Villa vicencio v. Lucban, 39 Phil.

778

Summary:

The Mayor of City of Manila ordered deportation of 170 women, from Manila to Davao. Some or most of
them were ill refute and/or prostitutes. The petitioners applied for writ of habeas corpus. In granting the
petition for the issuance of the writ, the SC upheld the right of these women, despite having ill
reputation, to liberty of abode and travel.

Doctrine:

[In relation to constitutional right to liberty and travel of the prostitutes, the SC explained:] "These
women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens."

Facts:

The Mayor of the city of Manila ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute. The women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.

In one midnight, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were
being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for
a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao where the women were landed and receipted for as
laborers.

The friends of the victim filed a case for issuance of habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.

Issues Ratio:

Whether or not, the writ [of habeas corpus] should be granted. Yes.

The court awarded the writ, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
Ynigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be
deprived of their liberty.

According to the Supreme Court, there is no law that justifies the action of the respondent in deporting
the women of ill refute to Davao. In upholding the right of the victims on liberty to abode and travel, the
SC explained that: these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.
Dispositive:

Writ granted.

Other Notes:

Although the case was decided prior to the enactment of 1987 Constitution, the case remains to provide
a good basis for discussions of the constitutional right to travel and abode.

Source: https://www.digest.ph/digests/villavicencio-vs-lukban/613

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

March 8,2016

Perez, J.:

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From
then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING
and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as
candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional
reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features
which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country
where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application
to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the
SC.

Fallo:

Wherefore, the petition is granted. The Resolutions to Wit: (as being Declared Filipino Citizen and
Qualified Candidate to run for presidency in the National and local elections of 9 May 2016.)

https://joyadays31.wordpress.com/2017/09/06/case-digest-grace-poe-vs-comelecet-al/

https://bingbing-wanders.blog/poe-llamanzares-vs-commission-on-elections/
Kuroda v. Jalandoni

Facts:

Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military
Commission due to the cruelty that were done against non combatant civilians and
prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which established the
National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial
of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing
that the same is not provided in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that
the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges
because it has no laws to base on, national or international.

Issue:
Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts.

Held:

Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of
the case at bar. EO 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that stated in
Article 2 (“The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation.”) of the Philippine Constitution. The Hague Convention and other similar
conventions whose principles are generally accepted are considered as part of the law
of the land.

Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the Military Commission, having been
convened by virtue of EO 68, has the jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed
against civilians and prisoners of war during the period covering 1943 – 1944 in
violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Fallo: The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order
No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said
petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such
Military Commission.
Agustin v Edu

FACTS:

Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning device to
be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and
transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing rules
and regulations of the said instruction.

Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early
warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set
of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the
motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without
appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine
Government under PD 207.

ISSUE:

WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.

HELD:

NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of
legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular
exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague
and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .

The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.

Petition dismissed.
Gonzales v Hechanova

FACTS:

Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of tons of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Petitioner Gonzales – a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association filed this petition, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign
rice, the aforementioned respondents “are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”,
because RA No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207 – explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
Respondent contended among others that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into
two contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international
law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the
parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and
the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute
are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved – under the American jurisprudence – in
favor of the one which is latest in point of time.

ISSUE:

WON the respondents, in attempting to import foreign rice, are acting without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes. The respondents acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It is respondents contend
that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of
rice, one with the Republic of Viet Nam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these
contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became
binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; that in case of
conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts,
on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each
other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is
latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive relative to
foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and that the
aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having
already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the
sellers of said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense. The Court is not satisfied that the status of
said contracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said
contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that
said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as
null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of
the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one
which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only
admit, but, also, insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon
the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its
Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as
regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up and that of the United States.

Ichong v Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957)

FACTS:

Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause,
denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional
requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not
really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws

ISSUE:

W/N RA 1180 is constitutional.

HELD:

RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional
requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the
nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one
department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no
jurisdiction to question this. (Petition is denied).
People vs Lagman

At Chrome:

The court of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment with
the costs.

