1
ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II
b. Re-acquisition
REPUBLIC v. DELA ROSA and FRIVALDO
G.R. No. 104654 | June 6, 1994
Facts: On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization under CA 63, captioned to be re-admitted as citizen
of the Philippines.
The respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March
16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition
in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for
three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at
least six months before the said date of hearing.
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to
Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall bedone on January
instead of having it on March,” where he manifested his intention to
run for public office inthe May 1992 elections. The motion was
granted and the hearing was moved on February.
Six days later, or on February 27, respondent Judge
rendered the assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines
by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and
privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen.
After receiving a copy of the Decision, the Solicitor General
interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court.
Issue: W/N Frivaldo has properly reacquired his Philippine
Citizenship.
Held: No, Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore,
disqualified from continuing to serve as Governor of Sorsogon.
A former citizen who opts to reacquire Philippine citizenship
thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law is duty
bound to follow the procedure prescribed by said law, and it is not
for him to decide and to select the requirements which he believes
are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are
inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.
Failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law rendered null
and void the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and oath
of allegiance taken.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the
petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings
conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken
therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication
and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization
and the order setting it for hearing must be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional. Moreover,
the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in
its full text for the court to acquire jurisdiction.
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations
required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that
he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3)
that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal
dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from
the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine
citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he
is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. The absence of
such allegations is fatal to the petition.
Likewise the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at
least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character
of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of
his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the
said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead
of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition
was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the
finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.
CIRILO VALLES v. COMELEC and LOPEZ
G.R. No. 137000 | August 9, 2000
Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Australia, to a Filipino father, and an Australian mother. In 1949, at
the age of 15, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
In 1952, she married Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen. Since then, she
has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental.
In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao
Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr.,
in a petition for quo warranto, alleging as ground therefor her alleged
Australian citizenship. The COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition
on the ground that no evidence was adduced to show that Lopez had
renounced her Filipino citizenship.
In the 1995 local elections, Lopez ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a
petition for disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the
said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, essentially on
the same grounds as the earlier quo warranto petition.
When Lopez re-ran for the May 1998 elections for governor
of Davao Oriental, a petition for disqualification was filed in the
COMELEC by Cirilo R. Valles (petitioner) raising once again the
question of Lopez's Filipino citizenship. The COMELEC’s First Division
issued a Resolution dismissing the petition. The COMELEC en banc
likewise denied the petition. Hence this petition.
According to petitioner, even if Lopez had renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian
passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the
Australian Embassy here in Manila, said acts did not automatically
restore her status as a Filipino citizen. She must still comply with the
mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171.
Moreover, the election of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez to public office did
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II
not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since she was not
legally repatriated.
Issue: W/N private respondent had renounced her Philippine
Citizenship.
Held: No.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen, being born of a Filipino
father
Rosalind’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5,
1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified
true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which
were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
Thus, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen, having
been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia
is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, Rosalind can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express
Petitioner’s contention that the application of private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.
As held by this court in the case of Aznar v. COMELEC, an
application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to
an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The
application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case
of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship—she was
an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a
child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been
included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since
private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine
citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the
process of repatriation does not hold water.
ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HRET and TEODORO CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840 | May 7, 2001
Facts: The citizenship of Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
2
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An
Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be
Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among others, “rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces
of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen
as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said
election.
Issue: W/N Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held: Yes.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II
GERARDO ANGAT v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 132244 | September 14, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the
Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the United
States of America. On March 11, 1996, he filed before the RTC of
Marikina City a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the
Philippines under CA No. 63, RA No. 965 and RA No. 2630. The case
was thereafter set for initial hearing.
On June 13, 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take
his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
R.A. 8171. The motion was initially denied by the trial judge but after
a motion for reconsideration, it was granted. The petitioner was
ordered to take his oath of allegiance pursuant to R.A. 8171. After
taking his oath of allegiance, the trial court issued an order
repatriating petitioner and declaring him as citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. The Bureau of Immigration was
ordered to cancel his alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen.
On March 19, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration)
asserting that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the
court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was
the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with
Administrative Order No. 285 (AO 285), issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization
to be the implementing agency of R.A 8171. The trial court granted
the motion and dismissed the petition.
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over Angat’s petition.
Held: No. The OSG was right in maintaining that Angat's petition
should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with
the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of
October 4, 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire
finality nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner.
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October
1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b)
of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity. The pertinent provisions
of the law read:
"SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall
thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen."
It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No.
N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for
petitioner to initially invoke R.A. No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since
these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship
by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces
of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States
of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition.
Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of
3
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact
with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines.
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA v. CA, BID and WILSON SOLUREN
G.R. No. 125793 | August 29, 2006
Facts: Petitioner Joevanie Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. When he was seven years old, petitioner acquired
American citizenship after his father became a naturalized citizen of
the United States.
When Petitioner came to the Philippines as a “balikbayan”,
he was arrested and detained by an agent of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) and thereafter, investigated. It
was found out as reported by the US embassy that petitioner’s
passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an
outstanding federal warrant of arrest. He was subsequently ordered
to be deported back to the US.
Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had
acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with
Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino
citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.
Issue: W/N petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino
who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or
economic necessity under RA 8171.
Held: No. To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation
under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their
Philippine Citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a
Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was
naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization,
petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to
believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of
natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor
at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under
RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the
filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left
the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his
Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or
economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been
motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for
naturalization. The decision was his parent's and not his. The privilege
of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born
Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign
country due to political and economic reasons, and extended
indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of
repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by simply taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II
4. Dual Citizenship
MERCADO v. MANZANO and COMELEC
G.R. No. 135083 | May 26, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and private respondent
Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Respondent Eduardo Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended in view
of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that Manzano is an American citizen based on
the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself
as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with
the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No.
B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States, San Francisco, California and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an
American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Sec 40(d)
of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective positions.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second
Division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice mayor of the
City of Makati. Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
the board of canvassers proclaimed Manzano as vice mayor of the City
of Makati. Hence, the present petition for certiorari seeking to set
aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare Manzano
disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City.
Issue: W/N Manzano is disqualified to hold the office of Vice
Mayor of Makati City.
Held: No.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens
of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered
a citizen of both states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
Dual citizenship, as a ground for disqualification, refers to
dual allegiance. Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides:
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law." In including such provision, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Sec 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Sec 20
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
4
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
In the case at bar, Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, at birth, he was a national both
of the Philippines and of the United States.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, Manzano elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship. By declaring under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen.
Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and
Allied Workers (AASJS) Member vs. DATUMANONG
G.R. No. 160869 | May 11, 2007
Facts: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent,
then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to
implement laws governing citizenship. Petitioner prays that a writ of
prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic
Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes."
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens
Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship.
Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-
born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their
Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section
3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born
citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance. Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, however, is
categorical that "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Issue: W/N Republic Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional
Held: No.
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear
that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to
do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa
 5
ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law I | Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens

who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether
or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act
No. 9225.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2
and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that
would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.

ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa