there was proper service of summons to individual petitioners

3. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the individual defendants by resorting to substituted
service of summons despite absence of earnest efforts on the part of the serving officer to serve summons personally

RULING:

1. YES. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. 24 Its purpose is two-
fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced
so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.25 "[C]ompliance with the rules regarding
the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the persons
enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules.27 The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted,
limited and exclusive following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.28 Substantial
compliance cannot be invoked.29 Service of summons upon persons other than those officers specifically mentioned in Section
11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not binding to said corporation

Petitioner corporation cannot conveniently rely on the sworn statements of the individual petitioners and Abante. Upon
examination, Ang's denial of having spoken with any process server to give instruction to serve the summons and other
pertinent papers to Abante34 is not incompatible with the Sheriffs Report stating that "[s]aid summons and all pertinent
papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, were received by Claudia Abante, [defendants']
[Liaison] Officer, as evidenced by her signature at the original copy of Summons and Writ." While it may be true
that Ang had not talked to the sheriff or process server, it still does not rule out the possibility that she in fact spoke to Abante
and instructed the latter to receive the documents in her behalf. As to the Affidavit of Abante, her disavowal of having spoken
to Ang or receiving telephone instructions from her is truly self-serving. Evidence as simple as a telephone billing statement
or an affidavit of a disinterested third person, among others, could have been presented to refute the sheriffs claim, but there
was none. Likewise, no substantial proofs were credibly shown to support Abante's allegation that the sheriff insisted on
having the court processes received and that she was "intimidated by the presence of a court personnel who was quite
earnest in accomplishing his task."35redarclaw

It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of the FACTS as set out
therein. This is fortified by the presumption of the regularity of performance of official duty. To overcome the presumption of
regularity of official functions in favor of such sheriffs return, the evidence against it must be clear and convincing. Sans the
requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith
and credit.36redarclaw

The same conclusion, however, could not be said with respect to the service of summons upon the individual petitioners.

2. NO. Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules, provides for substituted service of summons:

Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

In the instant case, it appears that the sheriff hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without
actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the individual petitioners. The "reasonable time" within which to personally
serve the summons - 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the sheriff as stated in Manotoc - has not yet elapsed at the
time the substituted service was opted to. Remarkably, based on the Sheriffs Report and the narration of petitioners, the
personal service of summons upon the corporation and the individual petitioners as well as the levy of their personal and real
properties were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for substituted service of summons to be available, there must
be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in
failure in order to prove impossibility of prompt service. To reiterate, "several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferrably on at least two different dates.

3. Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The second sentence of Section 20,50 Rule 14 of the Rules
that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance " clearly refers to affirmative
defenses, not affirmative reliefs.

In the present case, the individual petitioners prayed, among others, for the following: (1) discharge of the writ of attachment
on their properties; (2) denial of the motion to declare them in default; (3) admission of the Comment/Opposition (to the
motion to declare them in default) filed on December 19, 2006; and (4) denial of respondent's motion to strike off from the
records (their opposition to the motion to declare them in default). By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the
individual petitioners are deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.52 Therefore, the CA cannot be considered to have erred in affirming the
trial court's denial of the Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper service of summons.

GREEN STAR EXPRESS VS. NISSIN

FACTS: On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation ( URC) owned figured
in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.' s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the
van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent NissinUniversal Robina Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its
passenger bus amounting to ₱567, 070.68. NURC denied any liability therefore and argued that the criminal case shall
determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice, due to
insufficiency of evidence.

Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the R TC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis
Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the one who received the summons. On February 6, 2004, NURC filed a Motion to
Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.

On May 5, 2004, the RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC. The dispositive portion of said Resolution thus
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant's "Motion to Dismiss" is hereby DENIED.3

Since its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, NURC elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. On
September 17, 2007, the CA reversed the RTC ruling

ISSUE: Whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC, vesting the trial court with jurisdiction

RULING: It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity must be
strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its cost accountant, Francis
Tinio.1âwphi1 It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule on service of
summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served
only through its officers.Thus:

Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Here, Tinio, a, member of NURC’s accounting staff, received the summons on January 22, 2004. Green star claims that it was
received upon instruction of Junadette Avedillo. The general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however, does not appear
in the Sheriff’s Return.13 The Return did not even state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was
received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered the summons, but
Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf.
However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC’s motion to dismiss to attest to said
claim. And while the sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not
presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service
of summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the
trial court did not vadily acquire jurisdiction over NURC,14 although the corporation may have actually received the
summons.15 To rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the
administration of justice.

GUY VS. GACOTT

G.R. No. 206147

FACTS:

Sometime on March 3, 1997, Atty. Gacott (Gacott) from Palawan purchased two (2) brand new transreceivers from
Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) in Manila through its employee Rey Medestomas (Medestomas), amounting to a
total of PI 8,000.00. On May 10, 1997, due to major defects, Gacott personally returned the transreceivers to QSC and
requested that they be replaced. Medestomas received the returned transreceivers and promised to send him the
replacement units within two (2) weeks from May 10, 1997.

Time passed and Gacott did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC informed him that there were no available
units and that it could not refund the purchased price. Despite several demands, both oral and written, Gacott was never given a
replacement or a refund. The demands caused Gacott to incur expenses in the total amount of P40,936.44. Thus, Gacott filed a
complaint for damages. Summons was served upon QSC and Medestomas, afterwhich they filed their Answer, verified by
Medestomas himself and a certain Elton Ong (Ong). QSC and Medestomas did not present any evidence during the trial.

RTC ruled in favor of Atty. Gacott and issued a Writ of Execution. Gacott learned that QSC is a partnership and not a
corporation. He is also discovered that petitioner was appointed as General Manager of QSC. To execute the judgment,
Gacott instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of the motor vehicles of Guy.

Sheriff attached Guy’s vehicle by virtue of the Notice of Attachment upon Personalty. Thereafter, Guy filed his Motion to
Lift Attachment Upon Personalty, arguing that he was not a judgment debtor and, therefore, his vehicle could not be attached.
RTC denied his motion. Not satisfied, Guy moved for reconsideration and argued that he was neither impleaded as a
defendant nor validly served with summons and, thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Guy

RULING: NO. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam - the power of the court to render a personal
judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action - is an
element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.23
Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in court. As the initiating party, the
plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the action.24

Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is
replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive
summons for juridical entities.25cralawred

The records of this case reveal that QSC was never shown to have been served with the summons through any of the
enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely: president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is
invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. The CA was obviously mistaken when it opined
that it was immaterial whether the summons to QSC was served on the theory that it was a corporation.27

Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over the defendant, the same is merely
procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of summons may be cured by the
defendant's subsequent voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an
answer. In this case, it is not disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its
person was acquired through voluntary appearance.

SUNRICE GARDEN CORP. VS. CA

771 SCRA 616

FACTS: In 1998, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City passed City Ordinance No. 08-98 entitled "An Ordinance
Creating a Technical Committee to Conduct a Feasibility Study, Preliminary and Parcellary Survey for the Proposed
Construction of a City Road Connecting Four (4) Barangays in Antipolo City.

Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property was located in Barangay Cupang, which Sunrise Garden
Corporation planned to develop into a memorial park.

Sunrise Garden Corporation, through Cesar T. Guy, Chair of the Board of Directors, executed an Undertaking where
Sunrise Garden Corporation would construct the city road at its own expense, subject to reimbursement through tax
credits.

The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay
Mayamot, and Sunrise Garden Corporation.

Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor15 began to position its construction equipment.16 However, armed guards,17 allegedly
hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor from using an access road to move
the construction equipment.18

On January 24, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.

On March 19, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, subject to the posting of a bond
by Sunrise Garden Corporation. On March 22, 2002, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued.

While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed city road.

Sunrise Garden Corporation, thus, filed a Motion and Manifestation on May 16, 2002, 27 praying for the amendment of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction "to include any and all persons or group of persons from interfering, preventing or
obstructing all of petitioner's contractors, equipment personnel and representatives in proceeding with the construction of
the city road as authorized by Ordinance No. 08-98 of Antipolo City

Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.,blocked
Sunrise Garden Corporation's contractor's employees and prevented them from proceeding with the construction. On
November 15, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed an Ex-parte Motion to require K-9 Security Agency and First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. to comply with the May 22, 2002 Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion and issued an Order dated November 22, 2002
requiring K-9 Security Agency to comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Despite the issuance of the Order to comply, security guards dressed in civilian clothes still allegedly prevented the
workers from proceeding to the construction site on November 28, 2002.50

On November 29, 2002, Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Motion to cite Forefront Security Agency and First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. in contempt. 58 Sunrise Garden Corporation alleged that First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
was notified and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Sunrise Garden Corporation also alleged that First Alliance
Real Estate Development, Inc. adopted K-9 Security Agency's Opposition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over First Alliance Real Estate Development by virtue of its voluntary
appearance to the effect that it may be a subject of the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction

RULING: NO. While Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of
summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance."213

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et al., this court discussed that voluntary
appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction of a court.

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted
over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing
of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is
tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made,
i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.

The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed
as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this
case show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security
Agency and respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.

VI. RULE 15-19

ACAMPADO VS COSMILLA

771 SCRA 535

FACTS:

The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Document filed by respondents against
petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 6. In their Amended Complaint 6docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 6644,
respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) and is therefore null and void.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 31 March 2005 dismissing the complaint of the respondents for
failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the respondents in the SPA were forged.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 6 May 2005 seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC
Decision.

For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the requirement of notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration in Order11 dated 16 May
2005, viz:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion for Reconsideration is declared pro forma and the
decision sought to be reconsidered is declared final and executory as the period of appeal has already expired.

SO ORDERED."

Ascribing grave abuse of discretion, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus12 with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO seeking to annul and set aside the
RTC Order dated 16 May 2005.

For lack of merit, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by the respondents in a Decision dated 27 October 2006.13
The appellate court held that there is no showing that lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess in jurisdiction in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents. Resonating the disquisition of the lower
court, the Court of Appeals declared that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court is
nothing but a useless piece of paper and does not stall the running of the reglementary period.14

On Motion for Reconsideration by Respondents, 15 however, the Court of Appeals reversed its earlier Resolution and allowed
the relaxation of the procedural in a Resolution 16 dated 28 June 2007. Hence, the appellate court vacated the 16 May 2005
Order of the RTC directed the court a quo to thresh out the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents on the merits.

In a Resolution dated 19 August 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondents may be admitted despite lack of notice and
hearing

RULING:

The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to comply with the required notice and hearing and service
to the adverse party as mandated by the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:
 RULE 15. SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure
its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof.

The foregoing requirements — that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for
the hearing of the motion — are mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma.20 A
motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece
of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.

It bears stressing that a motion without notice and hearing, is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that cannot be acted by the
court.35 It presents no question that the court can decide.36 The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to
receive it.37 Indisputably, any motion that does not contain proof of service and notice to the adverse party is not entitled to
judicial cognizance.38

Considering that the running of the period towards the finality of the judgment was not stopped, the RTC Decision dated 31
March 2005 became final and executory. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable.39 For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment,
which is the life of the law.4

LAUDE VS. JUDGE GINEZ-JABALDE

G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015

Scott Pemberton. On October 15, 2014, a Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Olongapo Cit

On December 15, 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Pemberton before the Regional Trial
Court in Olongapo City. A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was issued on December 16, 2014. Pemberton surrendered
personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-Jabalde on December 19, 2014, and he was then arraigned.
On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The Motion was heard and denied by
Judge Ginez-Jabalde for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied.
Petitioners argue that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of
jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of
the Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on mere technicalities. In particular, they argue that the three-day rule on
motions under Rule 15, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Court is not absolute, and should be liberally interpreted when a case
is attended by exigent circumstances.

Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the three-day notice rule is satisfied when there is an opportunity to be heard,
which was present in this case since Pemberton's counsel and the Public Prosecutor were present in the hearing of the two
Motions filed by petitioners. Petitioners allege that the court noted their attendance, and were able to make comments during
the December 22, 2014 Motion hearing. They assert that the rights of Pemberton were not compromised.

Petitioners also aver that the three-day notice rule should be liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest and arraignment.
She also argue that even though the Visiting Forces Agreement gives the United States the "sole discretion" to decide whether
to surrender custody of an accused American military personnel to the Philippine authorities, "the rule is that . . . the Court
still has control over any proceeding involving a jurisdictional matter brought before it, even if it may well involve the
country's relations with another foreign power.

As for the nonconformity of the Public Prosecutor, petitioners argue that the Public Prosecutor's refusal to sign the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail rendered
the requirement for conformity superfluous. Petitioners allege that the Public Prosecutor's act is contrary to Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima's . They quote Secretary De Lima as having said the following statement in a news
article dated December 17, 2014:

The Philippines will now insist on the custody of Pemberton now that the case is filed in court and especially since the warrant
of arrest has been issued," De Lima told reporters in an ambush interview.

Petitioners also quoted Secretary De Lima as having stated in another news article dated December 18, 2014 the following:

Justice Secretary Leila De Lima stressed that Pemberton should be under the custody of Philippine authorities, following the
filing of charges.

"There is also a provision in the Visiting Forces Agreement that, in cases of extraordinary circumstances, the Philippine
government can insist on the custody and for me, there are enough such circumstances, such as cruelty and treachery,
that justified the filing of the murder and not homicide," De Lima said.

The contrary manifestations made by Secretary De Lima, according to petitioners, meant that "the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor is a mere superfluity" and was meant "to deny petitioners' 'quest for justice.

In his Comment dated June 16, 2015, Pemberton argues that Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail since petitioners violated the three-day notice rule and failed to secure the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor assigned to the case. He claims that he "was not given an opportunity to be heard" on petitioners' Motion.

Pemberton further argues that the custody over him "rightfully remain with the United States authorities " He
cites Section 6 of the Visiting Forces Agreement, which provides that the "custody of any United States personnel over whom
the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request,
from the commission of the offense, until completion of all judicial proceedings.
 Pemberton likewise argues that Marilou S. Laude, being only the private complainant, lacks the legal personality to file the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration "without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor." Quoting Rule 110, Section
5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pemberton states that the Public Prosecutor's lack of consent "rendered the
Urgent Motion a mere scrap of paper."

Pemberton also argues that Marilou S. Laude cannot rely on the alleged statements of Secretary De Lima for the following
reasons: First, Secretary De Lima did not direct the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor to give its approval to the
Urgent Motion and Motion for Reconsideration Second, Secretary De Lima did not state that the Public Prosecutor should
insist on turning over the custody of Pemberton to the Philippine authorities. Neither was there any such order from Secretary
De Lima. Petitioners' claims are, therefore, without legal basis.

As for the issue of custody under the Visiting Forces Agreement, Pemberton argues that there is a difference between
"jurisdiction" and "custody." He avers that jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to try, hear and decide a case."
Pemberton does not dispute that "Philippine authorities have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses
committed by [a] United States personnel which is why the case is being tried in a Philippine court." However, custody
"pertains to the actual physical control over the person of the accused and under the Visiting Forces Agreement, Pemberton
argues that custody shall reside with the United States Military authorities, since the Visiting Forces Agreement expressly
provides that "The custody of any United States personnel . . . shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities . . . from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the 3-day notice rule is justified?

2. Whether the petitioner has legal capacity to sue in criminal case at bar?

HELD:

Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days
an Shipping Corporation:

In

As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the
benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse
party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court.
Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be
heard,

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an
exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to
the other party nor violate his or her due process rights. 113 The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order
to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant.114 In this case, the general rule must apply
because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners' Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural
due process. Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing.

2. No. The conformity of the Public Prosecutor to the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail is not a mere "superfluity."In Jimenez v.
 Sorongon, this court held that in criminal cases, the People is the real party in interest, which means allowing a private
complainant to pursue a criminal action on his own is a rare exception

Procedural law basically mandates that "all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. " In appeals of criminal cases before
the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People.
.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in
several cases and continues to be the controlling
doctrine.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action
on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not
apply in the present case.

In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised
by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to
protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action
against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by
the OSG.al
In the case at bar, petitioners have not shown why the Motion may be allowed to fall under the exception. The alleged grave
abuse of discretion of the Public Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. The duty and authority to prosecute the
criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public Prosecutor. Her refusal to give her
conforme to the Motion is an act well within the bounds of her position.

That petitioners used as bases newspaper articles for claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted contrary to the position of
Secretary De Lima cannot be given weight. Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper remedy would have
been for petitioners to have the act reversed by Secretary De Lima through proper legal venues.

s DISMISSED for lack of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunctio

DE GUZMAN JR. VS. OCHOA

648 SCRA 677

Doctrine: An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor finally
disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such,
the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the
judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment

FACTS: Respondent spouses Cesar and Sylvia Ochoa , through respondent Araceli Azones, ostensibly acting as attorney-in-
fact, filed an action in the RTC seeking the annulment of contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and
damages. The petitioners as defendants in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground that the complaint
did not state a cause of action.

RTC’s RULING: RTC denied the petition and at the same time set the civil case for pre-trial, directing the parties to submit
their briefs.
Petitioner filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that the certification against forum shopping was not executed by the
parties themselves. Respondents opposed the second motion to dismiss, RTC agreed with respondents. Petitioners filed MR
but RTC denied.

Petitioner went to CA via a petition for certiorari.

CA’s RULING: CA denied for lack of merit, in its decision, it agreed with the RTC that following the omnibus motion rule,
the defects of the complaint pointed out by the petitioners were deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first
motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether the ‘omnibus motion rule’ will apply.

HELD: Yes. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor finally
disposes of it as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. An order
denying such may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. Only in
exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the court allows the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the
complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion must raise and include all objections
available at the time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, “all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. SISON

612 SCRA 702 (2010)

TOPIC: Intervention; Requisites: Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court.

DOCTRINE: To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding.
The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

FACTS: The Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar,
filed a letter-complaint accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the Province of Samar,
including respondent Maximo D. Sison, before the Office of the Ombudsman relative to the alleged highly anomalous
transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. The alleged calamity funds were expended without
a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement
were substantially overpriced. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.

The Office of the Ombudsman found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial
officials of Samar. In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations and asserted that his function is limited
to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been
obligated, and that funds are available. He averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the
minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding and that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in the letter-
complaint bore his signature.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local officials of the Province of
Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him
from service. Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43.
 CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision
rendered by the CA?

HELD: No. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion
in permitting or disallowing the intervention,8 thus:

“SECTION 1. Who may intervene.—A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

SECTION 2. Time to intervene.—The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the
subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one
action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.

To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest,
which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

ANONUEVO VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF JALANDONI

636 SCRA

TOPIC: Intervention
FACTS: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate. His brother Bernardino filed petition for issuance of letters of administration with
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to commence the judicial settlement of the estate. May Anonuevo and their
siblings introduced themselves as children of Sylvia Desantis, who is the daughter of Isabel Blee, who at the time of
Rodolfo’s death is the legal spouse of the letter. Thus, isable is entitled to a share in estate of Rodolfo.
Petitioners pray that they be allowed to intervene on behalf in the intestate proceedings because Sylvia and Isabel
have already passed away. Respondents opposed because the evidences showed by the Petitioners revealed that Isabel has a
subsisting marriage with John Desantis at time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo. Thus, marriage with Rodolfo was
void ab initio.
 The intestate court issued an order allowing petitioners to take part in settlement proceedings. CA sided with the
respondents with regard to the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred when it nullified the orders of intestate court allowing Petitioners to intervene in settlement
proceedings
RULING: NO
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of
sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise
stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.
Petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of
Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.
The birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage was
dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the
petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified.

FERNANDEZ VS. CA
691 SCRA 167
TOPIC: Intervention
FACTS: Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and Antonio Henson were elected to the board of directors of NADECOR. In
a regular stockholder’s meeting where two groups were vying for control over the company, Calalang, De Jesus, Romulo,
Ayala, Lazatin, Fernandez, Nitorreda, Engle were Elected. Gatmaitan was also elected as Corporate Secretary. Thereafter,
Ricafort/s, claiming to be stockholders of record, sought to annul the said meeting held. They filed a complaint before the
RTC of PASIG. Ricafort/s alleged that they were not given due notice of the said meeting thus they were not present and
were not able to exercise their right. RTC agreed with the Ricaforts. Four separate Petition for Certiorari were filed by the
members of the board with the CA, all with application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. The CA denied such
applications, but on the same day nevertheless, the 11th division issued a TRO. During the effectivity of the TRO, the old
Board of Directors assumed the functions of the new one in order to prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the corporation.
All the CA petitions were consolidated as well as the other cases. On February 17, 2012, the respondents Ricafort filed their
Comment Ad Cautelam to the petition in CA-G.R. No. 122784. The petitioners therein thereafter filed three
(3) urgent motions to resolve their application for writ of preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May 22, and again on June 6,
2012. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted by the CA 14th Division, which not for long was questioned.
Complainants filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to annul the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CA’s Special 14th Division. Complainants also filed an Administrative case against the Justices of
the 14th Division of the CA. Alleged in this administrative complaint that the respondent Justices are guilty of grave
misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and manifest partiality.

ISSUE: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA 14th
Division.

HELD: NO. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action.—Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary
writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. Moreover, a
person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to
bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious writ. Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for
certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is
filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.
In this Court’s Resolution dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. Nos. 202218-21, entitled “Jose G. Ricafort, et al. v. Court of Appeals
[Special 14th Division], et al.,” involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by JG Ricafort, De Jesus, Paolo A.
Villar, and Ma. NalenRosero-Galang, also questioning the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Special
14th Division of the CA, we ruled that persons who are not parties to any of the consolidated petitions have no personality to
assail the said injunctive writ.
In another Resolution, also promulgated on July 18, 2012, in G.R. Nos. 202257-60, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by herein complainants to assail the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in the aforesaid consolidated CA
petitions, we likewise dismissed the petition due to lack of personality of the petitioners, since they were non-parties and
strangers to the consolidated CA petitions. We pointed out that they should first have intervened below, and then filed a
motion for reconsideration from the questioned CA order. On September 19, 2012, we denied their motion for reconsideration
from the dismissal of their petition.
Having established that the herein complainants have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
CA’s former Special 14th Division, we cannot now permit them to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For
even granting that the issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held
administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that “a Judge cannot be
held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision render
RODRIGUEZ VS. CA
698 SCRA 352

TOPIC: Motion to Intervene;

FACTS: On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho filed before the CFI of Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of
land, measuring 125 hectares, located in San Mateo, Rizal. On November 16, 1965, the CFI rendered a Decision evaluating
the evidence presented by the parties as follows:

It has been established that the parcel of land under consideration was formerly several smaller parcels owned and possessed
by the several people, all of whom in January 1960, executed instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of
land in favor of [Landicho], x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x
which superseded the conditional sale. The applicant is entitled to the benefits provided by Section 48, of C.A. No. 141, as
amended.

The CFI confirmed the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho to the parcel of land under consideration and orders the
registration thereof in her name and personal circumstances aforementioned. The opposition of the Director of Lands was
dismissed. Upon finality, a TCT was issued instead of an OCT. After several sales, respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable
Association, Inc. (PCCAI), under TCT No. 482970, became owner on July 15, 1975.

MEANWHILE, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI) instituted Civil Case No. 12044 entitled A. Doronila Resources
Dev., Inc. v. CA, which was still pending before the RTC of Pasig City as of 2008. ADRDI asserted
ownership over the subject property. While still pending in court, ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to
Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued on March 25, 1983

On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of herein
petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.

On May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion alleging therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and
Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landicho’s title over the subject
property has not been executed alleging that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in Landicho’s name. As Landicho’s
successor-in-interest to the subject property, Rodriguez prayed that the Register of Deeds for Marikina City issue OCT in his
name.

Concerning the aforementioned Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but alleged that
said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear
at the hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 and to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. SM-02-0229; and
to testify in connection therewith.

On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-
5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal
interest therein as the registered owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI likewise pointed out that
Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No. 482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that
Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there being
no direct action or final court decree for its cancellation. Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion constituted a collateral attack on the
title of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its
intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests over the subject property; to note
and admit its Answer-in- Intervention; and to deny Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion for utter lack of merit.

The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in an Order dated April 10, 2007.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by PCCAI is proper even though it was filed after rendition of judgment
by the trial court. YES

HELD: Intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which read: SECTION 1. Who may
intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not
the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. A copy of the pleading- nintervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in several
cases, viz:

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not
been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of
the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has
already become final and executory. In Lim v.
Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances.

We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully
and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice.

The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on intervention. First, the
interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and executory. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez
trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of Landicho who prayed for the execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to
intervene in the case only to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property is already registered
in its name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landicho’s TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning of
Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI
was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to
PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguez’s name.
For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 26, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION deleting the
second sentence of the dispositive portion for being a superfluity.

PEOPLE V. PEREZ
Feb. 5, 2003 / 397 SCRA

TOPIC: PRE-TRIAL

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape. At pretrial, the prosecution and defense stipulated some FACTS
including the age of the victim and her birth certificate was presented as evidence. He was later convicted and was
punished to death by the RTC. In his reply brief, appellant maintains that the death penalty cannot be properly
imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove victim’s age by independent evidence. Appellant points out that while
the birth certificate was duly marked during pre-trial, it was not presented during the trial. Appellant assert that minority must
not specifically alleged in the information but must also be established beyond reasonable doubt during the trial.

ISSUE:
Whether the minority must still be established in the trial?

HELD:
NO. At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal case. Appellant, assisted by
counsel signed a pre-trial agreement stating that the victim is Maria, born May 23 as evidenced by her birth certificate. During
the pretrial, the prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate, it was submitted in its offer of evidence and RTC
admitted without objection from defense. The purpose of the pre-trial is to consider the following: a) plea
bargaining; b) stipulation of FACTS; c) marking for identification of evidence; d)waiver of objection to
admissibility of evidence; e) modification of order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interpose
lawful defense; f) such matter as will promote a fair and expedite the trial. FACTS
stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial binds the parties. After the pre- trial conference, the trial court will issue
and order reciting the action taken, FACTS stipulated and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of and control the course of trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

CHING VS. CHENG

G.R. No. 175507; October 8, 2014

DOCTRINE: Rule 17 of the RC governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the "two- dismissal rule"
under Rule 17, Section 1 will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.

FACTS: It Antonio Ching owned several businesses including Po Wing Properties. While he was unmarried, he had children
from two women: Ramon Ching with Lucina Santos; and Joseph and Jaime Cheng with Mercedes Igne. When Antonio was
weak, he entrusted to Lucina the distribution of his estate to his heirs if something were to happen to him. Lucina, then
handed, all the property titles and business documents to Ramon Ching for safekeeping. Fortunately, Antonio Ching
recovered from illness and allegedly demanded that Ramon return all the documents. In 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon
Ching alleged that he was summoned to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate declaring him to be Antonio’s sole heir.
After a year of investigation, the police found Ramon to be its primary suspect. Thus, Chengs filed a complaint filed a
complaint (first case) for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the RTC of Manila. The complaint was
amended, with leave of court, to implead additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon was a
primary stockholder. Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter,
which was granted by the RTC. In 2002, Chengs and Lucina filed a complaint (second case) for "Annulment of Agreement,
Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents against
Ramon and Po Wing Properties.However, Chengs and Lucina filed a motion to dismiss their complaint in the second case,
praying that it be dismissed without prejudice, which was also granted. Thus, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order and argued that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the "two
dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the previous dismissal of the first case.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case, as per the "two-
dismissal rule?”

HELD: The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case before any
responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court.
The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court; the second section of the rule contemplates a
situation where a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court;
the third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is
dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless
otherwise declared by the court. As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when
it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal, accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as adjudication upon the
merits.

YAO VS. PERELLO

G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003

REQUISITES TO FILE A MOTION FOR INTERVENTION

FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner before the HLURB against a certain
corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and PablitoVillarin, private respondent’s husband.

The HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders
to refund petitioner and to pay damages. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders and its
managers, and referred the writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for enforcement.

Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses PablitoVillarin and
private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The property was scheduled for public auction.

Private respondent filed before the RTC, a petition for prohibition with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin Sheriff Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public auction. On even date, public respondent Judge issued a
72-hour temporary restraining order and set the case for raffle and conference on March 22, 2002.

The case was eventually raffled to RTC, presided by public respondent judge. Public respondent judge issued resolution
granting private respondent’s petition for prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize.

On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the resolution of March 22, 2002, petitioner
filed a motion for intervention. However, public respondent judge denied the motion in her assailed order of May 10, 2002.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s motion for intervention should be granted

HELD: NO. Accordingly, private respondent acted well within her rights in filing a petition for prohibition against the
deputy sheriff because the latter went beyond his authority in attaching the subject property. This right is specifically reserved
by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the act or
acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus, as the judgment creditor in the
HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was an indispensable party in the petition for prohibition and should have been
allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not allowed to do so.

Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
FACTS with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings
in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non- forum shopping as provided in
the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (2a)

Consequently, petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision requires the
inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be
shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise
qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be
delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both
requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioner’s right as a judgment creditor was adversely affected by the lifting of the
levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants
in the HLURB case that can be levied upon.

Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he must exercise said right
in accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor.

As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court
resolution granting private respondent’s petition for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued
on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory.

Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution is sufficient cause
for the outright dismissal of the instant petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any.

Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. The Court fails to find grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent judge in
rendering the assailed resolution and order.

ALBERTO G. PINLAC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91486 JANUARY 19, 2001

SUMMONS; INTERVENTION; CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT

FACTS: The instant case springs from a contentious and protracted dispute over a sizeable piece of real property situated in
what is now known as Old Balara, Sitio Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon City. Petitioners herein are
World War II veterans, their dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of
Title before the RTC. In particular, petitioners claimed that the real property, which has an aggregate area of 502 hectares,
were part of forest lands belonging to the government; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said
property continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than thirty (30) years; and that they have accordingly filed
applications for land titling in their respective names with the appropriate government agency.

One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The individual
lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were not specifically named. Since personal service of summons could not be
effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to serve summons by
publication which was granted. Accordingly, the summons was published in the "Metropolitan Newsweek", a periodical
edited and published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.

Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings, while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to
answer, and were thus declared in default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
defaulted respondents. The trial court rendered a partial judgment in favor of the petitioners.
Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after the above-quoted judgement by default was rendered, a Petition for
Annulment of Judgement with Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus4 was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled
owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgement which nullified all their titles, arguing that
the court a quo had no jurisdiction over them and their respective titled properties. They also alleged that they only came to
know of the adverse judgement when petitioners sought the execution of the judgement by attempting to dispossess some of
the titled owners of the lots and making formal demands for them to vacate their respective properties. Also, they claimed that
the Partial Decision against the defaulted respondents was null and void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud.The trial court granted the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, granted the petition for annulment of judgment.

On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered
declaring:

“1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court had already rendered;

2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original area of 52,949,737 square meters;

3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;

4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are null and void; and

5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of the
hearings/proceedings having been sent to the Republic and other interested parties.

The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.”

ISSUES:

a. Whether the CA was correct in granting the petition for annulment of judgment?

b. Whether publication of the summons made in the Metropolitan Newsweek was defective, hence the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents.

c. Whether or not the intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is proper in this case.

HELD: a. Yes.

The case before the Court of Appeals was one for annulment of judgement, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. In resolving
the same, the Court of Appeals need not retry the FACTS. An action for annulment of judgement is grounded only on two
justifications: (I) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. All that herein private respondents had
to prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction; that they were prevented from having a trial or presenting their case to
the trial court by some act or conduct of petitioners; or that they had been denied due process of law. Thus, the Court of
Appeals need only to resolve the issues of lack of jurisdiction, existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due process of law.

The action for annulment of judgement cannot and was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The very purpose of the
action for annulment of judgement was to have the final and executory judgement set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation. Whether or not the assailed Partial Decision based solely on FACTS and evidence
presented by the petitioners is meritorious is irrelevant and immaterial. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err, nor did it
violate the petitioners' right to due process of law, when it refused to consider all the factual issues raised by petitioners.

b. No.

While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not cure the
fatal defect that the "Metropolitan Newsweek" is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City
.The Rules strictly require that publication must be "in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time
as the court may order." The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the
summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict
requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective publication of the summons
rendered the service by publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules
regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. It cannot be over emphasized that the
statutory requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by publication, must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is considered
ineffective.

Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the rules, the service of summons would still be
ineffective insofar as private respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of title was filed on
November 2, 1983, VilmaMaloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. VilmaMaloles Subdivision, a
partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC
dated January 26,1976. Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical personality.

c. Yes.

The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition
of judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed
judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.

In Mago v. Court of Appeals, intervention was granted even after the decision became final and executory, thus—

The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of
discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. But needless to say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only
after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case.

Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government properties located and
projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an indispensable party to the case at bar. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against arbitrary
action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its properties.

CHIPONGIAN vs BENITEZ-LIRIO
768 SCRA 204 (August 2, 2015)
TOPICS: Intervention, Section 1 of Rule 41 on record on appeal

FACTS: The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, the petitioner’s sister. Isabel had predeceased Vicente.
The couple had no offspring. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and petitioner executed an extrajudicial settlement respecting
the estate of Isabel, whereby the latte waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to
petitioner, however, Vicente executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the
paraphernal properties of Isabel.

Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a nephew of
Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente in the RTC. In its order dated May 13, 1994, the RTC
appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicente’s estate. On May 20, 1994, it issued the letters of administration to Feodor.

The petitioner intervened in the Special Proceedings. He sought the partial revocation of the May 13, 1994 order in order to
exclude the parapherna properties of Isabel from inclusion in the estate of Vicente. He cited the affidavit of Vicente in
support of the partial revocation.

Feodor countered that he be allowed to continue to administer all the properties left by Vicente, including paraphernal
properties of Isabel.

Petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion of the paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicente’s estate. However, he
withdrew the motion even before the RTC could rule on it. Instead, he filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Complaint-in-Intervention. This was opposed by respondents Victoria and Feodor.

The RTC granted the Motion, and admitted the complaint-in-intervention of the petitioner.

The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint-in-intervention, holding that petitioner was negligent in asserting his
right within a reasonable time which warrants the presumption that he had either abandoned it or declined to assert it but also
cast doubt on the validity of his claim. It took note of the fact that purported affidavit was executed simultaneously with the
deed of extrajudicial settlement which was published but the affidavit was not and why it was only after 12 long years that he
brought it out. The RTC went on to cited Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules which provides a limitation of 2 years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with either Sec. 1 or Sec. 2 of the Rule, within which an heir or other
person deprived of his lawful participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the said estate in the Courts for the
purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the judgment but was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was
denied due course for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. He filed a MR vis-à-vis the order denying due course
his notice of appeal.

The RTC issued its order whereby it conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but still denied the
motion on the ground that he had not perfected his appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees.

Petitioner brought his Motion to Set Aside the order denying his MR of the order denying due course his notice of appeal for
failure to pay the appellate court docket fees which was again denied.

Petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari in the CA which affirmed the order of the RTC. The petition was dismissed.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUES: Whether the present petition for review should be denied for failure of petitioner to file a record on appeal,
as mandated under Sec. 2 (a) Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
(In reply to respondents’ comments, the petitioner submits that the intervention was not an independent proceeding but only
ancillary or supplemental to the main case, the rule on multiple appeals does not apply and the filing of a record on appeal is
not a pre-requisite to the acceptance and consideration of the appeal by the appellate court.)

RULING: Yes. Intervention is “a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a
litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.
If an intervention makes a third party litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in- intervention should form part of the
main case.

Accordingly, when petitioner intervened in the Special Proceeding, his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC,
became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof subject to the rules specifically applicable to special
proceedings, including Rule 109 of the Rules, which deals with appeals in special proceedings.

Section 1 Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an appeal “may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.” In
the context of the final judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and judgments in special
proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the remedy of appeal to other orders
or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in the case.

The dismissal of petitioner’s intervention constituted a “final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing,” that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Sec. 1
of Rule 109, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as well as under paragraph
(e) of Section 1 because it was a final determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably with either or both
paragraphs, the dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely disposing
of his intervention.

The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal.
This is pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a
judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to perfect
an appeal because he will be filing not a only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval
of the trial court with notice to the adverse party..

Considering that petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his
appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final and immutable. He now has no one
to blame but himself. The right to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the
exercise of the right. As such, his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and
his failure to perfect appeal within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and beyond review on appeal.

NAVY OFFICERS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION VS. REPUBLIC

764 SCRA

TOPIC: Intervention

FACTS: TCT No. T-15387, issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009 square-meter parcel of land situated inside the
former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in Taguig, Metro Manila. The property previously formed part of
a larger parcel of land situated at the former Fort William McKinley, Rizal, which was covered by TCT No. 61524 issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. On July 12, 1957, then
President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 "reserving for military purposes certain parcels of the public domain
situated in the municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, province of Rizal, and Pasay City," which included the 15,812,684
square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 61524.On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued
Proclamation No. 461 which excluded from Fort McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein, situated in the
municipalities of Taguig and Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City," with an area of 2,455,310 square meters, and
declared the excluded area as "AFP Officers' Village" to be disposed of under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 274 and
730. A month after, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 478"reserving for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare and
training center site purposes" an area of 537,520 square meters of the land previously declared as AFP Officers' Village
under Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area under the administration of the Veterans Federation of the
Philippines (VFP).On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale between the Republic of the
Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and petitioner
NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI's name. The
Republic sought to cancel NOVAFs title based on the following grounds: (a) the land covered by NOVAFs title is part of a
military reservation; (b) the deed of sale conveying the property to NOVAI, which became the basis for the issuance of TCT
No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the LMB has no records of any application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and
of the NOVAFs alleged payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation
No. 2487, claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer and titling of
the property to NOVAI, is fictitious. NOVAI’s answer to the Republic is that the property was no longer part of the public
dominion, as the land had long been segregated from the military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No. 461, and that it
had actually filed a letter-application for a sales patent over the property with the LMB which prepared, verified and approved
the property's plan and technical description; and that the LMB delivered to it a copy of the deed of sale, signed and executed
by Dir. Palad, after it had paid a portion of the P14,250,270.00 purchase price, corresponding taxes, and other charges,
with the balance to be paid in installments. Also, NOVAI contended that, since any alleged irregularities that may have
attended the sale pertained only to formalities, the proper remedy for the Republic was to file an action for reformation of
instrument, not for cancellation of title. In any event, it added that the Republic's cause of action had prescribed because its
title to the property had already become indefeasible.

BCDA's Comment-in-Intervention

On December 28, 2007, and while the case was pending before this Court, the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA) filed a motion for leave to file comment-in-intervention and to admit the attached comment-in- intervention. The
BCDA contends that NOVAI is disqualified from acquiring the property given the constitutional and statutory provisions that
prohibit the acquisition of lands of the public domain by a corporation or association; that any sale of land in violation of the
Constitution or of the provisions of R.A. Nos. 274 and 730, and the Public Land Act are null and void; and that any title
which may have been issued by mistake or error on the part of a public official can be cancelled at any time by the State.

The BCDA further contends that NOVAI miserably failed to comply with the legal requirements for the release of the
property from the military reservation. More specifically, (1) the Director of Lands did not cause the property's subdivision,
including the determination of the number of prospective applicants and the area of each subdivision lot which should not
exceed one thousand (1,000) square meters for residential purposes; (2) the purchase price for the property was not fixed by
the Director of Lands as approved by the DENR Secretary; (3) NOVAI did not pay the purchase price or a portion of it to the
LMB; and (4) the Deed of Sale was not signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines or by the Executive
Secretary, but was signed only by the LMB Director.

ISSUE: Whether or not the comment-in-intervention should be properly accorded with.

 RULING: In its reply to the BCDA's comment-in-intervention, NOVAI primarily objects to the BCDA's intervention because
it was made too late. Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make
himself a party, either joining the plaintiff or defendant, or demanding something adverse to both of them. Its purpose is to
enable such third party to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by the proceeding, such interest being
actual, material, direct and immediate, not simply contingent and expectant.

As a general rule, intervention cannot be made at the appeal stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, governing
interventions, provides that "the motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court."
This rule notwithstanding, intervention may be allowed after judgment where it is necessary to protect some interest which
cannot otherwise be protected, and may be allowed for the purpose of preserving the intervenor's right to appeal. "The rule
on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available
for justice x x x and aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness
of the filing thereof." Thus, in exceptional cases, the Court may allow intervention although the trial court has already
rendered judgment. In fact, the Court had allowed intervention in one case even when the petition for review was already
submitted for decision before it. In the present case, the BCDA is indisputably the agency specifically created under R.A. No.
722732 to own, hold and/or administer military reservations including, among others, those located inside the FBMR. If we
are to affirm the CA's decision, the BCDA stands to benefit as a favorable ruling will enable it to pursue its mandate under
R.A. No. 7227. On the other hand, if we reverse the CA's decision, it stands to suffer as the contrary ruling will greatly affect
the BCDA's performance of its legal mandate as it will lose the property without the opportunity to defend its right in court.
Indeed, the BCDA has such substantial and material interest both in the outcome of the case and in the disputed property that
a final adjudication cannot be made in its absence without affecting such interest. Clearly, the BCDA's intervention is
necessary; hence, we allow the BCDA's intervention although made beyond the period prescribed under Section 2, Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court.

VI. RULES 23-32

ST 24, 1993

itness, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the deposition which was in comp

foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.

RULING: Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of
FACTS resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.
Depositions are principally made by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant FACTS; they are
not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. Leave of court is not
necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul gen. etc., and the defendants
answer has already been served.
Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule
that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of deposition after
pre-trial… the law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of RTC “to
perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court… or during the process of execution of a final and
executor judgment.”

GO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012

TOPIC: Depositions

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with Other Deceits under Art 318 of RPC before MTC Manila. They pleaded not guilty,
trial dates were postponed due to the unavailability of private complainant Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos,
Cambodia.

The Prosecution filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection
at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the
Philippines by reason of ill health.

Petitioners opposed. MTC granted said Motion; denied ensuing MR. Petitioners, filed a Rule 65 before RTC Manila

RTC granted the petition; declared the MTC Order null and void; denied ensuing Motion for Reconsideration

Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is
a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases,
which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.

Prosecution, elevated to CA. CA reversed RTC

no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the
complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal
cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make
timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.

ISSUE: Is allowing the deposition of private complainant tantamount to a violation of petitioners’ rights to public trial and to
confront the witnesses face to face? YES.

HELD: The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial
evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial
indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would

effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.13 This is true especially in criminal cases
where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face.
The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating FACTS" as it enables the judge to test the
witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.14 It is not
without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of witnesses – both for
the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v.
Risos15 explicitly states that –

o "x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that
may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of
both the defense and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time
or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other
party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably
be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the
case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case
is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal
of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the case is
pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the
Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section
15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing,
rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.18 (Underscoring supplied)

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is
pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in
Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further declared that –

While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case,
we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights.
The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the
trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.

It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as
special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable
also under the circumstances.

However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution
witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise."

The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and
Confrontation of Witnesses

The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no less
than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section
14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:

VDA. DE MANGUERRA VS. RISOS

563 SCRA 499

TOPIC: The examination of prosecution witnesses regardless of being frail and old is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 and
not Rule 23.

FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA Decision setting aside the
RTC Orders granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerras motion to take deposition, and Resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration of respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.

Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the RTC as Criminal Case that
arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it
appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to
the document.

Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions
testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.

The motion was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. At the
outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondent’s petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines,
an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its
merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court,
only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should have
been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus,
in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.

The CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional
right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be
applied suppletorily because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 23 of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of the petitioner.

HELD: In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too
sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. - When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination,
in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him,
shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.

The procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination be made
before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules
mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made
elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures
that the judge would be able to observe the witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is
especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.

ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, CO. VS. CA

299 SCRA 680

TOPIC: Admission of FACTS

FACTS: A complaint was filed by respondent Cherry Valley for collection of sum of money against the
petitioner Allied Agri-Business for its failure to pay for the value of orders made and received by the latter. Cherry Valley
served a Request for Admission of FACTS to Agri-Business. The latter failed to submit a sworn answer to the request for
admission within the allowed period. Thus, summary judgment ensued. Agri-Business alleged that Cherry Valley had the
burden to prove through its own witness during the trial the matters for which admissions were requested, and subsequently
questioned the summary judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s failure to answer the Request for Admission shall mean admission of the mailers stated
in the request which can be the basis for summary judgment?
HELD: The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of FACTS and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial
and to relieve parties of the costs of proving FACTS which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the
admission rather than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when Agri- Business failed to reply to a request to admit,
it may not argue that the adverse, party has the burden of proving the FACTS sought to be admitted. Agri-Business’ silence
is an admission of the FACTS stated in the request. This now becomes the basis of a summary judgment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs WEBB

312 SCRA 573

TOPIC: Oral depositions

FACTS: Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide, filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition, to
take the testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before the proper Philippine consular authorities since the
Philippine court had no jurisdiction over them and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify. Respondent
further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly
‘material and indispensable’ to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that Rule 24, Section 4 of
the Rules of Court has no application in criminal cases. The trial court denied the motion but was thereafter reversed by the
COA on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed reversible error in reversing the trial court’s ruling.

RULING: YES. It need not be overemphasized that the factual circumstances only serves to underscore the immutable fact
that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in
nature and in denying respondent’s motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to
be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the
persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at
least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty- four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as
those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain the proposition
that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in
the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.

SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA vs METROBANK

715 SCRA 399

TOPIC: Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition
pending appeal." The provision seeks to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain
order and facilitate the conduct of trial.

FACTS: Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure,
auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
(Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the RTC of Malolos City. With the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners
filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and
testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the
August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan
with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200- square meter land in
Meycauayan, Bulacan.

Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being a
litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma;
that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may
not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be produced in court;
and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.

On October 19, 2006, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the defective notice was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s
Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice. They further argued that Metrobank’s officers – who are the subject of
the subpoena – are not party-defendants, and thus do not comprise the adverse party; they are individuals separate and distinct
from Metrobank.
In an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank insisted that since a corporation may act only through its
officers and employees, they are to be considered as adverse parties in a case against the corporation itself.
The RTC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration prompting them to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
asserting this time that their Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a litigated motion; it
does not seek relief, but aims for the issuance of a mere process. They added that Rule 21 of the Rules requires prior notice
and hearing only with respect to the taking of depositions. Finally, petitioners claimed that the Rules – particularly Section
10,22 Rule 132 – do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.

The CA affirmed the assailed decision.

ISSUE/S: WON an adverse party can be required to take the witness stand (Sec. 6 of Rule 25) without complying with the
notice and hearing requirement under Sec. 4 and 5 of Rule 15

RULING: NO. On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing
was thus cured by the filing of the Opposition.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and
facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit FACTS useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness
stand as its witness.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to
present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is tantamount to
building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of
proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence,
then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.

DISINI VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

623 SCRA

DOCTRINE: It has been a settled rule that by seeking affirmative relief, voluntary appearance or submission to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan constitute waiver on the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant
files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the case.

FACTS: On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement under which
Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they
needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in
the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio, as an executive in
the latter's companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies. In the Immunity
Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any
other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but
18 years later, upon the Republic's application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to
testify and produce documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini moved to quash
the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena
directing him to testify before it. Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it
prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion
to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the PCGGs power
to grant immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did
not cover immunity from providing evidence in court. The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying against
Herminio contravened the states policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President Marcos.
The Republic further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads: Nothing
herein shall affect Jesus
P. Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony, Disini, despite the immunity given him against
being compelled to testify in other cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony in such other cases. For his part,
Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from revoking the questioned immunity as it had made
him believe that it had the authority to provide such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials
or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement, hence having jurisdiction over the person of Disini.

HELD: No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should
be fair.

The Court should not allow respondent Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross petitioner Disini. The Immunity Agreement
was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to get the best concessions out of it. The
Republic did not have to enter that agreement. It was free not to. But when it did, it needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as
Disini did. More than any one, the government should be fair.
PCGGs revocation of the questioned immunity and Sandiganbayan's denial of Disini's motion to quash the subpoena were
both annulled. The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of the
criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the
situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill- gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this
case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and
fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due
process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except
by their mutual consent. This applies with more reason in this case where Disini already complied with the terms of the
Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Immunity Agreement at a late stage would run afoul of the rule
that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The Court should not allow the
Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The Immunity Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of
negotiations with each party trying to get the best concessions out of it.

The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it was free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its obligations
honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair.

PEOPLE VS. BUSTAMANTE

697 SCRA 411

TOPIC: Testimony; Rape Case; Positive and credible testimonies of complainants

FACTS: AAA testified that she lived with his father, the appellant in this case, mother and younger siblings, 3 brothers and a
sister, in Alcala, Cagayan. At about lunch time or thereafter she was alone in the second floor in their house when the
appellant arrived. Her younger brother Jayjun was playing outside while her mother went to clean their ginger garden. The
appellant laid her down on the floor and removed her shorts and panty. He then removed his pants, went on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. [Appellant] removed his penis after he ejaculated and told her not to report what had
happened. Appellant forced her and she was not able to resist because she was still young during that time. She reported the
incident to her mother and the police.

On re-direct examination, AAA testified that she filed the case against the appellant so that the latter would no longer box
and maltreat her and because he raped her.

On re-cross, it was revealed that appellant was neither armed during the incident nor covered her mouth when he laid her
down. She did not shout because she was afraid. Appellant threatened her before he raped her.

Appellant testified that in the early morning on February 7, 1997, he went to Tuguegarao with his daughter, AAA. He went to
Mrs. Lolit Casauay, his employer, and Sgt. Poli to tell them his problem regarding AAA and her cousin having sex. Sgt. Poli
advised appellant to go to Alcala Police to have his problem entered in the blotter and to go back to him after. They stayed in
Tuguegarao the whole day and went back to Alcala, Cagayan about 7:00 o’clock in the evening. When they were approaching
their house, Purita Torrado called for AAA and told appellant that he was a traitor. Purita Torrado and brothers, Rogelio and
Amador Torrado, then entered his house, mauled him and tied his hands. Thereafter, policemen arrived and brought him to the
Municipal Hall of Alcala, Cagayan without informing him why.

His daughter AAA charged him of the heinous crime of rape because his wife and brothers-in-law harbored ill feelings against
him, blaming him to have spread the rumor that Rogelio Torrado was the father of the child of his own sister Purita Torrado.
Before February 17, 1997, his daughter AAA admitted to him that she had sexual relations with her cousin Randy Torrado for
which reason he went to Tuguegarao to help AAA file a complaint against said Randy Torrado. It was after they came from
Tuguegarao that his daughter AAA charged him with rape.
 On cross-examination, appellant testified that he did not report any barangay official that Randy Torrado sexually
molested his daughter, but went to a person Ernie Fiesta who was not a barangay official. He admittedly told his problem to
Sgt. Poli who asked AAA questions but the same was not entered in the blotter of the Cagayan Police Provincial Office.

On re-direct, appellant further testified that it was his daughter AAA who told him that Randy Torrado molested her so he
brought her to Tuguegarao the following day, February 17, 1997. He was not able to enter it in the blotter of Alcala
police as directed by Sgt. Poli because when they arrived in Maraburab, Alcala from Tuguegarao, his brothers-in-law mauled
him. He did not file any charges against his brothers-in-law.

Police Inspector Carlos T. Poli testified as follows: He was then the Assistant Chief Investigator at the Cagayan Police
Provincial Headquarters on February 17, 1997. Appellant, with his daughter AAA went to him. Appellant told him that his
daughter was molested by a nephew of his wife but he could not recall the name. He advised appellant to have the incident
reported to, and entered in the blotter of, the Alcala Police Station where the incident took place and to return for
investigation. He talked to AAA who admitted that there was truth to the report that she was molested and that there was a
second occasion. He did not enter the report in the blotter because they did not have a blotter so he advised appellant to
have the case entered in the blotter of Alcala Police. The report was not recorded because appellant only sought his advice
and that he would first talk to his wife as the suspect was her relative.

Admittedly, he invited the wife of appellant to his office upon the request of her in-laws who pitied and considered the
appellant as their son. He asked the wife if she could help but the latter could not do it because her brother and sister were
interested to pursue the case. The last witness for the defense was Lolita Casauay who testified, thus: she knew appellant who
was the mechanic of her brother. On February 13, 1997, he met the appellant who asked her advice regarding his daughter
who was sexually molested. She told the [appellant] to go to the police to enter the incident in the blotter. The appellant went
to Sgt. Poli for this purpose. On February 17, 1997, the appellant and AAA went to her house in Caggay, Tuguegarao. AAA
voluntarily related to her that she was molested by her cousin Randy Torrado.

In March 1997, she learned of the charge of rape against the appellant. When she saw the appellant in jail, she went to
Maraburab, Alcala, Cagayan, and called for the wife and daughter of the appellant. She asked the wife why the appellant
was incarcerated and the former felt guilty of what happened to the latter.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim is sufficient to convict the accused;
2. Whether or not the denial of the accused is meritorious so as to interpose the defense that his daughter is inclined with ill-
motive in accusing him of rape.

HELD: It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim,
are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.

Despite the absence of any evident force and intimidation, the same is still appreciated in the case at bar because it is
doctrinally settled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and
intimidation since, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse
of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.

In his defense, appellant interposes denial while also ascribing ill motive on the part of the victim, his own biological
daughter, for accusing him of rape. However, it is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial cannot prevail over the positive, candid and
categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of
the complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence. Likewise, the testimonies of
the witnesses presented by appellant failed to buttress his defense of denial as they merely related to tangential matters which
do not seriously affect the issue of AAA’s credibility.

With regard to the allegation that the accusation of rape was motivated by ill will and revenge, this Court is not surprised at
this rather common excuse being raised by offenders in rape cases. We have consistently held that such alleged motives
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of complainants who remained steadfast throughout the trial.
Jurisprudence tells us that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as
her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own
father.

METROBANK VS. SANDOVAL

691 SCRA 92

TOPIC: CONSOLIDATION; SEVERANCE; SEPARATE/JOINT TRIAL

FACTS: On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants.
The action was obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among
the properties subject of the action were 2 parcels of commercial land located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City,
registered in the names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina
L. Genito. Republic later on amended its complaint to implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant since the latter claimed
ownership of the 2 parcels of land as the registered owner and it was also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ
of possession issued by the RTC QC.

When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004,
it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank.

Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion and contended that it would be deprived of its day in court if
a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic had
adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant.

Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was
entirely distinct and independent from its cause of action against the original defendants; and that the issue with respect to
Asian Bank was whether Asian Bank had actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for the
properties in its name that such properties were the subject of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0004, while the issue as to the
original defendants was whether they had "committed the acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful accumulation
of wealth which would, as a consequence, justify forfeiture of the said properties or the satisfaction from said properties of the
judgement that may be rendered in favor of the Republic."

Asian Bank’s rejoinder to the reply asserted that the issue in Civil Case No. 0004 was intimately related to the issue delving
on the character of the properties as the ill-gotten wealth of the original defendants; that it thus had a right to confront the
evidence presented by the Republic as to the character of the properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to
decide Asian Bank’s ownership of the properties because the Sandiganbayan, being a special court with limited jurisdiction,
could only determine the issue of whether or not the properties were illegally acquired by the original defendants.

Sandiganbayan granted the Republic’s motion for separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the resolution,
but the Sandiganbayan denied its motion.
 Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil action for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank and
transferee of the properties.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank;
2. Whether Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to decide Asian Bank’s ownership of the properties because the Sandiganbayan

HELD: Separate Trials are Improper

I. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice to any party.

We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank
(Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original
defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one
time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense,
and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on
different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the
issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or
compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that
context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank
was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original defendants. Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the
issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the
properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank being
given the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.

II. The Court DECLARES that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the amended complaint in Civil
Case No. 0004 as against Asian Bank Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.

REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR.

G.R. NO. 199501

TOPIC: Consolidated Cases / Interlocutory Order

 DOCTRINE: Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that
the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.

In the context of legal procedure, the term “consolidation” is used in three different senses:

1. Quasi - consolidation; 2. Actual Consolidation; 3. Consolidation for Trial,

Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not necessary to appeal a
judgment already rendered in one action. *here is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in
one case which is consolidated with other cases.

FACTS: This case involved an action for annulment of the miscellaneous sales patent filed by Apog and San Juan; and for
the cancellation and reversion of the title filed by the Republic , against Oribello , Jr. before the RTC of Olongapo City.

On July 25,1997, the court issued an order stating that on several occasions when these cases were set for trial , neither of the
Republic’s counsels appeared., constraining the court to postpone the hearing. The actuations of both lawyers result to dely in
the early termination of these cases which have been pending since 1992. Wherefore the Republic is hereby deemed to have
abandoned the case for the government.

Order of 21 February 2005 , the trial court dismissed the consolidated cases without prejudice for non-substitution of the
deceased plaintiff ( Oribello) and his counsel.

Republic moved for reconsideration, contending that the order applied exclusively to civil case for recovery of possession and
did not affect case for reversion of property. Petitioner prayed that it allowed to present its evidence. The Trial Court allowed
the continuation of the presentation of petitioner’s evidence in its Order dated June 2005.

Heirs of Oribello filed then a Manifestation and Motion. They pointed out that from the time the Republic received the Order
in 1997, it did nothing to question the same, making the order final. In its resolution in July 12, 2006, the RTC recalled its
order and dismissed the case.

The Republic appealed to the CA. The CA agreed with respondents that petitioner has lost its right to participate in the
proceedings of the case when it failed to question the RTC’s September 12, 1997 order declaring it to have abandoned the
case as a consequence of petitioner’s inaction, such order inevitably became final. Republic however contends that the order,
deeming it to have abandoned the caes, is interlocutory in nature; thus is not appealable. Respondents argue otherwise,
maintaining that such order is a dismissal of the complaint on the ground of failure to prosecute which is under the Rules,
considered an adjudication on the merits, and hence, appelable.

ISSUES:

1. Is the RTC Order declaring the Republic to have abandoned the case interlocutory thus not appealable? YES.
2. Are the consolidated cases subject to multiple appeals? YES.

HELD:

1. YES, an interlocutory order “does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided by the court. Its
effects are merely provisional in character and substantial proceedigs have to be further conducted by the court to finally
resolve the issue or controversy.
Conversely, a final order is defined as “one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by court.” (Please
see SEC. 3 RULE 17)
2. Yes. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated,
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of
the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.25 To promote this end,
the rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues within
those cases
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 92) was consolidated with the complaint for
recovery of possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case No.223091). While these two cases involve common questions of law
and fact,28 each action retains its separate and distinct character. The reversion suit settles whether the subject and will be
reverted to the State, while the recovery of possession case determines which private party has the better right of possession
over the subject property. These cases, involving different issues and seeking different remedies, require the rendition and
entry of separate judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of
possession proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly by the trial court.

Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not necessary to appeal a
judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in
one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for convenience
or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a
party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.

MARANO VS. PRYCE GASES, INC.

755 SCRA 20

TOPIC: Consolidation of cases

FACTS: Spouses Juvy and Maria Luisa Maraño (petitioners) filed a free patent application for a 9,074-square-meter parcel of
land in Damulaan, Albuera, Leyte. The free patent application was subsequently granted and Original Certificate of Title No.
P-43553 was issued to the petitioners over the subject lot.

Petitioners filed an ejectment complaint against Pryce Gases, Incorporated (respondent) alleging that the latter illegally
entered the subject lot and constructed a building thereon.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Albuera, Leyte granted the petitioners’ complaint, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
reversed the MTC decision on appeal. On further appeal, the CA remanded the case to the MTC for trial as a reivindicatory
action under the ordinary rules of civil procedure.

In the interim, the respondent filed a protest on the free patent application filed by the petitioners. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) rendered a decision recommending the filing of reversion proceedings against
the petitioners, which decision became final and executory. However, no reversion proceedings were instituted against the
petitioners.

Eventually, the petitioners filed an action to quiet title in the RTC Leyte. A month later, respondents filed a complaint for
reconveyance against the petitioners with the same RTC. The petitioners move to dismiss, but the RTC denied their motion.
The respondent later moved to amend its complaint from reconveyance to the cancellation of the petitioners’ certificate of
title. The petitioners again moved to dismiss the respondent’s amended complaint on the ground of litis pendentia in view of
the then pending reivindicatory action with the MTC.

The RTC dismissed the petitioners’ motion. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was likewise denied
by the RTC.

The petitioners questioned the RTC’s resolution in a petition for certiorari with the CA.

In the reivindicatory action at the MTC, the latter court rendered a decisionruling in the respondent’s favour; it declared the
respondent as the owner of the subject lot and, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. The petitioners appealed the MTC’s
decision to the RTC. In the same year, the CA, acting on the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners, rendered a decision
affirming the RTC’s resolution that dismissed the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

The CA held that no litis pendentia exists between the reivindicatory action (then pending before the MTC) and the
amended complaint for cancellation of certificate of title filed by the respondent with the RTC. The petitioners moved to
reconsider the CA’s decision but their motion was denied, hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari with
this Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of title should be dismissed because the question of
validity of the certificate of title issued in their names over the subject lot is already being litigated in the reivindicatory
action case that is pending appeal before the RTC.

HELD: Yes. In this jurisdiction, there are three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property, namely: (1) actions for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, also denominated as accion interdictal, which are summary in nature and seek to
recover only physical possession (possession de facto) of the property, (2) an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to
recover the right to possess the property, without claim of title, and (3) an accion reivindicatoria (or accion de reivindicacion)
or a reivindicatory action, which is a plenary action to recover not only possession of, but also ownership of the real property.

Since a reivindicatory action includes a claim of title or ownership, the court must necessarily inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff’s acquisition of his or her title to the real property sought to be recovered. The petitioners point out
that the MTC in the subject reivindicatory case already conducted a full-blown trial on the issue of validity of their claim of
ownership and had, in fact, ruled that their certificate of title is inoperative and has no binding effect. They argue that for the
RTC to conduct another full-blown trial in the cancellation of title case on the same issue would, in effect, nullify the MTC’s
decision in the reivindicatory case.

Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of certificate of title, we find that the
consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of certificate of title case to be the appropriate remedy in the
present situation. Consolidation is proper when two or more actions pending, not necessarily, before the same court involve
a common question of law or fact. In such cases, the court may: order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions, order all the actions consolidated, and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein for the
purpose of avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.

PHIL. HEALTH INSURANCE CORP. VS. OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL

774 SCRA

TOPIC: Written interrogatories

FACTS: Petitioner PHIC filed a Complaint with its Legal Sector-Prosecution Department against OLLH for the
administrative offense of filing multiple claims, which is penalized under Section 145, Rule XXVIII of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7875. Allegedly, OLLH filed two claims of the same
amount of PhilHealth benefits involving the same patient for the same diagnosis and covering the same period of
confinement.

The case was assigned to Senior Arbiter Atty. Darwin G. De Leon (De Leon) and Summons was duly served upon
OLLH. Subsequently, OLLH filed a Verified Answer.

The parties were directed to file their respective Position Papers. PHIC complied with the order.

On its part, OLLH moved to defer the submission of its position paper pending the answer of the PHIC President and CEO to
the written interrogatories as well as the inspection and copying of the original transmittal letter and all other claims that
accompanied Annex B11 of the Complaint. According to OLLH, these modes of discovery were availed of because its
representatives were denied and/or not given access to documents and were not allowed to talk to PHIC personnel with regard
to the charge. PHIC filed its Comment on OLLH’s motion. Thereafter, the PHIC Arbitration Department, through Arbiter De
Leon, denied OLLH’s motion. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by OLLH suffered the same fate.

OLLH elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The CA reversed the Resolution and Order of the
PHIC Arbitration Department. In ruling that grave abuse of discretion was committed when OLLH’s resort to modes of
discovery was denied.

ISSUE/S: Whether the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the Resolution and Order of the PHIC Arbitration
Department, which denied OLLH’s resort to modes of discovery.

HELD: Yes. Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties any FACTS or matter that
are not privileged and are material and relevant to the subject of the pending action. Like other modes of discovery authorized
by the Rules, the purpose of written interrogatories is to assist the parties in clarifying the issues and in ascertaining the
FACTS involved in a case. On the other hand, the provision on production and inspection of documents is to enable not only
the parties but also the court (in this case, the PHIC Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant and material FACTS
in connection with the case pending before it. It must be shown, therefore, that the documents sought to be produced,
inspected and/or copied/photographed are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.

In this case, the questions contained in the written interrogatories filed and received were sought to elicit FACTS that could
already be seen from the allegations as well as attachments of the Complaint and the Verified Answer. Specifically, the entries
in the three (3) Validation Report that OLLH sought to be identified and/or explained by PHIC are either immaterial or
irrelevant (to the issue of whether OLLH is guilty of filing multiple claims and OLLH’s defense that it inadvertently attached
a second copy of the subject PhilHealth Claim Form 2 to the Transmittal Letter filed on June 19, 2007) or, even if material or
relevant, are self-explanatory and need no further elaboration from PHIC. Thus, the interrogatories were frivolous and need
not be answered. Aside from this, the PHIC Arbitration Department correctly observed that the written interrogatories were
mistakenly addressed to the President and CEO of PHIC, who could not competently answer, either based on his job
description or firsthand experience, issues that arose from and related to the filing and processing of claims.

We likewise find as self-serving the allegation of OLLH that its representatives were denied access to the documents
pertaining to the subject PhilHealth claim and, at the same time, were not allowed to talk to any of the PhilHealth personnel.
No iota of evidence, documentary or testimonial, was submitted to substantiate this convenient excuse.

As the PHIC Arbitration Department held, all the issues and queries raised by OLLH in its written interrogatories and motion
for production/inspection may be addressed in a hearing to be held after submission of the position paper of the parties. If the
Arbiter deemed it necessary, based on the required pleadings already submitted, a formal hearing may be conducted wherein
witnesses who testify may be subjected to clarificatory questions. In such hearing, the Arbiter has the power to issue subpoena
ad testificandum and duces tecum; he may issue subpoenas requiring attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production
of documents and other material/s
 necessary. In effect, these serve the same purposes of the modes of discovery. The foregoing considered, Arbiter De Leon did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying OLLH’s plea for written interrogatories and production/inspection of
documents. His resolutions were consistent with the summary nature of the administrative proceedings, expeditiously
resolving the case from the perspectives of time dimension and efficiency dimension.

VIII. RULES 33-36

REPUBLIC VS. GIMENEZ

778 SCRA 261

DOCTRINE:

Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence
on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled
to the relief sought.

FACTS:

The Republic, though the PCGG, filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages, among others against the Spouses
Gimenez. The complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by the Gminez as dummies or agents of former President
Marcoses.

z Spouses.9 The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Dire

aniel's testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further evidence." Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 da

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006, within which to file
[its] formal offer of evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same
date.roblesvirtuallawlibrary
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal
Offer of Evidence.

e lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence. S

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez's filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.

The Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines waived the filing of its
Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez's Motion to Dismiss on
demurrer to evidence.

RULING:

YES.

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state's policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts
should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer
to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."

In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza, this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based
on the disclosed FACTS, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the judgment is rendered "after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point."

To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he [or she] is not
entitled to the relief sought." 175 The order of dismissal must be clearly supported by FACTS and law since an order granting
demurrer is a judgment on the merits:

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a
reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the FACTS and the law on which it is based.176

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence essentially deprives one
party of due process.

BERNARDO VS. CA
278 SCRA 782

DOCTRINE: The accused can file a demurrer only if he is granted prior leave of court. If the motion for leave or demurrer is
denied, the accused can present his evidence, and there is no waiver; If the accused files a demurrer without leave, his right to
present evidence is waived.

FACTS: Paz T. Bernardo was originally charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Subsequently, private
complainant, respondent Florlita Ronquillo-Concepcion, executed an Affidavit of Desistance which led to the dismissal of the
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46794 and Q-93-46795, thus leaving Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-93-46793 to be
disposed of by the trial court. After presenting its last witness, the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits.
That hearing was set at 8:30 a.m. on that date for continuation of the reception of the evidence for the prosecution as
reflected in the calendar of the court. After the prosecution
had formally offered its evidence, Atty. Miravite asked for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to elicit the fact where the checks were issued and where they were actually dishonored. The Court denied
the motion for leave but Atty. Miravite nonetheless, submitted their demurrer. Again, it was denied.

ISSUES: Whether or not the appellate court decided the matter not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

HELD: The court on its initiative can dismiss the case after giving prior notice to the prosecution. The accused can file a
demurrer only if he is granted prior leave of court. If the motion for leave or demurrer is denied, the accused can present his
evidence, and there is no waiver; If the accused files a demurrer without leave, his right to present evidence is waived. There
may be instances where it is very plain that the evidence is insufficient, but there are also instances where the court is in doubt
it is the court that will now determine whether a demurrer should be filed or not after getting the opinion of both sides. If the
accused asks for leave of court and the court supports it, it is good; but if it finds the motion dilatory, then it denies it. But
there should be no waiver if the demurrer is with leave of court, because there may be a situation where the court itself may
want to dismiss the case. If leave is denied, and the accused still files the demurrer, then there is waiver (italics supplied). The
Committee finally approved the following propositions of the Chief Justice: (a) The court on its initiative can dismiss
the case after giving prior notice to the prosecution; (b) The accused can file a demurrer only if he is granted prior leave of
court; (c) If the motion for leave or the demurrer is denied, the accused can present his evidence, and there is no waiver; and,
(d) If the accused files a demurrer without leave, his right to present evidence is waived.

The power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose
is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings. Once prior leave is denied and
the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to
present evidence.

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO. VS. DEL ROSARIO

335 SCRA 288

TOPIC: Demurrer to Evidence, Promissory Note, When Demandable, Penalty, Interest (Credit Transactions) Laws
Applicable: Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court (Civil Procedure)

FACTS: On March 2, 1991: Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and
delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for P138,948 without need of notice or demand, in
installments of P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months leaving the period for the installments blank. Upon default,
the late payment, 2.5% penalty charge per month shall be added to each unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully
paid.

On June 7, 1993: Radiowealth filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence the
Spouses’ check payments, the demand letter dated July 12, 1991, Spouses’ customer’s ledger card, another demand letter and
Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the
execution of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.

July 29, 1994: Spouses filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action
 RTC: Dismissed for Radiowealth’s failure to substantiate the claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay

CA: reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings

o During the pretrial, through judicial admissions or the spouses admitted the genuineness of the Promissory Note and
demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments
were to begin

ISSUES:
1. W/N the spouses can still present evidence after the appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal on demurer of evidence.

2. W/N the obligation is due and demandable.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Appealed Decision is MODIFIED. Ordered to PAY P138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty
charge per month beginning April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of the amount due as attorney’s fees.

1. NO. Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the FACTS and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and
reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence

The appellate court shall resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage
prolonged litigations

2. Yes. The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment did NOT necessarily mean that the debtors were
allowed to pay as and when they could. While the specific date on which each installment would be due was left blank,
the Note clearly provided that each installment should be payable each month. It also provided for an acceleration clause and
a late payment penalty, both of which showed the intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite
date. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month (April 2, 1991) after the date of the Note because
the check representing their first installment bounced.

Respondents started paying installments on the Promissory Note, even if the checks were dishonored by their drawee bank.

The Note already stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to each unpaid installment until fully
paid. Payment of interest was not expressly stipulated in the Note. Thus, it should be deemed included in such penalty.
Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for being unconscionable. Such damages should also be deemed
included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Furthermore, we hold that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees, but only in a
sum equal to 10 percent of the amount due which we deem reasonable under the proven FACTS
 CABRADOR VS. PEOPLE
602 SCRA 760

Doctrine:

To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider
(1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective
of the party filing it.

FACTS:

On June 23, 2000, the public prosecutor accused Antonio Cabador before RTC Quezon City of the crime of murdering in
conspiracy with others.
On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end
the prosecutions presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary
evidence within 15 days from notice. [5] But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time, the last of which was to
end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written offer.

On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case
since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances,
the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the
prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.

Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution asked the RTC for another
extension of the period for its formal offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his
motion to dismiss.

On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabadors August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to present
evidence in his defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed
without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted
the case for decision insofar as he was concerned
RULING:

This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Election that, to determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to
evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith;
(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.

In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accuseds right to speedy trial.This denial is
characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements
that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring
this up for a ruling by the trial court.

The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the
prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime
charged. His so-called demurrer did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary
exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the
same date he filed his motion to dismiss. To say that Cabador filed a
demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had
touched a wall.

In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his
right to present evidence in his defense.

CLAUDIO VS. SARAZA

768 SCRA 356

TOPIC: Demurrer to evidence

FACTS: The case traces its roots an annulment of sale, power of attorney and mortgage with prayer for damages filed before
the RTC on September 28, 2004 by petitioners Mamerta Lopez Claudio (Mamerta), Eduardo L. Claudio, Asuncion Claudio-
Contegino (Asuncion), Ana Claudio-Isulat, Dolores Claudio-Mabini, and Fermin L. Claudio (Fermin) against respondents
Florentino Claudio (Florentino) and Spouses Federico and Norma Saraza (Spouses Saraza).

The complaint alleged that Porfirio Claudio (Porfirio) and his wife, Mamerta, during their marriage, acquired ten
(10) parcels of land in Pasay City including the disputed property; that on June 18, 2004, Florentino made it appear
that his parents, Porfirio and Mamerta Claudio, sold to him the disputed property thru a deed of absolute sale sometime in
October 2003; that the said deed of sale was void because the signatures of the vendors were forged and there was no
consideration for the sale; that the signatures of petitioners Fermin and Asuncion appearing in the same deed of sale,
expressing their conformity to the conveyance, were likewise forged; and that subsequently, Florentino sought the registration
of the said property in his name before the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.

It was further averred that Florentino executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the subject lot with special power to sell the
mortgaged property without judicial proceedings, in favor of Spouses Saraza to secure the payment of a loan; that Spouses
Saraza were mortgagees in bad faith because they knew fully well that Florentino could not have acquired the subject
property from his parents because Porfirio had long been deceased while Mamerta was in the United States of
America at the time of the alleged sale; that Spouses Saraza did not conduct a credit investigation on Florentino to
ascertain the validity of his title and his authority to mortgage the subject lot; that the real estate mortgage was void because it
emanated from a falsified deed of absolute sale and void title; that the registration of the real estate mortgage, together with
the special power of attorney and deed of conveyances, before the Register of Deeds was procured through fraud; that it was
only on June 28, 2004 that TCT No. 142989 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 145979 was issued in the name of
Florentino; and that for failure of mortgagor Florentino to redeem the subject property, it was consolidated in the name of
Spouses Saraza.

Spouses Saraza moved for the dismissal of the complaint. The RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit.

In their answer, Spouses Saraza interposed the defense that the lot, which was used as collateral in the real estate
mortgage contract, was valid and that the mortgage was enforceable.

After the presentation of the petitioners' evidence in chief, Spouses Saraza moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. They filed their Demurrer to Evidence praying for the dismissal of the civil case anchored on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.

RTC issued the assailed order, granting the Demurrer to Evidence with Leave filed by defendants Sarazas and
the Complaint against them is hereby Dismissed without prejudice.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC. The

petitioners appealed the order of dismissal before the CA.

The CA found no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the RTC. It held that Spouses Saraza had the right
to rely in good faith on TCT No. 145979, which covered the lot given as security by Florentino, considering that there was no
showing of any sign to excite suspicion. Thus, they were under no obligation to look beyond what appeared on the face of
the certificate of title and investigate it. The appellate court deemed Spouses Saraza as innocent mortgagees for value
and as such, the petitioners had shown no right to relief against them.

ISSUE: WON demurrer would prosper.

HELD: No. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is filed after the
plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence, which his adversary
produced, is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. In the case at bench, the
petitioners' evidence, together with such inferences and conclusions as may be reasonably drawn therefrom, amply supports the
allegations in their complaint necessary to their claim against Spouses Saraza. The evidence in chief of the petitioner clearly
made out a very strong case against them which would warrant recovery from them.

All told, the Court holds that the petitioners' evidence, standing alone and in the absence of controverting evidence, would
afford sufficient basis for a judgment in their favor and against Spouses Saraza. Despite the fact that Spouses Saraza are
deemed to have waived their right to present evidence before the RTC pursuant to Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court,
still this disposition is without prejudice to the judgment on the merits to be handed down by the RTC.

FELIPE VS. MGM MOTOR TRADING CORP.

771 SCRA 360

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents MGM Motor Trading
Corporation and Ayala General Insurance Corporation. Petitioner claimed that he purchased on instalment basis a Nissan
Terrano Wagon through MGM Motor’s authorized representative, Jane Sarmiento. (200,00Php downpayment and 5,000Php
as reservation)

On May 14, 1997, MGM Motors delivered the vehicle to the petitioner. Petitioner then insured the vehicle with Ayala
Insurance Corp. On November `15, 1997, the vehicle was lost while parked along Adriatico Street in Malate,Manila.

Petitioner tried to claim from insurer Ayala, but to no avail.

Respondent denied having received 200,000Php and the 5,000Php paid through Sarmiento. Ayala Insurance claimed that
petitioner had no valid cause of action against it. Petitioner had no insurable interest because he was not the owner according
to Ayala.

Trial proceeded. Respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence.

Trial court dismissed the case. Appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
 ISSUE: Whether the trial court correctly granted the demurrer to evidence and subsequently dismissed the complaint.

RULING: The Supreme Court agreed with the Trial Court.

In any event, a perusal of the records show that the trial court correctly dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.

The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has been able to show that he is entitled
to his claim, and it is incumbent upon the trial court judge to make such a determination

artial payment of the subject car. The allegation that the purchase of the vehicle was on an installment basis was not supported by any evidence. The receipt of

occurred and said loss was covered by his insurance policy. Considering that the trial court only admitted two pieces of evidence in petitioner's favor and none

REPUBLIC VS. SHELL PETROLEUM CORP

777 SCRA 393

TOPICS:
1. Question of Law” and “Question of Fact
2. Rule 35 summary judgement

BOC filed the present collection suit in the RTC (Civil Case No. 02-103191) for the payment of P10,088,912.00 owed by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation(PS

ctual and legal bases of BOC's collection efforts. PSPC moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-103191 on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subjec

RTC denied the motion to dismiss and PSPC eventually filed its answer questioning the RTC's jurisdiction. When the RTC
issued a notice of pre-trial, PSPC moved for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss. The RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration, prompting PSPC to elevate the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
71756). On October 23, 2003, the CA rendered decision denying PSPC's petition. With the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, PSPC sought recourse from the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 161953),
however it was denied and RTC was ordered to proceed the case.

As to CTA Case No. 6484, the CTA denied BOC's motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. When the CTA denied the
BOC's motion for reconsideration, the BOC appealed to the CA, which reversed the questioned CTA resolutions. PSPC again
sought recourse from this Court via a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 176380). By Decision dated June 18, 2009,
CA denied the petition and held that the present case does not involve a tax protest case within the jurisdiction of the CTA
to resolve. Citing our previous ruling in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
 Corporation v. Republic in which the CA ruled that the appropriate forum to resolve the issues raised by PSPC before the
CTA, which were all related to the fact and efficacy of the payments made, should be the collection case before the RTC
where PSPC can put up the fact of its payment as a defense.

PSPC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there is no basis for the Republic's claims considering that the
subject TCCs were already fully utilized for the payment of PSPC's customs duties and taxes, and that EXCOM Resolution
No. 03-05-99, the basis of the cancellation of the TCCs, was declared void and invalid in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. CIR.

presentation of evidence is necessary to determine if PSPC is a mere transferee in good faith and for value of the subject TCCs and that there was a valid transf

BOC appealed to the CA, according to the CA, BOC adopted a wrong mode of appeal because whether the RTC
erred in rendering summary judgment is purely a legal issue, jurisdiction over which is vested only in this Court.

ISSUE:

(1) Does the Republic's appeal involve purely questions of law and hence a wrong remedy from the assailed RTC orders?

(2) Whether or not summary judgment is proper

HELD:

1. When an appeal raises only pure questions of law, it is this Court that has the sole jurisdiction to entertain the same. On the
other hand, appeals involving both questions of law and fact fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA.

“Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,” Distinguished.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of FACTS, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged FACTS. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it
is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

2. Summary Judgments; When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a
party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the FACTS are not in dispute, the court is
allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material FACTS.—Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant.— A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
 part thereof. Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to
obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the FACTS are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material FACTS. Even if
on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such
issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter
of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine
issue as to any material fact.

COMGLASS CORP. VS. SANTOS CHECK CAR CENTER

754 SCRA 481

TOPIC: judgment on the pleadings/summary judgement

er that it was pre-terminating their lease contract. Santos Check Center Corporation refused to accede to the pre-termination, reminding Comglasco that their

new. On June 28, 2004, Comglasco filed its Answer. Santos Car Check Center Corporation moved for a judgment on the pleadings, which the RTC granted. On A

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was properly invoked by the trial court as basis for rendering its decision
2. Whether or not summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings is the proper remedy for Car Check Center
Corporation under the circumstances of the present case

HELD: As found by the CA, Comglasco’s Answer admitted the material allegations in the complaint, to wit:

a) that Santos holds absolute title to a showroom space;

b) that Comglasco leased the said showroom from Santos;
c) that after a little over a year, Comglasco pre-terminated the lease;
d) that, disregarding Santos’ rejection of the pre-termination of their lease, Comglasco vacated the leased premises on January
15, 2002;
e) that Comglasco never denied the existence and validity of the parties’ lease contract.

Specifically, the CA noted that Paragraph 2 of the Answer admitted the allegations in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the complaint
that the lease was for five years, starting on August 16, 2000 and to expire on August 15, 2005, at a monthly rental of
P60,000.00 on the first year, P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00 on the third up to the fifth
year.
The RTC acted correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the Pleadings, to cut short a needless trial. The
SC agrees with the CA that Comglasco cannot cite Article 1267 of the Civil Code, and that it must be deemed to have
admitted the material allegations in the complaint. Section 1, Rule 34 reads:

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material FACTS alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the FACTS as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing
in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A
genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false issue. Under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, Comglasco had recourse to move for summary judgment, wherein it
could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties’ lease, but it did not do so. Section 2 of Rule 35
provides:

Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. GO

642 SCRA

DOCTRINE: A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the FACTS as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real
or genuine issue or question as to the FACTS, and summary judgment is called for. When the FACTS as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

FACTS: On September 30, 1999, respondent Jose C. Go obtained two loans from PBCom, evidenced by two promissory
notes, embodying his commitment to pay P17,982,222.22 for the first loan, and P80 million for the second loan, within a ten-
year period from September 30, 1999 to September 30, 2009.

To secure the two loans, Go executed two (2) pledge agreements, both dated September 29, 1999, covering shares of stock in
Ever Gotesco Resources and Holdings, Inc. The first pledge, valued at P27,827,122.22, was to secure payment of the first
loan, while the second pledge, valued at P70,155,100.00, was to secure the second loan.

Two years later, however, the market value of the said shares of stock plunged to less than P0.04 per share. Thus,
PBCom, as pledgee, notified Go in writing on June 15, 2001, that it was renouncing the pledge agreements.

Later, PBCom filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
Go and his wife, Elvy T. Go. PBCom alleged that Spouses Go defaulted on the two (2) promissory notes, having paid only
three (3) installments on interest payments covering the months of September, November and December 1999. Consequently,
the entire balance of the obligations of Go became immediately due and demandable. PBCom made repeated demands upon
Spouses Go for the payment of said obligations, but the couple imposed conditions on the payment, such as the lifting of
garnishment effected by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Go’s accounts
Spouses Go filed their Answer with Counterclaim denying the material allegations in the complaint and stating, among other
matters, that:

8. The promissory note referred to in the complaint expressly state that the loan obligation is payable within the
period of ten (10) years. Thus, from the execution date of September 30, 1999, its due date falls on September 30,
2009 (and not 2001 as erroneously stated in the complaint). Thus, prior to September 30, 2009, the loan
obligations cannot be deemed due and demandable.

In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already
acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. (Article 1181, New Civil
Code)

9. Contrary to the plaintiffs proferrence, defendant Jose C. Go had made substantial payments in terms of his
monthly payments. There is, therefore, a need to do some accounting works (sic) to reconcile the records of both
parties.

10. While demand is a necessary requirement to consider the defendant to be in delay/default, such has not
been complied with by the plaintiff since the former is not aware of any demand made to him by the latter for the
settlement of the whole obligation.

11. Undeniably, at the time the pledge of the shares of stock were executed, their total value is more than the
amount of the loan or at the very least, equal to it. Thus, plaintiff was fully secured insofar as its exposure is
concerned.

12. And even assuming without conceding, that the present value of said shares x x x went down, it cannot be
considered as something permanent since the prices of stocks in the market either increases (sic) or decreases (sic)
depending on the market forces. Thus, it is highly speculative for the plaintiff to consider said shares to have
suffered tremendous decrease in its value. More so, it is unfair for the plaintiff to renounce or abandon the pledge
agreements.

PBCom filed a verified motion for summary judgment stating that the Answer interposed no specific denials on the material
averments in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the complaint such as the fact of default, the entire amount being already due and
demandable because of default, and the fact that the bank had made repeated demands for the payment of the obligations.

Spouses Go opposed the motion for summary judgment arguing that they had tendered genuine factual issues calling for the
presentation of evidence.

The RTC granted PBCom’s motion in its judgment. The Spouses Go moved for reconsideration but was denied.

The CA in its decision reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC and ordered the remand of the records to the court of
origin for trial on the merits. The CA disagreed with the conclusion of the RTC that the Spouses Go admitted several
paragraphs of the complaint. It found the supposed admissions insufficient to justify a rendition of summary judgment in the
case for sum of money, since there were other allegations and defenses put up by Spouses Go in their Answer which raised
genuine issues on the material FACTS in the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there exists a genuine issue as to material FACTS in the action.

RULING:

The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to three material FACTS, which have to be addressed during trial:
the fact of default; the amount of the outstanding obligation, and the existence of prior demand.
Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be
rendered. This rule was expounded in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial
International Bank, where it was written:

Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be
allowed. Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation
of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions
and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a
matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim. When the FACTS as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine
issue or question as to the FACTS, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has
the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the FACTS as
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

Spouses Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the transaction or the execution of the promissory notes or the pledge
agreements sued upon. The matters in contention are, as the CA stated, whether or not respondents were in default, whether
there was prior demand, and the amount of the outstanding loan. These are the matters that the parties disagree on and by
which reason they set forth vastly different allegations in their pleadings which each will have to prove by presenting
relevant and admissible evidence during trial.

Furthermore, in stark contrast to the cited cases where one of the parties disclaimed knowledge of something so patently
within his knowledge, in this case, respondents Spouses Go categorically stated in the Answer that there was no prior demand,
that they were not in default, and that the amount of the outstanding loan would have to be ascertained based on official
records.

ADOLFO VS. ADOLFO

753 SCRA 580

FACTS: The petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed a Petition for judicial separation of property against his estranged wife,
respondent Fe Tudtud Adolfo. The petitioner alleged that they were married on November 26, 1966 and had one child. During
their marriage, they acquired through conjugal funds a property in Brgy. Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Cebu. However, the
parties separated due to irreconcilable differences and since reunion was no longer feasible, the petitioner suggested a
separation of the conjugal property, but respondent adamantly refused. Moreover, the respondent denied petitioner’s co-
ownership of the subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal property. Hence, the petitioner prays that a judgment
be rendered decreeing a separation of the conjugal property and the subdivision or sale and division of the proceeds thereof
and ordering respondent to pay petitioner P50,000 as attorney’s fees, appearance fees P2,000 per hearing, and 20,000
litigation costs.
However, the respondent contended that while she remained married to petitioner, she is the sole owner of the subject
property, the same being her paraphernal property which she inherited from her mother, thus the respondent prayed that the
petition be dismissed.

By way of counterclaim, she sought the payment of moral, exemplary, and nominal damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses. While on the other hand a case for partition with damages was filed against the respondent which was filed by sister
Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon.

The Gingoyons alleged respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons over a 300-square meter portion of the
subject property, but that respondent refused to partition/subdivide the same even after the Gingoyons paid the taxes, fees and
expenses of the sale. However, the respondent claimed that when the sale to the Gingoyons was made, the subject property
constituted conjugal property of her marriage with petitioner and since the petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor of
the Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was null and void. Hence, the trial
court rendered its decision in Civil Case declaring that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. It
thus nullified the 1988 deed of sale executed by respondent in favor of the Gingoyons for lack of consent on the part of
petitioner, citing Article 124 of the Family Code. The trial court likewise awarded moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses in favor of the respondent in the total amount of P107,000.

The Gingoyons filed an appeal with the CA. Meanwhile, during the pre-trial conference, petitioner submitted as part of his
evidence and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons’ Complaint, respondent’s Answer thereto, and the trial
court’s decision in said case. The petitioner filed a Request for Admission of 1) the genuineness of the duly marked certified
true copies of the Complaint, Answer, and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683; 2) respondent’s declaration in said Answer
that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial court’s pronouncement in said case that
the subject property forms part of the conjugal estate.

Respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission. Therefore, the petitioner filed a
motion for 9udg'ent Based on the Pleadings, stating that since respondent failed to answer his request for
admission, the matters contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Hence, as a consequence of the application of the rule, respondent is in effect considered to have admitted that the
subject property is a conjugal asset of their subsisting marriage which may thus be the subject of his petition for judicial
separation of property and that on account of said admission, a hearing on the merits becomes unnecessary and, instead Rule
34 of the 1997 Rules on judgments on the pleadings should apply. Petitioner thus prayed that the trial court render judgment
in his favor based on the pleadings.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not in accord with law,
Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.” Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be
granted “if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them
at all.

“A ‘genuine issue’ is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim. When the FACTS as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue
or question as to the FACTS, and summary judgment is called for.”
 MENDEZONA VS. OZAMIS
376 SCRA 482

TOPIC: Newly discovered evidence to warrant new trial.

FACTS: On September 25, 1991, spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona, joined by spouses Luis J.
Mendezona and Maricar Mendezona instituted an action for quieting of title (suit to remove a cloud on their said
respective titles) on a parcel of land each in Lahug, Cebu city. The petitioners ultimately traced their titles of ownership over
their respective properties from a deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz and in consideration of P
1,040,000. It appears than on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with RTC Oroquieta,
City alleging that Carmen Ozamiz had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends and could no longer
take care of her properties by reason pf weak mind and absentmindedness. As guardians Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H.
Ozamiz filed on August 6, 1991 with the guardianship court their Inventories and Accounts including the 10,369 square
meters Lahug property. Said Lahug property covered by deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen
Ozamiz in favor of petitioners. In their Answer, respondents opposed the claim of ownership of the Lahug property and
alleged that the titles issued to the petitioners are defective and illegal and the ownership of said properties was acquired in
bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents
further alleged that on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of her mental faculties;
and that her properties having been placed in administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners. On
September 23, 1992, the Trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. On appeal the Court of Appeal reversed its
decision and ruled that the Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove
that the consideration was actually paid.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court. Subsequent thereto, the petitioners filed a
motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence. They contended, among other things, that the appellate court
totally ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. The said testimony was taken in the Special Proceeding No.
1250 in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. However, Judge Durias was not presented as a witness in Civil
Case No. CEB-10766 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Petitioners alleged that Judge Durias’s testimony is a
newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due
diligence.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the testimony of Judge Durias can be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new
trial.

