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CASE PRINCIPLES
REGISTRATION – entry of instruments or deeds in a book or public registry. (Art. 708, Civil Code)

PRIORITY OF OWNERSHIP

1. The First Registrant in Good Faith

2. The First Possessor in Good Faith
3. The Buyer (who in good faith) Presents the Oldest Title

DOUBLE REGISTRATION RULE

The owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land.

Legarda vs. Saleeby (1915)

Facts:

The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy adjoining lots. There exists and has existed for years a stone wall
between the said lots. In 1906, they presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) for the
registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate under the Torrens System. Said registration and certificate included the wall. Later
the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the CLR for the registration of the lot now occupied
by him. In 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate. The lot of
the defendant also included said wall.

Later, the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had
also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant. Plaintiffs immediately presented a petition in
the CLR for correction of error. The lower court however, denied said petition upon the theory that, during
the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection
to the registration of said lot that included the wall in question.

Issue: Whether Plaintiffs own the wall and the land occupied by it.

Held:

Yes. The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot
of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties
who did not appear and oppose it. Granting that theory to be correct one, then the same theory should be
applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had
therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name six years prior.

Here, Act No. 496 (1902) which provides for the registration of titles under the Torrens system affords us
no remedy. The Court thus ruled that in case of double registration under Act No. 496, the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is
discovered, transfers his original certificate to an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is that the vendee
of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor
had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of
the owner of the later certificate.

MIRROR DOCTRINE

This echoes the doctrinal rule that every person dealing with any registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. The recognized exception to this rule is stated as follows:

A person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT) and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which
excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate
the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can
neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does
not merit the protection of the law.

PRIMUS TEMPORE, POTIOR JURE - First in Time, Stronger in Right

MINIISTERIAL DUTY OF RD – does not include the determination of validity of instrument sought to be
registered.
Fudot v. Catleya Land (2007)

Facts:

In 1992 respondents asked someone to check on the titles of 9 lots which includes the subject land which
they intend to buy from spouses Tecson. Finding no defect, respondent purchased the lots through a
conditional sale and executed an absolute deed of sale in 1993 for the same lots. Both deeds were
registered in 1992 and 1993. The register of deeds however refused to annotate the deed of sale on the
titles because of an existing notice of attachment pending before the RTC in Bohol. The said attachment
was canceled by virtue of a compromise agreement between Tecson and their creditor. Thus, titles to 6 out
of the 9 lots were issued and title to the 3 remaining lots were refused to be issued.

In 1995 petitioner presented for registration before the register of deeds the owner’s copy of the title to the
subject property together with the deed of sale executed by the Tecson spouses in favor of petitioner.
Respondent oppose the application. However, the register of deeds had already registered the deed of sale
in favor of petitioner and issued a new title in her name. In 1995, respondent filed a complaint for quieting
of title and/or recovery of ownership, cancellation of title with damages before the RTC. The court ruled in
favor of respondent. According to the court the respondent had recorded in good faith the deed of sale in
its favor ahead of petitioner. Petitioner appealed. CA dismissed the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not there is double sale.

Ruling:

In the first place, there is no double sale to speak of. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code, which provides the rule on
double sale, applies only to a situation where the same property is validly sold to different vendees. In this
case, there is only one valid sale to advert to, that of spouses Tecson and the respondent.

The trial court declared that the sale between the spouses Tecson and petitioner is invalid, as it bears the
forged signature of Asuncion. Said finding is based on the unrebutted testimony of Asuncion and the trial
court’s visual analysis and comparison of the signatures in her Complaint-in-Intervention and the purported
deed of sale. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeals, as it ruled that the purported sale in
petitioner’s favor is null and void, taking into account Asuncion’s deposition. In particular, the Court of
Appeals noted petitioner’s failure to attend the taking of the oral deposition and to give written
interrogatories. In short, she did not take the necessary steps to rebut Asuncion’s definitive assertion.

Petitioner argues she has a better right over the property in question, as the holder of and the first one to
present, the owners copy of the title for the issuance of a new TCT. The Court is not persuaded. The act of
registration does not validate petitioner’s otherwise void contract. Registration is a mere ministerial act by
which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register
of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract,
or instrument. While it operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, it does not add to
its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties, nor amounts to a
declaration by the state that the instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the land. The registration of
petitioner’s void deed is not an impediment to a declaration by the court of its invalidity.