The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the
appellants. So ordered.

Aglipay v Ruiz

FACTS:

The government had authorized a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance in
Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic
Church. The petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure,
contending that it violated the Constitution because it benefited a particular religion; thus he
sought to prohibit the issuance and selling of the stamps commemorative of the event.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid for violating the principle of
separation of Church and State.

RULING:
No. the stamp issue was held to be not invalid.

The Supreme Court, on examining the background facts, discovered that although the original
design of the stamp featured a Catholic chalice, this was later rejected in favor a map of the
Philippines under which appeared the caption, “”Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937.” What was emphasized, therefore, is not the Eucharistic Congress itself
but Manila, as the seat of that congress. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not
inspired by any sectarian denomination. The only purpose was “to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourist to this country.” The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and its people”.

While it is obvious that the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,
received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The
Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.
Therefore, the stamp issue was held to be not invalid.
GARCES v. ESTENZO Case Digest
Posted Nov 10, 10:14 PM
G.R. No. L-53487
May 25, 1981

Facts

The Barangay council (every 5th day of April “of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the
patron saint of Valencia, Ormoc City) issued four resolutions in relation to the purchase of a
patron saint image which will be used for the celebration of the town fiesta and construction of a
waiting shed. Funds for the projects will be obtained by selling tickets and by donations.
Thereafter, the constitutionality of the resolutions are being questioned.

Petitioners argued that the Barangay Council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds
raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint’s wooden image and
making the image available to the Catholic church.

Issue
W/N such acquisition is in violation of the non-establishment clause?

Held
No. The constitution (Article 3, Section 5) provides that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion” and that “no public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion …”

The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. Moreover, the
wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering
with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. Barrio fiesta is a socio-
religious affair.

Hence, petition is denied.

Estrada v Escritor

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is
still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as
if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Re: Letter of Tony Valenciano

Facts:

This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City
had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and
other instrument for religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional
provisions on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the
appropriation of public money and property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or
any other system of religion. He further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of
Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other
activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are affected due to
the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.

Issue:

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates
the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional
prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.

Ruling:

No. The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of
Church and State. The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State
shall be inviolable; if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing
religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these
two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The Roman Catholic express their
worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to
the free exercise of their religion.

It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of
the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation
wherein the government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a
certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious
beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public
welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional
encroachment.

The constitution provides that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.

The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the
use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely
incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus,
the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for
public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its
primary purpose.

Fonacier v CA

Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop
Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration
of all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the
supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.

Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor
was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was
turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their
faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal Church of America.

CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme
Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration

CA affirmed the decision of the CFI

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of
IFI.

Held: Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo
De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes
as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws

To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the
rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other
superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules
for resolving such controversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation
adopts the majority rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly
constituted authorities within the congregation, then that should be followed.
 Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005

Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la
Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order
of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop
de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left
to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is
for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not
interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those
rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted
claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the
present case.
Tanada v Angara

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the
Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the
prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public
funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to)
give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to
place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of
both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit,
restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2,
Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

Held:

No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty,
particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting
in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution
did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed
in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”

By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also
commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been
used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for
example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the
regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial
relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact
and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed
by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny
alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.”

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
“equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade
environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino
capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

OR

Facts
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its
respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek
approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine
Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19,
Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issue
Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist
policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national
economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal
department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there
is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the
WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a
mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Calalang vs Williams

https://www.digest.ph/digests/calalang-vs-williams/510 In Chrome

Secretary of Defense v Manalo

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected
of being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in
various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led
by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their
brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met
other desaperacidos An enforced disappearance (or forced disappearance) is the secret abduction
or imprisonment . (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen
Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and
members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other
dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo. s a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity, and covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

Issue: Whether the right of the victims were violated and can they be protected by existing laws.
Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion.
The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity and security.

To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of
the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed
against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and
liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” is borne
out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abuses—often perpetrated
by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands.
The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats
thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity.
Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the
preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

Imbong V Ochoa – In Chrome