Political Law Reviewer

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Definition of Political Law
 Is the branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants
of its territory.
 It embraces constitutional law, law of public officers, law on elections, and law of public
corporations.
Background of the 1987 Constitution
1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution
a. Proclamation No. 1, February 25, 1986, announcing that she (Corazon Aquino) and
VP Laurel were assuming power.
b. Executive Order No.1, (Febrauary 28, 1986)
c. Proclamation No.3, March 25, 1986, announced the promulgation of the Provisional
(Freedom) Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new Constitution. I t
adopted certain provisions in the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles on
the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing laws. It also
provided of the calling of a Constitutional Commission to be composed of 30-50
members to draft a new Constitution.
2. Adoption of the Constitution
a. Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members.

b. Approval of the draft Constitution by the Constitutional Commission on October 15,
1986
c. Plebiscite held on February 2, 1987
d. Proclamation No. 58, proclaiming the
e. Ratification of the Constitution.
3. Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution: February 2
In re: Puno
 The government under Cory Aquino and the Freedom Constitution is a de jure government.
It was established by authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a revolutionary
government in defiance of the 1973 Constitution.
Chickoy 2011 Page 1

Estrada vs. Arroyo
ISSUE NO. 1:
Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
No less than the Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government
sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of
respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is
the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend
the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency
under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office
of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People
Power II is not inappropriate.
(in short: Arroyo’s ascendancy is subject to judicial review, which comes to the next question, is her
administration a legitimate one?)
ISSUE NO. 2:
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is
Chickoy 2011 Page 2

not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral.
It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before
he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his
act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on
the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
 The petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a
candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that
time.
 Former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo
para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."
There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at
this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The
resignation of the petitioner was implied.
 Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature
of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner
resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-
judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There
was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
 "Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for
any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery."
Chickoy 2011 Page 3

(Therefore, through his implied acts, notwithstanding section 12 of RA 3019, petitioner is deemed
resigned.)
ISSUE NO. 3
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.
Through House Resolution 176 and 178 and Senate Resolution 82 and 83 which confirms PGMA’s
assumption of office and confirming Guingona’s nomination as well as both houses of Congress
started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President is clear proof that
Estrada’s claim for inability has been rejected by Congress;
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that
this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the
government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a "textually demonstrable or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
ISSUE NO. 4
Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has
nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who
has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that
when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President,
the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.
Chickoy 2011 Page 4

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is
not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed
to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers.
Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice
and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters
in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself
was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first
be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings.
The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only
on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case
of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the
president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had
the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US
President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is
inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
ISSUE NO. 5
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases
violation of his right to due process.
In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al., we
laid down the doctrine that:
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere
fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself
prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For
one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings
Chickoy 2011 Page 5

news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news
form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair
and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v.
Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of
actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial
judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of
the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden
to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'
II. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
THE PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity,
the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
ART. II: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PRINCIPLES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces
of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure
the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
Chickoy 2011 Page 6

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment
thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
STATE POLICIES
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy
of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
Chickoy 2011 Page 7

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian
reform.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral

organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in
nation-building.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
The Concept of State
Chickoy 2011 Page 8

 A State is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite
portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a government to which
a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (CIR vs. Campos Rueda)
The Elements of a State
 Territory
 The national territory comprises the
 Philippine archipelago,
 with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
 and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction,
 consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
 including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas.
 The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the

archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines. (ART. I)
 Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code makes certain crimes punishable even if committed
outside the Philippines or Art. 15 of the Civil Code which provides that Laws
relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
 People
 Refers to the sovereign Filipino people of the Philippines. The Preamble of the 1987
Constitution expressly states that “ We, the sovereign Filipino people” “do ordain
and promulgate this Constitution.” They are the Citizens of the country because they
alone enjoy civil and political rights, entitled to vote and be voted to public positions
and be appointed to public offices, where they meet the required qualifications.
While foreigners living in the country are entitled to protection under the laws and
required to obey the laws, they are not the sovereign Filipino people.
Citizenship (Art. 4, 1987 Constitution)
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Chickoy 2011 Page 9

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by
their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law.
Bengzon vs Cruz
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship."
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not
left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
In Angat v. Republic, we held:
Chickoy 2011 Page 10

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring
to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and
all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born.
 Government
Government is defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an

independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to
enable men to live in a Social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the
aggregate of authorities which rule a society.
 Sovereignty
Sovereign means the supreme uncontrollable power, the jures summi imperii, the absolute
right to govern; it is the supreme will of the State, the power to make laws and enforce them
by all the means of coercion it cares to employ;
Immunity from suit
Art. XVI, Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
KAWAWANAKOA vs POLYBANK
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on
the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.

Jus Imperii vs Jus Gestionis
PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs SAN DIEGO
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either
by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation
as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Thus, as pointed out by the Court in Belleng vs. Republic, while the State has given its consent
to be sued in compensation cases, the pauper-claimant therein must look specifically to the
Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act for the
corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the State in Act 3083, the general
law waiving its immunity from suit "upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract
express or implied," imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that "no execution shall issue upon
any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines) under the
provisions of this Act;" and that otherwise, the claimant would have to prosecute his money
claim against the State under Commonwealth Act 327.
ACTS JURE IMPERII AND JURE GESTIONIS, DISTINGUISHED. –
"There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be
made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. x x x Certainly,
the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is
engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly
in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is
in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit." The service contracts referred to by private respondent have
not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of
immunity would not attach.
OPOSA vs FACTORAN
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: “Sec. 10. No law
impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet
be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same
is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
Art. XII, Sec. 10:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
MANILA PRINCE vs GSIS

 Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.
 Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact
that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be
self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the
granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national
patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,”
the latter shall be chosen over the former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on
Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling
51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince
Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for
the purpose.
TANADA vs ANGARA
Facts
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of
Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its
respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek
approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate
to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article
II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections
10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.
Issue
Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist
policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national
economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.”
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it
“a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in
government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing
proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO
Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a
mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has

contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
III. THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
The Congress (Art. 6)
 Section 1.
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
 Section 5
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,

and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELEC
It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."

Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political
parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." For
its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political parties." On the other
hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the
Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It
argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations."
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of
these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by
giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law,
we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the
House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to
its express terms.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a
student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who
can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list
system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is
not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

The Supreme Court ruled likewise that “not only must the candidate party or organization represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so must its nominees.”
Sec. 9 of RA 7941 lists the qualifications of nominees, as follows:
1. natural-born citizen;
2. registered voter;
3. resident of the Philippines for not less than one year immediately preceding the election day;
4. able to read and write;
5. twenty-five years of age; and
6. “a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.”
 Section 6
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen

of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
MARCOS vs COMELEC (residence and domicile, for purposes of election laws are
synonymous…)
The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of
a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Held:

So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases,
this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. It would be plainly
ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place.
A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living
in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one
place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
other place.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the
mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court concluded that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.
AQUINO VS COMELEC
Aquino was a resident of Tarlac for 52 years prior to his winning the Congressional seat in Makati,
to which he only resided for at least 10 months while renting a condominium;
Held:
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and

remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual
conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is "to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring
herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's
Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the
one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic
government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are
themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential
qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
 Section 11
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
 Section 21
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
BENGZON VS BLUE RIBBON
Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Granted.
FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the
petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin
“Kokoy” Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged “cronies” of former President Marcos
and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control
of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated
the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of
more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices
in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain

corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding
behind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a
speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who
died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23
May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzon’s plea
and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance
and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.
2. WON the SBRC’s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which
is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.
HELD:
1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
in the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of
the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers.
2. NO. As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise
of a power vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. The speech
of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of
Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the
committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by

stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article
XVIII of the Constitution.
3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as
private citizens, hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of
the SBRC, but of the courts. Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC
did. The inquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before
the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.
In Watkins vs United States: The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in

the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys
of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress
to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as it is, this power of inquiry, is not unlimited.
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification
in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his
argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of
the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be
related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for
the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are
indefensible.
4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends
also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal
proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid
of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.
FISCAL PROVISIONS
 Section 24
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
 Section 28
1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or

imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
TOLENTINO VS SEC. OF FINANCE
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well
as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the
result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a
contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also
to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be
more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in
the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days
as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day.

But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
 Section 26
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
Sec. 1: One Congress, Two Houses
Sec. 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
POWERS:
Legislative
 Republican Systems:
a. Original – possessed by the sovereign people
b. Derivative – that which is delegated by the sovereign people to the legislative bodies and
is subordinate to the original power of the people; vested in Congress
 Power according to its application:
1. Constituent – power to amend the Constitution
2. Ordinary – power to pass ordinary laws
Non-legislative
NOTA BENE:

Powers of Congress may be inherent (like the determination of its rules of proceedings and discipline of its members) or
implied (like the power to punish for contempt in legislative investigations).
The people, through amendatory process, can exercise constituent power, and, through initiative and referendum,
legislative power.
Sec. 12: Full Disclosure
Sec. 13 and 14: Disqualifications
 Cannot hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during term without forfeiting
his seat (incompatible office)
 Cannot be appointed to an office created or the emolument of which was increased during his
term (prohibited office)
 Cannot personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies
 Cannot be directly or indirectly interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or its subsidiary, during term
 Cannot intervene in any matter before any government office for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office
Sec. 15: Sessions
 REGULAR – once every year on the fourth Monday of July, unless a different date is fixed
by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until
30 days before the next regular session
 SPECIAL – anytime when called by the President
Sec. 16: Officers, Quorom, Rules of Proceedings, Discipline of Members
 DISCIPLINE:
 Expulsion – disorderly behavior
 Suspension – should not be for more than 60 days
NOTA BENE: The 60-day suspension imposed by Congress to discipline its member does not include the preventive
suspension which may be imposed by the Sandiganbayan for prosecution of offenses.
Courts have no authority to interfere in the manner of choosing officers in the Senate; such prerogative belongs to the
Senate
Sec. 17: Electoral Tribunals

COMPOSITION: (9 members)
 3 SC Justices – senior Justice is the Chairman
 6 Congressmen (Senators or Representatives)
 Based on proportional representation from the political parties or party-lists

 Instituted within 30 days after organization of Senate and House with election of President
and Speaker
FUNCTIONS:
 Exclusive power to determine the qualifications of members of Congress
 Sole jurisdiction to judge election contest between a member and the defeated candidate
HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests concerning its
members; House has no power to interfere; HRET members are entitled to security of
tenure, regardless of any change in their political affiliations
Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, Sept. 26, 1991
If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the
proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its
validity; Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office
Codilla vs. de Venecia, G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002
NOTA BENE:
 Distinguish between Codilla and Barbers. In Codilla, the action was still pending in the Comelec when the
proclamation was made and the main issue raised was the legality of the proclamation. Thus, Comelec could
not be divested of its jurisdiction to see the case through even when the proclaimed winner already assumed
office. On the other hand, in the Barbers case, the action was only taken after the proclamation of the winning
candidate. Thus, the proper forum should have been the SET, and not the Comelec, since the act of
proclaiming the winner made the latter a member of the Senate and thus within the sole jurisdiction of the
SET.
 Appeal, as a general rule, does not lie in election contests decided by the SET/HRET. However, the
Supreme Court may exercise its power of judicial review if the circumstances warrant.
Q: Who is the proper party to put up an election contest against a winning candidate?
A: Follow the rule on real party-in-interest. The proper party is the one who stands to benefit or lose
as a result of the decision. Thus, only a losing candidate (2nd or 3rd placer) can file an election
contest.
Q: What if the winning candidate is a lone candidate. Who can question his qualification?
Who has jurisdiction?
A: It is submitted that in case of a winning candidate who is a lone candidate, a non-candidate may
question his qualification. In which case, jurisdiction belongs with the electoral tribunal of the House
concerned in quo warranto proceedings.

Remedy: Petition for Cancellation of Candidacy before election, or Quo Warrant within 10
days from proclamation
Sampayan vs. Daza, 213 SCRA 807
Enrolled Bill and Journal
 MATTERS REQUIRED TO BE ENTERED IN THE JOURNAL:

 The yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill
 The yeas and nays on any question, at the request of 1/5 of the members present
 The yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President’s veto
 The President’s objection to a bill he had vetoed
Sec. 18: Commission on Appointments
COMPOSITION:
 President of Senate as ex officio Chairman
 12 Senators
 12 Reps
 Act on all appointments within 30 session days of Congress from their submission
 Majority vote of all members
KINDS OF APPOINTMENT:
1. Regular – requires concurrence of CA; if revoked by CA, can return to his old post but
cannot be reappointed; if bypassed by CA, reappointment is allowed
2. Ad Interim – permanent and effective until revoked or disapproved by CA; if revoked by
CA, cannot return to his old post or be reappointed; if bypassed, the appointment shall only
last until the next adjournment of Congress and official may be reappointed to the same
position
Ad interim appointments that the President may make during the recess of the Congress are
those made during a period of time from the adjournment of the Congress to the opening
session, regular or special, of the same Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be
withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke
at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.An ad
interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The
first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on
Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission
on Appointments acting on his appointment.
3. Temporary – appointments in acting capacity; no need for concurrence of CA and shall
last only for a period not exceeding one year
Legislative Inquiries/Investigations
KINDS:
 In Aid of Legislation (Sec. 21)
 Question Hour (Sec. 22)

In Aid of Legislation
CONDITIONS:
Must be in aid of legislation – either in making a new legislation or improving a defective one
The rules and regulations providing for its conduct must be duly published
The rights of individuals must be respected (e.g. right against self-incrimination)
Question Hour – Congress may summon heads of executive departments to shed light on certain
matters in aid of legislation or the heads may appear before Congress upon their own initiative with
approval of the President; either in the Congressional Chamber or the Executive Office
Q: Can a member of the Cabinet refuse to appear before Congress?

A: A distinction must be made between the question hour and inquiries in aid of legislation. The
former is merely permissive and does not, as a rule, include compulsory processes such that a
Cabinet member may validly refuse to appear before Congress. However, if the inquiry is in aid of
legislation, Congress is empowered to issue subpoenas and may rightly cite anyone called before it in
contempt should they refuse to appear. The only exemption to this power is if the President or the
Executive Secretary by the President’s authority invokes executive privilege.
Sec. 23: Power to Declare Existence of War and Delegate Emergency Powers
Q: Can Congress declare war?

A: No. The power to declare war rests with the President. All that the Congress can do, via two-
thirds vote of all its members in a joint session, is to declare its existence.
Q: How does Congress delegate emergency powers to the President?

A: Through a law passed for purpose of carrying out a declared national policy. It ceases with the
passing of another resolution from Congress without need for President’s approval. If no resolution
is passed, the power will automatically cease upon the next adjournment of Congress.
Requisites to Declare Existence of War (See David vs. Arroyo)
Sec. 24: Bills Originating from the House of Reps
MUST ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE OF REPS:

 Appropriation, revenue and tariff bills (ART)
 Bills authorizing the increase of public debt
 Bills of local application
 Private bills
Q: Why should these bills originate from the House of Reps?

A: The House Reps are elected by district, hence, they are more familiar with the needs of their
constituents. They are also more numerous, therefore, representative of the people.

Q: Does Sec. 24 violate the co-equality between the House Reps and Senate?
A: No, because the Senate can still file ahead of the House Reps any of the bills mentioned above.
However, they must withhold any action on the bill until it has received the version filed by the
House of Reps.
Sec. 25: ART Bills, Transfer of Funds, Discretionary Funds
Appropriation Bill – a statue the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release
of funds from the treasury
2 KINDS OF APPROPRIATION BILLS:

 General Appropriation
 Special Appropriation
SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF GENERAL APPROPRIATION BILL:

 Must originate from the House of Reps which has the power of the purse
 Must be based on a budget prepared by the President
 The particular provision must relate to a particular item in the said bill
 Must not be for the use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher,
or dignitary as such, EXCEPT: when such priest, etc. is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium
Q: Can a law creating an office and at the same time provide for disbursement of funds be
considered an appropriation bill?
A: No, because the main purpose of that law is not the disbursement of funds but the creation of an
office.
Q: Can Congress increase the budget appropriated or recommended by the President?

A: No, but Congress can decrease the amount.
Q: What happens if Congress fails to pass a general appropriations act?

A: The previous act will be re-enacted to be used for the fiscal year until such time that a General
Appropriations Bill shall be passed.
SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF SPECIAL APPROPRIATION BILL:

 Must be for a specific purpose
 Must have a certification from the National Treasurer that the funds are available or if there
is an accompanying revenue proposal as to how to raise the funds needed
 NOTA BENE:
 Certification from the National Treasurer is needed in order to avoid “sub rosa” appropriation, wherein a
special appropriations measure is done even though the funds are not available.

