1st Batch Cases Jurisdiction

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002

GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the Decisionl dated September 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No.. 2340- UDK,
entitled Bernardo Eradel vs. Non. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case No.1075, Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo
Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur .
The pertinent facts are as follow.
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bemardo Eradel 2 entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by
Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an
assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to
vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private
respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and
Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner appended to the
complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to file their Answer and was given
until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the, Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis
for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila,
entered into a Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the agreement stated that the Ruenas
recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero. 3 Herein private respondent Eradel was not a
party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint. 4
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private
respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over Lot No.1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000 annual
rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorney's fees and the cost of the suit. 5 Private respondent received
a copy of the decision on May 25, 1996.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of
Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief
that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial
court denied the motion for new trial.1âwphi1.nêt
Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an administrative case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and
Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur .
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his
Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the
land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are
indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming
ownership of the land, filed a Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of
said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and
therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of
Judgment was made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February 27,1997. On March 12,1997, private
respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private respondent is not estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for
Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All proceedings in "Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et.
al. Civil Case 1075" filed in the Court a quo, including its Decision, Annex "E" of the petition, and its Orders and Writ of
Execution and the turn over of the property to the Private Respondent by the Sheriff of the Court a quo, are declared null
and void and hereby SET ASIDE, No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction when it held that:
I.
...THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MA TTER OF THE CASE.
II
...PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT
EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.
III
...THE FAlLURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED. 7
The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had
jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several
motions before it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of appeals erred in holding that private respondent's failure to file an
answer to the complaint was justified.
At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that contain inaccurate
statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,8 we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC
had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E9 of his petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal
Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." But it
appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the
document contain a notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked this Court to refer to Annex
F,10 where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time
the complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are obviously
without evidentiary weight or value.
Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By
"grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. 11 But here we find that in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over
the case and that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals
discussed the facts on which its decision is grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter. 12 Its action was neither
whimsical nor capricious.
Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of
Appeals that he was not. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in
asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction, 13 we note that estoppel has
become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its
equitable enforcement.14 Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must
be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice. 15
In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it
was petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the said court, 16 believing that the
RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691 17amending BP 129 had become effective, such that
jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer,
in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a
Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the
complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he
defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the
evidence to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted
possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land.18 But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the
RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that
private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still
before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his
two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for relief from
judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was
not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express
consent.19 Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal.20 The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even
if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly
invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. 21Precedents
tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law.22 Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances.23 The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision in Javier vs. Court of
Appeals, thus:
x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result
of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party
taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of
the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule
9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled
for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.] 24
Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its
decision a 'lawless' thing."25
Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal
therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals was in order .
In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated
the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice.
Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court without appropriate
jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could
have moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could not be expected to know
the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he
claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the
controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the
RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be
sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction
on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as
tenant-lessee.1âwphi1.nêt
Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that,
given the circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed
the suit was properly his landlord's concern.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No.1075 entitled Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent turn over the
disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner .
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Buena, J., on official leave.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003]
ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE, TIMOTEO BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, THELMA
P. BULICANO, ROSALINDA CAPARAS, ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE LOS REYES, ROGELIO GADDI,
PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO IMPERIAL, HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL,
NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO G. ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO VALLESPIN, AND NARCISO YABUT, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed on July 17, 1997 which should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. It assails the Resolutions[1] dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 41394.[2]
The factual background of the case is as follows:
Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located at Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres, Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila on November 24,
1978. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and all unknown occupants of the subject property. [3]
Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the end of each month but were
impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent; on April
7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the
ejectment case against them.[4]
Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents, [5] for brevity) filed a consolidated Answer dated June 29,
1994 wherein they denied non-payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law
guarantees security of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the purchase
of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and
tendered payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in Civil Case No. 144049
while they await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.
Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19, 1994 against the 23
non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the premises occupied by each of them, and to pay jointly and
severally P10,000.00 per month from the date they last paid their rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at
the legal rate allowed by law, as well as P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. As to the 20 private respondents,
the MeTC issued a separate judgment[6] on the same day sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners
cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the private respondents, petitioner appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 47) of Manila (RTC). [7] In a Decision[8] dated July 5, 1996, the RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
41394. In a Resolution dated March 21, 1997, the CA dismissed the petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by petitioners counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91; [9] and, (b) the
only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and other material portions of
the record as would support the allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). [10]
On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [11] attaching thereto a photocopy of the certification of non-
forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself [12] and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. [13] Five days later, or on April
22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement [14] to his motion for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original of the
certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner. [15]
In a Resolution[16] dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and its supplement, ruling
that petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the instant petition. [17]
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:
A. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER
SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS A DULY AUTHENTICATED
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED AND EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES.
B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION 3, RULE 6 OF THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
PROCEEDINGS COPIES OF THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES BELOW.
C. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS TO LOSE SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT
GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
II.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT
IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC MANILA, BRANCH 47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC MANILA, BRANCH 26, THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE TERM OF THE LEASE IS MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH
EXPIRES AT THE END OF EACH MONTH. IN THIS REGARD,
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT TENANTS UNDER P.D. 1517 MAY BE EVICTED FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT, TERMINATION OF
LEASE OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT.
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED PRIORITY RIGHT TO BUY THE LOT THEY OCCUPY DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE
LANDOWNER DOES NOT INTEND TO SELL THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.
C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN A ZONAL IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS UNDER THE LAW RESULT
IN THE WAIVER OF PROTECTION AGAINST EVICTION.
E. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER P.D. 2016 SINCE THE
GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ON-GOING NEGOTIATION FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THAT IT
RENDERS THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PREMATURE.
G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE ALLEGED CASE FOR CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
IV.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE
COMPENSATION FOR THEIR USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT LEAST P10,000.00 PER
MONTH FROM THE DATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ACTUALLY VACATE THE SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE
MAXIMUM RATE ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.
V.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES
AND EXPENSES OF LITIGATION OF AT LEAST P20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.[18]
Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure is called for in view of the attendant circumstances
showing that the objectives of the rule on certification of non-forum shopping and the rule requiring material portions of the record
be attached to the petition have not been glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:[19]
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line
between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
[20]
(Emphasis supplied).
Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the
jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the prevailing rule is the newly promulgated 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was rendered on March 21, 1997, the
applicable rule is the three-month reglementary period, established by jurisprudence. [21] Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA
Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only
thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later,
or on July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review which was granted by us; and
petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.
We now go to the merits of the case.
We find the instant petition partly meritorious.
The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed before the CA and the
corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the then prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91. [22] It provides that
the petitioner himself must make the certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification by the petitioner
himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in
other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact. [23] The Court has ruled that with respect to the
contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because the requirement of strict
compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. [24]
The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against forum shopping but said certification was signed by
petitioners counsel. In submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration,
[25]
petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts attention to the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to
personally accomplish and sign the certification.
We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to have been prepared and sent to the
petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A.,
in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-
day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which
justifies relaxation of the rule.
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective[26]which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping. [27] The subsequent filing of the certification duly
signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.
In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his
petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the petition, does not justify the
outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties
to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of
the RIRCA,[28] the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due
course, the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the
RIRCA.[29] At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his motion
for reconsideration.[30] In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs.
Diaz[32] and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission[33] that subsequent submission of the missing documents with the
motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no
cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
putting a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.
Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities." [34] When technicality deserts its function of being an aid to
justice, the Court is justified in exempting from its operations a particular case. [35] Technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an
even more urgent ideal.[36]
The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals[37] is worth echoing: cases should be determined on the merits,
after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[38] Thus, what should guide judicial action is that a party
litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or
property on mere technicalities.[39] This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily explained the lapse and
fulfilled the requirements in his motion for reconsideration, [40] as in this case.
In addition, petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the merits without need of remanding the case to the CA.
He insists that all the elements of unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues that the alleged priority right to buy
the lot they occupy does not apply where the landowner does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that
respondents cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government has no intention of acquiring the subject
property, nor is the subject property located within a zonal improvement area; and, that assuming that there is a negotiation for the
sale of the subject property or a pending case for consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.
We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in the present petition for certiorari. The issues
involved are factual issues which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that are beyond the province of this
Court in a special civil action for certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review filed before it. As an
appellate court, it is empowered to require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive evidence,
to promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled, Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
47, Filomeno Arcepe, et al.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144025. December 27, 2002]
SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G.
DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON
JESENA, JR., as Manager, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated
December 29, 1999 and its resolution dated June 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54587.
The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky
Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28254 and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for their housing
loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly
identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent, through its general manager, informed petitioners of
such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the
construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19
was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19
was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their contract of sale be
reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However,
private respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract and damages
with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.
On January 15, 1998, the trial court [2] rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit and ordering herein
petitioners to pay private respondent the amount of P10,000 as moral damages and another P10,000 as attorneys fees. The
pertinent conclusion of the trial court reads as follows:
Aware of such fact, the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on the proposal that he would also buy the
same. Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise defaulted in the payment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot
19. Consequently Lot 19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction. Thereafter TCT No. T-29950 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT
No. T-86612 (Exh. 9) was issued in favor of SSS. This being the situation obtaining, the reformation of instruments, even if allowed, or
the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 as earlier proposed by the plaintiff, is no longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the
owner of Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore (sic). Upon the other hand, plaintiff will
be unjustly enriching himself having in its favor both Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by him and subsequently foreclosed by SSS,
as well as Lot 18 where his house is presently standing.
The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from
the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot
18 as claimed by the plaintiff.The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties, besides the
plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no longer be reformed. [3]
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent
motion to recall writ of execution, alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999,
petitioner-spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.
In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment, relying
mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.[4]
Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this instant petition, contending that the
Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by applying the principle of estoppel, even if the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of
Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. 17115.
At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack
of jurisdiction. Because it is not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve
into the propriety of the decision rendered by the trial court.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy.[5] We do not agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which
rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy:[6]
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in
pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
x x x
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs. Court of Appeals;[7] Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals;
[8]
Salva vs. Court of Appeals;[9] National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals;[10] Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals;[11] PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active participation in all stages
of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such
party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously
asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire
proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against
them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to
them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and
prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not. [13]
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the
courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith. [14] There
is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial
court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for
them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124644. February 5, 2004]
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-
Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by
Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case
No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was
conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City.
He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an
amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner
and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias Jun Bombita with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information reads:
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the
Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal
armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which
caused his death, and as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 ( P367,107.95)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency .[1]
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from the service under Presidential Decree
No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6,
1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated. [2]
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The petitioner
posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991, [3] the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on
December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash [4] the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No.
408,[5] in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He
alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be
reinstated. On September 23, 1993,[6] the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information on
whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed
a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and
pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994. [7] Trial thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution
rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the
case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., [9] he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his
duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order [10] denying the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a
preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a
member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with the
petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit
the offense charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the
prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the
offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the
company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant.[11]
For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by
Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto
Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date. [12]
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the
performance of his official function. The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, [13] the issue had become moot
and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since
the petitioner did not have a salary grade of 27 as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless
ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion[14] and R.A. No. 7975. The
amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration [15] of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of
Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that
the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30,
1995, could not be applied retroactively. [16]
The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and
unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission
when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It
declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the
prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint
before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed
by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to
thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after preliminary
hearing, this Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was committed by the accused in his relation to his
function and duty as member of the then Philippine Constabulary.
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11,
1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information alleging that the offense charged was
committed by the Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of this case, together with the transcripts
of the stenographic notes taken during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted
immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate
proceedings.[17]
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-
Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, [18] the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a
salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his
evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render
judgment therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his
evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was
still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was
charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while in the performance of
his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes
committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade below 27 committed in relation to office are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively. This is so, the
petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon
the effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor contends
that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It
asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by
the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July
31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.
The Ruling of the Court
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the remand of the
case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the Information or the Complaint and the
statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. [19] Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the
inception of the case continues until the case is terminated. [20]
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .[21]
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in
relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law. [22] The amended
Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his
office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it
ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to
office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975
amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding
to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was charged with
homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A.
No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively. [23]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Escobal vs Garchitorena (Remedial Law)

ARNEL ESCOBAL
vs.
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, xxx, Hon. David C. Naval, RTC Judge
(jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis of the RTC)
G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group
of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at a
café bar and restaurant in Naga City when he somehow got involved with a shooting incident that resulted to the death of Rodney
Nueca.
Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to
Quash the Information alleging that the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and
officers. RTC denied the motion.
Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented his evidence. On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the crime in the
performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed the motion but ordered
the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to
his office as a member of the PNP.
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the
performance of his official function. The trial court added that nonetheless, upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,the issue had
become moot and academic since the amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan
to the RTC. The petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and
R.A. No. 7975, and to include therein an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance
of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of his witnesses, the offense charged
was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995,
could not be applied retroactively.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the offense charged was committed by
the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter
transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC
HELD:
The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving
the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their
office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with
the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of
his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of
the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred
when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was
already in effect.
Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged
with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No.
7975 is a substantive procedural law, which may be applied retroactively.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 155001. January 21, 2004]
DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA, MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOE, MAMERTO S. CLARA,
REUEL E. DIMALANTA, MORY V. DOMALAON, CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS P. ADOLFO,
BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO, MIASCOR WORKERS UNION-NATIONAL LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY
LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications, respondents,
MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION, DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST
SERVICES, INC., MACROASIA-MENZIES AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION,
MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
FLORESTE ALCONIS, GINA ALNAS, REY AMPOLOQUIO, ROSEMARIE ANG, EUGENE ARADA, NENETTE BARREIRO, NOEL BARTOLOME,
ALDRIN BASTADOR, ROLETTE DIVINE BERNARDO, MINETTE BRAVO, KAREN BRECILLA, NIDA CAILAO, ERWIN CALAR,
MARIFEL CONSTANTINO, JANETTE CORDERO, ARNOLD FELICITAS, MARISSA GAYAGOY, ALEX GENERILLO, ELIZABETH
GRAY, ZOILO HERICO, JACQUELINE IGNACIO, THELMA INFANTE, JOEL JUMAO-AS, MARIETTA LINCHOCO, ROLLY LORICO,
FRANCIS AUGUSTO MACATOL, MICHAEL MALIGAT, DENNIS MANALO, RAUL MANGALIMAN, JOEL MANLANGIT, CHARLIE
MENDOZA, HAZNAH MENDOZA, NICHOLS MORALES, ALLEN OLAO, CESAR ORTAL, MICHAEL ORTEGA, WAYNE PLAZA,
JOSELITO REYES, ROLANDO REYES, AILEEN SAPINA, RAMIL TAMAYO, PHILLIPS TAN, ANDREW UY, WILLIAM VELASCO,
EMILIO VELEZ, NOEMI YUPANO, MARY JANE ONG, RICHARD RAMIREZ, CHERYLE MARIE ALFONSO, LYNDON BAUTISTA,
MANUEL CABOCAN AND NEDY LAZO, Respondents-in-Intervention,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-in-Intervention,
[G.R. No. 155547. January 21, 2003]
SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ and CONSTANTINO G. JARAULA, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR
TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his
capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications, and SECRETARY SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
in his capacity as Head of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondents, JACINTO V. PARAS, RAFAEL P.
NANTES, EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, WILLY BUYSON VILLARAMA, PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR.,
HARLIN CAST ABAYON, and BENASING O. MACARANBON, Respondents-Intervenors,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-in-Intervention,
[G.R. No. 155661. January 21, 2003]
CEFERINO C. LOPEZ, RAMON M. SALES, ALFREDO B. VALENCIA, MA. TERESA V. GAERLAN, LEONARDO DE LA ROSA, DINA C. DE
LEON, VIRGIE CATAMIN, RONALD SCHLOBOM, ANGELITO SANTOS, MA. LUISA M. PALCON and SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA SA PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS (SMPP), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.,
INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTAUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, respondents,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-in-Intervention.
RESOLUTION
Puno, J.:
Before this Court are the separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondent Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO), respondents-intervenors Jacinto V. Paras, Rafael P. Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie Buyson Villarama, Prospero C.
Nograles, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O. Macaranbon, all members of the House of Representatives
(Respondent Congressmen),[1] respondents-intervenors who are employees of PIATCO and other workers of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) (PIATCO Employees) [2] and respondents-intervenors
Nagkaisang Maralita ng Taong Association, Inc., (NMTAI)[3] of the Decision of this Court dated May 5, 2003 declaring the contracts for
the NAIA IPT III project null and void.
Briefly, the proceedings. On October 5, 1994, Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Philippine Government through the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) for the construction and development of the NAIA IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant
to R.A. No. 6957, as amended by R.A. No. 7718 (BOT Law). [4] In accordance with the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules), the DOTC/MIAA invited the public for submission of competitive and comparative proposals to
the unsolicited proposal of AEDC. On September 20, 1996 a consortium composed of the Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo
Consortium), submitted their competitive proposal to the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).
After finding that the Paircargo Consortium submitted a bid superior to the unsolicited proposal of AEDC and after failure by
AEDC to match the said bid, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the NAIA IPT III project to the Paircargo Consortium, which later
organized into herein respondent PIATCO. Hence, on July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile,
and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). On November 26, 1998, the 1997
Concession Agreement was superseded by the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) containing certain revisions
and modifications from the original contract. A series of supplemental agreements was also entered into by the Government and
PIATCO. The First Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999, the Second Supplement on September 4, 2000, and the Third
Supplement on June 22, 2001 (collectively, Supplements) (the 1997 Concession Agreement, ARCA and the Supplements collectively
referred to as the PIATCO Contracts).
On September 17, 2002, various petitions were filed before this Court to annul the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and
the Supplements and to prohibit the public respondents DOTC and MIAA from implementing them.
In a decision dated May 5, 2003, this Court granted the said petitions and declared the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA
and the Supplements null and void.
Respondent PIATCO, respondent-Congressmen and respondents-intervenors now seek the reversal of the May 5, 2003 decision
and pray that the petitions be dismissed. In the alternative, PIATCO prays that the Court should not strike down the entire 1997
Concession Agreement, the ARCA and its supplements in light of their separability clause. Respondent-Congressmen and NMTAI also
pray that in the alternative, the cases at bar should be referred to arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the ARCA. PIATCO-
Employees pray that the petitions be dismissed and remanded to the trial courts for trial on the merits or in the alternative that the
1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements be declared valid and binding.
I
Procedural Matters
a. Lack of Jurisdiction
Private respondents and respondents-intervenors reiterate a number of procedural issues which they insist deprived this Court
of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant cases on its merits. They continue to claim that the cases at bar raise factual questions
which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve, hence, they must be remanded to the trial court for reception of evidence. Further, they
allege that although designated as petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the cases at bar are actually actions for nullity of contracts
over which the trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Even assuming that the cases at bar are special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, they contend that the principle of hierarchy of courts precludes this Court from taking primary jurisdiction over them.
We are not persuaded.
There is a question of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the facts alleged. [5] Even a cursory reading
of the cases at bar will show that the Court decided them by interpreting and applying the Constitution, the BOT Law, its
Implementing Rules and other relevant legal principles on the basis of clearly undisputed facts. All the operative facts were settled,
hence, there is no need for a trial type determination of their truth or falsity by a trial court.
We reject the unyielding insistence of PIATCO Employees that the following factual issues are critical and beyond the capability
of this Court to resolve, viz: (a) whether the National Economic Development Authority- Investment Coordinating Committee (NEDA-
ICC) approved the Supplements; (b) whether the First Supplement created ten (10) new financial obligations on the part of the
government; and (c) whether the 1997 Concession Agreement departed from the draft Concession Agreement contained in the Bid
Documents.[6]
The factual issue of whether the NEDA-ICC approved the Supplements is hardly relevant. It is clear in our Decision that the
PIATCO contracts were invalidated on other and more substantial grounds. It did not rely on the presence or absence of NEDA-ICC
approval of the Supplements. On the other hand, the last two issues do not involve disputed facts. Rather, they involve contractual
provisions which are clear and categorical and need only to be interpreted. The interpretation of contracts and the determination
of whether their provisions violate our laws or contravene any public policy is a legal issue which this Court may properly pass
upon.
Respondents corollary contention that this Court violated the hierarchy of courts when it entertained the cases at bar must
also fail. The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and appellate courts
generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at
the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases
which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.
It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary. As the cases at bar merely concern the construction of the
Constitution, the interpretation of the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations on undisputed contractual
provisions and government actions, and as the cases concern public interest, this Court resolved to take primary jurisdiction over
them. This choice of action follows the consistent stance of this Court to settle any controversy with a high public interest
component in a single proceeding and to leave no root or branch that could bear the seeds of future litigation. The suggested
remand of the cases at bar to the trial court will stray away from this policy. [7]
b. Legal Standing
Respondent PIATCO stands pat with its argument that petitioners lack legal personality to file the cases at bar as they are not
real parties in interest who are bound principally or subsidiarily to the PIATCO Contracts. Further, respondent PIATCO contends that
petitioners failed to show any legally demandable or enforceable right to justify their standing to file the cases at bar.
These arguments are not difficult to deflect. The determination of whether a person may institute an action or become a party
to a suit brings to fore the concepts of real party in interest, capacity to sue and standing to sue. To the legally discerning, these
three concepts are different although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action. [8] As
defined in the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [9] Capacity to sue deals with a situation where a person who may have a cause of action is
disqualified from bringing a suit under applicable law or is incompetent to bring a suit or is under some legal disability that would
prevent him from maintaining an action unless represented by a guardian ad litem. Legal standing is relevant in the realm of public
law. In certain instances, courts have allowed private parties to institute actions challenging the validity of governmental action for
violation of private rights or constitutional principles. [10] In these cases, courts apply the doctrine of legal standing by determining
whether the party has a direct and personal interest in the controversy and whether such party has sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of, a standard which is distinct from the concept of real party in
interest.[11] Measured by this yardstick, the application of the doctrine on legal standing necessarily involves a preliminary
consideration of the merits of the case and is not purely a procedural issue. [12]
Considering the nature of the controversy and the issues raised in the cases at bar, this Court affirms its ruling that the
petitioners have the requisite legal standing. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 155001 and 155661 are employees of service providers
operating at the existing international airports and employees of MIAA while petitioners-intervenors are service providers with
existing contracts with MIAA and they will all sustain direct injury upon the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. The 1997
Concession Agreement and the ARCA both provide that upon the commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III, NAIA Passenger
Terminals I and II will cease to be used as international passenger terminals. [13] Further, the ARCA provides:
(d) For the purpose of an orderly transition, MIAA shall not renew any expired concession agreement relative to any service or
operation currently being undertaken at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I, or extend any concession
agreement which may expire subsequent hereto, except to the extent that the continuation of the existing services and operations
shall lapse on or before the In-Service Date.[14]
Beyond iota of doubt, the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts, which the petitioners and petitioners-intervenors
denounce as unconstitutional and illegal, would deprive them of their sources of livelihood. Under settled jurisprudence, one's
employment, profession, trade, or calling is a property right and is protected from wrongful interference. [15] It is also self evident that
the petitioning service providers stand in imminent danger of losing legitimate business investments in the event the PIATCO
Contracts are upheld.
Over and above all these, constitutional and other legal issues with far-reaching economic and social implications are
embedded in the cases at bar, hence, this Court liberally granted legal standing to the petitioning members of the House of
Representatives. First, at stake is the build-operate-andtransfer contract of the countrys premier international airport with a
projected capacity of 10 million passengers a year. Second, the huge amount of investment to complete the project is estimated to
be P13,000,000,000.00. Third, the primary issues posed in the cases at bar demand a discussion and interpretation of the
Constitution, the BOT Law and its implementing rules which have not been passed upon by this Court in previous cases. They can
chart the future inflow of investment under the BOT Law.
Before writing finis to the issue of legal standing, the Court notes the bid of new parties to participate in the cases at bar as
respondents-intervenors, namely, (1) the PIATCO Employees and (2) NMTAI (collectively, the New Respondents-Intervenors). After
the Courts Decision, the New Respondents-Intervenors filed separate Motions for Reconsideration-In-Intervention alleging prejudice
and direct injury. PIATCO employees claim that they have a direct and personal interest [in the controversy]... since they stand to
lose their jobs should the governments contract with PIATCO be declared null and void. [16] NMTAI, on the other hand, represents
itself as a corporation composed of responsible tax-paying Filipino citizens with the objective of protecting and sustaining the rights
of its members to civil liberties, decent livelihood, opportunities for social advancement, and to a good, conscientious and honest
government.[17]
The Rules of Court govern the time of filing a Motion to Intervene. Section 2, Rule 19 provides that a Motion to Intervene
should be filed before rendition of judgment.... The New Respondents-Intervenors filed their separate motions after a decision has
been promulgated in the present cases. They have not offered any worthy explanation to justify their late
intervention. Consequently, their Motions for Reconsideration-In-Intervention are denied for the rules cannot be relaxed to await
litigants who sleep on their rights. In any event, a sideglance at these late motions will show that they hoist no novel arguments.
c. Failure to Implead an Indispensable Party
PIATCO next contends that petitioners should have impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as an indispensable party. It
alleges that petitioners sued the DOTC, MIAA and the DPWH in their own capacities or as implementors of the PIATCO Contracts and
not as a contract party or as representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It then leapfrogs to the conclusion
that the absence of an indispensable party renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including
the judgment.[18]
PIATCOs allegations are inaccurate. The petitions clearly bear out that public respondents DOTC and MIAA were impleaded
as parties to the PIATCO Contracts and not merely as their implementors. The separate petitions filed by the MIAA
employees[19] and members of the House of Representatives [20] alleged that public respondents are impleaded herein because they
either executed the PIATCO Contracts or are undertaking acts which are related to the PIATCO Contracts. They are interested and
indispensable parties to this Petition. [21] Thus, public respondents DOTC and MIAA were impleaded as parties to the case for
having executed the contracts.
More importantly, it is also too late in the day for PIATCO to raise this issue. If PIATCO seriously views the non-inclusion of the
Republic of the Philippines as an indispensable party as fatal to the petitions at bar, it should have raised the issue at the onset of the
proceedings as a ground to dismiss. PIATCO cannot litigate issues on a piecemeal basis, otherwise, litigations shall be like a shore
that knows no end. In any event, the Solicitor General, the legal counsel of the Republic, appeared in the cases at bar in
representation of the interest of the government.
II
Pre-qualification of PIATCO
The Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the PBAC should apply to determine the financial capability of a
bidder for pre-qualification purposes: (i) proof of the ability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a minimum
amount of equity to the project and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project proponent and/or
members of the consortium are banking with them, that they are in good financial standing, and that they have adequate
resources.[22] The evident intent of these standards is to protect the integrity and insure the viability of the project by seeing to it
that the proponent has the financial capability to carry it out. As a further measure to achieve this intent, it maintains a certain
debt-to-equity ratio for the project.
At the pre-qualification stage, it is most important for a bidder to show that it has the financial capacity to undertake the
project by proving that it can fulfill the requirement on minimum amount of equity. For this purpose, the Bid Documents require in
no uncertain terms:
The minimum amount of equity to which the proponents financial capability will be based shall be thirty percent (30%) of the
project cost instead of the twenty percent (20%) specified in Section 3.6.4 of the Bid Documents. This is to correlate with the
required debt-to-equity ratio of 70:30 in Section 2.01a of the draft concession agreement. The debt portion of the project financing
should not exceed 70% of the actual project cost.[23]
In relation thereto, section 2.01 (a) of the ARCA provides:
Section 2.01 Project Scope.
The scope of the project shall include:
(a) Financing the project at an actual Project cost of not less than Three Hundred Fifty Million United States Dollars
(US$350,000,000.00) while maintaining a debt-to-equity ratio of 70:30, provided that if the actual Project costs should
exceed the aforesaid amount, Concessionaire shall ensure that the debt-to-equity ratio is maintained; [24]
Under the debt-to-equity restriction, a bidder may only seek financing of the NAIA IPT III Project up to 70% of the project cost.
Thirty percent (30%) of the cost must come in the form of equity or investment by the bidder itself. It cannot be overly emphasized
that the rules require a minimum amount of equity to ensure that a bidder is not merely an operator or implementor of the
project but an investor with a substantial interest in its success. The minimum equity requirement also guarantees the Philippine
government and the general public, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the project, that a bidder will not be indifferent to the
completion of the project. The discontinuance of the project will irreparably damage public interest more than private interest.
In the cases at bar, after applying the investment ceilings provided under the General Banking Act and considering the
maximum amounts that each member of the consortium may validly invest in the project, it is daylight clear that the Paircargo
Consortium, at the time of pre-qualification, had a net worth equivalent to only 6.08% of the total estimated project cost.[25] By any
reckoning, a showing by a bidder that at the time of pre-qualification its maximum funds available for investment amount to only
6.08% of the project cost is insufficient to satisfy the requirement prescribed by the Implementing Rules that the project proponent
must have the ability to provide at least 30% of the total estimated project cost. In peso and centavo terms, at the time of pre-
qualification, the Paircargo Consortium had maximum funds available for investment to the NAIA IPT III Project only in the amount
of P558,384,871.55, when it had to show that it had the ability to provide at least P2,755,095,000.00. The huge disparity cannot be
dismissed as of de minimisimportance considering the high public interest at stake in the project.
PIATCO nimbly tries to sidestep its failure by alleging that it submitted not only audited financial statements but also
testimonial letters from reputable banks attesting to the good financial standing of the Paircargo Consortium. It contends that in
adjudging whether the Paircargo Consortium is a pre-qualified bidder, the PBAC should have considered not only its financial
statements but other factors showing its financial capability.
Anent this argument, the guidelines provided in the Bid Documents are instructive:
3.3.4 FINANCING AND FINANCIAL PREQUALIFICATIONS REQUIREMENTS