Even assuming that there was double sale in this case, petitioner would still not prevail. In interpreting this
provision, the Court declared that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s
rights, except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first as provided
by the afore-quoted provision of the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar him from
availing of his rights under the law, among them to register first his purchase as against the second buyer.
However, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. It is thus essential,
to merit the protection of Art. 1544 (2) that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his
deed of sale.

The Court thus ruled in favor of the respondent.

BUYER IN GOOD FAITH

Salera v. Rodaje (2007)

Facts:

In 1993, Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title in the RTC against the respondents. The complaint
alleged that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land located in Leyte and acquired the property
from the heirs of Brigido Tonacao in 1986 as shown by a deed of absolute sale and registered in the registry
of deeds. In 1986, when they asked the Provincial Assessor to declare the land in their names for taxation
purposes the petitioners found out that tax declaration for Brigido Tonacao was already canceled and a
new one was already issued in the name of respondents. The complaint also alleged that they have been
in possession of the property and house built therein before the execution of the deed of sale.
Respondents allegedly claimed that they are the absolute owners of the property and acquired the property
from the father of Brigido as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale and a tax declaration issued in their
names. Prior thereto they had a verbal contract of sale with Catalino the Father of Brigido and paid him
1,000 as down-payment and agreed that the balance of 4,000 shall be paid at the execution of deed of
sale, since then they have been exercising their rights of ownership over the property and buildings therein
and alleged that they are buyers in good faith. The court ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal the CA
reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Respondents are the absolute owner of the property.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals is wrong. Article 1544 of the Civil Code contemplates a case of double sale or multiple
sales by a single vendor. More specifically, it covers a situation where a single vendor sold one and the
same immovable property to two or more buyers. It cannot be invoked where the two different contracts of
sale are made by two different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold. In the instant
case, the property was sold by two different vendors to different purchasers. The first sale was between
Catalino and herein respondents, while the second was between Brigido’s heirs and herein petitioners.

The plaintiffs-appellees had prior knowledge of the sale of the questioned property to the defendants-
appellants—and even recognized and respected the latter’s possession thereof—they acted with gross and
evident bad faith in perfecting a contract of sale in their favor. Accordingly, since it has been proven that
the defendants-appellants were the anterior possessors in good faith, ownership of the questioned property
is vested in them by sheer force of law. Besides, the defendants-appellants subsequently registered the
deed of sale in their favor in 1986. For all intents and purposes, they were the first to register the deed of
conveyance. Since they were the first vendees, their registration enjoyed the presumption of good
faith. The Court thus reinstated the RTC decision.

JURISDICTION – RTC, heretofore CFI, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications
(Sec. 2, PD 1529)

De Los Angeles v. Santos, et. al. (1964)

Facts:

In 1959, Leonor de los Angeles, et. al. applied for registration of title to 12 parcels of land before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They claimed to be the owners “pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land". The Director of Lands opposed the registration since the land is part of the public domain.
The oppositors, on the other hand, claimed ownership thereto for having previously acquired homestead
patents over said lots. This was reported by the Land Registration Commissioner in court when the latter
sought the dismissal of the application. When the CFI dismissed the application for land tile, applicants filed
an MR which the lower court denied.

Issue: Whether the CFI, as a land registration court, may be divested of jurisdiction by a
subsequent administrative act.

Ruling:

Proceedings for land registration are in rem, whereas proceedings for the acquisition of homestead patent
are not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the
land as far as courts acting upon proceedings in rem are concerned. In such a case, the applicants therein
should be given the opportunity to prove registrable title to the subject lot. Well settled is the rule that the
Director of Lands' jurisdiction, administrative supervision and executive control extend only over lands of
the public domain, not to lands already vested as private. Accordingly, a homestead patent issued by the
Land Registration Commissioner to Julio Hidalgo over land not of the public domain is devoid of force and
effect against the owner.

Since the applicants herein were already deemed "owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid
land" when they applied for land title, the homestead patent issued over the subject lot was no longer
considered public. Furthermore, considering that the existence or non-existence of applicants' registrable
title to the lot is decisive as to the validity or nullity of the homestead patent issued, the court a quo's
jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could not have been divested by the homestead patent's
issuance. In such a case, applicants should be given the opportunity to prove registrable title to the lot in
question, hence the Court remanded the case to the CFI for further proceedings.