 But a special appropriation bill may be filed even if there is no budget yet so long as there is an accompanying
revenue proposal on how to raise the funds.
Tax/Revenue – enforced proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the
State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of government and for public needs
INHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF TAXATION:

 Taxes are for public purposes
 Non-delegation of taxing power
 Territoriality or situs of taxation
 Tax exemptions as provided in the Constitution with concurrence of majority of Congress
 International comity
 Taxes should not be oppressive
 Due process must be observed
 Adheres to the bill of rights
 Non-infringement of religious freedom
 Non-impairment of contracts
 Tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only (any balance shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government
 Tax laws must be uniform and equitable
 Progressive tax system
Discretionary Funds
CONDITIONS:
 Disbursed for a public purpose
 Duly supported by appropriate vouchers
 Subject to guidelines prescribed by law
Transfer of Funds
GR: transfer of funds is not allowed
EXC: if the transfer is only within one department, or if there is surplus or savings and the transfer is for the purpose
of augmenting any item in the appropriation law
WHO MAY TRANSFER FUNDS:

 President
 Senate President
 Speaker of the House
 Chief Justice
 Heads of the Constitutional Commissions
Sec. 26: Requirements as to Bills
REQUIREMENTS:

 One subject per title – to prevent hodgepodge or logrolling legislation wherein many
subjects are contained in a single bill in order to accommodate some subjects that cannot
possibly pass through a single bill on its own and so that greater support for the bill is
garnered
 Subject of the bill must be expressed in the title – to prevent surprise or fraud beause
some members of Congress might not be able to read the whole bill; a way of informing the
public of what the bill is all about
 Some bills must originate EXCLUSIVELY from the House of Reps
 3 readings on 3 separate days and printing and distribution at least 3 days before final
approval – EXCEPTION: when the President certifies the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency
NOTA BENE:
Logrolling legislation is sought to be prevented in order to avoid a situation wherein what had been disapproved if
taken on its own, may be approved because it was lumped in a favorable subject.
It is enough that the title must be able to state what the bill is all about, without necessarily enumerating the details of
the bill.
Presidential certification dispenses with both the 3-day printing and the 3 readings on 3 separate days. But the bill
must still go through 3 readings, which may be done on the same day. This is not subject to judicial review, as a general
rule, because there is no factual basis of grave abuse of discretion to speak of.
Sec. 27: President’s Veto
HOW PRESIDENT EXERCISES VETO POWER:

 General – for all bills except ART bills; veto the whole bill (general rule)
 Line or Item – only for ART bills because each item of ART is a bill in itself in terms of
importance; veto only certain provisions that are inappropriate
INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS:
 Any provision that does not relate to a particular, distinctive appropriation or item; in such a
case, the inappropriate provision shall be treated as an item and therefore can be vetoed
 Any provision blocking admnistrative action in implementing the law or requiring legislative
approval for executive action
 Any provision that is unconstitutional
 Any provision that amends a certain law
Q: When does a bill become a law?

A: A bill becomes a law after the President’s approval. A bill may also become a law through the
President’s inaction (given 30 days to either approve or veto a bill; if no action, it is implied
approval). Another way for a bill to become a law is if Congress, after the President’s veto, overrides
the same by 2/3 votes of the members of each House.
Q: What is the effect of an invalid veto?

A: It will be like there was no veto at all.

Q: What is a pocket veto?
A: The rule is that if the President, after receiving a copy of the bill, does not act on the same within
30 days, neither indicating his approval nor veto, the bill shall pass into law as if he had signed it.
The exception is before the lapse of the 30-day period the Congress adjourns and the President does
not act on the bill until the said period lapses, thus effectively vetoing it. Ignoring legislation, or
“putting a bill in one’s pocket” until Congress adjourns is thus called a pocket veto. Since Congress
cannot vote while in adjournment, a pocket veto cannot be overridden.
Q: When does a law take effect?

A: A law becomes effective 15 days after publication, unless otherwise provided. The phrase “unless
otherwise provided”does not mean that publication may be dispensed with. Rather, the phrase refers
to the 15-day period. In other words, the law itself may provide, through its effectivity clause, that it
becomes effective after the lapse of a different period. (See Tanada vs. Tuvera)
The Legislative Mill

 Drafting – done by either a member of the House or the Bill Drafting Division. The draft goes
to the Plenary Affairs Bureau of the Index and Bills Division where it will be docketed and
assigned a bill number, e.g. House Bill No.
 First Reading – only the title and the number of the bill is read, after which, the Senate
President or the House Speaker will refer it to the right committee, depending on the title; the
committee will study the bill and, if necessary, conduct public hearings; this is where the bill
either gets “killed” or recommended for approval, with amendments, if any, or consolidated
with other bills on the same subject
 Second Reading – involves a reading of the whole text of the bill, not just the title and docket
number; the sponsor of the bill will make his Sponsorship Speech, followed by the Turno en
Contra who will oppose the passage of the bill; then comes the debate and interpellation, after
which, the amendments agreed upon are finalized; the bill as amended is then printed and
distributed to the members at least 3 days before the 3rd reading
 Third Reading – no more debates or discussions or questions; members are only there to vote
to approve or reject the bill and, if required by law, to explain why so; voting will be done
through yeas and nays
 Referral – after the 3rd reading, the bill will be referred to the other chamber where it will also
undergo 3 readings; in case of conflict, the bill will be referred to the Bicameral Chamber, which
is a committee composed of members of each House; the Bicameral Chamber will draft a
compromise measure that, if approved by both Houses, will be submitted to the President for
him to veto or approve into law
Limitations on Legislative Power

 Substantive - curtail the contents of a law
 Non-delegation of legislative power
 Prohibiting passage of irrepealable laws
 Prohibiting passage of law that increases the appellate jurisdiction of SC without its
advice and concurrence (Sec. 30)
 Prohibiting law granting royalty or nobility (Sec. 31)
 Procedural – curtail the manner of passing a law

The President (Art. 7)
 Section 1
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS I AND II
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be
free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights
of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused
by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after
the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack
of merit.
Ratio:
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.
Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have
not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it
is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.
President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are
merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general
grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton).
Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not
forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment
No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with
implied powers.
It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to
comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
A subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and
a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several
government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN UNSIGNED AND
UNVERIFIED LETTER COMPLAINT IS AN "APPROPRIATE CASE" WITHIN THE
CONCEPT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN WHICH PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAN OBLIGE
PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO PRODUCE TO HIM
"ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988
AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA
OF EIIB FOR 1988.
WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS

FOR THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE
WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE,
BEYOND THE REACH OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
Held:
In United States v. Nixon:
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
citizens and, added to those values , is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President
and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution. . . .
In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself
that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing of necessity,
the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that
military secrets are at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of
privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail .
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is
the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision
would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as
concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a
confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict
confidence by the Ombudsman himself.
Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint in
this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This contention lacks merit.
As already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint
filed "in any form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, § 12
provides:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof. (Emphasis added)
SENATE VS ERMITA
The power of Congressional inquiry is not absolute.
Section 21, Article VI establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry.
The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s
duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that
the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, or course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the
person affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be
exceptional circumstances, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might
be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive
department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case,
attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Concept of executive privilege.
Executive privilege is “the power of the Government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress.” It is the right of the President and high-level executive branch
offices to withhold information from Congress, the courts and ultimately the public.
Types or kinds of executive privilege.

Executive privilege is not a clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.
One variety of the privilege, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning
with Washington, on the ground that the information is such nature that its disclosure would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the
privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information
of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic
privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intra-governmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which government decisions and policies are formulated.
Basis for the three kinds of executive privilege.
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist
disclosure of information, the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to the fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled
early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets.
The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers
in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending
investigations. (In re Sealed, 121 F. ed. 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276;)
Appearance during the question hour not mandatory.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the
question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of
powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs
from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be
required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is
rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the
absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.
Basis of the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials or the lack of
it.
The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information, otherwise, it would not be able to
perform intelligently its power of legislation.

Meaning of the requirement of prior consent of the President or the head of office ing an
official to appear before the Congress.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is
“covered by the executive privilege,” such official is subject to the requirement that he first
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before the Congress. This requirement
effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The provision allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that
the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by the head of office,
authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in
possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes
the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present,
such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a
head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration,
however, even without mentioning the term “executive privilege,” amounts to an implied claim that
the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis
of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege. (Senate, et al. vs. Ermita, et al.).
Invocation of executive privilege to be accompanied by reasons.
The invocation of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific reasons. Certainly,

Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that
determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information
could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do
not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information
that it has requested.
No need to specify the exact reason.
Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege
against self-incrimination.
No claim of executive privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the
fulfillment of the unique rule and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances
where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus, premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in the pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Only the President can claim privilege.
In view of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege, it is essential to limit to the President
the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to
invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is “By the order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in
the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization where the
authorization is not explicit but mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is invalid on this
score.
Sec. 1: President
“The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
Sec. 2: Qualifications
Natural-born citizen
Registered voter
Able to read and write
At least 40 yrs old on the day of election
Resident for at least 10 yrs immediately preceding the election
Sec. 3: Vice-President
Same qualifications and term of office as President
Elected and removed in same manner as President
May be a member of the Cabinet without need of confirmation
Sec. 4: Election and Term of Office

PRESIDENT – six years without re-election
VICE-PRESIDENT – six years, 2 successive terms
Q: If the Vice-President succeeds in the Presidency, is he allowed to run for President in the next
election?
A: Yes, provided he did not hold the office of the President for more than 4 yrs.
Congress as Board of Canvassers
PROCEDURE:
Duly certified returns from each province or city shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the
Senate President
Upon receipt of certificate of canvass, the Senate President shall, not later than 30 days after election
day, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of reps in a joint public
session
Congress shall determine the due authenticity and due execution of the certificate canvass and start
canvassing the votes
Congress shall proclaim the candidate having the highest number of votes
In case of tie, Congress shall vote separately and the candidate having the majority votes of all
members of both Houses shall be proclaimed the winner
Role of Congress in Presidential Election is to canvass the votes (See Barbers vs. Comelec)
Supreme Court en banc as Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Sole judge of all contents relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose
NOTA BENE:
No pre-proclamation controversy is allowed against Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates, EXCEPT: the

correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns or State of Votes.
Only the candidate who garners the second or third highest number of votes may question the proclamation of a winner.

COMELEC has no jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in presidential, vice-
presidential, senatorial and congressional elections; Correction of Manifest Error in the
Statement of Votes may be filed directly with COMELEC en banc
Protestant cannot be substituted by widow in case of death of the former pending resolution of election protest;
Substitute must be a real party in interest; Poe vs Arroyo
Sec. 6: Privilege and Salary
PRIVILEGES:
 Official residence (Malacanang Palace)
 Immunity from suit – not provided in the Constitution; to prevent distraction from performance
of duties
SALARY
 Fixed by law
 Cannot be decreased during tenure (actual time he held office) and cannot be increased during
his term (only upon expiration of the term)
 Shall not receive during tenure any other emolument from Government or any other source
Sec. 7 and 8: Assumption of Office and Succession
 WHEN: before noon of June 30
 If President-elect fails to qualify, dies or is permanently incapacitated, Vice-President-elect

becomes the President
 If the President-elect becomes incapacitated temporarily, the Vice-President-elect will act as

President until such a time that the President can assume office
 If there is failure to elect the president, the Vice-President will assume or act as President
 If the President, during his term, dies, gets disabled permanently, is removed from office, or
resigns, the Vice-President becomes the President

SUCCESSION IN CASE OF VACANCY:
 Vice-President
 Senate President
 Speaker of the House
Sec. 9: Vacancy of Vice-Presidency
The President shall nominate one from the Senate and the House of Reps who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of the Houses, voting separately
Sec. 10: Special Election in Case of Vacancy
 WHEN: 10:00 a.m. of the third day after the vacancy
 Congress will convene without need of a call and within 7 days enact a law calling for a
special election to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from time of such
call
Sec. 11: Acting President
 GROUND: inability to discharge the powers and duties of the office
 HOW: written declaration of the President or majority of his Cabinet
 Vice-President shall assume office as Acting President
 RESUMPTION OF OFFICE: also through written declaration of the President; if majority

of Cabinet denies such declaration, Congress shall decide the issue (if not in session,
Congress will convene within 48 hrs) within 10 days (12 days if not in session), by 2/3 vote
Sec. 12: Illness of the President
 Public shall be informed of the state of his health
 Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces shall not be denied access to the President during such illness

Sec. 13: Prohibition
 Cannot hold any other office or employment during tenure
 Cannot, during tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession, participate in any
business or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government
 Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office
 President’s spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil degree be
appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including GOCCs and subsidiaries
WHO CANNOT HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE DURING TENURE:
 President
 Vice-President
 Cabinet Members
 Deputies and Assistants
EXCEPTIONS:
 When Vice-President is appointed as member of the Cabinet

 When Vice-President acts as President
 When Secretary of Justice is also a member of the Judiciary
Q: Does the President have the same prohibition as Congress?
A: No, because Congress is only prohibited from holding offices in GOCCs and any other
government instrumentality, agency or subsidiary during term while Executive is prohibited from
holding any other office, whether public or private during tenure.
Q: What is ex officio capacity?
A: When an official holds other duties for the same office where he does not receive additional
compensation and the office is required by his primary function.
ESTRADA VS ARROYO SUPRA

CLINTON VS JONES
A sitting President of the United States has no immunity from civil law litigation against
him, for acts done before taking office and unrelated to the office.
Sec. 14 and 15: Appointments extended by Acting President
 Effective unless revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his assumption or
reassumption of office
 Acting President shall not make appointments 2 mos immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, EXCEPT: temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety
Sec. 16: Appointing Power
TYPES OF APPOINTMENT:
 Regular
 Ad Interim
 Temporary
Acting Appointments, effect and validity (See Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary)
Q: When is Congress considered to be in recess?
A: Recess it not the time between the adjournment of Congress and the start of its regular session.
The recess referred to here is the times of interval of the session of the same Congress.
Q: How long will ad interim appointments last?
A: Such appointments will last until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress.
WHO ARE APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT:
 Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,

officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution – requires
confirmation from Commission on Appointments
 All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
by law

 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
 Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone
Section 17
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
President’s Power of Control
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive
employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the
President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or
curtail the President’s power of control over the Executive branch.
GR: Congress has power to abolish
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute,
or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, may be
abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry
out reorganization measures.
What powers may not be delegated
xxx There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.
The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise
of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused,
all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that
the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls
within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is
of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign,
which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance.

Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego
of the President is bound to secure the latter’s prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts.
Sec. 18: Commander-in-Chief Powers of the President:
 Power to call on the military or armed forces

 Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
 Power to declare martial law
CALLING OUT POWER
Conditions for calling out the armed forces:
 To suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion

 Whenever it becomes necessary
MARTIAL LAW
 Conditions for declaration of Martial Law:

 When there is (1) rebellion or (2) invasion (grounds)
 Public safety requires the declaration
NOTA BENE: There must be actual rebellion or invasion. Differ this from the calling out power
which does not require actual rebellion or invasion but only that whenever it (the exercise of the
calling out power) becomes necessary to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion. (See
Sanlakas vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004)
What happens when Martial Law is declared:
 No suspension of operation of the Constitution

 No supplanting of the functioning of the civil courts and legislative assemblies
 No conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function
 No automatic suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
Constitutional guards against the power to declare Martial Law:
 Will last only for 60 days, unless sooner revoked by Congress

 Within 48 hours after declaration, President is required to submit a report to Congress
 Congress shall revoke or extend the period by jointly voting with an absolute majority and
President may not reverse such revocation

 If Congress is not in session, they shall convene within 24 hours from such declaration
without need for call
 Supreme Court may nullify the declaration on the ground of lack of factual basis, judgment
to be rendered within 30 days from its filing by any ordinary citizen
SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(NOTE: the conditions and effect of the suspension of the writ is similar to declaration of martial
law)
Restrictions to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:
 Apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion

 Apply only to persons judicially charged for offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion
 The person arrested must be judicially charged within 3 days from arrest, otherwise he shall
be released
DAVID VS ARROYO
 "Take Care" Power of the President

 Powers of the Chief Executive
 The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature
FACTS:
These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national
emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases
are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact
laws and decrees
 If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
HELD:
“Take-Care” Power
This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on
Sec. 17, Art. VII: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will,
among others, “execute its laws.” In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may
employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country, including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: “to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.”
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”?
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President
Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing
provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos
under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the
period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows
that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she
cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order
the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
Sec. 19: Executive Clemencies
“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.”
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES:
 Amnesty
 Pardon
 Reprieve
 Commutation
 Remit fines and forfeitures
Amnesty – an act of grace by the Chief Executive as a result of the grant of amnesty, the criminal
liability of the offender and all the effects of the crime are completely erased. It is a blanket
pardon given to a class of persons who committed crimes that are political in nature. To be
valid, Congress has to concur with a majority vote (thus, it is a public act) and the accused must
admit his guilt.
Pardon – a private act of the President granted after judgment by final conviction for ordinary offenses. It may be
absolute or condition, in which case, acceptance of condition – if burdensome to the accused – is necessary.
The effect is to relieve the accused from further punishment, thus, if given after sentence has been
served, its effect is to extinguish the accessory penalties. In case of administrative cases, effect is
reinstatement but no payment of backwages.
Reprieve – discretionary upon the President to suspend the enforcement of judgment
MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite
the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will
take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor."
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's
innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose
of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full
agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a

convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, Petitioner must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
Sec. 20: Power to Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans
Sec. 21: Treaty-making Power
“No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Power to enter into and ratify treaties is sole prerogative of the Executive
Sec. 22: Preparation and Submission of Budget
The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty-days from the opening of every regular
session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.
Sec. 23: SONA
The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time.
Ratification by President vis-à-vis Concurrence of Senate
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation’s consent to be bound by
said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied
thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A
State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of
the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such
ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should
be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the
intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in
the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of
notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and
incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the
agreement.
The Supreme Court
Section 1
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
MARBURY VS MADISON
 That for every violation of a vested legal right, there must be a legal remedy.
 Acts of Congress that conflict with the Constitution are not laws and the Courts are bound
instead to follow the Constitution, affirming the principle of judicial review.
 "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"
 It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department [the judicial branch] to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the
operation of each.
Section 5
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.
Legal Standing
KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA
Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic."
PCSO enters into a contract of lease with PGMC, such that the latter would operate lotteries with
their own operational expenses for 15 years after which termination of lease would then succeed all
properties to PCSO; opposed by Kilosbayan composed of concerned citizen;
Do they have legal standing?
Is the contract valid?

Held:
General Rule: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
However: In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they
were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The
Court dismissed the objective that they were not proper parties and ruled that the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. We have since then applied this
exception in many other cases.
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in
many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners
deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
Contract of Lease is contrary to law; Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42,
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or
joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
PCSO had nothing but its franchise, which it solemnly guaranteed it had in the General Information
of the RFP. Howsoever viewed then, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually
understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical,
operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PCSO would, primarily,
provide the franchise.
FRANCISCO VS FERNANDO
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost
all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely:
1. an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought
not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
Taxpayer’s Suit
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he

would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
A taxpayer may challenge the validity of a statute, which provides for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory
that the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined by a taxpayer.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he
claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in his office.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to
enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle,
binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court. Where it
clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues
raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.
Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will
stand.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive

determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive:
1. the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
2. the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by

the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
3. the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.
Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.
RIPENESS AND PREMATURITY
In Tan v. Macapagal, this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture." Only then may the courts
pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.
JUSTICIABILITY

The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely,
a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. (Italics in the original)
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission
on Elections, this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which
the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will
be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in
deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote
of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once

an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
Doctrine of Operative Fact
"The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration."
- Planters Products vs Fertiphil Corp.
POLITICAL QUESTION
The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely,
a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. (Italics in the original)
MACEDA VS VASQUEZ
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner
Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been
rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera
alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held:

A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to
his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
Section 11
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
PEO VS GACOTT
Facts:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio
Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also
sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment
was made by the Second Division of the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline
respondent judge
Held:

To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.
The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that
disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the
Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should
be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally
separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can
“order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative
case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en
banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of
a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or
both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and
undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even
cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

IX-A COMMON PROVISIONS
 Civil Service Commission

 Commission on Elections
 Commission on Audit
What are the inhibitions on the members of the Constitutional Commissions?
Section 2
No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure,

 Hold any other office or employment
 Engage in the practice of any profession
 Take part in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be
affected by the functions of his office,
 Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Section 7
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Some evidence of the independence of the Constitutional Commission
1. Salaries are fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure
2. Shall enjoy fiscal autonomy
3. The Commissioners can be removed by impeachment only
4. The President cannot designate an acting Chairman, like the Chairman of the Comelec
(Brillantes vs Yorac)
Nota bene:
 Appointment to any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired term of the predecessor;
Civil Service Commission
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters;
 Chairman
 (2) Commissioners
o Natural born citizens
o At least 355 years at the time of appointment
o Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment
 Appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
 7 years for Chairman
 5 years for Commissioners and another commissioner for 3 years without reappointment
 No temporary or acting capacity in appointments
Positions exempt from competitive examination
 Policy determining
 Primarily confidential
 Highly technical
Nota bene:

 No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign; (soliciting votes is prohibited) mere
introduction in a political rally is not sufficient to warrant electioneering;
Section 6
No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations
or in any of their subsidiaries.
Section 7
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Section 8
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Commission on Elections
 Chairman
 6 Commissioners
Qualifications
 Natural born citizen
 At leats 35 at the time of appointment
 Holders of a college degree
 Must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. A majority of the members, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years;
 Appointed by the President with the consent of the COA
 7 years for Chairman, three members first appointed shall hold office for 7 years, 2
members for 5 years, and the last members for 3 years;
 No temporary or acting capacity
Nota bene:

 Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses;
 Can, however, deputize the fiscal to conduct preliminary investigation on election offenses
and prosecute them; if not deputized, fiscal has no power to assume the role of prosecutor
of election offenses;
 Persons holding a public appointive office is considered resigned upon filing of his
certificate of candidacy for public office; whether government owned or controlled
corporation with or without original charters;
 Comelec may issue a writ of injunction only in appellate jurisdiction;
IV. THE AMENDING PROCESS
Article XVII, Section 2
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
Constitutional provision on People's Initiative is not self-executory

Principle of Non-delegation of Powers, Exceptions
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case sought to amend certain provisions of the Constitution, specifically lifting the
limit of terms of elective officials, through people’s initiative. Santiago et al. opposed on the ground
that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. There is no law passed yet and RA 6735, which
provides for initiative on statues and local legislation but not initiative on the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 6735 adequately provided for people’s initiative on Constitution
RULING:
Constitutional provision on people’s initiative is not self-executory;
Sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the Constitution...is not self-executory. xxx
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of this right?
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. xxx
We agree that RA 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
But is RA 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to “provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?”
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondents COMELEC, Sec. 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. – The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with
the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum
on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments
on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”
xxx
Second. It is true that Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Sec. 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Sec. 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not
include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
xxx
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II)
and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative
on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended RA 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it

could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
xxx
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or

wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
“empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act.”
Principle of non-delegation of power
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim:
potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Sec. 28(2), Art. VI;
Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Sec. 23(2), Art. VI;
Delegation to the people at large;
Delegation to local governments; and
Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to

promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes
a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, RA 6735 miserably

failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. INHERENT POWERS
 POLICE POWER
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution,
for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe regulations to promote the

health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the
recognition that salus populi est suprema lex – the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact
increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the
President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991. (MMDA, et
al. v. Viron Trans. Co., Inc., supra.).
ERMITA VS MAYOR OF MANILA
 Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
 That Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
 That it requires that guest need to fill up required information to be admitted to such hotel
or motels in the presence of the hotel manager, owner, operator or representative;
 it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or
their duly authorized representatives
 that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring
the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in
each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due
process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies
to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room
 that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room
or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours
 and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended
party
Held:
The presumption of validity of a statute:

 Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity”. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. It admits of no
doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here
Valid exercised of police power:

 On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar
as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where
such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
Taxation may be made to implement the state's police power:

 In the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's
police power.
 It has been the settled law, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into
those imposed for 1. regulating occupations or regular enterprises, 2. for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and 3. for revenue purposes only. As
was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful
occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined
to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally
an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence
license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld,
especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.
Non-impairment of contracts still subject to police power:

 The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power.
 A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of
the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental
aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing,
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline,
so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order
and happiness for all.

ACEBEDO VS CA
 Police Power as exercised by LGUs, restrictions and qualifications

 Power of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke business permits
 Granting of business permits vs. granting of permit to practice profession
FACTS:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit was
therefor issued, subject to certain conditions like prohibition of putting up an optical clinic,
examining and/or prescribing reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When it was found that
petitioner violated these conditions, its business permit was cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra vires
RULING:
Police Power exercised by LGUs

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The
State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare
clause of the Local Government Code xxx
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all
matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the
community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant
business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the
ambit of this power.
Power of city mayor to grant business permits

 The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is
provided for by law.
 However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due
process and equal protection of the law.
 But can city mayor cancel business permits or impose special conditions? As aptly discussed by
the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily
includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to
revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain
conditions.
Did the conditions or restrictions imposed amount to a confiscation of the business?

 Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and
the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is

usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or
Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the
person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity.
A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to
engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
 In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage
in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the
practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons
who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
MMDA VS GARIN
MMDA confiscated Respondent’s driver’s license. Respondent opposed the sanction of MMDA
claiming it has no authority to exercise police power; MMDA contends that a license to operate a
motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner
further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without
due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
Held:
A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise
of its police power.
 The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property
right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the
exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the
procedural due process requirements.
 In State ex. Rel. Sullivan, the Court held that, “the legislative power to regulate travel over the
highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised
in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor
vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their
operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate
them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to
reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and
welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon
noncompliance with prescribed conditions.”
 Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk, to
the effect that: “Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them
constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully
operated, an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by
careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature,
in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must,
prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of
the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the
Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law
is manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power.”

The MMDA is not vested with police power
 In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., we categorically

stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone
legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
 Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the
MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative
power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance
from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid.
Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations
 This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created
for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
SUPERDRUG VS DSWD
Facts:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Public
respondents are DOH, DOJ, DILG and DSWD, which were tasked to monitor the drugstores’
compliance with the Expanded Senior’s Citizen Act.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sec. 4(a) of the Expanded Senior’s Citizen Act, on the
ground that it constitutes deprivation of private property, since compelling them to grant the
discount will result in a loss of profit and capital, because they impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10%
on branded medicines; and the law failed to provide a tax deduction scheme which will give them
just compensation.
Issue:
Whether or not the Expanded Senior’s Citizen Act is unconstitutional.
Held:
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for
which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The

word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount.
As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare
of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and
diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel;
utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers;
and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount
to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered
by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the
mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of
the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity
which every law has in its favor.
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive
pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must

accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the
Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and
jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public
utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished
upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
A. Definition, Scope & Basis
1. Definition / Description
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. (Freund, The Police Power [Chicago, 1904]).
Police power is the power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and
property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the
promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to
limitations of the Constitution, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police power is the
exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and
general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government (Marshall vs.
Kansas City, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 877, 883)
Police power has been defined as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August
1989])
2. Scope
Police power regulates not only the property but, more importantly, the liberty of private
persons, and virtually all the people.
The scope of police power, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to

conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25
August 1989])
3. Basis
The justification for police power is found in the ancient Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema
lex, and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual
benefit to the interests of the greater number.
Salus populi est suprema lex. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. (Lingo Lumber Co.
vs. Hayes, Tex. Civ. App. 64 SW 2d. 835, 839)
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. (Common law maxim meaning that) one should use his own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another (1 Bl. Comm. 306. Chapman vs. Barnett,
131 Ind. App. 30, 169 N.E. 2d 212, 214).
It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state,
plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.
(Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323)
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the ‘law of overwhelming necessity.’ It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it
does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is
inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government
that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. It is the plenary power of the
State “to govern its citizens.” (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989])
B. Characteristics
Pervasive and non-waivable - The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power
and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the
important interests and needs — or the public order — of
the general community. (Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, [GR
78164, 31 July 1987])
Essential, insistent and illimitable - The police power of the state has been described as
the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers, which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety

and welfare of society. (Lozano vs. Martinez, [GR L-63419,
18 December 1986])
Dynamic - Police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet
the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when
the police power of the state may even override a
constitutional guaranty, such as that the constitutional
provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the
police power of the state. (Lozano vs. Martinez, [GR L-
63419, 18 December 1986]) Police power is dynamic, not
static, must move with the moving society it is supposed to
regulate. Once exercised, it is not deemed exhausted and may
be exercised repeatedly, as often as it is necessary for the
protection or the promotion of the public welfare.
Police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the attainment of a
legitimate police objective.
C. Who exercises said power?
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of
due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of
such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to
judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel
Operators v. City Mayor, [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967])
Police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Police power
cannot be bargained away through the medium of a contract or even a treaty.
Police power under the general welfare clause authorizes the municipal council to enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein. (Villanueva vs. Castaneda, [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987])

The exercise of police power, the choice of measures or remedies if indeed action is made,
and the ascertainment of facts to which police power is to be based, lies in the discretion of
the legislative department. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police power.
The only remedy against legislative inaction is a resort to the bar of public opinion, a refusal of the
electorate to return to members of the legislature who have been remiss in the discharge of their
duties. The remedy chosen by the legislature cannot be attacked on the ground that it is not the best
suggested solution, that it is unwise, impractical, inefficacious, or even immoral. These issues are
political in nature, and cannot be inquired into by the legislature.
D. Tests of Police Power
Lawful subject - The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the police power. The enjoyment
of private rights, when within the scope of police power, may be
subordinated to the interests of the greater number.
Lawful means - The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The lawful objective
must be pursued through a lawful method. The means employed for the
accomplishment of the police objective must pass to the test of
reasonableness and conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill of Rights
for the protection of private rights.
a. Rational Relations Test (property rights)
A mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June
1973]) Notwithstanding the “new equal protection approach” with its emphasis on “suspect
classification” and “fundamental rights and interests standard,” the “rational relation test” still
retains its validity. (Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984])
b. Clear and present danger Test (human rights)
A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973])
Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances:

Test of a valid ordinance
An ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute,
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive,
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory,
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade,
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy, and
6. It must not be unreasonable. (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July
1994])
EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no
need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser,
in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. (Noble v. City of Manila,
67 Phil. 1) It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert
the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must
then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in
the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989])
The following exercise the power of expropriation:

1. The Congress
2. The President of the Philippines
3. The various local legislative bodies
4. Certain public corporations
5. Quasi-public corporations (Example, quasi-public corporation: PEZA)
Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation. (Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA
142 [1990]). The power of eminent domain is lodged primarily in the national legislature, but its
exercise may validly delegated to other government entities and even to quasi-public corporations
serving essential public needs or operating public utilities. The utility of the proposed improvement,
the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its
site, are questions which are essentially political and which are to be exclusively determined by the
legislature, and are usually not subject to judicial review.
Constitutional limitation
Art. III, Sec. 9
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized
agents, is necessary in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must
be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is
guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306, and cases
cited 73 Am. Dec., 576)
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the
constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any
recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions found in most of the state constitutions
relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the
government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. (Visayan
Refining Co. v. Camus [40 Phil. 550]). The constitutional restraints are public use and just
compensation.
D. Distinguished from destruction due to necessity
The destruction of the property does not come under the right of eminent domain, but
under the right of necessity, of self-preservation. The right of necessity arises under the laws of
society or society itself. It is the right of self-defense, of self-preservation, whether applied to
persons or to property. It is a private right vested in every individual, and with which the right of the
state or state necessity has nothing to do (American Print Works vs. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590).
Destruction from necessity may be validly undertaken even by private individuals. Such is not
allowed in the case of eminent domain. Further, destruction from necessity cannot require the
conversion of the property taken to public use, nor is there any need for the payment of
compensation.
E. Objects of Expropriation
Anything that can come under the dominion of man is subject to expropriation. This includes real
and personal, tangible and intangible properties. Even property already devoted to public use is
still subject to expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national legislature or
under a specific grant of authority to delegate. The only exceptions to this rule are money
and choses in action. Expropriation of money is futile inasmuch as payment of just compensation
is also money. A chose in action is essentially conjectural as to its validity and its value.
A chose in action is the right of proceeding in a court of law to procure payment of sum of
money, or right to recover a personal chattel or a sum of money by action (Gregory vs. Colvin,
235 Ark. 1007, 363 S.W.2d 539, 540); or is the right to receive or recover a debt, demand, or
damages on a cause of action ex contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty (Moran vs. Adkerson,
168 Tenn. 372, 79 S.W.2d 44, 45)
Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. Real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.

