Marcos v.

Manglapus

Facts:

This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her
to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held:

"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and
the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the
right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others.
However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well-considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Estrada v. Arroyo

FACTS:

On October 4, 2000, then President Joseph Estrada was embroiled in a corruption scandal after a close
friend, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson, revealed that Estrada and his family allegedly received
money from Jueteng lords.

The revelation prompted Senator Teofisto Guingona to deliver a privilege speech, detailing the
anomalies done by President Estrada. The public now calls for Estrada’s resignation. Eventually, he had
to face an impeachment trial in the Senate by December 7.

On January 16, 2001, in a vote of 11-10, the Senator-Judges ruled against opening the second envelope
which allegedly contains evidence wherein Estrada held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.”

At this point, everyone snapped. The prosecutors tendered their resignation – prompting the Senate to
postpone the impeachment proceedings indefinitely. People started marching towards EDSA to call for
Estrada’s resignation. On January 19, both the AFP and PNP declared that they are withdrawing their
support of the Estrada administration.

On January 20, (12 noon), Chief Justice Davide administered Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s
oath as the new President of the Republic of the Philippines. At around 2:30 PM, Estrada and his family
hurriedly left Malacanang. Estrada then issued the following statement:

“At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to
be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people
with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter (sent to House
Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel):

“Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. (Sgd.)
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

On January 22, now President Arroyo started discharging her functions as President. She appointed new
cabinet members, ambassadors and special envoys. Foreign state leaders also expressed their
recognition to Arroyo’s administration (including then President George Bush from the White House).
Congress issued House Resolution 175 to express support to the new admin. The court also issued the
following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

“A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her
Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting
on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the
Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court
Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by
a proper party.”

The Senate then passed Resolution No. 83 which officially moved to terminate the impeachment
proceeding. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated “for the record” that she voted against the
closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified
to run for another elective post.

Estrada on the other hand is now facing charges of plunder, graft, and corruption under the office of the
Ombudsman. He then filed a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ombudsman from “conducting
any further proceedings in or any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over.

Thru another counsel, Estrada filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment to confirm him as the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent (Arroyo) to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity.

ISSUES:

WON Estrada officially resigned as a president. (Yes)

WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as president. (No). Please read section 11, Article VII of
the Constitution.

WON the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity. (No).

HELD:

(1) YES. – please also read Section 8, Article VII of the Constitution

We hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement: (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation.

He also called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act
of farewell.

As to the second letter (addressed to Fuentebella and Pimentel), the court held that it is wrapped in
mystery since Estrada did not reveal the circumstances that led to its preparation. It was all too easy for
him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he
was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing.

Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of Estrada. If it
was prepared before the press release as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release,
still, it commands scant legal significance. Estrada’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the
subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
reputation by the people.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. The court held otherwise. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable.

Even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the
time Estrada resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges
voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the
public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against Estrada when he
resigned.

(2) NO – please read section 11, Article VII of the Constitution.

By virtue of the said letter, Estrada has officially resigned and has in effect, relinquished his powers as
president.

Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-
equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

(3) NO

Estrada also contends that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases
violation of his right to due process.

The court held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.

There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.

The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by
this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and
the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled.

PETITION IS DISMISSED.

Soliven v. Makasiar

“Presidential immunity from suit does NOT impose a correlative disability to file suit. The privilege
may also be waived by the President if so minded.”

FACTS:

Three cases were consolidated. A libel case was filed against petitioner Beltran in which Pres. Aquino
herself was the complainant. In his defense, Beltran contended, among others, that the reason which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit for if criminal
proceedings would ensue, the President may have to be brought under the trial court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Does the presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit?

RULING:
No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction considering that
being the Chief Executive is a job that demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from
suit pertains to the President by virtue of the office; and it may be invoked only by the holder of the
office, not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege and
submit to the court’s jurisdiction if so minded.

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan

Direct interest is NOT necessary. It suffices that there is indirect interest. The Constitution prohibits
the President, Vice-President, the Cabinet members and their deputies or assistants from DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY participating in any business with the government.

FACTS:

Incumbent PCGG Commissioner Doromal was president and director of a family corporation, the
Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC), which submitted bids to supply equipment to the
Dept of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (NYMC).
Both DECS and NYMC are agencies of the govt. A criminal case was filed against Doromal in the
Sandiganbayan for violating Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution as well as other laws.* Doromal moved to
quash the information against him on the ground that the special prosecutor admitted that he does not
possess any document signed and/or submitted to DECS by him after he became PCGG Commissioner,
which fact, according to him, belies his participation in the business of the DITC. Sandiganbayan denied
the motion hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Is a document duly signed or submitted by Doromal to DECS, which would signify his direct participation
in the business, necessary to file the criminal case against him?

