REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 – ATTY.

HENEDINO BRONDIAL
COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS
2ND Sem 2016-2017

CIVIL PROCEDURE
I. JURISDICTION
DUERO VS. CA
373 SCRA 11

Topic:

Jurisdiction and the application of estoppel

Facts:

Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradel entered and occupied petitioner's land
covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in
the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the
land was his, and requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, private
respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.

On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely,
Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.

Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for
a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound
themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was not a
party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was
rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been
occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the
complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to
the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial.

Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the
same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the Petition.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which is within the jurisdiction of the
MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR.

Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the latter granted.

Issues:

1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the case

1) Whether the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC
after he has successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom

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Ruling:

1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691 amending
BP 129.

2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a
tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the
surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the
complaint, private respondent was declared in default.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed before the
RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for
reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack
of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on
appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as
well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived
by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of
jurisdiction over the action

Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court)

Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and its Order that private respondent
turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are annulled and set aside.

DONATO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

417 SCRA 216

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located in Manila, covered
by a TCT. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint before the MeTC of Manila for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and “all unknown occupants” of the subject property.
Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each
month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime
in 1992, they stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate; the
non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the ejectment case against them.

Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents) filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994
wherein they denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban
Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that
there was a negotiation for the purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a
passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioner’s

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counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in a civil case while they await the
outcome of the negotiation to purchase.

On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a MR attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-forum
shopping duly signed by petitioner himself and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. Five days
later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement to his MR submitting the duly authenticated
original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.

On June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioner’s MR and its supplement, ruling that “petitioner’s subsequent
compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition.”

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification
which justifies relaxation of the rule. YES

1) Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA,
that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as
would support the petition, justifies the outright dismissal of the petition. NO

HELD:

1) YES. The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before
the CA and the corresponding sanction for noncompliance thereto are found in the then prevailing
Revised Circular No. 2891. It provides that the petitioner himself must make the certification against
forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple
petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification by the
petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be
unaware of such fact. The Court has ruled that with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule
on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict compliance
with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature
in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with.

We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to have been prepared and
sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and
for him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find
that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which justifies
relaxation of the rule.

We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus
be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.

2) NO. The failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to
append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support
the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA
gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be
necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the CA
may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given
due course, the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section
3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other

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material portions of the records below with his motion for reconsideration. In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National
Labor Relations Commission that subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for
reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.

Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.

GONZAGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

394 SCRA 472

FACTS: In 1970, spouses Gonzaga bought a parcel of land from Lucky Home Inc. Said lot was
specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 and which the spouses mortgaged to the Social Security
Commission as a security for their housing loan. Meanwhile, the spouses started to construct their house
on Lot No. 18, and not on Lot No. 19. They mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Lucky Homes
then informed them of such mistake but the spouses instead offered to buy Lot No. 18 to widen their
premises, thus they continued building their house thereon. However for failure on the part of the spouses
to pay their obligation to the SSS, Lot No. 19 was consequently foreclosed. The title thereto was
cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After such foreclosure, the spouses offered to
swap Lot Nos.18 and 19 and demanded from lucky homes to reform their contract. Lucky home however
refused. This prompted the spouses to file an action for reformation of contract with damages before the
RTC. The RTC however dismissed the action for lack of merit and awarded lucky homes moral damages
and attorney’s fees. Subsequently then, a writ of execution was issued. Spouses urgently filed a motion to
recall such writ, questioning now the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the case falls within the
jurisdiction of the Housing and land use regulatory board. Subsequently, the spouses went to the CA to
annul RTC’s decision. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the spouses were estopped from
question RTC’s jurisdiction pursuant to the case of Tijam.. On the other hand spouses contended that the
doctrine in Tijam case has been abandoned.

ISSUE: Whether the spouses Gonzaga is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court?

HELD: Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine
laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently
held that, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at
any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar
such party from attacking its jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by
instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even
once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which
lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution
against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts
jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.

ESCOBAL VS. GARCHITORENA

G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004

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TOPIC: Jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or
the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.

FACTS: Petitioner is a graduate of PMA and a member of AFP, PH Constabulary, and the Intelligence
Group of PNP. A shootout occurred during a surveillance operation conducted by him and his team.
Petitioner and one Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias “Jun Bombita” were then indicted for murder before the
RTC. RTC then issued a warrant and petitioner posted bail. RTC also issued an order preventively
suspending petitioner. He was then arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Petitioner, after arraignment, filed a
motion to quash the information on the ground that the court martial, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.

Pending the resolution of said motion, petitioner filed another motion for the lifting of his suspension. He
also filed an MD averring that since the offense was committed in the performance of his duties, it was the
Sandiganbayan which had exclusive jurisdiction over the same.

the offense was not committed in the performance of petitioner’s duties. However, upon MR, RTC
reversed itself and declared that based on the petitioner’s evidence, he was on official mission when the
shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It
likewise considered Luz Nacario Nueca’s admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner
was on official mission when the shooting happened. RTC then issued an order directing the prosecutor
to transmit the case to the SB

Presiding Judge of Sandiganbayan ordered the remand of the case to the RTC on the ff grounds:

1. considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of “23.”

2. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced
presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court
should continue with the case and render judgment therein after trial

ISSUE: Which court/ tribunal has jurisdiction over the murder charge against petitioner?

HELD: RTC.

The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the
Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the
Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is
terminated.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(1) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional
or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by
public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the
office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation

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to his office because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC
against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and
the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November
24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the
petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of
the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was
already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade “27”
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a
position corresponding to a salary grade below “27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial
Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was
a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade “23.” He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion
temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20
and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1 – ATTY. HENEDINO BRONDIAL

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DEMOSTHENES P. AGAS, JR., et al. vs PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.

G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003

TOPIC: Jurisdiction and Hierarchy of Courts

FACTS: Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted a proposal to the DOTC for the development
of NAIA Terminal 3. After a careful examination, the DOTC created the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project. PBAC however, awarded the project to Phil.
International Air Terminals Co (PIATCO). AEDC filed before the RTC of Pasig a Petition for Nullity of the
Proceedings and for Prohibition. The other air service providers of MIAA also claimed that the awarding of
the project to PIATCO would somehow jeopardize their employment or concession-contracts. PIATCO
commenced an arbitration proceeding before the International Chamber of Commerce against the Gov ’t
of the Philippines acting through the DOTC and MIAA and alleged that Philippine courts are without
jurisdiction to review its case against the government and that the submission of the case to the SC is a
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts as trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the SC with
respect to a special civil action for prohibition, thus, resort must first be had before the trial courts.

ISSUE: Whether the arbitration proceedings availed of by PIATCO deprived the SC of its jurisdiction over
the case?

RULING: No. After a careful examination of the facts of the case, the controversy involves significant legal
questions which the SC cannot just ignore. The rule on the hierarchy of courts will also not prevent the SC from
assuming jurisdiction as the rule may be relaxed when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts and where exceptional and compelling reasons justify the availment of the remedy.

In the present case, It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call
for the relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these cases are of
transcendental importance as they involve the construction and operation of the country’s premier
international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted for resolution are of first impression and they
entail the proper legal interpretation of key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court,
procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant cases.

It is also established that petitioners in the present case who have presented legitimate interests in the
resolution of the controversy are not parties to the PIATCO Contracts. Accordingly, they cannot be bound
by the arbitration clause and hence, cannot be compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings. A speedy
and decisive resolution of all the critical issues in the present controversy, including those raised by
petitioners, cannot be made before an arbitral tribunal. The object of arbitration is precisely to allow an
expeditious determination of a dispute. This objective would not be met if this Court were to allow the
parties to settle the cases by arbitration as there are certain issues involving non-parties to the PIATCO
Contracts which the arbitral tribunal will not be equipped to resolve.

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL VS. ATIENZA, JR.

420 SCRA 562

Facts: Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to Section
492 of RA No. 7160 (LGC), constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

Section 493 of that law provides that “the liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and 5 members of the board of
directors.” All other matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of
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LGUs shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the
provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-
laws to govern its internal organization. Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Liga came out
with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,
setting the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila,
together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.

Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing for the
election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections
for both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter
requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the
functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of
the City Council. Mayor signed and approved the city ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme Court.

Held: No. Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari,
there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional
and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to
this Court should be allowed.

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in certain
cases.

SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v.
Aguirre is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule wa

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE VS. NG KOK WEI

418 SCRA 454

TOPIC: Jurisdiction: Exception to the general rule that jurisdiction is not conferred by consent, silence or
acquiesce– estoppel by laches

FACTS: Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman, purchased a condominium unit
at Valle Verde Terraces. Petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell
in favor of respondent which states that the unit shall be substantially completed and delivered to the
respondent within 15 months from Feb. 8, 19989 or on May 8, 1990, and that should there be no
substantial completion and failure to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total
amount paid by respondent shall be charged against petitioner.

Upon his third return to the Phil. and the notices of delivery being sent to him despite the uninhabitable
condition of the unit, he was constrained to demand payment in a letter dated Nov. 21, 1990 for the
damages he sustained but the Corp. ignored his demand prompting him to file with the RTC Makati a
complaint for specific performance and damages.

The RTC found the Corp. liable for the contractual penalty plus moral and exemplary damages. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE/S: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

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RULING:

NO, it is the HLURB which has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of… condominium units against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman (Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1344).