RULING: No. A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only
where there is concurrence of the following requisites:

1. the evidence had been discovered after trial;

2. the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
and
3. the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative, or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted,
would probably alter the result.

All 3 requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.
 SC finds that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case,
the name Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the
respondent chose not to present his is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to
choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias' testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered
evidence since the FACTS to be testified to by Judge Durias' which were existing before and during the trial, could have been
presented by the petitioners at the trial The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from
him by questioning.

Factual findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the SC which is not a trier of FACTS. It is not the
function of the SC to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not without exception. If there is a
showing that the appellate court's findings of FACTS complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are
so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, the SC must discard such erroneous findings of FACTS. SC
finds that the exception applies in the case at bench.

Simulation is defined as :the declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce,
for the purposes of deception, the appearances of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from that which was really
executed. The requisites of simulation are:

1. an outward declaration of will different from the will of the parties;

2. the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement; and
3. the purpose is to deceive third persons. None of these were clearly shown to exist in the case at bar.

Contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the appellate court, a simulated contract cannot be inferred from the mere non-
production of the checks. It was not the burden of the petitioners to prove so. It is significant to note that the deed of absolute
sale is a notarized document duly acknowledged before a notary public. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

CHUA VS. PEOPLE

762 SCRA 523

TOPIC: Newly discovered evidence

FACTS: Chua and private complainant Philip See were long-time friends and neighbors. On different dates from 1992 until
1993, Chua issued several postdated PS Bank checks of varying amounts to See. However, See claimed that when he
deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed
to make good the checks. Hence, See filed a Complaint for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 (BP 22).

The prosecution filed a Motion to Re-open Presentation of Prosecution’s Evidence and Motion to Allow Prosecution to
Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003, intending to introduce the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 as a newly discovered evidence, stating that “despite diligent efforts to locate the demand letter x x x, the same was
not located until sometime in February 2002, when I was having our old house/office cleaned and ready to be rented out;”

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 qualifies as a newly discovered evidence.

RULING: NO. The demand letter dated November 30, 1993 deserves no weight and credence not only because it does not
qualify as a newly discovered evidence within the purview of law but also because of its doubtful character.
The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence
discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement
of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as
newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into
existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering
party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to
secure it.

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon
the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable
promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and
a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of
the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably
and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the FACTS known to him.

"Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material,
not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment."

In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence
within the purview of the law. Per See's statements in his affidavit, the said evidence was already known to him at the time he
filed his complaint against Chua. It was also apparently available considering that it was just kept in his house. Undeniably,
had See exercised reasonable diligence, he could have promptly located the said demand letter and presented it during trial.
However, the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was already existing at the time he filed the
complaint, the same was not mentioned therein. Only the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 was referred to in the
complaint, which per See's own allegations, was also not actually received by Chua. In addition, the prosecution failed to
present the original copy of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly on the basis of the demand letter
dated December 10, 1993 alone, the prosecution cannot possibly establish the existence of the second element of the offense.
Indeed, the surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 make it
susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction was a mere afterthought - a belated attempt to fill in a missing
component necessary for the existence of the second element of BP 22.

PADILLA-RUMBAUA VS. RUMBAUA

596 SCRA 15

DOCTRINE: New Trial

FACTS: The present petition traces its roots to the Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua's (petitioner) complaint for the declaration of
nullity of marriage against Edward Rumbaua (respondent) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner
alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the
following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed
to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions;
and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.
During the trial, aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;
and the testimony, curriculum vitae, and psychological report of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag.

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA decision reversed and set aside the RTC
decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondent’s so- called
“narcissistic personality disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight
into the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the
respondent’s incapacity was “deep-seated” and “incurable.”

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion.

ISSUE: WON the Court should remand the case to the RTC for the petitioner to recall her expert witness and cure the defects
in her testimony.

HELD: NO. The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for
further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial
was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her
to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be
liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.

The Court did not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not
procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside
a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion
for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have
been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been
impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and
produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand.
She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows
that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had
been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro
Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening
cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and intentional
commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in
the instant case.
 SENIT VS. PEOPLE
778 SCRA 425

DOCTRINE: APPEAL AND CERTIORARI; MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Estinozo while in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to private complainants Gaudencio Ang,
Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza Florendo that she was one
of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She then asked from
the said complainants the payment of placement and processing fees totaling P15,000.00.

Private complainants paid the fees, went with petitioner to Manila. On the promised date of their departure, however, private
complainants never left the country. Came November 1986 and still they were not deployed. This prompted private
complainants to suspect that something was amiss, and they demanded the return of their money. Petitioner assured them
refund of the fees and even executed promissory notes to several of the complainants; but, as before, her assurances were
mere pretenses.

Complainants then filed seven separate Informations for Estafa against petitioner with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte.
On request of petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly heard by the trial court.

During the trial, in her defense, petitioner testified, among others, that she was an employee of the COA who worked as a
part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez; that she received the amounts claimed by the
complainants and remitted the same to Ramirez; that complainants actually transacted with Ramirez and not with her and that
she was only forced to execute the promissory notes.

On November 9, 1994, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of estafa. Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration or a

petition for review, petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration. On June 28, 2001, the CA, in the its Resolution, denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA but the appellate court denied the same, on August 17,
2001. Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
assailing all the issuances of the CA.

ISSUE: WON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS THE PROPER REMEDY AVAILED
OF BY THE PETITIONER.

RULING: No. The petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court’s issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA
may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to
petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a
remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co- exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature
of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those
questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal,
not certiorari as a special civil action.
Granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still the Court cannot grant the writ prayed for
because there is no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now
without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial
cannot be extended, except in cases before the Supreme Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant
the extension requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration.

It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision, the challenged decision has already attained
finality and may no longer be reviewed. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal— certiorari is
not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When a decision
becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to
review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of
justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.

PEOPLE VS. LI KA KIM

429 SCRA 169

Topic: New Trial

Doctrine: The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.

FACTS: The Regional Intelligence Investigation Division (RIID) of the PNP received a report from an informer named Boy
that a certain alias Ed, known to be a drug deale who was operating in the southern part of Metro Manila, was looking for a
buyer of shabu. The RIID conducted a buy bust operation that led to the arrest of appellant Li Ka Kim alias Ed.

The appellant put forth the defense of denial. He claimed that he is a Chinese citizen who came to the Philippines on
a tourist visa. According to him, he was with Tan Eng Hong until the date when the buy bust operation was conducted. They
then went to a mall where he was arrested. Later on he was brought to the police station where the policemen allegedly
demanded of him P1, 000,000.00 for his release.

The trial court debunked appellant’s defense of denial. The court found it hard to believe that appellant would be
singled out by the police officers from scores of people at the mall where he was arrested and later indicted for selling shabu.
Strangely, the court observed that appellant’s friend, a certain Tan Eng Hong, did not appear in court to corroborate his
testimony. The court likewise noted that the car, as well as the license plate, used by appellant had been stolen, and that
appellant was an undocumented alien as so shown by the letter of then Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation Rufus
B. Rodriguez, to State Prosecutor Reynaldo J. Lugtu.

Finding the prosecution’s evidence far more credible than that of the defense and to have overwhelmingly
established the elements of the crime charged, the trial court convicted appellant and decreed the penalty of death. In
arriving at that penalty, the trial court considered the use of a motor vehicle to be an aggravating circumstance.
 Appellant contends that the (1) the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged; and (2) assuming arguendo that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged, nonetheless, the trial court erred in
imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death.

In this appeal, appellant filed a motion to remand the case for new trial. In his motion, appellant would attempt to
overturn his conviction or, at the very least, to be given a chance for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence, i.e., his passport which would establish his true identity as Huang
Xiao Wei, a Chinese National, and as having entered the Philippines as a tourist. Invoking his constitutional right to an
effective counsel, appellant chides his former counsel for having failed to secure and present his travel documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant’s motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, i.e. his passport, should be
granted.

HELD: NO. The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such
weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.

Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellant’s passport could have easily been presented and produced
during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellant’s passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case.
Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly,
appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei, which bolsters the conclusion that
appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise.

There is merit, however, in appellant’s contention that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty of death.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure requires the recitation in the information of aggravating or
qualifying circumstances in order to be appreciated as such. The use of a motor vehicle considered by the trial court in
decreeing the death penalty is inappropriate, that aggravating circumstance not having been aptly alleged in the Information.

IX. RULES 40-45

HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA VS. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA

763 SCRA 349

TOPIC: Distinctions between Rule 41 (appeal as a matter of right) vs Rule 42 (appeal as a matter of discretion)

FACTS: The late Melencio Bueno was a beneficiary of an agricultural lang in Iba, Zambales. On October 18, 1999 he
filed for an ejectment suit before MTC-Iba against the Municipality of Iba, Zambales. Bueno claimed that in 1983, the latter
constructed a public market on a substantial portion of his land without his consent and that the Municipality did not vacate
the property despite his repeated demands.

The MTC ruled in Bueno’s favor. Thereafter, the Municipality of Iba filed a notice of appeal, which the MTC denied.
Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba, Zambales to assail the denial of due course by
the MTC. The RTC granted its petition for certiorari.

The heirs substituted Bueno upon his death and moved for the reconsideration of the judgment which granted the certiorari,
but the RTC denied their motion.
 Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The CA dismissed the petition for review on October 28, 2003, ruling that it was not the proper mode of appeal upon its
observance that the assailed orders were issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether the petitioners were correct in maintaining that they have substantially complied with the requirements of
ordinary appeal under Rule 41 despite their admission that their petition for review under Rule 42 was inappropriate.

crucial for the petitioners and their counsel to have been cognizant of the different modes to appeal the adverse decision of the RTC in the special civil actio

Section 2. Modes of appeal.—

al with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be req

(b) Petition for review.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari.—In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n)

appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary a

perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection t

appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by p

RULE 41 (APPEAL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT)

An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the
trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance.

1) Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records
by verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal to the CA must be made within 30
days from the perfection of the appeal.
 RULE 42 (APPEAL AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION)

1) The discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary
appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to
due course to the petition for review or not.
2) The requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed
necessary.

ESTINOZO VS. CA
544 SCRA 422

DOCTRINE: APPEAL AND CERTIORARI; MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Estinozo while in Sogod, Southern Leyte, represented to private complainants Gaudencio Ang,
Rogelio Ceniza, Nilo Cabardo, Salvacion Nueve, Virgilio Maunes, Apolinaria Olayvar, and Mariza Florendo that she was one
of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting workers to be sent abroad. She then asked from
the said complainants the payment of placement and processing fees totaling P15,000.00.

Private complainants paid the fees, went with petitioner to Manila. On the promised date of their departure, however, private
complainants never left the country. Came November 1986 and still they were not deployed. This prompted private
complainants to suspect that something was amiss, and they demanded the return of their money. Petitioner assured them
refund of the fees and even executed promissory notes to several of the complainants; but, as before, her assurances were
mere pretenses.

Complainants then filed seven separate Informations for Estafa against petitioner with the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte.
On request of petitioner, the cases were consolidated and jointly heard by the trial court.

During the trial, in her defense, petitioner testified, among others, that she was an employee of the COA who worked as a
part-time secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency owned by Fe Corazon Ramirez; that she received the amounts claimed by the
complainants and remitted the same to Ramirez; that complainants actually transacted with Ramirez and not with her and that
she was only forced to execute the promissory notes.

On November 9, 1994, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of estafa. Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review,
petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration. On June 28,
2001, the CA, in the its Resolution, denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9,
Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA but the appellate court denied the same, on August 17, 2001. Displeased with this
series of denials, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing all the issuances of
the CA.

ISSUE: WON SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS THE PROPER REMEDY AVAILED
OF BY THE PETITIONER.

RULING: No. The petition is the wrong remedy to question the appellate court’s issuances. Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA
may file a verified petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to
petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action for
certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co- exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature
of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those
questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal,
not certiorari as a special civil action.

Granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still the Court cannot grant the writ prayed for
because there is no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now
without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial
cannot be extended, except in cases before the Supreme Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant
the extension requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration.

It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing of a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision, the challenged decision has already attained
finality and may no longer be reviewed. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute for the lost appeal— certiorari is
not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. When a decision
becomes final and executory, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court will have the power to
review the said judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of
justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.

HEIRS OF SPS. RETERTA VS. SPS. MORES

655 SCRA 580

TOPIC: Subject of appeal

FACTS: Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City,
averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having
inherited the land from their father and his predecessors in interest, who had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966
that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by
virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the
respondents. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence.

RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Considering further that the land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of
the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands
the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the determination whether or not fraud had been
committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is
of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the same was denied. The petitioners had challenged the
dismissal by petition for certiorari, but the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on the ground that certiorari was
not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s
dismissal of the case

HELD: No. Nonetheless, the CA should have given due course to the petition.

RATIO: The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that the order granting the
respondents motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was
an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only
when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Nonetheless, the petitioners posit that a special civil action for certiorari was their proper remedy to assail the order of
dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure, specifically pointing out that the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of
the Rules of Court (An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal
from the judgment or final order) prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (No appeal may be taken from: xxx An order denying a motion for
new trial or reconsideration) expressly declared that an order denying a motion for reconsideration was not appealable.
They remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly provided that in the instances where the judgment
or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The petitioners
position has no basis.

For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents motion to
dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final
order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called
for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy. The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on
one hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, viz: The
concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of right [final and
executory]), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at
the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the
task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which among others, may
consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course,
to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and
executory. xxx Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except
only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against
the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the
respondents motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly: Section 9.
 Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is
logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or
changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues,
contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify
the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.[10] By denying a motion for reconsideration, or
by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order,
and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of
the judgment or final order itself. The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section
1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May 15, 2002
included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit: Section 1. Subject of appeal. An
appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order denying a motion
for new trial or reconsideration; (b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking
relief from judgment; (c) An interlocutory order; (d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) An
order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) An order of execution; (g) A judgment
or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and (h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65. (n)

It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41,
supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-
appealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on
that basis would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time
when it issued its assailed final order. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when
appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition for
certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due
course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC
granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy
despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as:

a. when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party;

b. where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment;
c. where there may be danger of a failure of justice;
d. where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient;
e. where the issue raised is one purely of law;
f. where public interest is involved; and
g. in case of urgency.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or
preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy
remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
 failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in
order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of
Court. Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper remedy against an
assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to overcome the ordinary
disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it
conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to
destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the
court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus,
and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances
of each particular case as the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

MANALOTO VS. VELOSO III

632 SCRA

TOPIC: Fresh Period Rule

FACTS: Manaloto, et al.alleged that they are the lessors of a residential house located at Quezon City which was leased to
Veloso for a monthly rental of 17k. Despite repeated demands, Veloso failed to pay the monthly rentals. Thus, Manaloto et al.
filed an unlawful detainer case against Veloso. Veloso denied the non-payment of rentals and alleged that he made an advance
payment of P825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done on the leased property. Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor
of Manaloto and ordered Veloso to vacate the premises and pay the rentals. Veloso appealed to RTC br.88. While the appeal
is still pending, Veloso filed a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages with the RTC br. 227. The said complaint
alleged two cause of action:

o 1stCause of action was for damages, because he supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when Manaloto
distributed copies of MeTC decision to the Homeowners
o 2nd Cause of action was for Breach of Contract, since Manaloto failed to repair and preserve the property. Manaloto filed
an Omnibus Motion praying for the dismissal of Veloso’s complaint. He alleged that Veloso had no cause of action
against them because the MeTC decision was a matter of public record and its disclosure to the public violated no law or
any legal right of the respondent. RTC br. 227: dismissed Veloso’s Complaintfor violating the rule against splitting of
cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of a related case.CA: affirmed with modification

- Affirmed the dismissal of 2nd Cause of action (Breach of Contract)

- Reversed the dismissal of 1st Cause of Action.
- Veloso may have stated the same factual antecedents that transpired in the unlawful detainer case, such allegations were
necessary to give an overview of the FACTS leading to the institution of another case between the parties before the RTC
acting in its original jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals is correct in holding the petitioners liable for damages even without any
hearing or trial since petitioners, in filing their omnibus motion praying for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint on the
ground of “no cause of action,” were deemed to have hypothetically admitted as true the allegations in said complaint.

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious. We note, at the outset, that the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-Branch
227 of respondent’s second cause of action against petitioners (e.g., for breach of contract) was no longer disputed by the
parties. Thus, the present appeal pertains only to respondent’s first cause of action (e.g., for damages), and in connection
therewith, we are called upon to resolve the following issues: (1) whether respondent timely filed his appeal of the Resolution
dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 before the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether respondent is entitled to the
award of moral and exemplary damages.

We answer the first issue on the timeliness of respondent’s appeal affirmatively.

Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court
dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 (2009),
we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes
v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new
procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted.

The fresh period rule has retroactive application to cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity — procedural laws
may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights
in the rules of procedure.

LATORRE VS. LATORRE

617 SCRA

TOPIC: Appeals, Rule 41, 42, 45

FACTS: Petitioner Generosa Latorre filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Collection and Declaration of
Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, Luis Esteban Latorre, and one Ifzal Ali.

Petitioner averred that, respondent and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease over a 1,244-square meter real property, situated
at Makati City. Under the said contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and registered owner
of the subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration therein was erroneous because she and respondent
were co-owners of the subject property in equal shares.

Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC dismissed petitioner's claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between
petitioner and respondent.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, stating that the case filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of possession of a real
property situated at Makati City, the same should have been filed and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who,
undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied.

Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating the venue as jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's complaint as a
real action.

Petitioner came directly to the Supreme Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of
the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law.

ISSUE/S: Whether the petitioner was correct in going directly to the Supreme Court.

RULING: No. In Murillo v. Consul, the Supreme Court laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of FACTS, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged FACTS.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of FACTS, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged FACTS. For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.

In her Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioner prayed that the Court decide the case on the merits. To do so, however,
would require the examination the Court of the probative value of the evidence presented.

Taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, the Court. It
thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.

ALFREDO VS. BORAS

404 SCRA 145
FACTS: Sps. Godofredo sowns a parcel of land measuring 81,524 sq. Meters in Hermosa Bataan. They mortgaged said
property for Php 7,000 with the DBP. To pay the debt, Sps. Godofredo sold the land to Sps. Borras for P 15,000, the buyers to
pay the DBP loan and its interest and the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.

Sps. Borras later found out that Sps. Godofredo likewise sold the property to several buyers in January 1994.
On March 7, 1994, sps. Borras filed a complaint for specific performance against Godofredo before RTC Bataan. The RTC
ruled in favor of the sps. Borras and was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the factual findings of the
court are well supported by evidence.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition may be given due course
RULING:
NO.

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts.The factual
findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from
the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree
with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts

PEOPLE VS. CORPUZ

412 SCRA 479

TOPIC: Review of factual findings of the trial court.

FACTS: Private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-
Moher International Placement Services Corporation to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan. They were
accompanied by a certain "Aling Josie" who introduced them to the agency’s President and General Manager Mrs. Evelyn
Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they were told to return to the office
with P10,000.00 each as processing fee. Private complainants returned to the agency to pay the processing fees but Mrs.
Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called appellant on the telephone to ask her to receive the processing fees.
Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan employers.

Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private complainants decided to ask for the refund of their
money from appellant who told them that the processing fees they had paid were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they
talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she received from appellant was in payment of the latter’s debt. Thus,
private complainants filed their complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation which led to the arrest and detention of
appellant.

While the case was before the trial court, private complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellant’s
sister-in-law. Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance from participation in the case against appellant. Appellant
resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of Mrs.
Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation, where she had been
working as secretary. The trial court rendered the decision finding the appellant guilty as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should review the factual findings of the RTC.

HELD: It is axiomatic that findings of FACTS of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and
probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct,
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial
court. However, this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent FACTS and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception obtains in this case.

The records of the case show that Alga-Moher International Placement Service Corporation is a licensed land- based
recruitment agency. Its license was valid until August 24, 1999. Likewise, appellant was its registered secretary while Mrs.
Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is its President/General Manager. Part of its regular business activity is to accept applicants who
desire to work here or abroad. Appellant, as secretary of the agency, was in charge of the custody and documentation of the
overseas contracts. It is clear that all appellant did was receive the processing fees upon instruction of Mrs. Reyes. She neither
convinced the private complainants to give their money nor promised them employment abroad.

In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found that the prosecution failed to establish that
appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant started her employment
with the agency on May 1, 1998 and she was tasked to hold and document employment contracts from the foreign employers.
She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the business was managed. The trial court’s finding that
appellant, being the secretary of the agency, had control over its business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary
basis.

PAL VS. CA
417 SCRA 196

TOPIC: In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by this Court

FACTS: Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 53), Sorsogon, Sorsogon, a complaint for damages
against petitioner. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence presented by private respondents. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court in toto and denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition of PAL, petitioner arguing that while ordinarily, the findings of the CA are
accepted as conclusive by this Court, there are instances when the Court may make its own findings such as when the
appellate court based its findings on speculation, surmises or conjectures.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling.

RULING: We find no reason to disturb the affirmance by the CA of the findings of the trial court

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us
especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or
weigh the evidence all over again. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit:

(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals was based on a misapprehension of FACTS; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting;
(f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant FACTS not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or
are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the FACTS set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.

Petitioner invokes exception (b).

The truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. In the present case, it cannot be
said that the quality of the testimony of petitioner’s lone witness is greater than those of the private respondents. Fojas
testified that when respondents went to the check-in counter, there were no more persons in that area since all the passengers
already boarded the plane. However, the testimonies of Manuel Baltazar and Judy Amor point to the fact that many
passengers were not able to board said flight, including confirmed passengers, because of overbooking.

It is a well-entrenched principle that absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable error in its findings, this
Court will not question the probative weight accorded by the lower courts to the various evidence presented by the parties. As
we explained in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC Leasing & Financing Corporation:

The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over
again…So long as the findings of FACTS of the Court of Appeals are consistent with or are not palpably contrary
to the evidence on record, this Court shall decline to embark on a review on the probative weight of the
evidence of the parties. (Emphasis supplied)

It is also well established that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal except on very strong and cogent grounds. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the trial court
committed any error in upholding the testimonies of private respondents’ witnesses. We find that the CA committed no
reversible error in sustaining the findings of FACTS of the trial court.

In fine, the findings of fact of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, have to be respected. As we have
consistently held, trial courts enjoy the unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct
of witnesses as they give their testimonies. Thus, assignment to declarations on the witness stand is best done by them who,
unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh firsthand the testimony of a witness.

AUGUSTO VS. RIOS

417 SCRA 408

DOCTRINE: An appeal may be taken only from a final order and not from an interlocutory one; A final order is one
which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined; An order is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.

FACTS: Felisa Augusto and her siblings, were the co- owners of a parcel of land located in Barrio Mactan, Opon, Cebu.

On April 20, 1961,Felisa, Jose, Magdalena and Alfonso, all surnamed Augusto, sold the property to Guillermo Omolon for
P200.00. Guillermo Omolon and his wife, Cleofe Omolon, caused the aforesaid document to be registered in the Office of the
City Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City. Guillermo Omolon died intestate and was survived by Cleofe Omolon. Sometime in July
1995, Cleofe Omolon filed a petition for the reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot No. 4429, before the RTC and on
January 10, 1997, the RTC granted the same.
However, upon presentation of the aforesaid order to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, Cleofe
was informed that the owner’s copy had already been issued to Ruben Augusto, pursuant to an Order issued by the court dated
August 23, 1996, and that based on the record, the same was in the possession of Atty. Noel Archival. Hence, on May 14,
1997, Cleofe filed a petition before the RTC, alleging that as lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every
right to have and hold the owner’s duplicate of the said OCT. She prayed that after due proceedings, the respondents Ruben
Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the owner’s copy of the said title: In their Comment on the petition,
therein respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival alleged, inter alia, that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Felisa, Magdalena, Alfonso and Jose, all surnamed Augusto, was falsified and fictitious, and, thus, null and void.

On October 22, 1997, the RTC issued an order directing Atty. Noel Archival to produce the owner’s copy of OCT No. 3560
within 10 days to allow the annotation of Cleofe’s interest, upon which the owner’s duplicate copy of the title may thereafter
be returned. The respondents therein filed a “Motion for a Partial Reconsideration” of the Order alleging that Cleofe’s
interest over the property had been sufficiently protected by the annotation of her adverse claim. The court issued an Order
denying the motion of the respondents therein.

On November 26, 1997, the respondents filed a notice of appeal from the said order to the Court of Appeals. On December 5,
1997, the RTC issued an order denying due course therefor, on its perception that the orders subject thereof were
interlocutory; hence, not appealable.

ISSUE: Whether the October 22, 1997 Order was final and appealable, as the same disposed of the case.

RULING: In this case, the order of the public respondent directing the petitioners to produce the owner’s copy of OCT No.
3560 in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the annotation of the private respondent’s interest over the property is
merely interlocutory and not final; hence, not appealable by means of a writ of error. The public respondent had not fully
disposed of the case as it had not yet ruled on whether to grant the private respondent’s prayer for the surrender of the owner’s
copy of OCT No. 3560.

Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not from an
interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. An order or judgment
is deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on
the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside.
Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final
and appealable. In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.

ESCUETA VS. LIM

512 SCRA 411

DOCTRINE: Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states that a petition provided for in either of the preceding sections
must be verified within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to set
aside…x x x

The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings
and not from the date he actually read the same.

FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals entitled Lim v. Escueta.
Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to quiet title to real property against petitioners.
In her amended complaint, Lim alleged that she bought the hereditary shares of petitioners Rubio, the heirs of Luz Baloloy
and other co-heirs, paying therefore a down payment and earnest money in the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000.00
respectively as agreed in the contract of sale between them. In the said contract, it has been agreed that respondent will then
pay the balance upon acquisition of certificates of titles by petitioners. However, petitioners refused to receive the balance of
P100,000.00 from respondent Lim and failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of titles over the property.

As to petitioner Escueta, despite her knowledge that the lots have already been sold to respondent, it is alleged that a
simulated deed of sale was effected by Rubio in her favor and that such raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s title.

Petitioners filed their separate answers alleging that respondent Lim has no cause of action. The Baloloys failed to appear at
the pre-trial and upon motion of the respondent, the trial court declared the Baloloys in default. The trial court allowed
evidence ex parte in favor of respondent Lim and thereafter rendered partial decision against the Baloloys dated July 23,
1993.

The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and order dated July 4, 1994 but this was denied by the trial court hence
appeal to the CA was taken challenging the order denying the petition for relief.

Trial on the merits ensued between respondent and petitioners Rubio and Escueta. After the trial the court rendered its
decision dismissing the complaint and amended complaint of Lim against petitioners.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s order and partial decision pertaining to the Baloloys but reversed the later decision
pertaining to Rubio and Escueta.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court should review the factual circumstances surrounding the case?

HELD: The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid. Baloloy was represented by
his attorney-in-fact, Alejandrino Baloloy. In the Baloloys’ answer to the original complaint and amended complaint, the
allegations relating to the personal circumstances of the Baloloys are clearly admitted.

"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party during the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof." The
"factual admission in the pleadings on record dispenses with the need x x x to present evidence to prove the admitted
fact." It cannot, therefore, "be controverted by the party making such admission, and is conclusive" as to them. All proofs
submitted by them "contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or
not." Besides, there is no showing that a palpable mistake has been committed in their admission or that no admission has been
made by them.

Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel of record. Being
served with notice, he is "charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him." He must "see to it that his client
receives such notice and attends the pre-trial." What the Baloloys and their former counsel have alleged instead in their
Motion to Lift Order of as in Default dated December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of Bayani Baloloy’s special power of
attorney in favor of their former counsel, not that they have not received the notice or been informed of the scheduled pre-
trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived
it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the proceedings. For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy was properly
declared in default. Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
FACTS constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above-cited rule. "The 60-day period is reckoned from the time
the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same."

The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr., the former counsel of record of
the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision dated June 23, 1993 on April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is
still their counsel of record. The reckoning of the 60-day period therefore is the date when the said counsel of record received
a copy of the partial decision which was on April 5, 1994. The petition for relief was filed by the new counsel on July 4, 1994
which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days beyond the 60-day period. Moreover, the records further show that
the Baloloys received the partial decision on September 13, 1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards which bear the
numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino Baloloy.

SPRINGFIELD DEV. CORP VS. RTC JUDGE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL

514 SCRA

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The principal issue presented for
resolution is whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction to annul final judgment of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Petra Capistrano Piit and Springfield owned a lot which the DAR placed it as a
property under the coverage of RA. 6657 (CARP). After DARAB gave due course to the Notice of Coverage, Springfield
and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for annulment of the DARAB
Decision and all its subsequent proceedings. The RTC issued an Order dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul the judgment of DARAB
2. Whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the CA.
RULING:

1. NO.

The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its
adjudicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on December 26,
198827 specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of its decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1
states:

SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on
any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian
reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an appeal
to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator appealed from, shall be immediately executory.

Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB
decisions to the CA.28
The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means
that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.29

Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co- equal body
with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the
RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any
jurisdiction to entertain the same.

2. No. As previously noted, Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul
judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, 30 the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA that it
has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing Section 9 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts." This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals,31where the Court ruled that that the CA is
without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of judgment of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Recent rulings on similar cases involving annulments of judgments of quasi-judicial bodies are also quite instructive on
this matter.

In Cole v. Court of Appeals,32 involving an annulment of the judgment of the HLURB Arbiter and the Office of the President
(OP), filed with the CA, the Court stated that, "(U)nder Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment
is confined to decisions of the Regional Trial Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Consequently,
the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial
bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.

YUK LIK ONG VS. CO

752 SCRA 42

TOPIC: APPEAL BY CERTIORARI

FACTS: Yuk Ling Ong, a British-HK national, and Benjamin Co, a Filipino, were married on Oct. 3, 1982. Sometime in
Nov. 2008, Ong received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation directing her to appear because her
permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings due to the apparent nullification of their marriage in
court. Apparently, Co filed separate petitions for the declaration for nullity of marriage on the ground of PI before the RTC-
Manila on April 26, 2001 (address @ Manila) and July 19, 2002 (address @ QC) containing completely different addresses
for the respondent. The RTC issued summons on July 29, 2002 and the process server stated that on Aug 1, 2002, substituted
service of summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The summons and petition were
received by Mr. Espinosa, a security officer. On Dec. 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding their marriage void ab
initio due to PI and that Ong failed to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary period.

Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 before the CA on Nov. 24, 2008 claiming that she was never
notified and to nullify the Dec. 11, 2002 decision on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction due to the
deliberate indication of a wrong address and that the alleged substituted service of summons was made on a security
guard of their townhouse and not a member of her household. The CA held that there was no sufficient proof to establish
that Co employed fraud to ensure her non-participation and that the substituted service of summons to a security guard
is valid as per Robinson and Miralles.
 ISSUE/S:

1. WON RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
2. WON the FACTS proven constitute extrinsic fraud under Rule 47 of the ROC
RULING: NO. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to
reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being
bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. Her contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud, however, is
too unsubstantial to warrant consideration. The discussion shall then focus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in
court. The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc) discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of
summons:

1. Impossibility of prompt personal service – there must be several attempts (AT LEAST THREE TRIES, preferably on two
diff. dates) within a reasonable period of ONE MONTH and the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful.
2. Specific details in the return – sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the FACTS and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service, the effort made to find the defendant (including time, date, place, etc.) and the reasons behind
the failure.
3. A person of suitable age and discretion – sheriff must determine that the recipient must be of legal age, what the recipient’s
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and
his duty to deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the same.

In the case at bar, the Server’s Return indicates that the process server immediately opted for substituted service of summons
after only two days from the issuance of the summons nor does it indicate sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the
process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner nor did it expound on the competence of the security officer to
receive the summons on behalf of Ong. Aside from the server’s return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records
which would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the summons nor claim that Ong made any voluntary
appearance and actively participated in the proceedings. SC REVERSED THE DENIAL OF ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT BY THE CA.

DE VERA VS. SANTIAGO

759 SCRA 431

DOCTRINE: The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the MTC, MeTC, and MCTC in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate
jurisdiction; all cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. Hence,
the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction, and in declaring as moot and academic the
factual issues raised in the respondents' petition for review when it should have proceeded to review on appeal the factual
findings of the RTC. This is because the RTC not only has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitioners' action for
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, but also appellate jurisdiction over the MTC Decision itself.

FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession with damages against respondents before
the (MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan. Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of certain portions of a subdivided land
located at Barangay Patar, Bolinao, Pangasinan. Along with their predecessors-in- interest, petitioners have allegedly been in
actual and continuous possession and occupation of their respective
portions of the land since 1967, without disturbance from any third person. Later on, however, they discovered that their
respective lots covered by Lot 7303 were already covered by Free Patent Titles in the names of respondents, except Eugenio
Santiago, Sr., which were acquired through manipulation, misrepresentation, fraud and deceit.

Petitioners also claimed that their open, continuous and exclusive possession of the lot for at least a period of thirty (30)
years prior to the issuance of the Free Patent Titles, ipso jure converted it into a private property. In support of their claims,
petitioners attached to their complaint copies of their respective tax declarations. They also prayed to be declared as
absolute owners of the lot, for respondents to reconvey to them the whole area of the same lot, and for the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses.

In their Answer, respondents specifically denied the material allegations in petitioners' complaint and countered that they are
the owners of the land. They insisted that their acquisition of titles over the land was regular and done in accordance with
law. They also claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest are the actual possessors and owners of the disputed land
as shown by their titles and tax declarations.

As part of their affirmative defenses, respondents alleged that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. As the combined
assessed value of the disputed land is more than P20,000.00, the case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC
pursuant to Section 19, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), as amended. They also alleged that titles
over the land has already acquired the status of indefeasibility as they were issued as early as 1996, and they were
also issued tax declarations over their titled properties. They claimed to have acquired the land from Eugenio Santiago,
Sr., as shown in the Deeds of Sale which were all duly registered with the Register of Deeds, Alaminos, Pangasinan in 1991
and 1992. They noted that the only documents of petitioners are tax declarations which were issued as "new" in 1990 without
any proof of acquisition, hence, inferior to the Original Certificate of Titles and Tax Declarations issued to respondents.

MTC ruled for the respondents dismissing petitioners complaint, petitioners filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan. RTC ruled for the petitioners. Respondents filed with the CA a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA granted the petition for review, and annulled and set aside the Decisions of both
the RTC and the MTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. For the same reason, the CA declined to resolve and deemed as
moot and academic the other factual issues raised in the petition. CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its
Decision, hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners contend that while the MTC of Bolinao, Pangasinan, is without jurisdiction to act upon the action for
reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, involving a land with an assessed value of more than P20,000.00,
the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, nonetheless correctly assumed jurisdiction thereon on appeal pursuant to Section 8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

For their part, respondents counter that Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the case at bar, as it refers
only to cases where the lower court (MTC) dismissed a case filed with it without trial on the merits, and an appeal to the RTC
was taken from the order of dismissal. In which case, according to respondents, the RTC may reverse the dismissal and, if it
has jurisdiction, shall try the case on the merits as if the case were originally filed with it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 8, Rule 40 applies, granting the RTC jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: Yes. While the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance and
recovery of ownership and possession of a land with an assessed value over P20,000.00, the same cannot be said of its
ruling with respect to the RTC. Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite
having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC.

The Court explained that the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued
without trial of the case on the merits, while the second paragraph deals with an appeal from
an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for
dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Verily, the second paragraph refutes respondents' contention that Section 8, Rule 40
refers solely to cases where the MTC dismissed a case filed therein without a trial on the merits and an appeal to the
RTC was taken from the order of dismissal. Therefore, the RTC correctly proceeded to decide the case on the merits despite
the MTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for
purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction; all cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective
of the amount involved. Hence, the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction, and in declaring
as moot and academic the factual issues raised in the respondents' petition for review when it should have proceeded to
review on appeal the factual findings of the RTC. This is because the RTC not only has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, but also appellate jurisdiction over the MTC
Decision itself.

Additionally: On question of law and fact, in relation to the propriety of a petition for certiorari under Rule 45

There is a Question of Law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of FACTS and which
does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. Undeniably, the issue
whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law. The resolution of such issue
rests solely on what the law [B.P. Blg. 129, as amended] provides on the given set of circumstances as alleged in petitioners'
complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages. Meanwhile, the factual questions necessitating a
review of the evidence presented by the parties are raised in the respondents' petition for review filed with the CA. An issue
is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged FACTS, or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.

PNCC VS. ASIAVEST

767 SCRA 458

TOPIC: Contents of Appellant’s Brief.

FACTS: PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company
known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural roads and
bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia.

In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate that Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC of its construction
contracts . . . and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC. These contracts were understood to be governed
by the laws of Malaysia. There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of
Pahang to demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds. It "entered into a
compromise agreement with the State of Pahang by paying . . . the reduced amount. Consequently, the corporation demanded
indemnity from PNCC by demanding the amount it paid to the State of Pahang.
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money against PNCC before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian laws. PNCC filed Motions for extension of time to file its Answer on May
18, 1994, June 2, 1994, and June 17, 1994. The trial court granted these motions, with the last one set to expire on
July 3, 1994. On July 4, 1994, PNCC filed a Motion for another five-day extension.
 The trial court denied this Motion on July 13, 1994. On July 27, 1994, the trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to
file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte. The
Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad.

On January 30, 1995, the trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default. It also denied PNCC's Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. PNCC brought its case before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed PNCC's
appeal for raising pure questions of law exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration.

r not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the two Malaysian corporations, Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. and Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd., should ha

ourt enumerates the required contents of an appellant's brief. In paragraph (e), the appellant's brief must include "[a] clear and concise statement of the issues

In its appellant's Brief before the Court of Appeals, petitioner only assigned the following two errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AS IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE C

COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AD CAUTELAM FILED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT DEPRIVED THE LATTER

The argument on the two Malaysian corporations was raised by petitioner for the first time in its Motion to Lift Order of Default with Affidavit of Me

sideration Ad Cautelam dated December 21, 1994, praying, among others, that it "be considered as Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated Novem

has held that "[i]t is essential, to boot, that that party demonstrate that he has a meritorious cause of action or defense; otherwise, nothing would be gained by

Petitioner's bare allegations fail to convince. The bases of its argument to implead and hold the two Malaysian corporations
liable are the subcontract agreement and guaranty agreement. Copies of these agreements were not submitted with any of its
pleadings. Thus, the lower courts could not have determined for certain whether the two Malaysian corporations did enter into
the alleged agreements, the subject of the agreements, or the extent of their liabilities, if any.

nt in relation to the two Malaysian companies. Defendant also directly guaranteed to plaintiff, jointly with Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd., the repayment of ce

However, there was no factual finding on the connection between the "financing facilities" received by Asiavest- CDCP from
respondent, and the performance bond transactions respondent now claims from. This was argued by respondent in its Brief
before the Court of Appeals as follows:

The suit below was not filed to collect repayment of those financing facilities, whether against the entity that received the
facilities or its guarantors. It was filed to enforce PNCC's obligation to indemnify plaintiff Asiavest on its performance bond
payments to project owners that PNCC had abandoned. The Asiavest performance bonds were transactions different from the
"financing facilities" PNCC refers to. The Asiavest indemnification claims, and the bonds and other contracts on which they
were based, were clearly identified in the complaint.
Also, since petitioner mentioned its argument on the two Malaysian corporations in its Motion to Lift Order of Default and
Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam filed before the trial court, these were already considered by the lower court when
it ruled on both Motions.

Assuming that the subcontract agreement indeed provides that Asiavest-CDCP would answer any liability upon default on the
performance bond, petitioner may later claim reimbursement from this Malaysian corporation the amount it was made to pay
by judgment in this suit.

MARAVILLA VS. RIOS

767 SCRA 522

DOCTRINE: R42 S3 – Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements regarding the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

FACTS: Joseph Rios filed a criminal case against Teddy Maravilla for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries before the MTCC of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. Rios accused Maravilla of recklessly driving his jeep
which caused it to collide with the motorcycle he (respondent) was then driving; as a result, respondent was injured and
incapacitated to work for more than ninety days.

After trial, the MTCC rendered judgment acquitting herein Petitioner of the crime charged against him. However, the court
finds preponderance of evidence to hold him liable for damages.

Respondent interposed an appeal before the RTC which modified the decision of the court by deleting the award of
temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and finding respondent liable to pay private complainant Joseph Rios the
amount of P256,386.25 as actual and compensatory damages.

Petitioner (Maravilla) filed a Petition for Review with the CA which the latter dismissed for failure of the petitioner to
comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules - "xxx b. Some relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents, which are
necessary for a better understanding and resolution of the instant petition, were not attached therein, in violation of Section
2(d), Rule 429 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: i. Copy of the information filed before the municipal trial court; ii. Copy
of the appellant’s brief filed before the RTC; iii. Copy of the appellee’s brief, if any; iv. Other pieces of evidence/documents
adduced before the lower court. MR denied.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for review under Rule 42 due to technicalities

HELD: No. Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for review shall be
accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for
the dismissal thereof.

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 695 SCRA 10 (2013), this Court held that there are three guideposts in determining the
necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit: First,
not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and
pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations
in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court
to give due course to the petition. Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended
if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the
material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy
of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given
due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it
will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. The guideposts, which equally apply to a
petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached
documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA VS. MARCO

757 SCRA 222

Doctrine: The rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution is based on the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
Under this doctrine, a final and executory judgment "is removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered
it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it."

FACTS: Governor Ramoncita P. Ong (Governor Ong) permanently appointed. Hilario Marco as Cooperative Development
Specialist II on June 25, 2004, five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the Province. On June 28, 2004,
Marco’s appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field Office-
Aurora (the Field Office). His appointment, along with 25 other appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that
funds were available for the position.

When the new Governor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo took over, the appointments made by Gov Ong were revoked
based on the recall made by Budget Officer regarding the availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration
from the CSC Regional Office but was denied. On appeal, the CSC through a resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the
appointment on the ground that it complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the certification did not affect its validity
because evidence was not presented. On July 22, 2008, Provincial Administrator Alex N. Ocampo (Provincial
Administrator Ocampo), on behalf of the Province, filed before the Civil Service Commission a Petition for Relief on the
ground of extrinsic fraud.

The Civil Service Commission denied outright the Petition for Relief in the Resolution dated November 4, 2008. It
ruled that Provincial Administrator Ocampo had no legal personality to file the Petition for Relief absent an authorization
from the Provincial Governor. Moreover, a petition for relief was not allowed under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Thus, Provincial Administrator Ocampo erred in filing a Petition for Relief.

Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to implement the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an
MR of the Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15-day reglementary period. Marco
maintains that the Civil Service Commission’s Resolution dated April 14, 2008 has long become final and executory.
Therefore, the Resolution may no longer be disturbed. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for certiorari via
Rule 43 against the CSC’s second order implementing the Apr 14 resolution, invoking the constitutional prohibition against
midnight appointments. The CA denied the petition and upheld the CSC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission correctly granted Marco’s request for the Resolution’s implementation

HELD: YES. The Province erred in filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals, as no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution. Instead, it should have filed a petition for certiorari — the appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, should have dismissed the Province’s appeal outright. Rule 50, Section 1(i) of the Rules
of Court allows the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal where the order appealed from is not appealable.
 The rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution is based on the doctrine of immutability of final judgments. Under this
doctrine, a final and executory judgment "is removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further
alter or amend it, much less revoke it." The judgment remains immutable even if it is later on discovered to be erroneous. The
doctrine "is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error,
the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. To allow courts to amend final [and
executory] judgments will result in endless litigation."

ervice Commission. A decision of the Civil Service Commission becomes final and executory if no motion for reconsideration is filed within the 15-day reglement

Failure to file a petition for reconsideration of the Civil Service Commission’s resolution before filing a petition for review in
the Court of Appeals allowed the Civil Service Commission’s resolution to become final and executory. Hence, for all intents
and purposes, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution has become immutable and can no longer be amended or modified.
A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed.

ne 5, 2008 to file a motion for reconsideration.

14, 2008 Resolution became final and executory on June 6, 2008.

ed under civil service rules. Even assuming that a petition for relief may be filed before the Civil Service Commission, the party must show that the assailed

process. It did not even justify why it failed to file a motion for reconsideration despite its receipt of the Civil Service Commission’s Resolution. Contrary to the P

on

THOMASITES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES VS. RODRIGUEZ

728 SCRA 391

TOPIC: Nature of the Petition for relief from judgment; Sec 3 Rule 38

FACTS: On July 29, 2004, Rodriguez, Rillera, and Padrigon, all graduates of the University of the Philippines and holders of
teaching licenses from the Professional Regulation Commission, were hired by Dr. Jae Won Park and Dr. Cheol Je Cho,
Korean nationals and President and Academic Dean, respectively, of TCIS, to develop the academic programs of the said
school, design its curricula, create materials for the school website, recruit
 American and Filipino staff, draft documents required for the school's Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority accreditation, help supervise the construction of the school building in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, as well
as draft the school's rules and regulations and student and faculty handbooks. The parties executed no written contracts but the
respondents were promised a monthly salary of P25,000.00 plus shares of stock.

Disagreements arose between the respondents and the American teachers on the question of salaries. At the meeting called by
Dr. Cho on January 7, 2005, the American teachers threatened to resign unless the respondents were terminated. That same
afternoon, the respondents were served with letters of termination citing as reason the restructuring of the company and
consequent evaluation of its staffing requirements.