Property subject of expropriation must be by its nature or condition wholesome, as it is intended to
be devoted to a public use.
Where Expropriation Suit is filed
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the

jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
(Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor [GR 138896, 20 June 2000])
Taking
Definition and Scope
Common A physical dispossession of the owner, as when he is ousted from his land or
relieved of his personal property, and is thus deprived of all beneficial use and
enjoyment of his property.
Legal To take is to lay hold of, to gain or receive in possession, to seize, to deprive one of
the use or possession of, or to assume ownership (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th
Edition, 1453). There is taking of property when government action directly
interferes with or substantially disturbs the owner’s use and enjoyment of the
property (Brothers vs. US., C.A.Or., 594 F.2d 740, 741). To constitute a “taking,”
within constitutional limitation, it is not essential that there be physical seizure or
appropriation, and any actual or material interference with private property rights
constitutes a taking (Board of Com’rs of Lake County vs. Mentor Lagoons Inc.,
Com.Pl., 6 Ohio Msc. 126, 216 N.E.2d 643, 646). Also, taking of property is affected
if application of zoning law denies property owner of economically viable use of his
land, which can consist of preventing best use of land or extinguishing fundamental
attribute of ownership (Vari-Build Inc. vs. Reno, D.C.Nev., 596 F. Supp. 673, 679).
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
US 393)
1. Taking under police power and power of eminent domain distinguished
Taking under police power and taking under the power of eminent domain, however, should be
distinguished. The power being exercised was eminent domain when the property involved
was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public
safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation,
which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. (City of Baguio v. NAWASA,
106 Phil. 144)
A. Taking under police power

If an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State’s police power, the property is
generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote
the general welfare.
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the
owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights
in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its
owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the
owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use
prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions
— the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
B. Taking under the power of eminent domain
“Taking” under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private
property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority,
devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof. (Penn. vs. Carolina Virginia Coastal Corporation, 57 SE 2d 817)
In the context of the State’s inherent power of eminent domain, there is a “taking” when the owner
is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. (U.S. v. Causby, 382 U.S. 256, cited in Municipality of La Carlota v. NAWASA, 12 SCRA
164.) There is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a
momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a
public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof
(Republic v. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 [1974]). For ownership, after all, “is nothing without the
inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary
and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking
within the Constitutional sense.” (Municipality of La Carlota v. NAWASA, 12 SCRA 164)
2. Stages
The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an
order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint.” The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.”
This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
(Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584 [1989]) It is only upon the completion of
these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon

payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government. (Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]).
Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over
the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can
exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to
the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.
Requisites
1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority.
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Deprivation of Use
1. In General
Easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a
fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of
the land. (United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946])
2. Local Government Units
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual
taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation,
while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs.
Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116). A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all
beneficial use of his property is confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the 14th
Amendment. (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs. Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs.
Jacksonville, 133 So. 114). Specifically, while property may be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare such as to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the
comfort and happiness of residents, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive
to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community. (People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958])
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which cannot reasonably be made of it cannot be
said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Use of property is an element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of
zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without compensation, such
principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we
know them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property
remain open and unused, then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the

cost of reasonable compensation for such property under the rules of law governing the
condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 111. 212, 185 N.E.
827)
Public use
Over many years and in a multitude of cases the courts have vainly attempted to define
comprehensively the concept of a public use and to formulate a universal test. They have found here
as elsewhere that to formulate anything ultimate, even though it were possible, would, in an
inevitably changing world, be unwise if not futile. (Matter of New York City Housing Authority v.
Muller, 1 NE 2d 153)
Public Use, as traditionally understood, means any use directly available to the general
public as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or accommodation. (Justice Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, 74)
Public Use is “the constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For
condemnation purposes, ‘public use’ is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it
is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised
by one or many members of public, a ‘public advantage’ or ‘public benefit’ accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use.” (Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P.2d 769, 772, 773.)
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take private
property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole community as
distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not
be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is
to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient. (Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles
County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186). The term may be said to mean public
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the
inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular
individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without
obvious general loss and inconvenience. A ‘public use’ for which land may be taken defies absolute
definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances in the sciences, changing
conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought
about by an increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation. (Katz v.
Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586.)
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for
the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power
of eminent domain comes into play. The constitution in at least two cases determines what public
use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. (Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed., pp. 523-524)

Genuine Necessity
In the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the
legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term “necessary”, in this connection, does not
mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated
purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchel, 50 Phil 832,
837-838 [1927]).
The Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In
such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public
necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location
selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power
to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people. In the
absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and
expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and
not judicial in their character. (City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349
[1919])
Just Compensation
Defined
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. (Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. Dulay [GR L-59603, 29 April 1987])
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator (Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasques, 32 Phil. 286). It has been repeatedly stressed
by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. (Province of
Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467) The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word
“compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample (City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208).
Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for then the property owner is made to suffer
the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. (Eslaban vs. Vda. de
Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001])
Determination of Just Compensation
A. In General

The determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and
may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. (Export Processing
Zone Authority vs. Dulay [GR L-59603, 29 April 1987])
Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3)
competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the
time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the
time within which their report shall be submitted to the court. (Section 5, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure) The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not
taken and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the
owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the
corporation or the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But
in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or
the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (Section 6, Rule 67, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure)
Still, according to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners’ report. It may
make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the
exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record
(Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
B. Local Government Units
Section 19, Republic Act 7160. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with
the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to
be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
When Determined
A. When
Where the institution of an expropriation action precedes the taking of the property subject
thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time of the filing of the complaint. This is so
provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being
conditioned on its deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property as
provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. There are instances,
however, where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation

suit. In these instances, the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking,
not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. (Ansaldo vs. Tantuico [GR 50147, 3
August 1990])
When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value
should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the
latter should be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking of the property
involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed,
otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that compensation ‘be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint’ would never be operative. (Republic v. Philippine National Bank,
1 SCRA 957 [1961])
B. Why
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the
plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been
a natural increase in the value of the property from the time the complaint is filed, due to
general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or
injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the
only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., ”just not only to the individual
whose property is taken,” “but to the public, which is to pay for it.” (Republic v. Lara, 50 O.G.
5778 [1954])
Manner of Payment
A. Manner
1. Traditional
Although it may be said that “where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it
to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as ‘the
compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and
all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount.’” (Lewis, Law of
Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, pp. 1166-1167); the method of expropriation adopted in Philippine
jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and
irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. (Visayan Refining Co. v.
Camus and Paredes, 40 Phil. 550) Further, the Rules provide that “upon the filing of the complaint
or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money,
unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government
bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the
amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court. xxx” (Section 2, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure)

2. Revolutionary
Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that “Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the
land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with
the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.” (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [GR 78741, 14 July 1989])
B. Medium
1. Traditional
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is
entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to
make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always
been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. (Manila Railroad Co. v.
Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286)
Just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever
gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value
being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for
such property. (J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413)
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot
compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the
condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in
the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is
resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law
has fixed that standard as money in cash. (Mandl v. City of Phoenix, 18 p 2d 273.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as
a reliable and constant standard of compensation. (Sacremento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron,
156 Cal. 408, 104 pp. 979, 980.)
“Just compensation” for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which
must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of
the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable
advantage. (City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing Butler v. Ravine
Road Sewer Com’rs, 39 N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v. Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18 Wend. 9 35, 31

Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal 266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 14 p. 329, 10
Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.)
2. Revolutionary
The records of the Constitutional Commission do not provide any categorical agreement among the
members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the
comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to “fine
tune” the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should
“leave it to Congress” to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and
reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as “progressive
compensation” and “State-subsidized compensation” were also proposed. In the end, however, no
special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. (Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704; Vol. 3, pp. 16-20,
243-247.)
Trial with Commissioners
In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of
just compensation. Trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be
done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. (Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) vs.
Pineda [GR 59791, 13 February 1992])
Legal Interest for Expropriation Cases
Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that “If the obligation consists in the payment
of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being
no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is 6% per annum.” Central Bank Circular 416
does not apply as it only applies to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments
involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. (National Power Corporation vs.
Angas [GR 60225-26, 8 May 1992])
Writ of Possession
1. Issuance of writ of possession
A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the
government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to
expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes ministerial. (Biglang-awa v. Bacalla, GR 139927 and 139936, 22 November 2000.)

It is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation
proceedings, the following requisites must be met:
1. There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient inform and in substance;

2. A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or
executive) discretion; and
3. The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. (Ignacio v.
Guerrero [GR L-49088, 29 May 1987])
2. Remedy for party assailing validity of writ of possession
A petition for review could not have been resorted to inasmuch as the order of the trial court
granting a writ of possession was merely interlocutory from which no appeal could be taken. Rule
45, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to final judgments or orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court. A petition for certiorari is the suitable
remedy in view of Rule 65, §1 which provides “When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.”
Expropriation of Utilities, Landed Estates and Municipal Property
Art. XII, Sec. 18
Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate
vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
Government.
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of

small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
Art. XIII, Sec. 9
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with
the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under-
privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also
promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation
of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
Property held by a municipal corporation in its private capacity is not subject to the
unrestricted control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such property
against its will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with payment of full compensation.”
(McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, pp. 670-681).
In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different. The people of a compact
community usually require certain conveniences which cannot be furnished without a franchise from
the State and which are either unnecessary in the rural districts, such as a system of sewers, or parks
and open spaces, or which on account of the expenses it would be financially impossible to supply
except where the population is reasonably dense, such as water or gas. But in so far as the
municipality is thus authorized to exercise the functions of a private corporation, it is
clothed with the capacities of a private corporation and may claim its rights and immunities,
even as against the sovereign, and is subject to the liabilities of such a corporation, even as
against third parties. (19 R.C.L. p. 698)
DE KNECHT VS BAUTISTA
The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road
Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City.
Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the
Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the
Ministry argued that the new route will save the government P2 million. The government filed
expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom
was petitioner.
Held:
There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for
public use upon the payment of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation.” It is recognized, however, that the government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose what private property should be taken. A landowner is covered by the mantle
of protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the
antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in
an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea off
air play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by any
governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so
emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, Acts of Congress, as well as those of the
Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity.
The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it
can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly
militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and
economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would
seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development,
on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the
benefit of the people.
EPZA VS DULAY
The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City
which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court
recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA
filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and
current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower.
HELD:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible

encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court inutile in a matter
which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The valuation in the decree
may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it
may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the
just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just
compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax
declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of

martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those
documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
MORENO VS MACTAN-CEBU AIRPORT
Held:
In Fery, which was cited in the recent case of Reyes v. National Housing Authority, we declared that
the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the
character of its title over the properties –
If land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is
ended or abandoned, the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the
purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon
condition that the city can only use it for a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless
there is some statutory provision to the contrary x x x x If, upon the contrary, however, the
decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land
becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or
municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title
acquired by the expropriation proceedings x x x x When land has been acquired for public use
in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the
land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner x x x x
Our stand on the amount of repurchase price remains unperturbed. When the State reconveys
land, it should not profit from sudden appreciations in land values. Any increase or decrease in
market value due to the proposed improvement may not be considered in determining the market
value. Thus, reconveyance to the original owner shall be for whatever amount he was paid by the
government, plus legal interest, whether or not the consideration was based on the land’s highest
and best use when the sale to the State occurred.
TAXATION
A. Definition and Nature
1. Definition
a. Taxation is:
 the method by which enforced proportional contributions are exacted.
 the power by which the sovereign, through its lawmaking body, raises revenue
to defray the necessary expenses of government.

 a way of apportioning the costs of government among those who in some
measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burden.
 a “Symbiotic” relationship, whereby in exchange for the protection that the
citizens get from the government, taxes are paid.
b. Taxes
Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property levied by the lawmaking
body of the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for public
needs. (Cooley, Taxation, 4th edition, Section 1)
Distinction with license fees. The term “tax” applies — generally speaking — to all kinds of
exactions which become public funds. The term is often loosely used to include levies for revenue as
well as levies for regulatory purposes. Thus license fees are commonly called taxes. Legally speaking,
however, license fee is a legal concept quite distinct from tax; the former is imposed in the
exercise of police power for purposes of regulation, while the latter is imposed under the
taxing power for the purpose of raising revenues (MacQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 9,
3rd Edition, p. 26).
Distinction with special assessments. While the word “tax” in its broad meaning, includes both
general taxes and special assessments, and in a general sense a tax is an assessment, and an
assessment is a tax, yet there is a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is confined
to local impositions upon property for the payment of the cost of public improvements in its
immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed.
The differences between a special assessment and a tax are that:
1. A special assessment can be levied only on land;
2. A special assessment cannot (at least in most states) be made a personal liability of the
person assessed;
3. A special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and
4. A special assessment is exceptional both as to time and locality. The imposition of a
charge on all property, real and personal, in a prescribed area, is a tax and not an assessment,
although the purpose is to make a local improvement on a street or highway. A charge
imposed only on property owners benefited is a special assessment rather than a tax
notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax. (Apostolic Prefect of the Mountain Province vs. the
Treasurer of Baguio City [GR 47252, 18 April 1941]; citing Cooley)
2. Attributes / Characteristics of taxation
A forced charge, imposition or contribution and as such it operates in invitum. (Rochester vs. Bloss,
175 NY 42, 27 NE 794, 61 LRA [NS] Ann 7, Cas. 15) Taxes are not in the nature of contracts
between the party and party but grow out of a duty to, and are the positive acts of the government,
to the making and enforcing of which, the personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required
(Republic vs. Mambulao Lumber [GR L-17725, 28 February 1962]).
It is a pecuniary burden payable in money, but such a tax is not necessarily confined to
those payable in money (1 Cooley 3).
It is levied by the legislative body of the State because the taxing power is pecuniary and
exclusively legislative in character. (51 Am. Jr. 71)

It is assessed in accordance with some reasonable rule of apportionment, conformably with the
constitutional mandate on progressivity of a taxing system. (Article VI, Section 28[1], 1987
Constitution).
It reaches even the citizen abroad and his income earned from sources outside his State; as
well as all income earned in the taxing State, whether by citizens or aliens, and all
immovable and tangible personal properties found in its territory, as well as tangible
personal property owned by persons domiciled therein, are subject to its taxing power
(Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, 86)
A tax is levied for a public purpose as taxation itself involves a burden to provide revenue for public
purposes of a general nature.
3. Nature of taxing power
Inherent The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed

of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the
source of the bulk of public funds. Taxes being the lifeblood
of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of
the essence. (Sison v. Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984])
High prerogative of sovereignty As the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty,
the relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or
diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate, must
be strictly construed, and the same must be coached in clear
and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied. (84
C.J.S. pp. 659-800)
Legislative Taxing power is peculiarly and exclusively legislative in
character and remains undiminished in the legislative in
character and remains undiminished in the legislature in the
absence of an express surrender thereof, clear and explicit in
its terms. (51 Am. Jur. 71-73)
Constitutionally limited The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is the
strongest of all the powers of government. For all its
plenitude, the power to tax has restrictions. The Constitution
sets forth such limits. Adversely affecting as it does property
rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses may
properly be invoked to invalidate in appropriate cases a
revenue measure. (Sison v. Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July
1984])
B. Purpose
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary
hindrance. Despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one’s hard-earned income to the
taxing authorities, every person who is able to must contribute his share in the running of the
government. The government for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and
intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material

values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous
notion that it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power. (Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR L-28896, 17 February 1988])
Revenue:
The purpose of taxation is to provide funds or property with which the State promotes the general
welfare and protection of its citizens. (51 Am. Jur. 71-73) Raising of revenues is the principal object
of taxation. (Bagatsing vs. Ramirez [GR L-41631, 17 December 1976])
Non-Revenue:
Regulation: Taxes may also be imposed for a regulatory purpose as for example,
in the promotion, rehabilitation and stabilization of industry which is
affected with public interest. (See Lutz vs. Araneta [GR L-7859, 22
December 1955] , and Caltex Philippines vs. Commission on Audit
[GR 92585, 8 May 1992])
Promotion of general welfare: If objective and methods alike are constitutionally valid, no
reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made to implement the
state’s police power. (Lutz V. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 [1955]; citing
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed.
1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M’Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. )
Reduction of social inequality: Made possible through the progressive system of taxation
where the objective is to prevent the undue concentration of wealth
in the hands of a few individuals. (Aban, Benjamin. Law of Basic
Taxation in the Philippines, Second Edition 1994, page 6).
Encourage economic growth: In the realm of tax exemptions and tax reliefs, the purpose of
taxation (the power to tax being the power also not to tax. — Ed.) is
to grant incentives or exemptions in order to encourage investments
and thereby promote the country’s economic growth. (Ibid.)
Protectionism: In some important sectors of the economy, taxes sometimes provide
protection to local industries like protective tariffs and customs
duties. (Ibid.)
C. Scope (The power to tax is the power to destroy)
Philippine internal revenue laws are not political in nature and as such were continued in
force during the period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the
occupation government. As a matter of fact, income tax returns were filed during that period and
income tax payment were effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are deemed to be
the laws of the occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy. (Hilado vs. CIR [GR. L-9408, 31
October 1956.])
So pervasive is the power of taxation that it reaches even the citizen abroad and his income
earned from sources outside his State. In other cases, all income earned in the taxing State,

whether by citizens or aliens, and all immovable and tangible personal properties found in its
territory, as well as tangible personal property owned by persons domiciled therein, are subject to its
taxing power (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, 86) Tariff and customs duties are taxes
constituting a significant portion of the public revenue which are the lifeblood that enables the
government to carry out functions it has been instituted to perform. (Commissioner of Customs v.
Makasiar [GR 79307, 29 August 1989])
Legislative taxing power or discretion extends to the following:
 Subjects and objects of tax