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active participation
in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable
practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting
the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SARDILLO

401 SCRA 583

TOPIC: Jurisdiction

FACTS: Judge Sardido decided a case involving Falsification of Documents. Since one of the defendants
in a case is an RTC judge, he removed the name of the RTC judge from the roster of the defendants.
Judge Sardido's basis for removing the name of the RTC judge is Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89. The
Circular says that "the IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, all cases involving
judges of lower courts and justices xxx"

In the case, Judge Sardido referred the criminal aspect together with the administrative aspect to the SC.

ISSUE: whether the criminal aspect of the case is cognizable by the SC.

RULING: No. Only the administrative aspect of the case is what must be forwarded to the Supreme
Court. The trial courts retain jurisdiction to try the criminal aspect of a case involving judges. SC Circular
3-89 refers to administrative cases not to criminal cases.

KATON VS. PALANCA

437 SCRA 565

TOPIC: DISMISSAL; MOTU PROPRIO; RESIDUAL JURISDICTION; RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE

FACTS: On August 2, 1963, herein petitioner George Katon filed a request with the District Office of the
Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known
as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan for the purpose of eventual conversion or
reclassification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for Katon to apply for homestead patent.
Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed the Director of Lands, that since the subject land
was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural
land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
However, there were also several favorable endorsements that were made to survey the island
under the request of herein respondents. Then, the records show that, on November 8, 1996, one of the
respondents Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for the portion of the island consisiting of
8.5 hectares and the respondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. The
respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No. 14527 and OCT No. G-7098 on
March 3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering
certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were
obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
The petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole

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island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead
patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to
agricultural land. Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective
portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying
taxes thereon for twenty years.
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is
concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere
homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right
over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time. Respondents filed their Answer with
Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court ’s Order to amend
his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent
Gapilango.The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. Petitioner ’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated
December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA,
petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was
his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.

Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking residual prerogative.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in
the Petition?"

RULING: Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the
pleadings or the evidence on record.

In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v.
Larin11 we explained thus:

"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any
order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of
the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3,
Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no
radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another
cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as
follows:

"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected
as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

"A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter
thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

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"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.

"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics
supplied) The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal,
but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial
court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on
residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA
referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action
motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority
of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on
more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of
the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to
dismiss the action.

FIGUEROA VS. PEOPLE

558 SCRA 63

TOPIC : JURSDICTION / ESTOPPEL BY LACHES

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The RTC
found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction
on the case .The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches
has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4
years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional
infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter
may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the
principle of laches will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, constitute
laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said
issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the CA.

RULING: No. Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual
milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy
doctrine to be applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the

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presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party
invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already
been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. In the case
at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt
of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with
the appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece
of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to
take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court
that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringthat he
raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had
yet elapsed for laches to attach.

Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.

HANNAH SERANA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

653 SCRA (7/6/11)
TOPIC: Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as student
regent of UP to serve a one-year term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On Sept. 2000, petitioner
together with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects of the OSFRI was the renovation of Vinzons Hall in UP
Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave P15M as financial assistance for the said project. The source of funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.

However, the renovation failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and system-wide alliances
of students conseguently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Ombudsman. After due investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a criminal case against Serana and her
brother, charging them of Estafa.

Serana moved to quash the Information, contending that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction
over the offense charged nor over her person in her capacity as UP student regent. She contends that
Estafa falls under Crimes Against Property and not on the chapter on Crimes Committed by Public
Officers, only over which, she argues, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Furthermore, she argues that it
was not the governement that was duped, but Pres. Estrada, because the money came from the Office of
the President and not from government funds. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a
UP student regent, she is not a public officer since she merely represents her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity.

The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE/S: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged and over Serana

RULING: YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: 1) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606, as amended, and
that; 2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.

It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

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A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed or enduring at the pleasure of the power, an
individual is interested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the
other officers enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that while the first part of Sec.
4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g)
of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or
manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.

PAT-OG, SR. VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

765 SCRA JUNE 2013

FACTS: Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school student of the Antadao
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, filed an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third year
high school teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region
(CSC-CAR) for misconduct and a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injury
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province. Ruling of the CSC-CAR: In its Decision,
dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty of Simple Misconduct. On December 11, 2006,
the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit.

The Ruling of the CSC: In its Resolution, dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and
affirmed with modification the decision of the CSC-CAR and adjudged Pat-og guilty of grave misconduct.
Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the
case. He contended that administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially
heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. CA
affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the CSC as the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og. Hence, the present petition with the following

ISSUE: WON CSC has jurisdiction over the administrative case filed against Pat-og?

HELD: In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the
Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction
over administrative cases against public school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the
CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal.

Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and
discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which
is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent

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jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO G.R. No.
173946, June 19, 2013

TOPIC: JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PARTIES

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment against Sps. Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Lolita in her answer alleged that her husband Manuel is
already dead. During the trial, respondent Lolita moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Complaint failed to plead an indispensable party;

2. Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of BP 129 as
amended by RA 7691;
3. Trial court erred in ordering substitution of deceased Manuel by his heirs;
4. Trial court must also dismiss case against Lolita in accordance to Section 6, Rule 86;

RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time (after 6 years). Respondent appealed to the CA
which granted the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Manuel;
1. Whether or not respondent may still assail the question of jurisdiction of Manuel on her motion
to dismiss?
RULING:

1. NO, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant
is informed of a case against him when he receives summons. “Summons is a writ by
which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ
is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.” In the case at
bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no
valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the
complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court.
2. NO. Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court
was the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of
estoppel by laches finds no application in his case. Instead the principles relating to
jurisdiction are pertinent therein.Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a
party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of
Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss if filed in order
to prevent a waiver of the defense. If thee objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above quoted Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
As a question of jurisdiction raised here is that over the person of Manuel, the same is
deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent
cannot claim the defense since “lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to
waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby
waive it by silence.”

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PEOPLE VS. HENRY T. GO

MARCH 25, 2014

FACTS: A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (anti-graft).

Among those charged was herein Henry T. Go, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO,
for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a contract which
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein Henry T. Go for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. Thus an
information was filed against Henry before the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan however ordered the
prosecutor to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his
alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.

On the other hand, Henry filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

Citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, Henry, who is not a public officer
nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The prosecution however argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over
Henry’s case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public
officer.SB granted Henry’s motion to quash.

ISSUE: Whether Henry, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of
the Information.

HELD: Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.

The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public
officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE CUERDO

FEBRUARY 4, 2014

FACTS: The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo,
assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private respondents.

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Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits,
private respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint
denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business
Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction".

In its Order dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its Order 5 dated October
15, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October
15, 2004 Orders of the RTC.

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding
that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise,
be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29,
2006.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

RULING: The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer
also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no
perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De Jesus
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that “a court may issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SANTE VS CLARAVALL
FEBRUARY 22, 2010

Topic: Jurisdiction
Nature: Petition for certiorari
Facts:
1) In April 2004, private respondent Vita Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages
against petitioners Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante. Respondent alleged that while she was inside the
Police Station in Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, Irene Sante
uttered the words, “How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’
bitch! ” Bert refers to a friend of the respondent and one of her hired security guards in said station, and a
suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative.
Petitioners also allegedly went around Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed for the following:

Moral Damages 300,000

Exemplary Damages 50, 000
Attorney’s fees 50, 000
Litigation expenses 20, 000

2) Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction. They claimed that the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities instead of RTC Baguio should take cognizance. They argued that the amount of the claim
for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because
the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.
3) The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the amount of demand P420,000 was
above the jurisdictional amount for MTCC’s outside Metro Manila.
4) Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. Meanwhile, respondent filed an
amended complaint increasing the claim for moral damages to P1,000,000. Petitioners then filed a motion
to dismiss which was denied.
5) Petitioners AGAIN filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, raising that RTC Baguio
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint. CA ruled in favor of petitioners,
stating that MTCC had jurisdiction because considering ONLY the demand for P300,000 moral damages.
The CA held that the demand for exemplary damages was merely incidental.
6) Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issues:
Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case
Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amended complaint

Held: YES. RTC acquired jurisdiction. Hence, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio Decidendi:
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: The claim for moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 in the
original complaint, is the main action. The exemplary damages being discretionary should not be included
in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. Thus, RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the amended complaint.

GARCIA VS DRILON
JUNE 25, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent wounded.
Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.

The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not
get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived
her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of income.

Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against respondent
and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.

Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.
RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on
equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men
in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the
1987 Constitution.

REPUBLIC VS. BANTIGUE POINT DEV’T CORP

MARCH 14, 2012

PADLAN VS DINGLASAN
MARCH 20, 2013

FACTS:
Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land which is covered by TCT. While on
board a jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura Passion regarding the sale of the
said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner’s copy of the TCT from
Elenita and gave it to Mau
ra. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo
Dinglasan. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo,
Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots to Lorna Ong
(Lorna), who later sold the lot
to petitioner Editha Padlan for P 4,000.00. Thus, TCT issued under the former’s name was cancelled and
another TCT was issued in the name of Editha Padlan.
Respondents filed a case Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was,
thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered a Decision finding
petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied, respondents
sought recourse before the CA. CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the CA
reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of
Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondents’ own title.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint lacks
merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the person of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case

RULING:
No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the
complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even
presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents’
counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since
they have not yet obtained a copy from the
Provincial Assessor’s Office. However, they did not present such copy. To reiterate, where the ultimate
objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should
be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the
amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the

RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

TUMPAG VS TUMPAG
SEPTEMBER 29, 2014
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO VS ALIBIDBUD