In Rem Proceedings – judicial proceedings directed to a particular property located within the jurisdiction of
the land registration court. This follows the ‘Rex Rei Sitae’ principle embodied under Article 16 of the New
Civil Code. The ‘in rem’ jurisdiction of the court may be exercised even when other parties-in-interest are
not notified of the proceedings nor given the opportunity to be heard in court.
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem (Sec. 2, PD
1529). However, any action for the reconveyance of property wrongfully registered in another person’s
name under the Torrens System is in personam. Thus, the land registration court does not have any
jurisdiction at all. As an ordinary action, an Action for Reconveyance is filed with the regular court (RTC)
where the property is situated.

An Action for Reconveyance is based on the Land Registration Act (Section 55, Act No. 496), which states
that “in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value
of a certificate of title.” Per Statute of Limitation, this action may be filed within 30 years from the discovery
of fraud.

HOMESTEAD PATENT - having validity similar to a Torrens title - is a mode of acquiring alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain for agricultural purposes. Application for homestead patent is
conditioned upon actual cultivation and residence. No homestead patent may be granted if the applicant
already owns 12 hectares of land.

Gomez, et. al. v. CA (1988)

Facts:

Petitioners claimed absolute ownership over parcels of land that they supposedly inherited from their
decedent grandfather. In 1968, the Petitioners filed an application for registration before the Court of First
Instance of San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Without any opposition thereto, the CFI adjudicated the subject
lots in petitioners’ favor. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order expressly stating that the decision of 5
August 1981 had become final, in effect, directing the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the said lots.

But in 1984, Respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration
Commission (now LRA), submitted a report to the CFI stating that the lots in question were already covered
by homestead patents. These were registered under the Land Registration Act of 1902 (Act No. 496).

Petitioners opposed the Respondent’s report. They pointed out that there was no opposition being raised
during the registration proceedings and that the decision should be implemented because it had long
become final and executory. After hearing, the CFI rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting
aside its earlier decision and order.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the petition to
the Court of Appeals. In 1986, CA dismissed the petition, arguing that prior to the issuance of the decree
of registration, the respondent Judge still has the power and control over the decision he rendered. The
finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of
the one-year period after entry of the final decree of registration. Moreover, land already granted by
homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration.

Issues:

1. Whether the CFI Judge had jurisdiction to issue the challenged second decision which set aside the
lower court's first decision;

2. Whether respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) and Engr. Silverio Perez only have
a ministerial duty to abide by the CFI decision and order;

3. Whether the "the law of the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran as
invoked by the Petitioners.

Ruling:

As to the first issue, the Court ruled that Petitioners' contention is not correct to say that respondent Judge
acted without jurisdiction. Petitioners anchor this claim on Section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall
forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of
registration and certificate of title. The Court however took exception to this argument, saying that unlike
ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree of registration. As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission
(now LRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated.

As to the second issue, the Court ruled that the duty of respondent land registration officials to render
reports is not limited to the period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its
finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree. Here, Petitioners contend that
the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the CFI before its decision became
final.
But the Court however opined that if this argument is sustained, the Court would be pressuring respondent
land registration officials to submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the
reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision.

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be
in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record. The Court however
countered that if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree,
it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings, hence it is not a ministerial duty but discretionary for them to do so
as officials of the court.

As to the third issue, the Court said that Government vs. Abran is not "the law of the case", for the lots in
question were not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were already issued
over them in 1928-1929.

A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots
earlier covered by homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M.
Gomez. The decision states:

With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates of title, such certificates are sufficient
to prevent the title from going to appellants, for they carry with them preponderating evidence that the
respective homesteaders held adverse possession of such portions xxx. Wherefore, it is hereby ordered
that the lots respectively claimed be registered in their name, with the exclusion of the portions covered by
the homestead certificates xxx.

Since the report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homestead patents
registered the lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929 and the decision in Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December 1931, the subject lots are thus specifically excluded
xxx. The Court further said that it is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land
Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the
subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceedings.