Minimum Amount of Equity
Each member of the proponent entity is to provide evidence of networth in cash and assets representing the proportionate share in
the proponent entity. Audited financial statements for the past five (5) years as a company for each member are to be provided.
Project Loan Financing
Testimonial letters from reputable banks attesting that each of the members of the ownership entity are banking with them, in
good financial standing and having adequate resources are to be provided. [26]
It is beyond refutation that Paircargo Consortium failed to prove its ability to provide the amount of at
least P2,755,095,000.00, or 30% of the estimated project cost. Its submission of testimonial letters attesting to its good financial
standing will not cure this failure. At best, the said letters merely establish its credit worthiness or its ability to obtain loans to
finance the project. They do not, however, prove compliance with the aforesaid requirement of minimum amount of equity in
relation to the prescribed debt-to-equity ratio. This equity cannot be satisfied through possible loans.
In sum, we again hold that given the glaring gap between the net worth of Paircargo and PAGS combined with the amount of
maximum funds that Security Bank may invest by equity in a non-allied undertaking, Paircargo Consortium, at the time of pre-
qualification, failed to show that it had the ability to provide 30% of the project cost and necessarily, its financial capability for the
project cannot pass muster.
III
1997 Concession Agreement
Again, we brightline the principle that in public bidding, bids are submitted in accord with the prescribed terms, conditions and
parameters laid down by government and pursuant to the requirements of the project bidded upon. In light of these parameters,
bidders formulate competing proposals which are evaluated to determine the bid most favorable to the government. Once the
contract based on the bid most favorable to the government is awarded, all that is left to be done by the parties is to execute the
necessary agreements and implement them. There can be no substantial or material change to the parameters of the project,
including the essential terms and conditions of the contract bidded upon, after the contract award. If there were changes and the
contracts end up unfavorable to government, the public bidding becomes a mockery and the modified contracts must be struck
down.
Respondents insist that there were no substantial or material amendments in the 1997 Concession Agreement as to the
technical aspects of the project, i.e., engineering design, technical soundness, operational and maintenance methods and
procedures of the project or the technical proposal of PIATCO. Further, they maintain that there was no modification of the financial
features of the project, i.e., minimum project cost, debt-to-equity ratio, the operations and maintenance budget, the schedule and
amount of annual guaranteed payments, or the financial proposal of PIATCO. A discussion of some of these changes to determine
whether they altered the terms and conditions upon which the bids were made is again in order.
a. Modification on Fees and

Charges to be collected by PIATCO
PIATCO clings to the contention that the removal of the groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and porterage fees from the
category of fees subject to MIAA regulation in the 1997 Concession Agreement does not constitute a substantial amendment as
these fees are not really public utility fees. In other words, PIATCO justifies the re-classification under the 1997 Concession
Agreement on the ground that these fees are non-public utility revenues.
We disagree. The removal of groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and porterage fees from the category of Public Utility
Revenues under the draft Concession Agreement and its re-classification to Non-Public Utility Revenues under the 1997 Concession
Agreement is significant and has far reaching consequence. The 1997 Concession Agreement provides that with respect to Non-
Public Utility Revenues, which include groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and porterage fees, [27] [PIATCO] may make any
adjustments it deems appropriate without need for the consent of GRP or any government agency.[28] In contrast, the draft
Concession Agreement specifies these fees as part of Public Utility Revenues and can be adjusted only once every two years and in
accordance with the Parametric Formula and the adjustments shall be made effective only after the written express approval of the
MIAA.[29] The Bid Documents themselves clearly provide:
4.2.3 Mechanism for Adjustment of Fees and Charges
4.2.3.1 Periodic Adjustment in Fees and Charges

Adjustments in the fees and charges enumerated hereunder, whether or not falling within the purview of public
utility revenues, shall be allowed only once every two years in accordance with the parametric formula attached
hereto as Annex 4.2f. Provided that the adjustments shall be made effective only after the written express approval
of MIAA. Provided, further, that MIAAs approval, shall be contingent only on conformity of the adjustments to the
said parametric formula.
The fees and charges to be regulated in the above manner shall consist of the following:
....
c) groundhandling fees;
d) rentals on airline offices;
....
(f) porterage fees;
. . . .[30]
The plain purpose in re-classifying groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and porterage fees as non-public utility fees is to
remove them from regulation by the MIAA. In excluding these fees from government regulation, the danger to public interest
cannot be downplayed.
We are not impressed by the effort of PIATCO to depress this prejudice to public interest by its contention that in the 1997
Concession Agreement governing Non-Public Utility Revenues, it is provided that [PIATCO] shall at all times be judicious in fixing fees
and charges constituting Non-Public Utility Revenues in order to ensure that End Users are not unreasonably deprived of services.
[31]
PIATCO then peddles the proposition that the said provision confers upon MIAA full regulatory powers to ensure that PIATCO is
charging non-public utility revenues at judicious rates.[32] To the trained eye, the argument will not fly for it is obviously non
sequitur. Fairly read, it is PIATCO that wields the power to determine the judiciousness of the said fees and charges. In the draft
Concession Agreement the power was expressly lodged with the MIAA and any adjustment can only be done once every two
years. The changes are not insignificant specks as interpreted by PIATCO.
PIATCO further argues that there is no substantial change in the 1997 Concession Agreement with respect to fees and charges
PIATCO is allowed to impose which are not covered by Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993 [33] as the relevant provision of the
1997 Concession Agreement is practically identical with the draft Concession Agreement. [34]
We are not persuaded. Under the draft Concession Agreement, PIATCO may impose fees and charges other than those fees
and charges previously imposed or collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I, subject to the written
approval of MIAA.[35] Further, the draft Concession Agreement provides that MIAA reserves the right to regulate these new fees and
charges if in its judgment the users of the airport shall be deprived of a free option for the services they cover. [36] In contrast, under
the 1997 Concession Agreement, the MIAA merely retained the right to approve any imposition of new fees and charges which
were not previously collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I. The agreement did not contain an
equivalent provision allowing MIAA to reserve the right to regulate the adjustments of these new fees and charges.[37] PIATCO
justifies the amendment by arguing that MIAA can establish terms before approval of new fees and charges, inclusive of the mode
for their adjustment.
PIATCOs stance is again a strained one. There would have been no need for an amendment if there were no change in the
power to regulate on the part of MIAA. The deletion of MIAAs reservation of its right to regulate the price adjustments of new fees
and charges can have no other purpose but to dilute the extent of MIAAs regulation in the collection of these fees. Again, the
amendment diminished the authority of MIAA to protect the public interest in case of abuse by PIATCO.
b. Assumption by the
Government of the liabilities
of PIATCO in the event of the latters
default
PIATCO posits the thesis that the new provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement in case of default by PIATCO on its loans
were merely meant to prescribe and limit the rights of PIATCOs creditors with regard to the NAIA Terminal III. PIATCO alleges that
Section 4.04 of the 1997 Concession Agreement simply provides that PIATCOs creditors have no right to foreclose the NAIA Terminal
III.
We cannot concur. The pertinent provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement state:
Section 4.04 Assignment.
....
(b) In the event Concessionaire should default in the payment of an Attendant Liability, and the default has resulted in the
acceleration of the payment due date of the Attendant Liability prior to its stated date of maturity, the Unpaid Creditors and
Concessionaire shall immediately inform GRP in writing of such default. GRP shall, within one hundred eighty (180) Days from receipt
of the joint written notice of the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire, either (i) take over the Development Facility and assume the
Attendant Liabilities, or (ii) allow the Unpaid Creditors, if qualified, to be substituted as concessionaire and operator of the
Development Facility in accordance with the terms and conditions hereof, or designate a qualified operator acceptable to GRP to
operate the Development Facility, likewise under the terms and conditions of this Agreement; Provided that if at the end of the 180-
day period GRP shall not have served the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire written notice of its choice, GRP shall be deemed to
have elected to take over the Development Facility with the concomitant assumption of Attendant Liabilities.
(c) If GRP should, by written notice, allow the Unpaid Creditors to be substituted as concessionaire, the latter shall form and
organize a concession company qualified to take over the operation of the Development Facility. If the concession company should
elect to designate an operator for the Development Facility, the concession company shall in good faith identify and designate a
qualified operator acceptable to GRP within one hundred eighty (180) days from receipt of GRPs written notice. If the concession
company, acting in good faith and with due diligence, is unable to designate a qualified operator within the aforesaid period, then
GRP shall at the end of the 180-day period take over the Development Facility and assume Attendant Liabilities.
A plain reading of the above provision shows that it spells out in limpid language the obligation of government in case of
default by PIATCO on its loans. There can be no blinking from the fact that in case of PIATCOs default, the government will assume
PIATCOs Attendant Liabilities as defined in the 1997 Concession Agreement. [38] This obligation is not found in the draft Concession
Agreement and the change runs roughshod to the spirit and policy of the BOT Law which was crafted precisely to prevent
government from incurring financial risk.
In any event, PIATCO pleads that the entire agreement should not be struck down as the 1997 Concession Agreement contains
a separability clause.
The plea is bereft of merit. The contracts at bar which made a mockery of the bidding process cannot be upheld and must be
annulled in their entirety for violating law and public policy. As demonstrated, the contracts were substantially amended after their
award to the successful bidder on terms more beneficial to PIATCO and prejudicial to public interest. If this flawed process would be
allowed, public bidding will cease to be competitive and worse, government would not be favored with the best bid. Bidders will no
longer bid on the basis of the prescribed terms and conditions in the bid documents but will formulate their bid in anticipation of the
execution of a future contract containing new and better terms and conditions that were not previously available at the time of the
bidding. Such a public bidding will not inure to the public good. The resulting contracts cannot be given half a life but must be struck
down as totally lawless.
IV.
Direct Government Guarantee
The respondents further contend that the PIATCO Contracts do not contain direct government guarantee provisions. They
assert that section 4.04 of the ARCA, which superseded sections 4.04(b) and (c), Article IV of the 1997 Concession Agreement, is but
a clarification and explanation [39] of the securities allowed in the bid documents. They allege that these provisions merely provide for
compensation to PIATCO[40] in case of a government buy-out or takeover of NAIA IPT III. The respondents, particularly respondent
PIATCO, also maintain that the guarantee contained in the contracts, if any, is an indirect guarantee allowed under the BOT Law, as
amended.[41]
We do not agree. Section 4.04(c), Article IV[42] of the ARCA should be read in conjunction with section 1.06, Article I, [43] in the
same manner that sections 4.04(b) and (c), Article IV of the 1997 Concession Agreement should be related to Article 1.06 of the
same contract. Section 1.06, Article I of the ARCA and its counterpart provision in the 1997 Concession Agreement define in no
uncertain terms the meaning of attendant liabilities. They tell us of the amounts that the Government has to pay in the event
respondent PIATCO defaults in its loan payments to its Senior Lenders and no qualified transferee or nominee is chosen by the
Senior Lenders or is willing to take over from respondent PIATCO.
A reasonable reading of all these relevant provisions would reveal that the ARCA made the Government liable to pay all
amounts ... from time to time owed or which may become owing by Concessionaire [PIATCO] to Senior Lenders or any other
persons or entities who have provided, loaned, or advanced funds or provided financial facilities to Concessionaire [PIATCO] for
the Project [NAIA Terminal 3]. [44] These amounts include without limitation, all principal, interest, associated fees, charges,
reimbursements, and other related expenses... whether payable at maturity, by acceleration or otherwise. [45] They further include
amounts owed by respondent PIATCO to its professional consultants and advisers, suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors as well
as fees, charges and expenses of any agents or trustees of the Senior Lenders or any other persons or entities who have provided
loans or financial facilities to respondent PIATCO in relation to NAIA IPT III. [46] The counterpart provision in the 1997 Concession
Agreement specifying the attendant liabilities that the Government would be obligated to pay should PIATCO default in its loan
obligations is equally onerous to the Government as those contained in the ARCA. According to the 1997 Concession Agreement, in
the event the Government is forced to prematurely take over NAIA IPT III as a result of respondent PIATCOs default in the payment
of its loan obligations to its Senior Lenders, it would be liable to pay the following amounts as attendant liabilities:
Section 1.06. Attendant Liabilities

Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts recorded and from time to time outstanding in the books of the Concessionaire as owing
to Unpaid Creditors who have provided, loaned or advanced funds actually used for the Project, including all interests, penalties,
associated fees, charges, surcharges, indemnities, reimbursements and other related expenses, and further including amounts
owed by Concessionaire to its suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors. [47]
These provisions reject respondents contention that what the Government is obligated to pay, in the event that respondent
PIATCO defaults in the payment of its loans, is merely termination payment or just compensation for its takeover of NAIA IPT III. It is
clear from said section 1.06 that what the Government would pay is the sum total of all the debts, including all interest, fees and
charges, that respondent PIATCO incurred in pursuance of the NAIA IPT III Project. This reading is consistent with section 4.04 of the
ARCA itself which states that the Government shall make a termination payment to Concessionaire [PIATCO] equal to the Appraised
Value (as hereinafter defined) of the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal III] or the sum of the Attendant Liabilities, if greater. For
sure, respondent PIATCO will not receive any amount less than sufficient to cover its debts, regardless of whether or not the value
of NAIA IPT III, at the time of its turn over to the Government, may actually be less than the amount of PIATCOs debts. The
scheme is a form of direct government guarantee for it is undeniable that it leaves the government no option but to pay the
attendant liabilities in the event that the Senior Lenders are unable or unwilling to appoint a qualified nominee or transferee as a
result of PIATCOs default in the payment of its Senior Loans. As we stressed in our Decision, this Court cannot depart from the legal
maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
This is not to hold, however, that indirect government guarantee is not allowed under the BOT Law, as amended. The intention
to permit indirect government guarantee is evident from the Senate deliberations on the amendments to the BOT Law. The idea is
to allow for reasonable government undertakings, such as to authorize the project proponent to undertake related ventures within
the project area, in order to encourage private sector participation in development projects. [48] An example cited by then Senator
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, one of the sponsors of R.A. No. 7718, is the Mandaluyong public market which was built under the Build-
and-Transfer (BT) scheme wherein instead of the government paying for the transfer, the project proponent was allowed to operate
the upper floors of the structure as a commercial mall in order to recoup their investments. [49] It was repeatedly stressed in the
deliberations that in allowing indirect government guarantee, the law seeks to encourage both the government and the private
sector to formulate reasonable and innovative government undertakings in pursuance of BOT projects. In no way, however, can the
government be made liable for the debts of the project proponent as this would be tantamount to a direct government guarantee
which is prohibited by the law. Such liability would defeat the very purpose of the BOT Law which is to encourage the use of private
sector resources in the construction, maintenance and/or operation of development projects with no, or at least minimal, capital
outlay on the part of the government.
The respondents again urge that should this Court affirm its ruling that the PIATCO Contracts contain direct government
guarantee provisions, the whole contract should not be nullified. They rely on the separability clause in the PIATCO Contracts.
We are not persuaded.
The BOT Law and its implementing rules provide that there are three (3) essential requisites for an unsolicited proposal to be
accepted: (1) the project involves a new concept in technology and/or is not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct
government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and (3) the government agency or local government unit has invited by
publication other interested parties to a public bidding and conducted the same. [50] The failure to fulfill any of the requisites will
result in the denial of the proposal. Indeed, it is further provided that a direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity provision will
necessarily disqualify a proposal from being treated and accepted as an unsolicited proposal. [51] In fine, the mere inclusion of a direct
government guarantee in an unsolicited proposal is fatal to the proposal. There is more reason to invalidate a contract if a direct
government guarantee provision is inserted later in the contract via a backdoor amendment. Such an amendment constitutes a crass
circumvention of the BOT Law and renders the entire contract void.
Respondent PIATCO likewise claims that in view of the fact that other BOT contracts such as the JANCOM contract, the Manila
Water contract and the MRT contract had been considered valid, the PIATCO contracts should be held valid as well. [52] There is no
parity in the cited cases. For instance, a reading of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. JANCOM Environmental
Corporation[53] will show that its issue is different from the issues in the cases at bar. In the JANCOM case, the main issue is whether
there is a perfected contract between JANCOM and the Government. The resolution of the issue hinged on the following: (1)
whether the conditions precedent to the perfection of the contract were complied with; (2) whether there is a valid notice of award;
and (3) whether the signature of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources is sufficient to bind the
Government. These issue and sub-issues are clearly distinguishable and different. For one, the issue of direct government guarantee
was not considered by this Court when it held the JANCOM contract valid, yet, it is a key reason for invalidating the PIATCO
Contracts. It is a basic principle in law that cases with dissimilar facts cannot have similar disposition.
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete
and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to
compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and
equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.
II.
Temporary takeover of business affected with

public interest in times of national emergency
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national emergency the right to temporarily take
over the operation of any business affected with public interest. This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent
powers of the State.
Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare."[54] It consists of two essential elements. First, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property. Second, the power is exercised for the benefit of the common good. Its definition in elastic terms underscores its all-
encompassing and comprehensive embrace. [55] It is and still is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable [56] of the States powers. It
is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just
compensation for its paramount consideration is public welfare. [57]
It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national emergency is the primary consideration when the government
decides to temporarily take over or direct the operation of a public utility or a business affected with public interest. The nature and
extent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms thereof. It is the State that prescribes
such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation of the temporary takeover as dictated by the exigencies of the time. As
we ruled in our Decision, this power of the State can not be negated by any party nor should its exercise be a source of obligation for
the State.
Section 5.10(c), Article V of the ARCA provides that respondent PIATCO shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the
duration of the temporary takeover by GRP, which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for the use of the
Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. [58] It clearly obligates the government in the exercise of its police power to compensate
respondent PIATCO and this obligation is offensive to the Constitution. Police power can not be diminished, let alone defeated by
any contract for its paramount consideration is public welfare and interest. [59]
Again, respondent PIATCOs reliance on the case of Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong [60] to justify its claim for
reasonable compensation for the Governments temporary takeover of NAIA IPT III in times of national emergency is
erroneous. What was involved in Heirs of Suguitan is the exercise of the states power of eminent domain and not of police
power, hence, just compensation was awarded. The cases at bar will not involve the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
III.
Monopoly
Section 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the State prohibit or regulate monopolies when public interest so
requires. Monopolies are not per se prohibited. Given its susceptibility to abuse, however, the State has the bounden duty to
regulate monopolies to protect public interest. Such regulation may be called for, especially in sensitive areas such as the operation
of the countrys premier international airport, considering the public interest at stake.
By virtue of the PIATCO contracts, NAIA IPT III would be the only international passenger airport operating in the Island of
Luzon, with the exception of those already operating in Subic Bay Freeport Special Economic Zone (SBFSEZ), Clark Special Economic
Zone (CSEZ) and in Laoag City. Undeniably, the contracts would create a monopoly in the operation of an international commercial
passenger airport at the NAIA in favor of PIATCO.
The grant to respondent PIATCO of the exclusive right to operate NAIA IPT III should not exempt it from regulation by the
government. The government has the right, indeed the duty, to protect the interest of the public. Part of this duty is to assure that
respondent PIATCOs exercise of its right does not violate the legal rights of third parties. We reiterate our ruling that while the
service providers presently operating at NAIA Terminals I and II do not have the right to demand for the renewal or extension of
their contracts to continue their services in NAIA IPT III, those who have subsisting contracts beyond the In-Service Date of NAIA IPT
III can not be arbitrarily or unreasonably treated.
Finally, the Respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports by the House of Representatives found the
PIATCO contracts valid and contend that this Court, by taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a co-equal body.
[61]
They insist that the Court must respect the findings of the said committees of the House of Representatives. [62] With due respect,
we cannot subscribe to their submission. There is a fundamental difference between a case in court and an investigation of a
congressional committee. The purpose of a judicial proceeding is to settle the dispute in controversy by adjudicating the legal rights
and obligations of the parties to the case. On the other hand, a congressional investigation is conducted in aid of legislation. [63] Its
aim is to assist and recommend to the legislature a possible action that the body may take with regard to a particular issue,
specifically as to whether or not to enact a new law or amend an existing one. Consequently, this Court cannot treat the findings in a
congressional committee report as binding because the facts elicited in congressional hearings are not subject to the rigors of the
Rules of Court on admissibility of evidence. The Court in assuming jurisdiction over the petitions at bar simply performed its
constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal disputes properly brought before it, especially in this instance when public interest requires
nothing less.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by the respondent PIATCO, respondent Congressmen and the respondents-
in-intervention are DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 154599. January 21, 2004]
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY
COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series
of 2002,[1] and respondent City Mayors Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002,[2] dated 15 August 2002 , for being patently contrary
to law.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines,
which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991, constitutes the
duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political
subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that [t]he liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national
levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors. All other matters not provided for
in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by their respective
constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. [3]
On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization. [4] Section
1, third paragraph, Article XI of said Constitution and By-Laws states:
All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the Liga Election Code or such other rules as may be
promulgated by the National Liga Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of existing laws.
By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. [5] Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga
Election Code states:
1.2 Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC Chapters. There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the
provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the
synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. The incumbent Liga chapter president concerned duly assisted by the
proper government agency, office or department, e.g. Provincial/City/NCR/Regional Director, shall convene all the duly elected
Component City/Municipal Chapter Presidents and all the current elected Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC) of the respective
chapters in any public place within its area of jurisdiction for the purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers and directors of
the provincial, metropolitan or HUC/ICC Liga chapters. Said president duly assisted by the government officer aforementioned, shall
notify, in writing, all the above concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the exact date, time,
place and requirements of the said meeting.
The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of
2002,[6] setting on 21 October 2002 the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila,
together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.
On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other
things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both
chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. Section 3 (A) and (B) of the assailed ordinance read:
SEC. 3. Representation Chapters. Every Barangay shall be represented in the said Liga Chapters by the Punong Barangayor, in his
absence or incapacity, by the kagawad duly elected for the purpose among its members.
A. District Chapter
All elected Barangay Chairman in each District shall elect from among themselves the President, Vice-President and five (5) members
of the Board.
B. City Chapter
The District Chapter representatives shall automatically become members of the Board and they shall elect from among themselves
a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor and create other positions as it may deem necessary for the management
of the chapter.
The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent City Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for his signature and approval.
On 16 July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to the Office of the City Mayor, still unnumbered
and yet to be officially released, the Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed
considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly
beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.[7]
Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order
No. 011, Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance.
Hence, on 27 August 2002, the Liga filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ENACTED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002 PURPOSELY TO GOVERN THE ELECTIONS
OF THE MANILA CHAPTER OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS AND WHICH PROVIDES A DIFFERENT MANNER OF ELECTING ITS
OFFICERS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID CHAPTERS ELECTIONS, AND THE ELECTIONS OF ALL OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE LIGA NG MGA
BARANGAYS FOR THAT MATTER, ARE BY LAW MANDATED TO BE GOVERNED BY THE LIGA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS AND THE
LIGA ELECTION CODE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE ISSUED EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 011 TO IMPLEMENT THE QUESTIONED CITY ORDINANCE
NO. 8039 S. 2002.
In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, and Executive Order No. 011, Series of
2002, contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid. There exists neither rhyme nor reason, not to mention the absence
of legal basis, for the Manila City Council to encroach upon, or even assume, the functions of the Liga by prescribing, through
legislation, the manner of conducting the Liga elections other than what has been provided for by the Liga Constitution and By-laws
and the Liga Election Code. Accordingly, the subject ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and, as such, should be
declared null and void.
As for its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the petitioner cites as reason therefor the fact that under
Section 5 of the assailed city ordinance, the Manila District Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the regular barangay
elections. Hence, it argued that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction would be imperative to
prevent the implementation of the ordinance and executive order.
On 12 September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Pea, in his capacity as a member of the Liga ng mga Barangay in the City
Chapter of Manila, filed a Complaint in Intervention with Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction.[8] He supports the position of the Liga and prays for the declaration of the questioned ordinance and
executive order, as well as the elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay pursuant thereto, to be null and void. The assailed ordinance
prescribing for an indirect manner of election amended, in effect, the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides for the election of the Liga officers at large. It also violated and curtailed the rights of the petitioner and intervenor, as well
as the other 896 Barangay Chairmen in the City of Manila, to vote and be voted upon in a direct election.
On 25 October 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment. [9] It supports the
petition of the Liga, arguing that the assailed city ordinance and executive order are clearly inconsistent with the express public
policy enunciated in R.A. No. 7160. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. Thus, the
enactments in question, which are local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of law.
On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts rule, the OSG posits that technical rules of
procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition. While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction over
cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this
rule. Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that the Liga ng mga
Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians for the immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization
of issues affecting barangay government administration. Thus, the immediate resolution of this petition is a must.
On the other hand, the respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and pray for the
dismissal of the present petition on the following grounds: (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2) the
petition should not be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or
petitions questioning the subject ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and (4) the act sought
to be enjoined is fait accompli.
The respondents maintain that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available to one aggrieved by the decision of a tribunal,
officer, or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The City Council and City Mayor of Manila are not the board and
officer contemplated in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because both do not exercise judicial functions. The enactment of the subject
ordinance and issuance of the questioned executive order are legislative and executive functions, respectively, and thus, do not fall
within the ambit of judicial functions. They are both within the prerogatives, powers, and authority of the City Council and City
Mayor of Manila, respectively. Furthermore, the petition failed to show with certainty that the respondents acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot claim that it has no other recourse in addressing its grievance other
than this petition for certiorari. As a matter of fact, there are two cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the RTC of Manila (one
is for mandamus; the other, for declaratory relief) and three in the Court of Appeals (one is for prohibition; the two other cases,
for quo warranto), which are all akin to the present petition in the sense that the relief being sought therein is the declaration of the
invalidity of the subject ordinance. Clearly, the petitioner may ask the RTC or the Court of Appeals the relief being prayed for before
this Court. Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove discernible compelling reasons attending the present petition that would
warrant cognizance of the present petition by this Court.
Besides, according to the respondents, the petitioner has transgressed the proscription against forum-shopping in filing the
instant suit. Although the parties in the other pending cases and in this petition are different individuals or entities, they represent
the same interest.
With regard to petitioner's prayer for temporary restraining order and/ or preliminary injunction in its petition, the
respondents maintain that the same had become moot and academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga ng mga
Barangay on 15 September 2002 and their subsequent assumption to their respective offices. [10] Since the acts to be enjoined are
now fait accompli, this petition for certiorari with an application for provisional remedies must necessarily fail. Thus, where the
records show that during the pendency of the case certain events or circumstances had taken place that render the case moot and
academic, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that
may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. [11]
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as
a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. [12]
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise
to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties.[13]
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As
correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by
respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively,
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. [14] Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved.[15]
Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced
by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in
certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:[16]
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor0 will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,[17] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[18]
Petitioners reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre [19] is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not
an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the
President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local government units. We reiterated therein that when an act of
the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this
Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is coequal with Congress.
We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis
pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the
same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.[20]
In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the parties in this case and in the alleged other pending cases are
different individuals or entities; thus, forum-shopping cannot be said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five petitions are
indeed pending before the RTC of Manila and the Court of Appeals, we can only guess the causes of action and issues raised before
those courts, considering that the respondents failed to furnish this Court with copies of the said petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Liga ng Mga Barangay vs Atienza, Jr (Remedial Law)