They filed with NLRC illegal dismissal and money claims, against TCIS and Dr. Cho.

he complainants moved for issuance of a writ of execution. LA directed the issuance of a writ of execution, which was served on TCIS 's counsel on February 8,

On February 19, 2007, TCIS re-filed its petition for relief, with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, before the NLRC. NLRC denied the petition.

On petition for certiorari, the CA dismissed on May 24, 2012 the TCIS 's petition outright for its failure to indicate the
material dates to show the timeliness of the petition. CA also denied its Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment will prosper

RULING: NO. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there
is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion
for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will
not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to
his own negligence: otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence.

As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly
comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such
judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from
judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the
fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to
1itigation.

The NLRC pointed out that TCIS 's petition for relief was filed beyond the period provided under Rule 38.The earliest that it
could have learned of the LA's judgment was on June 21, 2006 when Dr. Cho received a copy thereof, and the latest was
during the pre-execution conference held on September 22, 2006, when Atty. Bayona formally entered her appearance as
counsel for TCIS and Dr. Cho. TCIS's petition for relief was filed only on February 13, 2007, well beyond the 60-day period
allowed.

Also, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence prevented TCIS from filing an appeal from the decision of
the LA.

XI. RULE 47
 DIONA VS. BALANQUE
688 SCRA 22

TOPIC: Grounds for annulment of judgment

DOCTRINE: While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based
only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional
ground to annul a judgment.

FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner, payable by a Real Estate Mortgage. When the debt became
due and upon failure of respondents to pay, the petitioner filed a complaint. The RTC granted the complaint but awarded 5%
per month interest.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their
former counsel of the RTC’s Decision. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According to the other respondents, they had no
knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTC’s Decision
be set aside and a new trial be conducted.

RTC issued a Writ of Execution. However, since the writ could not be satisdied, petitioner moved for the public uaction of the
property which the RTC likewise granted. The auction sale was conducted with the petitioner as the only bidder.

RTC granted respondents’ motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum.

sed its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per annum. It ruled that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction. However, the proper

Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 672).

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in
G.R. SP No. 85541 which granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that
portion of the October 17, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding petitioner
5% monthly interest rate for the principal amount of the loan respondent obtained from her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave and serious error of law when it granted the petition for
annulment of judgment as a substitute or alternative remedy of a lost appeal
 HELD: No. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to
the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final,
the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul
a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if,
upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of
due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party.
They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations
require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought
by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed
relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default
than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is
allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section
3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint.

SANTOS VS. SANTOS 737 SCRA 637

TOPIC: Rule 47 Annulment of Judgment

DOCTRINE: The Proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to
annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively death has
never been absent.

FACTS:

1. July 27, 2007, Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared Celerina Santos presumptively dead after her husband, Ricardo
Santos, filed a petition for declaration of absence of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.
Ricardo Santos married on September 17, 2008.
2. Ricardo Santos alleged in the petition that Celerina Santos and him rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro
Manila and a year later moved to Tarlac City.
3. Ricardo Santos claimed that their business did not prosper therefore Celerina Santos convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong.
4. Celerina Santos allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila and left Tarlac City and was never heard from
again her.
5. Ricardo Santos alleged that he exerted efforts to locate the whereabouts of Celerina Santos but to no avail Celerina’s parents,
relatives and friends gave him no any information.
6. November 17, 2008, Celerina Santos filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the ground of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo Santos, despite his
knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to
Celerina Santos her true residence is in Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.
7. Celerina Santos claimed that she never resided in Tarlac and she never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. She also
claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May
2008 to cohabit with another woman.
8. Court of Appeals issued the resolution dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of
remedy. The proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance
with Article 42 of the Family Code.
9. Celerina Santos filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ resolution. The Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong
remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

RULING: The petition is meritorious.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, resolution has become final, and the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.

Celerina Santos filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from July
27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008.
The petition was, therefore, filed within the four year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is
barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina Santos at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on
her.

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he
contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35 (4) of the
Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of “well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family
Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply”.

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also
the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and subsequent marriage.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration
of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina’s
choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

LASALA VS. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY

767 SCRA 430
Topic: Annulment of judgment

Doctrine: Only two grounds may be recognized in a petition for annulment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Because
it is an exceptional relief, the Rules provide that only two grounds may be availed of in a petition for annulment.

FACTS: Lasala, through his company PSF Security Agency, used to provide security guard services to the NFA. Lasala's
employees who were deployed to the NFA filed with the NLRC a complaint for underpayment of wages and nonpayment of
other monetary benefits. The NLRC ruled for the employees and held Lasala and the NFA solidarily liable for the employees'
adjudged monetary award. Consequently, the sheriff garnished the bank deposits with the Development Bank of the
Philippines.

Believing that it had no liability to Lasala's employees, the NFA filed with the RTC-QC, a complaint for sum of money with
damages and an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Lasala.

Although the NFA's complaint was dismissed, Lasala's counterclaim remained, and he presented evidence to support it.
Interestingly, Atty. Cahucom, the NFA's new counsel, did not submit any evidence to controvert Lasala's counterclaim
evidence. When asked during trial, Atty. Cahucom simply waived his right to cross-examine Lasala and did not exert any
effort to counter his testimony.

Despite the huge award to Lasala, the NFA failed to appeal its case to the CA. Atty. Cahucom did not inform the NFA's
management about the trial court's adverse ruling. When asked to explain, he reasoned out that he only discovered the
decision after the lapse of the period for appeal. Having lost its chance to appeal, the NFA filed with the trial court a
petition for relief from judgment grounded on excusable negligence. In its petition, the NFA through Atty. Cahucom,
attributed its failure to appeal to one of the NFA's employees. Allegedly, this employee received the copy of the trial court's
decision but did not inform Atty. Cahucom about it. It was only after the lapse of the period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration and an appeal that the NFA learned about the adverse ruling.

The trial court did not accept the NFA's reasoning; thus, it denied the petition for relief for insufficiency in substance.

In the meantime, then NFA Administrator Arthur C. Yap had assumed his position. One of his first instructions was the
legal audit of all NFA cases. In doing this, the NFA management found out that the two lawyers (Attys. Mendoza and
Cahucom) assigned to the case against Lasala, grossly mishandled it; hence, causing a huge and unjust liability to the NFA.

Thus, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the NFA, now through the OGCC, filed with the CA a petition
and an amended petition for annulment of judgment of the trial court's decision which had granted a substantially higher
award than what Lasala originally prayed for in his counterclaim.

The CA granted the petition and annulled the trial court's. It ruled that though Lasala's counterclaim is compulsory in nature
the trial court's decision must still be annulled for having been rendered without any jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prior filing of a petition for relief bars the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment.

HELD: The prior filing of a petition for relief does not per se bar the filing of a petition for annulment of
judgment.

Annulment of judgment may only be resorted to if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies, are no longer available without the petitioner's fault.

Thus, the petitioner must be able to provide a plausible explanation for not resorting first to the more common remedies
enumerated under the Rules. As annulment is an equitable remedy, it cannot be used to compensate litigants who lost their
case because of their negligence or because they slept on their rights. This safeguard has
been put in place to address the concern that defeated litigants would use and abuse Rule 47 to avoid or delay an already final
and executory judgment.

In the present case, the NFA actually availed of the remedy of petition for relief at the trial court level. Through Atty.
Cahucom, the NFA, invoking the ground of excusable negligence, prayed that the execution of the trial court's September 2,
2002 decision be restrained, and that its right to appeal be recognized.30 However, the trial court also dismissed this petition
for being insufficient in substance.

There is identity of parties in the petitions for relief and annulment of judgment, but no identity of subject matter and cause of
action.To determine the existence of identity of cause of action between the two cases, the Court has often applied the
identity of evidence test -i.e., whether the evidence to support and establish the present and former causes of action are the
same.

The petition for relief prayed that the execution of the trial court's adverse ruling be restrained, and for the recognition of the
NFA's right to appeal on the ground of excusable negligence. On the other hand, the petition for annulment and its
amendment sought the setting aside of the trial court's decision because of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the pieces of evidence that NFA presented in its petition for relief are different from the evidence it presented in the
current case - the former, grounded on excusable negligence, sought relief from judgment because one of its employees failed
to give a copy of the trial court decision to Atty. Cahucom on time to file an appeal.

The distinctions between the grounds invoked and reliefs prayed for between the two petitions highlight the need for different
pieces of evidence to prove them. Thus, their causes of action are not identical, and res judicata does not bar the filing of the
present petition for annulment.

Only two grounds may be recognized in a petition for annulment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Because it is an exceptional relief, the Rules provide that only two grounds may be availed of in a petition
for annulment. These are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

We rule that the CA committed an error; it violated the restrictive application of a petition for annulment; only extrinsic fraud
and/or lack of jurisdiction may annul a final judgment.

By seeking to include acts committed with grave abuse of discretion, the CA's ruling enlarged the concept of lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for annulment.36 Moreover, grave abuse of discretion is properly addressed not through a
Rule 47 relief but through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Since the NFA availed of a petition for annulment of judgment,
then the CA's disposition must also be confined to findings on the existence of either extrinsic fraud or the trial court's lack of
jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter as explained below.

In a petition for annulment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner cannot rely on jurisdictional defect due to grave abuse
of discretion, but on absolute lack of jurisdiction. As we have already held, the concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to
annul a judgment does not embrace grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.37 In Republic v. G
Holdings,38 we explained:

The NFA did not waive its right to raise extrinsic fraud precisely because the circumstances prevented its inclusion
in the petition for relief. Notably, Atty. Cahucom was the one who drafted and filed the petition for relief, which he based not
on his own negligence, but on that of another NFA employee.

Since part of the extrinsic fraud against the NFA was attributable to Atty. Cahucom, it could not be expected that he would
raise his own act as a ground and incriminate himself in the petition for relief. In our analysis, the NFA could not have availed
of this ground because Atty. Cahucom himself prevented it.

Moreover, it was only in 2002, when then NFA Administrator Arthur Yap ordered a legal audit of all existing NFA cases, that
the NFA's management discovered the mishandling of the case against Lasala.
In these lights, we rule that the prohibition under Section 2, Rule 47 should not apply to the NFA. Although available during
the filing of the petition for relief, the NFA could not have raised this ground because it was fraudulently precluded from
doing so.

Thus, the actions of Attys. Mendoza and Cahucom, under the unique circumstances of this case, amount to extrinsic fraud that
warrants the grant of NFA's petition for relief from judgment.

MANGUBAT VS. MORGA-SEVA

775 SCRA 312

FACTS: In 1974, Gaudencio Mangubat and his filed with RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur a Complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages against respondent Belen Morga-Seva and two other defendants. The RTC ruled in favor of the Mangubat.
Since Belen and her co-defendants' appeal to the CA and later to this Court were both unsuccessful, the RTC Decision became
final and executory. In 1988, Gaudencio and his children as heirs of the deceased Aurelia filed with the same court a
Complaint for Revival of the Decision. They averred that the writ of execution could not be implemented because Belen and
her co-defendants evaded service thereof. And since five years had already lapsed from the date of its entry, Gaudencio and
the heirs prayed for the revival of the RTC Decision. Gaudencio, assisted by Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera (Atty. Herrera) and
Belen by Atty. Junnel M. Relativo, entered into a Compromise Agreement. The RTC approved the agreement. Upon its
finality, the Writ of Execution was ordered issued by the said court. Subsequently in behalf of all the heirs, Abner filed a
Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void. It was alleged therein that Gaudencio acted only on his own behalf
when he entered into the compromise agreement with Belen, hence, the same is null and void for want of consent and
participation of the heirs who were indispensable parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Annulment of Final Order can be granted.

HELD: The Petition fails. It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain
exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. Hence, it is allowed only on
two grounds, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Abner anchors his Petition for Annulment of Final Order on lack of jurisdiction. He posits that the RTC had lost jurisdiction
over the case when its 2001 Decision became final, hence, any issuance subsequent thereto is made without any jurisdiction.
In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is,
the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law." The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions
for revival of judgment had already been upheld by the Court. It was held that "[a]n action for revival of judgment may be
filed either 'in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or
in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.'" Here, the Complaint for revival
of judgment was filed in the same court which rendered the Decision. Undoubtedly, the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.
There is therefore no valid ground for the Petition for Annulment of Final Order that Abner filed with the CA. In any event,
Abner's Petition for Annulment of Final Order was not the proper remedy to nullify the September 25, 2006 Order which is an
interlocutory order. "An interlocutory order refers to a ruling respecting some point or matter between the commencement and
end of the suit, but is not a final adjudication of the claims and liabilities of the parties that are in dispute in that suit.50 The
2006 Order merely dealt with the incidental matter of causing the transfer of the title to the property covered by TCT under
the name of Belen in accordance with the final and executory 2001 RTC Decision after Abner refused to comply with the
directive to deliver the owner's copy thereof.
 SIBAL VS. BUQUEL
778 SCRA 17

FACTS: Respondents Pedro Buquel, Santiago .Buquel, Jr., Rosalinda Buquel and Francisco Buquel inherited from their
parents, Santiago Buquel, Sr. and Faustina Buquel, a parcel of land consisting of 81,022sq. m. covered by OCT No. 0-725
sometime in January 1999.

Petitioner Camilo Sibal and Tobi Mangoba possession of a portion of the property which belonged to Santiago, Sr.
Thereafter, the Buquels made several demands against Sibal and Mangoba for them to vacate and turn over the property, but
the latter refused to do so. Hence, they filed a complaint before the Tuguegarao RTC for recovery of possession and
damages.

The Tuguegarao RTC ruled in favor of the Buquels, Thereafter, said RTC decision became final and executory; hence, the
trial court issued a writ of execution.

Petitioner Sibal filed a Petition for annulment of the RTC decision before the CA, where he raised lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud as ground. The CA dismissed Sibal petition. Sibal l filed a motion for Reconsideration, but the same was
denied. Thus, he filed the instant petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and
2. Whether or not the Buquels were guilty of extrinsic fraud.

HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. Sibal contends that the RTC decision should be annulled on the ground that the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case as the complaint filed merely alleged that the value of the sub3ect property is
P51,190.00, without, however, categorically mentioning its assessed value, and only the real property tax order of payment
was attached to the complaint and not the tax declaration that could determine the assessed value of the property.

According to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, fraud is extrinsic when th unsuccessful party has
been prevented from fully exhibiting his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
away from court, a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had acknowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and
similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a
new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.

As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse party, and the fraud
must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed
by the petitioner's own counsel.

By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character ,i.e., it relates to any fraudulent act
the prevailing party in litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been
prevented from presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. And even in
the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by one's own lawyer. In
the latter case, the remedy of the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where judgment had
been rendered.

Sibal asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense during the proceedings in Civil case
No. 6429 resulted in violation of his right to due process. He claims that this counsel's inexcusable negligence denied him of
his day in court. However, he admitted that he attended only one stage of the proceedings blow, which was the preliminary
conference. He was not aware of the subsequent proceedings as he was totally dependent on his former counsel and would
merely wait for the latter to notify him if his attendance
 would be required. There was likewise no indication that his counsel was in fact in cahoots with the Buquels to obtain the
assailed judgment. Sibal must therefore bear the unfortunate consequences of his actions. As a litigant, he should not have
entirely left the case in his counsel's hands, for he had the continuing duty to keep himself abreast of the developments, if
only to protect his own interest in the litigation. He could have discharged said duty by keeping in regular touch with his
counsel, but he failed to do so. The petition was denied.

XIII. RULE 39

BANES VS. BANES 374 SCRA 340

sion of the net conjugal assets forfeiture of Gabriel’s half share in the net assets in favor of common children; payment of 100,000 as attorney’s fees and surren

Aida filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The RTC gave due course to the execution pending appeal and issued a writ
of execution commanding the sheriff to order the respondent to vacate the house and surrender the Mazda car. It also ordered
the petitioner to post bond to answer for all damages that respondents may suffer.

The CA set aside the judgment.

Upon motion, Aida prayed that she and her children be allowed to occupy the house for she did not have the chance to occupy
it and besides, she posted a bond for damages that respondent may suffer. Respondent on the other hand argued that Aida
chose not to live in the house for she owned two houses in the US where she resides.

ISSUE: WON the execution pending appeal is justified?

HELD: Execution pending is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result
from issuance of writ. Otherwise, the writ may become a tool of oppression and inequity.

In this case, considering the reason cited by Aida, there is no superior or urgent circumstances that outweigh the damages
which the respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. She did not refute the respondent’s allegations that
she did not intend to use the house for she owned two houses in the US where she resides. Merely, putting up a bond is not
sufficient to justify her plea for execution pending appeal.

FAJARDO VS. QUITALIG 400 SCRA 25

DOCTRINE: As frontline officials of the justice system,sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the
performance of their duties. Hence, they must see to it that the final stage in the litigation process is completed without
unnecessary delay.

The sheriff is primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs originating from the
court and its branches, including such as may be properly delegated to him by other courts.
 FACTS: Sheriff Rodolfo Quitalig was charged by Reverend Fernando Fajardo with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and/or dereliction of duty.

Complainant filed a case of ejectment against Datuin. Fernando (Complainant) won. The decision was appealed to the RTC
but was dismissed. The decision became final and executory. Complainant claimed that after the Writ of Execution was
served, defendant (Datuin) asked for a period of 2 weeks for her to remove her property. After 2 weeks he went to Sheriff
Quitalig so that the Writ shall be implemented. In executing the Writ, respondent did not do anything except to ask Defendant
Datuin to bring out her personal properties. In addition a TRO was issued according to respondent.

The Office of the Court Administrator found Respondent to have been negligent in the performance of his duty as a sheriff.
The writ was issued on March 7, 2000 and served on March 9, 2000. The TRO did not ripen into an injunction. The writ was
only implemented only on August 24, 2000 which was more than 4 months.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE SHERIFF WAS REMISS IN HIS DUTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION.

RULING: YES. The SC agreed with the findings of the OCA. Respondent only enforced the Writ dated March 7, 2000 only
on August 24, 2000. Respondent should have immediately implemented and made a return of the Writ after duly serving it
upon the Defendant on March 9, 2000.

He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff. He should have immediately reported to the MTCC that he was unable to
enforce the Writ because another court has issued a TRO. His failure to make a return of a writ within the required period is
nonfeasance.

SANTOS VS. COMELEC 399 SCRA 611

TOPIC:

FACTS: Edgar Santos and Pedro Panulaya were candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in
the 2001 elections. Panulaya was proclaimed the winner. Santos, filed an election protest before RTC where it ruled in favor
of Santos “trial court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while respondent received only 2,105”

Santos, filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Panulaya then appealed to the COMELEC before RTC could have acted
on Santos’ motion. COMELEC, issued a writ of PI against the RTC’s decision, then dismissed Panulaya’s appeal and lifted
the earlier WPI.

Santos, posted bond then RTC, issued a writ of execution “thereby installing petitioner as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan,
Misamis Oriental “. Santos then took his oath and assumed duties. Panulaya then filed an MR before the COMELEC, and
pending resolution of his MR, he filed another petition before the COMELEC, which contained the same prayers.
COMELEC then issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante and enjoining Santos from assuming the
functions of Mayor, Santos filed an MR before COMELEC 1st Division

COMELEC 1st Division did not refer the MR to the COMELEC En Banc

Santos filed a Rule 65 before the SC and filed an Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC

1. To Dissolve The Status Quo Order As It Was Based On An Unverified And Dismissed Petition With Pending Motion
For Reconsideration
2. To Refer This Motion To The Commission En Banc Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

COMELEC then granted the omnibus motion

ISSUES:

1. Did Panulaya commit forum shopping? YES.

2. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC? NO.
3. Was the COMELEC correct in setting aside the RTC order which granted the motion for execution pending appeal?
NO.

HELD: It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above, that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping when he
instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the COMELEC. Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or
order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. For it to exist, there
should be (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same FACTS; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration.

In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was dismissed by the
COMELEC. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental petition, praying for the nullification of the
trial court’s order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and while
the same was very much pending before the COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR
No. 37-2002, wherein he pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the supplemental petition. This is plainly evident from the
respective prayers in the supplemental petition and the petition for certiorari as reproduced hereinabove. In doing so,
respondent, before allowing the COMELEC to fully resolve the incidents in SPR No. 20-2002, both of which were at his own
instance, sought to increase his chances of securing a favorable decision in another petition. He filed the second petition on
the supposition that the COMELEC might look with favor upon his reliefs.

Forum-shopping is considered a pernicious evil; it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the
court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial
processes. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs.

Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his petition should
have been dismissed outright by the COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of
the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court.

The petition for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial court’s orders for the execution of its decision pending appeal.
The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain the
annulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He
should show not merely a reversible error committed by the trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.

We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. In its order granting execution pending appeal, it
held:

It is of judicial notice that for the public official elected last May 14, 2001 elections only a short period is left. Relative to this
Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case, the settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of appeal does not divest the
trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and to resolve pending incidents, i.e., motion for execution pending appeal
(Asmala vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be overemphasized.

However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for execution
of a judgment pending appeal.

We disagree.

While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond are not good reasons, we clearly
stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that:

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based “upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order.” The following constitute “good reasons” and a combination of two or more of them
will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the
remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending
(italics supplied).

The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost one year
of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent
appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to
run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning.
The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election protest was
pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.

Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of
Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the court’s decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the case of
Ramas v. COMELEC in this wise:

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate
execution should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.” The rationale why such execution is
allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, “to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge’s
decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.” Thus:

Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume office, subject to future
contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of
canvassers is composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart
from their being more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the board must act summarily, practically racing
against time, while, on the other hand, the judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better
technical preparation and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature
deliberation before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the immediate execution of decisions
in election cases adverse to the protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there
are, in the sound discretion of the court, good reasons therefor.
 To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC,
bring back the ghost of the “grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest” techniques so often resorted to by devious
politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a
consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.

Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of dismissing outright, the petition in
SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping; and in setting aside the trial
court’s order granting execution pending appeal.

RCBC VS. MAGWIN MARKETING CORP 402 SCRA 592

re to prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered, reversed, and set aside to reinstate the civil case and have it ready for pre-trial are matters which should hav

FACTS: Petitioner RCBC filed on March 4, 1999 a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and Anderson Uy. On
April 26, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of attachment. On June 4, 1999 the writ was returned partially satisfied since only a
parcel of land purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was attached. In the meantime, summons was served on each of the
defendants who filed their respective answers, except for Gabriel Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as party-
defendant as his whereabouts could not be located. On September 21, 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ of
attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a quo denied. Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial, and
for 6 months petitioner and respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, undertook restructuring of the indebtedness of
respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation. Petitioner finally approved a debt payment scheme for the corporation, with only
respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the terms and conditions of the
restructuring. RTC Makati City, on its own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without prejudice the case for failure of
petitioner as plaintiff to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. Petitioner then filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference alleging that only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the already
approved defendant Magwin Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to
the terms and conditions specified in the letter sent by RCBC. This motion was followed by petitioner’s Supplemental Motion
to Plaintiffs Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference affirming that petitioner could not submit a
compromise agreement because only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature. Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the
submissions of petitioner while respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy neither contested
nor supported them. The trial court denied petitioners motion to calendar case for pre-trial for failure of the plaintiff to submit
a compromise agreement.

Petitioner then went to the CA in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA dismissed the petition, for failure to prosecute its
action for an unreasonable length of time is dependent on the following conditions, to wit: a) The submission of the
compromise agreement by petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice; and b) Failure of petitioner to submit the said
compromise agreement shall cause the imposition of the payment of the required docket fees for the re-filing of the case; so
much so that the non-compliance by petitioner of condition no. 1 would make condition no. 2 effective, especially that
petitioners manifestation and motion to set case for pre-trial conference and supplemental motion were denied which in means
that the order was ultimately not set aside considering that a party need not pay docket fees for the re-filing of a case if the
original case has been revived and reinstated.
 ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it did not allow the parties to set the case for pre-trial and dismiss the case after
no compromise agreement was submitted.

HELD: the SC ruled in favor of RCBC.

Petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court may dismiss a case on the ground of
non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is
chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party’s
conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e.,
equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to
achieving the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure
to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to
dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

sign his name on the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and the common concern of the courts a quo was dispatch in the proceedings, the holding o

t willing to contest petitioners allegations, and more critically, since this approach promotes the useless and thankless duplication of hard work already underta

CITY OF ILIGAN VS. PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GR 407 SCRA 554

TOPIC: Execution pending appeal

FACTS: A MOA on a ‘turn-key’ arrangement was drawn by Mayor Quijano with Land Bank Realty Development
Corporation (LBRDC) as General Contractor and PMGI as Developer - Financing Manager. The project to be undertaken was
the construction of a Sports Complex which upon completion shall be turned over to Iligan City for acceptance and the
issuance of Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to enable LBRDC-PMGI to call on the SLC.

The work on the project stopped due to the refusal of some of the occupants to vacate the premises claiming that they have not
been paid their disturbance compensation. By then, PMGI had already accomplished 78.27% of the contracted project
equivalent to P10,957,800.00 of the total project cost of P14,000,000. PMGI requested from petitioner for a deductive change
order to enable it to collect the above-stated amount based on the 78.27% accomplishment of the project. Petitioner claimed
that PMGI’s accomplishment was only 52.89% or equivalent
only to P6,958,861.59 based on the Accomplishment Report. Petitioner refused to pay since the mutually agreed price of
P14,000,000 shall only be paid after the completion of the project and acceptance by it and since the project is not yet
complete, no payment can be paid. The problem on the payment of the affected occupant, which was the cause of the work
stoppage, was accordingly brought to the attention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod which authorized the payment of the
affected occupants in the project site.

PMGI filed a complaint against petitioner for rescission of the MOA and damages. After the filing of petitioner’s Answer, a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed by PMGI which claimed that there was no genuine issue as to the fact of
the obligation of the petitioner since it admitted the accomplishment of 52.89% or equivalent to P6,958,861.59 of PMGI and
that the petitioner had not specifically denied under oath the genuineness of the Letter of Credit and MOA. An Opposition to
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed by petitioner. The trial court granted the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and ruled in favor of PMGI. Petitioner’s MR was denied. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. PMGI filed a Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal which alleged that when the appeal is clearly dilatory, order for execution upon good reasons
may be issued with the discretion of the court. The same was granted over the opposition of the petitioner. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the execution pending appeal was proper or not?

HELD: The Order granting execution pending appeal was proper. Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. There are 3 requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal:

a) a motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;

b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; and

c) the good reasons must be stated in a special order.

Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be obtained until and
unless

(a) the judgment has become final and executory;

(b) the right of appeal has been renounced or waived;

(c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or

(d) having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin -- in
which case, execution shall issue as a matter of right.

On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be allowed except if,
in the court’s discretion, there are good reasons therefor. These reasons must be stated in a special order, because unless these
are divulged, it will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised by the lower
court. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it become
illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who
may have no recourse but to delay.

The good reason relied upon by both the trial and the CA was that the partial adjudication of the case was based on
petitioner’s own admission; hence, any appeal based on that point would be unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed, both
courts ruled that an appeal by petitioner would only serve as “a good and sufficient reason upon which to issue execution.”

The ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the
appellate court will not normally disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be proper, if it is shown that there has
been an abuse of discretion. Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
grant of execution pending appeal. Indeed, a good and sufficient reason upon which to authorize immediate execution is
when an appeal is clearly dilatory.

VILLARUEL VS. FERNANDO

412 SCRA 54

FACTS:

Petitioner Villaruel, issued a memorandum addressed to the respondents detailing them to the Office of DOTC
Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal. After the lapse of 90 days, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their
mother unit. Without acting on respondents’ request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on addressed to
Abarca placing him under “preventive suspension” for 90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave
misconduct.

Respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their mother unit since more than
90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the
Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia the action taken on respondents’ request for reconsideration of the detail order.
Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum directing petitioner to recall respondents to
their mother unit. Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their
mother unit.

Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. the trial court
granted respondents’ prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering petitioner to comply with the order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall respondents to their
mother unit until further orders by the trial court. For petitioner’s continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary
injunction, respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt.
Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial court’s
order.

HELD:

Petitioner not denied of due process. Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard[19] and this opportunity
was not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the
opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioner’s former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This
negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not
relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence[20] and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and
executory.

As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when the application of the general rule would result in
serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for. “

In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the general rule that the
negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the respondents’ allegations in the petition
for mandamus and damages.

MORTA VS. BAGAGNAN

415 SCRA 624
FACTS:

Petitioners filed 2 cases of damages with preliminary injunction with the MTC of Guinobatan, Albay against respondents.

In the complaints, petitioners alleged that respondents, through the instigation of Atty. Baranda Jr., gathered pilinuts, anahaw
leaves and coconuts from their respective land, delivered the same to the latter and destroyed their banana and pineapple
plants.

In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the owners of the land in question. They alleged that the
torrens title is registered to the father of one Josefina Opiana-Baraclan. Respondent Occidental contended that he was a
bona fide tenant of Josefina. They denied the accusations against them.

MTC rendered decision in favor of petitioners.

Respondents then appealed to the RTC questioning the MTC’s jurisdiction that the case was cognizable by the DARAB and not
of the MTC. RTC reversed MTC’s decision ruling that the cases for damages are tenancy-related problems which fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WoN the civil actions for damages are tenancy-related and is cognizable by the DARAB and not of the trial court.

HELD:
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses made by the
defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely
upon the defendant.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction there must exist a tenancy-relationship between the parties. For a tenancy agreement to take
hold over a dispute, it would essential to establish all its indispensable elements:
1. That the parties are the landowner and the tenant/agricultural lessee;
2. That the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3. That there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. That the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5. That there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
6. That the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant/agricultural lessee.

The Court held in Vda. De Tangub v. CA, the jurisdiction of the DAR is limited to the ff:

1. Adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

2. Resolution of agrarian conflict and land-tenure related problems;
3. Approval and disapproval of the conversion of agricultural lands into residential; commercial, industrial and other
non-agricultural uses.

Petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the
land. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants
thereof and is outside DARAB’s jurisdiction.
At any rate, the case cannot be considered as tenancy-related for it fails to comply with other requirements. Thus, for failure
to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35300 and that of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752.

The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay, in Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, for
damages.

SO ORDERED.

SERRANO VS. CA
417 SCRA 415

WRITS OF EXECUTION; SUPERVENING FACTS

The execution of a judgment may be stayed, nothwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed judgment by the Supreme Court
if there are supervening FACTS and circumstances which either have a direct effect upon a matter already litigated and
settled or create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final
judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice.

FACTS: The Spouses Serrano were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon located at Road 4,
Project 6, Diliman, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80384, and a parcel of land located in Caloocan
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15191. The couple mortgaged the said properties in favor of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as security for a loan of P50,000. By June 1969, the couple was able to pay
only the amount of P18,000.

On June 23, 1969, the Spouses Serrano, as vendors, and Spouses Emilio and Evelyn Geli, as vendees, executed a deed of
absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage over the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 80384 and the house thereon
for the price of P70,000. The Spouses Geli paid the amount of P38,000 in partial payment of the property, the balance of
P32,000 to be paid by them to the GSIS for the account of the Spouses Serrano. The Spouses Geli thereafter took possession
of the property. In the meantime, Evelyn Geli died intestate and was survived by her husband Emilio Geli and their children.

Emilio Geli and his children failed to settle the amount of P32,000 to the GSIS. The latter forthwith filed a
complaint against Emilio Geli and his children with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the rescission of the deed
of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage. The defendants therein alleged, by way of special defense, that the
plaintiffs Spouses Serrano failed to furnish them with a detailed statement of the account due from the GSIS, thus amounting
for their failure to remit the balance of the loan to the GSIS. On September 6, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering the rescission of the said deed.

Emilio Geli and his children appealed the decision to the CA on October 19, 1984. During the pendency of the appeal, the
GSIS foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the property for non-payment of the P50,000 loan secured by the said property.
At the sale on public auction, the GSIS was the highest bidder. A certificate of sale over the property was thereby issued by
the sheriff in its favor on August 30, 1986. On October 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987, Emilio Geli paid the redemption
price of P67,701.844 to the GSIS. Official Receipts Nos. 905401 and 901685 for the said amount with the notation “for the
account of Arturo Serrano” were issued. Accordingly, on February 22, 1988, the GSIS executed a certificate of redemption5
and turned over to Emilio Geli the owner’s copy of TCT No. 80384 in the names of the Spouses Serrano. Emilio Geli did not
inform the Spouses Serrano and the CA that he had paid the redemption price to the GSIS.
After the remand of the records, the Spouses Serrano filed with the RTC on January 14, 1994 a motion for the execution of
the trial court’s September 6, 1984 Decision. On February 15, 1994, the trial court issued an order granting the motion and
forthwith issued a writ of execution. The writ, however, was not implemented as the Spouses Serrano were then in the United
States. On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution on motion of the plaintiffs. This, too, was not
implemented, because of the defendants’ change of address. On May 9, 1996, the trial court issued an order granting the
motion of the plaintiffs for a second alias writ of execution. On September 6, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to quash the
same claiming, for the first time, that defendant Emilio Geli had already redeemed the subject property in 1988 from the
GSIS. According to the defendants, this constituted a supervening event that would make the execution of the trial court’s
decision unjust and inequitable.

On May 19, 1997, the trial court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion of the defendants. It noted that the payment by
defendant Emilio Geli of the redemption price to the GSIS took place before the CA dismissed the appeal and before the
decision of the RTC became final and executory; hence, it did not constitute a supervening event warranting a quashal of the
writ of execution.

The appellate court ruled that since Emilio Geli paid the redemption price for the property to the GSIS in 1987 while his
appeal was pending in the CA, the said redemption was a supervening event which rendered the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the trial court against them unjust and inequitable.

Hence, spouses Serrano appealed with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that the
redemption constituted a supervening event which change the relations of the parties, thus rendering execution inequitable
under the premises

HELD: The Supreme Court granted the Petition. Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of right on
the part of the prevailing party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the trial court to enforce its own judgment once it
becomes final and executory. It may happen, however, that new FACTS and circumstances may develop or occur after a
judgment had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new matters had developed after the appeal has
been dismissed and the appealed judgment had become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of and could not
have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that time. In the first
situation, any attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an executory decision must fail. Once a judgment has become
final and executory, the only remedy left for material attention thereof is that provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
as amended. There is no other prerequisite mode of thwarting the execution of the judgment on equitable grounds predicated
on FACTS occurring before the finality of judgment. In the second situation, the execution may be stayed, notwithstanding
the affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court. It is required, however, that the supervening FACTS and
circumstances must either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or create a substantial change in the
rights or relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or
when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice. The interested party may file a motion to quash a writ of execution
issued by the trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and further
supervening FACTS. Evidence may be adduced by the parties on such supervening FACTS or circumstances.

In this case, the payment by Emilio Geli of the amount of P67,701.84 on October 30 and November 3, 1987 to the GSIS for
the account of the petitioners was made while the appeal of the private respondents from the summary judgment of the RTC
was pending. The summary judgment of the RTC had not yet become final and executory. It behooved the said respondents to
prosecute their appeal and file their brief, where they should have invoked the payment of the redemption price as a ground
for the reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment in their favor. The respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the
payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners. Worse, the respondents did not pay the requisite docket fees for their
appeal, which resulted in its dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution of the CA dismissing their appeal. In sum, the respondents allowed the decision of the trial court to become final
and executory.
 Consequently, the enforcement of the summary judgment of the trial court can no longer be frustrated by the respondents’
payment, through Emilio Geli, of the amount of P67,701.84 to the GSIS in 1987.

D’ARMOURED SEC. AGENCY VS. ORPIA

461 SCRA 312

D Armoured Security and Investigation Agency, Inc,, petitioner, Fortune Tobacco filed with the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims

e Tobacco filed an appeal before NLRC. Petitioner, on the other hand, did not appeal. Hence, only the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was dismissed and be

h or Recall Writ of Garnishment. It was denied.

filed with CA a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance a writ of preliminary injunction.

is petition for review on certiorari.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner's monthly receivables from the Foremost Farms, Inc. (garnishee)
are not exempt from execution.

RULING:

We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there
would be no end to litigation.2 On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible. Assuming that an appeal is
proper, still we have to deny the instant petition

Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties are exempt from execution. Section 13
(i) of the Rules pertinently reads:

'SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. - Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property,
and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

xxx

(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal services within the four months
preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family. '

The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the substantive law which
proscribes the execution of employee's wages, thus:
'ART. 1708. The laborer's wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter,
clothing and medical attendance.'

Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant to favor only
laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's labor
for immediate or present support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa v. Court of
Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985)].

It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable for his own and that of his
family's support are exempted under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Undeniably, a corporate entity such as
petitioner security agency is not covered by the exemption.

PEREZ VS. CA 464 SCRA 87

Topic: Effect of Judgments

FACTS: The spouses Digos, secured a loan from the International Exchange Bank to finance their project for the
construction of townhouses. To secure the payment of the loan, the spouses Digos executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM)
over the said property. The construction was delayed resulting to the failure of Sps. Digos to pay their loan which
subsequently caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of their REM. Consequently, the property was sold at public auction, with
the bank as the highest bidder at P4,500,000.00, which appeared to be the account of the spouses Digos at the time. The
Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff was, thereafter, registered at the Office of the Register of Deeds. When the period
to redeem the property was about to expire, sps. Digos ask for an extension from the bank to redeem property, to which the
bank after previous refusal agreed to one month extension. However, instead of repurchasing said property, the spouses filed a
complaint for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and sale at public auction and/or
redemption of the property against the bank. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the trial court.

Thereafter the bank sold the questioned property to petitioners. Subsequently, another complaint was filed by Sps. Digos
against the bank, Perez and Ragua, for the cancellation and annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by them in favor of the bank, the sale at public auction as well as the certificate of sale executed by the
sheriff, and the Torrens title issued to them. The Digos reiterated their allegations in their first complaint that they were not
notified of the sale at public auction, and that the banks P4,500,000.00 bid for the property was unconscionably low
compared to the prevailing market price of P25,000,000.00. They also admitted their failure to pay their amortization on
their loans.
However, they alleged this time that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction
were illegal because the bank charged much more than the amount due on their loan account, to wit: interest of 26% per
annum on the loan account covering January 2, 1998, whereas under the promissory note executed in favor of the bank, the
new interest rate should commence only on March 4, 1993; penalty charges of 26% of the account, and 5% penalty charges on
top of the 26% interest per annum, as shown by the banks statement of account.

The spouses Digos also averred that although they pleaded for a restructuring of their loan account and a moratorium on the
payment of their account, they were unaware of the erroneous computation of the balance of their loan account. They
maintained that the banks consolidation of its title over the property on September 19, 1999 was premature because they were
given until October 8, 1999 to redeem the property. Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on similar grounds of res
judicata, splitting of a single cause of action and forum shopping, which the trial court denied. The MR was also denied.
Upon elevation to via certiorari (rule 65), the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed orders.
The appellate court declared that there was no identity of causes of action in the two cases because the first action was
one for injunction and
redemption of the property, whereas the second action was for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous computation of the balance on the respondents account
with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were not estopped from filing their second action. The petitioners filed a motion
for a reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment in the first case is res judicata to the second case.

HELD: Yes. Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or
claims and instituting two or more actions therein. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or
divided so as to be made the subject of two or more different actions. A single act or omission may be violative of various
rights at the same time, such as when the act constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. The violation of
each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may be violated by several acts or omissions,
there would only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two separate and distinct primary rights are violated by one and
the same wrong; or if the single primary right should be violated by two distinct and separate legal wrongs; or when the two
primary rights are each broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two causes of action would result.

Causes of action which are distinct and independent, although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of fact
may be sued separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on the others. The mere fact that the same
relief is sought in the subsequent action will not render the judgment in the prior action as res judicata. Causes of action are
not distinguishable for purposes of res judicata by difference in the claims for relief. Comparing the material averments of the
two complaints, it would appear that separate primary rights of the respondents were violated by the banks institution of a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction; hence, the respondents had
separate and independent causes of action against the bank, to wit: (a) the first complaint relates to the violation by the bank
of the right to a judicial, not extrajudicial, foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and for an extension of the period for the
respondents to redeem the property with damages; (b) the second complaint relates to the breach by the bank of its loan
contract with the respondents by causing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage for P4,500,000.00 which was
in excess of their unpaid account with the bank.

However, we are convinced that the institution by the respondents of their second complaint anchored on their claim that the
bank breached its loan contracts with them by erroneously computing the actual and correct balance of their account
when the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage was filed by it designed to avert the dismissal of
their complaint due to splitting causes of action and res judicata, following the dismissal of their first complaint and the
dismissal of their appeal through their negligence. The Court is constrained to conclude that this was a last-ditch attempt to
resuscitate their lost cause, a brazen violation of the principle of res judicata.

Section 49(b)(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides in part:

SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: (b) In other cases the
judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity. (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged,
or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata, known as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by judgment, which
refers to a theory or matter that has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
without fraud or collusion. There are four (4) essential requisites which must concur for the application of this doctrine: (a)
finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.

A judgment or order is on the merits of the case when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
ultimate FACTS as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented for trial. It is not necessary that a trial, actual hearing or
argument on the FACTS of the case ensued. For as long as the parties had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their
respective claims and contentions, the judgment or order is on the merits. An order of the trial court on the ground that the
complaint does not state a cause of action is a determination of the case on its merits. Such order whether right or wrong
bars another action based upon the same cause of action. The operation of the order as res judicata is not affected by a
mere right of appeal where the appeal has not been taken or by an appeal which never has been perfected. Indeed, absolute
identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for the application of res judicata. It is sufficient that there is a shared
identity of interest. The rule is that, even if new parties are found in the second action, res judicata still applies if the party
against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, a case can always be renewed by
the mere expedience of joining new parties in the new suit. The ultimate test to ascertain identity of causes of action is
whether or not the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the first and second cases. The application of the
doctrine of res judicata cannot be excused by merely varying the form of the action or engaging a different method of
presenting the issue.

Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. This is the second branch, otherwise known
as collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict. This applies where, between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the
second case wherein such judgment is involved, there is no identity of causes of action. As explained by this Court: It has
been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the
same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the
second. In order that this rule may be applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either from the record itself or by the aid
of competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or question in issue in the second suit was involved and decided in the
first. And in determining whether a given question was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind the judgment to
ascertain whether the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in the second action would have authorized a judgment for the
same party in the first action. In the present case, before the private respondents filed their first complaint, they already
knew that the balance of their account with the bank was P4,500,000.00. They even offered to make a P1,000,000.00 partial
payment of their loan to reduce their account to P3,500,000.00. If indeed the bank made an erroneous computation of the
balance of their account as claimed by the private respondents in their second complaint, this should have been alleged in the
first complaint as one of their causes of action. They failed to do so. The private respondents unequivocably admitted in
their first complaint that the balance of their account with the bank was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise amount for
which the bank sought the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property at public auction; they
even sought judicial recourse to enable them to redeem the property despite the lapse of the one- year period therefor.
Relying on these admissions on the part of the private respondents, and the fact that the bank has already consolidated its
title over the property, the Court thus dismissed their first complaint. The Order of the Court dismissing the first complaint is
a judgment of the case on the merits. The attempt of the respondents in their second complaint to avoid the application of the
principle of res judicata by claiming the nature of their account on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot prosper.
Case law has it that where a right, question
 or fact is distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a first case, between the same
parties or their privies, the former adjudication of that fact, right or question is binding on the parties or their privies in a
second suit irrespective of whether the causes of action are the same. The ruling of the CA that the action of the private
respondents and their legal theory in their second complaint were different from their causes of action and legal theory in the
first complaint is not correct. A different cause of action is one that proceeds not only on a sufficiently different legal theory,
but also on a different factual footing as not to require the trial of FACTS material to the former suit; that is, an action that can
be maintained even if all disputed factual issues raised in the plaintiffs original complaint are concluded in defendants favor.
In this case, the private respondents second complaint cannot be maintained without trying the FACTS material to the first
case, and the second case cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues raised in the first complaint are considered in
favor of the bank. The principle of res judicata applies when the opportunity to raise an issue in the first complaint exists but
the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the pleading of a different legal theory would have convinced the trial court to decide a
particular issue in the first action which, with the use of diligence the plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so,
they are barred by res judicata. Nor do legal theories operate to constitute a cause of action. New legal theories do not amount
to a new cause of action so as to defeat the application of the principle of res judicata. The statement of a different form of
liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong.
Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been
open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first,
merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. It bears stressing that a
party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing
when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for
relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury. A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must
present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor.
He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which
a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to
litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed.

FEBTC VS. TOH SR.

404 SCRA 590

oes not state, enumerate, or give examples of “good reasons” to justify execution. The determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed

FACTS: Tomas Toh, Sr. and sons executed a Comprehensive Security Agreement in favor of FEBTC wherein the Tohs
jointly and severally bound themselves as sureties for the P22 million credit facilities, denominated as Omnibus Line and Bills
Purchased Line, earlier granted by FEBTC to CASICO.

Said credit line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed the same for another year, subject to some amendments.

Toh, Sr. filed before RTC an action seeking recovery of his bank deposits with petitioner in the amount of P2,560,644.68 plus
damages. He claimed that FEBTC had debited, without their knowledge and consent, said amount from his savings and
current accounts with petitioner bank and then applied the money as payment for the Letters of Credit availed of by
CASICO from FEBTC. Thus, when Toh issued two checks to Anton Construction Supply, Inc., they were dishonored by
FEBTC allegedly for having been drawn against insufficient
funds, although Toh alleged as of February 4, 1999, he had an outstanding withdrawable balance of P2,560,644.68.