EN CONSULTA (Section 6 (c), PD 1529/Section 117, PD 1529) – review process from RD decision to LRA;
once LRA decision is deemed adverse to the appellant, then the court may be resorted to, following the
doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

MINISTERIAL DUTY – if matters are administrative in nature; can be compelled by mandamus.

DISCRETIONARY – if LRA/RD acts for and on behalf of the land registration court; cannot be compelled
by mandamus.

Almirol v. Register of Deed of Agusan (1968)

Facts:

In 1961, Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land somewhere in Esperanza, Agusan.
The following year, he sought the registration of the Deed of Sale before the Register of Deeds of Butuan
City, and to secure therefrom a transfer certificate of title under his name. The Register of Deeds refused,
stating that: 1. the property in question is a conjugal property; 2. spousal consent is necessary in the sale
of a conjugal property; and, 3. since the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving
husband cannot dispose of the whole property without prior partition of the property and consent of the
other heirs.

The refusal by the RD moved Almirol to file a petition for mandamus before the CFI to compel the Register
of Deeds to register the Deed of Sale, and to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title. The CFI
however declared that the prayed for mandamus does not lie because there is an alternative remedy under
Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151.

Issue: Whether mandamus may compel the RD to register the Deed of Sale in question.

Ruling:

No, the writ of mandamus does not lie because Petitioner has other remedy under the law. Section 4 of RA
1151 provides that:

When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the
question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration xxxx. The latter’s decision shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest
disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said
decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court said that the validity of the Deed of Sale is not for the RD to determine. This function belongs
properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. Although the reasons relied upon by the Respondent may
pertain appropriately to the law of succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not
constitute legal grounds to justify his refusal to register the sale of said property.

The Court does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered. If the purpose of registration is
merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of instruments are expected to be
decided after, not before, registration. Indeed, the RD is entirely precluded by Section 4 of Republic Act
1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to
register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid.

For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed
or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify
the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION (CA No. 141) for imperfect titles requires the applicant to prove the following:

1. That land is alienable and disposable

2. Possession and occupation be in a manner prescribed by law or since June 12, 1945

PROOF OF ALIENABILITY – positive act by government

1. Presidential Proclamation
2. Executive Order
3. Statute/ Act by Congress

Malabanan v. Republic (2017)

Facts:

Sometime in 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title covering a parcel of
land in Silang, Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and for which he and his predecessors
in interest claimed to have been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the land
for more than 30 years (Section 48 (b), CA 141).

Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-grandfather which passed
down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons became the administrator of the properties. One of these
properties was the one sold by Velazco to Malabanan. They also presented an evidence on the
classification of land to be alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982. The RTC ruled in
their favor, but the CA reversed citing the case of Republic v Hebierto.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed without prior declaration
of alienability by the State.

Ruling:

No - pursuant Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141. It should be noted here first that CA 141,
particularly Section 48 (b) vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD
1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other.

It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073
did limit the lands to be registered, as provided under Sec. 9 of CA 141. The Court holds that the correct
interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit, not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where
the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus: The requirement of bona fide
ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when at the time of the application, the land is already classified
as alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia - the
antecedent bears relation to what follows next.

A contrary ruling will result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the right nugatory and the provision
inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at the time the Philippines is still not an independent state.

The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if done so in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is already
an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. The Court rules
that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-
422 of the New Civil Code.

It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men and the patrimonial property
of the State can be subject to an ordinary acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription. It is also
clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no longer in use, is converted into
patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a
positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such. Hence, combining both rulings, it is
clear that only when there is a positive act, regardless of whether the land was classified as alienable
and disposable, that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.

In the case at bar, Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other
substantive evidence was presented. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared
as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
or service for the development of the national wealth, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.

REQUIREMENT FOR ACQUISITION OF TITLE- in the case below, what the law requires is that the
property sought to be registered is already ALIENABLE and DISPOSABLE at the time the application for
title is filed.

Republic vs Naguiat (2006)

Facts:

Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof
for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.

Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question
since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in
question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

Issue:

Whether the areas in question cease to have the status of forest once a title thereto is being applied for
registration.

Ruling:

No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is of little moment, since unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES

JURA REGALA

Literally means royal right; natural fruit of conquest. This doctrine presupposes that everything within the
public domain is owned by the State. Legal foundation is Section 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution
(Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources). Under the 1987 Constitution, the doctrine is enshrined
in Section 2, Article XII.