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL
vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA
G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines which pursuant to the Local Govt Code, constitutes
the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, Metro Manila chapter, and metropolitan political
subdivision chapters. On March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws. Pursuant to its Constitution, it
also adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Thereafter, it came out with its calendar of activities and guidelines for the
implementation of its election code. The synchronized elections for highly-urbanized city chapters was also set on Oct. 21, 2002.
On June 28, 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance providing among other things, for the election of
representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days after the
barangay elections.
Upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to Mayor Atienza for his approval, the Liga sent him a letter requesting
that said ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon or even assumed the functions of the Liga through legislation.
However, Atienza stillapproved and signed the ordinance, and issued an executive order for its implementation.
This prompted the Liga to file a petition for certiorari with the SC. Respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and
executive order and prays for the dismissal of the petition on the ff grounds: 1) certiorari under Rule 65 is unavailing; 2) two actions
were pending before the RTC Manila questioning the ordinance and executive order; 3) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; 4) act
sought to be enjoined is fait accompli; and 5) the city council does not fall within the ambit of “tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions”
ISSUE:
WON the City Council of Manila and Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when they enacted and approved the ordinance
purposely to govern the elections of the Manila Chapter of the Liga, and which provides a different manner of electing its officers,
despite the fact that the law mandates such elections to be governed by the Liga Constitution and By-laws
HELD:
The SC ruled that the action, in its essence, seeks to declare the unconstitutionality/illegality of the ordinance. Thus it partakes of an
action for declaratory relief of which the SC has only appellate and not original jurisdiction.
Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken, as according to parties seeking any of the writs, an
absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which the application therefore will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for issuance of extraordinary writs against the first level (inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those against the
latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention, which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prvent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
Forum Shopping; Exists if elements of Litits Pendentia are present. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following
requisites must be present: 1) identity of the parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interest in both actions; 2)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; 3) identity with respect to the @
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. For the Writ of Certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: 1) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 3) there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139791. December 12, 2003]
MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution[2] dated August 5,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504, entitled Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the Philippines. On November 29,
1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention to
purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-
square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price
in the sum of P729,830.00.
Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the
respondent. The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall substantially be completed and delivered to the
respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no substantial
completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall be
charged against (petitioner).
Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to the Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President, Mr. Mario G. Zavalla, informed
respondent of the substantial completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d
etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.
Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew back
to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building administrator advising the latter that
respondent is scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still
unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the
damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
150, Makati City, a complaint against the former for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3440.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and on April 12, 1991,
occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision [3] finding the petitioner liable for payment of damages due to the
delay in the performance of its obligation to the respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering Manila Bankers Life Insurance
Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy Ng Kok Wei the following:
1. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in toto the trial courts award of damages in favor
of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated August 5,
1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case;
and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of
the condominium unit to respondent.
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No.
1344, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)] [4] shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
xxx
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium
units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
x x x.
Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have consistently held that
complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.[5]
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active participation in the proceedings
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings
and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.[6]
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner
confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial
courts jurisdiction.
On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled that
the factual findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[7] Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages as a result
thereof, are indeed factual questions.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by
evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. [8] These exceptions are not present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370. April 25, 2003]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido (Judge Sardido) formerly presiding judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Sardido issued an Order dated 20 October
1998 excluding Judge Braulio Hurtado, Jr. (Judge Hurtado) of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato as one of the
accused in an Amended Information. [1] Judge Sardido ruled that Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 requires that Judge Hurtado be
dropped from the Amended Information and his case be forwarded to the Court.
The Facts
Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of the crime of Falsification by Private
Individual and Use of Falsified Document. [2] The Amended Information included Judge Hurtado. The case, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 14071, was raffled to Judge Sardido, then presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato (MTC-
Koronadal).
In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993, private complainant Magbanua and six other vendors allegedly sold two
parcels of land, covered by TCT Nos. 47873 and 33633 and located at the commercial district of Koronadal, to Davao Realty
Development Corporation, represented by accused Ong, with co-accused Pagunsan, as broker. Judge Hurtado, who at that time was
the Clerk of Court of RTC-Koronadal and ex-officio notary public, notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale.
However, private complainant Magbanua denies signing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993 which states that the
consideration for the sale was only P600,000.00. Private complainant asserts that what she and the other vendors signed was a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 6 August 1996 for a consideration of P16,000,000.00. Under the terms of the sale, the vendee agreed to pay
for the capital gains tax. The consideration in the 8 August 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale was apparently undervalued. Subsequently,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the vendors a deficiency capital gains tax of P1,023,375.00.
Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded to the Supreme Court. Judge
Hurtado claimed that Circular No. 3-89 dated 6 February 1989 requires all cases involving justices and judges of the lower courts,
whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of
immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc. to be forwarded to the Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado asserted that
since the case against him is one involving a judge of a lower court, the same should be forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to
Circular No. 3-89.
The Provincial Prosecutor opposed Judge Hurtados motion, arguing that the case against Judge Hurtado is not within the scope
of Circular No. 3-89 since it is not an IBP-initiated case. Moreover, the offense charged was committed in 1993 when Judge Hurtado
was still a clerk of court and ex-officio notary public.
On 20 October 1998, Judge Sardido issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is, whether the case of Judge Hurtado, who is charged for acts committed prior to his
appointment as an RTC Judge, falls within the purview of the afore-said Circular No. 3-89.
It is the humble submission of the Court that the case of Judge Hurtado, an RTC Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North
Cotabato, falls within the meaning and intent of the said circular.
For reasons being, firstly, the said circular provides that all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts shall be forwarded to
the Supreme Court for appropriate action, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of
their official functions, and regardless of the nature of the crime, without any qualification whether the crime was committed before
or during his tenure of office. Under the law on Legal Hermeneutics, if the law does not qualify we must not qualify. Secondly, it
would sound, to the mind of the Court, awkward for a first level court to be trying an incumbent judge of a second level court.
For reasons afore-stated, this Court can not and shall not try this case as against Judge Hurtado, unless the Honorable Supreme
Court would order otherwise.
Wherefore, the foregoing premises duly considered, the name of Judge Braulio L. Hurtado, Jr. is ordered excluded from the
amended information and the case against him is ordered forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court, pursuant to the afore-said
Circular No. 3-89 of the Supreme Court, dated February 9, 1989.
Accordingly, Maxima S. Borja (Borja), Stenographer I and Acting Clerk of Court II of the MTC-Koronadal, South Cotabato, wrote
a letter dated 21 July 1999 forwarding the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator for appropriate action.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated 25 October 2000 pointing out that Circular No. 3-
89 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular does not apply
to criminal cases filed before trial courts against such justices and judges.
Thus, in the Resolution of 6 December 2000, the Court directed that the letter of Acting Clerk of Court Borja be returned to the
MTC-Koronadal together with the records of the criminal case. The Court directed Judge Sardido to explain in writing why he should
not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended Information and for transmitting the
records of Judge Hurtados case to the Court.
In his Explanation dated 26 January 2001, Judge Sardido reasoned out that he excluded Judge Hurtado because Circular No. 3-
89 directs the IBP to forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts x x
x.Judge Sardido claims that the Circular likewise applies to courts in cases involving justices or judges of the lower courts, especially
so in this case where Judge Hurtado was charged with falsification of public document as a notary public while he was still the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the 11th Judicial Region in Koronadal, South Cotabato.
In the Resolution of 28 March 2001, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation,
report and recommendation. On 10 July 2001, the OCA submitted a Memorandum recommending that this case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter.
Judge Sardido filed his Manifestation dated 20 September 2001 stating that he is submitting the case for decision based on
the pleadings and records already filed. Judge Sardido insisted that he did what he had done in all honesty and good faith.
OCAs Findings and Conclusions
The OCA found that Judge Sardido erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended Information in
Criminal Case No. 14071. The OCA held that Circular No. 3-89, which is Judge Sardidos basis in issuing the Order of 20 October 1998,
refers to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular does not apply to
criminal cases filed against justices and judges of lower courts. The OCA recommended that a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed on Judge
Sardido for gross ignorance of the law.
The Courts Ruling
The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 in response to a letter dated 19 December 1988 by then IBP President Leon M. Garcia,
seeking clarification of the Courts En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1998 in RE: Letter of then Acting Presiding Justice Rodolfo A.
Nocon[3] and Associate Justices Reynato Puno[4] and Alfredo Marigomen[5] of the Court of Appeals.
A certain Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing had filed a complaint against Court of Appeals Justices Nocon, Puno and Marigomen
relating to a petition filed before their division. In its En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988, the Court required the IBP to refer to
the Supreme Court for appropriate action the complaint [6] filed by Atty. Balaoing with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The
Court stated that the power to discipline justices and judges of the lower courts is within the Courts exclusive power and authority
as provided in Section 11, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. [7] The Court Administrator publicized the En Banc Resolution of 29
November 1988 by issuing Circular No. 17 dated 20 December 1988.
The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 on 6 February 1989 clarifying the En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988. Circular No. 3-89
provides in part as follows:
(1) The IBP (Board of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all
cases involving justices and judges of lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the
discharge of their official functions, such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Circular No. 3-89 clarified the second paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states that:
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the
instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service.
(Emphasis supplied).
As clarified, the phrase attorneys x x x in the government service in Section 1 of Rule 139-B does not include justices of appellate
courts and judges of lower courts who are not subject to the disciplining authority of the IBP. All administrative cases against justices
of appellate courts and judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
However, Rule 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys which is administrative and not criminal in nature. The
cases referred to in Circular No. 3-89 are administrative cases for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys, including justices
of appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. The Court has vested the IBP with the power to initiate and prosecute
administrative cases against erring lawyers. [8] However, under Circular No. 3-89, the Court has directed the IBP to refer to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action all administrative cases filed with IBP against justices of appellate courts and judges of the
lower courts. As mandated by the Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive power to discipline administratively justices of
appellate courts and judges of lower courts.
Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. Trial
courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by justices of appellate courts [9] and judges of lower
courts. This is clear from the Circular directing the IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed against justices
of appellate courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an administrative
case filed with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law.
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act and an administrative offense.
Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed before or after he became a judge is of no moment.
Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney or judge
is distinct and separate from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the dismissal of
an administrative case arising from the same set of facts. The quantum of evidence that is required in the latter is only
preponderance of evidence, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in criminal cases.[10] As held in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza:[11]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution
will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the
trial courts finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action
before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two
will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the Courts ruling in In re Almacen,
which we quote:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. He must be
conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth with passion.
[12]
Judge Sardido failed in this regard. He erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended Information and in
forwarding the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court.
One last point. This administrative case against Judge Sardido started before the amendment [13] of Rule 140 classifying gross
ignorance of the law a serious offense punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. The amendment
cannot apply retroactively to Judge Sardidos case. However, the fine of P5,000.00 recommended by the OCA is too light a penalty
considering that this is not the first offense of Judge Sardido.
In RE: Hold Departure Order Issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido,[14] the Court reprimanded Judge Sardido for issuing a hold-
departure order contrary to Circular No. 39-97. In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,[15] the Court fined Judge Sardido P5,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. The Court gave a stern warning to Judge Sardido that a
commission of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. In Almeron v. Judge Sardido,[16] the Court imposed on
Judge Sardido a stiffer fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. He was again sternly warned that the commission of the
same or similar act in the future would be dealt with more severely including, if warranted, his dismissal from the service.
In a more recent administrative case, Torcende v. Judge Sardido,[17] the Court found Judge Sardido again guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and of gross misconduct. This time the Court dismissed Judge Sardido from the service with forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits. The dismissal was with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
The records of the OCA further disclose that Judge Sardido has other similar administrative complaints[18] still pending against
him. Such an unflattering service record erodes the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. It is the duty of every member of
the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary. [19] The Court may still impose a
fine on Judge Sardido in the instant case despite his dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for gross ignorance of the law.
The fine may be deducted from his accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151149. September 7, 2004]
GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial
court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different
grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision [2] and the
November 20, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land in question, it
appears that his action is already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost 23 years from the time the original
certificate of title has been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was certified as
agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment of patents or titles acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the
petitioners action is deemed misplaced as he really does not have any right to assert or protect. What he had during the time he
requested for the re-classification of the land was the privilege of applying for the patent over the same upon the lands conversion
from forest to agricultural.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost.[4]
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTCs
dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and
lack of jurisdiction.
The Antecedent Facts
The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:
On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan,
Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares. Said property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C of
Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582.
Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the
land subject of the petitioners request for eventual conversion or re-classification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for
George Katon to apply for a homestead patent.
Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in
the presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said
survey, there were no actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by petitioner
and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to the island from time to time to undertake
development work, like planting of additional coconut trees.
The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto
Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus
Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.
In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila, that since
the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural land for
disposition under the Public Land Act.
Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and
certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then [l]and investigator of the
District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo
Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On November 22, a second endorsement was issued by Palawan District
Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents consisting of
five (5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey Authority No. R III-342-65 was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor
Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo
Agustin filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares.
Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the
island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8,
1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 [5] with an
area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions
of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for
the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute
and that on or about the time of such request, [R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already occupied their respective
areas and introduced numerous improvements. In addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for
the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the island.
According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents insist that they already had their respective occupancy
and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the petitioner because he said he was acting for
himself in developing his own area and not as anybodys caretaker.
Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said portions for
taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years.
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an action for
reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by
laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The
petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who
requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land. [6]
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they
also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so
he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by
the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated
December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while petitioner
had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under
the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.
The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the State were
matters between the latter and the homestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the grant, the
homesteaders right thereto stands.
Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already
barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent Palancas title had been issued.
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with
petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for
Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five
members with two justices dissenting pursuant to its residual prerogative under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance
of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State
could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of the land to the public domain.
Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. First, petitioners action was brought 24 years
after the issuance of Palancas homestead patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have been taken within ten years
from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the submission (Annex F of the Complaint) of
petitioner himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years
before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period under
Articles 1141 and 1137 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the
Petition?
2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition? [8]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CAs ruling on the merits. He raised it with the
appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November
20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:
Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety,
complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges,
five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand
corrected.[9]
That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CAs Resolution on this point has rendered petitioners issue
moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on
the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion
committed by the trial court in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, [10] more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
Second Issue:
Dismissal for Prescription
and Lack of Jurisdiction
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to
the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It
follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu
proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin[11] we explained thus:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3,
Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the
new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.[12] (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the
notice of appeal in due time.
A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of
the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on
appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal. (Italics supplied)
The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over
the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon
the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. [13] In either
instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under
Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to
dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of
Section 2 of Rule 1[14] of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio on more fundamental
grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction [15] and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action. [16]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought.[17] In his Complaint for Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089
and for Reconveyance of Title,[18] petitioner averred:
2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioners] cousin, in
connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and in bad faith:
2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite to the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name
and that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner] KATON had previously applied or requested for
re-classification and certification of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which request was favorably acted upon and
approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and misrepresentation;
x x x x x x x x x
2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where
there was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud and misrepresentation;
3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the
filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having
been done fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso facto null and void and of no effect whatsoever.[19]
x x x x x x x x x
x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural necessity arise knowing from such act or omission,
[Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and intimacy is guilty of intrinsic
fraud [sic]. x x x.[20]
Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications of Respondents
Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of Respondent Palanca;
and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner.[21]
The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title
or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion?
The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the trial court could have exercised
jurisdiction.
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1)
that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the
defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of ti tle
over the parcel of land claimed by the plainti ff. [22] In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from
the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow ti tle; hence, the issued patent
or certificate of title was void ab initio.[23]
In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the
property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendants
name.[24] As with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title
to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of
the property.[25]Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the
plaintiff the property or the title thereto.[26]
In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in question. On
the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land, [27] that it had never been privately titled in his name, and
that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act. [28] This Court has held that a complaint by a
private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means, and who consequently prays for its
annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be dismissed. [29]
Neither can petitioners case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the
solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. [30] A private person may not bring an action for reversion or
any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the result that the land thereby
covered would again form part of the public domain. [31]
Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the title is
canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party who may bring action is the government, to which the
property will revert.[32] A mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of action in a suit for
reconveyance.[33] As it is, vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by the applicant,
after approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the formers final proof of homestead patent. [34]
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter
absence of a cause of action,[35] a defense raised by respondents in their Answer. [36] Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court[37] ordains that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by which
to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court. [38]
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case
should still be dismissed for being time-barred. [39] It is not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was
issued to Palanca on February 21, 1977,[40] while the Complaint was filed only on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way
past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered
real property.[41]
It must likewise be stressed that Palancas title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the
patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[42] ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead
patent, is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding one year from its issuance; provided, however, that
the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case.
In Aldovino v. Alunan,[43] the Court has held that when the plaintiffs own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed,
such action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,[44] we
also explained thus:
"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or
other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v.
Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such
ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is
found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al.,
97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is
that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record;
either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence."[45] (Italics supplied)
Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must
endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent future litigations. [46]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition
for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on
August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. 6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among
others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction. 7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to
have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified
the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated
and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the Honorable Court
of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not
by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per
hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to
warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per
hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the
legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against
the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the
road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime
charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. 10 In this case, at the time
the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land
Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 11 had already been amended by Republic
Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except
in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses
or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage
to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment
for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs).
Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the
principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on
for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner,
for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time
on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the
bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can
act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa 15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and
indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190
Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is
given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by
the parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the
principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no
bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective
character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In
such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where,
after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that
the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp.
388-389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped
subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.) 18
But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee
therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this
Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960.
Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed
down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment
of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of
the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over ₱200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No.
L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of
plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter’s
jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would
exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of
appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of
attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x 20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour
for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded,
thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in
pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In
the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37
S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not
right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963
(supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting
the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al.,
G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc.
vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of
the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July
19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent
but revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated
invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez, 23 we pointed out that
Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by
estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost
fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the court’s
jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court
accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as
foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., 25 the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant
case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse
judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended
complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after
it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5,
1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking
for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed
its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only
on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the question of
the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics
ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private
respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore,
it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never questioned the trial court’s
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private
respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the
trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus
foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all
stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of
Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction
was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of
jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus,
was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal. 281avvphi1
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:
Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial
had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after
trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart
dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be barred
from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents
the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done
in a trial in which it has actively participated.
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches
may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case.
In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to
exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The
reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses
contained in the answer.30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings by
presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial.
Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already
been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure
or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 32
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy
doctrine to be applicable, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of
jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of
jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have
been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15
years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court
of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final
adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt
of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said
court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show
cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an
active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear
to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. 34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule
enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always
been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since
such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm. 35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it
further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches
has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of
evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. 36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. 37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant
case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from
necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its
favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. 39 Moreover,
a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. 40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies
in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach
when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. 41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v.
Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject
matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by,
any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the
cause of action. x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in
his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the
parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks. 43
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. January 22, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar ** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng
pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is
known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.
[2]
On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). [3]

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. [4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. [5] The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine
Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. [6]

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade
Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. [7] The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and
taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall,
and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said
false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and
benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said
accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. [8] It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes
covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. [10]

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public
officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She
added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of
Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or
that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed
out during a full-blown trial.[13]

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the
general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office,
petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of
public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.[14]

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. [15] It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public
officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in
view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the
primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents,
to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate
powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the
government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with
the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University,
professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of
service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of
trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body
of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a
member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this
Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case. [16]

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. [17] The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated February 4, 2004.[18]

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION. [19]

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that
when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial,
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. [20] Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. [21] The evident reason for this rule is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.[22]

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions,
thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such
a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a
plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense
of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if
the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The
following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of
Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction
over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further
proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue,
this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the
case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash
based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the
criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set
aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24]
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. [25] She repeats the reference in the
instant petition for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of authorities.[27]

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner
repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. [28]

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan
was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain
the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.[29]

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A.
No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintended or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action
had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. [31] Pursuant to Section
10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. [32]

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section
4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on
private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from
any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in
which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or
affinity in the third civil degree. The word close personal relation shall include close personal friendship, social and
fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such
public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of
the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without
regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or
an absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature. [34] The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view. [35] In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a
statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. [36]Optima statuti
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo
na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one
of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January
14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No.
30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No.
69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD
No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated
July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under
the Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
(Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent
parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple
reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the
Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged
for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by
penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be
possible.

Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. [39] The 1987 Constitution does not define who
are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ( [Mechem Public
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.[42]

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying
student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,
[43]
We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.[44]

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a
board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. [45] By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by
P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. [46] At most, it is merely incidental to
the public office.[47]

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. [48]

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional
and technical training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
created for profit.[50]

The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the
offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by
the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. [51] More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by
the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. [52]Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. [53]

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of
U.P., while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on
this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner
insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses
and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case. [54]

A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum,
unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different
from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant
suspension or disbarment.[56]

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should
be characterized by candor and fairness.[57] The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete
candor and honesty before the courts.[58]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON
CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the
Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively, which are being imposed by the respondents.
The Case
On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011,2 or the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be
established for the purpose.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized by the Quezon City Government for the following
projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land development; (d)
construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-private
partnership agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Housing Authority (NHA) with the private sector.3 Under
certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying the special assessment:
SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment tax as imposed by this ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit.
The tax credit may be availed of only after five (5) years of continue[d] payment. Further, the taxpayer availing this tax credit must
be a taxpayer in good standing as certified by the City Treasurer and City Assessor.
The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner, which
shall be given as follows:
1.� 6th year� -�� 20%
2.� 7th year� -�� 20%
3.� 8th year� -�� 20%
4.� 9th year� -�� 20%
5.� 10th year� -�� 20%

Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be continued by the subsequent property owners
even if they are buyers in good faith, heirs or possessor of a right in whatever legal capacity over the subject property. 4
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took effect ten days after when it was
approved by respondent City Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited
solely and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. 7 Section 1 of the
Ordinance set forth the schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:
SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in relation to Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND MANNER FOR THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF
GARBAGE FEES, AS FOLLOWS:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
201 sq. m. � 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. � 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. � 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
1,501 sq. m. � 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00
41 sq. m. � 60 sq. m. PHP50.00
61 sq. m. � 100 sq. m. PHP75.00
101 sq. m. � 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
151 sq. m. � 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium � The Homeowners Association of high- rise condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the
total size of the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be collected based on
area occupied for every unit already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units � Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the
entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the
real property tax, but not later than the first quarter installment. 8 In case a household owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the
garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof, shall be charged. 9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in Quezon City which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage
fee in the sum of Php100.00.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February 5, 2014, which enjoined the enforcement of
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and required respondents to comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course
thereto.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents filed their Comment12 with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on February 17, 2014. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply
and a Memorandum on March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014, respectively.
Procedural Matters
A.� Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they are not tribunals, boards or officers exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon
City Council exercised quasi-judicial function because the ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the SHT and
the garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic essential public services that they should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65
petition is improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases like in Rosario v. Court of Appeals,13 has taken
cognizance of an improper remedy in the interest of justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogatives.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights
of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is �a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers
or bodies � required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.�
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to
some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties.14
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the assailed ordinances was done in
the exercise of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city.15 Said law likewise is
specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge, or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of
the local government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance. 16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and
illegality of the questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus, over which We exercise original
jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching implications or one which raises transcendental issues or questions that need to be resolved
for the public good.18 The judicial policy is that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress sought cannot be
obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of Our primary jurisdiction.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a petition for prohibition may be filed:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person � whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions � who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that
judgment be rendered, commanding the respondents to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the
petition. In this case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent respondents from implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-
2235. Obviously, the writ being sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are performing ministerialfunctions. A ministerial
function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard
for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. 20 Respondent Mayor, as chief
executive of the city government, exercises such powers and performs such duties and functions as provided for by the LGC and
other laws.21 Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are collected, and that city funds are
applied to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance. 22 On the other
hand, under the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or
their duly-authorized deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among others, of ensuring that all laws and policies governing
the appraisal and assessment of real properties for taxation purposes are properly executed. 23Anent the SHT, the Department of
Finance (DOF) Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more specific:
6.3 The Assessor�s office of the Id.ntified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its jurisdiction which shall be subject to the levy of the Social
Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands and registered owners shall
also be posted in 3 conspicuous places in the city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurer�s office and the local sanggunian concerned of the list of lands affected;
6.4 The Treasurer�s office shall:
a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property Tax, SEF Tax and other special assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government Finance, and the Mayor�s office the monthly collections
on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An annual report should likewise be submitted to the HUDCC on the total revenues
raised during the year pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the manner in which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to Us should be allowed. Aside from presenting a
novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances adversely affect the property
interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test case for the guidance of other local
government units (LGUs). Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim,24 the Court cited the case of Senator Jaworski v. Phil.
Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. x x x This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. 26
B.� Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioner�s legal standing to file this case on the ground that, in relation to Section 3 of Ordinance No. SP-
2095, petitioner failed to allege his ownership of a property that has an assessed value of more than Php100,000.00 and, with
respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what standing or personality he filed the case to nullify the same. According to respondents,
the petition is not a class suit, and that, for not having specifically alleged that petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer, it could only be
surmised whether he is a party-in-interest who stands to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a
real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought
to be enforced."27
�Legal standing� or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. 28 The concept has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged.29 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show �not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.� It must be shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained
of.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file the petition. He is a real party-in-interest to assail the
constitutionality and legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 because respondents did not dispute that he is a registered co-
owner of a residential property in Quezon City and that he paid property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage fee. He
has substantial right to seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future imposition. While he is a lone petitioner, his cause
of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial and of paramount interest to similarly situated property
owners in Quezon City.
C.� Litis Pendentia
Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis pendentia. They claim that, as early as February 22, 2012, a
case entitled Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Herbert Bautista, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-7-820,
has been pending in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, which assails the legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095. Relying
on City of Makati, et al. v. Municipality (now City) of Taguig, et al.,32 respondents assert that there is substantial identity of parties
between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the civil case filed their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon
City.
For petitioner, however, respondents� contention is untenable since he is not a party in Alliance and does not even have the
remotest identity or association with the plaintiffs in said civil case. Moreover, respondents� arguments would deprive this Court of
its jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means �a pending suit� and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis
pendens and auter action pendant.34 While it is normally connected with the control which the court has on a property involved in a
suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in
court.35 In Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We elucidated:
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against
multiplicity of suit and authorizes a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.
xxxx
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentiaare: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such
as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.
xxxx
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not
be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether
the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case
may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis pendentia is inextricably linked with that
of res judicata, each constituting an element of the other. In either case, both relate to the sound practice of including, in a single
litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to a cause of action that is before a court. 37
There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the
second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 38 Moreover, the fact that the positions of the parties are
reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice-versa, does not negate the identity of
parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading connected with the alleged civil case pending before the
Quezon City trial court. Granting that there is substantial identity of parties between said case and this petition, dismissal on the
ground of litis pendentia still cannot be had in view of the absence of the second and third requisites. There is no way for Us to
determine whether both cases are based on the same set of facts that require the presentation of the same evidence. Even if
founded on the same set of facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be different. Moreover, there is no basis to rule
that the two cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in one,
regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his non-compliance with Section 187 of the LGC,
which mandates:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. � The
procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code:
Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any
question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the
accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim,40 has been construed as mandatory41 considering that �
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to
raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently,
any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax
ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. x x x. 42
The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market Vendor Asso. v. Municipality of
Hagonoy:43cralawlawlibrary
x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a �mere technicality�
that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory. x x x Being its
lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and
provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity
of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved
party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.�44
Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones,45 held that there was no need for petitioners therein to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts, considering that there was only a pure question of law, the parties did not
dispute any factual matter on which they had to present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v. City of
Cagayan de Oro,46We relaxed the application of the rules in view of the more substantive matters. For the same reasons, this
petition is an exception to the general rule.
Substantive Issues
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of garbage are basic and essential
duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage fee, the latter has shown a penchant and
pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land,
business, transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) from the National Government. For petitioner, it
is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon City Government is in dire financial state and desperately
needs money to fund housing for informal settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue
collection in 2012 is in the sum of P13.69 billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the Quezon City Government as an exercise of its
power to create sources of income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. 47 According to petitioner, the constitutional
provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself
admits of guidelines and limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the assessed value of the property, which
is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the property. The SHT and the
garbage fee are actually increases in the property tax which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its reassessment
every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC. 48ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235,
invoking Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49People v. Siton, et al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-
Delorino.51 They argue that the burden of establishing the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party challenging its
constitutionality. They insist that the questioned ordinances are proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. & Broadcast
Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.53 and that their enactment finds basis in
the social justice principle enshrined in Section 9, 54 Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character, citing Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of Education, et
al.55 and Askay v. Cosalan.56 Thus, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became
effective after its approval on December 26, 2013.
Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:

On the Socialized Housing Tax
Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle found in Sections 1 and 2, Article XIII 57 of the 1987
Constitution and Sections 2 (a)58 and 4359 of R.A. No. 7279, or the �Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA).
Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente,60 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias,
etc.,61 respondents assert that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real property owners without discrimination. There is no
way that the ordinance could violate the equal protection clause because real property owners and informal settlers do not belong
to the same class.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA. While the law authorizes
LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers properties
with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6 th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount to a penalty imposed on real property owners due to
the failure of respondent Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform their duty to secure and protect real property owners from
informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the expenses to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be viewed
as a �charity� from real property owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class legislation that violates the right of property owners to equal
protection of the laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy property not their own and pay no taxes over law-abiding real
property owners who pay income and realty taxes.
Petitioner further contends that respondents� characterization of the SHT as �nothing more than an advance payment on the real
property tax� has no statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be collected before it is due because, under the LGC, chartered
cities are authorized to impose property tax based on the assessed value and the general revision of assessment that is made every
three (3) years.
As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was based on Section 43 of the UDHA, petitioner asserts
that there is no specific provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social
function. And even if there is, it is seriously doubtful and far-fetched that the principle means that property owners should provide
funds for the housing of informal settlers and for home site development. Social justice and police power, petitioner believes, does
not mean imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for the benefit of another. At best, the principle that
property ownership and enjoyment bear a social function is but a reiteration of the Civil Law principle that property should not be
enjoyed and abused to the injury of other properties and the community, and that the use of the property may be restricted by
police power, the exercise of which is not involved in this case.
Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected. Bistek is the monicker of respondent City
Mayor. The Bistekvilles makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will take the credit for the tax imposed on real property owners.
On the Garbage Fee
Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police power, collects on the average from every household a
garbage fee in the meager amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per day compared with the sum of P1,659.83 that the Quezon City
Government annually spends for every household for garbage collection and waste management. 62ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee. Even assuming that the garbage fee is a tax, the same
cannot be a direct duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different subject matter and is of a different kind or character. Based
on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo63 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,64 there is no �taxing twice�
because the real property tax is imposed on ownership based on its assessed value, while the garbage fee is required on the
domestic household. The only reference to the property is the determination of the applicable rate and the facility of collection.
Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an exercise of police power. The cases of Calalang v.
Williams,65Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,66 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.,67 which were cited by
respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed ordinance is a revenue measure and does not regulate the disposal or other aspect
of garbage.
The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee only from domestic households and not from
restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more than residential
property owners.
Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double taxation because garbage collection is a
basic and essential public service that should be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community
tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the revenue collection of
the Quezon City Government reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A small portion of said amount could be spent for garbage collection
and other essential services.
It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 68 of R.A. No. 9003, or
the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of
preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan, and that LGUs have access to the Solid Waste Management
(SWM) Fund created under Section 4669 of the same law. Also, according to petitioner, it is evident that Ordinance No. S-2235 is
inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003 for while the law encourages segregation, composting, and recycling of waste, the ordinance only
emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee; while the law calls for an active involvement of the barangay in the
collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such mandate.
Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its
approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage fee.
The Court�s Ruling
Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open to judicial inquiry. Much
should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless
the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained
acceptance is that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made
subject to imposition.70
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the
Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable. 71 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the
formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with
the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy).72ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. 73 If not, it is
void.74 Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. 75 As to conformity with existing
statutes, Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals76 has this to say:
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in
conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently
expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the
spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there
is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.),
this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the
first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless
there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not
prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it,
the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.77
LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was
never intended by the drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political
subdivision independent of a single sovereign state. 78 �[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only
as local units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal
corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs
of the entire state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was
granted.�79ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature; they are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. 80�Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the
delegation to the various LGUs of the State�s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the
power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in
the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the
constitutional and statutory limitations.�81ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues in
financing and supporting myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general
welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. 82 As this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City
of Cabanatuan:83cralawlawlibrary
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to
realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as
public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to
levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
�Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such
taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.�
This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy
and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country�s highly centralized government structure has bred a
culture of dependence among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also �dampened the spirit of initiative,
innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders.� The only way to
shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient
powers to generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates
Congress to enact a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, set the guidelines and
limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x 84
Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet 85 that:
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is summarized in Icard v. City Council of
Baguio:
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be
construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against
the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions � all these � have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a
municipal corporation. [Underscoring supplied]
xxxx
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, �the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative
bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges.� Nevertheless, such authority is �subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.�
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters. 86
Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic
law or by the statute.87 �Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax
power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the
current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad
tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional
objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the
legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions;
(b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be
unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.�88ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and
authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local
government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or
furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions. 89 The relevant provisions of the LGC which establish the
parameters of the taxing power of the LGUs are as follows:
SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. � The following fundamental principles shall govern the exercise of the taxing and other
revenue-raising powers of local government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer�s ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition
by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and,
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. � Unless otherwise provided herein, the
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges
and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions
of local government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any
form whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four
(4) years, respectively from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as
otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by
hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving
thereof, except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810
and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938) otherwise known as the �Cooperative Code of the
Philippines� respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. � Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges
which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly
urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more than
fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.
SECTION 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. � Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or
charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or
charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Contrary to petitioner�s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a social
function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. 90 The Court already recognized this in Social Justice
Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:91cralawlawlibrary
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also a social function insofar
as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society. The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. 92
Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law), is
the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. 93 Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. 94 In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that
taxation may be made the implement of the state�s police power.95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of
Php100,000.00. This special assessment is the same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or the UDHA. 96 The SHT is one of the sources of
funds for urban development and housing program. 97Section 43 of the law provides:
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax. � Consistent with the constitutional principle that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a
social function and to raise funds for the Program, all local government units are hereby authorized to impose an additional one-half
percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City Government with sufficient funds to initiate, implement
and undertake Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary activities;
WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing Programs and Projects of the City Government, specifically
the marginalized sector through the acquisition of properties for human settlements;
WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market value of properties in the city[.]
The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their respective localities in
coordination with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the national housing agencies, the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other non-government organizations. 98 It is the declared policy of the State
to undertake a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program that shall, among others, uplift the
conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in resettlement areas, and provide for the rational use
and development of urban land in order to bring about, among others, reduction in urban dysfunctions, particularly those that
adversely affect public health, safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless
citizens.99 Urban renewal and resettlement shall include the rehabilitation and development of blighted and slum areas 100 and the
resettlement of program beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of the UDHA. 101ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the UDHA, socialized housing102 shall be the primary strategy in providing shelter for the underprivileged and homeless. 103 The
LGU or the NHA, in cooperation with the private developers and concerned agencies, shall provide socialized housing or
resettlement areas with basic services and facilities such as potable water, power and electricity, and an adequate power
distribution system, sewerage facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal system; and access to primary roads and
transportation facilities.104 The provisions for health, education, communications, security, recreation, relief and welfare shall also be
planned and be given priority for implementation by the LGU and concerned agencies in cooperation with the private sector and the
beneficiaries themselves.105ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in coordination with the NHA, are directed to implement the
relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places like sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. 106 In coordination with the NHA, the LGUs shall
provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities
sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families. 107ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Aside from the specific
authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. 108 The collections made accrue
to its socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied
with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is
greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless
constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the
poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations and is subject to the requirement that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.109 In the words of City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.:110cralawlawlibrary
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to
due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
xxxx
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights �
a violation of the due process clause.111
As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject and a
lawful method or, to be precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.112ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real property owners because it burdens them with expenses to
provide funds for the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors the latter who occupy properties
which is not their own and pay no taxes.
We disagree.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.113 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 114 Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. 115 The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently
from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from
another.116ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class.117ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program, the disparities between
a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The
differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the
tax was to favor one over another.118 It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of
taxation.119 Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.120ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being
imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. As pointed out by respondents, while the law authorizes LGUs to collect
SHT on lands with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value
exceeding P100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject
ordinance are fair and just.
On the Garbage Fee
In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to regulate garbage falls within its police power
to protect public health, safety, and welfare.121 As opined, the purposes and policy underpinnings of the police power to regulate the
collection and disposal of solid waste are: (1) to preserve and protect the public health and welfare as well as the environment by
minimizing or eliminating a source of disease and preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to defray costs and ensure financial
stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with the sum of all charges marshalled and designed to pay for the
expense of a systemic refuse disposal scheme.122ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of validity. 123 Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of U.S.
cases addressing a city's authority to impose mandatory garbage service and fees have upheld the ordinances against constitutional
and statutory challenges.124ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage within its corporate limits. 125 The LGC
specifically assigns the responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid waste to local governing bodies because the Legislature
determined that such bodies were in the best position to develop efficient waste management programs. 126 To impose on local
governments the responsibility to regulate solid waste but not grant them the authority necessary to fulfill the same would lead to
an absurd result.�127 As held in one U.S. case:
x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject matter, the manner and means of exercising those
powers, where not specifically prescribed by the legislature, are left to the discretion of the municipal authorities. x x x Leaving the
manner of exercising municipal powers to the discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of reasonableness within which a
municipality's exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary." 128
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers under Section 22 of the
same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. 129 Section 16 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. � Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs. 130 The provisions related
thereto are liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of
life for the people in the community. 131Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests
of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests since the Sanggunian is in the best
position to determine the needs of its constituents. 132ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of the LGC and national policies, the LGUs shall
share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their
territorial jurisdiction.133 In this regard, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
which include, among others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities related to
general hygiene and sanitation.134 R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,135 affirms this authority as it
expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions within their
respective jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative effort among the national government, other local government units, non-
government organizations, and the private sector. 136ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services
rendered.137 �Charges� refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while �Fee� means a charge
fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity. 138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. The basis for
this could be discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in terms of population and urban geographical areas,
apart from being competent and efficient in the delivery of public service, apparently requires a big budgetary allocation in order to
address the problems relative and connected to the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services such as the effective system of
waste management, public information programs on proper garbage and proper waste disposal, including the imposition of waste
regulatory measures;
WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city�s waste management system, the City Government through
the Sangguniang Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of reasonable fees or charges for the garbage collection
services for residential (domestic household) that it renders to the public.
Certainly, as opposed to petitioner�s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar,
Batangas,139 the Court had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts:
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that �if the generating of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally
revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax.�
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect of the imposition determine
whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the imposition is properly a
license tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may be apparent from the
provisions of the ordinance. Thus, �[w]hen no police inspection, supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the
applicant to establish, or that he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business designated, without
qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no
prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and
licensee, the presumption is strong that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is being exercised.�
In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been consistently treated as a fee and not a tax. 140 In another
U.S. case,141 the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given by the
city which had previously been provided at no cost to its citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double
taxation142 must necessarily fail.
Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal corporation, it must be reasonably
commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service. 143 To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce revenue in
excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the
regulation exceeds the cost of the regulation.144ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, which authorizes
LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management
plan, and that it has access to the SWM Fund under Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with
R.A. No. 9003, because the ordinance emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee with no concern for segregation,
composting and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law calling for the active involvement of the barangay in the
collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage.
We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.
Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste
management program which shall, among others, ensure the proper segregation, collection, transport, storage, treatment and
disposal of solid waste through the formulation and adoption of the best environmental practices in ecological waste
management.145 The law provides that segregation and collection of solid waste shall be conducted at the barangay level, specifically
for biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the
responsibility of the municipality or city. 146 Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily be conducted at the source, to
include household, institutional, industrial, commercial and agricultural sources. 147Segregation at source refers to a solid waste
management practice of separating, at the point of origin, different materials found in solid waste in order to promote recycling and
re-use of resources and to reduce the volume of waste for collection and disposal. 148 Based on Rule XVII of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001, 149 which is the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9003, barangays shall be responsible for the collection, segregation, and recycling of
biodegradable, recyclable, compostable and reusable wastes. 150 For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), which shall
receive biodegradable wastes for composting and mixed non-biodegradable wastes for final segregation, re-use and recycling, is to
be established in every barangay or cluster of barangays. 151ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board, is mandated by law to prepare a 10-year solid
waste management plan consistent with the National Solid Waste Management Framework. 152 The plan shall be for the re-use,
recycling and composting of wastes generated in its jurisdiction; ensure the efficient management of solid waste generated within its
jurisdiction; and place primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling, and composting programs while
identifying the amount of landfill and transformation capacity that will be needed for solid waste which cannot be re-used, recycled,
or composted.153 One of the components of the solid waste management plan is source reduction:
(e) Source reduction � The source reduction component shall include a program and implementation schedule which shows the
methods by which the LGU will, in combination with the recycling and composting components, reduce a sufficient amount of solid
waste disposed of in accordance with the diversion requirements of Section 20.
The source reduction component shall describe the following:

(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;
(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary to carry out such activities;
(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be considered, provided that such technologies conform with the
standards set pursuant to this Act;
(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;
(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid wastes to be diverted from disposal at a disposal facility
through re-use, recycling and composting; and
(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to implement re-use, recycling and composting.
The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and identification of rate structures and fees for the purpose of
reducing the amount of waste generated, and other source reduction strategies, including but not limited to, programs and
economic incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this Act to reduce the use of non-recyclable materials, replace disposable materials
and products with reusable materials and products, reduce packaging, and increase the efficiency of the use of paper, cardboard,
glass, metal, and other materials. The waste reduction activities of the community shall also take into account, among others, local
capability, economic viability, technical requirements, social concerns, disposition of residual waste and environmental impact:
Provided, That, projection of future facilities needed and estimated cost shall be incorporated in the plan. x x x 154
The solid waste management plan shall also include an implementation schedule for solid waste diversion:
SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. � Each LGU plan shall include an implementation schedule which shows that
within five (5) years after the effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid waste from waste disposal facilities
through re-use, recycling, and composting activities and other resource recovery activities: Provided, That the waste diversion goals
shall be increased every three (3) years thereafter: Provided, further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a local government unit
from implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to exceed the goal.
The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste characterization result 155that each LGU is mandated
to undertake.156ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail of the SWM Fund on the basis of their approved solid
waste management plan. Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees under Section 47 of the law, which states:
SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees � The local government unit shall impose fees in amounts sufficient to
pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan prepared pursuant to this Act. The fees shall
be based on the following minimum factors:
(a) types of solid waste;
(b) amount/volume of waste; and
(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting the local fees. In determining the amounts of the fees,
an LGU shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the plan and the setting and collection
of the local fees.
Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:
Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees. � The Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall impose fees on
the SWM services provided for by the LGU and/or any authorized organization or unit. In determining the amounts of the fees, a
Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the
SWM Plan and the setting and collection of the local fees. This power to impose fees may be ceded to the private sector and civil
society groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be
covered by a Contract or Memorandum of Agreement between the respective board and the private sector or civil society group.
The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM Plan prepared pursuant to the Act. Further, the fees
shall also be used to pay the actual costs incurred in collecting the local fees and for project sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees
Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the following minimum factors:
a) Types of solid waste to include special waste
b) amount/volume of waste
c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility
d) capacity or type of LGU constituency
e) cost of construction
f) cost of management
g) type of technology
Section 3. Collection of Fees. � Fees may be collected corresponding to the following levels:
a) Barangay � The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes
from households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of Barangay MRFs. The computation of the fees shall
be established by the respective SWM boards. The manner of collection of the fees shall be dependent on the style of administration
of respective Barangay Councils. However, all transactions shall follow the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.
b) Municipality � The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the barangay MRFs for the collection and transport of non-
recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. The level and procedure for exacting fees shall
be defined by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board and supported by LGU ordinances, however, payments shall be
consistent with the accounting system of government.
c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group � On the basis of the stipulations of contract or Memorandum of Agreement, the private
sector or civil society group shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping in their SLFs. Receipts and invoices shall be issued
to the paying public or to the government.
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the other hand,
have the authority to impose fees for the collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from
households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This is but consistent with Section 10
of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes shall be conducted at
the barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality
or city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage fee is the volume of waste currently generated by
each person in Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of waste generation for the
past three years.157 Respondents did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes
generated � whether residential, market, commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agro-
industrial, institutional, etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount pertains to the totality of wastes,
without any distinction, generated by Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the authority of a municipality or city to
impose fees extends only to those related to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers only to non-recyclable and special wastes,
still, We cannot sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the
provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer�s ability to pay, and not
unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.158ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot,
condominium, social housing project or apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is again quoted below:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;
LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
201 sq. m. � 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. � 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. � 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
1,501 sq. m. � 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00
41 sq. m. � 60 sq. m. PHP50.00
61 sq. m. � 100 sq. m. PHP75.00
101 sq. m. � 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
151 sq. m. � 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium � The Homeowners Association of high rise condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the
total size of the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be collected based on
area occupied for every unit already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units � Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the
entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an
occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output
produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.159ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized
housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with
an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of �promoting shared responsibility
with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in generating
waste.�160 Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of
wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age and size, accessibility to
waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003
may also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, SWM service fees may be computed based on minimum factors such as types
of solid waste to include special waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility,
capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction, cost of management, and type of technology. With respect to utility rates
set by municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under reasonable classifications based upon factors such as
the cost of service, the purpose for which the service or the product is received, the quantity or the amount received, the different
character of the service furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of
distinction.161cralawlawlibrary
[A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The establishment of classifications and the
charging of different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable and does not violate the requirements of equality and
uniformity. Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those in like circumstances
having equal rights and privileges. Discrimination with respect to rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a
reasonable fact basis or justification.162
On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-2235, which states:
SECTION 3. Penalty Clause � A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof
(interest) shall be charged against a household owner who refuses to pay the garbage fee herein imposed.
lacks the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which provides:
SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges. � The sanggunian may impose a surcharge not
exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and an interest at the rate not exceeding two
percent (2%) per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case shall
the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.
Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes
that he paid his realty tax on January 7, 2014 which already included the garbage fee. Respondents counter that if the law provides
for its own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly, Ordinance No.
SP-2095 took effect after its publication while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its approval on December 26, 2013.
The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:

SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. � (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the
local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof
is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in
at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the
entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local
government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language or dialect
understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record
such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where
the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of
such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted
or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city:
Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. � Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true
copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive
days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no
newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places. (Emphasis
supplied)
On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, which provides that it would take effect after
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 163 On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, which was passed by the City
Council on December 16, 2013, provides that it would be effective upon its approval. 164 Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on
December 26, 2013, respondent City Mayor approved the same. 165ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner�s negative allegation that respondents did not comply with the
posting and publication requirements of the law. Thus, We are constrained not to give credit to his unsupported claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the
�Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City,� is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7279. On the other
hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money
collected relative to its enforcement.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2095. In
contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibra
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192463, July 13, 2015
OMAIRA LOMONDOT AND SARIPA LOMONDOT, Petitioners, v. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, PRESIDING JUDGE, SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURT, 4TH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LANAO DEL SUR AND AMBOG PANGANDAMUN AND SIMBANATAO
DIACA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of demolition seeking to annul the Order 1 dated November
9, 2009 of the Shari'a District Court (SDC), Fourth Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi City, issued in Civil Case No. 055-91, denying
petitioners' motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, and the Orders 2 dated January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010 denying
petitioners' first and second motions for reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
On August 16, 1991, petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC, Marawi City, a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order against respondents Ambog Pangandamun
(Pangandamun) and Simbanatao Diaca (Diaca). Petitioners claimed that they are the owners by succession of a parcel of land located
at Bangon, Marawi City, consisting an area of about 800 sq. meters; that respondent Pangandamun illegally entered and encroached
100 sq. meter of their land, while respondent Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters, as indicated in Exhibits �A� and �K� submitted as
evidence. Respondents filed their Answer arguing that they are the owners of the land alleged to be illegally occupied. Trial
thereafter ensued.
On January 31, 2005, the SDC rendered a Decision, 3 the dispositive portion of which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. DECLARING plaintiffs owners of the 800 square meter land borrowed and turned over by BPI and described in the complaint and
Exhibits �A� and �K�;
2. ORDERING defendants to VACATE the portions or areas they illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits �A� and �K� and to
REMOVE whatever improvements thereat introduced;
3. ORDERING defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs (a) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (b) P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (C) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED 4
Respondents filed an appeal5 with us and petitioners were required to file their Comment thereto. In a Resolution 6 dated March 28,
2007, we dismissed the petition for failure of respondents to sufficiently show that a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
SDC as the decision was in accord with the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondents' motion for reconsideration
was denied with finality on September 17, 2007.7 The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 became final and executory on October
31, 2007 and an entry of judgment8 was subsequently made.
Petitioners filed a motion9 for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a writ of demolition.
On February 7, 2008, the SDC granted the motion 10 for a writ of execution and the writ was issued with the following
fallo:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid judgment. If defendants do not vacate the
premises and remove the improvements, you must secure a special order of the court to destroy, demolish or remove the
improvements on the property. The total amount awarded to and demanded by the prevailing party is P150,000.00 (damages,
attorney's fees and the cost) which defendants must satisfy, pursuant to Section 8 (d) and (e), Rule 39, Rules of Court. 11
The Sheriff then sent a demand letter12 to respondents for their compliance.
On February 3, 2009, petitioners filed a Motion 13 for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition to implement the SDC Decision dated
January 31, 2005. The motion was set for hearing.
On March 4, 2009, the SDC issued an Order14 reading as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The plaintiffs, the prevailing party, filed a Motion for Writ of Demolition and the motion was set for hearing on February 16, 2009.
On this date, the plaintiffs, without counsel, appeared. The defendants failed to appear. Thus, the court issued an order submitting
the motion for resolution.
Resolution of the motion for issuance of a Writ of Demolition should be held in abeyance. First, defendant Ambog Pangandamun has
filed on February 6, 2009 an Urgent Manifestation praying deferment of the hearing on the motion for writ of execution. Second,
Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro filed on February 13, 2009 a Notice of Appearance with Motion to Postpone the hearing set on February 16,
2009 to study the records of the case as the records are not yet in his possession. Third, the recent periodic report dated January 26,
2009 of the Sheriff shows Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is negotiating the parties whereby the defendant Ambog Pangandamun will
be made to pay the five (5)-meter land of the plaintiffs encroached by him and that what remains to be ironed out is the fixing of the
amount.
WHEREFORE, the resolution on the Motion for Writ of Demolition is HELD IN ABEYANCE. The Sheriff is DIRECTED to exert efforts to
bring the parties back to the negotiating table seeing to it that Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is involved in the negotiation. Atty. Saro
is REQUIRED to file his comment on the motion for writ of execution within fifteen (15) days from notice to guide the court in
resolving the incident in the event the negotiation fails.
SO ORDERED.15
On May 5, 2009, the SDC issued another Order16 which held in abeyance the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of
demolition and granted an ocular inspection or actual measurement of petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land.
The SDC issued another Order17 dated May 14, 2009, which stated, among others, that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
While the decision has become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are instances when a Writ of
Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that prevents the Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution.
The defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of Execution and their buildings are
not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs. This to the Court is the supervening event, thus the order granting the request of Atty.
Jimmy Saro, counsel for the defendants, to conduct a survey to determine whether there is encroachment or not. Thus, the Order
dated May 5, 2009.
Wherefore, Engr. Hakim Laut Balt is hereby commissioned to conduct a survey of the 800 square meters claimed by the plaintiffs.
Said Eng. Balt is given a period of one (1) month from notice within which to conduct the survey in the presence of the parties. 18
On November 9, 2009, the SDC issued the assailed Order 19 denying petitioners' motion for demolition. The Order reads in
full:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It was on February 3, 2009 that the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Demolition. The defendants filed their comment
thereto on March 24, 2009. They prayed that an ocular inspection and/or actual measurement of the 800 square meter land of the
plaintiffs be made which the court granted, in the greater interest of justice, considering that defendants claimed to have complied
with the writ of execution, hence there is no more encroachment of plaintiffs� land.
The intercession of concerned leaders to effect amicable settlement and the order to conduct a survey justified the holding in
abeyance of the resolution of the pending incident, motion for writ of demolition.
After attempts for settlement failed and after the commissioned Geodetic Engineer to conduct the needed survey asked for relief,
plaintiffs asked anew for a writ of demolition. Defendants opposed the grant of the motion, alleging compliance with the writ of
execution, and prayed for appointment of another Geodetic Engineer to conduct a survey and actual measurement of plaintiffs' 800
square meter land.
At this point in time, the court cannot issue a special order to destroy, demolish or remove defendants' houses, considering their
claim that they no longer encroach any portion of plaintiffs� land.
Gleaned from Engineer Hakim Laut Balt's Narrative Report, he could have conducted the required survey had not the plaintiffs
dictated him where to start the survey.
WHERFORE, the motion for issuance of a writ of demolition is DENIED. A survey is still the best way to find out if indeed defendants'
houses are within plaintiffs' 800 square meter land. Parties are, therefore, directed to choose and submit to the court their preferred
Geodetic Engineer to conduct the survey within ten (10) days from notice. 20
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which the SDC denied in an Order 21 dated January 5, 2010 saying that the motion
failed to state the timeliness of the filing of said motion and failed to comply with the requirements of notice of hearing. Petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration was also denied in an Order 22 dated February 10, 2010. The SDC directed the parties to choose
and submit their preferred Geodetic Engineer to conduct the survey within 15 days from notice.
Undaunted, petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan de Oro City a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders issued by the SDC on
November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010.
In a Resolution23 dated April 27, 2010, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, saying, among others,
that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In pursuing the creation of Shari'a Appellate Court, the Supreme Court En Banc even approved A.M. No. 99-4-06, otherwise known
as Resolution Authorizing the Organization of the Shari'a Appellate Court.
However, the Shari'a Appellate Court has not yet been organized until the present. We, on our part, therefore, cannot take
cognizance of the instant case because it emanates from the Shari'a Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or tribunals
enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of [Batas] Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended over which We can exercise appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, the instant Petition should be filed directly with the Supreme Court. 24
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari assailing the SDC Orders, invoking the following grounds:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
RESPONDENT JUDGE, HONORABLE RASAD G. BALINDONG, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF DEMOLITION AFTER THE
WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE COURT COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AND INSTEAD DIRECT THE CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY.
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING IT APPEAR THAT HE WAS IN COURT AT HIS SALA
IN MARAWI CITY LAST JANUARY 28, 2010 WHEN THE PARTIES WERE PRESENT AND HE WAS NOT THERE. 25
Preliminarily, we would deal with a procedural matter. Petitioners, after receipt of the SDC Order denying their second motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying their motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction in a Resolution dated April 27, 2010 saying that, under RA 9054, it is the
Shari�a Appellate Court (SAC) which shall exercise jurisdiction over petition for certiorari; that, however, since SAC has not yet been
organized, it cannot take cognizance of the case as it emanates from the Shari�a Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or
tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended, over which it can exercise appellate
jurisdiction.
Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled, "An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as amended", the Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of
the Shari'a District Courts. In Villagracia v. Fifth (5th) Shari�a District Court,26 we said:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x We call for the organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system � a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial, political,
international, and religious laws � is part of the law of the land, and Shari�a courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.
The Shari�a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the
Shari�a District Courts. It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus,
and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.The decisions of the Shari�a Appellate Court shall be final
and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this court. 27
and
In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong,28 we stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x [t]he Shari�a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices.
Until such time that the Shari�a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or
decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably
composed of Muslim CA Justices.29
Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was rendered on April 27, 2010. The CA's reason for
dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision came from SDC which the CA has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to follow
the Tomawis ruling. However, we need not remand the case, as we have, on several occasions, 30 passed upon and resolved petitions
and cases emanating from Shari�a courts.
Petitioners contend that their land was specific and shown by the areas drawn in Exhibits �A� and �K� and by oral and
documentary evidence on record showing that respondents have occupied portions of their land, i.e., respondent Pangandamun's
house encroached a 100 sq. meter portion, while respondent Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters; and that the SDC had rendered a
decision ordering respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits �A� and �K�
and to remove whatever improvements thereat introduced. Such decision had already attained finality and a corresponding entry of
judgment had been made and a writ of execution was issued. Petitioners' claim that the SDC's order for a conduct of a survey to
determine whether respondents' land are within petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land would, in effect, be amending a final and executory
decision.
Only respondent Pangandamun filed his Comment, arguing that petitioners' motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition has no
factual and legal basis because his houses are clearly outside the 800-sq.-meter land of petitioners; that his house had been
constructed in 1964 within full view of the petitioners but none of them ever questioned the same.
We find for the petitioners.
The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally encroached as
indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to remove whatever improvements thereat introduced. Thus, petitioners had established that
they are recovering possession of 100 sq. meters of their land which was occupied by respondent Pangandamun's house as indicated
in Exhibit "K-1", and 200 sq. meter portion being occupied by Diaca as indicated in Exhibit "K-2". Such decision had become final and
executory after we affirmed the same and an entry of judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or amended.
In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr.,31 we explained the concept of a final and executory judgment, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This is
the doctrine of finality of judgment. It is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk
of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there will
be no end to litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. 32
However, the SDC later found that while the decision has become final and executory and a writ of execution has been issued, there
are instances when a writ of execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that prevents the sheriff to execute
the writ of execution. It found that respondents' claim that their buildings are not within the area claimed by petitioners is a
supervening event and ordered a survey of the land, hence, denied the motion for a writ of demolition.
We do not agree.
It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, and one of
which is a supervening event.
In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or
relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts
that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained
finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in
existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of
execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening
event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent
evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment. 34
In this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses intruded petitioners' land is the issue in the recovery of possession
complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered a supervening event that would
stay the execution of a final and immutable judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine whether respondents'
houses are within petitioners' land is tantamount to modifying a decision which had already attained finality.
We find that the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for the issuance a writ of demolition.
The issuance of a special order of demolition would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final
and immutable decision.35 Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. �
xxxx
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution.- when the property subject of the execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed
to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
Notably, this case was decided in 2005 and its execution has already been delayed for years now. It is almost trite to say that
execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. 36 A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty
victory for the prevailing party.37redarclaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010, of the Shari'a
District Court, Fourth Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi City are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. The Shari'a District Court is
hereby ORDERED to ISSUE a writ of demolition to enforce its Decision dated January 31, 2005 in Civil Case No. 055-91.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for whatever action he may undertake in light of
our pronouncement in the Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong case quoted earlier on the creation of a Special Division to handle appeals or
petitions from trial orders or decisions of the Shari�a District Court.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, Petitioner, v. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, 4THJUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, AND HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO ALOMPO,
REPRESENTED BY SULTAN DIMNANG B.ALOMPO, Respondents.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines 1 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) vests concurrent jurisdiction upon Shari'a
district courts over personal and real actions wherein the parties involved are Muslims, except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. The question presented is whether the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of
possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim. The respondent judge held that it has. We
reverse.
I
The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint 2 with the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City (Shari'a
District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an
area of approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the
owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow"
the land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed a
condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the
land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land
within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to them as successors-in-
interest of Macalabo.
The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss 3 on the ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued
that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.
In its Order4 dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's motion to dismiss. It held that since
the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original
jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." It added that venue was properly laid because the Shari'a District Court
has territorial jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi and Iligan.
Moreover, the filing of a motion to dismiss is a disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts. 5
The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari'a District Court. The Shari'a District Court also
ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within 10 days. 6 The Municipality of Tangkal timely filed its answer 7 and raised
as an affirmative defense the court's lack of jurisdiction.
Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to us via petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order 8 (TRO). It reiterated its arguments in its earlier motion to dismiss and
answer that the Shari'a District Court has no jurisdiction since one party is a municipality which has no religious affiliation.
In their Comment,9 private respondents argue that under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts, a petition
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the district court is a prohibited pleading. Likewise,
the Municpality of Tangkal's motion to dismiss is disallowed by the rules. They also echo the reasoning of the Shari'a District Court
that since both the plaintiffs below and the mayor of defendant municipality are Muslims, the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction
over the case.
In the meantime, we issued a TRO10 against the Shari'a District Court and its presiding judge, Rasad Balindong, from holding any
further proceedings in the case below.
II
In its petition, the Municipality of Tangkal acknowledges that generally, neither certiorari nor prohibition is an available remedy to
assail a court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss. But it cites one of the exceptions to the rule, i.e., when the denial is
without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify its remedial action. 11 In rebuttal, private respondents rely on the Special Rules of
Procedure in Shari'a Courts which expressly identifies a motion to dismiss and a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court as prohibited pleadings. 12
A
Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this procedural rule may be
relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of the complaint. As we held in Rulona-Al
Awadhi v. Astih:13
Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack .of jurisdiction over the parties
and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise.
A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction
when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the
jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action. 14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, when it is apparent from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is duty-bound to dismiss
the case regardless of whether the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 15Thus, in Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court,16 we held
that once it became apparent that the Shari'a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the defendant is not a
Muslim, the court should have motu proprio dismissed the case.17
B
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to
dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment.18 As exceptions, however, the defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the
motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter, 19 or when the denial of the
motion to dismiss ts tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 20
The reason why lack of jurisdiction as a ground for dismissal is treated differently from others is because of the basic principle that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action21 to the extent that all proceedings before a court without jurisdiction are void. 22 We grant certiorari on this basis. As will
be shown below, the Shari'a District Court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is patent on the face of the complaint, and
therefore, should have been dismissed outright.
III
The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in
Article 143.23 Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal
laws among Muslims,24 it has a catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real actions
except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. 25cralawred The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is
concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. 26 There is, however, a limit to the general
jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if
both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts. 27
The complaint below, which is a real action 28 involving title to and possession of the land situated at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal,
was filed by private respondents before the Shari'a District Court pursuant to the general jurisdiction conferred by Article 143(2)(b).
In determining whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold question is whether both parties are
Muslims. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the
requirement is satisfied because the mayor of the defendant municipality is also a Muslim.
When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein the parties involved are Muslims," the word
"parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real parties in interest as
those who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the
parties who will be directly benefited or injured are the private respondents, as real party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal,
as the real party defendant. In their complaint, private respondents claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Macalabo, entered into
an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal for the use of the land. Their cause of action is based on the Municipality of Tangkal's
alleged failure and refusal to return the land or pay for its reasonable value in accordance with the agreement. Accordingly, they
pray for the return of the land or the payment of reasonable rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private respondents,
either allowing them to recover possession or entitling them to rentals, would undoubtedly be beneficial to them; correlatively, it
would be prejudicial to the Municipality of Tangkal which would either be deprived possession of the land on which its municipal hall
currently stands or be required to allocate funds for payment of rent. Conversely, a judgment in favor of the Municipality of Tangkal
would effectively quiet its title over the land and defeat the claims of private respondents.
It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a representative capacity, as
chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-and
neither does he become-a real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest; 29 the representative
remains to be a third party to the action.30 That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with
the jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real party
defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the oneness of God and the Prophethood of
Muhammad and professes Islam."31 Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it
nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, which is a fundamental personal right. 32 The ability to testify to the "oneness of God
and the Prophethood of Muhammad" and to profess Islam is, by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical
persons are artificial beings with "no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires." 33 They are considered persons
only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local Government Code, a municipality
is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.34
Furthermore, as a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects35-consistent with the non-establishment clause.36 Hence, even if it is assumed that juridical persons are
capable of practicing religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less exercising, any
religion, including Islam.
The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of Tangkal "is
neither a Muslim nor a Christian."37 Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is
manifest error on the part of the Shari'a District Court. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is
separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other officers composing it. 38 And under no circumstances can this
corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations-as the Shari'a District Court has done-without running afoul the
inviolability of the separation of Church and State enshrined in the Constitution. 39
In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private respondents' complaint
because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear from the complaint that the real party defendant
was the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari'a District Court should have simply applied the basic doctrine of separate juridical
personality and motu propriodismissed the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City in Civil Case No. 201-09
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 201-09 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 209447, August 11, 2015
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON. WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, MAKATI CITY AND UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB), Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 210901]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v. HON. WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, MAKATI CITY AND UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION
(COCOLIFE), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
It is an important fundamental principle in our judicial system that every litigation must come to an end.� Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment
has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 1� Adherence to the
principle impacts upon the lives of about three million poor farmers who have long waited to benefit from the outcome of the 27-
year battle for the judicial recovery of assets acquired through illegal conversion of the coconut levies collected during the Marcos
regime into private funds.
The Case
Before us are the consolidated petitions seeking the reversal of the following Orders 2 issued by respondent Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 59:� (a)� Order dated April 29, 2013 denying petitioner�s motion to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 12-1251;� (b)� Order dated June 28, 2013 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner;
(c) Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2013 denying petitioner�s motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 12-1252; and (d)
Order dated December 4, 2013 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
The Antecedents
The factual background of this case is gathered from the records and the decisions of this Court involving the coconut levy funds.�
We reproduce the pertinent portions of the January 24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic3:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In 1971, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra.
Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the
disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA,
now PCA) as having the largest membership.
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees (�P.Ds.�) purportedly designed
to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. While coming generally from impositions
on the first sale of copra, the coconut levy fund came under various names x x x. Charged with the duty of collecting and
administering the Fund was PCA. Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in
different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.
The following were some of the issuances on the coco levy, its collection and utilization, how the proceeds of the levy will be
managed and by whom, and the purpose it was supposed to serve:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. P.D. No. 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust
fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
2. P.D. No. 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
3. Then came P.D. No. 755 providing under its Section 1 the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at a preferential
rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation of the �Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers� executed by the [PCA] x x x; and that the [PCA] is hereby authorized to
distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers x x x.Towards achieving the policy thus
declared, P.D. No. 755, under its Section 2, authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank
and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a
certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. The same section also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be
considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government within the contemplation of P.D.
No. 711.
4. P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development of coconut/palm oil industries.
5. The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by P.D. No. 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code),
read:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ARTICLE III
Levies
Section 1. Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy. � The [PCA] is hereby empowered to impose and collect x x x the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy x x x.
xxxx
Section 5. Exemption. � The [CCSF] and the [CIDF] as well as all disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be construed x x x as
special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government within the contemplation of PD 711; x x x
the intention being that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall
be owned by them in their private capacities: x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
6. Letter of Instructions No. (LOI) 926, Series of 1979, made reference to the creation, out of other coco levy funds, of the Coconut
Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) in P.D. No. 1468 and entrusted a portion of the CIIF levy to UCPB for investment, on behalf of
coconut farmers, in oil mills and other private corporations, with the following equity ownership structure:
Section 2. Organization of the Cooperative Endeavor. � The [UCPB], in its capacity as the investment arm of the coconut farmers
thru the [CIIF] x x x is hereby directed to invest, on behalf of the coconut farmers, such portion of the CIIF x x x in private
corporations x x x under the following guidelines:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a) The coconut farmers shall own or control at least x x x (50%) of the outstanding voting capital stock of the private
corporation [acquired] thru the CIIF and/or corporation owned or controlled by the farmers thru the CIIF x x x. (Words in bracket
added.)
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to [finance] various projects and/or was converted
into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this case was their use to acquire the First United Bank (FUB), later
renamed UCPB, and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF companies, of a large block of SMC shares.
xxxx
Shortly after the execution of the PCA-Cojuangco, Jr. Agreement, President Marcos issued, on July 29, 1975, P.D. No. 755 directing,
as earlier narrated, PCA to use the CCSF and CIDF to acquire a commercial bank to provide coco farmers with �readily available
credit facilities at preferential rate,� and PCA �to distribute, for free,� the bank shares to coconut farmers.
Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the priorities of then President Corazon C. Aquino�s revolutionary government was the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos family and close relatives, their nominees and associates. Apropos
thereto, she issued Executive Order Nos. (E.Os.) 1, 2 and 14, as amended by E.O. 14-A, all Series of 1986. E.O. 1 created the PCGG
and provided it with the tools and processes it may avail of in the recovery efforts; E.O. No. 2 asserted that the ill-gotten assets and
properties come in the form of shares of stocks, etc.; while E.O. No. 14 conferred on the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original
jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases, with the proviso that �technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be applied
strictly� to the civil cases filed under the E.O. Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued numerous orders of sequestration,
among which were those handed out, as earlier mentioned, against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered
in the names of (a) more than a million coconut farmers and (b) the CIIF companies, including the SMC shares held by the CIIF
companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit docketed thereat as CC No. 0033.
After the filing and subsequent amendments of the complaint in CC 0033, Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al., purportedly
representing over a million coconut farmers, sought and were allowed to intervene. Meanwhile, the following incidents/events
transpired:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. On the postulate, inter alia, that its coco-farmer members own at least 51% of the outstanding capital stock of UCPB, the CIIF
companies, etc., COCOFED, et al., on November 29, 1989, filed Class Action Omnibus Motion praying for the lifting of the orders of
sequestration referred to above and for a chance to present evidence to prove the coconut farmers� ownership of the UCPB and
CIIF shares. The plea to present evidence was denied;
2. Later, the Republic moved for and secured approval of a motion for separate trial which paved the way for the subdivision of the
causes of action in CC 0033, each detailing how the assets subject thereof were acquired and the key roles the principal played;
3. Civil Case 0033, pursuant to an order of the Sandiganbayan would be subdivided into eight complaints, docketed as CC 0033-A to
CC 0033-H.
xxxx
4. On February 23, 2001, Lobregat, COCOFED, Ballares, et al., filed a Class Action Omnibus Motion to enjoin the PCGG from voting
the sequestered UCPB shares and the SMC shares registered in the names of the CIIF companies. The Sandiganbayan, by Order of
February 28, 2001, granted the motion, sending the Republic to come to this Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 147062-64,
to annul said order; and
5. By Decision of December 14, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64 (Republic v. COCOFED), the Court declared the coco levy funds as
prima facie public funds. And purchased as the sequestered UCPB shares were by such funds, beneficial ownership thereon and
the corollary voting rights prima facie pertain, according to the Court, to the government.4 (Additional emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
As mentioned in the above-cited case, the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 revolved around the provisional take-over by
the PCGG of COCOFED, Cocomark, and Coconut Investment Company and their assets and the sequestration of shares of stock in
UCPB CIIF corporations (CIIF oil mills and the 14 CIIF holding companies), or CIIF companies, so-called for having been either
organized, acquired and/or funded as UCPB subsidiaries with the use of the CIIF levy.� The basic complaint also contained
allegations about the alleged misuse of the coconut levy funds to buy out the majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San
Miguel Corporation (SMC). 5redarclaw
The proceedings relevant to this case pertain to Civil Case No. 0033-A entitled, Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., et al., Defendants, COCOFED, et al., BALLARES, et al., Class Action Movants (Re: Anomalous Purchase and Use of [FUB]
now [UCPB]), and Civil Case No. 0033-F entitled, Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,
Defendants (Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of Stock).
The Sandiganbayan rendered partial summary judgments in Civil Case No. 0033-A and 0033-F on July 11, 2003 and May 7, 2004,
respectively.� In our Decision dated January 24, 2012 in COCOFED v. Republic, 6 we affirmed with modification the said partial
summary judgments and also upheld the Sandiganbayan�s ruling that the coconut levy funds are special public funds of the
Government.� Citing Republic v. COCOFED7 which resolved the issue of whether the PCGG has the right to vote the sequestered
shares, we declared that the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest but are, in fact, prima facie public funds.
We also upheld the Sandiganbayan�s ruling that Sections 1 and 2 of P.D. 755, Section 3, Article III of P.D. 961, and the implementing
regulations of the PCA, are unconstitutional �for allowing the use and/or the distribution of properties acquired through the
coconut levy funds to private individuals for their own direct benefit and absolute ownership.� As to the ownership of the six CIIF
companies, the 14 holding companies, and the CIIF block of SMC shares of stock, we held these to be owned by the Government,
having likewise been acquired using the coconut levy funds. Accordingly, �the properties subject of the January 24, 2012 Decision
were declared owned by and ordered reconveyed to the Government, to be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for
the development of the coconut industry.�8redarclaw
Under the Resolution dated September 4, 2012, we denied with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 177857-58.
The dispositive portion of the September 4, 2012 Resolution in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic
of the Philippines9 thus reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY the instant Motion for Reconsideration dated February 14, 2012 for lack of
merit.
The Court further resolves to CLARIFY that the 753,848,312 SMC Series 1 preferred shares of the CIIF companies converted from the
CIIF block of SMC shares, with all the dividend earnings as well as all increments arising from, but not limited to, the exercise of
preemptive rights subject of the September 17, 2009 Resolution, shall now be the subject matter of the January 24, 2012 Decision
and shall be declared owned by the Government and be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of
the coconut industry.
As modified, the fallo of the January 24, 2012 Decision shall read, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178793 are hereby DENIED. The Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11,
2003 in Civil Case No. 0033-A as reiterated with modification in Resolution dated June 5, 2007, as well as the Partial Summary
Judgment dated May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F, which was effectively amended in Resolution dated May 11, 2007,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, only with respect to those issues subject of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193.
However, the issues raised in G.R. No. 180705 in relation to Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 and Resolution dated
June 5, 2007 in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall be decided by this Court in a separate decision.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A dated July 11, 2003, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We rule as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SUMMARY OF THE COURT�S RULING.
A.� Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated April 11, 2001 filed by Defendant Maria Clara L.
Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment dated April 11, 2001 filed by defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED,
et al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: COCOFED, ET AL. AND BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April 22, 2002 filed by
Plaintiff.
1. a. The portion of Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it
acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations it may promulgate.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is unconstitutional: (i) for having allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit
directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by
PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined �coconut farmers�, which negated or circumvented the national policy or
public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755 to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve its
vertical integration; and (ii) for having unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA.
b.� The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 and Resolution No.
074-78 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it that the distribution of shares serve exclusively or at least primarily or
directly the aforementioned public purpose or national policy declared by P.D. No. 755.
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary funds
nor part of the general funds of the national government and similar provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5,
Art. III, P.D. No. 1468 contravene the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not legally and validly obtained title of ownership over the subject UCPB
shares by virtue of P.D. No. 755, the Agreement dated May 25, 1975 between the PCA and defendant Cojuangco, and PCA
implementing rules, namely, Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
4. The so-called �Farmers� UCPB shares� covered by 64.98% of the UCPB shares of stock, which formed part of the 72.2%
of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of the UCPB, the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA to the
CCSF, are hereby declared conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F dated May 7, 2004, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES OF STOCK) dated
August 8, 2005 of the plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However, this Court orders the severance of this particular claim of
Plaintiff. The Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is now considered a separate final and appealable judgment with respect
to the said CIIF Block of SMC shares of stock.
The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is modified by deleting the last paragraph of the dispositive portion, which
will now read, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and Cocofed, et al.) filed by
Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:
1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);
2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);
3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);
4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);
5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and
6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),
AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:�
1. Soriano Shares, Inc.;
2. ACS Investors, Inc.;
3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;
4. Arc Investors; Inc.;
5. Toda Holdings, Inc.;
6. AP Holdings, Inc.;
7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;
12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
14. First Meridian Development, Inc.
AND THE CONVERTED SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES TOTALING 753,848,312 SHARES SUBJECT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE
COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 TOGETHER WITH ALL DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID OR ISSUED THEREON AFTER THAT DATE, AS
WELL AS ANYINCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED
OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE USED ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT FARMERS AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE COCONUT INDUSTRY, AND ORDERED RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.
THE COURT AFFIRMS THE RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-A AND ON
MAY 11, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-F, THAT THERE IS NO MORE NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CIIF FLOCK OF SMC SHARES, AND (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY
HAVE FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11, 2003 AND MAY 7,
2004.
SO ORDERED.
Costs against petitioners COCOFED, et al. in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and Danilo S. Ursua in G.R. No. 178193.
No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let Entry of Judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.10� (Boldface in the original; additional underscoring supplied)