RULING:

No. The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the
application to bid xxx is not a sine qua non. Doromal “can rightfully be charged xxx with having
participated in a business” which act is absolutely prohibited by Sec 13 of Art VII of the Constitution
because “the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest.”
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in
83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of
Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section
3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.

Ratio:

In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

Funa vs Agra

G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013

Facts:

The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as
the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to
vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated
Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his
capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno
S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as
the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different
version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of
Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5,
2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera
who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in
Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as the Government
Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his
duties as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact
that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is
sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

Issue:

Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, viz:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit
were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment
during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so
provided.

It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section
13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was
concerned.

In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in ossession and
administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and
duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no
reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13,
supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To
construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional
disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of
appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-
owned or controlled corporations.

It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested
with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the
general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to the
conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public
Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold
more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the case of
Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was
laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office
has the right to interfere with the other.

Sarmiento v. Mison

Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla, petitioners

Salvador Mison, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, and Guillermo Carague, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget, respondents

Commission on Appointments, intervenor

FACTS:

In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments. Herein petitioners,
both of whom happened to be lawyers and professors of constitutional law, filed the instant petition for
prohibition on the ground that the aforementioned appointment violated Section 16, Art. VII of the1987
Constitution. Petitioners argued that the appointment of a bureau head should be subject to the
approval of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of bureau heads should be subject to the approval of the Commission
on Appointments.

HELD:

No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the President is well within
her authority to appoint bureau heads without submitting such nominations before the Commission on
Appointments. In its ruling, the SC traced the history of the confirmatory powers of the Commission on
Appointments (which is part of the legislative department) vis-a-vis the appointment powers of the
President.

 Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the
consent or confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. As a result, the Commission became very
powerful, eventually transforming into a venue for horse-trading and similar malpractices.
 On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by
successive amendments, the 1973 Constitution placed the absolute power of appointment in the
President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.

Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers intended to strike a "middle ground" in
order to reconcile the extreme set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. As such, while the
President may make appointments to positions that require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution also grants her the power to make appointments on her own
without the need for confirmation by the legislature.

Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution enumerates four groups of public officers:

 heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this constitution;

 all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

 those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

 officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President. “Ad interim” means “in the meantime” that Congress is in recess.

Matibag v. Benipayo

FACTS:

The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Such appointment was
renewed in “temporary” capacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier.
Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and assumed
their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments,
PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX-C.
2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent
assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX-C.

RULING:

Nature of Ad Interim Appointments

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. xxx

…the term “ad interim appointment”… means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn
or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a
definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

Right of an Ad Interim Appointee

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government
employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitution protection that “[n]o officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus,
an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into
office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated
to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the
office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for
cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

How an Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first
cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second
cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his
appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all
ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over
the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an

appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC
xxx

Was the Renewal of Appointment Valid?

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can
no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not
provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well
as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not
because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
 Olaguer v Military Commission

FACTS:

Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of
the AFP created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal case against
petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further action on their
case for the tribunal should be considered null and void. Respondents invoked that the creation of
Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case – Aquino v. Military Commission
No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However, petitioners contend that such ruling must be
overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law has already been lifted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military Commission be abandoned and/or modified in so far as
the case at bar is concerned?

HELD: Yes.

REASONING: First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the case is still
pending, military tibunals, which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already
since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting views of some justices in Aquino v.
MilComm, stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner placed on tiral for civil offenses under general law
are entited o trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process…xxx..Judicial power exist only
in courts’.1Moreover, the Court emphasized that “Reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot
prevail when constitutionalism and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should
be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all, more important than
anything else is that this Court should be right.’

martial law and suspending the

privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for
a period not exceeding 60
days as required by the
constitution. Furthermore, In
accordance with
Section 18, Article VII, the
President submitted a written
report on the factual basis of
his
proclamation two days later to
the congress reasoning that
the grounds therefor were the
acts and
hints of rebellion for years
already on Marawi City and is
going worse.
In his report, he stated that
the a certain terrorist group
called Maute have done grave
acts of
rebellion and waving a foreign
flag of Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in Marawi City
thereby
renunciating the place's
allegiance to the country and
uphold its constitution
alongside acts
endangering public safety and
destruction of public property
by taking over a hospital and
securing
the place.
Thereafter, the senate declared
finding “no compelling reason
to revoke Proclamation 216".
For
this, petitioners questioned the
factual basis of President
Duterte’s Proclamation of
martial law.
Stating that
1. there is no rebellion or
invasion in Marawi City or in
any part of Mindanao;
2. the President's Report
contained "false, inaccurate,
contrived and hyperbolic
accounts";
martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for
a period not exceeding 60
days as required by the
constitution. Furthermore, In
accordance with
Section 18, Article VII, the
President submitted a written
report on the factual basis of
his
proclamation two days later to
the congress reasoning that
the grounds therefor were the
acts and
hints of rebellion for years
already on Marawi City and is
going worse.