FEBTC filed an Answer and averred that the debiting of Toh’s bank accounts was justified due to his surety undertaking in
the event of the default of CASICO in its payments. It further claimed that the reduction of credit line does not relieve Toh,
Sr. from his continuing surety obligation, citing the absence of a new surety undertaking or any provisions in the renewal
agreement releasing Toh, Sr., from his personal obligation. It pointed out that CASICO’s default in its obligations became
inevitable after CASICO filed a Petition for Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).

Toh, Sr. filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was granted by the RTC and rendered judgment against FEBTC.

Toh, Sr. filed a Motion for Discretionary Execution invoking Section 2,[5] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. He
prayed that execution pending appeal be granted on the ground of old age and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy
his money deposited in petitioner’s bank.

RTC gave due course to FEBTC’s appeal but also granted the Motion for Discretionary Execution. It hheld that discretionary
execution may be issued upon good reasons by virtue of Section 2(a),[7] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Citing De
Leon v. Soriano,[8] where we held that the approach of the end of one’s life span is a compelling cause for discretionary
execution pending appeal,[9] the trial court used the circumstance of Toh’s advanced age as a “good reason” to allow
execution pending appeal.

FEBTC did not file an MR, and directly filed Certiorari (Rule 65) to the CA. The

CA dismissed the petition and denied ensuing an MR.

ISSUE: WON discretionary execution may be allowed in this case.

HELD: YES.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in sustaining the lower court. Discretionary execution is
permissible only when “good reasons” exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or
pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal. “Good reasons” are compelling
circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party
may, after the lapse of time, become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who
may apparently have no case except to delay.

he Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of “good reasons” to justify execution.
The determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ of execution must necessarily be controlled by the
judgment of the judge in accordance with his own conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free
from the control of another’s judgment or conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of
a hard and fast rule.

In the present case, private respondent Toh is already 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be denied that he
is already of advanced age. Not a few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no one could claim with certainty that
his tribe would be always blessed with long life.

PANOTES VS. TOWNHOUSE DEV. CORP

512 SCRA 269
DOCTRINE: Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one who
did not have his day in court.

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the
prevailing party.

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Rogelio Panotes, president of Provident Village Homeowners Association Inc. with the
National Housing Authority (NHA) against Provident Securities Corporation (PROSECOR) for its failure to provide an open
space in the subdivision.

During the proceedings before the NHA, an ocular inspection showed that the subdivision has no open space. The NHA
found, however, that Block 40, with an area of 22,916 square meters, could be utilized as open space. Thus, in its Resolution
dated August 14, 1980, the NHA directed PROSECOR to provide the Provident Village an open space which is Block 40.
Considering that PROSECOR did not appeal from the NHA Resolution, it became final and executory.

When Panotes filed a motion for execution of the NHA Resolution, it was found that the records of the case were
“mysteriously missing.” Hence, his motion “was provisionally dismissed” without prejudice. Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold to
City Townhouse Development Corporation (CTDC), respondent, several lots in the subdivision. Among the lots sold were
those comprising Block 40. CTDC was unaware of the NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR to have Block 40 utilized as
open space of Provident Village.

Eventually, Panotes was succeeded by Araceli Bumatay as president of the Provident Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
She filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for revival of the NHA Resolution ,
impleading CTDC whom she alleged as successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

In its answer, CTDC averred, among others, that (1) Araceli Bumatay has no legal personality to file the action for revival of
judgment; (2) there is a pending litigation between CTDC and PROSECOR involving Block 40; and (3) other entities like the
Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas and Provident Savings Bank have existing liens over Block 40. The HLURB rendered its
Decision in favor of Bumatay, reviving the NHA Resolution and declaring Block 40 of the Provident Village as “open space”
for the said subdivision.

On appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the decision was affirmed with modification in the sense that CTDC has
the right to recover from PROSECOR “what it has lost.”

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, CTDC then interposed an appeal to the Office of the President (OP). The OP
rendered its Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. CTDC filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.

CTDC then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43.

The appellate court rendered its decision reversing the decision of the OP and dismissing the complaint for revival of
judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA resolution may be enforced against CTDC;

HELD: NO. An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing
party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness
of the first judgment.

Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and PROSECOR, not
between petitioner Araceli Bumatay and respondent CTDC.
In maintaining that CTDC is bound by the NHA Resolution, petitioner claims that CTDC is the successor-in- interest of
PROSECOR and, therefore, assumed the obligations of the latter to provide an open space for Provident Village.

CTDC purchased from PROSECOR Block 40 in the said village, not as an owner-developer like PROSECOR, but as an
ordinary buyer of lots. Even after the sale, CTDC did not become an owner-developer. The Deed of Sale executed by CTDC,
as buyer, and PROSECOR, as seller, shows that the subject matter of the sale is the unsold lots comprising Block 40 within
the subdivision to CTDC. The contract does not include the transfer of rights of PROSECOR as owner-developer of the said
subdivision. Clearly, there is no basis to conclude that CTDC is the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR.

It bears stressing that when CTDC bought Block 40, there was no annotation on PROSECOR’s title showing that the property
is encumbered. In fact, the NHA Resolution was not annotated thereon. CTDC is thus a buyer in good faith and for value, and
as such, may not be deprived of the ownership of Block 40. Verily, the NHA Resolution may not be enforced against CTDC.

Clearly, providing an open space within the subdivision remains to be the obligation of PROSECOR, the owner- developer
and the real party-in-interest in the case for revival of judgment.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE VS. FELIX 508 SCRA 357

DOCTRINE: RULE 39 Execution Pending Appeal; Requisites; Existence of Grounds to Justify Execution Pending Appeal

FACTS: Emerita Garon (private respondent) filed an action for sum of money against Project Movers Realty and
Development Corporation (Project Movers) and Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold Insurance). The RTC of
Makati granted Garon’s motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2000 and ruled in her favor.

On October 6, 2000, Garon filed a motion for execution pending appeal. On October 10, 2000, Stronghold Insurance moved
for the reconsideration of the September 19 Order. The court denied Stronghold Insurance’s motion for lack of merit. On
February 8, 2001, the trial court granted Garons motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court ordered Garon to post a
bond of P20 million to answer for any damage that Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by reason of the
execution pending appeal. The clerk of court issued a writ of execution pending appeal on February 14, 2001.

Stronghold Insurance filed a notice of appeal on February 16, 2001. It also filed for certiorari before the CA on the Order
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution pending appeal. The CA issued a TRO
(temporary restraining order) to enjoin the trial court, Garon, and the clerk of court from enforcing the February 8 Order.

However, notices of garnishment were already served on Stronghold Insure before the CA issued the TRO. Stronghold
Insurance filed for a motion to recall the notices of garnishment, which the trial court denied.

The CA sustained the trial court in issuing the writ of execution pending appeal on the ground of illness of Garon’s husband.
The CA held that while it was not Garon who was ill, she needed the money to support her husband’s medical expenses and to
support her family.

Stronghold Insurance alleged that its liability is limited only to P12,755,139.85 in accordance with its surety bond with
Project Movers, plus attorneys fees of P200,000 as awarded by the trial court. However, the amount in the writ of
execution pending appeal and notices of garnishment is P56 million. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that Stronghold
Insurance failed to show that more than P12,755,139.85 had been garnished.
Hence, the petition before this Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether there are good reasons to justify execution pending appeal.

RULING: No, the Court held that Garon failed to prove that she had provided proof of good reasons to justify execution
pending appeal. The Court held that an execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule.

Execution pending appeal is provided under Sec. 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate
court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

As to its nature, an execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, which is strictly construed against the
movant because the courts do not favor any attempt to execute a judgement which has not acquired finality. It affects the
rights of parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal.

The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the following:

(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;

(b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal;

(c) the good reasons must be stated in the special order.

As a discretionary execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately
executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

The Court defined ‘good reasons’ as special, important, pressing reasons which exist to justify the execution
pending appeal. They must consist of exceptional circumstances of such urgency that outweighs the injury or
damage that the losing party may suffer should the appealed decision be reversed later.

In the instant case, the posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good reasons required under Section 2, Rule
39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow execution pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is not a
good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which
impels the grant of immediate execution.

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY 700 SCRA 69

TOPIC: Foreign judgment

FACTS: In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the Philippines.
But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married another Japanese citizen (Shinichi
Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to Japan.
 In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a Japanese
judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Said decree was granted in the same
year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the Philippines together.

In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)“. He filed the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or
Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be done:

red void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and
ate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Adm

null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that under A.M. No. 02-11- 10-SC or the “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citiz
Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

gn judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.

ct of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandat

Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the sta

Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits,
i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact.”
 RCBC VS. SERRA
701 SCRA 124

DOCTRINE: where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own initiatives and for her advantage as well as
beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to
have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

FACTS: Petitioner Federico Serra, who is the owner of a 374 square meter parcel of land located at Masbate, Masbate, and
private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) entered into a "Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy" in May 25, 1975 which provided that Serra will lease the subject land to RCBC for a period of 25 years from June 1,
1975 to June 1, 2000, that the RCBC has the option to purchase the same at P210.00 per square meter within a period of 10
years from May 25, 1975, the date of the signing of the Contract, and that Serra will have to register said land under the
Torrens System to the Register of Deeds of Province of Masbate within the same 10-year option period. Pursuant to said
contract, RCBC constructed improvements on the subject land to house its branch office, while the petitioner had the
property, within 3 years from 1975, duly registered with OCT No. 0-232 under the Torrens System. Later, petitioner alleged
that as soon as he had the property registered, he kept on pursuing the branch manager for the sale of the lot as per their
agreement, but it was not until September 4, 1984, that RCBC decided to exercise the option.

RCBC informed petitioner, through a letter, of its intention to buy the property at the agreed price of not greater than P210.00
per square meter or a total of P78,430.00, but petitioner replied that he is no longer selling the property. RCBC then filed an
action for specific performance and damages against Serra in March 1985 alleging that during the negotiations it made clear
to petitioner that it intends to stay permanently on property once its branch office is opened unless the exigencies of the
business requires otherwise.

Although finding that the contract was valid, the lower court ruled that the option to buy is unenforceable because it lacked a
consideration distinct from the price and RCBC did not exercise its option within the reasonable time. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, the lower court reversed itself on the 2nd issue, declared the contract as valid, and ordered Serra to
deliver the proper deed of sale to RCBC. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed said decision.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that petitioner RCBC is barred from having its 05 January 1989
decision executed through motion, considering that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, RCBC was unlawfully
prevented by the respondent from enforcing the said decision.

HELD: YES.

Exception to five-year period to move for execution of judgment. The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory
judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five
years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion
even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.

In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own initiatives and
for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the
judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on 15 April
1994. This decision orders Serra to execute an deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC. However, to evade his
obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who then
 transferred it to Liok. Serra’s action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the
execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively
suspended the five-year period to enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision
in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBC’s motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011,
RCBC’s motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a motion.

CBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON VS. RICAFORTE 700 SCRA 778

TOPIC: Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising pure question of law.

FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon". In their complaint,
they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind real properties

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b)
two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense,
he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c)
the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially
declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation
of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name.

RTC Ruling
RTC finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the
plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters
of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the
contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir –
through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia
Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s
failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was
proper.
RULING: Yes, it was proper.

General Rule: The rule is that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the
case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the
decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

Exception: By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.

1. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a
sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

2. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration
of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status
or right.

CITY OF CEBU VS. DEDAMO 689 SCRA 547

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; EMINENT DOMAIN; LEGAL INTEREST

FACTS: The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over two (2) parcels of
land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, on September 17, 1993. The petitioner immediately took possession of the lots after
depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine National Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.

During the pendency of the case, or on December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses Dedamo entered into a Compromise
Agreement whereby the latter agreed to part with the ownership of the parcels of land in favor of the former in consideration
of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P1,786,400.00) as
provisional payment and just compensation in an amount to be determined by a panel of commissioners. Forthwith, the
panel was constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC recommending the sum of P20,826,339.50 as just compensation.
The report was adopted and approved by the RTC in its Order dated December 27, 1996.5
The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then by the Court, in a Decision dated May 7, 2002, when the matter was
elevated for review in a petition docketed as G.R. No. 142971. When the said decision became final and executory on
September 20, 2002,

the case was remanded for execution to the RTC, before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by
Spouses Dedamo on April 4, 2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of the writ.

In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed away and they were substituted in the case by herein respondent.

On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50 which is the difference between the just
compensation due and the provisional payment already made.

On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order the petitioner to pay interest on
the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the lands.

On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and ruled that it can no longer amend a final and executory judgment that did
not specifically direct the payment of legal interest.

Adamant, the respondent sought recourse before the CA asserting that the petitioner is liable to pay: (a) 12% legal
interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the property up to the date
of payment of just compensation; and (b) 12% legal interest from the time the decision awarding just compensation became
final and executory on September 20, 2002 until its satisfaction on December 23, 2003.

Subsequently, the CA rejected the respondent’s first claim since the issue was belatedly raised during the execution stage and
after the judgment of just compensation attained finality. Nonetheless, it found the second contention meritorious and
awarded legal interest accruing from the time the RTC Order dated December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was
affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court up to the time of full payment.

Both parties elevated the CA judgment to the Court. The respondent’s petition was docketed as G.R. No. 172942 where he
sought, in the main, that the 12% interest rate be reckoned from the date of taking of the property and not from the date of
finality of the Decision dated May 7, 2002 in G.R. No. 142971. The Court denied his petition on August 22, 2006 for failure
to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. The respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of the said decision was denied with finality on November 27, 2006.

The petitioner prays for the annulment of the award of 12% legal interest made by the CA in view of the
termination of the eminent domain case upon payment of the just compensation in satisfaction of the writ of execution. The
petitioner further asserts that the final judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 which did not explicitly pronounce the
payment of interest can no longer be modified lest the basic principles of remedial law be defiled.

The respondent avers that Section 10, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court mandating the payment of legal interest on just
compensation forms part of every judgment rendered in eminent domain cases even if the same was not directly ordered
therein. The respondent also claims that the award of just compensation must be reckoned from the date of taking of subject
lots and not from the date of finality of G.R. No. 142971 because just compensation, before it is paid, constitutes loan or
forbearance of money that entails the imposition of a 12% interest per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CA as to the reckoning point from which the legal interest be computed has
obtained its finality.
HELD: YES. The petition is denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of judgment. A perusal of the
allegations in the present case evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly raised and already resolved in
G.R. No. 172942.

Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those
in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re- litigation in a second case
of a fact or question already settled in a previous case.

The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who can no longer question the
respondent’s entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA. The Court’s determination in
G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate
the said matter anew through the present recourse. Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief
sought in the latter is inextricably related to the ruling in the former.
 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION

HANNAH SERRANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

542 SCRA

DOCTRINE: It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan—the Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.

FACTS: Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as student regent of UP to serve a
one-year term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her siblings and relatives, registered
with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects of the OSFRI was the renovation
of Vinzons Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave P15M as financial assistance for the said project. The source of funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.

However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and system-wide alliances of students
conseguently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Ombudsman. After due investigation,
the Ombudsman instituted a criminal case against Serana and her brother, charging them of Estafa.

Serana moved to quash the Information, contending that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the offense
charged nor over her person in her capacity as UP student regent. She contends that Estafa falls under Crimes Against
Property and not on the chapter on Crimes Committed by Public Officers, only over which, she argues, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it was not the governement that was duped, but Pres. Estrada, because the
money came from the Office of the President and not from government funds. As to jurisdiction over her person, she
contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer since she merely represents her peers, in contrast to the other
regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity.

The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and over Serana

HELD: YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.

It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes
one a public officer.

A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed or enduring at the pleasure of the power, an individual is interested with some portion
of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the other officers
enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials
with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of
Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
 GARCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
603 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, albeit the
proceeding thereunder is civil in nature—the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a
criminal offense.

FACTS: To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias’ had allegedly amassed and acquired, the
Republic, through the OMB filed with the SB 2 petitions for the forfeiture of those properties. The Garcias’ filed motion to
dismiss on the ground of SB’s lack of jurisdiction for lack of proper and valid service of summons: (1) Forfeiture I – the
corresponding summons on the case were all issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention; (2) Forfeiture II –
the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed
them to Gen. Garcia.

The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged
receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: Im receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo &
Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction on the person of Clarita Garcia and her three sons, considering
that summons were improperly served and that the plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107) has already been filed and pending
with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB.

HELD: Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the
Latter Is Criminal

A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the
notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder,
what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In
the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of
evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to
prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the
properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the
respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.

On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her
children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioners contention.

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid substituted
service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service
of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction
over a person.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores
Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also
undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through
Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
irregular and defective.

Requirements as laid down in Manotoc vs CA

1. Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time.
Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent
man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
2. Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service.
3. Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s house or residence; or
on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of business.

ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORENA
422 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the
Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof.

For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861
over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation
between the office and the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information—it is not enough
to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that
would be a conclusion of law.

FACTS: Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the
Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance
operations on drug trafficking at a café bar and restaurant in Naga City when he somehow got involved with a shooting
incident that resulted to the death of Rodney Nueca.

Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to
Quash the Information alleging that the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP
members and officers. RTC denied the motion.

Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented his evidence. On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the
crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed the
motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the
petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.

On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the
performance of his official function. The trial court added that nonetheless, upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue
had become moot and academic since the amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3)
thereof.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion
and R.A. No. 7975, and to include therein an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.

The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of his witnesses, the offense
charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on
March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.

The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was
committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A.
No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE/S: Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC

HELD: The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….

For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation
to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge
of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended
Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between
his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24,
1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime
in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing
that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.

Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade
"23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that
R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which may be applied retroactively.

PEOPLE VS HENRY GO
March 25, 2014

DOCTRINE: The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential Decree (P.D.)
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers.

FACTS: An information was filed against Secretary Arturo Enrile and Henry T. Go before the Sandiganbayan. The said
information also alleged that there was a conspiray between Enrile and Go.

Go filed a motion to quash alleging that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased
Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor
was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.

ISSUE/S: Whether the SB lost its jurisdiction over the person of the accused since he was not a public officer.

HELD: It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can
be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary
Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy
between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death,
he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that
such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer
may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.

RAMISCAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
630 SCRA

DOCTRINE: In finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan,
and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case.

FACTS: Ramiscal Jr (Ramiscal) was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his incumbency, the BOD of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of
land for development as housing projects. On August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as represented by Ramiscal Jr., and Flaviano the
attorney-in-fact of 12 individual vendors executed and signed a bilateral Deed of Sale (1st Deed) over the subject property at
the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m. After the payment @ P 10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed a
unilateral Deed of Sale (2nd Deed) over the same property with a purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd
Deed was presented by Flaviano for registration which became the basis of the Certificate of Title of the said property.

Ramiscal Jr filed his first Motion for Reconsideration date February 12, 1999 with a supplemental motion dated May 28,
1999 regarding the findings of the Ombudsman. With this, a panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the
case, they found out that Ramiscal Jr., indeed participated in an affixed his signature on the contracts and found probable
cause. The Ombudsman acted positively on the findings of the prosecutor and scheduled the arraignment of Ramiscal Jr.
Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for petitioner on the ground that there is a pending resolution of his second
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and should hold his arraignment.
2. Whether or not there is probable cause to file a case for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and falsification of public documents.

HELD: No, Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the
filling of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the
motion.

The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are: unsoundness of mind, prejudicial
question and a pending petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which the suspension shall not
exceed 60 days. Ramiscal Jr., failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of
arraignment obtained in this case.

With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan,
and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr., failed to establish that Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion, thus, there is probable cause in the filing of the case.

PEOPLE VS BENIPAYO
586 SCRA

DOCTRINES:
1. Jurisdiction in libel cases belong to the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts
2. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
3. The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers.

FACTS: Alfredo, then Chairman of the Commission of elections, was charged with libel before the Office of the City
Prosecutor by Photokina Marketing Corporation, which felt alluded to in a speech made by Alfredo before the Bahay
Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, and in an television interview before “Point Blank”, a show hosted by Ces Orena-
Drilon at ANC. The Office of the City Prosecutor, in both instances, filed Informations for libel before the Regional Trial
Court. In both instances, Alfredo moved for the dismissal of the case, considering that at the time he made the alleged
utterances, he was an impeachable officer and the same was made in relation to his duties, therefore, even assuming that he
can be charged with libel, the same should be lodged with the Sandiganbayan. In both instances, the RTC ruled in his favor,
thus Photokina elevated the case to the Supreme Court on question of law on whether the utterances were made in relation to
his office; and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not (1) utterances of Benipayo were made in relation to his office, and (2) RTC had jurisdiction over
the libel case.

HELD: The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged
criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said
question will ultimately determine which court–the RTC or the Sandiganbayan–has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed.
The Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which the parties, and
even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations
to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent
jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office.

Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to
try cases of written defamations, thus: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court]
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx. [Underscoring and italics ours.]

More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya, acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically
designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory
provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be
followed.

This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao, where the
Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed “by similar means,”
and despite the fact that the phrase “by similar means” is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360. In these cases, and
in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal
trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera, we explained at length that: The
applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases
[is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32
and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it
was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us,
respondent judge’s orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows: “WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the
respondent Court’s Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for
having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for proper disposition.”

Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter: “Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find
no reversible error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be
sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360,
Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691
(Sec. 32 ), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited
by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases,
hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases.”

Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case
for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.

For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the
jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the
provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. “Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court,
are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court
of First Instance) which is a general law.” A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law,
because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore
prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC.

Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel
cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not
favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition
must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in
the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the
jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of
certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously
CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in
Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel.

Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel
cases, hence settled the matter with finality:

“RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS

DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.
xxxx
“LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER
THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.” (Underscoring supplied)

As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano,
and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal
and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the
exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply
override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as
aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means. The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over
offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the
RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed
in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the RTC.

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for
the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court
that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further
proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.”

LACSON VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

301 SCRA

DOCTRINE: Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender; In enacting Republic Act 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of
Presidential Decree 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in
bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those
included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the
incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein
petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused”
are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus,
they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of
R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to
the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

HELD: RTC HAS JURISDICTION.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5,
1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said cases.

SANCHEZ VS DEMETRIO
227 SCRA
DOCTRINE: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render
the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
information.

FACTS: Accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide on seven
counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer the penalty of seven reclusion perpetua. The prosecutions version of the
events was based mainly on the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan - coconspirators
turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, but denied
any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed. In this appeal, the pith of the assigned
errors and the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of witnesses Centeno and Malabanans credibility, whose open-
court narrations served as principal basis for the trial courts rendition of a guilty verdict.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on the grounds that he is
being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons.

HELD: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of
homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special
complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree.

The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six.
Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in
committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each
of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven
of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually
raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate
informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying
of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in
succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.

The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge
who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available
but not reflected in the record. The trial courts impressions of the star witnesses for the State bind this Court, for we accord
great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. Further, all the appellants relied
on the defense of denial/alibi but positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime,
demolishes the alibi.

Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of the respondent
Judge Demetriou denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged rape and
homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the non-
inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person
against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there
was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a
Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two other persons.

DISINI JR VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

716 SCRA

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies
have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
 FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012. Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

The following provisions were questioned:

1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

2. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
3. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
5. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
6. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
7. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
8. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
10. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
11. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
12. Section 8 on Penalties;
13. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
14. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
15. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
16. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
17. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
18. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
19. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
20. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
21. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions

ISSUE/S: Which court has jurisdiction over cases covered by RA 10175?

of the place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or committed with the use of any computer system w

There shall be designated special cybercrime court manned by specially trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.

RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

JIMENEZ VS SORONGON
687 SCRA 151

DOCTRINE: The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in the SC.

FACTS: In 2003, Jimenez, the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis listed incorporators of
Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment, alleging that Antzoulatos, et al.
 falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment
agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).

An Information was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Mandaluyong. Subsequently, the City Prosecutor
reconsidered resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The RTC denied the motion to
withdraw information as it found the existence of probable cause to hold Antzoulatos, et al. for trial.

Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against Antzoulatos, et al. Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus
motion for reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest, which was denied.

Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.,
which was denied for being moot and academic. Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge Capco-
Umali, for being biased or partial.

Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did not resolve Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and
the Jimenez's motion to expunge.

The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.

The RTC granted Alamil’s motion for reconsideration, and treated the motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for
lack of probable cause.

Jimenez moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent
Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the RTC, which was denied.

The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.

Jimenez filed a notice of appeal. Alamil moved to expunge the Jimenez' notice of appeal since the public prosecutor did not
authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.

The RTC denied the Jimenez's notice of appeal since Jimenez filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is
mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice
of appeal expunged from the records.

Jimenez elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, which was dismissed outright by the CA for Jimenez’s
lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Jimenez, the private complainant, has legal personality in assailing the RTC Orders.

HELD: NO. It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]"
"who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real
party in interest, the suit is dismissible.

Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the
OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code.
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings
pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the
controlling doctrine.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own
behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.

PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
663 SCRA 272

DOCTRINE: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.

FACTS: On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 in the evening, Estrella Sayson was at a canteen (which also includes a jai alai
betting station) located at 77 Corregidor St, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the 2nd celebration of her
2nd husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later that evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former
policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson, owned the said canteen and betting station. At about 9:00, Estrella’s other sons,
Joselito and Ferdinand Sayson arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather.

At about 10:00 of the same evening, the celebration was interrupted by the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin who alighted from a
motorcycle in front of the jai alai betting station. Eduardo and Edwin, agitated, asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio, to
come out. Jonathan was then attending to other customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and
Edwin and tried to reason with them. He advised them not to force Jonathan to go out. Estrella then heard one of the accused-
appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin kita?” Moises replied “Huwag”. Successive gunshots were
thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his
brother. He was however, was also shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Joselito, ran away but was also hit at
the back while running.

The RTC convicted the 2 accused of 3 counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer Resclusion Perpetua for each count of
murder.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.

In this appeal, PO2 Valdez contended that the state failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery

ISSUE/S: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

HELD: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is
not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as
to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by
then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and
immediate cause of their deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended
each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun,
without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused
from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for
there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a
sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the
informations.

x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his
favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being
charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for
which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.

MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
657 SCRA 560

DOCTRINE: The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged.

FACTS: Vice Mayor and other local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, Fernando Miguel, of violations of R.A. 3019 (Antigraft and Corrupt
Practices Act) in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal Public Market.

The Ombudsman directed the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit. After moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his
counter-affidavit. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some other private individuals
for violation of RA 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Documents under Art. 171 par. 4 of the
RPC.

The Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan
gave the petitioner 10 days to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.

Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner asked for another 3-day extension and afterwhich another 20-day
extension.

Despite the given extensions, the petitioner still failed to file his counter-affidavit prompting prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to
declare the petitioner to have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence. Ombudsman approved the resolution.

After several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal
cases against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this,
despite the OSPs earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counter-
affidavit.

After the arraignment, the OSP file a Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition based
on the obvious and fatal defect in the information.

The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendent lite.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan
denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of the suspension order.

ISSUE/S: Whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order against the
petitioner.

HELD: No. In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the accused (Motion to Suspend Pendente
Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing.

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the information/suspension, the
court believed that the pleadings filed for and against them achieved the goal of the procedure. The right to due process is
satisfied not by just oral arguments but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda
and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate
opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against a mandatory suspension under RA 3019, then an accused would have
no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean oral
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.

PEOPLE VS SORIA
685 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the of ense should be regarded as a
description of only one of ense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness.

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

The victim, AAA, is the daughter of the accused. On February 26, 2000, AAA and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their
father brought home for merienda. After eating, AAA went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also entered the
room and positioned himself on top of AAA, took off her clothes and “felt” that he inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point, appellant
apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. The whole incident was witnessed by AAA’s brother, BBB. The pain
persisted until AAA’s vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a hospital for treatment.
Her mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal. AAA was taken into the custody of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.

Version of the Defense:

Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of AAA’s alleged rape but denied committing the same. Instead,
he claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair
with a man residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have molested AAA because he treated her
well. In fact, he was the only one sending his children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes
home.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would warrant his acquittal?
2. Whether the information is sufficient to justify the conviction of the accused?

HELD:
1. Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of Article
266-A is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element and it must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by
sexual assault. The perpetrator commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual intercourse but It is evident from the testimony of
AAA that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched her labia and entered her organ. AAA
stated that she only knew that it was the “bird” of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her
brother BBB. Clearly, AAA has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and
inserted into her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the
declaration of AAA’s brother, BBB, which declaration was hearsay due to BBB’s failure to testify.

The court however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object
that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina.
Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his
moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence and intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt
that appellant raped AAA by sexual assault.

It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter AAA to file the charges publicly expose
the dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed committed.

2. The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in paragraph 2 thereof. The
Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted rape by sexual
intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged that appellant used
force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to
the mode or manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the
automatic dismissal of the case. "[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is
alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact
that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation
in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense
and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness." Any objection from the
appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial.
He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence
adduced during trial.

In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A,
it is essential to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of "AAA". There must be proof that his
penis touched the labia of "AAA" or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to
ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.

We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found nothing therein that would show that she was raped through sexual
intercourse. While "AAA" categorically stated that she felt something inserted into her vagina, her testimony was sorely
lacking in important details that would convince us with certainty that it was indeed the penis of appellant that was
placed into her vagina.

Based on the evidence adduced, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by sexual
assault.
 UNION BANK VS PEOPLE
667 SCRA 113

DOCTRINE: The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court

FACTS: Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false
narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.

The accusation stemmed from Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe, filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City; and filed and
raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping.

Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City
court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over he perjury case. Second, she argued that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood – was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced involving
the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the
second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the
Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash and subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration.

Union Bank and Tomas filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-
Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, which was dismissed. The RTC-Makati City subsequently
denied Union Bank and Tomas’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, the review under Rule 45.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Makati City, where the Certificate Against Forum Shopping was notarized, is the proper venue for
the case of perjury.

HELD: YES. Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the
criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule
is two- fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and
try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In
determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a),
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood
from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some
 place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction
are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE
718 SCRA 263

DOCTRINE:

1. Civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.

2. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that
arising from the offense charged.

FACTS: Two days after his birth, Gerald Gercayo, who was born with an imperforate anus, underwent colostomy, enabling
him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.

In 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro
Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio.
The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and Dr. Fernando Solidum.

During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he
regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.

Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) then lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely
against Dr. Solidum

Dr. Solidum were pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA).

He then filed an appeal to the SC. The SC acquitted Dr. Solidum because circumstances, taken together, did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to
Gerald.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Dr. Solidum, through his acquittal, is exempt from civil liability.
2. Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila should be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the accused.

HELD:

1. YES.
 The circumstances that have been established do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal
did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had
been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of
the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be
to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.

2. NO
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal
action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been
charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their
judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not
respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for
subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term
industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is
engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit
but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for
profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the
operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that
civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was
unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

CASTILLO VS SALVADOR
JULY 2014

DOCTRINE: An acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused is not exempt from civil liability, which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

FACTS: Phillip R. Salvador and his brother, Ramon Castillo, was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code by petitioner Cristina B. Castillo, a businesswoman engaged in real estate business, educational
institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Phillip and Ramon to engage in freight and remittance
business.

As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a
father to her children while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She agreed with
respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided among them and that respondent
would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the operations
of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.

The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual
operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to respondent Salvador, which was witnessed by her
disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong
for three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited
in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since
then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

Upon their arraignment, Phillip and Ramon pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding Phillip guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered him to pay Castillo,
US$100,000.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.

Ramon was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Phillip appealed his conviction to the CA, which overturned the RTC
decision. Castillo filed a petition for review on certiorari on the civil aspect of the case, arguing that the Court should have at
least retained the amount of damages to her.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the acquitted accused are still liable for damages.

HELD: YES.

In Manantan v. CA, we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused as follows.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First
is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability, which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated
in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x.

A reading of the CA decision would show that Phillip was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. [S]ince the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, [Phillip] is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., we explained the concept of
preponderance of evidence as follows:

x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.

In discrediting [Castillo's] allegation that she gave [Phillip] US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) [Castillo]
failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the
source of the same; (2) [Castillo]failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction
and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) [Castillo's] claim of trust as
reason for not requiring [Phillip] to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with
him; and (4) [Castillo's] behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of
someone who had been swindled.

LIM VS. KOU CO PING

679 SCRA 114
DOCTRINE: If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal
action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. Because of the distinct and independent
nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the of ended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without of ending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.

FACTS: FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal
authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state
the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a
provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities
covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag. Co sold these withdrawal
authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim
withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back
some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.

FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the
matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once
Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co
to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.

An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co.

The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to
return her money amounting to P2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

The RTC of Pasay acquitted Co for insufficiency of evidence.

After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim.

Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed
estafa against her. The trial court denied the motion. Lim filed her notice of appeal.

A month later, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The
defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC,
Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The complaint asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse
of rights.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Lim commited forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages
during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa.

HELD: NO. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender: (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of
the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also
be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by
specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”).

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense;
hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly
instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability
based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.”

The independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in
Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:

ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party
may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping,
litis pendentia, or res judicata.

CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
388 SCRA 28

DOCTRINE: The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused “may be litigated in a separate civil action.”

FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Casupanan, figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the MCTC.

Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, while Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi- delict.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil
case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion and dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.

The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a
final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further
held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on
the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of
discretion. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same.

ISSUE/S: Whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil
action against the offended party in the criminal case.

HELD: Yes. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under
these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising
from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict—without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case.
This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused
“may be litigated in a separate civil action.” This is only fair for two reasons.

First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If
the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period
continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.

PEOPLE VS ROMERO
306 SCRA 90

DOCTRINE: The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability ex delicto.

FACTS: Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB, Butuan City. He came to know the
business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR) when he interviewed accused Martin
Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the corporation’s investment operations in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte.
Romero was the president and general manager of SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the operations manager.

SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a marketing business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and
investments from the public. The corporation guaranteed an 800% return on investment within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21)
days. Investors were given coupons containing the capital and the return on the capital collectible on the date agreed upon. It
stopped operations in September, 1989.

Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz went to SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to make an investment, accompanied by his friend
Jimmy Acebu, and SAIDECOR collection agent Daphne Parrocho. After handing over the amount of one hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P150,000.00) to Ernesto Rodriguez, complainant received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check instead
of the usual redeemable coupon. The check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words, but the amount in figures was
for P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment. Complainant did not notice the discrepancy. When the check was
presented to the bank for payment on October 5, 1989, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the
check return slip issued by the bank.

Both accused could not be located and demand for payment was made only sometime in November 1989 during the
preliminary investigation of this case. Accused responded that they had no money.
Daphne Parrocho testified that complainant, with his friend Jimmy Acebu, approached her to invest the amount of
P150,000.00 at SAIDECOR. As she has reached her quota, and therefore, no longer authorized to receive the amount, she
accompanied them to the office of SAIDECOR at Ong Yiu District, Butuan City. Accused Ernesto Rodriguez accepted the
investment and issued the check signed by him and Martin Romero.

For their defense, accused Martin Romero testified that he issued a check in the amount of P1,200,000.00 corresponding to
the total of the P150,000.00 investment and the 800% return thereon. He claimed that the corporation had a deposit of
fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) at the time of the issuance of the check and four million pesos (P4,000,000.00) at the
time SAIDECOR stopped operations. Romero knew these things because he used to monitor the funds of the corporation
with the bank. He was not aware that the check he issued was dishonored because he never had the occasion to meet the
complainant again after the September 14, 1989 transaction. He only came to know about this when the case was already
filed in court sometime in the second or third week of January 1990.

On appeal, both accused did not deny that complainant made an investment with SAIDECOR in the amount of P150,000.00.
However, they denied that deceit was employed in the transaction. They assigned as errors: (1) their conviction under P.D.
1689 due to the prosecution’s failure to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court’s failure to
consider the joint stipulation of facts in their favor.

Ernesto Rodriguez, died pending appeal.

ISSUE/S: What is the effect of the death of an accused on the case?

HELD: Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict.

Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero.

MAGISTRADO VS PEOPLE
527 SCRA 125

DOCTRINE: There is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.

FACTS: Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner Magestrado with the
Office of the City Prosecutor.

After the filing of petitioner’s counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended
the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an
information for perjury with the MeTC.

Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No.
Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
84, and Civil Case No. Q-9834308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the
said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.

ISSUE/S: Whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Case No.
Q98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 on the ground of prejudicial question.
HELD: No. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court
or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings
until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question
must be lodged in another tribunal.

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case,” therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. However, the court in which an action is
pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the
same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.

Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are
settled, the second action should be stayed. The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if
proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations,
conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to its sound discretion.

PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL
630 SCRA 436

DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide. Further, the resolution of
the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial
question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel with the RTC Quezon City. Less than four months thereafter, Joselito received summons to appear before the RTC
in Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between Maria and Joselito on the ground
of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. He asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim
is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City denied the motion, holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. It held that the issues in the parricide case are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in
question.

Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari with application of WPI and/or TRO before the Court of Appeals, assailing the denial
of RTC Quezon City.

The CA dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared
void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge
of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

ISSUE/S: Whether the resolution of the action in annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question;

HELD: NO. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. Clearly, the
civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action
an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

A prejudicial question is defined as:

“x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.”

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent
were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
granted, it will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short,
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
 J.M. DOMINGUEZ VS LICLICAN
764 SCRA 338

DOCTRINE: As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions,
and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

FACTS: During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. (JMD) held at the
Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of directors was conducted. This event was presided by then company
president respondent Cecilia Liclican (Liclican), and attended by her co-respondents Norma Isip (Isip) and Purita Rodriguez,
and by petitioners Helen Dagdagan (Dagdagan), Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis, and Shirley Dominguez (Dominguez) as well.
Conflict ensued when petitioners Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allowed to vote on the ground that they are
not registered stockholders of JMD. As pointed out, it was their mother and grandmother, both deceased, who are the
stockholders in JMD, and that there is still no settlement of their respective estates to effectively transfer their shares in the
company to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis. But since the remaining stockholders with outstanding shares constituted a quorum,
the election of officers still proceeded.

In reaction to the foregoing developments, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC Baguio Branch
59 for nullification of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs. After a failed
mediation, was referred for appropriate Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the RTC. Meanwhile, petitioner
stockholders immediately took hold of corporate properties, represented themselves to JMD’s tenants as the true and lawful
directors of the company, and collected and deposited rents due the company to its bank account.

Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners, executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging respondents Liclican and Isip with
qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint that Liclican and Isip, without any authority whatsoever, conspired to
withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the corporation’s savings account with the Equitable-PCI Bank; and that the
following day, they issued a check in the amount of P200,000, payable to cash, and to be drawn against JMD’s account with
Robinson’s Savings Bank. In a separate complaint, the corporation claimed that respondents Liclican and Isip likewise issued
a check payable to one Atty. Francisco Lava, Jr. for P200,000 to be debited from the corporation’s account.

The City Prosecutor of Baguio City recommends for approval of the Informations for Qualified Theft against LICLICAN and
ISIP. Thereafter, Judge Tiongson-Tabora of RTC Baguio found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest.

In due time, respondents lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, to annul and set aside the two Orders by the RTC,
branch 7 anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question. According to respondents, petitioner
stockholders, by filing the complaint-affidavit, are already assuming that they are the legitimate directors of JMD, which is
the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute pending in the RTC, Branch 59.

The CA granted the petition, holding that Judge Tiongson-Tabora should have refrained from determining probable cause
since she is well aware of the pendency of the issue on the validity of JMD’s elections. As the judge overseeing the JDR of
the said intra-corporate dispute, she knew that there was still doubt as to who the rightfully elected directors of JMD are and,
corollarily, who would have the authority to initiate the criminal proceedings for qualified theft.

The CA further noted that even as corporate officers, as they claim to be, petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis cannot file
the Complaint-Affidavit in the exercise of corporate powers without authority from the board of directors under Sec. 23,18 in
relation to Sec. 2519 of the Corporation Code
 Section 23. The board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of
all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such
corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks,
or where there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year until
their successors are elected and qualified. x x x

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not the civil case constituted a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of criminal
proceedings;
(2) Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Tabora in disregarding the pending case
on the validity of JMD’s election, by issuing the warrants;

HELD:

(1) YES. As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before
the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to
avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Here, the CA aptly observed the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case. To be sure,
the Civil involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD’s meetings, election and acts of its
directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between the two contesting
group of officers should rightfully be seated at the company’s helm. Without resolution of the civil case, petitioners’
authority to commence and prosecute the Criminal case against respondents for qualified theft in JMD’s behalf
remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the criminal proceedings.

(2) YES. In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora acted with grave abuse of discretion
when she ordered the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial question. Judge
Tiongson-Tabora cannot deny knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge presiding over its
JDR. As correctly held by the CA.

Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said prejudicial question that should have barred the filing
of the criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the simple reason that a juridical person can only
act through its officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for
nullification of meetings, election and act of directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs. Thus, she knows for
a fact that there is a question as to who are the legitimate directors of JMD such that there is doubt as to whether
private respondents are in a position to act for JMD.

RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

FENEQUITO VS VERGARA, JR.

677 SCRA 113

DOCTRINE: It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with the RTC.
Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of
the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and
Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the
provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors
and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties
incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions.”

FACTS: An Information for falsification of public documents was filed with the MTC of Manila by the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Manila against herein petitioners. Herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of
Probable Cause. After respondent’s Comment/Opposition was filed, the MeTC issued an Order dismissing the case on the
ground of lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, respondent, with the express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed the
case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The RTC rendered judgment setting aside the Order of the MeTC and
directing the said court to proceed to trial.

Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review. The CA rendered its presently assailed Resolution
dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not appealable.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied the same.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds that the (1) CA erred in outright dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the remedy is improper and (2) RTC Ruling is final and unappealable. The petitioners relies on “Strict
enforcement of the Rules may be suspended whenever the purposes of justice so require.”

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on improper remedy;
(2) Whether or not the RTC ruling is final and unappealable;

HELD:

(1) NO. The Court notes at the outset that one of the grounds relied upon by the CA in dismissing petitioners’ petition
for review is the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition
filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. While petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, they, however, failed to comply with these requirements. Worse, they did not even mention
anything about it in the said Motion. Section 3, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides:

“Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.”

Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. An
appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the
Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are
bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance
cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. In the instant case, petitioners had all the opportunity to
comply with the Rules. Nonetheless, they remained obstinate in their non-observance even when they sought
reconsideration of the ruling of the CA dismissing their petition. Such obstinacy is incongruous with their late plea
for liberality in construing the Rules. On the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is
dismissible.
(2) NO. A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Upon the other hand, an
order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its
merits. The RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of petitioners’ motion to
quash because it leaves something more to be done x x x, i.e., the continuation of the criminal proceedings until the
guilt or innocence of the accused is determined. Specifically, the MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then
proceed to trial and finally render the proper judgment.

Petitioners contend that the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report, submitted as evidence by
respondent to the prosecutor’s office, showed that the findings therein are not conclusive and, thus, insufficient to
support a finding of probable cause.
The Court is not persuaded.

It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report No. 048-03 that the
document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale as compared to the standard
signatures “reveal divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which is] an indication that they
WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.” The Court agrees with the prosecutor’s
pronouncement in its Resolution dated September 22, 2003, that although the findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory
were qualified by the statement contained in the Report that “no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact
that questioned signatures are photocopies wherein minute details are not clearly manifested,” the fact that an expert
witness already found that the questioned signatures were not written by one and the same person already creates
probable cause to indict petitioners for the crime of falsification of public document.

In the instant case, the Court finds no justification to depart from the ruling of the RTC that the offense charged was
committed and that herein petitioners are probably guilty thereof.

With respect to respondent’s legal personality to appeal the Order of the MeTC, suffice it to say that the appeal filed
with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public prosecutor who handles the case.

It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with the RTC. Section 35
(l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “Reorganizing the
Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the
Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the law in force at the time the
appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have charge of
the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of such
province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions.” In
consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held by this Court that the fiscal represents the People of
the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with
the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had
authority to file the same.

Moreover, petitioners’ reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision refers only to
cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor’s power to file an information or dismiss a case is predicated or
conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There
is nothing in the said law which provides that in cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor
may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Stated
 differently, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the
RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.

BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION VS REYES

687 SCRA 524

DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to
determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof.

It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus
affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the
fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses
or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected
by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.

This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there
is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.

FACTS: Private respondent Josefa “Jing” C. Reyes (Reyes), sometime in 1996, offered her services to petitioner as the
latter’s real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She
informed petitioner that more or less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties. Convinced
of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those parcels of
land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her
personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail
despite her receipt of the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the
Assistant City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City.

Reyes, while admitting that she acted as a real estate agent for petitioner, denied having converted or misappropriated the
involved amount of money. She claimed that the said amount was used solely for the intended purpose and that it was
petitioner who requested her services in procuring the lots. According to her, it was upon the petitioner’s prodding that she
was constrained to contact her friends who were also into the real estate business, including one named Mateo Elejorde.
Meanwhile, Reyes received information that her sub-broker Mateo Elejorde had been depositing the involved money
entrusted to him under his personal account. On March 28, 2000, through a board resolution, petitioner allegedly authorized
Reyes to institute, proceed, pursue and continue with whatever criminal or civil action against Mateo Elejorde, or such person
to whom she may have delivered or entrusted the money she had received in trust from the firm, for the purpose of
recovering such money. Thus, Reyes filed a complaint for the crime of estafa against Mateo Elejorde before the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City.

