The Province of Aklan vs. Jody King Construction and Development Corp.

FACTS:
On January 12, 1998, The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction
(respondent)entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and
Terminal in Malay, Aklan. The total project costs P38,900,000.00. In the course of the
construction, petitioner issued change orders for additional works. On January 5, 2001, another
contract was entered for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building. On October 22, 2001,
respondent demanded for the payment of the whole amount including the variation orders which
petitioner allegedly failed to settle. On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in the RTC
Marikina for the collection of the said amounts. RTC then issued a writ of preliminary attachment
on August 17, 2006.However, petitioner DENIED any unpaid balance and interest due to
respondent. Petitioner asserted that the sums being claimed were not indicated in the change orders
as approved by the Office of the Provincial Governor and that respondent has made a letter dated
June 10, 2003 absolving petitioner from any liability regarding the Passenger terminal. However,
RTC rendered the decision on August 14, 2009 in favor of Jody King Construction and ordered
the Province of Aklan to pay the amounts specified. Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration
but was denied. RTC now issued a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff to demand immediate
payment from petitioner. Sheriff then served notices of garnishment on LBP, PNB and DBP for
the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the accounts of petitioner. The banks however refused
to give due course to the court order citing the provisions of statutes, circulars on the determination
of gov’t monetary liabilities, their enforcement and satisfaction. Petitioner then filed in the CA for
certiorari with application for TRO and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution –
dismissed (found RTC no grave abuse of discretion for the issuance of Writ of Execution and that
the matter of execution was rendered moot by respondent’s filing of a petition before the COA)
Notice of appeal denied, MR also denied Petitioner then filed another petition for Certiorari
questioning the orders denying due course to its Notice of Appeal - dismissed

Reasons for dismissal:

1. Failure to provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely MR
2. CA held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction as it
only raised the issue of COA’s primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a
writ of execution was issued against it

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction

2. Whether or not the issuance of the Writ of Execution is void

HELD:

1. No. The petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction. COA has the primary
jurisdiction over the respondent’s money claims. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if
a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper
jurisdiction. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the
judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the
parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. Respondent’s
collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been
first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the
filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and
before the CA.

2. Yes. The writ of execution issued in violation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is VOID. All the
proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby
are null and void. Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator
of any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and
the void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void. Clearly,
the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it

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ordered the execution of its judgment against petitioner and garnishment of the latter’s funds.

Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA

Facts:
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED), for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the
Ministry of Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks. IEI was advised
that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI
and MMIC signed a Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests
to MMIC. IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the
Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started
operating in the coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that the rights
for the operation be granted back. Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant
because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed. Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus
Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC. RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and
for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that
RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue:
W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary
civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to
be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to
develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national
program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-
supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the
reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering
the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the
coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application
for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the
BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It
may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that
the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever

enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of
what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal
operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the
administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial
Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the
exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues
preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when

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apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an
administrative agency.

HERNANI N. FABIA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132684, August 20, 2001

Facts
Petitioner Hernani N. Fabia, until his resignation on 10 August 1994, was the President of private
respondent MTCP, a domestic corporation engaged in providing maritime courses and seminars
to prospective overseas contract workers and seamen. He was likewise a Director and stockholder
thereof. MTCP through its new President Exequiel B. Tamayo filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafa against Hernani N. Fabia alleging that on various occasions Fabia drew cash advances from
MTCP, covered by cash vouchers, amounting to P1,291,376.61 which he failed to liquidate despite
repeated demands.

Petitioner now questions the jurisdiction of the trial court arguing that the instant case involves an
intra-corporate controversy primarily cognizable by the SEC and, as such, the public prosecutor
had no authority to initially rule in the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa filed
against him as it was barred under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction from exercising jurisdiction
over the criminal case without the prior resolution of the SEC on the matter.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court has the jurisdiction to decide issues involving intra-corporate
controversies.

Held
Yes. Section 6, PD 902-A confines the jurisdiction of the SEC to "intra-corporate disputes"
defined as any act or omission of the Board of Directors/Trustees of corporations, or of
partnerships, or of other associations, or of their stockholders, officers, or partners, including any
fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law or rules and regulations
administered and enforced by the Commission.[9] This underscores the relationship of the party-
litigants with each other, and indicates that the nature of the cause of action should be limited to
fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law, rules and/or regulations
administered and enforced by the Commission for the cause of action to fall within the ambit of
authority of the SEC elements that are both present in the instant case.

Indeed, the charge against petitioner is for estafa, an offense punishable under The Revised
Penal Code (RPC), and prosecution for the offense is presently before the regular courts. However,
as correctly pointed out by private respondent MTCP, jurisdiction is determined not from the law
upon which the cause of action is based, nor the type of proceedings initiated, but rather, it is
gleaned from the allegations stated in the complaint. It is evident from the
complaint that the acts charged are in the nature of an intra-corporate dispute as they involve fraud
committed by virtue of the office assumed by petitioner as

President, Director, and stockholder in MTCP, and committed against the MTCP
Corporation. This sufficiently removes the action from the jurisdiction of the regular courts, and
transposes it into an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the SEC. The fact that a
complaint for estafa, a felony punishable under the RPC, has been filed against petitioner does not
negate and nullify the intra-corporate nature of the cause of action, nor does it transform the
controversy from intra-corporate to a criminal one.