On December 28, 2012, a petition for declaratory relief 11 was filed by respondent UCPB in the RTC of Makati City (Civil Case No. 12-
1251) against the six CIIF oil mills and 14 holding companies (CIIF companies), PCGG and other corporations �similarly situated.� A
similar petition12 was also filed by respondent United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation (COCOLIFE) against the same
defendants (Civil Case No. 12-1252).
Civil Case No. 12-1251
UCPB alleged that the capital or equity used in establishing the CIIF companies was not exclusively sourced from the coconut levy
funds. It claimed that while P633 Million was invested by it as Administrator of the CIIF, as universal bank it also invested around
P112 million in the six oil mill companies or oil mills group (CIIF OMG).� As to the 14 holding companies, UCPB claimed that while it
had the funds in mid-1983 to purchase the 33,133,266 shares in SMC then being sold by the Soriano Group for the price of P1.656
Billion to Mr. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., it could not, under banking laws, directly engage in the business of brewery. To make the
equity investment, the 14 holding companies were established by the CIIF OMG to serve as corporate vehicles for the investment in
SMC shares (CIIF SMC Block of Shares).
With the foregoing supposed equity in the CIIF companies and contributions to the acquisition of the SMC shares, UCPB
claims 11.03% indirect ownership valued at P7.84 Billion, based on the P71.04 Billion present value of the said sequestered shares
(P56.5 Billion redemption price of the redeemed shares plus P14.54 Billion dividends and accrued interests for the account of the 14
holding companies).� UCPB thus prayed for a judgment
declaring the rights and duties of [UCPB] affirming and confirming [UCPB�s] proportionate right, title and interest in the Oil Mills
Group Companies, its indirect equity of the 14 Coconut Industry Investment Funds (�CIIF�) Holding Companies and the San Miguel
Corporation (�SMC�) Shares, the dividends thereon and the proceeds of the redemption thereof and that any disbursement or
disposition thereof should x x x respect and take into account [UCPB�s] right, title and interest thereto.13
PCGG filed a motion to dismiss citing the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (2) the
January 24, 2012 Decision of the Supreme Court cannot be the proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief; (3) a petition for
declaratory relief is unavailing since the alleged right or interest of UCPB over the CIIF companies and the CIIF Block of SMC Shares
had long been breached or violated upon the issuance of the writ of sequestration against the said companies and shares of stock by
the PCGG, which thereafter assumed their administration and voted the shares of stock; (4) UCPB is now estopped from asserting its
alleged right over the subject companies and shares of stock, having failed to enforce it for a long time (25 years) from the date of
filing by PCGG of the complaint in the Sandiganbayan in 1987 until the Supreme Court decided with finality the issue of ownership of
the subject sequestered companies and shares of stock on September 4, 2012; and (5) the petition is defective, as it failed to
implead an indispensable party, the Republic of the Philippines. 13-aredarclaw
UCPB opposed the motion contending that the subject of its petition is not the Supreme Court Decision dated January 24, 2012 but
the proper documents establishing UCPB�s ownership over the subject companies and shares of stock.� It further asserted that
there is no actual breach of right or estoppel that would bar UCPB�s claim considering that it was not even a party to any previous
legal suit involving the subject properties.13-bredarclaw
On April 29, 2013, respondent Judge issued the first assailed Order denying the motion to dismiss and directing the PCGG to file its
Answer.� PCGG�s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the Order dated June 28, 2013.
Civil Case No. 12-1252
COCOLIFE raised similar claims of ownership in the subject companies and shares of stock by virtue of its being a stockholder,
owning 146,610,567 UCPB shares independently of its right as direct shareholder of the CIIF OMG and the 14 holding companies, as
well as the CIIF SMC Block of Shares. It alleged that on December 18, 1985, it purchased from UCPB shares of stock in four CIIF oil
companies. Using funds coming from COCOLIFE and UCPB, the CIIF OMG was able to raise the money for the purchase of the
33,133,266 common shares in SMC.� Consequently, COCOLIFE�s percentage ownership in the CIIF SMC Block of Shares being held
by the 14 holding companies is 11.01%. According to COCOLIFE, its investment in the CIIF OMG is evidenced by certificates of stock
issued by San Pablo Manufacturing Corp., Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills, Granexport Manufacturing Corp. and Legaspi Oil Co.,
Inc.
Like UCPB, COCOLIFE asserted that the CIIF OMG and 14 CIIF holding companies are not wholly owned by the Government.� Since
it was not impleaded in the complaint filed by the PCGG for the recovery of allegedly ill-gotten properties (CIIF companies and CIIF
SMC Block of Shares), COCOLIFE argued that it should not be deprived of its proportionate interest (11.01%) in the said properties
sequestered by PCGG. It thus prayed that judgment be rendered by the RTC declaring the rights and duties of COCOLIFE affirming
and confirming COCOLIFE�s proportionate interest in the four CIIF oil companies, its indirect equity in the 14 CIIF holding
companies and the CIIF SMC Block of Shares including the proceeds or their equivalent, and that any disbursement or disposition
thereof should preserve, respect and take into account COCOLIFE�s right and interest.
Civil Case No. 12-1252 was consolidated with Civil Case No. 12-1251. PCGG likewise moved to dismiss the petition in Civil Case No.
12-1252 on the same grounds it raised in Civil Case No. 12-1251.
The Omnibus Order dated May 15, 2013 denied the motion to dismiss and further required PCGG to file its Answer.� PCGG�s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent Judge on December 4, 2013.
Petitioner�s Arguments
PCGG contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in not dismissing the petitions for declaratory relief, which�
merely aim to re-litigate the issue of ownership already passed upon by the Sandiganbayan under the Partial Summary Judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 0033-F and the January 24, 2012 Decision of this Court in COCOFED v. Republic.14 It argues that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the acts performed by PCGG pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions, particularly those relating to the issuance of
writs of sequestration, and that all cases involving ill-gotten wealth assets are under the unquestionable jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Contrary to the asseveration of respondents UCPB and COCOLIFE, PCGG maintains that their petitions for declaratory relief actually
seek to modify or alter the Decision of this Court in COCOFED v. Republic, which has become final and executory.� PCGG also
contends that documents like stock certificates cannot be a proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief considering that the
phrase �other written instruments� contemplated by the Rules of Court pertains to a written document constituting a contract
upon which rights and obligations are created, which terms could be interpreted by the courts so as to avoid any conflicting interests
between the parties.� Further, the alleged ownership or title of UCPB and COCOLIFE have already been breached or violated by the
issuance of writs of sequestration over the subject properties.
On account of their inaction for more than 25 years that the issue of ownership over the sequestered CIIF companies and CIIF SMC
Block of Shares were being litigated, PCGG argues that UCPB and COCOLIFE are now estopped from asserting any such right in the
said properties. And as to their non-participation in the cases before the Sandiganbayan, PCGG asserts it has no legal obligation to
implead UCPB and COCOLIFE, as held in Universal Broadcasting Corporation v. Sandiganbayan (5th Div.).15redarclaw
Respondents� Arguments
Respondents question the authority of Commissioner Vicente L. Gengos, Jr. in filing the present petitions before the Court and
signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping. They point out that the PCGG is a collegial body created by virtue
of EO 1, and it may function only as such �Commission.�� Consequently, the present action should have been properly
authorized by all members of the Commission.
On the issue of jurisdiction, UCPB and COCOLIFE argue that since they have properly alleged a case for declaratory relief, jurisdiction
over the subject matter lies in the regular courts such as the RTC of Makati City. Having filed a motion to dismiss, PCGG is deemed to
have admitted the material allegations of the complaint, specifically that UCPB and COCOLIFE had jointly acquired the six CIIF oil
mills by investing direct equity of P112 Million (UCPB) and P112 Million (COCOLIFE) for the four CIIF oil mills.� Citing San Miguel
Corporation v. Kahn16 where this Court held that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction if the subject matter of the case does not
involve or has no relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, UCPB and COCOLIFE insist that the subject matter of their petitions is
the declaration of their rights under corporate documents, which in turn relate to UCPB and COCOLIFE�s investments not sourced
from the coconut levy funds.� It is thus the allegations in the complaint that determine the cause of action and what court has
jurisdiction over such cause of action, and not the defenses raised in the motion to dismiss and/or answer.
In the same vein, UCPB and COCOLIFE posit that, contrary to PCGG�s position, proceeding to hear the cases below will not pave the
way for re-examining the findings of this Court in its Decision in COCOFED v. Republic.� This is because the subject matter of the
petitions for declaratory relief is not the coconut levy funds but their own investments in the CIIF OMG and consequent indirect
ownership of the CIIF SMC Block of Shares. Neither do their petitions seek to lift the sequestration orders as these pertain only to
those shares in CIIF OMG which were acquired by UCPB as Administrator, using coconut levy funds.� While respondents adhere to
the wisdom of the Decision in COCOFED v. Republic, it is their position that the ruling therein does not affect their respective claims
to 11% proportional equity stake in the CIIF OMG companies.� Moreover, since they were not impleaded in Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0033-F and in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193, respondents maintain that they are not bound by any adjudication of
ownership rendered therein.
Respondents further contend that the writ of sequestration issued by the Sandiganbayan cannot be considered a breach which gives
rise to a cause of action in favor of any of the parties. There was no �injury� on the part of UCPB and COCOLIFE despite the
sequestration proceedings because they were not impleaded as a party in the sequestration case. They point out that their title and
interest in the subject properties remained unaffected by the sequestration by PCGG considering that the CIIF companies had not
done anything to disown or deny UCPB and COCOLIFE�s stockholdings, as in fact, in their Answer to the petition for declaratory
relief, these companies expressly admitted the existence of respondents� stockholdings in each respective company. Also, the CIIF
OMG were all in agreement that there is a need for declaratory relief judgment on respondents� claims in the sequestered
properties notwithstanding the final decision of this Court which resolved the issue of ownership in favor of the Government.
On February 26, 2014 in G.R. No. 210901, we issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) immediately enjoining the respondent
judge, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 59, their representatives, agents or other persons acting on their behalf, from proceeding with
the hearing of the petitions for declaratory relief in Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252. 17� Likewise, a TRO was issued in G.R. No.
209447 enjoining the respondent judge from further hearing the said petitions for declaratory relief. 18redarclaw
Issues
The issues generated by this controversy are the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1)� Non-compliance with the rule on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which was signed by only one PCGG
Commissioner;
2)� Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252;
3)� Non-compliance with the requisites of a petition for declaratory relief complied with; and
4)� Application of res judicata and/or laches as bar to the suits for declaratory relief filed by UCPB and COCOLIFE.
Our Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
Alleged Lack of Authority of PCGG

Commissioner Vicente L. Gengos, Jr.
to file the present petition�
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. 19 A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. 20� The
party need not sign the verification.� A party�s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts
alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.21redarclaw
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. 22redarclaw
It is obligatory that the one signing the verification and certification against forum shopping on behalf of the principal party or the
other petitioners has the authority to do the same.23� We hold that the signature of only one Commissioner of petitioner PCGG in
the verification and certification against forum shopping is not a fatal defect.
It has been consistently held that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of
requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely speculative. This
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective.24redarclaw
As to the certification of non-forum shopping, a rigid application of the rules should not defeat the PCGG�s mandate under EO 1,
EO 2, EO 14 and EO 14-A to prosecute cases for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and to conserve sequestered assets and
corporations, which are in custodia legis, under its administration. Indeed, relaxation of the rules is warranted in this case involving
coconut levy funds previously declared by this Court as �affected with public interest� and judicially determined as public funds.�
Relevantly, after the promulgation of the decision of this Court in COCOFED v. Republic, EO 180 was issued on March 18, 2015
reiterating the Government�s policy to ensure that all coco levy funds and coco levy assets be utilized �solely and exclusively for
the benefit of all the coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry.� In line with such policy, Section 3 thereof
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 3. Actions to Preserve, Protect and Recover Coco Levy Assets.� The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and any other concerned government agency shall, under the general supervision of the
Secretary of Justice, file the proper pleadings or institute and maintain the necessary legal actions to preserve, protect, or recover
the Government�s rights and interests in the Coco Levy Assets and to prevent any dissipation or reduction in their value. �
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Apropos PCGG v. Cojuangco, Jr.,25 involving the issue of who has the right to vote the sequestered SMC shares, we gave due course
to the petition for certiorari and mandamus despite the lack of signature of the Solicitor General; but it was signed by two special
counsels and the verification was signed by Commissioner Herminio Mendoza.� We noted the extraordinary circumstances in the
filing of the petition by the said government officials that justified a liberal interpretation of the rules.
The RTC has no jurisdiction over