Thereafter, an Information for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed
against Reyes and raffled before the RTC Makati City. Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the Department
of Justice (DOJ), but it was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration, and in
a Resolution on the said motion was granted.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Secretary of Justice. Eventually, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. The latter, however, affirmed the questioned Resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice. Hence, the petition for review to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether of not the CA erred in not finding that the element of misappropriation was not sufficiently established in
the case but instead concurred with the decision of the DOJ Secretary;

HELD: It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who,
under the Revised Administrative Code,9 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and
who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice
secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds
that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency
should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.

In the present case, after review and reconsideration, the Secretary of Justice reversed the investigating prosecutor’s finding
of probable cause that all the elements of the crime of estafa are present. Estafa, under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, is committed by―

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).―Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below:

xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(a) xxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x

In reversing the finding of probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed, the Secretary of Justice reasoned out
that, [the] theory of conversion or misappropriation is difficult to sustain and that under the crime of estafa with grave abuse
of confidence, the presumption is that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or is different from that for which it was
intended but did not take place in this case. The CA, in sustaining the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, ruled
that the element of misappropriation or conversion is wanting. It further ratiocinated that the demand for the return of the
thing delivered in trust and the failure of the accused to account for it, are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation,
however, the said presumption is rebuttable and if the accused is able to satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the thing
delivered in trust, he may not be held liable for estafa.

It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A
preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether
(a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.

This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there
is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.

A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the elements
of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as
proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to
 return the same amount but was not heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money,
despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation.

To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.22 Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED and, accordingly, the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

ABANADO VS BAYONA
677 SCRA 595

DOCTRINE: The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not
mandatory or required under the rules.

om Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr. City Prosecutor Abanado filed the Information2 in the MTCC, Bacolod, which w

In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused Palo, Judge Bayona issued an order directing complainant Abanado to present

a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation,

Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder,
Memorandum of the transfer of case assignment from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor, and
Exhibit to the Court, to enable his court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause.

n. Because there was a conflict between Jarder’s and complainant’s resolutions, those documents were necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the eviden

Judge Bayona did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City Prosecutor. He required complainant to explain
why he should not be cited for contempt. Complainant requested for a ten-day extension to comply with it but was denied. He
also ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify on the
existence of his resolution dismissing the case against Palo and to Office of the City Prosecutor’s Records Officer Myrna
Vañegas to bring the entire record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo case. Complainant then filed an inhibition
against the judge and a certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain respondent
from proceeding with the hearing of the contempt proceedings. Complainant’s prayer for a TRO was granted by Presiding
Judge Pepito Gellada of the RTC Bacolod. Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that when a city or
provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause
 replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would be
that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is no longer required that the
complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and be examined by the judge.
The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the
complete records of the cases all the time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest against the accused. What is required is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon
which to make his independent judgment or at least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause.

mment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado, reiterated the importance of the Jarder’s Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an executive function.

HELD: Yes, the conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. The courts must consider the rules
of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public
prosecutor is put in question. The Department of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Such attachment is
not mandatory or required under the rules.

HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA VS OBIAS

635 SCRA 91

DOCTRINE: The justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the investigating prosecutor
even after the information has already been filed in court; The justice secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing the
information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case.

FACTS: On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning at the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr. Nestor Tria,
Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region V and concurrently Officer-In-Charge
of the 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was
brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape. Subsequently, the incident was
investigated by the NBI.

On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto Aclan, Juanito, Ona and Atty. Epifania "Fanny" Gonzales-
Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria. On the basis of statements given by 26 individuals, autopsy and ballistic examination
reports, and relevant documents gathered the NBI found that: ACLAN and ONA had been conducting an almost daily
stakeout, for about two weeks prior to the incident, at Dir. TRIA’s office. They would observe TRIA’s arrival and departure
from office and would even ask the security guard on duty if TRIA has already arrive or left the office.

Around 8:00 o’clock in the morning of May 22, 1998, ACLAN and ONA were spotted in their usual places at the DPWH
Office. Shortly after, Administrative Officer JOSE PECUNDO announced to those who had some documents for signature of
Director TRIA to proceed to Pili Airport where TRIA would sign them before leaving for Manila. Upon hearing this,
ACLAN and ONA left hurriedly on board a red motorcycle. Shortly after 10:00 a.m. on that day, Director TRIA arrived at
the Airport. After signing some documents at the parking lot he proceeded towards the pre-departure area on the second floor
of the airport building. ONA, who was waiting on the stairway, immediately followed TRIA as the latter was going up the
stairs. As TRIA was approaching the pre-departure area he was met by Atty. [E]PIFANIA OBIAS who shook his hands and
started conversing with him. It was at this juncture that a gunshot rang out and TRIA dropped like a log on the floor, bleeding
profusely from a gunshot wound at the back of his head. Atty. EPIFANIA OBIAS, on the other hand, admitted that she was
with ACLAN in the early morning of May 22, 1998; that at about 7:00 a.m. on that day she went to the residence of Director
TRIA at Liboton, Naga City, had a brief talk with the latter and left immediately after agreeing to meet at the airport later on.
She also volunteered the information that ROBERTO ACLAN was not the gunman who had fired the fatal shot at Director
TRIA. She was also the last person seen talking with Director TRIA when the latter was gunned down. A practicing lawyer,
Atty. OBIAS also engages herself in real estate business on the side.

In 1997 she had brokered a sale of real estate between and among spouses JEREMIAS, as Vendors, and Spouses NESTOR
and PURA TRIA, as Vendees, over a land in Balatas, Naga City. It was Atty. OBIAS who received, for and in behalf of the
vendors, the full payment of P2.8 Million of the sale but the latter deliberately avoided the TRIA family and, despite verbal
and written demands, she failed and refused, as she still fails and refuses, to fulfill her legal obligation to the TRIA family.
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, respondent filed her Counter-
Affidavit denying that she was in anyway involved with the killing of Engr. Tria and denied most of the allegations made by
the NBI.

On July 2, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur issued a resolution8 directing the filing of an
information for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein
respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias. This was, however, modified on January 25, 2000 by then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas
directing the Provincial Prosecutor to include respondent in the information for murder filed against Aclan and Ona.
Respondent along with Aclan and Ona filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ’s January 25, 2000 resolution. In the
meantime, the information charging Aclan and Ona has already been filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili,
Camarines Sur. Upon request however, the venue was transferred to the RTC Quezon City by resolution of this Court in
A.M. No. 00-3145-RTC.16 After so much petition and appeal, the DOJ eventually directed the Provincial Prosecutor to
forward the records of the case to the Office of the President in compliance. In his Order dated March 24, 2004, Presidential
Assistant Manuel C. Domingo granted respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reversed the DOJ resolutions. The OP
concluded there was no interlocking circumstantial evidence of respondent’s acts before, during and after the killing of Engr.
Tria that would establish conspiracy among Aclan, Ona and respondent to commit the crime. Accordingly, the case against
respondent was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners filed a series of motions, which reached the CA, who
denied their petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the appeal or motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent had
deprived them of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses on those affidavits belatedly
submitted by the respondent. –-- No.
2. Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of Justice.
–-- Yes.

HELD: Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified
from a party or witness, "[t]he parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They
may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned." Hence,
the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the motion for reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not
violate petitioners’ right to due process. The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of
probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ.

Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the
prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to
dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. In reversing the DOJ’s finding of
probable cause, the OP found merit in the argument of the respondent that the DOJ’s finding that she was with Aclan when
she went to the residence of Engr. Tria early in the morning of May 22, 1998, was not sufficiently established. The OP gave
more weight to the affidavit of Calayag stating that Aclan was not around when they and respondent, among other visitors,
were at Engr. Tria’s house at that time -- than that account given by SA Eduarte, which was uncorroborated.

As to the double sale allegedly committed by the respondent from which the latter’s strong motive to liquidate Engr. Tria was
inferred, the OP found this as a mere expression of opinion by the investigators considering that Engr. Tria’s widow, Mrs.
Pura Tria, categorically admitted her knowledge of the said transaction. Neither was the OP persuaded by the NBI’s "kiss of
death" theory since it is but a customary way of greeting a friend to shake hands and hence it cannot imply that respondent
utilized this as a signal or identification for the gunman to shoot Engr. Tria. Respondent’s alleged indifference immediately
after Engr. Tria was gunned down while conversing with her, was also negated by the affidavit of an employee of Philippine
Air Lines based at the Pili Airport, stating that right after the incident took place he saw respondent in the radio room in
shock and was being given water by another person.

Considering the totality of evidence, the OP was convinced there was nothing suspicious or abnormal in respondent’s
behavior before, during and after the fatal shooting of Engr. Tria as to engender a well-founded belief of her complicity with
the killing of Engr. Tria. Petitioners, however, maintain that the records are replete with abundant proof of respondent’s
complicity in the murder of Engr. Tria.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so.

The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is not a pronouncement of guilt.
On the other hand, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown
through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.

We reverse the OP’s ruling that the totality of evidence failed to establish a prima facie case against the respondent as a
conspirator in the killing of Engr. Tria. To begin with, whether or not respondent actually conspired with Aclan and Ona need
not be fully resolved during the preliminary investigation. The absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where the parties can adduce
evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial
proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Prosecutors control and
direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the
Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination
was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to review unless made with grave abuse.

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on record, we find no such grave abuse when the Secretary of Justice found
probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.

The following facts and circumstances established during preliminary investigation were sufficient basis to incite reasonable
belief in respondent’s guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had credible reason to have Engr. Tria killed because of the impending
criminal prosecution for estafa from her double sale of his lot prior to his death, judging from the strong interest of Engr.
Tria’s family to run after said property and/or proceeds of the second sale to a third party; (b) Access - respondent was close
to Engr. Tria’s family and familiar with his work schedule, daily routine and other transactions which could facilitate in the
commission of the crime eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom (Aclan) she and her father categorically
admitted being in her company while she visited Engr. Tria hours before the latter was fatally shot at the airport; (c)
Suspicious Behavior -- respondent while declaring such close personal relationship with Engr. Tria and even his family,
failed to give any satisfactory explanation why she reacted indifferently to the violent killing of her friend while they
conversed and shook hands at the airport.

Indeed, a relative or a friend would not just stand by and walk away from the place as if nothing happened, as what she did,
nor refuse to volunteer information that would help the authorities investigating the crime, considering that she is a vital
eyewitness. Not even a call for help to the people to bring her friend quickly to the hospital. She would not even dare go near
Engr. Tria’s body to check if the latter was still alive. All the foregoing circumstances, in our mind, and from the point of
view of an ordinary person, lead to a reasonable inference of respondent’s probable participation in the well-planned
assassination of Engr. Tria.

We therefore hold that the OP in reversing the DOJ Secretary’s ruling, and the CA in affirming the same, both committed
grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, the OP and CA arbitrarily disregarded facts on record which established probable cause
against the respondent. The petition is GRANTED. The January 25, 2000 Resolution of then Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas
is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.

UY VS JAVELLANA
680 SCRA 13

DOCTRINE: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of
a criminal case under said Rule.

Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for an of ense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.

FACTS: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross
incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public
Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding
Judge Javellana of the MeTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in
their complaint:

Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited
several occasions as examples: In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge
Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure; Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant
the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana
refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein
complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for
Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a
preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set
the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.

Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest
without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the
accused under immediate custody.
As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a
warrantless arrest had been effected. Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v. Bautista, for
preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing
the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were
baseless and malicious; and the acts being complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the
proper subject of an administrative complaint. Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint
against him. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of
the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said
Rule.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

HELD: Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v.
Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously referred
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) ofthe Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A case which
has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on
the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge
Javellana’s argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People
v. Celeste, et al. were not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge
Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v.
Celeste, et al. (hindi ko sure) Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary
investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those
specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the
case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People
v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised
Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under
Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

PEOPLE VS VALENCIA
214 SCRA 89

DOCTRINE:

1. Information can be filed without a preliminary investigation against an accused arrested without warrant.
2. Preliminary investigation; deemed waived when not invoked.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Alejandro Valencia appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in 2 Criminal
Cases convicting him of Homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm and Less Serious Physical Injuries.

Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three, respectively, and her mother, are
residents of 2008 F. Muñoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989, as she was about to eat supper, she
noticed appellant standing five steps away from the open door of her house and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun.
Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain
from her children inside the house. Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she
did so, she saw appellant running away, carrying the sumpak. Two neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the injured
children to the Philippine General Hospital. That same evening, Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator,
interviewed Jimenez at the hospital about the shooting incident. Since she was still experiencing shock over the incident
Jimenez forgot to mention the name of appellant as the one who shot her children. Acting on the report of a barangay tanod,
Patrolmen Roberto Cajiles, Romeo de la Peña and Carlos Castañeda, assigned at the Ong Detachment, Police Station No. 5,
conducted an investigation of the shooting incident in the house of Jimenez. At the time, Jimenez and her injured children
were already in the hospital. Nevertheless, Pat. Cajiles was able to interview the mother of Jimenez, the barangay captain, a
certain Josie, and appellant’s brother, Rolando, who all mentioned appellant as the gunwielder. Moreover, the policemen
discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big hole with the size of the circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door
of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets were also found at the crime scene.

Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia Castillo, his aunt, where he
believed appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and took him to the Ong Detachment for initial
investigation. He was indorsed to the police headquarters for further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989. At 12:20
a.m. of the following day, one of the injured children, Annabelle, died as a result of the gunshot wounds she suffered. The
other child, Samuel Jr., who was shot in the right forearm, was discharged from the hospital one week after the incident, but
needed 2 more weeks for healing. On March 26, 1989, Arlyn Jimenez executed a sworn statement wherein she identified
appellant as the culprit. On March 30, 1989, a certain Ramon Bacnotan executed a sworn statement and turned over to the
police the sumpak allegedly used by appellant in the shooting of the two children. 2 Criminal Cases were filed against
Valencia, for Homicide with the use of an unlicensed firearm and Less Serious Physical Injuries. When arraigned, the
accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in accused-appellant’s conviction.

ISSUE/S: WON the finding of the court of Accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is correct in spite of the fact
that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient evidence exists proving his guilt.

HELD: YES. A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of
Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 24
Under said Section 7, Rule 112, 25 the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary
investigation, which was done in the accused-appellant’s case.

Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been
filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, 27 the Court can only conclude that he
waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, 28 when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment.

PCGG VS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
773 SCRA

DOCTRINE:

1. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The
term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
2. Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely
based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is
a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of
a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."

FACTS: PCGG filed against former officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), namely, Ferry,
Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea, Castell, and Sison, as well as former officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation
(Galleon), namely, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque charging them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
PCGG alleged that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No.
13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify
various anomalous loans entered into by the Philippine Government in the past.

Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG) examined and studied
documents relative to loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during the regime of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) -one of which is the loan account granted by the DBP to Galleon.

TWG found anomalies after examining the loans of Galleon. PCGG then files a case against the individual officers. Only
Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell filed their counter-affidavits. In their defense, Roque stated that he was only a minor
stockholder and in no position to influence such loan. Zamalea was only chairman of DBP after the transaction. Tenco argued
that the charges already prescribed, and Castell argued that his job is only supervision of employees.

Ombudsman found no probable cause against them hence the case was dismissed on the basis that pieces of evidence
attached to the case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual respondents, considering
that the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive summaries and technical reports, which are
hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value.

PCGG move for reconsideration but was also denied.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in finding no probable cause
to indict the respondents.

HELD: Yes.

It must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the
Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. The Court's pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit:

xxx this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based
not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman
but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by the Ombudsman or
by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for
trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., the Court defined probable cause and the
parameters in finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit:

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
"actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable
cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion
and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction. "[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's]
evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level."

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
criminal complaint against individual respondents for lack of probable cause, as will be explained hereunder.

As already stated, individual respondents were accused of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the elements of which are as
follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. In the same vein, they were
likewise charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of the same law, which has the following elements: (a) that the accused is a
public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Notably, private individuals may also be charged
with violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.

Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG's findings contained in the Executive Summary which
were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point
out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in
the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it was held that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay, viz.:

Justice Brion's pronouncement in Unilever that "the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or
merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented" correctly recognizes the
doctrine in the United States that the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence,
as long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible. In United States v. Ventresca, the United States Supreme
Court held:

While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has long held that "the term 'probable cause' . .
. means less than evidence which would justify condemnation," x x x and that a finding of "probable cause" may rest
upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial, x x x As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United States x x x,
"There is a large difference between two things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between the tribunals
which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." Thus,
hearsay may be the bases for issuance of the warrant "so long as there ... [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." x x
x And, in Aguilar, we recognized that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct
personal observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of the underlying circumstances"
supporting the affiant's conclusions and his belief that any informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed..." was
"credible" or his information "reliable." x x x.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties, x x x.

DE LIMA VS REYES
779 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He
does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on
the accused, not the fiscal.

FACTS: The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may cause a
probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to,
the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary
investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.

Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at
around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San PedroPuerto Princesa City, Palawan.

Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega
and also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr. Edrad
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of Investigation where he
alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr.
Ortega.

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 0918 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to
conduct preliminary investigation.

Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her
husband's murder On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution
dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.

On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service and due process" to address the offer of
additional evidence denied by the First Panel. But it was also revoked.

Pursuant to the revocation, Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring former Governor Reyes to appear before them and to
submit his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence.

Dr. Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's Resolution.

Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel. He argued that the
Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. He also argued that the parties were
already afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was neither new nor material to the
case.

On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes. Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued
warrants of arrest but the warrants were ineffective since the Gov. Reyes allegedly left the country days before the warrants
could be served.

Gov. Reyes filed a petition for review alleging that the resolution of the second panel was void. CA affirmed. Court of
Appeals stated that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the
creation of the Second Panel since both parties were given full opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel. It
also ruled that the evidence examined by the Second Panel was not additional evidence but "forgotten evidence" that was
already available before the First Panel during the conduct of the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
when she issued Department Order No. 710.

HELD: The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to
judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions." A quasi-judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis
for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs
quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same
effect as the judgment of a court.

In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only
determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent-is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial
functions. In Santos v. Go:

[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare-his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it. is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.

Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature,
this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the
rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged
with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.

In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was filed against the
Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order. The assailed order directed all prosecutors to forward all cases already
filed against Celso de los Angeles of the Legacy Group to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the Department of
Justice.
This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to tribunals that
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or executive
function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court of law,
it is not a quasi-judicial agency:

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.
Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function
when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:

. . . [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a
quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.

But the limited similarity, between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-
judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications
determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In
contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause
in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of
Justice reviews the public prosecutor's orders or resolutions.

RULE 113 – ARREST

SARAUM VS PEOPLE
781 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and
seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug
paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia
that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a
valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court
has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.

FACTS: Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M., The accused did then and there have in his possession
the following: 1 = One (1) lighter, 2 = One (1) rolled tissue paper, 3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil, which are instruments
and/or equipments fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into
the body.

Sarum pleaded not guilty and was released due to his application of bail.
According to the prosecution,the police officers conducted a buy-bust operation and coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation.

During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a
curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia
apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum’s possession a lighter, rolled tissue
paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper,
and made initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-08-
17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed, the subject items were turned over to the
property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.

Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in question, he was passing by
Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by men with firearms. They were already
with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted
the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court.

RTC ruled against Sarum. CA sustained the RTCs decision.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Arrest of sarum was valid

HELD: Yes.

Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. Besides, a review of the
records reveals that the CA did not err in affirming his conviction.

The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug
into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution has convincingly established that
Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which
were offered and admitted in evidence.

Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the
very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum’s statement that he was not committing a crime at the time of his arrest. PO3
Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then holding a disposable lighter in his right hand
and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand, while they were in the course of arresting somebody. The case is
clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally
caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at
the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses."
On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained the respective uses of the items to prove that they were
indeed drug paraphernalia. There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination and finding as to the presence or
absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said items since possession itself is the punishable
act.

The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug
paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As
these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraum’s arrest was legal,
the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found
and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the
judgment of conviction.

Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when he did not raise the
issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his
arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving
the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived." In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to the
admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the
prosecution.

COMERCIANTE VS PEOPLE
763 SCRA 587

DOCTRINE: The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself in.
This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they
themselves observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the
police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

FACTS: Comerciante was caught having in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams
which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.

According to the prosecution, the Police were patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road,
Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. when they spotted two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick
Dasilla7 (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to
the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla.
The police officer arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.

After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal.
However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived
and ordered him to present his evidence.

In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in
the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and
taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked
money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to
undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The RTC found that PO3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets
containing shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined that there was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering
that PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and
apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any malicious
motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.

CA Affirmed the RTCs ruling.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the there was a valid warrantless arrest and “stop and frisk” conducted by the Police

HELD: No, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to
identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a
speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets
held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact
that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs
when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante
was indeed shabu.

Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied
with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3
Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that
the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have
been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante
untenable. In People v. Cogaed, the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk" searches:

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers
should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to
protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be
undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe -
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or
her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

x x x x Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine
probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine
jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable
cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.

Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds
that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
 In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.

LUZ VS PEOPLE
667 SCRA 421

r to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to

FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet and this prompted
him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while
driving said motor vehicle. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. While he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept
on getting something from his jacket. He was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket which included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation
and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain
shabu. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu was incident to a lawful arrest.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto
and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under
R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the
arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under
arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.
Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-
station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience
that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.Even if one were to work under the
assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of
arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
GRANTED.

ANTIQUERA VS PEOPLE
714 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.

FACTS: At around 4:45 A.M. of February 11, 2004, police officers Gregorio and Laurence while onboard a patrol car, saw
two unidentified men rush out of a house in David St., Pasay City. Sensing something amiss, the police officers approached
the house and peeked inside the partially opened door, where they saw George holding an improvised tooter and a pink
lighter, and beside him, his live-in partner, Corazon. Because of this, they entered the house, and arrested George and
Corazon. A search of the immediate surroundings revealed a wooden box containing improvised tooter, scoop 10 sachets of
suspected shabu, and strips of aluminum oil. Because of they, they were charged with illegal possession of drugs
paraphernalia. Only George appealed the decision rendered by the RTC convicting him as charged, since Corazon jumped
bail. The Court of Appeals denied his appeal, hence he elevated his case to the Supreme Court. Both lower courts justified the
conviction of George, citing his arrest was a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: The Supreme Court:

The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the
police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid
warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize
the paraphernalia they found there.

The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of
Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged
which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that
even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a “peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.” This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David
Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase
to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the
fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for
help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.

Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:

THE COURT:

Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the door
open?Was it totally open, or was it partially open?

A – It was partially open Your Honor.

Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?

A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did
you have to push the door?

A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.

Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a police
officer?

A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…

Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the interior of the
house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house, considering
your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?

A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening because you did
not know what was happening inside?

A – Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house
and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.”

Accused acquitted.

PEOPLE VS VASQUEZ
714 SCRA
 DOCTRINE: Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of CA which affirmed the joint decision of RTC in a consolidated case,
convicting the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan (Don) of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
regulated drugs. Initially the case of illegal possession of drugs was raffled but upon motion it was consolidated with the case
of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The pre-trial conference of the cases
was held, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts. During the trial of the case
the prosecution stated the events. There was a confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo about the illegal drug
activities. Fajardo form a buy-bust team. It was in the buy-bust operation that Don was arrested. RTC convicted the appellant
of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction of the appellant. Hence this appeal. He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a
warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to
secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a
result thereof was inadmissible in court.

ISSUE/S: Whether the appellant Don may assail the validity of arrest.

rity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagra

ver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, whil

RULE 114 – BAIL

FLORESTA VS UBIADAS
429 SCRA 270

DOCTRINE: Judges owe it the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply to a given
controversy.

FACTS: Then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta administratively charged Judge
Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct in hearing and deciding several cases.
 Judge Floresta faults Judge Ubiadas for dismissing a criminal case for illegal entry, for lack of jurisdiction. Complainant
likewise faults Judge Ubiadas for failure to resolve, as he has yet to resolve, the Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Clarificationof the Order dismissing said criminal case, despite the lapse of more than two years since the filing of the
motion. By such failure, he charges Judge Ubiadas with violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which enjoins judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods, and of SC
Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987) which requires lower courts to resolve cases or matters before them within three months or
ninety days from date of submission.

Zambales which found probable cause against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (“Special Protection of Children Against Child

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Judge Ubiadas acted with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct in hearing and deciding cases

HELD: Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas is found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the
law or procedure in granting an application for bail without affording the prosecution due process.

On innumerable occasions this Court has impressed upon judges that, as mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct, they owe
it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply to a given controversy. They are
called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the
basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence.

The propriety of the dismissal, on motion of the accused, on jurisdictional grounds is, however, a matter for judicial
adjudication and the proper recourse of a party aggrieved by the decision of a judge is to appeal to the proper court,
not file an administrative complaint.

However, having failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Ubiadas is liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision or order which is a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

The Court takes the occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance the interests of the accused who
is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his
defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction, against the right of the State to protect the people and the
peace of the community from dangerous elements.

In the exercise of his power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors or lawyers in the government service for assistance.

Judge Ubiadas was not only aware of complainant’s designation, hence, belying his explanation that he must have
overlooked the same. It also shows his ignorance of the provision of the Ombudsman Act which does not require the
presence of a special reason for the designation or deputization by the Ombudsman of any prosecutor or government lawyer
to assist him.

ZUNO VS CABEBE
444 SCRA 382
DOCTRINE: The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered
aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of
bail.

FACTS: The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaintof Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño of
the Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe,then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court. The charges are
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.

In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that Criminal Case for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated
drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, against Rey DaquepArcangel, VictorinoGametMalabed, William Roxas
Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused,
assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused to a speedy trial. On
November 5, 2002, respondent judge motupropioissued an Order granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for each at
P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00
in cash. Respondent judge issued the Order without the accused’s application or motion for bail.

The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent judge issued an order inhibiting
himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that
respondent judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.

In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order granting bail to the accused without
any hearing, “the same was premised on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial.” The prosecution did not
object to the grant of bail to the accused.

On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.

In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance
of the law and recommended that a fine ofP20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE/S: W/N the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by granting bail without hearing.

HELD: YES.

In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural
necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a
hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.It must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which
remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.

There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections
8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure);
 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.);
otherwise the petition should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence
so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.

Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing before
he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail.
Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have
conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing
and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.

Respondent’s contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the criminal case that the prosecution has
intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a
hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court.
In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain
professional competence; and by the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He
must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
standards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules
and is hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPEC. ADM. REGION VS OLALIA

521 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases—clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.

FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a
final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition
for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE/S: WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

HELD: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007,
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

1. the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

2. the higher value now being given to human rights;
3. the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and
4. the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and
the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the
sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post
bail.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
529 SCRA 764

DOCTRINE: Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail
may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. A grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same
Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.

FACTS: On November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President
of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his
associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.

On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Information against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein
petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to
[the] respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.

The amended information referred to, like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together with the former President and
several others, with plunder, defined and penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659.

From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for certiorari before this
Court claiming that the respondent

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the charge against him for alleged offenses
and with alleged conspirators with whom he is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for him. Pending resolution of
this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an „Urgent Second Motion for Bail for
Medical Reasons. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. For three (3) days in September 2001, the Sandiganbayan conducted
hearings on the motion for bail, with one Dr. Roberto Anastacio of the Makati Medical Center appearing as sole witness for
Jinggoy. On December 18, 2001, Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition
for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the
same day, the Court referred the motion to the Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed said court to make a report, not
later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.

The report was submitted as directed. Attached to the Report was a copy of the SandiganbayanÊs Resolution dated December
20, 2001 denying Jinggoy’s motion for bail for lack of factual basis. According to the graft court, basing its findings on the
earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical
condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail.

On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoy’ petition.

On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the prosecution
filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda.

In the herein assailed Resolution of March 6, 2003, respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted the omnibus
application for bail.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto which the respondent court denied via the herein equally assailed May
30, 2003 Resolution.

Hence, the present petition on the submission that respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

ISSUE/S: Whether the grant of bail was proper.

HELD: Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may
justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a
little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk.

As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable to and of governing sway to the issue of
the propriety of revoking Jinggoy’s release on bail. As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail
to respondent Jinggoy to his virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong
contextually dealt with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been adduced. Unlike in
this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the bail application, was not an issue in
Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case, respondent Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts
and merits of the main case.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed
resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence.

OKABE VS GUTIERREZ
426 SCRA 685

DOCTRINE: Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous
rulings of the Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his
right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon; Curative statutes are by their essence
retroactive in application.

FACTS: Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating
prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the
affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties
were not attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were
not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against her.

The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:

(a) Based on its personal examination and consideration of the Information, the affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama
and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly approved by the city prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the
petitioners arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a determination of probable cause was made after the court had already
found probable cause and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the latter filed a personal bail bond for her
provisional liberty, such motion was a mere surplusage;

In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause, she posits that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S: If the RTC judge may rely on investigating prosecutor’s resolution in the determination of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused.

HELD: NO. In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should
not rely solely on the said report.[The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to
the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that he had
conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable cause
for the filing of the Information.

The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense
included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged of crimes from
the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must
make a personal determination of the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Under
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. A preliminary investigation is for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial.

If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information against the respondent, he executes a
certification at the bottom of the Information that from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the
offense charged has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating
prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis
for a finding of the existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

LEVISTE VS CA
615 SCRA 619

DOCTRINE: Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed; Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of
the accused; In the exercise of discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution
and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.

FACTS: Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of
homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to
his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.

On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the
denial of his application for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114
of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than
20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending
appeal.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of Leviste.

HELD: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other circumstances:

1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance
of reiteration;
2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification;
3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of
discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

ENRILE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
AUGUST 18, 2015

DOCTRINE: Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that
the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in
Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

FACTS: On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his
purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion
requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued
that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age
and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk
due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable
by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:

1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to
assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with
a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence
of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed
and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of
the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial
discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called
to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail
hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

a) In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
b) Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
c) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
 d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its commitment to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. They arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance
of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of
Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically
and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE

664 SCRA

DOCTRINE: While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or
possession.

FACTS: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner,
secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3
Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased
him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to
the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned
with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for
cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to
confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty
by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari
contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.

ISSUE/S: Whether the search made in the nipa hut is valid.

HELD: No, The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established
that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure
due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under
his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under
petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to
start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

MIGUEL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
675 SCRA

DOCTRINE: To be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process
exists.

FACTS: Then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials[3] of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)[4] charging the petitioner, among others,[5] with
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the
engineering design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market
(project).[6]

In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit. On October
23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.

The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the
petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted.
The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.

The petitioner asked for extension twice and still failed to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the extension period asked and
given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner
had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.

The OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the
obvious and fatal defect of the information in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was
done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, since he was not accorded a pre-
suspension hearing.

ISSUE/S: Whether the information against petitioner and petitioner's suspension valid.

HELD: Yes to both.

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him,
[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense
charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with
reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly
charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a person of common
understanding in appreciating the import of the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality. A reading of the
information clearly reveals that the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality was merely a continuation of
the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic
reading of the information would yield.

Suspension is valid.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate
opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused
would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean
oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.

PEOPLE VS LARA
678 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being
made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.

FACTS:
 Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC.
 Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued.

PROSECUTION: 3 witnesses: Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Bernard Cruz and PO3 Efren Calix

SUMULONG:
• May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to
defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian and while at around 10:30 AM, while the pickup he was riding was
at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of
the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?”;
• Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the bag. He threw the bag in Bautista's direction and
Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun
• He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident and when he went
back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground;
• He was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him;
 • June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City and
he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie and Manacob (other companions at
pickup) identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian's money.

SPO1 CRUZ:
• Around 7:55 PM on June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along
Dr. Pilapil Street
• 4 police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified and they then
approached Lara and invited him for questioning.
• At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie;
and after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.

PO3 CALIX:
• May 31, 2001: he was informed of a robbery that took place and he, together with 3 other police officers, proceeded to
the crime scene wherein upon arriving one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him
11 pieces of empty shells and 6 deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol;
• As part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and before Bautista died,
he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.

DEFENSE:
LARA
• May 31, 2001: he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room
which was corroborated by his sister, Edjosa Manalo and neighbor, Simplicia Delos Reyes.
• June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived
and asked him if he was Arturo Lara and after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to
go with them to the Barangay Hall. He voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen
said,"You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you”.
• He was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated for
robbery with homicide and when he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place, the police
challenged him to produce witnesses but when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to
come back the following day.
• While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at
uuwi na tayo"; and when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.

RTC: GUILTY of robbery with homicide sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties prescribed by law.

Rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows because Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as
the person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, and the one who shot Joselito Bautista
which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. Also, it is not impossible for him to be at the place.

ARGUMENTS:
• On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested without
a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings including those that
led to his conviction.
• Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial
investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
• Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a
witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot
Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police
was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator.
Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took possession
of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty.
 • Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled
by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given the credence they deserve. While
his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their
credibility.

CA: AFFIRMED conviction.

- AUTOMATIC APPEAL TO SC as the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE/S: Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible because
Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel? (NO, identification not custodial investigation)

HELD: DENY appeal.

- NO. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial
investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel.

• That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's identification of Lara
inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins
and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
• People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights,
may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken
into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements.
• Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
• The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused
during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because
during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually
the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.
• An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation.
In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group of persons
gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or
confession was extracted from him. During the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
• Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his
alleged uncounseled confession or admission.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SANICO VS PEOPLE
754 SCRA

DOCTRINE: If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was so serious that the client
was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be reopened to give to the client another chance to
present his case.

FACTS: The petitioner Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing and theft of minerals in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Cebu. The MCTC found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City ordered Sanico to
file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC ruled for the dismissal of the appeal.

Later on, one Atty. Dennis Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the dismissal
of the appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with problems due to
his wife’s debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel, Atty. Baring’s own medical condition
which caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as principal counsel hereof.

The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration because of its lack of verification and affidavit of merit; and because the
supposed sickness of Sanico’s wife and the lapses of Atty. Baring were not justifiable reasons.

Sanico, through Atty. Cañete, filed a petition for review in the CA, contesting his conviction, and assailing the dismissal of
his appeal for failure to file the memorandum on appeal.

CA denied the petition for review on the following grounds, namely:

a. the docket fees were not paid;

b. there was no proper proof of service of a copy of the petition for review on the adverse party;
c. the petitioner did not furnish to the RTC a copy of the petition for review;
d. there was no affidavit of service;
e. no written explanation for not resorting to personal filing was filed;
f. the documents appended to the petition were only plain photocopies of the certified true copies;
g. no copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record were attached;
h. the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were defective due to failure to contain a statement
that the allegations therein were based on the petitioner’s personal knowledge;
i. the verification and certification of non-forum shopping did not contain competent evidence of identity of
the petitioner; and
j. the serial number of the commission of the notary public and the office address of the notary public were
not properly indicated.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.

In the meantime, the counsel for respondent Jennifer S. Tenio filed an Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Judgment, which the
RTC authorized the issuance of. Sanico filed an omnibus motion to recall the order and to quash the entry of judgment, but
the RTC denied the omnibus motion, noting that Sanico did not provide the RTC with a copy of his petition for review;
hence, the RTC had no way of knowing about the pendency of his petition for review in the CA; and that in any case, the CA
had already denied his petition for review, while his motion for reconsideration had yet to be acted upon by the CA. Sanico’s
motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the negligence of the petitioner’s counsel should be binding on the petitioner.

HELD: No, without doubt, the petitioner could reasonably expect that his counsel would afford to him competent legal
representation. The mere failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the protection of the interests
of the petitioner as the client — as manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings discovered in the petition for review
— was gross negligence in any language because the defects were plainly avoidable by the simple application of the relevant
guidelines existing in the Rules of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was
so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be reopened to give to the client
another chance to present his case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to have his conviction
reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.
 PEOPLE VS AYSON
175 SCRA 216

DOCTRINE: The rights guaranteed a person under Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution are not available when he is not
under custodial investigation. Thus, a statement or confession voluntarily given by an employee during an administrative
investigation that he had malversed his employer’s funds is admissible although without a prior information of said rights and
without the assistance of counsel.

FACTS: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged
that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given
to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He
proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos
pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants
argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of
accused.

HELD: No, the handwritten admission and statement of accused were declared to be admissible.

Right Against Self-Incrimination

of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or adminis

when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to

That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding
over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is
a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well-known axiom that everyone is presumed to know
the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness
can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by
or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or
impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
 VILLAREAL VS PEOPLE
664 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The right to a speedy trial is violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial,
or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.

FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation rites has
ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain
and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by
the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner.
They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a
sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.

The case however did not proceed until 2002. The unexplained length of time in which the case remained dormant caused
the dismissal of the case for being in violation of the accuseds’ constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.

ISSUE/S: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the case for violation of the accuseds’ right to speedy trial

HELD: Yes. The SC did not see any grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of
the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an
Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court
of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo
in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such
order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of
the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused
Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was
no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the
latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which
the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever
is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.
RULE 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

PEOPLE VS ESTOMACA
256 SCRA 421

DOCTRINE: Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or
by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein,
then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory
requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by
way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the
precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary
defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.

FACTS: Estomaca is an illiterate laborer accused of raping his own daughter, Estelita. 5 complaints were filed and 2 of them
are being challenged. These instances happened sometime in 1993 and 1994 which both took place in their residence in
Iloilo. The court imposed the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for the sexual assault in 1993 and the penalty of death for the
alleged rape in 1994.

The records show, however, that there was an irregularity in his arraignment where the complaints were supposed to have all
been read to him in the Ilonggo/local dialect. In this said arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty to all 5 complaints but
subsequently stated the he wasn’t guilty of the other 3 cases against him

ISSUE/S: Whether the arraignment was valid or not

HELD: No. The transcript of the arraignment shows that it merely consisted of the bare reading of the 5 complaints. It was
reported in the transcript that “Reading the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect”. Since it was
stated in the singular, the court speculates whether all 5 complaints were actually ready, translated or explained to him on a
level within his comprehension considering his limited education. Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that
appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This assumes added significance since Ilonggo, or properly called
Hiligaynon, is a regional language, spoken in a major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in
Capiz. Within a province or major geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects spoken
in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion of the transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is
merely a local dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it would be different if local dialect was
used to denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without identifying what it was. The significance of this
distinction is found right in the provision of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations,
deliberately required that the complaint or information be read to the accused in the language or the dialect known to him, to
ensure his comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily
capable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to
and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and
his family are natives, the local dialect is known as kinaray-a. Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended
social or commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon
regional language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for an appreciable period of time. The converse is true for
those whose native tongue is the dialect of kinaray-a, since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or
Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether
and how the indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that the appellant was truly and honestly made
aware of the charges and, especially, the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal
anything on this point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant was translated. Yet a mans life is at
stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty.

Since no valid judgments can be had upon an invalid arraignment, the cases were set aside and were remanded to the trial
court.
 PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN
518 SCRA 359

DOCTRINE: Procedural defect of belated arraignment was cured when the counsel of the accused participated in the trial
without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.

FACTS: Alfredo Pangilinan was charged with 2 informations for the rape of his daughter, AAA. He was arrested and
detained with no bail recommended.

He then filed a petition for bail. The petition for bail was heard and prosecution presented evidence. The Regional Trial
Court denied petition Defense then presented its evidence.

The RTC after having discovered that Pangilinan was not yet arraigned, scheduled his arraignment. Pangilinan pleaded not
guilty. RTC convicted him and sentenced him to death.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the arraignment was valid.

HELD: YES.

Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he was arraigned only after the case was
submitted for decision, said irregularity, he argues, is a procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is
tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent
arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial proceedings because at the time the petition for bail was heard, the trial court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.

The accused is mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired
jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance.19 In the case at bar, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was
arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of
why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.

Admittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. The question is: Were appellant’s rights and
interests prejudiced by the fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the proceedings? We do not think so. Appellant’s
belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the
trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the
prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of
the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the
procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences,
that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect.
This Court will not allow it.

In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar circumstances, we held that while
the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non- prejudicial and
has been fully cured. Since appellant’s rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated.

DAAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
560 SCRA 233

DOCTRINE:

1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval—it usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than
that for the graver charge.
2. Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings but it may also be made during the
trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.

FACTS: Daan (together with other co-accused) was charged for three counts of malversation of public funds and three
counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee before the Sandiganbayan.

In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of
"guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in
their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not
guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the
accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.

Prosecution found this acceptable. Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to
the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.

The Sandiganbayan likewise denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration.

Daan filed a Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Daan’s motion to plea
bargain.

HELD: YES.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
 SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,viz:

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special
laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

□ (a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the
court. (Emphasis supplied)

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested
its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it
was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.9

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e.,
that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama, the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is
not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court. However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion should
neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed
to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the
proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential
grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have
merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."

Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events
and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls for
the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction.

In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of
P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage
caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.

There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also
willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.

PEOPLE VS JANJALANI
639 SCRA 157

TOPIC: Valentine’s Day Bombing by Abu Sayyaf; Trinidad and Baharan plead guilty for multiple murder but plead not
guilty for frustrated multiple murder.

DOCTRINE:

1. All trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice demands a
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty,
he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction; The requirement for a judge
to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment.
2. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused—the conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been
under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea.
3. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.

FACTS: An RRCG bus was plying its usual route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via
EDSA. Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop,
the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and
let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on
the bus together, the two sat away from each other—one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the
bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish.
When he approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked
dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more
concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more
certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.

Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the
bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to
alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He
then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the
bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a
statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.

Shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group—Abu Solaiman— announced over radio station
DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he
again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview sometime after the
incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the
network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television
interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor
identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on
the evening of 14 February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group—namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah
Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other “John” and “Jane Does”—were then charged
with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the
other accused remain at-large.

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge, Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other
hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge, accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan
pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges.

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to
changing their “not guilty” pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled “guilty” to the heavier
charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan
and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and
manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’ plea of guilt despite insufficiency of
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital of ense; reception of evidence.—When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court
noted that since accused-appellant’s original plea was “not guilty,” the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to “guilty.”

Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense
counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida,
this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that
his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the
accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or
threatened.

The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that
the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects,
and consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory. Nevertheless, the High Court is not
unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of
guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge—
multiple murder—based on the same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt—one through
an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via
judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the “searching inquiry” in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the
accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.

ABS-CBN CORP. VS GOZON

753 SCRA 1

TOPIC: SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.—Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the
following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A
petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the
President; provided that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.

DOCTRINE: The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino overseas worker and hostage
victim Angelo dela Cruz.

As summarized by the CA: Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition
for his release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was released by his
captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July 2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the
public interest it generated, both GMA Network, Inc. and petitioner made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the
live event.

Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS-CBN. GMA-7’s
news control room staff saw neither the “No Access Philippines” notice nor a notice that the video feed was under embargo
in favor of ABS-CBN.

ABS-CBN filed the Complaint for copyright infringement against Dela Pena-Reyes and Manalastas to which the prosecutor
found probable cause to indict the latter. Respondents filed the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. DOJ
Secretary Raul Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents and held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. Both
parties moved for reconsideration of the Gonzalez Resolution. The trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
filed earlier by Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. The Motion to Suspend was granted.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend.

HELD: The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-
day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.

The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the
case.

The suspension of the arraignment should always be within the limits allowed by law. The doctrine in Crespo v. Judge Mogul
was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to
refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already pending with this court: In order to avoid a situation
where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court. The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas’
arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8,
2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial
court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As
Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the
requirements of due process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”

ENRILE VS PEOPLE
766 SCRA 1

DOCTRINE: The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is
filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a
manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown.

The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime
charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what the Information means. The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil
or criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with
the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters of
evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove
any item of factual information included in the bill of particulars.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Napoles, et. al before the
Sandiganbayan. Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to dismiss for
lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for bail), and (2) a supplemental opposition to
issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information,. The Sandiganbayan heard both motions. Thereafter, the
prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.

The Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the
accused. Soon after, Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him that his arraignment would be held before the
Sandiganbayan. The day before his arraignment, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particular as well as a motion for deferment
of arraignment since he was to undergo medical examination at the PGH.
The Sandiganbayan denied his motion for Bill of Particulars on the following grounds:
1. the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition
to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
2. the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Enrile then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari before the High Court claiming that the Sandiganybayan gravely abused its discretion
in denying his motion for bill of particulars.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars;

HELD: YES. The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is
filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a
manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is shown.
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill of
particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary without any explanation
supporting this conclusion constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Some of the desired details are material facts that must be
alleged to enable the petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted
through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each detail was an ultimate or
evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of
documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these
desired details; neither can we put on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired
details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to positively
respond and make an intelligent defense.

A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of the proof; it limits the
evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this
reason that the failure of an accused to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence which
could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms which sufficiently charges the
defendants with a definite crime.

Sec, 9 Rule 116, Bill of particulars.—The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the
details desired.

In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action, which an accused may avail of
by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars
has been defined as a complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a
pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. The purpose of a motion for bill
of particulars in civil cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive pleading properly. In criminal cases, a bill of
particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the
crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused: to know the theory of the government’s case; to prepare his defense and to
avoid surprise at the trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to
compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence.

In dealing with a motion for a bill of particulars in a criminal case, judges should observe that: (a) the remedy is distinct from
a motion to quash in the sense that it presupposes that the acts or offenses constituting the offense (or the ultimate facts that
comprise the crime’s component elements) are already stated in the Information, albeit may be couched in vague language;
(b) the remedy is, as mentioned, not meant to supply evidential information (or evidentiary facts); and (c) the particulars to be
allowed are only those details that would allow a man of ordinary intelligence, as may be reasonable under the circumstances,
to, again, properly plead during his arraignment and to prepare his defense for trial. Accordingly, the analysis involved in
motion for bill of particulars should go beyond a simple ultimate facts-evidentiary facts dichotomy.

