158. ECHANES vs SPS. HAILAR
REYES vs HEIRS OF FORLALES
GR 203880
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
FACTS: The late Eduardo Cuenta was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land
with an area of 1,447 square meters, covered by a tax declaration under his name.
The heirs of Eduardo Cuenta executed an Extrajudicial Settlement dividing and
adjudicating unto themselves the parcel of land left by Eduardo Cuenta. A portion of
the said lot which was denominated as Lot No. 2297-A was adjudicated to petitioner
who is one of the heirs of Eduardo Cuenta. Thereafter, petitioner applied for a free
patent over Lot No. 2997-A. Accordingly, an Original Certificate of Title was issued in
her name by the Register of Deeds. A portion of Lot No. 2291-A is currently
occupied by respondents. Since petitioner’s children are in need of the area
currently occupied by respondents, petitioner sent respondents a Notice to Vacate .
Despite receipt of said demand letter, respondents refused to vacate the premises.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Damages.
ISSUE: Who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of
the property in dispute?
RULING: RESPONDENTS! Settled rule in an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the
issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the
same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the property. Therefore, since the
issue of ownership is raised in this unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down
to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight. Further, in an
action for forcible entry and detainer, if plaintiff can prove prior physical possession
in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other
hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for
forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.
There is no dispute that the respondents had continuously and openly occupied and
possessed, in the concept of an owner, the subject property from the time they
purchased it from Eduardo Cuenta. They segregated and declared for taxation
purposes as early as 1959 the portion of Lot No. 2297-A. The property was
consistently declared for taxation purposes until 2007. While tax declarations and
realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of possession, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner based on the presumption that no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not his possession.
159.
GR 193075
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
FACTS: As early as 1978, the petitioners claimed that they had already been
occupying the disputed portion (part of estate). Independencia Forlales sent a
demand letter to vacate the premises to petitioners on May 28, 1993, which went
unheeded. Thus, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioners.
This complaint was dismissed because the respondents filed it one (1) year beyond
the date Independencia demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises. On
2005, the respondents again filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners
before the MCTC. Petitioners mainly argued in their answer that the complaint for
ejectment had prescribed.
RTC ruled that although the petitioners' possession lasted beyond May 28, 1993 -
the date of the first demand to vacate - their continued possession from then up to
the time they received the last demand to vacate on May 27, 2005, should be
considered as possession by mere tolerance. The RTC concluded that the one-year
prescriptive period for filing the ejectment suit should be counted from the date of
the last demand to vacate because it was only from that time that the petitioners'
possession became illegal.
ISSUE: W/N the ejectment complaint has already prescribed
RULING: YES. If the entry is illegal from its inception, the action which may be filed
against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If not - or the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal - the case is one of
unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last
demand to vacate. The present case cannot be said to be an unlawful detainer case
because in the first place, the possession of petitioners from 1993 was NOT BY
MERE TOLERANCE. The filing of the first complaint for unlawful detainer four (4)
years after May 28, 1993, affirms the fact that the respondents no longer wanted
the petitioners to occupy the disputed portion as early as 1993. Thus, the
possession of the petitioners after said date started becoming illegal because they
no longer had a right to occupy the portion of the lot.
NOTE: By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or
license, acts of possession are realized or performed.
160. BEGNAEN vs SPS CALIGTAN
GR 189852
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Hearing Office of National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against respondents alleging that the
latter entered his property, by using FIST and put up a shack bordered with chicken
fence without his consent. Respondents averred that the area in question is a land
that they had purchased pursuant to age-old customs and traditions which the
father of the petitioner had affirmed when he was still alive.
The RHO thereafter dismissed the complaint because the case should have
gone to the council of elders and not through the Barangay Lupon, as mandated by
the IPRA. However, instead of obeying the orders of NCIP, the petitioner filed
another complaint before the MCTC. MCTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that it is
the NCIP-RHO which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. RTC
reversed, saying that the MCTC had jurisdiction. CA reversed and set aside the RTC
rulings, and reinstated the Resolution of the MCTC saying that the provisions of
IPRA has divested regular courts of their jurisdiction when the parties involved are
members of ICCs/IPs and the disputed property forms part of their ancestral
domain. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not NCIP-RHO has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under
customary laws.
RULING: NO. NCIP cannot be said to have even primary jurisdiction over all ICC/IP
cases. On a careful perusal of Section 66 of the IPRA, there is no specificity in the
grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP. Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of the ICCs/IPs.
As such, the provisions of NCIP’s Administrative Circulars’ classification of its RHO’s
jurisdiction cannot be warranted by the Court for it broadens the scope of the
jurisdiction conferred by the IPRA on NCIP. Such implementing rules and regulations
of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage rather it must remain
consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement.
The regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of
ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes necessarily include the IPRA
and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs. The Court intimates that while the
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter, the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
161. ROSARIO vs ALBA
GR 199464
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Respondent - son and only surviving legal heir of Luz; Petitioners - fellow heirs to
the estate of Urbano and Vicenta.
FACTS: The subject properties originally formed part of a parcel of land belonging
to the estate of the late Urbano Rosario and Vicenta Zarate. By virtue of a Decision
of the RTC, which was rendered pursuant to a Compromise Agreement, the subject
properties were adjudged as shares of Luz. The petitioners introduced residential
dwellings and other improvements on the subject properties even before the death
of Luz. After Luz died, the respondent sent out written notices to vacate upon the
petitioners. Petitioners refused to leave, thus, respondent instituted the action for
ejectment. Petitioners claimed that the subject properties were already sold by Luz
to Rogelio and to Pablo Rosario, even before the execution of the Compromise
Agreement and was allegedly proved by duly notarized deeds of sale. MTC ordered
the petitioners to vacate the same based on the findings that the petitioners'
possession was merely tolerated, which became unlawful after the respondent
demanded them to vacate the subject properties. RTC set aside the decision of the
MTC and ordered the dismissal of the respondent's complaint on the grounds that
the complaint cannot give rise to an unlawful detainer action nor one for forcible
entry since there was no allegation that entry was committed by means of force,
intimidation, strategy or stealth. CA reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s complaint is constitutive of any of the
forms of cases for ejectment
RULING: NO. In a previous case, the Court explained two forms of ejectment, to wit,
“Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied.” Premises considered, the Court ruled that the complaint cannot
be considered as one for forcible entry because there was no showing that the
action was filed within one year from the questioned entry. Neither can the Court
consider the complaint as one for unlawful detainer. The possession of the
property by defendant in contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff meant to
present the basis of the lawful possession in the beginning. It is, however,
undisputed that no contract, express or implied existed between the parties in the
case.