suits involving the sequestered coco
levy assets and coco levy funds.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. 26� Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed for therein.� Jurisdiction is not acquired by
agreement or consent of the parties, and neither does it depend upon the defenses raised in the answer or in a motion to
dismiss.27redarclaw
Under Section 4 (C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan included
suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and related cases:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
xxxx
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.�
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In PCGG v. Pe�a,28 we made the following clarification on the extent of the Sandiganbayan�s jurisdiction:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x Under section 2 of the President�s Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding �the
Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees� whether civil or
criminal, are lodged within the �exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan� and all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan�s exclusive and original jurisdiction,
subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. 29� (Emphasis supplied)
Soriano III v. Yuzon30 reiterated the above ruling, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Now, that exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action,
i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to �all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such
cases,� such as the dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies
relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum.
As explained by the Court in Pe�a:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
�The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood. Given the magnitude of the past regime�s �organized
pillage� and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in the
market, it is a matter of sheer necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which would have tied into knots and made
impossible the commission�s gigantic task of recovering the plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the process
had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since ballooned to $28.5 billion.� (italics and emphasis
supplied.) (Additional emphasis supplied)
Respondents� petitions for declaratory relief filed in the RTC asserted their claim of ownership over the sequestered CIIF
companies and indirectly the CIIF SMC Block of Shares, in the following percentages: 11.03% (UCPB) and 11.01% (COCOLIFE).�
Undeniably, these are related to the ill-gotten wealth cases (Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F) involving the issue of ownership of
the aforesaid sequestered companies and shares of stock, which have been tried and decided by the Sandiganbayan, and the�
decision had been appealed to and finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 31 (COCOFED and Lobregat, et. al�s
ownership claim over the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares) and G.R. No. 180705 32 (Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.�s claim
over UCPB shares under an Agreement with PCA).
Contrary to respondents� contention, the subject matter of their petitions for declaratory relief, i.e., their purported contribution
to the acquisition of four CIIF OMG companies and the 14 holding companies, as well as indirect ownership of a portion of the CIIF
SMC Block of Shares, is inextricably intertwined with the issue of ownership judicially settled in the aforementioned appeals from
the Partial Summary Judgments rendered in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F.
The allegation that no coconut levy funds were actually used to purchase stockholdings in the CIIF companies is of no moment.�
Since the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares have long been sequestered and placed under the administration of the
PCGG, the latter�s functions may not be interfered with by a co-equal court.� In Republic v. Investa Corporation33 involving the
propriety of dilution of the Government�s percentage in the stockholdings of a sequestered corporation (DOMSAT), we held that it
is the Sandiganbayan and not the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which has jurisdiction over the petition filed by the
Republic and DOMSAT.� As conservator of sequestered shares, PCGG has the duty to ensure that the sequestered properties are
not dissipated under its watch.
Previously, this Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC in a suit also involving a claim of ownership in the sequestered corporation,
and ruled in this wise:34redarclaw
We disagree with the RTC and the CA on the issue of jurisdiction. While there can be no dispute that PCOC was sequestered, the fact
of sequestration alone did not automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the question of ownership of the subject
gaming and office equipment. The PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan �s exclusive jurisdiction may
be correctly invoked.� This is deducible from no less than E.O. No. 14, the �Pe�a� and �Nepomuceno� cases relied upon by
both subordinates courts. Note that in Section 2 of E.O. No. 14 which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
�Section 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.�
it speaks of the PCGG as party-plaintiff.� On the other hand, the PCGG was impleaded as co-defendant in both the �Pe�a� and
�Nepomuceno� cases. But here, the PCGG does not appear in either capacity, as the complaint is solely between PAGCOR and
respondents PCOC and Marcelo. The �Pe�a� and �Nepomuceno� cases which recognize the independence of the PCGG and
the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases, therefore, cannot be invoked in the instant case so as to divest the RTC of its jurisdiction,
under Section 19 of B.P. 129, over PAGCOR�s action for recovery of personal property. 35� (Emphasis supplied)
In Cuenca v. PCGG,36 we upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over all incidents affecting the shares of a
sequestered corporation considering that the action before the RTC is inexorably entwined with the Government�s case for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth pending with the Sandiganbayan.� Thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Petitioners contend that even if UHC was indeed sequestered, jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners� Complaint for
enforcement or rescission of contract between petitioners and respondents belonged to the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners cited Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals, x x x, this Court held that the fact of
sequestration alone did not automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the question of ownership of the disputed
gaming and office equipment as PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan�s exclusive jurisdiction may be
correctly invoked, and as Section 2 of EO 14 was duly applied in PCGG v. Pe�aand PCGG v. Nepomuceno, which ineluctably spoke of
respondent PCGG as a party-litigant.
xxxx
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case
A rigorous examination of the antecedent facts and existing records at hand shows that Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction
over the instant case.
Thus, the petition must fail for the following reasons:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First, it is a fact that the shares of stock of UHC and CDCP, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 91-2721 before the Makati City RTC,
were also the subject matter of an ill-gotten wealth case, specifically Civil Case No. 0016 before the Sandiganbayan. In Civil Case No.
91-2721 of the Makati City RTC, petitioners prayed for a judgment either transferring the UHC shares or restoring and reconveying
the PNCC shares to them. In the event a final judgment is rendered in said Makati City RTC case in favor of petitioners, then such
adjudication tends to render moot and academic the judgment to be rendered in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0016 considering that
the legal ownership of either the UHC or PNCC shares would now be transferred to petitioners Rodolfo Cuenca and CIC. Such
adverse judgment would run counter to the rights of ownership of the government over the UHC and PNCC shares in question. x x x
Moreover, inasmuch as UHC was impleaded in Civil Case No. 0016 as a defendant and was listed among the corporations
beneficially owned or controlled by petitioner Cuenca, the issue of the latter �s right to acquire ownership of UHC shares is
inexorably intertwined with the right of the Republic of the Philippines, through PCGG, to retain ownership of said UHC shares.
It must be borne in mind that the Sandiganbayan was created in 1978 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.� Said law has
been amended during the interim period after the Edsa Revolution of 1986 and before the 1987 Constitution was drafted, passed,
and ratified. Thus, the executive issuances during such period before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution had the force and
effect of laws. Specifically, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued the following Executive Orders which amended PD 1606 in so far
as the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over civil and criminal cases instituted and prosecuted by the PCGG is
concerned, viz:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
Bearing on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases of ill-gotten wealth, EO 14, Secs. 1 and 2 provide:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
SECTION 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential Commission on Good Government with the
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all
cases investigated by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986 and Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12,
1986, as may be warranted by its findings.
SECTION 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notably, these amendments had been duly recognized and reflected in subsequent amendments to PD 1606, specifically Republic
Act Nos. 7975 and 8249.
In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has jurisdiction
over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged �ill-gotten wealth� of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the
UHC shares is of no importance. The benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
and their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents affecting
the UHC shares and PCGG�s right of supervision or control over the UHC must be addressed to and resolved by the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much
lost time, wasted effort, more expenses, and irreparable injury to the public interest.
Second, the UHC shares in dispute were sequestered by respondent PCGG. Sequestration is a provisional remedy or freeze order
issued by the PCGG designed to prevent the disposal and dissipation of ill-gotten wealth. The power to sequester property means to
place or cause to be placed under [PCGG�s] possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property
or any records pertaining thereto may be found, including business enterprises and entities, for the purpose of preventing the
destruction of, and otherwise conserving and preserving the same, until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial
proceedings, whether the property was in truth ill-gotten. (Silverio v. PCGG, 155 SCRA 60 [1987]).
Considering that the UHC shares were already sequestered, enabling the PCGG to exercise the power of supervision, possession,
and control over said shares, then such power would collide with the legal custody of the Makati City RTC over the UHC shares
subject of Civil Case No. 91-2721. Whatever the outcome of Civil Case No. 91-2721, whether from enforcement or rescission of the
contract, would directly militate on PCGG�s control and management of IRC and UHC, and consequently hamper or interfere with
its mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth. As aptly pointed out by respondents, petitioners� action is inexorably entwined with the
Government�s action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth � the subject of the pending case before the Sandiganbayan. Verily,
the transfer of shares of stock of UHC to petitioners or the return of the shares of stock of CDCP (now PNCC) will wreak havoc on the
sequestration case as both UHC and CDCP are subject of sequestration by PCGG.
Third, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. are not analogous to the case at bar. The first
dealt with ownership of gaming and office equipment, which is distinct from and will not impact on the sequestration issue of PCOC.
The second dealt with an ordinary civil case for performance of a contractual obligation which did not in any way affect the
sequestration proceeding of NRHDCI; thus, the complaint-in-intervention of Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. was properly denied for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In both cases cited by petitioners, there was a substantial distinction between the sequestration proceedings and the subject
matter of the actions. This does not prevail in the instant case, as the ownership of the shares of stock of the sequestered
companies, UHC and CDCP, is the subject matter of a pending case and thus addressed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Sec. 2 of EO 14 pertinently provides: �The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or
criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.�
The above proviso has been squarely applied in Pe�a, where this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the
Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action, that is, recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but
also to all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases, including a dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety
of the issuance of ancillary writs of relative provisional remedies, and the sequestration of the shares, which may not be made the
subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum. Indeed, the issue of the ownership of the sequestered companies,
UHC and PNCC, as well as IRC�s ownership of them, is undeniably related to the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth and can
be squarely addressed via the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Fourth, while it is clear that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only encompasses cases where PCGG is impleaded, such
requirement is satisfied in the instant case. The appellate court clearly granted PCGG�s petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
49686, assailing the trial court�s denial of its Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the trial court�s April
20, 1998 Order was reversed and set aside by the appellate court through its assailed Decision. Consequently, PCGG was granted
the right to intervene and thus became properly impleaded in the instant case. Without doubt, the trial court has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide Civil Case No. 91-2721.37 (Additional emphasis supplied)
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 12-
1251 and 12-1252.
First, the subject matters of respondents� petitions in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F filed by the PCGG against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, et al. are the same, i.e., the ownership of� CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares, which were claimed by the
Government as acquired by the defendants using public funds (coco levy funds). In the interest of orderly administration of justice
and the policy against multiplicity of suits, it is but proper that all incidents affecting the coconut levy funds and assets be addressed
and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Claims of ownership of a portion of the subject CIIF companies and SMC shares by private
entities such as UCPB and COCOLIFE are inextricably related to the aforementioned ill-gotten wealth cases filed in the
Sandiganbayan.
Second, UCPB, along with the CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares, were duly sequestered by the PCGG and had been under
the latter�s administration for more than 25 years.� With the final determination made by this Court in COCOFED v. Republic that
these properties unquestionably belong to the Government as they were acquired using the coconut levy funds, the PCGG can now
exercise full acts of ownership as evident from the latest executive issuance, EO 180, by President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III.
Third, aside from their sequestration by PCGG, the ownership of the aforesaid assets is the subject matter in both Civil Case Nos. 12-
1251 and 12-1252 filed in the RTC and Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F in the Sandiganbayan.� Respondents� assertion that the
subject matter of their petitions for declaratory relief is different due to private funds used in buying shares in UCPB and CIIF oil mills
is but a feeble attempt to create an exception to the Sandiganbayan�s exclusive jurisdiction.� As underscored in Cuenca v.
PCGG,38 the benchmark is whether such shares of UCPB and CIIF oil mills are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
perceived cronies, which is sufficient to bring the case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to existing
laws and decrees.
Fourth, the requirement in Pe�a and Nepomuceno that the PCGG must be a party to the suit in order to invoke the
Sandiganbayan�s exclusive jurisdiction was satisfied in this case. PCGG was impleaded as co-defendant in Civil Case Nos. 12-1251
and 12-1252.� It even filed a motion to dismiss in both cases and appealed from the denial of said motions by respondent judge.
Thus, while the Republic itself was not impleaded in the petitions for declaratory relief, PCGG was formally made a party thereto.
Applicability of Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
as to� the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes� an absolute bar to subsequent actions� involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action.39 The following requisites must obtain for the application of the doctrine: (1) the former judgment
or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence
or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and
of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties. 40redarclaw
There is no question regarding compliance with the first, second and third requisites.� However, respondents maintain that while
they adhere to the Decision in COCOFED v. Republic, said decision did not affect their right or title to the subject properties since the
subject matter in their petitions for declaratory relief is not the coconut levy funds but their own private funds used by them in
purchasing shares from UCPB and CIIF companies, that in turn resulted in their indirect ownership of the CIIF SMC Block of Shares in
their respective proportions: 11.03% (UCPB) and 11.01% (COCOLIFE).
Respondents further assert that they are not bound by the adjudication of ownership in COCOFED v. Republic considering that they
were not impleaded as defendants in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F.
We disagree.
In Universal Broadcasting Corporation v. Sandiganbayan (5th Div.),41 we reiterated that it is not necessary to implead companies
which are the res of suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth.� We held that �
Petitioner submits that the Sandiganbayan never acquired jurisdiction over it as it was not impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil
Case No. 0035.
The submission has no merit.
The Price Mansion property is an asset alleged to be ill-gotten. Like UBC, it is listed as among the properties of Benjamin Romualdez.
For sure, UBC is among the corporations listed as alleged repositories of shares of stock controlled by Romualdez.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that there is no need to implead firms which are merely the res of the actions in ill-
gotten wealth cases and that judgment may simply be directed against the assets, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
C. Impleading Unnecessary Re Firms which are the Res of the Actions
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit
conduct � in other words, the companies themselves are the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof - there is no
need to implead them either.� Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-
gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part. The judgment may simply be directed against the shares of
stock shown to have been issued in consideration of ill-gotten wealth. x x x
x x x In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause
of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions. x x x 42� (Additional emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects.� The first, known as �bar by prior judgment,� or �estoppel by verdict,� is the
effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.� The second,
known as �conclusiveness of judgment,� otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.43redarclaw
[C]onclusiveness of judgment � states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed
upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to
that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while
the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive
as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that
same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity
of issues.44� (Emphasis and italics supplied)
We have applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment in a previous case involving ownership of shares of stock in a
sequestered corporation, as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In cases wherein the doctrine of �conclusiveness of judgment� applies, there is, as in Civil Case No. 0034 and Civil Case No. 0188
identity of issues not necessarily identity of causes of action. The prior adjudication of the Sandiganbayan affirmed by this Court in
G.R. No. 140615, as to the ownership of the 1/7 Piedras shares of Arambulo, is conclusive in the second case, as it has been
judicially resolved.
The filing of Civil Case No. 0188, although it has a different cause of action from Civil Case No. 0034, will not enable the PCGG to
escape the operation of the principle of res judicata.� A case litigated once shall not be relitigated in another action as it would
violate the interest of the State to put an end to litigation � republicae ut sit litium and the policy that no man shall be vexed twice
for the same cause � nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. Once a litigant�s rights had been adjudicated in a valid final judgment
by a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. 45� (Additional italcis and
emphasis supplied)
We hold that res judicata under the second aspect (conclusiveness of judgment) is applicable in this case.� The issue of ownership
of the sequestered CIIF companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares was directly and actually resolved by the Sandiganbayan and
affirmed by this Court in COCOFED v. Republic.� More important, in the said decision, we categorically affirmed the resolutions
issued by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F �THAT THERE IS NO MORE NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH
RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CIIF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES, AND (3) THE
CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED
JULY 11, 2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.� Among the admitted facts set forth in the Order dated February 23, 2004 is the acquisition by
UCPB of the �controlling interests� in the six CIIF oil mills.� The Partial Summary Judgment further quoted from the Answer to
Third Amended Complaint (Subdivided) with Compulsory Counterclaims dated January 7, 2000 filed by the CIIF oil mills and 14
holding companies, in which they also alleged that pursuant to the authority granted to it by P.D. 961 and P.D. 1568, �UCPB
acquired controlling interests� in the six CIIF oil mills.46redarclaw
In the same decision we specifically upheld the Sandiganbayan�s findings and conclusion on the issue of ownership of the CIIF
OMG, the 14 holding companies and the CIIF SMC Block of Shares, viz.:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The CIIF Companies and the CIIF Block
of SMC shares are public funds/assets
From the foregoing discussions, it is fairly established that the coconut levy funds are special public funds. Consequently, any
property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
In this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by the UCPB using coconut levy funds. On the other hand, the 14 CIIF holding
companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. Conversely, these companies were acquired using or whose
capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the case of UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments
in the CIIF oil mills to coconut farmers, and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portion distributed to the supposed
coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78.� And as the administrator of the CIIF holding
companies, the UCPB authorized the acquisition of the SMC shares. In fact, these companies were formed or organized solely for the
purpose of holding the SMC shares. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding companies used borrowed funds from the
UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion.
Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using coconut levy funds � funds, which have been
established to be public in character � it goes without saying that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be regarded and
treated as government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned by the Government, for the coconut
industry pursuant to currently existing laws.
It may be conceded hypothetically, as COCOFED, et al. urge, that the 14 CIIF holding companies acquired the SMC shares in question
using advances from the CIIF companies and from UCPB loans. But there can be no gainsaying that the same advances and UCPB
loans are public in character, constituting as they do assets of the 14 holding companies, which in turn are wholly-owned
subsidiaries of the 6 CIIF Oil Mills. And these oil mills were organized, capitalized and/or financed using coconut levy funds. In net
effect, the CIIF block of SMC shares are simply the fruits of the coconut levy funds acquired at the expense of the coconut industry.
In Republic v. COCOFED, the en bancCourt, speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, stated: �Because the
subject UCPB shares were acquired with government funds, the government becomes their prima facie beneficial and true
owner.�� By parity of reasoning, the adverted block of SMC shares, acquired as they were with government funds, belong to the
government as, at the very least, their beneficial and true owner.
We thus affirm the decision of the Sandiganbayan on this point. But as We have earlier discussed, reiterating our holding in Republic
v. COCOFED, the State�s avowed policy or purpose in creating the coconut levy fund is for the development of the entire coconut
industry, which is one of the major industries that promotes sustained economic stability, and not merely the livelihood of a
significant segment of the population. Accordingly, We sustain the ruling of the Sandiganbayan in CC No. 0033-F that the CIIF
companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares are public funds necessarily owned by the Government. We, however, modify the
same in the following wise: These shares shall belong to the Government, which shall be used only for the benefit of the coconut
farmers and for the development of the coconut industry.47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In G.R. No. 180705, separately decided by this Court on November 27, 2012, we also affirmed the Sandiganbayan�s decision
nullifying the shares of stock transfer to Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.� We held that as the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of
taxes and can only be used for public purpose, and importantly, for the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the development,
rehabilitation and stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used to benefit��whether directly or indirectly��private
individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement words it, compensation. Accordingly, the UCPB shares
of stock representing the 7.22% fully paid shares subject of the petition, with all dividends declared, paid or issued thereon, as well
as any increments thereto arising from, but not limited to, the exercise of pre-emptive rights, were ordered reconveyed to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall �be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the
development of the coconut industry.�48redarclaw
Having resolved that subject matter jurisdiction pertains to the Sandiganbayan and not the RTC, and that the petitions for
declaratory relief are barred by our January 24, 2012 Decision which settled with finality the issue of ownership of the CIIF oil mills,
the 14 holding companies and CIIF SMC Block of Shares, we deem it unnecessary to address the other issues presented.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Orders dated April 29, 2013 and June 28, 2013 in Civil Case No. 12-1251; and Omnibus
Order dated May 15, 2013 (Branch 138) and Order dated December 4, 2013 in Civil Case Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252 (consolidated
petitions) of the� Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.� The petitions in Civil Case
Nos. 12-1251 and 12-1252 filed by UCPB and COCOLIFE, respectively, are DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SECOND DIVISION
January 25, 2016
G.R. No. 198172
REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Regulus Development, Inc. (petitioner) to challenge the November
23, 2010 Decision1 and August 10, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290. CA Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr. penned the rulings, concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Fiorito S. Macalino.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan Apartments) located at San Juan Street, Pasay City. Antonio dela
Cruz (respondent) leased two units (Unit 2002-A and Unit 2002-B) of the San Juan Apartments in 1993 and 1994. The contract of
lease for each of the two units similarly provides a lease period of one (1) month, subject to automatic renewals, unless terminated
by the petitioner upon written notice.
The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal to vacate
the units, the petitioner filed a complaint3 for ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City, Manila, on May 1,
2001.
The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals due
until the respondent actually complies.4
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the monthly rentals to the
RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals.
The RTC affirmed5 the decision of the MTC in toto and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent.
CA-G.R. SP No. 69504: Dismissal of Ejectment Case
In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the ejectment case.6 On
March 19, 2003, the dismissal of the case became final and executory.7
Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 for payment of rentals due under lease contracts
The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by the defendant-appellant as lessee) 8 praying for the withdrawal of the
rentals consigned by the respondent with the RTC.
In an order dated July 25, 2003,9 the RTC granted the petitioner’s motion. The RTC explained that the effect of the complaint’s
dismissal would mean that there was no complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of rentals for the
use and occupation of the subject units, as provided in the executed contracts of lease and on the basis of justice and equity.
The court denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration 10 in an order dated November 28, 2003.11
On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution on December 18, 2003, to cause the enforcement of its order dated
July 25, 2003.12
CA-G.R. SP No. 81277: Affirmed RTC Orders
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to assail the RTC Orders dated July 25, 2003 and
November 28, 2003 (RTC orders), which granted the petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds.
The CA dismissed13 the petition and held that the assailed RTC Orders were issued pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 39,14 and Rules 515 and 616 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied.
G.R. SP No. 171429: Affirmed CA Ruling on RTC Orders
The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court to assail the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 81277. In a
resolution dated June 7, 2006,17 we denied the petition for insufficiency in form and for failure to show any reversible error
committed by the CA.
Our resolution became final and executory and an entry of judgment 18 was issued.
Execution of RTC Orders
The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to allow it to proceed against
the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing rentals for the leased properties from May 2001 to October 2001, and to
withdraw the lease payments deposited by respondent from November 2001 until August 2003. 19 The RTC granted the motion.20
The RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution21 dated April 26, 2007, allowing the withdrawal of the rental deposits and the value of
the supersedeas bond.
The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments directly made by the respondent to the
petitioner, were insufficient to cover rentals due for the period of May 2001 to May 2004. Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation
and motion22 dated October 23, 2007, praying that the RTC levy upon the respondent’s property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 136829 to satisfy the judgment credit.
The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion in an order dated June 30, 2008.23 The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC in an order dated August 26, 2008.24
CA-G.R. SP No. 105290: Assailed the levy of the respondent’s property
On October 3, 2008, the respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 25 with application for issuance of a temporary
restraining order. The petition sought to nullify and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s real
property. The CA dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration 26 dated November 3, 2008.
Pursuant to the order dated June 30, 2008, a public auction for the respondent’s property covered by TCT No. 136829 was held on
November 4, 2008,27 where the petitioner was declared highest bidder. Subsequently, the Certificate of Sale 28 in favor of the
petitioner was registered.
Meanwhile, on January 7, 2010, the respondent redeemed the property with the RTC Clerk of Court, paying the equivalent of the
petitioner’s bid price with legal interest. The petitioner filed a motion to release funds 29 for the release of the redemption price paid.
The RTC granted30 the motion.
On February 12, 2010, the respondent filed a manifestation and motion 31 before the CA to withdraw the petition for the reason that
the redemption of the property and release of the price paid rendered the petition moot and academic.
Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision dated November 23, 2010, which reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC
directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The CA held that while the approval of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw the
consigned rentals and the posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the
respondent’s real property.
The CA explained that the approval of the levy on the respondent’s real property could not be considered as a case pending appeal,
because the decision of the MTC had already become final and executory. As such, the matter of execution of the judgment lies with
the MTC where the complaint for ejectment was originally filed and presented.
The CA ordered the RTC to remand the case to the MTC for execution. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration which was
denied32 by the CA.
THE PETITION
The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 which held that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
The petitioner argues: first, that the RTC’s release of the consigned rentals and levy were ordered in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction; second, that the respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 was already moot and academic with the conduct of
the auction sale and redemption of the respondent’s real property; third, that the petition in CAG. R. SP No. 105290 should have
been dismissed outright for lack of signature under oath on the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
The respondent duly filed its comment33 and refuted the petitioner’s arguments. On the first argument, respondent merely
reiterated the CA’s conclusion that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the levy on respondent’s real property as it no longer falls
under the allowed execution pending appeal. On the second argument, the respondent contended that the levy on execution and
sale at public auction were null and void, hence the CA decision is not moot and academic. On the third argument, the respondent
simply argued that it was too late to raise the alleged formal defect as an issue.
THE ISSUE
The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
OUR RULING
We grant the petition.
Procedural issue: Lack of notarial seal on the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping is not fatal to the petition.
The petitioner alleged that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed since the notary public failed to affix his seal on the
attached Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
We cannot uphold the petitioner’s argument.
The lack of notarial seal in the notarial certificate 34 is a defect in a document that is required to be executed under oath.
Nevertheless, a defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served. 35
Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction, unless the covering Rule is relaxed on the ground of "substantial compliance" or based on the
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." 36 Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is
deemed obligatory, it is not however jurisdictional. 37
In the present case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping were in fact submitted. An examination of these
documents shows that the notary public’s signature and stamp were duly affixed. Except for the notarial seal, all the requirements
for the verification and certification documents were complied with.
The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice.
The higher objective of procedural rules is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. 38
The CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead gave due course to the petition as it substantially complied with the requirements on
the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.
An issue on jurisdiction prevents the petition from becoming "moot and academic."
The petitioner claims that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed because the subsequent redemption of the property
by the respondent and the release of the price paid to the petitioner rendered the case moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events,
rendering the adjudication of the case or the resolution of the issue without any practical use or value. 39 Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness except when, among others, the case is capable of repetition yet
evades judicial review.40
The CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the orders directing the levy of the respondent’s
property. The issue on jurisdiction is a justiciable controversy that prevented the assailed CA petition from becoming moot and
academic.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. "Even on appeal
and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case." 41
Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s redemption of the property, the CA may still
entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
Under this perspective, the CA correctly exercised its jurisdiction over the petition.
Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the RTC
The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties
when an appeal is perfected.42
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments
to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. 43
The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the subject units were issued
pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not have
issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment
case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the
complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate
jurisdiction.
This Court takes judicial notice44 that the validity of the RTC Orders has been upheld in a separate petition before this Court,
under G.R. SP No. 171429 entitled Antonio Dela Cruz v. Regulus Development, Inc.
The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed with the MTC.
An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008, directing the levy of the respondent’s real property shows that it was based
on the RTC order dated July 25, 2003. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued to satisfy the amounts due under the lease
contracts, and not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.
The CA erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment case when it directed the levy of
the respondent’s property.
Furthermore, the order to levy on the respondent’s real property was consistent with the first writ of execution issued by the RTC on
December 18, 2003, to implement the RTC orders. The writ of execution states that:
xxx In case of [sic] sufficient personal property of the defendant cannot be found whereof to satisfy the amount of the said
judgment, you are directed to levy [on] the real property of said defendant and to sell the same or so much thereof in the manner
provided by law for the satisfaction of the said judgment and to make return of your proceedings together with this Writ within
sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. (emphasis supplied)
The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondent’s property was merely a reiteration and an enforcement of the original
writ of execution issued.1âwphi1
Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, the only question that needs to be resolved is which court has jurisdiction
to order the execution of the RTC orders.
The RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to order the levy of the respondent's real property.
Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1, 45 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with
jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders.
Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondent's real property before the
RTC as the court of origin.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated November 23, 2010, and the resolution
dated August 10, 2011, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated
June 30, 2008, and August 26, 2008, of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against
respondent Antonio dela Cruz.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013
ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the April 6, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101700, affirming the April 11, 2007 Decision 2 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Alberto Pat-og, Sr. (Pat-og) from the service for grave misconduct.
The Facts
On September 13, 2003, Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school student of the Antadao National High
School in Sagada, Mountain Province, tiled an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of the same school,
before the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).
Bang-on alleged that on the morning of August 26, 2003, he attended his class at the basketball court of the school, where Pat-og
and his third year students were also holding a separate class; that he and some of his classmates joined Pat-og’s third year students
who were practicing basketball shots; that Pat-og later instructed them to form two lines; that thinking that three lines were to be
formed, he stayed in between the two lines; that Pat-og then held his right arm and punched his stomach without warning for failing
to follow instructions; and that as a result, he suffered stomach pain for several days and was confined in a hospital from September
10-12, 2003, as evidenced by a medico-legal certificate, which stated that he sustained a contusion hematoma in the hypogastric
area.
Regarding the same incident, Bang-on filed a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injury with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file his counter-affidavit. He denied the charges hurled
against him and claimed that when he was conducting his Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health (MAPEH) class, composed of
third year students, he instructed the girls to play volleyball and the boys to play basketball; that he later directed the boys to form
two lines; that after the boys failed to follow his repeated instructions, he scolded them in a loud voice and wrested the ball from
them; that while approaching them, he noticed that there were male students who were not members of his class who had joined
the shooting practice; that one of those male students was Bang-on, who was supposed to be having his own MAPEH class under
another teacher; that he then glared at them, continued scolding them and dismissed the class for their failure to follow
instructions; and that he offered the sworn statement of other students to prove that he did not box Bang-on.
On June 1, 2004, the CSC-CAR found the existence of a prima faciecase for misconduct and formally charged Pat-og.
While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case and found Pat-og
guilty of the offense of slight physical injury. He was meted the penalty of imprisonment from eleven (11) to twenty (20) days.
Following his application for probation, the decision became final and executory and judgment was entered.
Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing conference was conducted after repeated postponement by Pat-og. With the
approval of the CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of evidence and formally
offered its evidence, which included the decision in the criminal case. It offered the affidavits of Raymund Atuban, a classmate of
Bang-on; and James Domanog, a third year high school student, who both witnessed Pat-og hit Bang-on in the stomach.
For his defense, Pat-og offered the testimonies of his witnesses - Emiliano Dontongan (Dontongan), a teacher in another school, who
alleged that he was a member of the Municipal Council for the Protection of Children, and that, in such capacity, he investigated the
incident and came to the conclusion that it did not happen at all; and Ernest Kimmot, who testified that he was in the basketball
court at the time but did not see such incident. Pat-og also presented the affidavits of thirteen other witnesses to prove that he did
not punch Bang-on.
Ruling of the CSC-CAR
In its Decision,3 dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises told, respondent Alberto Pat-og, Sr., Teacher Antadao National High School, is hereby found guilty of
Simple Misconduct.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first offense of Simple
Misconduct is suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Due to seriousness of the resulting injury to the fragile body of the minor victim, the CSC-CAR hereby imposed upon respondent the
maximum penalty attached to the offense which is six months suspension without pay.
The CSC-CAR gave greater weight to the version posited by the prosecution, finding that a blow was indeed inflicted by Pat-og on
Bang-on. It found that Pat-og had a motive for doing so - his students’ failure to follow his repeated instructions which angered him.
Nevertheless, the CSCCAR ruled that a motive was not necessary to establish guilt if the perpetrator of the offense was positively
identified. The positive identification of Pat-og was duly proven by the corroborative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who
were found to be credible and disinterested. The testimony of defense witness, Dontongan, was not given credence considering that
the students he interviewed for his investigation claimed that Pat-og was not even angry at the time of the incident, contrary to the
latter’s own admission.
The CSC-CAR held that the actions of Pat-og clearly transgressed the proper norms of conduct required of a public official, and the
gravity of the offense was further magnified by the seriousness of the injury of Bang-on which required a healing period of more
than ten (10) days. It pointed out that, being his teacher, Pat-og’s substitute parental authority did not give him license to physically
chastise a misbehaving student. The CSC-CAR added that the fact that Pat-og applied for probation in the criminal case, instead of
filing an appeal, further convinced it of his guilt.
The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct. It, however, found the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service too harsh under the circumstances. Thus, it adjudged petitioner guilty of Simple
Misconduct and imposed the maximum penalty of suspension for six (6) months.
On December 11, 2006, the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit. 4
The Ruling of the CSC
In its Resolution,5 dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the CSC-
CAR as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the CSC-CAR is affirmed with
the modification that Alberto Pat-og, Sr., is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct, for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal
from the service with all its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibilities, perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service, and forfeiture of retirement benefits. 6
After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained the CSC-CAR’s conclusion that there existed substantial evidence to sustain the
finding that Pat-og did punch Bang-on in the stomach. It gave greater weight to the positive statements of Bang-on and his witnesses
over the bare denial of Patog. It also highlighted the fact that Pat-og failed to adduce evidence of any ill motive on the part of Bang-
on in filing the administrative case against him. It likewise gave credence to the medico-legal certificate showing that Bang-on
suffered a hematoma contusion in his hypogastric area.
The CSC ruled that the affidavits of Bang-on’s witnesses were not bereft of evidentiary value even if Pat-og was not afforded a
chance to cross-examine the witnesses of Bang-on. It is of no moment because the cross- examination of witnesses is not an
indispensable requirement of administrative due process.
The CSC noted that Pat-og did not question but, instead, fully acquiesced in his conviction in the criminal case for slight physical
injury, which was based on the same set of facts and circumstances, and involved the same parties and issues. It, thus, considered
his prior criminal conviction as evidence against him in the administrative case.
Finding that his act of punching his student displayed a flagrant and wanton disregard of the dignity of a person, reminiscent of
corporal punishment that had since been outlawed for being harsh, unjust, and cruel, the CSC upgraded Pat-og’s offense from
Simple Misconduct to Grave Misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service.
Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He contended that
administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
On November 5, 2007, the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration. 7 It ruled that Pat-og was estopped from challenging its
jurisdiction considering that he actively participated in the administrative proceedings against him, raising the issue of jurisdiction
only after his appeal was dismissed by the CSC.
In its assailed April 6, 2011 Decision,8 the CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings. It was of the
view that Pat-og was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine Bang-on and his witnesses because he was given the
opportunity to be heard and present his evidence before the CSC-CAR and the CSC.
The CA also held that the CSC committed no error in taking into account the conviction of Pat-og in the criminal case. It stated that
his conviction was not the sole basis of the CSC for his dismissal from the service because there was substantial evidence proving
that Pat-og had indeed hit Bang-on.
In its assailed Resolution,9 dated September 13, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og.
Hence, the present petition with the following
Assignment of Errors
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS AGAINST THE PETITIONER WITHOUT
CONSIDERING PETITIONER’S LONG YEARS OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER
IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING THE APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
On Jurisdiction
Pat-og contends that Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
provides that administrative charges against a public school teacher shall be heard initially by a committee constituted under said
section. As no committee was ever formed, the petitioner posits that he was denied due process and that the CSC did not have the
jurisdiction to hear and decide his administrative case. He further argues that notwithstanding the fact that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised for the first time on appeal, the rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has no
jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.
The Court cannot sustain his position.
The petitioner’s argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. No. 4670 is misplaced.
In Puse v. Santos-Puse,10 it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers-
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil
service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. 11 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of
1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) 13 expressly provide that the CSC has the
power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the
investigating committee constituted therein.14 Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization
Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the
certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein. 15
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate
tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to
be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. 16
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board
of Professional Teachers.17
In CSC v. Alfonso,18 it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and
discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and foremost, a
civil servant accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a public servant. To hold that
R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public school teachers would negate the very purpose for which the CSC was
established and would impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud 19 that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against public school teachers, should be construed to refer only to the
specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670
confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school teachers on the DepEd.
At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue. Although the
rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel
has supervened.20 Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by actively
participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of
jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction when adverse.21
On Administrative Due Process
On due process, Pat-og asserts that the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are of questionable veracity having been
subscribed in Bontoc, which is nearly 30 kilometers from the residences of the parties. Furthermore, he claimed that considering
that the said affiants never testified, he was never afforded the opportunity to cross-examine them. Therefore, their affidavits were
mere hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.
The petitioner does not persuade.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 22 Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is
not always necessary23 and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of administrative due process.24 The petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the affidavit of Bang-on and his
witnesses are hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.
At any rate, having actively participated in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR, the CSC, and the CA, the petitioner was apparently
afforded every opportunity to explain his side and seek reconsideration of the ruling against him.1âwphi1
As to the issue of the veracity of the affidavits, such is a question of fact which cannot now be raised before the Court under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. The CSC-CAR, the CSC and the CA did not, therefore, err in giving credence to the affidavits of the complainants
and his witnesses, and in consequently ruling that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of misconduct on the part of
the petitioner.
On the Penalty
Assuming that he did box Bang-on, Pat-og argues that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he did so with a clear intent to
violate the law or in flagrant disregard of the established rule, as required for a finding of grave misconduct. He insists that he was
not motivated by bad faith or ill will because he acted in the belief that, as a teacher, he was exercising authority over Bang-on in
loco parentis, and was, accordingly, within his rights to discipline his student. Citing his 33 years in the government service without
any adverse record against him and the fact that he is at the edge of retirement, being already 62 years old, the petitioner prays
that, in the name of substantial and compassionate justice, the CSC-CAR’s finding of simple misconduct and the concomitant penalty
of suspension should be upheld, instead of dismissal.
The Court agrees in part.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a
public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or t1agrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. 25
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must not only be competent in the practice of their noble profession, but must also
possess dignity and a reputation with high moral values. They must strictly adhere to, observe, and practice the set of ethical and
moral principles, standards, and values laid down in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which apply to all teachers in
schools in the Philippines, whether public or private, as provided in the preamble of the said Code. 26 Section 8 of Article VIII of the
same Code expressly provides that "a teacher shall not inflict corporal punishment on offending learners."
Clearly then, petitioner cannot argue that in punching Bang-on, he was exercising his right as a teacher in loco parentis to discipline
his student. It is beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a public school teacher, deliberately violated his Code of Ethics. Such violation is
a flagrant disregard for the established rule contained in the said Code tantamount to grave misconduct.
Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave misconduct
is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 27 This penalty must, however, be tempered with compassion as
there was sut1icient provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering further the mitigating circumstances that the petitioner has
been in the government service for 33 years, that this is his first offense and that he is at the cusp of retirement, the Court finds the
penalty of suspension for six months as appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and MODIFIES the April 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101700. Accordingly, Alberto Pat-og, Sr. is found GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct, but the penalty is reduced from dismissal from
the service to SUSPENSION for SIX MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (1) the Decision, 1 dated 28 February 2006 and
(2) the Resolution,2 dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88586. The challenged decision granted herein
respondent's petition for certiorari upon a finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's
motion to dismiss the complaint against her.3 Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Orders, dated 8
November 20044 and 22 December 2004,5respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24.
The Facts
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. 6 Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May
1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer 7 in which she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-
defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.8 The death certificate9 of Manuel states "13 July 1995" as the date of death. As
a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. 10 In compliance with
the verbal order of the court during the 11 October 1999 hearing of the case, respondent submitted the required names and
addresses of the heirs.11 Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying that Manuel be substituted
by his children as party-defendants. It appears that this motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000. 13
Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001, the trial court issued its pre-trial order containing, among others, the dates of
hearing of the case.14
The trial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, as plaintiff, presented its evidence and its exhibits were thereafter admitted.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September
2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to evidence. 15 However, on 7
October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) that the complaint
failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court
must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. 16
The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states that: "Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made x x x." 17 Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was
likewise denied on the ground that "defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches" since
respondent failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so. 18
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred and gravely
abused its discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that would
constitute a ground for dismissal of the case. 19
The Court of Appeals granted the petition based on the following grounds:
It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant x x x only when the latter voluntarily appeared or
submitted to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, x x x. In this case, it is undisputed that when petitioner
Boston filed the complaint on December 24, 1997, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead, x x x. Such being the case, the
court a quo could not have acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel S. Toledo.
x x x the court a quo’s denial of respondent’s motion to dismiss was based on its finding that respondent’s attack on the jurisdiction
of the court was already barred by laches as respondent failed to raise the said ground in its [sic] amended answer and during the
pre-trial, despite her active participation in the proceedings.
However, x x x it is well-settled that issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on
appeal. By timely raising the issue on jurisdiction in her motion to dismiss x x x respondent is not estopped from raising the question
on jurisdiction.
Moreover, when issue on jurisdiction was raised by respondent, the court a quo had not yet decided the case, hence, there is no
basis for the court a quo to invoke estoppel to justify its denial of the motion for reconsideration;
It should be stressed that when the complaint was filed, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead. The complaint should have
impleaded the estate of Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not only the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an
indispensable party, which stands to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the case. x x x
xxxx
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted by public respondent judge as the same was in order.
Considering that the obligation of Manuel S. Toledo is solidary with another debtor, x x x, the claim x x x should be filed against the
estate of Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with the provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, x x x. 20
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that:
1. Respondent is already estopped from questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction;
2. Petitioner never failed to implead an indispensable party as the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party;
3. The inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not warranting the dismissal of the case before
the lower court; and
4. Since the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party, it is not necessary that petitioner file its claim against the estate
of Manuel.
In essence, what is at issue here is the correctness of the trial court’s orders denying respondent’s motion to dismiss.
The Ruling of the Court
We find merit in the petition.
Motion to dismiss filed out of time
To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent. Well settled is the rule that the
special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of
the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case and still
leaves something to be done by the court before a case is finally decided on the merits. 21 Therefore, "the proper remedy in such a
case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered." 22
As the Supreme Court held in Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on Higher Education: 23
A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court
within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to
perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s
motion to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed SIX
YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This circumstance alone already warranted the outright
dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear contravention of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised
Rules of Court. Under this provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim.24
More importantly, respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed the presentation of its evidence in the
trial court, giving credence to petitioner’s and the trial court’s conclusion that the filing of the motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on
the part of respondent to delay the prompt resolution of the case against her.
Also worth mentioning is the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss under consideration herein is not the first motion to dismiss
she filed in the trial court. It appears that she had filed an earlier motion to dismiss 26 on the sole ground of the unenforceability of
petitioner’s claim under the Statute of Frauds, which motion was denied by the trial court. More telling is the following narration of
the trial court in its Order denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to dismiss:
As can be gleaned from the records, with the admission of plaintiff’s exhibits, reception of defendants’ evidence was set on March
31, and April 23, 2004 x x x . On motion of the defendants, the hearing on March 31, 2004 was cancelled.
On April 14, 2004, defendants sought the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum to one Gina M. Madulid, to
appear and testify for the defendants on April 23, 2004. Reception of defendants’ evidence was again deferred to May 26, June 2
and June 30, 2004, x x x.
On May 13, 2004, defendants sought again the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to the said Gina Madulid.
On May 26, 2004, reception of defendants [sic] evidence was cancelled upon the agreement of the parties. On July 28, 2004, in the
absence of defendants’ witness, hearing was reset to September 24 and October 8, 2004 x x x.
On September 24, 2004, counsel for defendants was given a period of fifteen (15) days to file a demurrer to evidence. On October 7,
2004, defendants filed instead a Motion to Dismiss x x x. 27
Respondent’s act of filing multiple motions, such as the first and earlier motion to dismiss and then the motion to dismiss at issue
here, as well as several motions for postponement, lends credibility to the position taken by petitioner, which is shared by the trial
court, that respondent is
deliberately impeding the early disposition of this case. The filing of the second motion to dismiss was, therefore, "not only improper
but also dilatory."28 Thus, the trial court, "far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on the matter, x x
x had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case." 29 The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred not only in
entertaining respondent’s petition for certiorari, it likewise erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.
On whether or not respondent is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
should not be an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded by the fact that jurisdiction has
been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals and, finally, before this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in
order to finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in this case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the issue of
jurisdiction.
1. Aspects of Jurisdiction
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was filed more than
six years after her amended answer was filed. According to petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at various stages of the
proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of
Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. 30 petitioner claimed that respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier
stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.
Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1)
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases
involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. 31
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the then Court of First Instance to
hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the amount of ₱1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject matter of the case. Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 32 the issue for consideration was the authority of
the regional trial court to hear and decide an action for reformation of contract and damages involving a subdivision lot, it being
argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC, Legaspi City, 33 petitioners argued that the respondent
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the issue of ownership was raised in the
pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga,34 accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of which she was charged, falls
within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or city courts and the then courts of first instance, and that the judgment of
the court of first instance, to which she had appealed the municipal court's conviction, should be deemed null and void for want of
jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject
matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture
by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily. 35
Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person
of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to
jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.
The Rules of Court provide:
RULE 9
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
RULE 15
MOTIONS
Sec. 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Based on the foregoing provisions, the "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to
dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can always be
raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject, however, to the principle
of estoppel by laches."36
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed
waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a
waiver of the defense.37 If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction
over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.38
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned decision, stating that "issue on
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal" and that, therefore, respondent timely
raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction. As the question
of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer
or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to
waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence." 39
2. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Manuel Toledo
In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case
against him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person." 40
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons
upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. The
issues presented in this case are similar to those in the case of Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te. 41
In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a decision declaring that Patricio Sereno was illegally dismissed from employment and ordering the
payment of his monetary claims. To satisfy the claim, a truck in the possession of Sereno’s employer was levied upon by a sheriff of
the NLRC, accompanied by Sereno and his lawyer, Rogelio Sarsaba, the petitioner in that case. A complaint for recovery of motor
vehicle and damages, with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente lite was eventually filed against Sarsaba, Sereno, the NLRC
sheriff and the NLRC by the registered owner of the truck. After his motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, petitioner
Sarsaba filed his answer. Later on, however, he filed an omnibus motion to dismiss citing, as one of the grounds, lack of jurisdiction
over one of the principal defendants, in view of the fact that Sereno was already dead when the complaint for recovery of
possession was filed.
Although the factual milieu of the present case is not exactly similar to that of Sarsaba, one of the issues submitted for resolution in
both cases is similar: whether or not a case, where one of the named defendants was already dead at the time of its filing, should be
dismissed so that the claim may be pursued instead in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant.
The petitioner in the Sarsaba Case claimed, as did respondent herein, that since one of the defendants died before summons was
served on him, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and the claim should be filed against
the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner in Sarsaba, therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed, not only against
Sereno, but as to all the defendants, considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. 42 This is exactly
the same prayer made by respondent herein in her motion to dismiss.
The Court, in the Sarsaba Case, resolved the issue in this wise:
x x x We cannot countenance petitioner’s argument that the complaint against the other defendants should have been dismissed,
considering that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s
person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view
of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed
against all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on Sereno’s person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint
against the other defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of the summons and complaints and have long
submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all
possible defenses and objections personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent answers. 43 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint against Sereno only.
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, there is no basis for dismissing the complaint against respondent herein. Thus, as already
emphasized above, the trial court correctly denied her motion to dismiss.
On whether or not the estate of Manuel
Toledo is an indispensable party
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case that a final adjudication cannot
be made in his or her absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but "an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest
or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination
between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable." Further, an indispensable party is one who
must be included in an action before it may properly proceed. 44
On the other hand, a "person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the
interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice
between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him or her
and those already parties to the action, or if he or she has no interest in the subject matter of the action." It is not a sufficient reason
to declare a person to be an indispensable party simply because his or her presence will avoid multiple litigations. 45
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the
collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and respondent’s husband, on the other, states:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of
PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (₱1,400,000.00)] x x x.47
The provisions and stipulations of the contract were then followed by the respective signatures of respondent as "MAKER" and her
husband as "CO-MAKER."48 Thus, pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil Code, petitioner may collect the entire amount of the
obligation from respondent only. The aforementioned provision states: "The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."
In other words, the collection case can proceed and the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent only, even without
impleading the estate of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for sum
of money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the contention of respondent, held that the claim of petitioner should have been filed
against the estate of Manuel in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The aforementioned provisions
provide:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise, they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
x x x.
SEC. 6. Solidary obligation of decedent. Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed
against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the
other debtor. x x x.
The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the above-quoted provisions.
In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
latter provision has been retained in the present Rules of Court without any revisions, the Supreme Court, in the case of Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Villarama, et. al., 49 held:50
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil Procedure from whence [Section 6, Rule 87] was taken, this Court held that where two
persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of
the latter, the decedent’s liability being absolute and primary; x x x. It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87
provides the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said
provision making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving solidary
debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe
the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand,
the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
There is, therefore, nothing improper in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of
instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and expounded in the later case of Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion 51where the Supreme
Court pronounced:
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a
creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in
a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. x x x
xxxx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the
right to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously." The choice is undoubtedly left to
the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he
(the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of
the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a
condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive
rightsprovided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New
Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of
[the deceased debtor] only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the [creditor’s] right under the New Civil Code to proceed against
any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by principle, which is too well settled to require
citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter,
substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party and the case can proceed as against respondent only.
That petitioner opted to collect from respondent and not from the estate of Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent’s
motion to dismiss asserting that the case, as against her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can proceed against the estate of
Manuel.
On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as
party defendant is a misjoinder of party
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that "neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an
action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately."
Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must have the capacity to sue or be sued in the
event that the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel
in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in fact, the action would have proceeded against him had he been alive at the
time the collection case was filed by petitioner. This being the case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain
here. The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot simply be dropped from the case. Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in
Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te,52whose facts, as mentioned earlier, resemble those of this case, should be followed herein. There, the
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court when it resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Sereno in this
wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since there
was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together
with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be served upon him.
However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein, does not render the action
DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants, x x x, were validly served with summons and the case with respect to
the answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3) answering defendants have previously
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio
Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused [sic] will proceed. (Emphasis supplied.) 53
As a result, the case, as against Manuel, must be dismissed.
In addition, the dismissal of the case against Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states
that: only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." Applying this provision of law,
the Court, in the case of Ventura v. Militante,54 held:
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. x x x. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an
actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial
person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person.
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to
name the proper party defendant to his cause of action. In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can
acquire no jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally capable
of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a question
of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
The original complaint of petitioner named the "estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura" as the
defendant.1âwphi1 Petitioner moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the defendant as named in the complaint had no legal
personality. We agree.
x x x. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the
capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action. (Emphases supplied.)
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the complaint may be
dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action
pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one
who cannot be a party to a civil action.55
Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the dismissal of the case as against
him, thus did the trial court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party
to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
Death of party;duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. x x x
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator x x x.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person
and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 February 2006 and the Resolution dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88586 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated 8 November 2004 and
22 December 2004, respectively, in Civil Case No. 97-86672, are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila is hereby
DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 97-86672 against respondent Lolita G. Toledo only, in accordance with the above
pronouncements of the Court, and to decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated
June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision 3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A.
3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile,
he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which
Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the
assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c)
in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines. 4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo
Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. 5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash 7 the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts
adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB,
also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone
accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was
filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed
in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. 9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO.
28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 10
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices
act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case
involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted
for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died
prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the Information
and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for
violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that
their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement
of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such
private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. 15 If two or more persons enter into a
conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance
of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the
actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. 17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the
conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent
of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death
of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense. 19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is deemed
hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also
incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public
officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices," 20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer
would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta 21 as to the nature of and the principles governing
conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion
and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to
commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains
undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a
conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically
prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital
importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime
and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that
"when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole,
the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when
two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of
the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the
close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common
agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be
regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved,
collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be
proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the
conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to
all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a
rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in
furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their
evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable. 22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the
absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. 23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against
respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion 24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was
likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by
allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the
present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion
to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned
the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a
minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This
Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919
should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail
for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation 26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with
petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. 27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to
avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person
at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby
gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily
appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must
do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have
submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must
be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not
be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x. 28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to
his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090
only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers
representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant
case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under
the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by
reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the
SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean
that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as
the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the main case has
already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the
resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to
Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City
Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM
MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.;
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE
LINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable
period from January to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center,
Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus
Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15,
16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized
to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their
business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for
"Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they
filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20
of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government
Code] on double taxation. They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the
RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. 2
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 4 but the RTC denied it in its Order5 dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the
RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction
over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was
filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA
9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the petitioners, their agents and/or authorized representatives from
implementing Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private respondents.
III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or
refund with the City Treasurer of Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting agents of
the City Government.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner City of Manila and its constituents would result to greater
damage and prejudice thereof. (sic)8
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a Decision 9 in the main case had already been
rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to
grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year
2002 in the following amounts:
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - 419,689.04
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - 231,453.62
Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - 220,204.70
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34
TOTAL: - P 19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.10
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had already become final and executory per the
Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution 12 was issued by the RTC on
November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve
the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering that the trial
court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now final
and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. 13
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for
future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review. 14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural
error which petitioners committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for
reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as they
disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost
appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court
has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. 18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the
15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and
because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the
instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case. The basic question posed before this Court is
whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a
local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over
the following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges;
seizure, detention or release of property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property or other matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the
jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.
Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal
Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto,
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions
of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and
Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article,
and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and
countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose
said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of
Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of
taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) or where
there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of
such civil action separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in
their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees,
charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by
them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that th e
CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. 20 Thus, in
the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v. COMELEC,23Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v.
Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25 this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for
certiorari on the ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. 26 It must be observed, however, that
with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 28 now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among
others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of
certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that
the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among
others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed
that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.
There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. 29 that
"if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." 30 This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v.
Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court
has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court." 32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and
De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo 33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely
the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. 35 The Court cannot accept that such was
the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence
over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such
power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax
refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an
appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that
the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the
decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari
when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final
orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter. 36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders
that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to
protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere
with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. 37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its
jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to
defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers
of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to
those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise
of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or
are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the
court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 38
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction,
a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things
that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates."39 Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and
coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its
authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original
causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for
certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution
as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned,
the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from
the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015
SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioner, v.HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 85, QUEZON CITY, Respondent.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A petition for the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title must strictly comply with the requirements prescribed in Republic Act No.
26;1 otherwise, the petition should be dismissed.
This case is a direct resort to the Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petitioner applied for the judicial reconstitution
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1609 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and for the issuance of a new OCT in place
thereof, docketed as L.R.C. Case No. Q-18987 (04), but respondent Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Quezon City dismissed the petition for reconstitution through the assailed order dated September 12, 2006. The petitioner
alleges that the respondent Judge thereby committed grave abuse of discretion and unlawful neglect of performance of an act
specifically enjoined upon him. Equally assailed is the ensuing denial of its motion for reconsideration through the order dated
February 5, 2007.
The antecedents follow.
On October 28, 2004, the petitioner claimed in its petition for reconstitution that the original copy of OCT No. 1609 had been burnt
and lost in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Register of Deeds in the late 80�s. Initially, respondent Judge gave due course to the
petition, but after the preliminary hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution through the first assailed order of September
12, 2006,2 to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With the receipt of Report dated July 14, 2006 from Land Registration Authority (LRA) recommending that the petition be dismissed,
and considering the Opposition filed by the Republic of the Philippines and University of the Philippines, the above-entitled petition
is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
On October 11, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, 3 attaching the following documents to support its
petition for reconstitution, namely: (1) the copy of the original application for registration dated January 27, 1955; (2) the notice of
initial hearing dated June 23, 1955; (3) the letter of transmittal to the Court of First Instance in Quezon City; (4) the copy of the
Spanish Testimonial Title No. 3261054 dated March 25, 1977 in the name of Eladio Tiburcio; (5) the copy of Tax Assessment No.
14238; and (6) the approved Plan SWD-37457.
On February 5, 2007, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of any cogent or justifiable ground to
reconsider.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, on February 22, 2007, the petitioner came directly to the Court alleging that respondent Judge had �unfairly abused his
discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which is specifically enjoined upon him as a duly [sic] under Rule 7,
Section 8, of the Revised Rules of Court;�5that �in finally dismissing the herein subject Petition for Reconsideration, respondent
Honorable Acting Presiding Judge has acted without and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of discretion to the further
damage and prejudice of the herein petitioner;�6 and that it had no other remedy in the course of law except through the present
petition for certiorari and mandamus.cralawred
Issues
The Court directed respondent Judge and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition
for certiorari and mandamus. Respondent Judge submitted his comment on May 23, 2007, 7 and the OSG its comment on July 19,
2007.8 On November 13, 2007, the University of the Philippines (UP) sought leave to intervene, attaching to its motion the intended
comment/opposition-in-intervention.9 The motion for the UP�s intervention was granted on November 28, 2007. 10 In turn, the
petitioner presented its consolidated reply on February 8, 2008. 11 The parties, except respondent Judge, then filed their memoranda
in compliance with the Court�s directive.
Respondent Judge justified the dismissal of the petition for reconstitution by citing the opposition by the OSG and the UP, as well as
the recommendation of the Land Registration Authority (LRA). He pointed out that the petitioner did not present its purported
Torrens title to be reconstituted; that the petitioner�s claim was doubtful given the magnitude of 4,304,623 square meters as the
land area involved;12 and that the UP�s ownership of the portion of land covered by petitioner�s claim had long been settled by
the Court in a long line of cases.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The OSG and the UP argued that by directly coming to the Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus, the petitioner had availed
itself of the wrong remedies to substitute for its lost appeal; that the correct recourse for the petitioner was an appeal considering
that the two assailed orders already finally disposed of the case; that the petitioner intended its petition
for certiorari and mandamus to reverse the final orders;14 that the petitioner further failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, despite the Court of Appeals (CA) having concurrent jurisdiction with the Court over special civil actions under Rule 65; 15that
the RTC would have gravely erred had it proceeded on the petition for� reconstitution despite the petitioner not having notified the
adjoining owners of the land or other parties with interest over the land; 16 that the petitioner had no factual and legal bases for
reconstitution due to its failure to prove the existence and validity of the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, in addition to
the ownership of the land covered by the petition for reconstitution being already settled in a long line of cases; that the
petitioner�s claim over the land was derived from the Deed of Assignment executed by one Marcelino Tiburcio � the same person
whose claim had long been settled and disposed of in Tiburcio v. People�s Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the
Philippines (106 Phil. 477), which vested title in the UP, and in Ca�ero v. University of the Philippines (437 SCRA 630); and that the
Deed of Transfer and Conveyance dated November 26, 1925 executed by Tiburcio in favor of St. Mary Village Association, Inc. was
not a basis for the judicial reconstitution of title accepted under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 26.
In its memorandum, the petitioner indicates that the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction
in dismissing its petition for reconstitution on the basis of the recommendation of the LRA and the opposition of the Republic and
the UP despite having initially given due course to the petition for reconstitution. It urges that the dismissal should be overturned
because it was not given a chance to comment on the recommendation of the LRA, or to controvert the oppositions filed. 17 It
contends that the LRA report did not substantiate the allegation of dismissal of the application for registration of Marcelino Tiburcio
on October 17, 1955, in addition to the veracity of the report being questionable by virtue of its not having been under
oath.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and mandamus, being devoid of procedural and substantive merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions defined by the Rules of Court. The conditions
are that: (1) the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 19Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute
lack of authority; there is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority;� grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in
other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his
jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under Section 12 21 of Republic
Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title, the Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of First
Instance) had the original and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial reconstitution of title. Hence, the RTC neither
lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for reconstitution involved land already registered in the
name of the UP, as confirmed by the LRA. Instead, it would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt with and granted
the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
Secondly, the petitioner did not present the duplicate or certified copy of OCT No. 1609. Thereby, it disobeyed Section 2 and Section
3 of Republic Act No. 26, the provisions that expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an existing Torrens
title, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d)� An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of
title was issued;
(e)� A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f)� Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an
authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer
certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
Thirdly, with the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for judicial reconstitution, nothing more was
left for the RTC to do in the case. As of then, therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals
by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. By allowing the period of appeal to
elapse without taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary
remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. That the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an
available remedy in the ordinary course of law is clear from Section 1 of Rule 65, which requires that there must be no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Indeed, no error of judgment by a court will be corrected by
certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional errors. 22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Fourthly, the filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only
when there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with
the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. 23 There being no special, important or
compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari.
Finally, the land covered by the petition for judicial reconstitution related to the same area that formed the UP campus. The UP�s
registered ownership of the land comprising its campus has long been settled under the law. Accordingly, the dismissal of the
petition for judicial reconstitution by respondent Judge only safeguarded the UP�s registered ownership. In so doing, respondent
Judge actually heeded the clear warnings to the lower courts and the Law Profession in general against mounting or abetting any
attack against such ownership. One such warning was that in Ca�ero v. University of the Philippines,24 as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We strongly admonish courts and unscrupulous lawyers to stop entertaining spurious cases seeking further to assail respondent
UP�s title.� These cases open the dissolute avenues of graft to unscrupulous land-grabbers who prey like vultures upon the
campus of respondent UP.� By such actions, they wittingly or unwittingly aid the hucksters who want to earn a quick buck by
misleading the gullible to buy the Philippine counterpart of the proverbial London Bridge.� It is well past time for courts and
lawyers to cease wasting their time and resources on these worthless causes and take judicial notice of the fact that respondent
UP�s title had already been validated countless times by this Court.� Any ruling deviating from such doctrine is to be viewed as a
deliberate intent to sabotage the rule of law and will no longer be countenanced. 25
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August 18, 2009 Resolution 1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with
Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. 3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),
Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue
Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his
financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are
the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P.
DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest 7before
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26.
Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an
official of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below
Salary Grade 27.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and
those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and,"
which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together "relating one to the
other" to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade,
fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already resolved in Inding.
Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan has yet to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan 12 and Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in his
rejoinder.
On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing: WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore
issued against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides
that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v.
Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied; 16 Hence, this petition.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required respondents to file a comment
on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto. 17 Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was
filed by petitioner.
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A
No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A)
(1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who
is merely a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary
grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. 18 By virtue of the powers vested
in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, 20Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No.
1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof. 24 Aside from
Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was
further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.30
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary
grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second
part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 32
That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and higher" is apparent from the
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249,
respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it only in instances
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which
shall remain with the Sandiganbayan. 33 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and
leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the
clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving
thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary
grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in government regardless of
salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called "big
fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called
"small fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets. 35
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that
they hold the positions enumerated by the law. 36 In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of
the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27,
the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g).
Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over
whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial
courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the
entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give
effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect
to the whole of the statute – its every word. 39
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, 40 a department manager of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth), 41 a student regent of the University of the Philippines, 42 and a Head of the Legal Department and
Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) 43 fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated in
Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco.1avvphi1Therein, the accused was the
Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in
1992, his position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26. 44It was opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the
commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases
falls with the Regional Trial Court.
We sustain petitioner's contention.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed
by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade "26"
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error
of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office,
entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a
Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26. 46
There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that respondent court has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to
the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and February
8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196278 June 17, 2015
CE CASECNAN WATER and ENERGY COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, THEOFFICEOFTHEPROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF NUEVA ECIJA, and THEOFFICEOFTHEPROVINCIAL
TREASURER OF NUEVA ECIJA, as represented by HON. AURELIO UMALI, HON. FLORANTE FAJARDO and HON. EDILBERTO PANCHO,
respectively, or their lawful successors,Respondents,
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, As Necessary Parties.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a local tax case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 2, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 108441
which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Petition for Certiorari of petitioner CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc.
(petitioner) against the Province of Nueva Ecija, the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Nueva Ecija (Office of the Provincial Assessor)
and the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Ecija (Office of the Provincial Treasurer) (respondents). Also assailed is the March
24, 2011 Resolution3 of the CA denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. 4
Factual Antecedents
On June 26, 1995, petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract
known as the "Amended and Restated Casecnan Project Agreement" 5 (Casecnan Contract) relative to the construction and
development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and Power Project (Casecnan Project) in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija and
Alfonso Castaneda, Nueva Vizcaya. The Casecnan Project is a combined irrigation and hydroelectric power generation facility using
the Pantabangan Dam in Nueva Ecija. On September 29, 2003, petitioner and NIA executed a Supplemental Agreement 6 amending
Article II of the Casecnan Contract which pertains to payment of taxes. Article 2.2 thereof states that NIA must reimburse petitioner
for real property taxes (RPT) provided the same was paid upon NIA’s directive and with the concurrence of the Department of
Finance.
On September 6, 2005, petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Assessor a Notice of Assessment of Real Property dated
August 2, 2005, which indicates that for the years 2002 to 2005, its RPT due was 248,676,349.60. Petitioner assailed the assessment
with the Nueva Ecija Local Board of Assessment Appeals (Nueva Ecija LBAA) which dismissed it on January 26, 2006. Undeterred,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Nueva Ecija Central Board of Assessment Appeals (Nueva Ecija CBAA). During the
pendency thereof, respondents collected from petitioner the RPT due under the said assessment as well as those pertaining to the
years 2006 up to the second quarter of 2008, totalling ₱363,703,606.88. Petitioner paid the assessed RPT under protest; it also
initiated proceedings questioning the validity of the collection with respect to the years 2006 up to the second quarter of 2008.
Thereafter, petitioner received a letter7 dated July 9, 2008 from the Office of the Provincial Treasurer stating that it has RPT in
arrears for the years 2002 up to the second quarter of 2008 amounting to ₱1,277,474,342.10. Petitioner received another
letter8 dated August 29, 2008 from the same office clarifying that its arrearages in RPT actually amounted to ₱1,279,997,722.70
(2008 RPT Reassessment). Again, petitioner questioned this assessment through an appeal before the Nueva Ecija LBAA. While the
same was pending, petitioner received from respondents a letter dated September 10, 2008 demanding payment for its alleged RPT
arrearages.
Hence, on September 23, 2008, petitioner filed with the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija a Complaint 9 for injunction and damages
with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction 10 praying to restrain the collection of the 2008 RPT
Reassessment. Petitioner emphasized, among others, that it was not the one which should pay the taxes but NIA.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 24, 2008, the RTC denied petitioner’s application for a 72-hour TRO. 11 Meanwhile, petitioner received from the Office
of the Provincial Treasurer a letter dated September 22, 2008 further demanding payment for RPT covering the third quarter of 2008
(2008-3Q Assessment). Thus, petitioner filed on September 29, 2008 an Amended Complaint 12 asking the RTC to likewise enjoin
respondents from collecting RPT based on the 2008-3Q Assessment in the amount of ₱53,346,755.18.
On October 2, 2008, the RTC issued a 20-day TRO13 enjoining respondents from collecting from petitioner the RPT covered by the
2008 RPT Reassessment amounting to ₱1,279,997,722.70, including surcharges and penalties.
Subsequently, however, the RTC denied petitioner’s application for writ of preliminary injunction in its Order 14 of October 24, 2008.It
also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof in an Order 15 dated January 30, 2009.
On April 24, 2009, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 16 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set
aside the aforementioned October 24, 2008 and January 30, 2009 RTC Orders.
In its November 2, 2010 Decision,17 the CA observed that the Petition for Certiorari before it was actually an offshoot of the 2008 RPT
Reassessment. And since in resolving the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the issue of the validity of the assessment and the collection of the RPT against
petitioner must also be resolved, thus jurisdiction over the case lies within the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).Hence, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner sought reconsideration; however, it was denied in a Resolution 19 dated March 24, 2011.
Undaunted, petitioner filed this Petition imputing upon the CA grave error in:
x x x ruling that it is the Court of Tax Appeals (and not the Court of Appeals) which has jurisdiction over the CA Injunction Case. 20
Petitioner’s Arguments
In its Petition21 and Reply,22 petitioner argues that it is the CA, not the CTA, which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of its
Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner maintains that its petition relates to an ordinary civil action for injunction and not to a local tax
case. It insists that in both the RTC injunction case and the Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner was not protesting
respondents’ assessment of RPT against it; what it was seeking was respondents’ enjoinment from committing or continuing to
commit acts that would probably violate its right. In particular, petitioner points out that the RTC injunction case was intended to
enjoin respondents from collecting payment during the pendency of the case with the LBAA challenging the validity of the 2008 RPT
Reassessment. Petitioner explains that the said injunction case was filed with the RTC because the LBAA has no injunctive power.
Respondents’ Arguments
In their Comment,23 respondents argue that in resolving the issue on the propriety of issuing a writ of injunction, the CA will have to
inevitably pass upon the propriety of the assessment of RPT on the Casecnan Project, a local tax matter which is within the
jurisdiction of the CTA. Respondents also echo the CA pronouncement that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies with
respect to the assessment and collection of RPT.
Our Ruling
There is no merit in the Petition.
It is the CTA which has the power to rule
on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order of the RTC relating
to a local tax case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the consent or
waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the merits and must dismiss it. 24
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction by
virtue of Republic Act No. 9282.25 This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction.26
In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 27 the Court ruled that the CTA likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction, thus:
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that
the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. 28 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
Further, the Court in City of Manila, citing J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, 29 De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,30 as well as the more
recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Hon. Judge Geronimo 31 and Bulilis v. Nuez,32 held that:
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that
‘if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction
to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.’ This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of
Appeals, where the Court stated that ‘a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has
jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.’ The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De
Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo and Bulilis v. Nuez.
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.33 (Citations omitted)
Anent petitioner’s contention that it is the CA which has jurisdiction over a certiorari petition assailing an interlocutory order issued
by the RTC in a local tax case, the Court had this to say: If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction over
their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly
administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly
confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax
cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise
would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the
very same case.
xxxx
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders
that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to
protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of
its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. 34 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied) Given these, it is settled that it is the
CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a
local tax case.
The RTC injunction case is a local tax >case.
In maintaining that it is the CA that has jurisdiction over petitioner’s certiorari petition, the latter argues that the injunction case it
filed with the RTC is not a local tax case but an ordinary civil action. It insists that it is not protesting the assessment of RPT against it
but only prays that respondents be enjoined from collecting the same.
The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the collection of RPT, petitioner also implicitly questions the propriety of the
assessment of such RPT.1awp++i1 This is because in ruling as to whether to restrain the collection, the RTC must first necessarily rule
on the propriety of the assessment. In other words, in filing an action for injunction to restrain collection, petitioner was in effect
also challenging the validity of the RPT assessment. As aptly discussed by the CA:
x x x [T]he original action filed with the RTC is one for Injunction, with an application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the province of Nueva Ecija from further collecting the alleged real property tax liability assessed
against it. Simply because the action is an application for injunctive relief does not necessarily mean that it may no longer be
considered as a local tax case. The subject matter and the issues, not the name or designation of the remedy, should control. While
an ancillary action for injunction may not be a main case, the court [still has] to determine, even in a preliminary matter, the
applicable tax laws, rules and jurisprudence. x x x35
Moreover, in National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas, 36 as well as in City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine
Economic Zone Authority,37 this Court already held that local tax cases include RPT.
No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case. And as earlier discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an
interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the CT A. Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 2, 2010 Decision and March 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No.108441 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002