If the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order the government to file a bill
of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the
accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing
certain overt acts through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to prove at
the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all
the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged
carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period of time.

RULE 117 – MOTION TO QUASH

PEOPLE VS LACSON
400 SCRA 267

DOCTRINE: The interpretation of Sec. 8 of Rule 117 to the effect that in the event that the accused is prosecuted anew with
the same offense, albeit under an identical information, the new proceedings being conducted
as if the accused has been charged afresh has in its favor the soundest policy considerations based no less on the fundamental
objectives of procedural rules

Section 1 (g) of Rule 116—Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment
shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of
the pendency or a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be
excluded in computing the period.

FACTS: Before the Court is the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002, remanding
this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual issues relative
to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against
the respondent and his co-accused with the said court. The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder
for the shooting and killing of eleven persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal
when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held
therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there
is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the requirements for valid motion to quash were attendant;

HELD: NO.

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or
both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2)
years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is
burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:

1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal
of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.

The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new
rule. The raison d’ etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case
is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the
issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution6 without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the
timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.

Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent
requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a
provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused
to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case or his failure to.

A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods
provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed
periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling
is barred by the statute of limitations.

The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new
witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a
new Information is filed.

In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were
present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did
not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion
for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the
trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and
to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondent contended therein that
until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be
issued against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then
prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this
Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and
their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of
this incident. Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.

The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
 PANAGUITON VS DOJ
571 SCRA 549

DOCTRINE: The prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.

FACTS: Cawili borrowed money from petitioner. As payment for the loan, Cawili and Tongson jointly issued three checks
in favor of petitioner. The checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by closure of the account. Petitioner
filed a complaint for violation of BP 22. The prosecutor found probable cause only with respect to Cawili as Tongson’s
defense that his signatures on the checks had been falsified. Petitioner then filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even while
the case against Cawili was already filed in court. The Chief State Prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation and to refer the falsified document to the NBI. After reinvestigation, still only probable cause with respect to
Cawili was sustained. In the city prosecutor’s resolution, it was held that the case with respect to Tongson had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4)
years. n this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18
March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from
1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the
alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. Ultimately, the DOJ held that the action on the crime
has prescribed.

In justifying its resolution, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a
prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of
the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the
prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.

ISSUE/S: WON the running of the prescriptive period tolled upon the filing of the information in court or upon the filing of
the complaint with the prosecutor for preliminary investigation.

HELD: Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive
periods. Act 3326 provides:

“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the
peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. “the term ‘proceedings’ should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character”. To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.

PEOPLE VS DUMLAO
580 SCRA 409
DOCTRINE: Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash—insufficiency of evidence is a
ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.

FACTS: An Amended Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging respondents Dumlao and Lao, Aber P.
Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr. and Fabian C. Ver with violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The accusatory portion of the information reads:

“That on or about May 10, 1982, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Hermenegildo C. Dumlao,
Aber Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr., and Fabian C. Ver, being then the members of the
Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which is a government corporation
and therefore all public officers, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
while in the performance of their official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into contract of lease-purchase with Emilio G. Lao, a private person whereby the GSIS agreed to sell
to said Emilio G. Lao, a GSIS acquired property consisting of three parcels of land with an area of 821
square meters together with a 5-storey building situated at 1203 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, known as
the Government Counsel Centre for the sum of P2,000,000.00 with a down payment of P200,000.00 with
the balance payable in fifteen years at 12% interest per annum compounded yearly, with a yearly
amortization of P264,278.37 including principal and interest granting Emilio G. Lao the right to sub-lease
the ground floor for his own account during the period of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals in
excess of the yearly amortization which contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.”

Respondent Dumlao, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. A Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the court on 10 January 2005; after which the court
issued Pre-Trial Order; Respondent Dumlao then filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. He argued that the allegedly approved Board Resolution was not in fact
approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees, contrary to the allegations in the information. Since the signatures of
Fabian Ver, Roman Cruz, Aber Canlas and Jacobo Clave did not appear in the minutes of the meeting held on 23
April 1982, he said it was safe to conclude that these people did not participate in the alleged approval of the Lease-
Purchase Agreement. This being the case, he maintained that there was no quorum of the board to approve the
supposed resolution authorizing the sale of the GSIS property. There being no approval by the majority of the Board
of Trustees, there can be no resolution approving the Lease-Purchase Agreement. The unapproved resolution, he
added, proved his innocence. He further contended that the person to be charged should be Atty. Luis Javellana, who
sold the subject property to respondent Lao without the proper authority. Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of
respondent; the People through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case against respondent
Dumlao, arguing that it was denied its right to due process when the court a quo dismissed the case against
respondent Dumlao after pre-trial and before it could present its witnesses and formally offer its exhibits.

ISSUE/S: WON facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by
law.

HELD: Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for
dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecutions right to due
process. It deprived the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the culpability of the accused.

It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the
ground invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised by him, and not at the appropriate
time. The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.

SORIANO VS PEOPLE
591 SCRA 244

DOCTRINE: The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a),19 Rule 117 of the1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law.20 The trial court
may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the
defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material
averments do not constitute the offense.

FACTS: State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, with
violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules)

An information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was also filed against Soriano and Ilagan. The
informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch
14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime.

Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against Soriano, this time, covering
the P15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol.

Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for obtaining said loan. The cases
were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 77, presided by Judge Aurora
Santiago-Lagman.

Petitioners Soriano and Ilagan filed an MQ before both salas. Petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more than one
offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial
document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not
constitute an offense.

Both salas of RTC denied the MQs

Petitioners filed a Rule 65 before the CA but it was dismissed.

Petitioners filed a Rule 45 before the SC

ISSUE/S: : Whether the 2 judges correctly denied the Motion to Quash

HELD: YES.

Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than one (1) offense is charged. They
point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification of commercial document for
allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be
quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule
11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing
the accused in preparing his defense.

By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.15 Section 13 of Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.

In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than one
information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.

Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all the charges filed against him
proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that he cannot be charged with
estafa thru falsification of commercial document, considering that he is already being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.

The contention has no merit.

Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.

In Loney v. People, this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges against the accused, held: As early as the start of
the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this
rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." In
People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" —

x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is consistent with
settled doctrine.

As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI violation
consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the
grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the
majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to
the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which
are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against
Soriano was, therefore, proper.

Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending that the same do not constitute an
offense.

The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation
contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners against
the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper
grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.

We have reviewed the informations and find that they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI
rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.

In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of DOSRI rules, the informations alleged that Soriano was the president of
RBSMI, while Ilagan was then its general manager; that during their tenure, Soriano, with the direct participation of Ilagan,
and by using the names of Virgilio Malang and Rogelio Mañaol, was able to indirectly obtain loans without complying with
the requisite board approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 37722 as amended.

Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge petitioners with estafa thru falsification of
commercial document. They allege that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans
and received the proceeds thereof when they did not in fact secure said loans or receive the amounts reflected in the
promissory notes and other bank records.

The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b)23 of the RPC to
wit: (i) that money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (iv) that there is demand made by the offended
party to the offender.

The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the other hand, further alleged the following essential elements of estafa
under Article 315 (2) (a)24 of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (ii) that
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means—that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 &
1981, thus, charge petitioners with the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.

Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motions.

In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of
a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.25 Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the
special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that
would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error,
much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.

CEREZO VS PEOPLE
650 SCRA 222

DOCTRINE: Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not
rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty to
assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding
on courts.
FACTS: In 2002, Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente
Afulugencia, as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo). Finding probable cause to indict Yaneza, et al., the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) filed the corresponding Information against them before the RTC. Yaneza, et al. thereafter filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s Evidence before the OP-QC. In its resolution, the
OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss
and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC.During the intervening period, Yaneza, et al. were arraigned. All of
them entered a "not guilty" plea. In deference to the prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case
dismissed. Aggrieved, Cerezo moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the OP-QC resolution has not yet
attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the DOJ. In 2006, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated his resolution reversing and setting aside the OP-QC’s resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier
Information for libel. The RTC issued its Order granting Cerezo's motion for reconsideration, conformably with the
resolution of the DOJ Secretary. Yaneza, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC. Relentless,
Yaneza, et al. elevated their predicament to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
CA annulled the impugned RTC Orders. Cerezo interposed the appeal when his motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision was denied.

ISSUE/S: .

1. Whether the dismissal of the case by the RTC was valid.

2. Whether double jeopardy set in after the RTC's dismissal of the case.

HELD:

1. No, because there was independent assessment of the merits of the motion on the part of the RTC.
2. No. The elements of double jeopardy are not attendant in the present case.

Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the
court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and
merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court
abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with
grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and
produced no effect whatsoever.

This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a
prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew.

It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Since we have held that the Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then
respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite
which requires the conviction and acquittal of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the accused,
was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
 CO VS NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
727 SCRA 503

DOCTRINE: While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration
of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.

FACTS: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against
petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City.

In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant
to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).

On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding
Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.

On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal
cases.

It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005. Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on
December 16, 2005. Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 171096. We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.There being no motion for
reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the
inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a “Motion for Permanent Dismissal” on July 13, 2006. Uy opposed the motion, contending
that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge
Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion. When the court subsequently denied
Uy’s motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City.
On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling
and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed
with the trial of the criminal cases.Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the
petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

Petitioner’s contention: Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He
reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a “vexatious,
capricious and oppressive” delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) and
Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating that the entire trial period should not
exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction
over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because its revival would already put
him in double jeopardy.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner on the ground of denial of his right to speedy
trial constitutes final dismissal of these cases;

HELD: The petition is unmeritorious.

Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence that the alleged
“vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good
cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept.”In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b)
reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. “While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy
trial.”

PEOPLE VS DE LEON
754 SCRA 147

DOCTRINE: A Buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers,
provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.

FACTS: Rodante de Leon was charged with violation of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
A buy-bust team was formed to act on the illegal activities of De Leon upon the report of a confidential informant at the Anti-
Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the Novaliches Police Station in Quezon City. De Leon was arrested upon
selling to PO2 Magcalayo, posing as buyer, shabu for P200. The seized drug was identified as a prohibited drug and
subsequently presented in evidence.

The RTC and CA both found De Leon guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the buy-bust operation, allegedly full of irregularities was legal.

HELD: YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and
has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.

The Court upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and ruled that the elements of the crime
were sufficiently established, thereby affirming the decision of the CA.

RULE 119 – TRIAL

SALVANERA VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 143093; May 21, 2007

DOCTRINE: In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
 c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

FACTS: Petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is
charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, by feloniously assaulting and attacking Parane using a firearm causing his death.
Petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried
Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the accused
have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large. Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of
victim Ruben Parane.

Petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, moved for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix, to serve as state
witnesses. In an order, the trial court granted petitioner’s application for bail and denied the prosecution’s motion for the
discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The prosecution moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.

The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. It alleged that the testimonies of
the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane. The
prosecution likewise claimed that it was premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioner’s application for bail
because the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the hearing for the discharge of the two accused.

The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Abutin and Tampelix from the Information to become
state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not there was substantial corroboration of Abutin and Tampelix’s testimony to discharge them and
serve as State Witnesses.

HELD: YES. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

To require Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render
nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of the state witness." The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to
consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. The Supreme Court ruled that a
conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements
of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory
testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects. It is
enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are
satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by
each other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to
such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
As co-conspirators, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in
secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other
prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and
witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link
petitioner to the commission of the crime.

VDA. DE MANGUERRA VS. RISOS

G.R. No. 152643; August 28, 2008

DOCTRINE: It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is
also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

FACTS: Respondents, Risos et.al. were charged with Estafa before the RTC of Cebu City which arose from the falsification
of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that petitioner De
Manguerra, the owner of the mortgaged property affixed her signature to the document. Petitioner was then confined in a
hospital in Manila for gastro-intestinal bleeding. Respondents filed a motion for suspension of criminal proceedings on the
ground of a prejudicial question alleging that the action for the declaration of nullity of mortgage should first be resolved.
The RTC granted the motion. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to nullify the RTC orders.

Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to take her deposition due to petitioner’s weak physical condition. The RTC granted the
motion and ordered petitioner’s deposition to be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati. Respondents assailed the order of
the RTC granting the motion to take petitioner’s deposition but the RTC denied the MR stating that “procedural technicalities
should be brushed aside due to the urgency of the situation.” Respondents assailed the RTC orders before the CA, with the
CA ruling in their favor stating that Rule 119, Section 15 and not Rule 23 applies in this case.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Rule 23 applies to the deposition of De Manguerra.

HELD: NO. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This
is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance
to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of said
witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.

This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses.

It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary
that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable
notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination
during trial, that is, through question and answer.

PEOPLE VS. JIMENEZ

G.R. No. 152643; August 28, 2008

DOCTRINE: The requirement is that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should not
only "appear to be the most guilty."
FACTS: Montero, a former employee of the BSJ company owned by the Jimenezes executed sworn statements confessing
his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda and naming petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez, Descalso, Ponce and
Fernandez as his coconspirators. The statements of Montero led to the recovery of a cadaver encased in a drum near or
practically at the place Montero pointed to.

The state prosecutors charged the accused of murder for the killing of Barrameda. Montero thereafter filed a motion for his
discharge as state witness. Petitioner opposed the motion. The RTC denied the motion to discharge Montero as state witness
ruling that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 19, Rule 119 of the ROC. This was however
reversed by the newly-appointed regular Judge Docena ruling that the prosecution complied with the requisites of Sec. 17,
Rule 119 further ruling that Montero is qualified to be discharged as state witness. Petitioner filed with the CA petition for
certiorari seeking the annulment of Judge Docena’s orders. The CA initially ruled in favor of petitioner but on MR, reversed
its ruling in favor of respondents agreeing with Judge Docena’s decision. Upon denial of petitioner’s MR, petitioners filed the
consolidated petitions for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Montero’s discharge as a state witness complied with the requirements of Sec. 17, Rule 119 of the
ROC.

HELD: YES. The requirement is that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should not
only "appear to be the most guilty."

By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the
offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
penalty due to conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of
participation in the commission of the offense. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free
while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized.

Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness, what are controlling are the
specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed.

The SC ruled that from the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge Montero, it appears
that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no
direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing, the
records do not indicate that he had active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly came from
accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose which was executed by accused Lennard. Montero’s
participation was limited to providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the
steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box
containing the cadaver into the sea.

The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual
in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of who had the most participation in the commission of the crime. The
appellate courts do not interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual issue except when grave abuse
of discretion intervenes.

PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO

588 SCRA 550

DOCTRINE: Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at
the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b)
during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light
offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence
is required and cannot be waived.
FACTS: An Information for the murder of Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the RTC of Tanauan Batangas against Joven
de Grano, Armando de Grano, and Estanislao Lacaba, together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho, Domingo
Landicho, and Leonardo Genil, who were at-large. Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty.”

Respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecution’s evidence was not strong. RTC found the accused guilty
of the offenses charged. An order was issued that modified the previous decision, which downgraded the charge of murder to
homicide.

However, Joven, Armando, and Domingo were not present during promulgation. Petitioner maintained that while they were
not present during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the
promulgation. Therefore, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration which included that of Estanislao, the RTC
was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the absence of
the other accused during the promulgation of judgment.

HELD: The RTC erred in taking cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration despite the absence of the other accused
during the promulgation of judgment. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the
accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of
innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of
the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.

When the Decision was promulgated, only Estanislao was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and
explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at
large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.

RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint MR with respect to the respondents who were at large. It
should have considered the joint motion as a MR that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have
not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed
to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

ASISTIO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 200465; April 20, 2015

DOCTRINE: “Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not
show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction,
or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint
or information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."

FACTS: Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). The accused being the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative entered into a contract with Coca Cola Products in her own personal capacity when in
truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have accrued to Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of the said
Cooperative.

The school principal directed petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead, petitioner
claimed that the principal had no business and authority to require her to produce financial statements, and that the said
reports had been posted on the school bulletin board. The principal ordered to conduct an auditing. Based on the documents
obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared by
petitioner, the audit committee found that petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for 3 years.

After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to
Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it
a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.

Subsequently, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent appealed the decision of the RTC
to the Court of Appeals which was granted. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence
final and cannot be appealed.
 Whether or not the right of the accused against double jeopardy has been violated.

HELD:

NO. In this case, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the
issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being the case the RTC order
of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal hence may still be subject to an appeal under Rule 41 of the ROC. “Acquittal is
always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is
beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal
terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that
the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or
sufficient in form and substance, etc."

NO. The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be
stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding,
albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to
attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent
of the accused. There is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by
moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence he is deemed to have waived his protection against
double jeopardy.

CABRADOR VS. PEOPLE

602 SCRA 760

DOCTRINE: One can avail of a demurrer to evidence only after the plaintiff or the prosecution has rested its case. Resting
one’s case requires a formal offer of evidence which has been commented on or has been opposed and the court has already
ruled on the formal offer of evidence together with the opposition or comment thereto.

FACTS: The public prosecutor accused Cabador of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Valerio. After 5 years of trial
and 5 witnesses, RTC ended the prosecution's presentation of witnesses and required the prosecution to make a written or
formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. The public prosecutor asked for 3 extensions of time
but was still not able to make the offer.

Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, invoking his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, he claimed that the trial court could
not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. 4 days before such filing, without the knowledge of
Cabador, another extension was asked for, and an offer was made on the day Cabador filed his MTD.
RTC issued an order treating Cabador's MTD as a demurrer to evidence. And since he filed his motion without leave of court,
he waived his right to present evidence in his defense. RTC submitted the case for decision. Cabador filed a MR which the
RTC denied. CA likewise denied his petition and affirmed RTC. CA denied his MR.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the motion filed by Cabador was demurrer to evidence or a motion to dismiss.

HELD: The SC ruled that Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, not a demurrer to evidence. He did not waive his right to
present evidence. There are 2 stages in the trial proper of a criminal case: (1) prosecution's presentation of evidence against
the accused; and (2) accused's presentation of evidence in his defense. If after the first stage, the evidence appears insufficient
to support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage,
and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since
the prosecution bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal.

But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a
caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment.

To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider the ff: the
allegations in it were made in good faith; the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; the primary objective of the party
filing it.

Cabador in his MTD pointed out how the trial dragged on for years; the gaps between hearings were long, with hearings often
postponed due to the absence of the prosecutor. And it was compounded by the repeated motions for extension by the
prosecutor to make the formal offer, and its failure to make such offer. He invoked his right to speedy trial.

In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to speedy trail. This denial is
characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified
postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the
right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.

Cabador did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed
to meet the elements of the crime, something that is fundamental in ay demurrer. It did not touch on any particular testimony
or documentary exhibit. He could not do so because he did not know that the prosecution finally made its offer of exhibits on
the same date he filed his MTD.

A demurrer assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. In this case, after the prosecution filed its formal offer,
the trial court still needed to give Cabador an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule
on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. The MTD was filed
before he could object to the offer, before the trial court could rule on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case.
It cannot be said that he intended his MTD to serve as a demurrer. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present
evidence in his defense.

PEOPLE VS. TAN

625 SCRA 388

DOCTRINE: The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused
was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. The only instance when double jeopardy
will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
FACTS: Information for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, in relation to Sections 32 (a)-1 and 56 of the Revised Securities Act were
filed against Tan in the RTC. After arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges and trial commenced. He made his
formal offer of evidence. RTC issued an Order admitting some (Exhibits A, B, W and X) but denied admission of all the
other exhibits. Tan filed a MR but this was denied by the RTC. He filed an omnibus motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence and to admit the attached demurrer to evidence. RTC granted the motion for leave to file the demurrer and admitted
the attached demurrer. The RTC issued an Order granting the respondent’s demurrer to evidence.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Orders of the RTC. CA denied the petition, ruling that the
dismissal of a criminal action by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is one on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for
which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not double jeopardy applies in this case.

HELD Double jeopardy applies. In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained the general rule that the grant of a
demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and cannot be appealed.

The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only
instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

This exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the
proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence.

Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC violate petitioner’s right to
due process?" Petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents
which led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.

Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse
can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the
merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, RTC extensively discussed its position on the various issues brought to
contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s decision to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence
to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are
preferred shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.

Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to
afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse
of criminal processes.

IMPERIAL VS. JOSON

635 SCRA 71

DOCTRINE: The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays.

FACTS: A truck, owned by petitioner Imperial and being driven by petitioner Francisco, collided with a truck, owned by
respondent. After colliding with respondent’s truck, Imperial’s truck rammed into a KIA Besta Van killing the driver and 7 of
its passengers, and inflicting serious physical injuries upon 3 other passengers. A criminal complaint for Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damages to Property was filed against
petitioners with the MTC.

Francisco proposed a series of facts for stipulation with the prosecution. Prosecutor Zabella refused to stipulate. Court issued
pre-trial order to that effect. Francisco filed motion to “compel and disqualify Prosecutor Zabella and to correct the pre-trial
order”, on the ground, among others, that the latter cannot refuse to stipulate on matters which he has personal knowledge.
MTC denied motion. However, it directed another pre-trial conference in view of the reassignment of the case to another
prosecutor, and appearance of a new private prosecutor.

Francisco filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the RTC. He further moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that his right to speedy trial was violated in view of the 9 postponements of the pre-trial conference. This
was denied, so again he filed a CPM petition with the RTC, which was consolidated with the previous CPM petition. Both
CPM petitions were dismissed for lack of merit. Francisco elevated this to the CA. CA upheld the RTC.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not double jeopardy applies in this case.

HELD The accused’s right to speedy trial was not violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding
criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said
right is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

645 SCRA 726

DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be
appealed because it would place accused in double jeopardy. It is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65.

FACTS: Vice Mayor Manuel Barcenas of Toledo City in Cebu failed to liquidate cash advances P62, 765.00 despite
demands to the damage and prejudice of government. He was charged with violation of Sec. 89 PD 1445 before
Sandiganbayan. He was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented lone witness COA State Auditor
Villad. Thereafter, prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case. Barcenas filed motion for leave to file
demurrer to evidence. Sandiganbayan granted the motion on ground that prosecution failed to prove that government suffered
any damage from Barcenas’ non-liquidation of subject cash advance.

ISSUE: W/N Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: No. Actual damage to government arising from non-liquidation of cash advance is not an essential element. Instead,
mere failure to timely liquidate is the gravamen of the offense. Even if Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous
interpretation of law, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. The error committed is of such
nature that can no longer be rectified on appeal by prosecution because it would place accussed in double jeopardy. Such
error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy had already set in.

BANGAYAN, JR. VS. BANGAYAN

659 SCRA

DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, acquittal of accused or dismissal of case against him can only be appealed by Solicitor
General. Court cannot review an order granting demurrer to evidence. Acquitting the accused on ground by insufficiency of
evidence is of such based on the merits, thus to do so will place accused in double jeopardy.

FACTS: Sally Go filed complaint accusing Bangayan, Jr and Resally having committed bigamy. Sally Go learned that
Bangayan, Jr had taken Resally as is concubine. Sally Go further discovered that Bangayan Jr also married a certain Azucena
in Caloocan City. After arraignment, both Bangayan Jr and Resally pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented and offered
evidence. Both Bangayan Jr and Resally separately filed their respective motions for leave to file demurrer to evidence. RTC
dismissed case for insufficiency of evidence. Sally Go elevated case to CA via petition for certiorari. CA held that the pieces
of evidence presented by prosecution were sufficient to deny demurrer to evidence.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by CA when it reversed RTC order dismissing criminal
case against them.

HELD: Yes. Double jeopardy already set in. All 4 elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid information for bigamy
was filed against petitioners. They pleaded not guilty to charges against them and subsequently case was dismissed after the
prosecution rested its case. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants demurrer, such dismissal of the case
is one on the merits, which is equivalent to acquittal of the accused. Even if trial court had incorrectly overlooked the
evidence against petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified
by certiorari. It must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.

PEOPLE VS. JOSE GO

AUGUST 6, 2016

DOCTRINE: Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. To be sufficient, evidence
must prove: (1) that commission of crime and (2) precise degree of participation by the accused. Thus, when the accused files
a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS: Fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s Inc and Asia Textile Mills, Inc – were approved, after which two
manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different
entities – Philippine Recycler’s Inc and Zeta International – without any documents issed by the supposed borrowers
Timmy’s Inc and Asia Textile Mills, Inc assigning the supposed loan proceeds to the two payees. Thereafter, these two
manager’s checks – together with several others totaling P 120, 819, 475. 00 – were encashed, and then deposited in OCBC
Savings Account of Go. Then several automatic transfer deposits were made from Go’s savings account to his OCBC Current
Account which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonoured personal checks. PDIC, designated as OCBC receiver,
came to the conclusion that the signatures on Timmy’s Inc and Asia Textile Mills, Inc loan documents were indeed falsified.
Two counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed by PDIC against Go. CA affirmed RTC Order
granting Go’s demurrer.

ISSUE/S: W/N there’s sufficient evidence not to warrant demurrer to evidence

HELD: Yes. Trial court effectively failed and /or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against Go, which it was duty-
bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money –
not to mention that banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with
circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving issues. Demand is not an element of the felony.
Furthermore, as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of the falsification. It is irrelevant that the
proceeds of supposed loans were made payable to entities other than the alleged borrowers. The bottom line is that they are
encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and used to fund
personal checks.

PEOPLE VS. PEPINO

779 SCRA 170

DOCTRINE: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are
shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on an independent in-court identification made by
Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-court identification during the police lineup.

FACTS: Two men and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Paraniaque City,
and pretended to be customers. Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money
was inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted the "'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go
with them. Kidnappers called Edward's father and demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward's father told the
kidnappers that he did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00
ransom. When Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He
drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader. Edward was invited to identify
some suspects from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward positively identified Pepino,
Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino. Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. Only
Pepino only Gomez were arraigned while others remained at large.

RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. RTC held that they were positively identified in police lineup.
The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection to the illegality of their arrests when they
did not move to quash the information before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial. Only Gomez
appealed.

ISSUE/S: W/N Edward's identification of her during trial might have been preconditioned by the "suggestive identification"
made during the police lineup

HELD: No. The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other
facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a
judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test , there was thus ample opportunity for Edward - before and after the gun had been
pointed at him - to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had
talked to him "[a]t least once a day" during the four days that he was detained. Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front
seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes
when they arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to
take a good look at the occupants of the car when he was about to be released.

On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the person who pointed a gun at her
husband while going down the stairs, and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she
was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she could not forget Pepino's face.

Police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not
compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have been ideal if there had been more
women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact
alone that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence
that the police had supplied or even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators.

Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among those already presented to the media as
kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were already the focus
of the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation when the out-of-court identification was
conducted.

Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having been tainted by an irregular out-of-court
identification in a police lineup. They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants' arrests.

The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more favorable to him.

RULE 120 – JUDGMENT

LLAMAS VS. CA
601 SC 288

DOCTRINE: The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.

FACTS: Petitioners were charged before RTC of Makati with crime “other forms of swindling.” Llamas mortgaged to Rural
Bank of Imus parcel of land then sold the same property to Conrado Avila, falsely representing the same to be free from all
liens and encumbrances. CA affirmed decision of RTC finding Llamas guilty. Francisco Llamas moved for recall of warrant
of arrest, raising for first time that trial court had no jurisdiction over offense charged. No action was taken by trial court.
Petitioners instituted Annulment of the RTC and CA’s decisions. They are invoking remedy under Rule 47 to assail decision
in criminal case.

ISSUE/S: W/N remedy of annulment of judgment can be availed of in criminal case

HELD: No. Rule 47 limits the scope of the remedy to judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTC for
which ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petitions for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. The remedy cannot be resorted to when RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a
criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47
from the enumeration of the provisions of 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to
criminal cases as stated in Sec 18 Rule 124: only Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56.

PEOPLE VS. MONTECLAROS

589 SCRA 320

DOCTRINE: When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of crime and though all
the persons who took part in commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. It becomes
relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different degrees of
responsibility in the commission of crime and consequently, differing degrees of liability. The particular liability that each
accused is responsible for depends on nature and degree of his participation in commission of crime.

FACTS: The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of the appellant Ida and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida
worked as waitress in Bayanihan Beer House. Ida and ABC rent a room in house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On
April 1, 1995, Ida and Tampus forced ABC to drink beer, she consumed 3 ½ glasses of beer. She overheard Tampus
requesting her mother that he be allowed to “remedy” or have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida agreed. ABC fell asleep and
when she woke up she noticed that her underwear and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her
vagina. On April 4, Tampus threatened to kill her if she would report to anyone. Another sexual act was consummated. ABC
sought help from her aunt Nellie. ABC filed 2 complaints of rape. First criminal case, conspiracy of Tampus and Ida; second,
only Tampus.

Dr. Costas showed that Ida was an outpatient from Nov 11, 1994-Jan 12, 1995 as she was diagnosed with schizophrenia,
paranoid type. Trial court and CA appreciated in favour of Ida mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish
exercise of will-power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

Tampus’ civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by reason of his death before final judgment.

ISSUE/S: W/N Ida still liable to pay the amount of civil indemnity

HELD: No. Finding guilt of Ida as an accomplice in rape is dependent on proving the guilt of principal accused. Ida
participated in commission of crime by previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a
principal but as an accomplice. Community of design between acts of Tampus and Ida is present.

Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. The courts have discretion to determine the apportionment
of civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice, and accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect
to basis of allotment. Each of the participants should be liable only for acts actually committed by him. The power of the
courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation
and caprice.

Since Tampus died before final judgment, his civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished. His share in civil indemnity and
damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice. And even if Tampus were alive, Ida would only have been subsidiarily
liable for his share of the civil indemnity. With death of Tampus, Ida’s subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also
eliminated, following the principle that accessory follows the principal.

HIPOS SR. VS. BAY

581 SCRA 674

DOCTRINE: Mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. If petitioners believed that the respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuance of Order denying Motion to Withdraw Information, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a petition for certiorari against the assailed order. Furthermore, once a criminal complaint
or an information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.

FACTS: Two informations of rape and acts of lasciviousness were filed against Petitioners. AAA and BBB filed Motion for
Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order City Prosecutor to study if proper information had been filed. Petitioners filed
Joint Memorandum to Dismiss cases due to lack of probable cause. City Prosecutor filed Motion to Withdraw Information.
Judge Bay denied. Without moving for Reconsideration, Petitioners filed Petition for Mandamus.

ISSUE/S: W/N Supreme Court can compel Judge Bay to dismiss case thru Writ of Mandamus by virtue of Resolution of City
Prosecutor finding no probable cause

HELD: No. Remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not discretionary one. While
judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Information can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e. to grant or deny such Motion. The trial court, when confronted with Motion to
Withdraw Information on ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the
government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfies by the
respondent judge in the case at bar.
 PEOPLE VS. LORENZO
619 SCRA 389

DOCTRINE: Presumption of innocence of accused is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the
burden of proving that an accused in guilty of offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

FACTS: Two Informations were filed against Lorenzo charging him violations on Section 5 and 11, Article 2 of RA 9165
with respect to possessing of 2.04 grams of shabu and selling of 0.20 grams of shabu. Estanislao charged in a different
Information for possessing 0.05 grams of shabu. Both accused entered ‘not guilty’ pleas. Prosecution presented its lone
witness PO1 Noel Pineda.

According to defendants, Lorenzo was in his mountain bike on his way home while Estanislao was riding in his motor cross
style bike. The chain on Estanislao’s bike went loose. When he was repairing his bike, 3 policemen, who were then on board
an owner type jeep, arrived and arrested Lorenzo and Estanislao. It was later that they were informed that the arrest was for
illegal drugs.

RTC convicted Lorenzo while acquitted Estanislao. CA affirmed RTC judgment.

ISSUE/S: W/N prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for crime charged

HELD: No. In both illegal sale and illegal possession prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of drug. It must be established with moral certainty. Non-compliance with the stipulated procedure,
under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.

There must be a Chain of evidence. However, in this case, it was not certain when and where the said marking was done nor
who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter. Prosecution did not present poseur-buyer who had
personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone witness of prosecution was at least four meters away from accused and
poseur-buyer. With that distance, it was impossible for him to hear the conversation.

Facts and circumstances create a doubt as to whether sachets of shabu seized were the same one that were released to Camp
Crame and submitted for laboratory exam.

PEOPLE VS. BARON

621 SCRA 646

DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction that the appellant conspired with his co-accused
in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim that he acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury could not be sustained because there was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat, preventing his
escape that compelled him to take part in the commission of the offense charged.

FACTS: An information was filed against apellant accusing him of robbery with homicide.

The Prosecutions Version

Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the appellant is as follows:

On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a conversation
with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julies Bakeshop at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived and parked his
tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The appellant approached Berallo and asked if he could take him and his companions to
Hacienda Caridad for P30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant called Villatima, then wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo.
They then rode Berallos tricycle.

Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julies Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino and Ballesteros were in front of
the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle while the appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread,
she approached Berallo and asked if he was going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could ride with him. However, Berallo
replied that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While inside the
jeep, she saw two more persons boarding Berallos tricycle.

On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide incident. Together with other
policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he saw Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about
20 meters away from the highway. They also noticed several traces of footprints near Berallos body and a tricycle sidecar in a
canal beside the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.

Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Berallo. She found that the victim
sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds. Five of them were considered as fatal
and caused the immediate death of Berallo. The wounds also indicated that they could have been inflicted by more than one
person.

The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of the suspects. After having been apprised of
his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took Berallos tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the
sidecar, brought the motorcycle to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the house of
Villatimas aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).

Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew Villatima, together with the appellant, and another
companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to her house in Kabankalan.

Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of Natividad as the one stolen from her deceased
husband. She also testified on the sum of money and the value of the personal property stolen from her husband. She
allegedly spent the sum of P2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot.

The Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at around 7 oclock in the evening, he
bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to the public transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle
with two passengers passed by and its driver inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded the tricycle and
told the driver that he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver requested him to accompany them up to Segundo Diez. He
agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon reaching Bangga Doldol, however, the passengers announced a hold-
up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the driver not to make any wrong move, or they would be killed.
Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the driver and dragged him towards the sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what
happened to the driver since he remained in the tricycle. However, he suspected that the driver was killed by the two
passengers.

Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of the tricycle. They then took him to a house at
Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the premises. The following morning, they returned to Cadiz City. The two
passengers even accompanied him to his house and threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the incident to the
police authorities.
On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, policemen came to his house and asked where the motorcycle was
taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and insisted that he had nothing to do with the incident. He stressed that the
two passengers whose names he did not know, were responsible for the crime committed.

RTC founded the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In his appeal to the CA the accused stated that the trial court failed to appreciate his defense of exempting circumstance of
irresistable force and/or uncontrollable fear, CA denied.

ISSUE/S: Whether the defense of irresistable force and/or uncontrollable fear shall be appreciated.

HELD: No. There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime.
However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when
the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more than 10 hours and passed
several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or at least request for assistance from the people around
him.

ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE

655 SCRA 683

DOCTRINE: Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the
acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.

FACTS: An Information was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document in connection
with a Deed of Sale over a certain parcel of land owned by the spouses Alonto. After trial in the RTC, the trial court found
that petitioner had no intention to defraud and that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not
personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of
public document. The trial court sentenced petitioner with imprisonment, ordered him to restore full ownership and
possession of the land to Sps. Alonto, and in case of his failure to do so, he shall pay Sps. Alonto the value of the properties.
He was further adjudged to pay damages and costs of suit to Sps. Alonto. On appeal, CA acquitted petitioner as it opined that
the conviction for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated
petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nevertheless, the
imposition of the civil liability was sustained. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether petitioner could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court and the CA?
2. Whether the alternative sentence imposed by the trial court to petitioner should be sustained?
HELD: No. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When
the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award
the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In case of exoneration of the accused, the civil liability may
still arise when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.
Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage
to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, Court found that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause
any damage to spouses Alonto. Moreover, the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of
Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and
thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.

No. the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to institute an action for the
recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages. Sentences should not be in the
alternative. There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. While a judge has the
discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. He must fix positively and with
certainty the particular penalty.

Wherefore, Petition granted.

PEOPLE VS. ASIS

629 SCRA 250

DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at
the trial court or at the appellate level. (2) While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner
in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. (3) An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a
trial court s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a
writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS: The RTC acquitted accused Abordo of the attempted murder of Montes, and only held him liable of Serious
Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez, and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. The OSG filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, but the CA dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy.
According to the CA, the remedy should have been an appeal, not petition for certiorari.

Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home when an altercation ensued between him and the three offended parties
Montes, Calvez, and Majait. The accused Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the abdomen. Montes
escaped unhurt. 2. Abordo was charged with two counts of attempted murder (Majait and Montes) and one count of frustrated
murder (Calvez).

The RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with
regard to Majait, when it found no treachery and evident premeditation. Four mitigating circumstances were appreciated in
favor of Abordo. Abordo was acquitted with respect to the complaint of Montes. CA: (petition dismissed). The OSG filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the ground that Judge Asis of the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision of acquitting Abordo in one case, only holding
him liable for Serious Physical Injuries and Less Serious Physical Injuries In the two other cases. The CA dismissed the
petition, saying that the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. It said that as the State was questioning the
verdict of the acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. It said thus:
a. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy. b. Section
1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order
unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In filing the petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in
double jeopardy. c. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy. d. The petition is dismissible not only on
the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such action
places the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari.

HELD: Yes. Certiorari is the proper remedy A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a
verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level.

Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the
OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. Exception to
Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of
acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained
petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. In People v LouelUy,
the Court said that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower
court in acquitting the accused: (1) Committed reversible errors of judgment (2) Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Such commission of the lower court renders its judgment void. No double
jeopardy When the order or dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via
certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. OSG s petition for certiorari before the CA, however, is bereft of merit While the CA
was erroneous of dismissing the petition, the OSG s petition for certiorari if given due course is bereft of merit. While
certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice. A reading of the OSG petition fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Also, what
the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo s constitutionally
guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court s evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only
correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. Error of Judgment v Error of
Jurisdiction Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will botbe issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.

BASILONIA VS. VILLARUZ

765 SCRA 489

DOCTRINE:
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure with prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against the Orders issued by respondent Judge Villaruz
of RTC Roxas City.

On June 19, 1987, petitioners Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John "Jojo" Basilonia were convicted GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as principals in Criminal Case No. 1773 for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete on
September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines.

In criminal case no. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, petitioner John “Jojo” Basilonia was convicted guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal against the person of Rene Gonzales on September 15, 1983.

In criminal case no. 1774 for Illegal Possession of Firearm, all the accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

• Petitioners files a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1987 which the Trial Court granted on August 3, 1987.
• On January 23, 1989, CA dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to file their brief despite extensions of time given.
• The Resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on September 18, 1989. Thereafter, the entire case were
remanded to the trial court on October 4, 1989.
——————————————————————————————————————————————
• Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, claiming
to be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment.
• He alleged that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not been enforced
because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request.
——————————————————————————————————————————————
• Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an Omnibus Motion for
Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.
• On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Relief of Judgment praying to set aside the June 19, 1987
trial court Decision and the January 23, 1989 CA Resolution. Further, on September 1, 2009, they filed before the trial
court a Manifestation and Supplemental Opposition to private respondent Roblete's motion.
——————————————————————————————————————————————
• The trial court granted the motion for execution on December 3, 2009 and ordered the bondsmen to surrender petitioners
within ten (10) days from notice of the Order. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied on January 4,
2010.
• Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail for their
provisional liberty was ordered forfeited on January 25, 2010. On even date, the sheriff issued the writ of execution.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a trial judge have jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20)
years after the date of entry of judgment?

HELD: The determination of whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in a criminal
case became final and executory necessarily calls for the resolution of the twin issues of whether the penalty of imprisonment
already prescribed and the civil liability arising from the crime already extinguished.

Prescription of Penalty

As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, the Court already opined that evasion of service of
sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al. expounded on the rule
that the culprit should escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by final
sentence to commence to run

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit
should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time, they were
never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of
penalty of imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and in eventually granting the same.

Extinction of Civil Liability

In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for execution within the five-year period
or an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year period. Worse, other than the bare allegation that the judgment has not
been enforced because the public prosecutor has not acted on the request to file a motion for execution, no persuasive and
compelling reason was presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent
Roblete, the instant case does not fall within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was
entirely beyond their control or that petitioners have any hand in causing the same.

In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a motion for execution should be filed in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

MORILLO VS. PEOPLE

777 SCRA 207

FACTS:

• In July, 2003, Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, representing themselves as contractors with business in
Pampanga, bought contraction materials from Armilyn, worth P500,054.00. Per their agreement, 20% of the amount
should be paid within seven days, while the remaining 80% shall be paid within 35 days, with post-dated checks.
• After the last delivery, Richard paid P20,000.00 and issued two post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga
branch. Upon maturity, Armilyn deposited the checks in her account with Equitable PCIBank; they were however
dishonoured.
• When Armilyn communicated the fact of dishonour to Richard, the latter replaced the checks with two post-dated
Metrobank checks, which again were dishonored.
• Despite demand, Richard and his partners failed to make good on the checks, hence Armilyn filed a case for BP 22 against
Richard and Milo Malong before the MeTC of Makati City.
——————————————————————————————————————————————
• After trial, the MeTC Makati City convicted Richard as charged, hence he appealed to the RTC, arguing that the MeTC of
Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered
to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually
transpired in Makati City. He also assailed the absence of the public prosecutor, as the latter delegated the prosecution of
the case to the private prosecutor.
——————————————————————————————————————————————
• The RTC affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower courts. It ruled that MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, as all the elements of the crime of BP 22 happened in Pampanga. The checks were issued in
Richard’s office in Pampanga; the knowledge of dishonour also happened in Pampanga, when Armilyn proceeded to
Richard’s office and informed him of the dishonour of the checks; the third element of dishonour of the checks by the
drawee bank also occurred in Pampanga, where Metrobank Pampanga is located. Since all the elements of the crime
happened in Pampanga, the case should have been filed in Pampanga, not where Armilyn deposited the checks, in Makati
City.
• Aggrieved, Armilyn appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the court of the place where the checks were deposited, had jurisdiction to try a case for BP 22.
 2. WON the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.

HELD: It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some
acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed.

It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain procedural infirmities.
Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.7 Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the State.

There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of
the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court, when there is denial of due
process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the
private offended party, when there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so
requires.

Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering
the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved party’s prayer is not
tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or
bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy be violated.

Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic, the same should be
summarily dismissed. The unique and special circumstances attendant in the instant petition, however, justify an
adjudication by the Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.

First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court’s dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is
the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a
Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal
of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal.

This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant’s guilt is
beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.

The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when,
after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on
the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the
dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an
acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent
jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a
court of competent jurisdiction.

Thus, petitioner’s resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is
not a trier of facts. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts
and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.

In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely “whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was
committed within the jurisdiction of said court.” Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our
procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the
commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned.

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to
the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime
charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with
respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly
brought to this Court under Rule 45.

Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a blind eye
thereto lest the administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of the rules. Rules of procedure
are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way
of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play
takes place, the rules should be liberally construed. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where
the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better
and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

CA decision reversed. RTC decision affirming MeTC’s decision is reinstated.

RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

ESTINO VS. PEOPLE

584 SCRA 304

DOCTRINE: Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes
final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

FACTS: - Three informations were filed against Estino and Pescadera.

- Sandiganbayan ruling on the three informations:
(1) Estino and Pescadera guilty of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government
employees of Sulu;
(2) Pescadera guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for failure to
remit the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the provincial government employees
amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30, Estino acquitted; and
(3) both acquitted of the charge for violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3(e).

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial which were
denied by Sandiganbayan where petitioners presented a Certification stating that the Representation and Transportation
Allowance for the period January to May 1999 was paid to the officials entitled to it and that the GSIS premiums pertaining
to prior years were also settled by the Provincial Government of Sulu.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the motion for new trial should be granted.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for new trial in relation to
the conviction of Estino and Pescadera for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

We resolve to grant petitioners a chance to prove their innocence by remanding the case to the Sandiganbayan for a new trial
of Criminal Case No. 26192. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of
conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment.

Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were
mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In their Supplemental Motion and/or Motion for New
Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the
subject of the charge was the nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998
reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were precluded from presenting pieces of evidence
that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget because the prosecutions evidence was
confined to alleged nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget.

BRIONES VS. PEOPLE

588 SCRA 345

DOCTRINE: For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following
conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been
discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if
admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.

FACTS: On January 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., S/G Molina, security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services, and
S/G George Gual (S/G Gual) were manning the northwest gate of BF Homes Northwest, Parañaque. Somewhere on Jakarta
Street, they noticed Romulo Bersamina, a homeowner, being mauled by four (4) individuals, two (2) of whom were later
identified as Briones and his brother, Vicente Briones (Vicente), who were both residents of BF Homes.

SG Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop the mauling; it was at this point that S/G Molina lost his firearm to
Briones. S/G Molina subsequently reported the incident to his supervisor, Arthur Alonzo, and to SPO1 Manuel Plete. The
police arrested Briones after conducting an investigation. Briones denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm
grabbing, and claimed that he was in his house when the incident happened.

In the decision7 dated August 31, 1999,8 the RTC found Briones guilty of simple theft under paragraph 3, Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code).