Accordingly, as the matter involves an intra-corporate dispute within the jurisdiction of the SEC,
the issue of whether prior non-accounting precludes a finding of probable cause for the charge of
estafa no longer finds relevance.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction exhorts us to refer the instant case to the SEC for its
resolution of the matter in dispute. However, it should be noted that RA 8799, The Securities

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Regulation Code, has amended PD 902-A, and transferred the jurisdiction of the SEC over
intra-corporate cases to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Courts.To transfer the present case to the SEC would only result in a circuitous
administration of justice. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Manila should dismiss Crim.
Case No. 98-162570 without prejudice to the filing of the proper action which shall then be
raffled off to the appropriate branch of the court pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government
through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract
in the so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was later advised that in line with the
objective of rationalizing the country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in
the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and
transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages
against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy
Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S.
Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared
the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to issue its written
affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the decision
and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD 1206, it
is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and
development of coal blocks.

ISSUE:

whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?

HELD:
It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many caseS
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur
that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in
an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter
is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.

This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in
the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its view.

Part 2
Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
FACTS  Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed, with modifications, ruling by the RTC
granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed
by Lacap against RP
 Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27,
1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified

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  Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a
certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook the works and purchased
materials and labor in connection with
 On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final
investigation of end product and fount it 100% completed according
to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
 DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved
final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having
expired
 Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded
to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law (RA 4566) does not
provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of
license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or
declares void such a contract
 DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First
Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that payment be made to
Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued
 On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC.14
 On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did
not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to
disapprove the claim.
 Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order dated March 11, 1996 denying the
Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18
but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23,
1996.
 On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-
suability of the State
 Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision
ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of the project, 12%
interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
 CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%
ISSUE WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for
completed projects

A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed

projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof.
RULING Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or
wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or
undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a
construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who
shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence
of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate
or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate
or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos
but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning rule" or verba
legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not

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 declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a
contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such
contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment,
however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under
the law.

PROXIMATE CAUSE
RODOLFO BELBIS JR. AND ALBERTO BRUCALES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay.
On the night of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m.,
Veronica Dacir, Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where
Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was
held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed
him. Jose was brought to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days. Jose
was brought back to the hospital on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys had
inflamed due to infection. He died the next day.

Version of the Defense:

Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in engaged in a
conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their
way home, they heard Jose’s whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose
what is the matter and the latter replied, “What about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on
Rodolfo, but the latter was able to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a
scabbard. Rodolfo and Jose grappled for the bolo while Alberto was merely shouting at them to
stop. Rodolfo eventually got hold of the bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand so Alberto took
him to the hospital.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would
warrant his acquittal

HELD:

No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed to
defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense
to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear
and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed
the victim.

The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the victim ceased when
petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of

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the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a
person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack
sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.
In the present case, four stab wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to prevent the
alleged continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already without a weapon.

Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the death of the victim is not
controlling since what really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate
cause of his death. It can be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds,
the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ
failure that caused his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. The petitioners are found
guilty of homicide.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos

FACTS:

Herein petitioner conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign.
Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II,
a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner
which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel
Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

RULING:

No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family
Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a
teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must
be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In order that there
may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening
efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Also, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Hence, the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd

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persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Wherefore, the case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the
defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador

Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador (2007) / Ynares-Santiago

Facts:

Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in LBHT. She underwent a medical exam @ CDC
with Garcia (medtech) conducting the HBs Ag test. Her result was REACTIVE. The company
physician (Sto. Domingo) told her she is suffering from HepaB, and based on the medical report
SD submitted, LBHT terminated her employment. Ranida told her father Ramon about her
condition, then the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital.
Ranida took another HBs Ag test in BDH, and the result was NON-REACTIVE. She told Dr. SD
about it but the latter said the CDC test was more reliable, so she took another test at CDC again,
and the result this time was NON-REACTIVE. She took the same test used in CDC @ BDH and
the result was NON-REACTIVE (four tests!). She submitted the results to the LBHT ExecOff who
requested her to undergo under test (WTF!) - result is NEGATIVE (5th test, haha), so LBHT
rehired her.

Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against medtech Garcia + pathologist Castro,
claiming that the erroneous interpretation led her to lose her job, suffer mental anxiety, while
Ramon was hospitalized + lost business opportunities. Garcia denied the allegations of gross
negligence and incompetence; explained "false positive." Castro said he did not examine Ranida,
and that the results bore only his stamped signature.

RTC dismissed the Salvadors' complaint for failure to present sufficient evidence. CA
reversed this and ordered Garcia to pay moral damages (50k), exemplary damages (50k), and atty's
fees (25k). Castro was exonerated.

Issue and Holding:

WON CA correctly found Garcia liable for damages. YES

1. WON a person is negligent is a question of fact
-Petition for review on certiorari limited to reviewing errors of law
>Negligence - failure to observe for the protection of another's interest that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which circ demand, whereby the other suffers injury
ALL ELEMENTS OF AN ACTIONABLE CONDUCT ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE
Duty, Breach, Injury, Proximate causation
Negligence is a violation of statutory duty -- so many laws were broken!
1. CDC is not administered, directed, supervised by licensed physician
but by a licensed medtech
1. Castro's infrequent visit barely qualifies as an admin
supervision and control
2. Garcia conducted HBs Ag test of Ranida without Castro's
supervision
3. HBs Ag test result released to Ranida without Castro's authorization
Garcia's failure to comply with laws, rules promulgated for the protection of public safety
and interest is failure to observe the care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
observe --> BREACH OF DUTY!

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 2. Injuries suffered by Ranida could have been avoided had proper safeguards
been followed
3. NCC 20 is the legal basis for award of damages to one who suffers whenever
another commits an act in violation of some legal provision

Damages, fees upheld. Garcia guilty of gross negligence.

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