Escobal vs Garchitorena (Remedial Law)

(jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis of the RTC)

G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J.

c. Failure to Implead an Indispensable Party

3.3.4 FINANCING AND FINANCIAL PREQUALIFICATIONS REQUIREMENTS

1997 Concession Agreement

a. Modification on Fees and

4.2.3 Mechanism for Adjustment of Fees and Charges

4.2.3.1 Periodic Adjustment in Fees and Charges

Direct Government Guarantee

Section 1.06. Attendant Liabilities

Temporary takeover of business affected with

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Liga ng Mga Barangay vs Atienza, Jr (Remedial Law)

G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004

2.� 7th year� -�� 20%

3.� 8th year� -�� 20%

4.� 9th year� -�� 20%

5.� 10th year� -�� 20%

On all domestic households in Quezon City;

A.� Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari

C.� Litis Pendentia

D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:

On the Garbage Fee

Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;

(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;

(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

(b) Documentary stamp tax;

(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;

On the Garbage Fee

We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.

The source reduction component shall describe the following:

(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;

(b) amount/volume of waste; and

(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees

c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility

d) capacity or type of LGU constituency

The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:

The antecedent facts are as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

On March 4, 2009, the SDC issued an Order14 reading as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong,28 we stated that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

We find for the petitioners.

In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

[G.R. NO. 210901]

3. Then came P.D. No. 755 providing under its Section 1 the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We rule as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SO ORDERED.10� (Boldface in the original; additional underscoring supplied)

Civil Case No. 12-1251

Civil Case No. 12-1252

The issues generated by this controversy are the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

The petitions are meritorious.

Alleged Lack of Authority of PCGG

The RTC has no jurisdiction over

Soriano III v. Yuzon30 reiterated the above ruling, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case

Thus, the petition must fail for the following reasons:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Applicability of Res Judicata