The CA found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293, in relation to paragraph 5 of Article 294, of the Code, and not of
theft; Briones thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Dismiss, and
Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Dismiss11 (collectively, Omnibus
Motion) with the CA where he confessed his physical presence and participation on the alleged robbery of the firearm, but
claimed that he was merely protecting his brother, Vicente, when he took the firearm.12 The CA denied the Omnibus
Motion; hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether a new trial is justified under the circumstances

HELD: For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions
must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted.26 In this case,
although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.

Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered before the trial in the court below.27 The determinative test is the presence of due or reasonable diligence to
locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial.

Under the circumstances, Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the firearm; his allegation
in his Omnibus Motion that he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded negative results, is purely
self-serving. He also now admits having taken the firearm and having immediately disposed of it at a nearby house, adjacent
to the place of the incident.28 Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject firearm,
but did not do anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below.

In any case, we fail to see how the recovery of the firearm can be considered material evidence that will affect the outcome of
the case; the recovery of the subject firearm does not negate the commission of the crime charged.

SALUDAGA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

619 SCRA 364

DOCTRINE: The Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after
trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight
that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

FACTS: Quintin Saludaga and SPO2 Fiel E. Genio allegedly entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of
Barangay Day Care Centers in Northern Samar without conducting a competitive bidding to the prejudice of the government.
An information was subsequently filed for the violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against the petitioners on the ground of casing undue injury to the government.

This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319. In a
Resolution3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted petitioners’ Motion to Quash and dismissed the
information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an
essential element of the crime charged."

In a Memorandum4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the
possibility of having the information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information 5 dated August 17, 2007 with the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, charging the
petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice
of the government.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary investigation which was denied by the Sandiganbayan stating that re-filed
information did not change the nature of the offense. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 9 dated August
6, 2008, submitting that the two Informations substantially charged different offenses, such that the present information
constituted a substitution that should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.

On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion 10 in open court.
Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court averring that the newly
discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding that prima case existed to file the case

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the affidavit of the author of the audit report may qualify as newly-discovered evidence.

HELD: No. the Pornelos affidavit cannot qualify as newly-discovered evidence as it was already in existence prior to the re-
filing of the case.

Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such
weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant way back in November 29,
2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was
already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered
during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’ Supplement to Motion for
Reinvestigation,25 offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject
project.

LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE

642 SCRA 248

DOCTRINE: To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be
shown that the evidence was "newly discovered." Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not,
by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court.

FACTS: This resolves the motions for reconsideration separately filed by Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, Cesar
Fortuna and Rameses de Jesus assailing the decision of the Court dated September 7, 2010 convicting them of the crime of
murder.

The petitioners seek the reversal of their conviction on the basis of the Affidavit dated November 12, 2009 executed by a
certain Orencio G. Jurado, Jr. who claims to be one of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case. One of the
accused, Fortuna, contends that said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police
authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the affidavit of Jurado qualify as newly discovered evidence that would warrant new trial

HELD: No. The affidavit of said police officer cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence as the defense failed to
show that it has exerted efforts during trial to secure testimonies of Jurado and others.

To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the
evidence was "newly discovered" pursuant to Section 2,10 Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.

Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered before the trial in the court below. 11 Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to
secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected
to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly
discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that
whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the
accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.

PAYUMO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

654 SCRA 277

DOCTRINE: New and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment, as one of the
grounds to grant a new trial; requisites.

FACTS: The petitions stem from the facts of Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident that occurred on
February 26, 1980 at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite
team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians
instantly killing one and wounding several others. The accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and
Attempted Murder before the Sandiganbayan. After four (4) years of trial, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan
rendered its Decision[4]dated October 5, 1984, penned by Justice Romeo M. Escareal, convicting the accused as co
principals in the crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder. On January'11, 1985, the accused filed
their Motion for New Trial, which was denied. The accused elevated the case to the Supreme Court, which set aside the
October 5, 1984 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and remanding the case for a new trial. Thus, Criminal Case No. 4219 was
remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was raffled to the First Division. Accordingly, the First Division received anew all the
evidence of the parties, both testimonial and documentary. Later, with the creation of the Fourth and Fifth divisions, Criminal
Case No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth Division. On February 23, 1999, the Fifth Division promulgated judgment, penned
by Justice Godofredo T. Legaspi, convicting the accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The
accused filed their Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial. Since the Fifth Division could not reach
unanimity in resolving the aforesaid omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was constituted pursuant to Section 1 (b) of
Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. On September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-2,
issued the subject Resolution promulgated on October 24, 2001, setting aside the November 27, 1998 Decision and granting a
second new trial of the case. The Special Fifth Division pronounced among others that a second new trial would enable it to
allow the accused to adduce pertinent evidence including the records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to shed light on the "serious allegations"
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted anew trial of Criminal Case
No. 4219.

HELD: On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in Criminal Case No. 4219, the
Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis. Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that: new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial. The records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do
not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or
during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the
accused and could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records
cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that prevented the accused from using these records
during the trial to substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a military operation. The Court finds
and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of
its jurisdiction when it nullified the November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219. There
is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its
authority as determined by law. Accordingly, the assailed Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside.

RULE 122-125 - APPEALS

MACAPAGAL VS. PEOPLE

717 SCRA 425

DOCTRINE: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or
duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

FACTS: On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for
misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold
pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on

January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which
the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 3, 2009, but the same
was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, Branch 9 gravely erred in denying the notice of appeal filed by
the herein petitioner.

HELD: The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court cannot ignore and
are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but
likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail,
because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.

First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken.

Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application
will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and
specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.

Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial court’s decision
convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As
stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision
convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure,
petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order
denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain
a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

PEOPLE VS. MORALES

616 SCRA 223

DOCTRINE: "The accused must not have opportunity for escape of self-defense"

FACTS: That on or about the 9th day of November, 1994, in the municipality of Bacolor, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct and kidnap
Jefferson C. Tan, Joanna C. Tan, Jessie Anthony C. Tan, Malou Ocampo and Cesar Quiroz, while the latter were on board a
L-300 van with Plate No. CKW-785 at San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, for the purpose of extorting ransom money from the
parents of the said victims with threat to kill the said victims if their parents failed to deliver the ransom money, that said
victims were brought and detained in Bataan until the father of victims, Feliciano Tan, paid and delivered to the aforesaid
accused the amount of P92,000.00.

ISSUE/S:

1. Can Fernando Morales be granted the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury.
2. if conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:

No. Since according to the ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person
is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In Del Rosario, however, we
held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough

-By not availing of the chance to escape (since the other accused were waiting for them at the distance of 1 kilometer) their
allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable, for it to apply: it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.

The fear (threats against family members), were not of imminence as to prevent any chance of escape, and that this fear they
allegedly suffered does not suffice to grant them the exempting circumstance.

Yes. The acts done by the appellants (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the children while they are w/
them, instructing the father to go to Gumi for the ransom) clearly shows that there was close coordination, indicating a
common purpose or design

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts
that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established.

It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common
purpose or design to commit the felony.

QUIDET VS. PEOPLE

618 SCRA 1

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: In 1992, Rosie Quidet, Feliciano Taban, Jr., and Aurelio Tubo were charged with homicide for the death of Jimmy
Tagarda. On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide for the stab wounds sustained by
Jimmy’s cousin, Andrew Tagarda. Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty (frustrated homicide.
Meanwhile, on the other case (homicide), Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while Quidet and Tubo maintained their
innocence. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a partial judgment sentencing Taban to imprisonment and to pay the heirs of
Jimmy Tagarda civil indemnity.Joint trial ensued.

In 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding Quidet and Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused guilty of frustrated
homicide. From this judgment, only Quidet appealed to the CA. In 2005, the CA promulgated a Decision, affirming with
modifications that the crime was only Attempted Homicide, and that the civil indemnity was deleted, as the same has not
been fully substantiated. Quidet filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court may look into factual matters in the present appealed case.

HELD: Yes. While, generally, factual findings of the trial court are accorded respect by this Court, the Court may look into
such factual matters when the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which can affect the result of the case.

The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Quidet is criminally liable only for his
individual acts. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it is
not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of
will or unity of action and purpose, which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. What is determinative is proof
establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.

As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial evidence, are
accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this
palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be
lightly taken away. In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Quidet
conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide.

BALABA VS. PEOPLE

593 SCRA 210

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, to which the
Regional Trial Court convicted him.

Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals and filed his
Appellant’s Brief

Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellee’s Brief, filed a Manifestation and Motionpraying for the
dismissal of the appeal for being improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.

CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and denied ensuing Motion for Reconsideration.

Balaba filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court . He claims that it was due to inadvertence that the
notice of appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his appeal was
dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules to afford him an opportunity to correct the
error and fully ventilate his appeal on the merits.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Balaba’s appeal should be given due course.

HELD: NO.

Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3,
Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided. (Emphasis ours)

There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal before the Court of Appeals
instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks
to appeal.

In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled:

An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating
 the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said
period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of
court would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads:

"An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright." (Emphasis ours)

In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The
trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of
Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on
27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE VS. OLIVIO

594 SCRA 77

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Accused-appellants Olivo, Danda and Zafra were charged in an Information dated November 29, 2000, as follows:

The undersigned accuses CHARMEN OLIVO Y ALONG alias Lipay, NELSON DANDA Y SAMBUTO
alias Teng, and JOEY ZAFRA Y REYES, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of November 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence, and
intimidation against persons, to wit: by then and there armed with guns forcibly entered the hardware store of
Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta located at Eagle Street, Sitio Veterans B, Bgy. Bagong Silangan, this City,
then announced that it was [a] HOLD-UP and ordered Maricel Permejo, storekeeper thereat, at gunpoint to
give them the money of said store, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, rob and carry
away the total amount of P35,000.00 Philippine Currency, representing the days earnings of said hardware
store, that on the occasion of and by reason of the said robbery and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the said
accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one MARIANO CONSTANTINO Y ZOLETA, by then and there
shooting him with a gun hitting him on the trunk and extrem[i]ties, thereby inflicting upon said Mariano
Constantino [y] Zoleta serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on January 22, 2001, all of the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. [4]

The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.

Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court Appeals, which was dismissed by the latter.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the present appeal have an effect over Zafra.

HELD: YES.
Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence before them.
In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not
confine itself to oral testimony during the trial.

We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence relied upon by the
trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on
nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.

In view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order.

One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and who was likewise
convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The record does
not show the reason therefor.

Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.27 Our pronouncements
here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are
definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should
benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a),
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal
from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.

GUASCH VS. DELA CRUZ

5892 SCRA 97

DOCTRINE: In exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an
appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the
appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.

FACTS: Mercedita T. Guasch went to the residence of Arnaldo dela Cruz requesting him to exchange her check with cash
of P3,300,000.00. Initially, he refused. However, Guasch returned the next day and was able to convince him to give her cash
in exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check upon her assurance that she will have the funds and bank deposit to cover
the amount. Upon presentment by dela Cruz at the bank, the check was dishonored for the reason that the account was
already closed.

Dela Cruz soon filed filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Mercedita T. Guasch with the City Prosecutor of Manila. Soon after,
an information was thereafter filed. Guasch entered her plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, Guash filed
a Motion with Leave To Admit Demurrer to Evidence.

The RTC of Manila granted the demurrer. Thus the case was dismissed. Aggrieved, dela Cruz filed a Manifestation with
Motion to Amend Order to include a finding or civil liability of Guasch. In the Manifestation dela Cruz claimed that his
counsel’s failure to file a motion within the reglementary period of 15 days is justified because all postal offices in Metro
Manila were closed due to a rally in Ayala Avenue. Meanwhile, dela Cruz filed certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA
praying that the trial court’s order granting the demurrer to evidence be set aside.

RTC denied the motion. Persistent, dela Cruz filed a notice of Appeal stating that he was appealing the Order of the RTC.
RTC denied his appeal. Dela Cruz then filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari with the CA to set aside the Order
granting the demurrer, the order finding dela Cruz’ counsel inexcusably negligent and the order denying the appeal of the
order. The CA granted the petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA is correct in granting the petition without a motion for reconsideration;

HELD: YES

As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period,
the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such
statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly
the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which
are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by
suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered or the appeal to
be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.

A review of the records shows that the evidence to make a determination of petitioner’s civil liability is already at the
disposal of the trial court. For example, the checks covering the amounts owed by petitioner to respondent in the total amount
of P3,300,000.00 were already submitted by petitioner to the trial court as Annexes to the Motion to Quash28 that she filed.
Neither can it be said that petitioner’s right to due process shall be violated if her civil liability be determined in the same
case.

PEOPLE VS. TARUC

579 SCRA 682

DOCTRINE: Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his
standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.

FACTS: Francisco Taruc was charged before he RTC of Bataan with the crime of murder in connection with the death of
Emelito Sualog. The RTC convicted Taruc, sentencing him to death. The case was brought to the CA for automatic review
Taruc filed a motion for extension to file an appellant’s brief. Meanwhile, he escaped from prison. The CA granted the
motion for extension. After the period of extension lapsed no appellant’s brief has been submitted to the CA. The CA
required Taruc’s counsel to explain the non-compliance with the reglementary period. After receiving explanation from the
PAO lawyer assigned to Taruc, the CA accepted the appellant’s brief.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the CA was correct in giving due course to the appeal;
 2. Whether or not the accused waived his right to appeal by escaping prison;

HELD:

1. YES. The escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction,
considering that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a power of
the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases. In this case, considering that the penalty imposed by the trial court
was death, the Court of Appeals rightly took cognizance of the case. Upon review by the appellate court, however, it
modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

2. YES. By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc,18 the Court
enunciated that:

“There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is
not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases.
He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the
court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him
x x x.”

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is
otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the
court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in
court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.

By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, accused-appellant revealed his
contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process,
he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.

Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as well as for the
entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is pending before this
Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would succeed.

TIU VS. PEOPLE

586 SCRA 118

DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by respondent Edgardo
Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge
for grave threats against Postanes. Consequently, an Information for Slight Physical Injuries, and an Information for Grave
Threats, , were filed with the MeTC of Pasay City. Upon motion of Pasion the 2 criminal cases were consolidated before the
MeTC Br. 44 of Pasay City. The MeTC dismissed the criminal cases for slight physical injuries against Pasion and the Tiu’s
counter-charge of grave threats against Postanes. Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied, so he filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC rendered the decision of the MeTC void against the acquittal of Postanes.
Postanes filed a motion for reconsideration, but was subsequently denied. Postanes went up to the CA challenging the Order
of the RTC.

Meanwhile, Tiu filed a motion with the MeTC to enforce the RTC’s decision. He also filed before the CA a motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum shopping.

The CA affirmed the decision of the MeTC in the dismissal of the criminal cases. Further, it also denied the motion to
dismiss by Tiu.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the motion to dismiss by Tiu before the CA has merit;

HELD: NO.

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed
by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor
General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal
proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without
legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the
Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail.

COLINARES VS. PEOPLE

662 SCRA 266

DOCTRINE: When an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

FACTS: The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Colinares with frustrated homicide before the RTC
Camarines Sur. Accordingly, Rufino P. Buena and Jesus Paulite at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, went out to
buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby when, allegedly
Arnel struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but
someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. Paciano Alano testified that he saw the
whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought
Rufino to the hospital.

Colinares for his part claimed self-defense, saying that on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and
Ananias who were all drunk. Arnel asked Rufino asked a question regarding the whereabouts of the Mayor of Tiagaon, but
Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel
but missed. Colinares according to his defense tried to defend himselfwith a rock, with which he struck Rufino on the
head. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Colinares apparently avoided the
hit and struck Ananias with the same stone, after which Colinares hid in his sisters house. On September 4, 2000, he
voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment against Colinares finding him guilty offrustrated homicide and sentenced him
two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Colinares did not qualify
for probation.
Arnel appealed to the CA, invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted
homicide. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE/S: Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty,
whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

HELD: Ordinarily, Arnel Colinares would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty
imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

***Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified
convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Since Arnel appealed his conviction for
frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.***

While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does
not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2
years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial
judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE

743 SCRA

DOCTRINE: The finality of a CA decision will not bar the state from seeking the annulment of the judgment via a Rule 65
petition; finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments.

FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation rites has
ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain
and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by
the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner.
They then slept at the carport. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting.
When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to
the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35
Aquilans.
26 of the Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining 9
accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.The trial
court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty of the crime of homicide,
penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
 judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew. The
CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability
of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused. On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed
the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy
trial.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court.
*(Relevant) Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.

Respondents Tecson et al., filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek
To support their claims, respondents attached certified true copies of their respective Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders grantin

ISSUE/S: Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged them from their
criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them.

opardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgme

iction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already

Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade
a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process
where the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the
second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience.
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not
absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the
criminal judgment.

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place; the
focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered
by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been
a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule
65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of
law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

DUNGO VS. PEOPLE

761 SCRA 375

DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.

FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and the Resolution of the CA which
affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding petitioners Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr., guilty of the crime of
violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049. On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Laguna, the
Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers conducted initiation rite.
Marlon Villanueva, a neophyte was subjected to physical harm. After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about
Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the
resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard as
he heard that Dungo had done the same. RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-
Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit, after which a petition for review on certiorari to the SC
was filed.

ISSUE/S: Is a petition for review under Rule 45 to the SC the correct manner of appeal in this case.

HELD: An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The
right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.

Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15,
2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.31 According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."

Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been imposed by the CA, can
simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal
case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties.32 Section 13(c), Rule 124
recognizes the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of
Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law.34 Moreover, such review
is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons.

In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice
of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for
review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of
discretion and raise only questions of law.

In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the petitioners. The latter
opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of
law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their reply,36 which is a question of fact that would
require an examination of the evidence presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue
presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review.

Ultimately, the SC ruled against Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr, Affirming the findings of the CA.

MANANSALA VS. PEOPLE

777 SCRA 563

DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of
the penal law.

FACTS: On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy, Vice President for Finance of UMC Finance and Leasing
Corporation (UMC), instructed her secretary, Marissa Bautista, to withdraw via Automated Teller Machine (ATM) the
amount of P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista was not
able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself to get such amount from the petty cash
custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy where she got the money. On June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager
Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao informed Siy that as per the Petty Cash Replenishment Report (subject report) of the same date
prepared by UMC Petty Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of P38,000.00 which
remained unliquidated. It was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she immediately rectified the
situation by issuing two (2) checks to reimburse UMC’s petty cash account. As the checks were eventually encashed
resulting in the replenishment of UMC’s petty cash account, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise the subject report by
deleting the entry relating to Siy’s alleged cash advance, to which Manansala acceded. On June 11, 1999, Lacanilao reported
the incident to UMC President Conrado G. Marty.

Sometime in March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report, re-insert the entry relating to Siy’s
alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch paper, and repeatedly fold the paper to make it look old. On the
basis of the reprinted subject document, Siy was administratively charged for using office funds for personal use. On April
18, 2000, Siy was terminated from her job and Lacanilao succeeded the former in the position she left vacant.

In a Decision dated October 27, 2010, the MeTC both found Lacanilao and Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents.
Aggrieved, Manansala appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142 (RTC). Records are,
however, bereft of any showing that Lacanilao made any similar appeal, thus, her conviction had lapsed into finality. In a
Decision dated October 20, 2011, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto. It held that Manansala clearly falsified the
subject report by inserting a statement therein which she knew from the start to be untruthful - that Siy made a cash advance
for her personal needs - resulting in prejudice on the part of Siy.

In a Decision dated April 16, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA agreed with the MeTC and RTC's findings that
Manansala made untruthful statements in the subject report which was contrary to her duty as UMC Petty Cash Custodian
and that such findings were utilized to the detriment of Siy who was terminated on the basis of said falsified report.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of appeals correctly affirmed Manansala’s conviction for Falsification of Private
Documents.

HELD: The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision
based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over
the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and
cite the proper provision of the penal law.

The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a) that the offender committed any
of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any
private document; and (c) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage. On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.

In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the aforesaid
crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the
documents she prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made
any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c) despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in
revising the subject report by inserting therein a statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great
prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared. Basic is the rule
that findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a
clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case or any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.

While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for the MeTC to appreciate the
"mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear and for the RTC and the CA to affirm in toto the
MeTC's ruling without correcting the latter court's mistake.

To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in
Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such
a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal
to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.
A threat of future injury is not enough.

In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in committing a falsity in the preparation of the
subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her
superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of
any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a
circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor.

Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify Manansala's criminal liability in this case - and also
taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law - she must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

RULE 126- SEARCH AND SEIZURE

MICLAT VS. PEOPLE

656 SCRA 539

DOCTRINE: [Under Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165; and the implementing provision of Section
21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165], the failure of the law enforcers to
comply strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him
inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."

FACTS: Miclat was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he
voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. In an Information, Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was
charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, for possession of [Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride
(Shabu). Upon arraignment, Miclat, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently,
trial on the merits ensued. In 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense
charged, rendered a Decision convicting Miclat of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. Aggrieved, Miclat
sought recourse before the CA. The CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the unwarranted search was valid.

2. Whether the police complied with the proper procedure in the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby
casting serious doubt on its seizure.

HELD:

1. Yes, under the plain view doctrine.

2. Yes. There was an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs.

As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions. Verily, no less than the
1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely: (1) Warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) Search of evidence in "plain view"; (3) Search of a moving vehicle; (4) Consented
warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and Frisk; and (7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest,
but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly
view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioner’s arrest is
among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner
was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting
officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense
charged.

[Under Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165; and the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article
II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165], the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with
the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible. What is
essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the drugs seized from the petitioner
was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was
sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic
sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately
brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the
evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the official
blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police District
PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa. After
a qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the prosecution from the arresting
officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the
petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and
later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS

621 SCRA 327

DOCTRINE: Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which
borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a
mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
where the warrant must be sought.
FACTS: In 2005, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at
the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. At
dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for
the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag
with an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the
vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc
found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner
of the bag, but no one knew. When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few
moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two
(2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but one of the women got away. The one caught was Belen Mariacos. She was charged in an Information of violating Section
5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165 for unlawfull delivering dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or
authority from the proper government agency or office. When arraigned, Mariacos pleaded not guilty. The RTC found
Mariacos guilty as charged. Mariacos appealed her conviction to the CA. The CA dismissed Mariacos' appeal and affirmed
the RTC decision in toto. Mariacos appealed her conviction.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the search and seizure was valid.

2. Whether the chain of custody was established thereby rendering the seized articles admissible in evidence.

HELD:

1. Yes. It is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor
vehicles

2. Yes. Non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render the arrest of the accused illegal.

RATIO:

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object
of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the
impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. This
exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house
or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an
aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must
be sought.

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband
or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to
require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case.
The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same
left for its destination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and
that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-
compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. While it is true
that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not
necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will
remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.
 Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial
court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to
have waived any objection on the matter.

PEOPLE VS. TUAN

628 SCRA 226

to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the

FACTS: On January 2000, two informants namely, Tudlong and Lad-ing arrived at the office of CIDG (Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group) in Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement
Unit (SDEU), that a certain "Estela Tuan" had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. SPO2
Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing.On the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-
ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and accompanied the two informants to the accused Tuan’s house. Tudlong and Lad-ing
entered the house, while SPO2Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. Later, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out and showed
SPO2 Fernandezthe marijuana they bought. Upon returning to the CIDG office, SPO2 Fernandez requested a
laboratoryexamination on the specimen and yielded positive results for marijuana.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with the informants, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-
Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at
around three o’clock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a
Search Warrant, which stated Tuan’s residence as“ the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City”. Even though accused Tuan was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda
(Magno), accused’s father, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez guarded the surroundings of
the house, while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside. They saw, in the presence of Magno, a movable cabinet in
Tuan’s room, below of which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. Later Tuan arrived and thereafter, the police
officers asked Tuan to open a cabinet, in which they saw more bricks of marijuana. The defense, on the other hand,
disclaimed ownership of the bricks and alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house because of a quarrel with her
neighbor named Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). The RTC found accused guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA modified by
acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal possession of firearm but affirming her conviction for illegal possession of
marijuana. Tuan raised the matter to the Supreme Court contending, among others, that the warrant failed to particularly
describe the place because the house was a two-storey building composed of several rooms.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON there was probable cause for the judge to issue a Search Warrant and whether thesearch warrant particularly
described the place to be searched.
2. WON the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched.

HELD:

1. YES. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:(1) it must be issued upon probable
cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as
the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized.

The only issue is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of
the place to be searched and things to be seized. Probable cause generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s)
or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by
virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.

A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought
to be searched. Such substantial basis exists in this case. Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search
Warrant for Tuan’s residence after said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing
and Tudlong, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed
to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of Tuan.

2. YES. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be
searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was
accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.

ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE

629 SCRA 370

DOCTRINE: In a “stop-and-frisk,” it is essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest
of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

FACTS: PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas were sent to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher
operating in the Pasay area known only as “Ryan.”

As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the
direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to
be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic
sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then
introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette
case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin
who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case and thereafter arrested her. RTC
found appellant guilty of illegal possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant thus rendering any evidence
obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible. She assails the appellate court’s application of the “stop-and-frisk” principle in
light of PO1 Cruzin’s failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing
something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could only be
invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the stop-and-frisk principle was properly applied by the CA?

HELD: In a “stop-and-frisk,” it is essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or
contraband concealed about him. Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.

The circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her person was warranted:
The police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts when PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case. Given his training as a law enforcement
officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to
flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked
his curiosity.

From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid “stop-and-frisk”
operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner’s possession - later voluntarily exhibited
to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1
Cruz in introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious
behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself. Absent any proof of motive to falsely
accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of
the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner

THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURES OF PROHBITED DRUGS

AND EVENTUAL ARREST
610 SCRA 670

§ 1. Introductory, p. 671
§ 2. Some of the Rulings on Warrantless Search, Seizure and Arrest Without Warrant, p. 672

§ 3. Constitutional Freedom of the Individual from Unlawful Search and Arrest, p. 673

§ 4. “Stop and Frisk Rule” and Use of Military Checkpoints, p. 676

§ 5. Arrest Without Warrant of Escaped Convicts, p. 681

§ 6. Reasonable Period to Apply for Warrant of Arrest, p. 682

§ 7. Arrest by Private Person, p. 683

§ 8. Duty to Deliver Arrested Person to Police or Judicial Authority, p. 683

§ 9. The Full Compliance or Conditions of Rule 113, Sec. 5 to Protect the Individual, p. 684

§ 1. Introductory The law allows the search, seizure and arrest of person in possession of prohibited drugs even without a
warrant issued by a judicial office to prevent abuse that may be committed by the arresting officer may violate the freedom of
the individual. Conditions have been proposed in the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Court reads: “Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling
under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.” The facts as found by the decision of
the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Quebral y Mateo, Fernando Lopez y Ambus and Michael
Salvador y Jornacion shows that the accused who were arrested for the possession of prohibited drugs by the police upon
information by the Chief of the Drugs Enforcement Unit who called up the police that some persons were in possession of
shabu. It was on the following day that the police conducted the operation and eventually arrested the accused in carrying the
prohibited drugs. The issue raised by the accusedappellants is whether the conditions of Rule 113, Section 5 were complied
with warrantless arrest.
§ 2. Some of the Rulings on Warrantless Search, Seizure and Arrest Without Warrant (a) A search, seizure and eventual
arrest without warrant as an exception to the constitutional prohibition against reasonable search and seizure was originally
governed by Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code, which authorized among
others the arrest of persons when there is reasonable ground to believe him guilty of some offense, provided: First. That the
authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe than an unlawful act, amounting to crime had been committed. Second.
That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such
unlawful act or crime. (Rule 28, supra; United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472) The Supreme Court in the 1909 case United
States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 likewise pointed to section 37 of Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila) which designated customs
officials, including police officers or peace officers who may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about
to commit any crime or breach of the peace; or may arrest, or cause to be arrested without warrant, any offender, when the
offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view. (b) The extent of a peace officer’s arrest powers in
the Philippines without warrant and the limitations therein was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1917 case of U.S. vs.
Santos (36 Phil. 85) and as stated in the Legislature in the Charter of the City of Manila (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil.
472); the Administrative Code (Sec. 2204, edition of 1916) and Sec. 2258, edition of 1917 which enjoins Municipal
policemen to “exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.” The decision likewise cited the common law rule in
the arrest of suspicious night walkers. (c) In the 1939 case of People vs. Ancheta, 68 Phil. 415, the Supreme Court pointed to
section 848 of the Administrative Code and Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code as allowing members of the Constabulary
or policemen to make arrests without warrant, not only when a crime is being committed or is about to be committed in their
presence, but also when they reasonably believe or have grounds to suspect that a crime has been committed and that it has
been committed precisely by the person arrested. (d) Under Commonwealth Act No. 181 (Section 3), an arrest without
warrant may be made by agents of the Department of Justice (i.e., the Chief of the Division of Investigation and his
subordinates) for a crime which has been committed in their presence, or within their view, or in cases where the person
making the arrests has reasonable grounds to strongly believe that the person so arrested is guilty of such crime and where
there is likelihood of the person escaping before a legal warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person arrested shall be
immediately taken before the competent Court of Justice. Under this law, members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of
Investigation shall be peace officers and as such, have the power to make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with
existing laws and rules.

§ 3. Constitutional Freedom of the Individual from Unlawful Search and Arrest Article III of the Bill of Rights of the
Philippine Constitution reads: “Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Article 32(4) of the Philippine Civil
Code reads: “Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages. (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention.” The decision of the Supreme Court in Sammy Malacat vs. Court
of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, is another example in a long line of
controversial cases on whether arrest without warrant can be made if the accused is caught in flagrante delicto or under the
“stopandfrisk rule” on in “hot pursuit.” The issue of war rantless arrests has a long history as shown in a number of varied
interpretations by trial judges, the justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Generally, the arrest of persons
without judicial warrants, in many instances, is a blatant violation of human rights solemnly guaranteed in Article IX of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Section 2 of
Article III of the Philippine Constitu tion. In the front line of warrantless arrest of criminals are the police officers and other
peace officers who are usually con fronted in sight. The decisions on warrantless arrests have been the subject of authors in
textbooks and comments in law journals based on constitutional principles. This annotation is, however, made from the
viewpoint of human rights. An analysis of the subject from the viewpoint of human rights, hopefully, might help clarify the
finer points on the issue, situations on whether to arrest an individual even without a warrant of arrest. In their enthusiasm to
ap prehend the culprit, officers are prone to violate the individ ual liberty of individuals. The facts of this case under
annotation illustrate one of the borderline cases on warrantless arrest. In response to bomb threats reported seven days before
the arrest was made, police officers on foot patrol on Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo near the Mercury Drug Store in Plaza
Miranda saw some men acting suspiciously with their eyes moving fast. As the police officers approached them, the group of
men fled in different directions. One of them, the petitioner, was caught and upon searching him they found a fragmenta tion
grenade tucked in his waistline. The petitioner was prosecuted and was convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of
explosives. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the arrest was law ful on the ground that the accused was
attempting to commit an offense. The Court of Appeals observed: “The police officers in such a volatile situation can be
guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for
Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would
then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the
lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but
rather the practical considera tions of everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will
ordinarily act. In other words, the case can fall under the “stopandfrisk rule.” The Supreme Court reversed the decision and
acquitted the accused on 3 reasons: 1. There was no clear evidence that the accused was a mem ber of the group that
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier; 2. There was nothing in the behavior of the accused other than his eyes
were moving of act that he was about to commit a crime; 3. There was no probable ground that the accused was armed with a
deadly weapon. There was no telltale bulge on the waist of the accused. It is apparent that the Supreme Court has titled the
bal ance of law in favor of human rights of individuals.
§ 4. “StopandFrisk Rule” and Use of Military Checkpoints At least in “buybust operations” for violation of the Dan gerous
Drugs Act, there is quite a consensus among members of the Supreme Court on the legality of warrantless arrests [People vs.
Claudio, 160 SCRA 640 (1988); People vs. Juatan, 260 SCRA 632 (1996); People vs. Gonzales, 228 SCRA 293 (1993);
People vs. Fernandez, 209 SCRA 1 (1962).] In People vs. Lua, 256 SCRA 539 (1996), where the arrest of the accused was
legal, having been caught in flagrante delicto, there was no need for warrant for the seizure of 3 bags of marijuana. There is
no consensus, however, on the legality of military checkpoints arrests on searches and seizures. In Valmonte vs. Gen. De
Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989), the constitutional legal ity of military checkpoints for searches and seizures without warrant
was held to be legal. The majority opinion said:— “True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is suscepti ble of abuse
by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible for abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.” Upholding the
conceptual human rights, Justice Isagani Cruz in the dissenting opinion stated: “The bland declaration that individual rights
must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the
authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are
peremptorily pronounced to be rea sonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The
improbable excuse is that they are aimed at ‘establishing an effective territorial defense, main taining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere condu cive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.’ For
these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time sim ply because he excites the
suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to
death, if he resists.” Justice Abraham Sarmiento also said that the existence of checkpoints alone, makes searches done
therein unreasonable and repugnant to the Constitution. They are so “repressive” measures, the same measures against which
we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a dictatorship.
How soon we forget. While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal
to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit
that in that event, the burden is the State’s, to demonstrate the rea sonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo
Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the “details of the incident” (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore
and gruesomeness. In any event, the absence alone of a search war rant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches
unreason able, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Su pra). As it is, “checkpoints” have become “search
warrants” unto themselves—roving one at that. The Court has not also been unanimous on the legality of “Stop and Frisk
Rule.” In People vs. Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402, 1988), the arrest of the accused was effected while he was coming down a
vessel, to all appearances, no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not commit ted nor was he
actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. The PC Officer simply
arrested him and inspected his bag and found marijuana leaves. He was convicted of illegal possession of marijuana. The
court found that the arrest was illegal and the accused was acquitted. A dissenting opinion stated that the accused was caught
in flagrante delicto. The leading case on this issue is People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 11 (1986), where the Court ruled that it is
not enough that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. This doctrine was followed in Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 210 (1987). In
People vs. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174 (1992), the accused was convicted of ille gal possession of firearm merely on the
strength that a stolen pistol was found on his person at the time of his arrest with out warrant. The incident occurred in 1987
when the Western Police Dis trict received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons
in a street in Tondo. The policemen went to the place and saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom was holding
his abdomen. As the policemen approached, the two men tried to run away but the policemen apprehended them. One of
them, the accused was found with a .38 caliber revolver and the other with a fan knife. Mengote, the accused was prosecuted
and convicted of illegal possession of firearms. The Court held that a warrantless arrest in broad daylight of a person merely
looking side by side and holding his abdo men is certainly not a crime. The person may not be stopped and frisked on a busy
street on mere unexplained suspicion. The Court held “it would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stom achache, or if a peace
officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have com mitted a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is
exalted over liberty or, worse, per sonal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justi fied in the name of security.”
There is no need to discuss the other issue raised by the accusedappellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain
his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecu tion has lost
its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The said firearm is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime imputed to him. The Court reminded peace officers to be mindful of the pro visions of the Bill of Rights,
the prosecution of the accusedappellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their overzealousness to get the
better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and sei zure that rendered inadmissible the
vital evidence they had invalidly seized. In People vs. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 [1997], the Supreme Court held that the
warrantless arrest was illegal. In said case, the police officer received late in the afternoon a tip from an informant that the
following morning, appellant would be arriving at the Surigao Port bringing Marijuana. Without securing a search warrant
allegedly because courts were al ready closed for the day, the lawmen proceeded early next morning to the city wharf. About
8:30 a.m., they saw the sus pect, carrying two plastic baby chairs, disembark and thereaf ter board a tricycle. The police
followed immediately and or dered the driver to stop. After introducing themselves, the policemen asked Encinada to alight
and to hand over his lug gage for inspection. Found between the baby chairs was a bulky package which was later found to
contain marijuana. On these particulars, he was charged, tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II
of RA 6425, hold ing that Encinada was caught in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless search following his arrest was
valid, and the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence. Reversing the ruling of the trial court, the Supreme Court held
that: “Encinada was not committing a crime in the pres ence of the police; the latter did not have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that he just committed an offense; and raw intelligence information was not a sufficient ground for a warrantless
arrest. Furthermore, “(t)he prosecution’s evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked
from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be as cribed to
appellant under such bare circumstances. Having known the identity of their suspect the previous day, the law enforcers
could have secured a warrant of arrest even within such limited period (per Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No.
19, s. 1987). In emphasizing the importance of according respect to every person’s constitutional right against illegal arrest
and searches, the Court exhorted: “Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate every law they are ex pected to enforce. (The
policeman’s) receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprit’s identity, the particular crime he allegedly
committed and his exact whereabouts un derscored the need to secure a warrant of his arrest. But he failed to do so. Such
failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant.” “x x x That the search disclosed a
prohibited substance in appellant’s possession and this confirmed the police officers’ initial information and suspicion, did
not cure its patent ille gality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the
evidence yielded by the search.”

§ 5. Arrest Without Warrant of Escaped Convicts Under paragraph (c) of Section 5, a convict who evades sen tence by
escaping from the custody of a policeman or penal institutions may be arrested without warrant by a police offi cer or by a
private individual.1 However, if the person escapes after having been arrested, Section 5(c) does not apply. The situation is
governed by Sec tion 13 of Rule 113, Rules of Court which authorized the rearrest of an escapee. The right of arrest without
warrant of a person who es caped from prison is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the
continued act of commit ting a crime, i.e., evasion of service of sentence.2 The said Rule governing the arrest of detention
prisoners who escaped from confinement. Thus, an escaped convict has no right to demand from the arresting officers that
they be armed with warrant of arrest. A convict who is evading completion of his sentence by escaping from the penal
institutions may be arrested without warrant not only by a person in authority but also by a pri vate individual.3

§ 6. Reasonable Period to Apply for Warrant of Ar rest Generally, a person may not be arrested without a warrant issued
by a judicial officer. Under Art. III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution, it is necessary before a person may be taken into
custody to answer for the commission of a crime. A warrant shall issue only upon a probable cause determined by a judge,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particu larly
describing the person to be seized. If there is reasonable time for peace officers to serve the warrant, any arrest without such
warrant is unlawful. Warrantless arrest is not justified considering the fact that three (3) days had elapsed from the date of the
ambush kill ing. It shows lack of credibility of prosecution witness.4 War rant is required to arrest suspect and for the search
and sei zure of his personal effects if the same was done 49 hours after the commission of the crime.5 Section 2(a) and (b) of
Republic Act No. 7438 simplifies fur ther the duties of the arresting officer or private individuals. Section 2(b) reads:
“Section 2(b): Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by
him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at
all times be allowed to confer in private with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.” See People vs. Lacap, 171 SCRA 147 [1989]; People vs. Albior, 163 SCRA 333 [1988].”
§ 7. Arrest by Private Person Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court states: “Section 9. Method of arrest by private person.
—A private person when making an arrest shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of
the arrest, unless the person to be arrested is then engaged in the commission of an offense, or is pursued
immediately after its commission or after the arrest has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information
will imperil the arrest.” The power of the private person to arrest without warrant is one that must be exercised in utmost
good faith or else it would be an excuse for violation of the individual liberties guaranteed in the Constitution.6 § 8. Duty to
Deliver Arrested Person to Police or Judicial Authority The human rights of a person illegally arrested is violated if he is not
delivered to the proper judicial authority within the specified period as provided by law. Even if the warrantless arrest is
illegal but the person arrested is turned over to the proper judicial authority immediately, at least the judicial officer can
remedy the irregularity as soon as possible and order the release of the individual to enjoy his liberty. “Art. 125. Delay in the
delivery of detained persons to proper judicial authorities.—The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent; and thirtysix (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.” If
the arrest is made by a private individual and he does not turn over the arrested person to the proper judicial authority within
the period provided by law, he is guilty of illegal deten tion under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (Lino vs. Fugoso,
77 Phil. 933; Sallo vs. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315). § 9. The Full Compliance or Conditions of Rule 113, Sec. 5 to Protect the
Individual In People vs. Sucro (195 SCRA 388 (1991), We held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without
a warrant on the basis of Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his
plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Accusedappellant was not even denied due process by virtue of his alleged
illegal arrest, because of his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and
counselassisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter. (People vs. Gonzalez,
560 SCRA 419 [2008])

MARIMLA VS. PEOPLE

604 SCRA 57

DOCTRINE: As a rule, search warrants should be filed with the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the crime was
committed (Sec. 2 (a), Rule 126, Rules of Court). The exceptions to the general rule are:

(a) for compelling reasons, it can be filed with the court within whose judicial region the offense was committed or
where the warrant is to be served;

(b) but if the criminal action has already been filed, the application for a search warrant can only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending; and

(c) in case of search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti- Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, the Executive Judges and, whenever
they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the
RTC of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the NBI, PNP and the Anti-
Crime Task Force (ACTAF), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and the Reaction Against
Crime Task Force (REACT-TF).
FACTS: On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed
two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners’ house located
on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz,
Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended.

The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagasca’s request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his
personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance
operations and a test buy made at petitioners’ house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to seize the
shabu and marijuana and other articles used therewith.

Executive Judge Mario Guariña III (Judge Guariña III) examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and Fernandez, in the
form of searching questions and answers, and found that based on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez,
petitioners had in their possession and control, inside their house an undetermined amount of methamphetamine
hydrochloride known as shabu and marijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guariña III issued a search warrant which
commanded any peace officer “to make immediate search, at any time of the day or night, not beyond 10 days from date
hereof, of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the properties subject of the offense and
bring to his court said properties to be dealt with as the law directs.”

On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division, were able to seize cash in the amount
of P15,200.008 and the paraphernalia as well as the suspected shabu and marijuana.

An information was filed. Petitioners however filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant for suppressed evidence and
illegally seized items on the following grounds:

1. the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the
court where the alleged crime was committed;
2. the court which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued
the same because under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction;
3. the questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and
4. the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in
evidence.

It was denied. Subsequently, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence
Illegally Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

HELD: No. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the
Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution. At the heart of the present
controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search
Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.

From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the
other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be
filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any
court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,
which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on
February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law. The petitioners’ contention lacks merit. A.M.
No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue until
further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And
Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE VS. PUNZALAN

774 SCRA 653

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the morning, Intelligence Agent 1
Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and her team implemented a search warrant issued on October 28, 2009 by then Manila
RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to: (i) make an immediate search of the premises/house of accused-appellants Jerry and
Patricia Punzalan, Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who are all residents of 704
Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay City; and (ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined
quantity of assorted dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the court.

Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch of
the compound describing the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant.

Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo
Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a media representative
affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation. From the barangay hall, they walked toward the target place using as
a guide the sketch they prepared.

When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, which is a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan
knocked on the door. A woman, later identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When they
introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried
to close the door but was not successful since the PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house
of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the
search warrant in front of accused-appellants.

Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table. Intelligence Officer 1 Pagaragan (IO1
Pagaragan) was able to seize 9 heat-sealed plastic sachets, 2 square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a small round
plastic container. All 3 plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of
suspected shabu. There were also other paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, Special
Investigator 2 Esteban (SI2 Esteban) and Intelligence Officer 2 Alvarado (IO2 Alvarado) effected the arrest of accused-
appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan after informing them of their constitutional rights. IO1 Pagaragan immediately marked
the seized items by placing the marking "ADP". After searching and marking the evidence found on the first floor, the team,
together with the barangay officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and conducted the search on the second and third
floors but found nothing. They went downstairs where they conducted the inventory of recovered items. IO1 Pagaragan
prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which were later signed by the
barangay officials.

After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were brought to the PDEA Office in Quezon City for
investigation. IO1 Pagaragan presented the seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report, Request for Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination. Laboratory examination of the seized pieces of
drug evidence gave positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a
dangerous drug.

Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal
possession of 40.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.

On March 29, 2010, the trial court convicted accused-appellants for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. The
trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of different persons named therein is valid as there
is no requirement that only one search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the address
of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and adequately described. A sketch that specifically
identifies the places to be searched was attached to the records and such description of the place was unquestionably accurate
that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to successfully conduct their operation in the premises described in the
search warrant.

In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two phases of the search done in the Punzalan house. The first
or initial search was done at the ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry and was beyond
doubt made in the presence of both accused. This is where the bulk of illegal drugs were found, confiscated and consequently
marked. It is of no moment that the barangay officials were not able to witness the said initial search and their failure to
arrive on time to witness the first or initial search at the ground floor of the Punzalan house, or even their total absence
thereat, will not render the subject search invalid and unlawful inasmuch as their presence is not required.

The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the house after the markings on the 293 sachets of
confiscated specimens were completed by 101 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated in by the barangay officials.
Finally, after the search of the entire house was concluded, it is not disputed that an inventory of all the items seized was
conducted by IO1 Pagaragan in compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. The CA held that there was a valid search and seizure
conducted and the seized items are admissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the search conducted was valid – YES.

2. Whether or not the chain of custody rule has been complied with – YES.

HELD:

I. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. - No search of a house,
room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality.

As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present during the initial search, the search was
witnessed by accused-appellants themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the
premises or any member of his family.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to
establish with moral certainty the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Accused-appellants were caught in actual possession of the prohibited drugs during a valid search of their house. It bears
stressing that aside from assailing the validity of the search, accused-appellants did not deny ownership of the illegal drugs
seized. They have not proffered any valid defense in the offense charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

II. This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same.

It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of
guilt. In this case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly established from the time the heat-sealed plastic
sachets were seized and marked by IO1 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in Quezon
City. IO1 Pagaragan was also the one who personally delivered and submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of
shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens were kept in custody until they were
presented as evidence before the trial court and positively identified by IO1 Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked
during the inventory.

The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does not undermine the integrity and
evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.