Introduced by the Spaniards by the Laws of the Indies & the Royal Cedula; followed by the Mortgage Law
of 1893; and amended by the Maura Law in 1894 – the last Spanish Law promulgated in the Philippines.

TREATY OF PARIS

Spain ceded to the government of US all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the
Philippine Islands (December 10, 1898). Regalian doctrine was absorved.

NATIVE TITLE

Exception to the Jura Regalian doctrine which holds that native inhabitants’ rights are presumed; Carino vs
Insular Government (1909) enshrined this principle, as written by US SC Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes.
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (1946) case, and Cruz v. Secretary of the
Environment (2000). The latter case was upheld by SC by a tie vote of 7-7; twice deliberated with the same
results. Section 7, Rule 56 of the ROC holds that in case of a tie, the law being challenged is upheld (RA
8371).

TORRENS SYSTEM

Introduced by Sir Robert Torrens of South Australian. Here, title by registration takes the place of title by
deeds. The purpose is to do away with delay, uncertainty and expense of the old conveyancing system.
Eventually, this system of registration of transaction is meant to establish and certify to the ownership of an
absolute and indefeasible title to realty property.

ACT NO. 496 (The Public Land Act of 1902) – introduced the Torrens system of land registration by the
Philippine Commission. The real legislative purpose is to QUIET TITLE to land (see Legarda v. Saleeby
case).

REGISTRATION

This is not a mode of acquiring ownership; does not vest title; merely a procedure to establish evidence of
title over the property.

Act No. 926 – first public land act pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902; governs the disposition of public
land; issues patent to native settlers.

Act No. 2259 – the cadastral act of 1913; establish to adjudicate land titles; Solicitor General represents
the government in any in rem proceedings, not the LRA.

Act No. 2874 – second public land act; governs the exploitation of agricultural lands; parity rights between
Filipinos and Americans.

CA No. 141 – the Public Land Act of 1936; essentially the same with Act No. 2874 but it provides for more
grants such as homestead, sale, free patent (administrative legalization of land ownership); applies to
lands of the public domain which have been declared open to disposition or concession. Important: Section
48 (b and c) thereof permits judicial confirmation of imperfect titles through acquisitive prescription;
reiterated under Section 14 of PD 1529.

PD No. 1529 – codifies all land registration laws in the Philippines. Issued by Pres. FM. In Director of Lands
v. Santiago, the Court ruled that PD 1529 supersedes all land registration laws of the country.

RA 7691 (1994) – delegates jurisdiction to inferior courts in cadastral and land registration cases: 1. where
the land sought to be registered is not the subject of controversy or opposition; and 2. where the lot is
contested but the value is less than 100K. MTC decision is appealable to RTC. This amends Section 34,
BP Blg. 129 (1980); also reflected in SC AC No. 6-93-A.

COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION – now RTC; created by Act No. 496 (1902); sole function is to confirm
and register title; jurisdiction ends upon registration of title; judicial proceedings here is in rem (against the
thins or res), not in personam (against any person). See: Section 2, PD 1529.

Upon issuance of the Decree of Registration, it shall bind the land and quiet title thereto; conclusive against
the world/third persons. Petition for review allowed within one year only.

JURISDICTION OVER THE RES (thing/property) –by way of 1. Publication; 2. Mail; 3. Notice.

IN REM – where the purpose is to BAR any opposition to the right sought to be established; IN PERSONAM
– against a person who might have an interest in the property subject to litigation.

LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION/LRA – created by PD 1529 as a central repository of records

relative to original registration of titles, including subdivision and consolidation of plans of titled lands. The
Land Management Bureau has the authority to do the survey.

JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES – determined by the allegation and relief sought; involving title to
property; RTC – if assessed value is 20K or higher/50K if in Manila; if 20K or lower, MTC- including unlawful
detainer and forcible entry of property (crim cases).

VERY IMPORTANT!

(Section 14, PD 1529 (1978)

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance (RTC)
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Also provided under Section
48 of CA 141 with exception to force majeur/war)

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original
registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro,
the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless
prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

PRESCRIPTION

Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is
concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.

Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires

possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and
other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.

Article 1137, Civil Code: Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.