 Amount and rate of tax
 Purpose for which taxes are to be levied
 Apportionment of the tax ( general, limited to a particular locality, or mixed)
 Situs of taxation
 Manner and mode of enforcement and collection
(Aban, Benjamin. Law of Basic Taxation in the Philippines, Second Edition 1994, page 8).
The taxing authority can select the subjects of taxation (Gomez vs. Palomar (GR L-23645, 29
October 1988). The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation conforms to the practical
dictates of justice and equity, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is
therefore uniform. There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is
required is that the tax applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar
situation. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. It is enough that the
classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. (Sison v.
Ancheta [GR L-59431, 25 July 1984])
Thus, a classification is reasonable where

1. It is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
2. These are germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
which are substantially identical to those of the present;
4. The classification applies only to those who belong to the same class (Felwa v. Salas [GR
L-26511, 29 Oct 1966]).
Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
(Ormoc Sugar Company vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City [GR L-23794, 17 February 1968])
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and
render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government
a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very
measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be
denied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the magic of the word confidence. Taxation,
it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of
destruction, would be an abuse, to presume which, would banish that confidence which is
essential to all government. (Chief Justice Marshall, McCulloch vs. Maryland, 17 US 316 [1819])
In those days (the case of McCullough vs. Maryland [1819] — Ed.) it was not recognized as it is

today that most of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If the States had any power
it was assumed that they had all power, and that the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether.
But this Court which so often has defeated the attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt
to discriminate or otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power to
tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits. The power to fix rates is the power to
destroy if unlimited, but this Court while it endeavors to prevent confiscation does not
prevent the fixing of rates. (Dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, Panhandle Oil Co. vs. State of
Mississippi Ex Rel. Knox, 277 US 218 [1928]). Construing the “power to tax is the power to
destroy,” it merely describes “not the purposes for which the tax may be used but the
degree of vigor with which the taxing power may be employed in order to raise revenue (1
Cooley 179-181).
D. Who exercises the power?
1. In general
Taxing power is peculiarly and exclusively legislative in character and remains

undiminished in the legislature in the absence of an express surrender thereof, clear and
explicit in its terms. (51 Am. Jur. 71-73) It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that “inequalities which result from a singling out
of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation” (Carmichael
vs. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245, citing numerous authorities, at p.
1251).
Still, tax collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very
reason for government itself. It is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it be exercised
reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. It is therefore necessary to
reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real
purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved. If it is not, then
the taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor. For all the
awesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can
demonstrate that the law has not been observed. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue [GR
L-28896, 17 February 1988])
2. Local Government Units
Previously, a municipal corporation has no inherent power of taxation. To enact a valid

ordinance, the City must find in its charter the power to do so, for said power cannot be
assumed. A municipal corporation, unlike a sovereign state, is clothed with no inherent
power of taxation. Its charter must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the corporation
cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed strictissimi juris. Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the term used must be resolved against the municipal corporation. (Santos
Lumber Co. vs. City of Cebu, et al., 102 Phil., 870; See also Arong vs. Raffiñan, 98 Phil., 422). Now,
direct authority has been conferred to local government units by the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Section 5, Article X thereof, which provides that “Each local government unit
shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent

with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.”
Except as otherwise provided in the Local Government Code (RA 7160), the province may levy
only the taxes, fees, and charges as provided in Article I, Chapter II, Title I, Book II; such the Tax
on Transfer of Real Property Ownership; Tax on Business of Printing and Publication; Franchise
Tax; Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources; Professional Tax; Amusement Tax; Annual
Fixed Tax For Every Delivery Truck or Van of Manufacturers or Producers, Wholesalers of,
Dealers, or Retailers in, Certain Products (Section 134). Further, municipalities may levy taxes, fees,
and charges not otherwise levied by provinces (Section 142). Furthermore, the city, may levy the
taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That
the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component
cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of the Local
Government Code, and Provided further that the rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed
the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more than 50% except the rates
of professional and amusement taxes (Section 151).
Section 130 of the Local Government Code provides for fundamental principles that shall
govern the exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government
units, that is,
a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
1. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;
2. be levied and collected only for public purposes;
3. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
4. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the
restraint of trade;
c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to
any private person;
d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code shall
inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the local
government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided herein; and,
e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
Art. VI Sec. 28
Section 28 The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (exclusively means primarily not
necessarily solely)
No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Art. XIV, Sec. 4 (3)
Section 4
xxx
All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or
cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by law.
Art. X, Sec. 5
Section 5 Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
Tax Exemptions
1. Nature
Tax exemptions are either constitutional or statutory. Exemption is granted religious and
charitable institutions because they give considerable assistance to the State in the
improvement of the morality of the people and the care of the indigent and the
handicapped. (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 Edition, 92-93) Statutory exceptions are
granted in the discretion of the legislature, but such law should be passed with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of Congress. Where the taxation is granted gratuitously, it may be
validly revoked at will, with or without cause. However, if the exemption is granted for
valuable consideration it is deemed to partake of the nature of a contract and the obligation
thereof is protected against impairment (Ibid., 94-95)
By its very nature, the law that exempts one from tax must be clearly expressed because the
exemption cannot be created by implication. Exemption from taxation are highly disfavored in
law; and he who claims an exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of
organic or statute law. An exemption from the common burden cannot be permitted to exist upon
vague implication. (Asiatic Petroleum Co. vs. Llanes, 49 Phil., 466; See also House vs. Posadas, 53
Phil., 338.)

The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution (Apostolic Prefect of the Mountain Province vs. the Treasurer of Baguio City [GR
47252, 18 April 1941]). The phrase “exempt from taxation,” as employed in the Constitution
should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. The exemption from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated in the Constitution are property taxes, as
contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax
imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the
property themselves. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of
the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of
such excise tax on property used for religious purposes do not constitute an impairment of
the Constitution. (Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-19201, 16 June 1965])
As to franchise grantees and other entities specifically granted exemption by the legislature, “tax
exemption must be strictly construed and that the exemption will not be held to be conferred unless
the terms under which it is granted clearly and distinctly show that such was the intention of the
parties.” (Philippine Acetylene vs. CIR [GR L-19707, 17 August 1967]
2. Burden of Proof
The cardinal rule in taxation is that exemptions therefrom are highly disfavored in law and
he who claims tax exemption must be able to justify his claim or right thereto by the clearest
grant of organic or statute law. (Wonder Mechanical Engineering vs. CTA [GR L-22805 & L-
27858, 30 June 1975]) The burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed deduction.
It is the universal rule that he who claims an exemption from his share of the common
burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that the Legislature intended to
exempt him by words too plain to be mistaken. (Statutory Construction by Francisco, citing
Government of Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, 25 Phil. 42.)
It is axiomatic that when public property is involved, exemption is the rule and taxation, the
exception. (SSS vs. Bacolod City [GR L-35726, 21 July 1982])
Double Taxation
There is double taxation when additional taxes are laid on:

1. the same subject
2. by the same taxing jurisdiction
3. during the same taxing period
4. and for the same purpose. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 48)
Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the
same governmental entity (cf. Manila vs. Interisland Gas Service, 52 Off. Gaz. 6579, Manuf. Life
Ins. Co. vs. Meer, 89 Phil. 357).
National vis-a-vis local

Where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city, the argument
against double taxation may not be invoked, as there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or

activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. (Punsalan v. Municipal Board of
Manila [GR L-4817, 26 May 1954])
Possibly both local, Tax and license fee

Both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the same business or occupation, or for
selling the same article, this not being in violation of the rule against double taxation
(Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Manila [GR L-16619, 29 June 1963]; citing Bentley
Gray Dry Goods Co., vs. City of Tampa 137 Fla. 641, 188 SO. 758; MacQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, Vol. 9, 3rd Edition, p. 83).
National vis-a-vis another country

Double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit
of the same governmental entity (cf. Manila vs. Interisland Gas Service, 52 Off. Gaz. 6579,
Manuf. Life Ins. Co. vs. Meer, 89 Phil. 357). Where the taxpayers would have to pay two taxes
on the same income (one in the Philippines and one in the United States, for example), the
Philippine government only receives the proceeds of one tax. As between the Philippines,
where the income was earned and where the taxpayer is domiciled, and the United States, where that
income was not earned and where the taxpayer did not reside, it is indisputable that justice and
equity demand that the tax on the income should accrue to the benefit of the Philippines. Any relief
from the alleged double taxation should come from the United States, and not from the Philippines,
since the former’s right to burden the taxpayer is solely predicated on his citizenship, without
contributing to the production of the wealth that is being taxed. (CIR vs. Lednicky [GR L-18169, L-
18286, & L-21434; 31 July 1964.])
License Fees
There are three kinds of licenses recognized by law:

1. Licenses for the regulation of useful occupations;
2. Licenses for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises; and
3. Licenses for revenue only. Non-payment of a license fee for a business makes the business
illegal unlike tax.
The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered in determining whether it is a tax or an
exercise of the police power. The amount may be so large as to itself show that the purpose was to
raise revenue and not to regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a marked distinction between
license fees imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes to regulate
but not restrict, and those which are inimical and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the
latter case the fee may be very large without necessarily being a tax. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. IV,
pp. 3516-17)
The power to regulate as an exercise of police power does not include the power to impose
fees for revenue purposes. Fees for purely regulatory purposes “may only be of sufficient amount
to include the expenses of issuing the license and the cost of the necessary inspection or police
surveillance, taking into account not only the expense of direct regulation but also incidental
expenses. (Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818) The regulatory fee “must be no more than
sufficient to cover the actual cost of inspection or examination as nearly as the same can be
estimated. If it were possible to prove in advance the exact cost, that would be the limit of the fee
(Manila Electric Co. vs. Auditor General, 73 Phil. 129-135).

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE, supra
II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Due Process
Art. III, Sec. 1 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Art. III. Sec. 14 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
Definition, Nature and Scope
a. Definition / Concept
The concept of due process is that it is a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial, so that every citizen shall hold
his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which
govern society. (Hurtado vs. People of State of California [110 U.S. 516, 3 March 1884]) It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. (Ermita Malate
Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967])
No attempt was made to spell out the meaning of due process or to define the concept with some
degree of exactitude. Due process continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation
calling for its application. The very elasticity of the provision makes this possible and thus enlarges
the rights of the individual to his life, liberty or property. (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 200
Edition, 98-99)
“Due process of law” mean law in its regular course of administration, according to prescribed
forms, and in accordance with the general rules for the protection of individual rights. (Hurtado vs.
California, citing Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129) Due process, in any particular case, means such an
exercise of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction under
such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe. (Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534, 572 [1918])
Due process is described as “responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice .”(Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31
July 1967]) It has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play. (Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.)
b. Nature
Dynamic Due process continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every

situation calling for its application. The very elasticity of the provision makes
this possible and thus enlarges the rights of the individual to his life, liberty
or property. (Justice Cruz, Constitutional Law, 200 Edition, 98-99)

Waivable The right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly so,
as long as the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf.
If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard
to complain that he was unduly silenced (Stronghold Insurance Co. Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals [GR 88050,30 January 1990]).
c. Scope
Due process applies and protects all persons, without regard to any difference of race, color or
nationality. Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property
is concerned (Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163). It includes aliens and their means of
livelihood (Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho [GR L-29646, 10 Nov 1978]). Even the State is
entitled to due process (Uy vs. Genato, 57 SCRA 123, People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166).
Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property
a. Life
Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, and extends to the
use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable (Justice Malcolm, Philippine
Constitutional Law, 380; Buck vs. Bell, 274 US 200).
The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just the protection of the right to be alive or
to the security of one’s limb against physical harm. The right to life is also the right to a good
life. (Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A commentary, 1996
Edition, 102).
b. Liberty
Liberty means the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude. It includes the right of the citizen to be free to use facilities in all lawful ways (Rubi,
et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919])
c. Property
Property means anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of
contract. It represents more than the things that a person owns; it includes the right to
secure and dispose of them (Tonaco vs. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197).
Protected property has been deemed to include vested rights as a perfect mining claim, or a
perfected homestead, or a final judgment. It also includes the right to work and the right to earn
a living (Fr. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A commentary, 1996
Edition, 101). One’s employment, profession, trade, or calling is protected property (Callanta vs.
Carnation Philippines Inc., 145 SCRA 268, 279 [28 October 1986]).
A license is not considered protected property, but is deemed a privilege withdrawn when
public interest required its withdrawal. Still, a privilege may evolve into some form of property

protected by the Constitution when a holder of such privilege has been enjoying it for so long and
has put in substantial investment making the business the source of employment for thousands.
Once licenses are issued, continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
Suspension of issued licenses involve state action that adjudicated important interests of the
licensees. (Bell vs. Burson, 402 US 535, 539 [1971])
Public office is not property but a public trust or agency. The right to office, however, is
protected right. Due process may be relied upon by public officials to protect the security of tenure
which in the limited sense is analogous to property (Morfe vs. Mutuc, [GR L-20387, 31 January
1968]).
Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty or property. The inquiry is whether the law is a proper exercise of
legislative power.
Requisites:
 The means are reasonable for the accomplishment of the purpose of the law; and
 The law must be intended for the interest of the public rather than for private interest.
Procedural Due Process
The justice that procedural due process guarantees is the one “which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.” (Daniel Webster, Dartmouth
College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518) The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitutes the essential elements of due process and neither of these elements can be
eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty. (Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. vs.
NLRC, 286 SCRA 656)
Requisites:
 There must be an impartial tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it.
 The court must have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and over the property
which is the subject matter of the proceeding, if any.
 There must be opportunity to be heard.
 The judgment must be rendered after trial and in accordance with law.
Publication Requirement
The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” refers not to the need of publication but to the
requirement of 15 days. The 15 days can be lengthened or shortened but not to the point of
allowing no publication at all. There can be no such thing as a law that is effective immediately,
even if the law is not penal in nature. The underlying reason for this rule is that due process, which
is a rule of fairness, requires that those who must obey a command must first know the command.
Related to the rule on publication is the rule on vagueness. A law that is utterly vague is
defective because it fails to give notice of what it commands. (Fr. Bernas, The 1987

Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A commentary, 1996 Edition, 122). As a rule, a
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men “of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
(Tribe, American Constitutional Law 718 (1987), citing Connally vs. General Construction Co., 269
US 385 [1926]). It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. (People vs. Nazario, 165 SCRA
186, 195-196)
Impartial Court or Tribunal
A court affected by bias or prejudice cannot be expected to render a fair and impartial
decision. Every litigant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (Gutierrez vs.
Santos [GR L-15624, 30 May 1961]). There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already waiting only to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. The judge will
reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of
the established facts and the pertinent law (Javier vs. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA 194).
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested
as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Prejudicial Publicity
Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due
process right to fair trial. However, pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere exposure of judges to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there
must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of
publicity. (People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001]) Still, the Supreme Court reminds a
trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair
administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every
criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty
and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that
justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from
the bar of public opinion. (Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995])
Notice and Hearing:

Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its own evidence and to meet and refute the
evidence submitted by the other party. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void
ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally (David vs. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707). Due
process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever
reason, not to be heard. If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be
heard to complain that he was unduly silenced (Stronghold Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 88050,30 January 1990]).
Exceptions to notice and hearing requirements
Due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require trial-
type proceedings. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “’To be heard’
does not only mean verbal arguments in court. One may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be head, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded , there is no denial
of procedural due process. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 316)
Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated
as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action
where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative
functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter,
and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person
whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing (73
C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453; cited in Philcomsat
v. Alcuaz [GR 84818, 18 December 1989]).
The right to appeal is not essential to the right to a hearing. Except when guaranteed by the
constitution, appeal may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretions. But as
long as the law allows him to appeal, denial of that remedy is a denial of due process. The
legislature cannot deprive anyone of the right to appeals in
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question;
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto;
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher; and
5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved; as specified in Article VIII,
Section 5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Administrative Due Process
Requisites:
1. There must be a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence
in support thereof;

2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties;
6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision; and
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision.
PBM EMPLOYEES VS PBM
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute
with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation
of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners
and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other
employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace
Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty by CIR
for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble
violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest of herein private respondent
firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can

report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded
them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation
merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of
Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As
heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of
free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be
apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be
regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and
abet continued alleged police persecution.
Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
 JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of
the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the
court over the property is recognized and made effective.
 The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that
nature and is substantially such.
 DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to
be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held,
under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila
to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on
January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted
foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice
by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila,
the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and
afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908,
this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale,
a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to
vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of
default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of
the action
Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have
reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to
administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or
(2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may
entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and
his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted
over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of
the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the
latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be
taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found
in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of

what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of
land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical
control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise
a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all
the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a

proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking
an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression
"action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in
courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation
upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem
in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose
of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property
of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way
thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
xxx
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however,
does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem;
and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
On Due Process
xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There
must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;
and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe
that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing
the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer
this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the
mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called
constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means
provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of
judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to
protect it.
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may
never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon

the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our
law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally
and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all
these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law,
to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which
may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due
process?
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial
of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the
judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only
form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was
absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it
be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the
matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either
has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered
as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion
that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the
idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The
jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity
for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem
highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision
which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power
in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of
Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has
not been infringed.
Ang Tibay v. CIR
Facts:
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the CIR and to the
motion for new trial of the National Labor Union.
The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General, as it found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The Court granted the motion for a new trial and

the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth.
1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid concept of separation of powers
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation (CA 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It
not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wage shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or
both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper
to be dealt with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing
the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to
settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the
President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry
concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share
of laborers or tenants, or a maximum “canon” or rental to be paid by the “inquilinos” or tenants or
lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to
the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here
a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers.
2. The CIR free from rigidity of certain procedure requirements, but not free to ignore or
disregard fundamental and essential requirements of due process involving proceedings of
administrative character
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to “act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.” (Section 20, CA
103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or

determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute
or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however,
that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.
3. Cardinal primary rights respected in administrative proceedings; Guidelines
a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after t the party is given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to
whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.
c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the
genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere.
Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative
force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from
their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized
legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter
under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice
of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and

functions as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10)
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that
it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. There is no statutory authority to authorize examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to solve
the difficulty.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
4. New trial granted under circumstances
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the
main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which
it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result.
PEOPLE VS CAYAT
Facts:
“Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession,
or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-
called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of
said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the
classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the
members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and
more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended
to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes”

The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and
order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and
civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act applies
equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number
of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its
operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL VS QUISUMBING
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on
two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation
factor" and (b) limited tenure.
Held:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and
laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the
very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of

work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the
field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities
for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities

regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal
to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform
equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why
the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
III. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE
Arrest, Searches and Seizures
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines,
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court. ( Section 1, Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court)
It is undisputed that only judges have the power to issue search warrants. (Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183
SCRA 145 [1990]) This function is exclusively judicial. Inherent in the courts’ power to issue search
warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this connection, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a criminal
case has already been instituted in another court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the
latter. (People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 [1998]).
Because of the fundamental public interest in implementing the criminal law, the search warrant, a
heretofore effective and constitutionally acceptable enforcement tool, should not be suppressed on
the basis of surmise and without solid evidence supporting the change. Forbidding the warrant
and insisting on the subpoena instead when the custodian of the object of the search is not
then suspected of crime, involves serious hazards to criminal investigation. (Zurcher vs.
Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May 1978])
What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is

purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
(Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211, 216 [1989])
The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and
violence, as for his repose. (Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 195 [K. B.]) The
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic” meant that absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, police could

not enter a home to make an arrest. An arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly
carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there
is reason to believe the suspect is within. (Payton v. New York , 445 U. S. 573, 603-604 (1980])
To Whom Directed
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. The modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution
(RE: Sec. 2, Art. III; in relation to the phraseology of the 1935 Constitution) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance
thereof. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition
against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and
did not shift to anyone else. (People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991])
Who May Invoke the Right?
a. In general
Alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by
an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. (People vs. Andre Marti [GR
81561, 18 January 1991])
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. (Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967])
b. Corporations
Although, an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its
creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse
to produce the books and papers of such corporation, a corporation is entitled to immunity, under
the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing
itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.
Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due
process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. (Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
Crime should exist first. In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a
finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence,
since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent
requirements and is therefore defective on its face. (Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR
144309, 23 November 2001])

Conditions for a valid warrant
a) Existence of Probable Cause
1. Probable cause defined, construed
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. (People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 262
[1998]; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984]) In the determination of
probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the
issuance or quashal of the search warrant. (Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23
November 2001])
2. Probable cause in issuance of warrants distinguished from probable cause in preliminary

investigation
While the power to issue search warrants upon showing probable cause is a function which is
exclusively judicial, “the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation
has been described as an executive function.” (People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400
[1998]) The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one
hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings
entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other’s finding as regards the
existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the other. The first is to
determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an
information should be filed in court. (Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23
November 2001])
3. Reliable information as basis for probable cause
Notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search yielded
contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding one’s abdomen, or of standing
on a corner with one’s eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came near, does not
justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting something in one’s pocket,
handing over one’s baggage, riding a motorcycle, nor does holding a bag on board a trisikad sanction
State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se. Personal knowledge was also
required in the case of People v. Doria. Recently, in People v. Binad Sy Chua, the Court declared
invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice
box. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, the Court ruled, two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information
alone is insufficient. In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest
because of “suspicious” circumstances: People v. Tangliben (accused was “acting suspiciously”),
People v. Malmstedt (a bulge on the accused’s waist), and People v. de Guzman (likewise a bulge on
the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes). There is, however, another set of
jurisprudence that deems “reliable information” sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless

arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this class of cases belong
People v. Maspil, Jr., People v. Bagista, People v. Balingan, People v. Lising, People v. Montilla,
People v. Valdez, and People v. Gonzales. In these cases, the arresting authorities were acting
on information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or suspicious
circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two, come
under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr.
involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagista was both, and
Lising and Montilla were consented searches. Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to
the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113.
Note the phrase “in his presence” therein, connoting personal knowledge on the part of the
arresting officer. (People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003])
In fine, probable cause exists in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of
marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646
[1988]) (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting
suspiciously; (People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]) (c) where the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that
said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; (People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1990])
(d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain
Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the
accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport
and other identification papers when requested to do so; (People v. Malmsteadt, 198 SCRA 401
[1991]) (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one who participated in
the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong — that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country; (People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]) (g) where
the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a
drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona
Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him; (People v. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 [1994]) (h) where
police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray
luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila; (People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277
[1995]) and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted
the description given by a civilian asset. (People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 [1999])
b) Personal determination by judge
In General
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him
to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Article III, Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 constitution , and Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of
which prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon probable cause.” The determination of
whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the
contrary. (Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971]; Codal references
modified to suit present Constitution and Rules of Court)

c) Examination of witnesses
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Section 5, Rule 126, is more emphatic and
candid, for it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to “personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce.” Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record. (Roan v. Gonzales, GR 71410, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 694)
Listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the
commission of perjury, and administering the oath to the complainant and his witness; cannot be
consider a personal examination. The reading of the stenographic notes to the Judge did not
constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner the
Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness,
and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training,
was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the
all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause. (Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs.
Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971])
Sufficiency of deposition or affidavit
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable. The oath required must refer to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking
the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance
of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937])
d) Particularity of description
Purpose A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit
the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they shall seize, to the end that “unreasonable searches and seizures” may not be
made, — that abuses may not be committed. (Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et
al., 42 Phil. 886, 896)
1. Description of Place
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. (Prudente vs.
Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989])
2. Description of items to be seized

While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein
and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific
only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. (In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389
[1932]) Where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is
not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude that where the description of those goods
to be seized have been expressed technically, all others of a similar nature but not bearing the exact
technical descriptions could not be lawfully subject to seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable purpose of
the warrant issued would be defeated by mere technicalities. (Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 126859, 4 September 2001])
Tests A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs.
Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law
— by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 3, Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court).
One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a
search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued. (Bache and Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA
823, 835 [1971])
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances
of:
1. Search of moving vehicles,

2. Seizure in plain view,
3. Customs searches,
4. Waiver or consent searches,
5. Stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
6. Search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. (People vs.
Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999])
Valid Waiver
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one
cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 695). The
consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the

consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. (68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, §135.) Hence, consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. (68 Am Jur 2d Searches and
Seizures, §136.)
The Supreme Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless
searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers’ request to search personnel effects was
orally articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request. (People vs.
Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 [1999])
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. (Schneckloth vs. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218) In
case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must first appear, first,
that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. ( People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 16 [1986]; citing Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689 [1938]; 67 C. J., 299)
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public
or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s
belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of
the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
(United States vs. Tillman, 963 F. 2d 137; Florida vs. Royer, 460 U.S. 491; United States vs.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544.)
Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. (People v.
Encinada, 280 SCRA 72, 91 [1997]; citing Aniog v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424, 436-
437 [1994]) In any event, the failure to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not
constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a
submission to the authority of the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol. I, I, 630.) As the constitutional
guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen
in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional
rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C. J.,
pp. 1180, 1181.)
A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to

prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for
incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
It is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A
gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification,
therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ —
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. There is no comparable justification, however, for
routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs — or, for that matter,
for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself. (Chimel v. California; 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 23 June 1969)
Plain view doctrine
1. Elements
Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful objects within the “plain view” of an officer who
has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence. (People v. Musa) For this doctrine to apply, there must be:
a. Prior justification;
b. Inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and
c. Immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. (People v. Musa)
The elements of plain-view are:

a. A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are;
c. The evidence must be immediately apparent;
d. “Plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. (People v. Bolasa, 378
Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 [1999])
2. When object is in plain view
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position
from which he can particularly view the area. (Harris v. United States, supra) In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
(Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra). The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]) It is clear that an object is in
plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is
inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. (Robbins

v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744, 751 [1981]) It must be immediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993])
3. Plain-view objects as evidence
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When the discovery of the evidence did not
constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the
warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the “plain view” doctrine and upheld the
admissibility of said evidence. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]) Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where
the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is
not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927];
Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
4. Limitations to plain-view
The “plain view” doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant’s guilt. The “plain view” doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each
of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension
of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The
“plain view” doctrine neither justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature
of the object is not apparent from the “plain view” of the object. (People v. Musa [GR 96177,
27 January 1993])
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no
longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained
that “What the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification –
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused —
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain
view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another

until something incriminating at last emerges.” (People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001]
citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433,29 L. Ed. 2d 564 [1971])
“Stop and frisk”
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken. (Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968])
While probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a
two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer. (Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December 1997])
SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. —
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a
vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. (People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994])
Manner of search
In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to
routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to
physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.
(People v. Barros) When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. (People v.
Bagista; Valmonte v. de Villa).

One such form of search of moving vehicles is the “stop-and-search” without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se (People vs.
Exala; Valmonte vs. de Villa), for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists (People vs. Escaño). A checkpoint may either be
a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are not
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The search which is
normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
1. Where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds;
2. Simply looks into a vehicle;
3. Flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
4. Where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
5. Where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
6. Where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
Emergency circumstances
As there was general chaos and disorder at that time … [that] the courts in the surrounding
areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted …
[and that] the military operatives … had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search.
(People vs. de Gracia)
Arrests with warrant
a. Probable cause defined
Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest. Thus, the term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
b. Probable cause distinguished from prima facie evidence
The confusing concepts of “prima facie evidence” and “probable cause” were clarified and set aright
by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum
of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to “engender as well
founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the respondent’s probable guilt
thereof. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule,
that is, that the investigating fiscal “finds cause to hold the respondent for trial,” or where “a
probable cause exists.” It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless
arrest should be considered as legally authorized.

c. Reliable information as basis for probable cause
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable
information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.”
d. Personal determination by judge
The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is
to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.
The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their
findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their
distinct objectives.
Since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor
in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion that
there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the
judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in
him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease
the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the
evidence on hand as to enable the His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on
whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to
unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the
time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that
the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely
solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this
case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance
of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he
relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.” (Ho vs. People, 280
SCRA 365)

The question whether “probable cause” exists or not must depend upon the judgment and
discretion of the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant. It does not mean that particular
facts must exist in each particular case. It simply means that sufficient facts must be
presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the
particular person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing
that the person whose arrest is sought committed the crime charged. No rule can be laid
down which will govern the discretion of the court in this matter. If he decides, upon the proof
presented, that probable cause exists, no objection can be made upon constitutional grounds against
the issuance of the warrant. His conclusion as to whether “probable cause” existed or not is final
and conclusive. If he is satisfied that “probable cause” exists from the facts stated in the complaint,
made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his conclusion is sufficient upon
which to issue the warrant for arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses as
he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. The issuance of the warrant of arrest is prima
facie evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed “probable cause” for believing that the
person against whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the crime charged. There is no law which
prohibits him from reaching the conclusion that “probable cause” exists from the statement of the
prosecuting attorney alone, or any other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in
the opinion of the judge or magistrate.
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Rebellion as Continuing Offense
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them
in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which (are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case
of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies
continues cannot be less justified. (Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990])

Committed in the Presence of Police Officers
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof. (People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991])
Personal Knowledge of the Offense
In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant,
arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such fact or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. (People vs.
Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999])
Time of Arrest
1. Hot Pursuit
Paragraph (b) of Section 5 is otherwise known as the doctrine of “hot pursuit” arrests. This doctrine
is based on the rule that an arrest can be made without warrant when an offense has just been
committed and the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that a crime has just been committed. It is not necessary that the arresting
officers have direct knowledge of the crime. But they must have direct knowledge or view of
the crime right after its commission. (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668)
2. “Has just been committed”
It is not sufficient that a crime was indeed committed but it is required that the said crime has just
been committed. The proximity of time of commission of the crime must be close to the time
of the arrest. Otherwise, the arrest is illegal. (Pineda, Ernesto L., The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, 2003 Edition, 161.)
Marked Money
The discovery of the marked money on [a person] did not mean he was caught [in fragrante delicto].
The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not
retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure. (People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26 May
1993])
Lack of Urgency
Applications made during weekends and holidays. The Supreme Court’s Circular 19, dated 14
August 1987, which reads “3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court having
jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the
facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent” merely provides for a

guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search
warrant. (Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14 December 1989])
Effect of Entry of Plea
By pleading “not guilty” at their arraignment, the accused submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over their persons. (People vs. Plana [GR 128285, 27 November 2001])
Validity of Conviction
The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. (People vs. De Guzman, 224
SCRA 93, 100 [1993]). The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused,
nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point
to their culpability. (People vs. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701, 710 [1994]; People vs. De Guia, 227 SCRA
614, 626 [1993])
Art. III, Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
VALMONTE VS DE VILLA
Facts:
On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its
area or responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political dev''t of the NCR. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. Petitioners aver that,
because of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles
are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, w/o a
Search Warrant and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin
Parpon, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or
continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
HELD:
Constitutional Right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right

Petitioner’s concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners' rights
against unlawful search and seizure. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable
are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as
measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
Self-preservation of the State is paramount over individual rights

Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable
limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Personal Examination (by the judge)
SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
Warrant personally determined by the judge

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
President’s immunity from suit

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all
of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.

Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Allowable warrantless Searches
PEOPLE VS GERENTE
Accused conspired with two others to kill the victim. Hours later, the police received a report of
such matter. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and
Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There
they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They
were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she
pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to
come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked
appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette
foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Issue: WON the arrest and subsequent search and seizure was valid.
Held:
ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT IS LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING OFFICER HAS

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS
COMMITTED THE CRIME
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers
had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace

and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected
one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this
Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the
mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating
their escape in many instances."
SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS

AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to
a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be
arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it
was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used
against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate
control may be seized."
Custodial Investigations (Section 12)
Section 12.
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
From Miranda to Bacamante
- To put the accused on equal footing with the State
"in custody" - includes deprivation or mere restriction on physical liberty
Custodial Investigation – investigation conducted by law enforcer immediately after arrest
The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine – all evidence (the fruit) derived from an illegal
search (the poisonous tree) must be suppressed, whether it was obtained directly through the
illegal search itself, or indirectly using information obtained in the illegal search
“But For” Test – or taint doctrine; the evidence would not have come to light but for the illegal
action of the police
WHEN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BEGINS:

Restrictive View - limited to in-custody interrogations as when the accused has been arrested
and brought to the custody of the police for questioning
Expanded View – contemplates two situations: (1) general inquiry as to identification,
circumstances of a crime without focus on any particular suspect; and (2)
suspicion is focused on a particular person and questions are asked
from him to elicit admissions or information
**Under the expanded view, general inquiry as to identification, like in a police line-up, is not
considered part of “custodial investigation” hence the accused may be identified by a witness in a
police line-up even if made not in the presence of counsel
NOT PART OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION:

Police line-up, or during process of identification
Spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner
(spur-of-the-moment statements) – res gestae
Volunteered statements
Extrajudicial admission to the prosecutor or a private person
Investigation made by a citizen or private security officer
Miranda Doctrine: Rights Under Custodial Investigation
Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed 2d 694

Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but, briefly stated, it
is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial investigation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures
are required: Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation
of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with
an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Q: COA auditor investigated certain anomalies in the accounts of a government agency. He
questioned X, a public employee therein, without benefit of counsel. Are X’s statements
admissible?
A: Yes. A COA auditor is not a law enforcer.
Q: Miguel, an AFP major, arrested B and questioned him without benefit of counsel.
Admissible?
A: Yes. An AFP member is not a law enforcer.
Q: H, a police officer, and husband of W, saw the latter cheating on him with her paramour.
The paramour was able to escape while W was detained by H and then questioned. Later, H
filed a case for adultery against W and used her statement as evidence. Admissible?
A: Yes. Even if H is a police officer, the time when he questioned W, his wife, he was not acting in
his official capacity as a police officer but in his personal capacity as her husband.
Q: X, the accused in a case for rape, was asked to provide the police investigating team with
samples of his DNA. He did so without assistance of counsel. Admissible?
A: Yes. The act of providing samples for identification is a mere mechanical act, not covered by the
right against self-incrimination.
Q: If in the above case, X was also made to sign booking sheets and police reports, also
without counsel. Admissible?
A: No. Handwriting is not a mere mechanical act.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

 Refers not only to testimonial confessions but also to acts
 But does not apply to acts that are merely mechanical (does not require use of intelligence) or to
general questions
MECHANICAL ACTS:
Paraffin test
DNA test
Examination of physical body
Fingerprinting
Being asked to step on a footprint to compare foot size
NOT MECHANICAL:
Handwriting
Initials on marked money
Signing of inventory receipts in search warrant (see People vs. Go)
Reenactment
PEOPLE VS GALIT
- At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; he shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means
- by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the wiaver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
PEOPLE VS ENDINO
Accused murdered Dennis Aquino. Was later apprehended. Accused then later confessed in TV
Patrol.
Held:
Apropos the court a quo’s admission of accused-appellant’s videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession
does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to
media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he
had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who,
in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision:

Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview, freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward
Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or
against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one’s guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that
trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be
detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
PEOPLE VS MAHINAY
Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his
constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney’s Office
voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of accused
Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely
and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment
on his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984; 150 SCRA 311). He did not even
inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he swore to the truth of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he
was forced, coerced or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details
known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office, Atty.
Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes, he informed and explained to the accused his
constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office is expected to be watchful
and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions
of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual
strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the
accused that he pushed the victim and the latter’s head hit the table and the victim lost
consciousness.
Accused pleaded not guilty but was proven guilty on account of his extrajudicial confession;
Issue:
Was the confession valid and admissible in court?
Held:
Confession is held to be true absent any factors affecting the validity of its acquisition
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of
violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the
investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the
confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given.
Appellant’s defense is highly improbable; in the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New
Jersey:

“Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except
its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.”
Procedure, guidelines and duties which a law enforcement officer must observe at the time
of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in
accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438;
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must
be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after
a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or messenger – with his
lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical
doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned
that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;

10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during
the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE VS BASAY
An accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel "contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.”
PEOPLE VS BACAMANTE
Patrolman Salvador Fradejas of the WPD Homicide Station, testified that he was the one who was
present when accused executed his extrajudicial confession. Fradejas stated that Atty. Gilbert
Zulueta was requested to act as counsel for accused during the custodial investigation. It is to be
noted however that Fradejas admitted that while accused was undergoing investigation and
answering the questions propounded to him, Atty. Zulueta would "come and go" and that Atty.
Zulueta was not at all times within hearing distance of accused but was merely "within the
premises". Atty. Gilbert Zulueta himself admitted that he could not remember having informed
accused of the constitutional presumption of his innocence.
Held:
The term "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer
be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the
first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that
the person under investigation fully understands the nature and consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic
to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.
RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT COUNSEL

- Absolute, even if accused himself is a lawyer
 “Independent” - counsel is not hampered with any conflicts of interest

 “Competent” - counsel who is vigilant in protecting the rights of accused
Accused must be appraised of his rights under custodial investigation
NOTA BENE:

 The right to counsel attaches upon investigation, that is, when the investigation officer starts
to ask question to elicit information or confession or admission. In case of waiver of rights,
the same must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 A legal officer of a city cannot qualify as “independent” counsel. As to who has burden of
proving the voluntariness of the confession and that the constitutional safeguards have been
complied with, the prosecution has the burden of proof.
 If admission is made before a private person, then it is admissible even if done without
assistance of counsel.
Waiver:
PEOPLE VS PAMON
Accused was charged with murder; he executed an extrajudicial confession which he later retracted
during the trial on the ground that he was not given a counsel of his own choice; the trial court
upheld the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession;
Issue:
Was the extrajudicial confession valid?
Held:
Extrajudicial admission is sustained absent any proof of irregularities in its procurement

The Court upheld the admissibility of his extrajudicial Confession. A confession constitutes an
evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his
conscience. This presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves
otherwise. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward of leniency. In People vs. Quijano, the
Court dismissed the plea that the trial court erred in admitting the accused's allegedly involuntary
extrajudicial confession, and which held:
Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than
the statements of the appellants. As has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive attempt
of appellants to backtrack from their prior voluntary admission of guilt. . . . .
In the case at bar, Fortunato Pamon had several chances to deny the voluntariness of his
Confession. First, when he and Atty. Rubencio Ligorio conferred; second, when he subscribed the
Confession before Judge Vicente Aseniero on March 20, 1987; and third, when he was before the
investigating officer on March 23, 1987. In the last instance, instead of repudiating his Confession,
he reaffirmed it.
Where counsel is provided for by investigators, the confession taken in the presence of such
counsel is inadmissible except where there is conformity with the counsel provided by the
investigators and the confessant, the latter's confession is considered as valid and binding
upon him.

The evidence presented by the prosecution has adequately established that Atty. Rubencio Ligorio
was present when the confession was made and subscribed to. But Fortunato Pamon claimed that
Atty. Rubencio Ligorio was not a counsel of his choice.
We are well aware of the constitutional mandate that the counsel present must not be just any
counsel, but one who has been chosen by the accused. In a recent case, we affirmed the rule that ". .
. no in-custody investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person in his behalf or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by someone in his behalf". Thus, We already had
occasion to rule that where counsel is provided for by investigators, the confession taken in the
presence of such counsel is inadmissible as evidence because it fails to satisfy the constitutional
guarantee. But this doctrine recognizes certain exceptions. Where the counsel has been
appointed by the investigators with the conformity of the confessant, the latter's confession
is considered as valid and binding upon him. The decision in People vs. Alvarez is also relevant
to the case at bar. We said therein that "while it may be that a lawyer was provided by the
police, Alvarez never signified to have a lawyer of his choice." Thus, the trial court's findings
that Fortunato Pamon was assisted by a counsel of his choice is hereby sustained.
Right to Bail
Art. III, Section 13 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
Rights during trial
Art. III, Section 14
1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due

process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

NUNEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN (Co Chiong v. Cuadern, the general guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give
way to [a] specific provision)
ISSUE:
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the Sandiganbayan is violative of the due
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
 In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a
special Court, the Sandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as
may be determined by law."
 To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental
act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the
spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason.”
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew
"that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances
or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest."
 In People v. Vera, Classification to be valid, must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
 It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far
back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public
official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v.
Cuaderno, a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included
among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give way to
[a] specific provision, " in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of
public services or utilities." The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly
broad enough to cover the instant situation.
 The Kay Villegas Kami decision promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most
recent and binding pronouncement on the matter(on ex post facto). To quote from the
ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which:
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;

2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony . than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil
rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful, and
5. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty."
MARQUEZ VS COMELEC
Please check…too many Marquez cases, each doesn’t make any sense…
Right to be heard
PEOPLE VS AGBAYANI (PRE-ARRAIGNMENT GUIDELINES)
Issue:
Whether or not, at the time appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be
assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
Since appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to
counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly
performed by the trial court stands. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied
with its four-fold duties under Section 6[32] of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely,
1. to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before
being arraigned;
2. after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of
counsel;
3. if he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him
reasonable time to do so; and
4. if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must
assign counsel de oficio to defend him.
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised
the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason
being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and
trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it
has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the
trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused
was informed by the court of such right.

In United States v. Labial, in the sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be
presumed that the defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. “***
The cases of People v. Domenden and People v. Cachero cited by appellant are inapplicable. In
both casis the trial courts there clearly failed to inform the accused of their right to counsel nor
appoint de oficio counsel during the arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to
admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties to inform the
accused of his right to counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to inform him that, unless
he is allowed to defend himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, a de oficio counsel will be
appointed for him, must appear on record.
Turning to the alleged violation of appellant’s right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, Section 9
of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 9. Time to prepare for trial. -- After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two
(2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded
does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right
may be waived, expressly or impliedly.[43] In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to
prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.
Right to Speedy Disposition
Art. III, Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Art. III, Section 17 No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
BILL OF ATTAINDER
Art. III, Section 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Right to be present at the trial
 Accused has an absolute right to be personally present during the entire proceedings from
arraignment to sentence, if he so desires

 Limited only to trial court proceedings and only to the actual trial therein, not to appellate
proceedings or proceedings subsequent to the entry of final judgment, looking only to the
execution of the sentence
GENERAL RULE: Accused may waive his right to be present during trial
EXCEPTIONS: (Presence of Accused is Mandatory)
Arraignment and plea – presence of lawyer is also indispensable
 during trial, for identification

 during the promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense wherein the accused may
appear by counsel or a representative
NOTA BENE:
 If the judgment is one of acquittal, the accused need not be present.

 If the judgment is conviction but for a light offense, the accused need not be present.
 If the judgment is conviction and the offense is grave, the presence of the accused is
mandatory.
 If trial in absentia and judgment is rendered, it will be promulgated even without
presence of accused but he will be furnished with copies sent to his last known address.
 If appeal, presence of the accused is not necessary. It is the duty of the appellate court
to appoint counsel, whose presence is indispensable.
Right to counsel
 if the accused appears without an attorney, he must be informed by the court of such right
before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires to have the aid of counsel
 if he can’t afford one, a counsel de officio shall be appointed for him
 the indispensable aid of counsel continues even at the stage of appeal
 not waivable
 the right to be represented by counsel is ABSOLUTE, but the option of the accused to hire
one of his own choice is LIMITED
Right to an impartial judge
 a judge who had conducted the preliminary investigation and made a finding of probable cause
is not disqualified from trying the case, in the absence of evidence of partiality
Right of confrontation

 Available only during trial, not during preliminary investigation
 REASON: so defendant may make objection to the witness or so witness may identify him
Right to cross-examine
if the defense counsel deferred cross-examination of the prosecution witness and then this witness
dies, accused cannot anymore ask the witness’ direct examination to be expunged from the records
since the denial of the right to confrontation is through no fault of plaintiff
EXCEPTIONS:
 Dying Declaration
 Trial in absentia - REQUISITES: (1) accused has been arraigned; (2) accused has been
duly notified of the date of trial; (3) failure of the accused to appear is unjustified
 Depositions - witness is dead, insane or otherwise cannot be found, with due diligence, in the
Philippines
Right to compulsory processes
2 KINDS OF SUBPOENA:
 Ad testificandum - to compel a witness to attend and testify
 Duces Tecum - to compel a person having under his control documents or

papers
relevant to the case to bring such items to court during trial
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION
 presence of accused is indispensable during arraignment and promulgation of judgment of

conviction
 after arraignment, only formal amendments to the Information may be granted by court
 not waivable
 description, not designation of the offense, controls
 all the attending aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the Information
and proved during trial; EXCEPT: for purposes of proving moral damages only, then it is
allowed to be proved even if not alleged
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

- available in every criminal prosecution
“Speedy” - there is no fixed criterion in our statues to determine with precision the time for
speedy trial. As soon as after indictment as the prosecution can with reasonable

diligence prepare for it. It means a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. But justice and fairness, not speed, are the objectives
NOTA BENE: If the accused is acquitted on ground of denial of his right to speedy trial, it
is a judgment on the merits and therefore, first jeopardy attaches.
“Impartial” - cold neutrality of an impartial judge; absence of bias or prejudice
“Public” - open to the free observation of all
- EXCEPT: evidence to be adduced at the trial is of such character as to be offensive to decency and
public morals
SECTION 17
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Sec. 17: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
 Available both before or during criminal prosecution

 Accused is competent to testify in his behalf, but he is entitled to the right not to testify as a
witness against himself. He cannot be compelled to incriminate himself; that is, to say or do
anything that can be used against himself
 Accused can invoke this right from the beginning; however in case of witness, he can invoke this
right only when the questions start to become incriminating
RATIONALE:
 Public policy
 Humanity
GENERAL RULE: The accused cannot be compelled to testify against his co-accused under
the theory that the “act of one is the act of all.”
EXCEPTIONS:
If he is discharged as a state witness

After he is convicted or acquitted
By trying him separately instead of jointly with his other co-accused
IV. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER DUE PROCESS
Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
Section 15 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED
Before Criminal Prosecution: (before arraignment)

1. Right to due process (Sec. 14(1))
2. Custodial rights (Sec. 12)
3. Right to be informed of his rights
4. Right to remain silent
5. Right to counsel
6. Right to bail (Sec. 13)
7. Right to speedy disposition of his case (Sec. 16)
8. Right of free access to the courts
During Criminal Prosecution: (after arraignment up to promulgation of judgment)

1. Right to presumption of innocence (Sec. 14(2))
2. Right to be heard by himself and counsel (Sec. 14(2))
3. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him (Sec. 14(2))
4. Right to have speedy, impartial and public trial (Sec. 14(2))
5. Right to confrontation (Sec. 14(2))
6. Right to have compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and production of
evidence on his behalf (Sec. 14(2))
7. Right against self-incrimination (Sec. 17)
8. Right against double jeopardy (Sec. 21)
9. 9.Right against ex-post facto law and bill of attainder (Sec. 22)
After Conviction:
 Right against excessive fines and cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment (Sec. 19)
Mendoza vs. CFI, G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973
Habeas Corpus: When it is available
Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his
detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the
writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all-embracing in its reach.
It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must
be for a cause recognized by law. The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of
ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it has to
discharge without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person in custody has to produce
him in court as soon as possible. What is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be
demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from
responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.
Remedy of Habeas Corpus not available when there is Warrant of Arrest
The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation.
Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued
after a determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring

the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced.
No allegation to the contrary may be entertained. It cannot be denied that petitioner's co-accused,
Nelso Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas and Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come to this court to
challenge the filing of one information where there were three victims. Accordingly, this Court, in
Unal v. People, required three separate amended informations. There was no question, however, as
to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued, not only in the case of the parties in such
petition, but likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the circumstances, would not therefore
lie."
Bail, concept, rationale
Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is he,
however, entitled to bail? Precisely that is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of any
flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a remedy, as a matter of fact,
was granted him in accordance with an order of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter,
however, the bail was revoked by the Court of First Instance in the order now challenged. Such
actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion. In the landmark decision of Chief
Justice Concepcion, People v. Hernandez, the right to bail was rightfully stressed as an aspect
of the protection accorded individual freedom which, in his eloquent language," is too
basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, ...." To be more matter of
fact about it, there is this excerpt from de la Camara v. Enage "Before conviction, every person is
bailable except if charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a
right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the
observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person
charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce
and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would
be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there
anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of
guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with
a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be
resisted."
Can bail be cancelled without violating the right to bail?
The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus obtained, it
could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail. In the answer filed on behalf of respondent
Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza did stress the absence of authority on the part of special
counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized to intervene in this case on behalf of the state
but did so, his failure to object being the basis of the bail granted by the municipal court of Mulanay,
Quezon. Such an allegation was denied by petitioner. We are not called upon to rule definitely on
this aspect as independently thereof, there are two other basic objections. One was that petitioner,
when the bail was granted, was still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have granted
bail in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. Thus: "'The constitutional mandate that
all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should

be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure
one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is free.'" Secondly, and what is
worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine
in People v. San Diego is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is
in custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial,
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the Court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court granting
bail should be considered void."
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Burden of proof lies on his accusers to prove him guilty
Equiponderance of Evidence (Equipoise Doctrine) – when preponderance of evidence is at

equipoise, court will find for the defendant; when the scale stand at an equipoise and there is
nothing in evidence to incline it either way, the court shall rule against the party who has the
burden of proof
Proof beyond reasonable doubt – not to be equated with absolute certainty; moral certainty, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind
Prosecution has Burden of Proof
ACTS WHICH CANNOT BE CRIMINALIZED
 Section 10 No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
 Section 20 No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
 SECTION 22
No Ex Post Facto Law or Bill of Attainder
Sec. 22: No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex post facto law – one that punishes an act which was not punishable when committed; or
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when committed; or changes the
laws on evidence so that lesser evidence is needed for conviction than when
the act was done
Bill of Attainder – a law which inflicts punishment without benefit of judicial trial
ELEMENTS OF EX POST FACTO LAW:

 Penal
 Retroactive

 Disadvantageous to the accused
 Must take from the accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the
constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of
the commission of the offense charged against him
ELEMENTS OF BILL OF ATTAINDER:

 There is a law
 The law imposes a penal burden on a specified individual or an easily ascertainable members
of a group
 The penal burden is imposed directly by the law without judicial trial
WHICH PUNISHMENTS COULD NOT BE IMPOSED
Section 18
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a

crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any

prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
SECTION 21
Right Against Double Jeopardy
Sec. 21: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Double Jeopardy – two perils or dangers of being tried and punished
2 KINDS:
1. Same Offense (First sentence of Sec. 21)
REQUISITES:
 First jeopardy

 A valid complaint and information
 A court of competent jurisdiction
 Arraignment and valid plea
 First jeopardy has been terminated
 Second jeopardy for the same offense – includes an attempt or frustration of the same
offense or it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other
“Terminated” – either by conviction, acquittal or dismissal upon the merit without consent of
the accused
 CONVICTION: a judgment declaring the accused guilty of the offense charged and
imposing upon him the penalty provided by law; accused may appeal and this is not double
jeopardy
 ACQUITTAL: a termination of the case based upon the merits of the issue; prosecution
cannot appeal anymore
 DISMISSAL: a termination of the case other than upon the merits thereof; first jeopardy
only attaches if dismissal without consent of accused
NOTA BENE:
 Consent means approval, acquiescence, conformity, agreement, etc. Mere silence of the
accused should not be construed as consent.
 Even if the motion to dismiss was filed by the accused, the dismissal is equivalent to
acquittal if it is grounded on (1) insufficiency of evidence (demurrer to evidence after
prosecution has rested its case); (2) denial of the right to speedy trial
 Supervening Facts – when the second offense was not in existence when the first offense
was charged and tried, then another information may be filed or the present information
may be amended (substantial)
2. Act Punished by a Law and Ordinance (Second sentence of Sec. 21)

 this will only apply if the accused has been either convicted or acquitted
 if the case was only dismissed not upon the merits, the prosecution may re-file
AFFIRMATIVE RIGHTS
Section 11 Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 12
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.

2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall

be inadmissible in evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (SEC. 4)
Section 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
Prior Restraint, Subsequent Punishment
O’BRIEN TEST
A Government regulation is sufficiently justified:

1. If it is within the constitutional power of the Government
2. If it furthers an important or substantial Government interest
3. If the Governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. If the incidental restriction in the freedom of expression is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest;
 Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it
should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free
expression."
 Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary
to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
SWS VS COMELEC
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
Held:

§5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression,
and the press.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because
of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the
same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and
other opinion takers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by
referring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression means that "the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few
unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
xx…These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality…xx
Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by §5.4 cannot be
justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition
may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute,
and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so
because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven
(7) days immediately before a local election. ..
Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech
and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet
criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to
further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute
pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and
resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the
regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression,
when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech
because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
ABS-CBN VS COMELEC

Comelec issued a resolution to restrain ABS-CBN from conducting exit polls which according to
them might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or
deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the
petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the
May 11 elections.
Held:
Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity
 The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May
11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the
resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future
elections.
 This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or
the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,
or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available.
Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a

'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties.
This must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of
thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."
In Cabansag v. Fernandez the Court laid down two theoretical tests in determining the validity of
restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
 Clear and present danger rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil'
sought to be prevented;
 Dangerous tendency rule means “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency
which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary
that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or

unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance
be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent."
 Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. In setting the standard
or test for the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of justice
Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree."
 A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive
character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency" doctrine,
the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element;
the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable. The evil sought to be
avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a writing
instrument.
 The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to
be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right
of suffrage. We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so
vital a constitutional right as free speech." When faced with borderline situations in which
the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is
invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court
shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the
State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections
if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.
 The balancing of interest test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or types of situations. It is here where the
court has to weigh the individual rights as against the interest of the public and more often than
not, the court has to uphold the interest of the public.
On exit polls producing a clear and present danger or has a dangerous tendency
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled.
Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It
consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably
voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are
the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls
cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all,
the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
Violation of Ballot Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy
of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the
voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter
identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to
other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be
identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or
disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is
the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the
votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot,
however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also
choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed
by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls,
without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.
NOTA BENE:
CONTENT BASED RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED BECAUSE OF THE CONTENT OF

THE SPEECH AND ARE THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER TEST;
CONTENT NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROHIBIT THE SALE OR

DONATION OF PRINT SPACE AND AIR TIME TO POLITICAL CANDIDATES DURING
THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD, AND ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH THE CONTENT OF
THE SPEECH.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
OBSCENITY
MILLER VS CALIFORNIA
Miller operated a mail order porno. In a campaign for expansion, he mass-mailed brochure to which
one was sent to a restaurant where the manager opened such mail together with his mother. Thus
the proceedings; The prosecution contends that he committed misdemeanor;
Issue:
What are the tests to determine obscenity?
Held:
 Under common law and in an 1868 case of Regina vs Hicklin, obscenity is that which tends to
"deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences" and
could be banned on that basis.

 In Roth vs United States, 1957, the court held that obscenity is not one of those protected by
the First Amendment;
 In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, (1966), the Court veered sharply away from the Roth concept and,
with only three Justices in the plurality opinion, articulated a new test of obscenity. The plurality
held that under the Roth definition: "as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must
coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because
it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterlywithout redeeming social
value."
 While Roth presumed "obscenity" to be "utterly without redeeming social importance,"
Memoirs required that to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively established that the material is
"utterly without redeeming social value."
 Apart from the initial formulation in the Roth case, no majority of the Court has at any
given time been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes obscene,
pornographic material subject to regulation under the States' police power.
 The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
a. whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
b. whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
c. whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
 We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of
Memoirs v. Massachusetts; that concept has never commanded the adherence of more than
three Justices at one time. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as
written or construed, the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate
courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary.
GONZALES VS KALAW-KATIGBAK
The film Kapit sa Patalim was classified as for adults only. Petitioner contends that such
classification was without basis since it is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression.
The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers
belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film.
Issue:
Is the classification valid?
Held:
 It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation,
the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to
safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for
general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults

only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions, the
exemption.
 The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and
present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such
danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is
feared may be traced to the expression complained of.
 This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not
enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave.
 All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is
concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures
where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. It cannot
be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude
of caring for the welfare of the young.
Nota bene:
The power of the board is limited only to classification and not to the issuance or denial of permit
because that is a previous restraint tantamount to censorship.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
(CALIBRATED PRE-EMPTIVE RESPONSE)
KMP VS ERMITA, GR NO. 169838
Petitioners argue that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails
the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place
of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is
not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. Also, the
phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government
because they are being tolerated. Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without
providing clear standards. Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits
on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a
permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a
clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a
permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.
Held:

The right of peaceful assembly enjoys primacy in the hierarchy of rights.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances
is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in
the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. Again,
in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and
to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
Right of peaceable assembly however, is not absolute
In Primicias, this Court said: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized
and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not
absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police
power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is
exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those
and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such
as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal
and city councils enact ordinances for purpose.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was
adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation
of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,” “protesting” and
“influencing” in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words “petitioning the government for redress of grievances” come from the wording
of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to “rally, demonstration,
march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.” So
it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings. Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates
the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid

a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is,
likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
Freedom Parks allow avenues for free speech (however, only a few existing)
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s system of
regulation of the people’s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is
constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may
be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality
until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without
such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices
should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
Maximum Tolerance, definition
“Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of
the same.”
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not
act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not
produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence
and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed
on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application
without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the
law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the
application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of
maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses
our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it
is subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in
accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city
concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be
required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and
the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
VI. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Art. III, Section 5 No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
EBRALINAG VS SUPERINTENDENT (freedom to believe and act on one’s belief)
Facts:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for
raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS
students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school
authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by
doing these are religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They
contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against
official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al
v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the
church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious
ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception
from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption
disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of
citizenship.
Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Held:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of
thought. 2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The
only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public
safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the
petitioners from the school is not justified.
The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who
refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and
worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this
right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the
Students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies
quietly, it doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the
petitioner’s request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The
expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s
right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute
ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national

heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore,
expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED.
VII. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Art. III, Section 10 No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
VIII. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
Art. III, Section 6 The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Seven (7) Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
The United Nation's "Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning

Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations", adopted by the UN General Assembly, thru Resolution No. 2625 (XXV)
on October 24, 1970, after ten (10) years of work and study, contain the following seven (7)
basic principles of international law:
1. The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations;

2. The principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not
endangered;
3. The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state, in accordance with the Charter;
4. The duty of states to cooperate with one another in accordance with the
Charter
5. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
6. The principle of sovereign equality of states; and
7. The principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by
them in accordance with the Charter. (cf. fifth (5th) Introductory Clauses of the
"Declaration" in Merlin M. Magallona, 96).
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LAW?
It is a body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their
relations to one another.
The law which defines the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their
relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or
juridical;
Some theories about international law
Command theory
Law consists of commands originating from a sovereign and backed up by threats of

sanction if disobeyed
Consensual theory
International law derives its binding force from the consent of states. Treaties are an
expression of consent; likewise, custom, as voluntary adherence to common practices, are
seen as expression of consent;
Natural law theory
Law is derived by reason from the nature of man. Most customary laws are derivations from
natural laws;
Note:

International law is law because it is seen as such by states and other subjects of international
law;
Public international law – governs the relations between and among states as well as
international organizations and individual persons;
Private international law – domestic law which deals with cases where foreign law intrudes in
the domestic sphere, where there are questions of the applicability of foreign law or the role
of foreign courts;
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules

expressly recognized by contesting states
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
d. subject to the provisions of Art. 59 “ the decision of the Court has no

binding force except between the parties and in respect to that particular
case.” Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law
The principle of sovereign equality of states.
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members
of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political
or other nature.
In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
a. States are juridically equal;

b. Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
c. Each state has the duty to respect the personality of other states;
d. The territorial integrity and political independence of the state are inviolable;
e. Each state has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems;
f. Each state has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international
obligations and to live in peace with other states." (cf. Principle No. 6 of the main
body of the "Declaration" in Magallona, 104).
The Subjects and Objects of International Law

A subject of international law is an entity with capacity of possessing international rights
and duties and of bringing international claims. This entity is said to be an international
person or one having an international personality, on the basis of customary or general
international law. (Magallona, 18-19).
A subject of Public International Law is an entity directly possessed of rights and obligations in
the international legal order, e.g. a sovereign state, such as the Philippines. (Paras, 43).
An object of Public International Law, on the other hand, is merely indirectly vested with
rights and obligations in the international sphere, e.g. a Filipino private citizen is generally
regarded not as a subject but an object of Public International Law because, while he is entitled to
certain rights which other states ought to respect, he usually has no recourse except to course his
grievances through the Republic of the Philippines and its diplomatic officers. (id.).
Kinds of Subjects in International Law
A. The STATE
Magallona distinguishes between:
a. general or objective international personality and

b. particular or special international personality, as follows:
"x x x As to the first (general or objective international personality), rights and obligations are
conferred by general international law and such personality is binding erga omnes; and as to
the second (particular or special international personality), personality binds only those which
give consent (express or tacit).
"The distinction is implied in the Reparation for Injuries Case, in which on the question as to the
legal personality of the United Nations to claim reparation for injury to its agents committed by
nationals of a non-Member State, the (International Court of Justice or ICJ) states: "xxx fifty
States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had
the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing
objective international personality and not merely personality recognized by them alone,
together with capacity to bring international claims xxx [ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 185]."
(Magallona, 19).
B. STATES: Single/Simple and Composite
Paras categorizes "subjects in international law" into two (2) categories: (a) the complete or perfect
international personality, and (b) the incomplete or imperfect, or qualified or quasi-international
personality. (Paras, 47).
He classifies states into the following species: (a) single or simple state (e.g., Philippines), and (b)
composite state.
The 1933 Monteviedo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides for the legal
characteristics of a State, thus:

"The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
a. a permanent population;
b. a defined territory;
c. government;
d. and capacity to enter into relations with other States." (cf. Magallona, 20).
The "capacity to enter into relations with other States" refers to independence, which many
highly qualified publicists consider as the decisive criterion of statehood. (Magallona, 20-21).
RECOGNITION is considered as "the act by which another State acknowledges that the political
entity recognized possesses the attributes of statehood." (Magallona, 21, citing Jessup, Modern Law
of Nations: An Introduction, 1949, p. 4).
There are two theories on the nature and effect of recognition, as discussed by Magallona
(at pp. 22-22):
 The constitutive school maintains that it is the act of recognition which constitutes or
creates the status of a State as a subject of law and thus gives it a legal personality. The
international status of any entity as a State is to be determined by the will and consent of already
existing States.
 The declaratory theory asserts that recognition merely confirms the acceptance by States
of the status of an entity as a State. A new State acquires legal personality by its own
creative act in bringing about the objective criteria of statehood, rather than by the
subjective act of other States.
The declaratory school is the preferred approach, the prevailing view being that recognition is not an
element of statehood.
Paras, Coquia and Defensor-Santiago classify the different kinds of composite states as follows:
1. The Federation or Federal State (such as the United States and the United States of
Switzerland);
2. The Confederation (such as the original Confederation of the American States, which
eventually became the nucleus of the present United States).
(NOTE: The principal difference between a federal union and a confederation is that a federal
union of states exists when the central or federal government exercises authority over both
the various states in the union and the citizens thereof; while the confederation has some sort
of power over its individual states, but not over the individual citizens of the member states.
The federal union, as such, is an International Person, thus the United States is represented in the
United Nations as one juridical or international entity; on the other hand, the confederation as
such is not an International Person, each of the member-states being represented by its own
delegate. However, there is at present no confederation of confederated states).

3. The Real Union (such as the former United Arab Republic which was formed by two
sovereign states [Egypt and Syria] linked by a common government in external
affairs and by a common chief of state. The union then possessed a single international
personality [the separate personalities of the states having been merged into a unified whole].
xxx.
4. The Personal Union (this is the merger of two separate sovereign states in the sense
that both have the same individual as the accidental or temporary head of state.
However, the union as such has no separate international personality since each of the
member-states has its own government and its own separate international personality. It
would seem that today, there is no Personal Union in existence. xxx.
5. The Incorporate Union (one where the internal and external organs of government of
two states are merged into one, resulting in a single international personality. An
example is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland xxx. While in a Real
Union there is a merger only of foreign affairs or external relations, in the Incorporate Union
the merger is actually complete and concerns internal as well as external affairs and
relations).
NOTE: The British Commonwealth of Nations xxx apparently does not fall under any of the
preceding classifications xxx. (Paras, 49-50; Coquia & Defensor-Santiago, 64-100).
C. The INCOMPLETE, IMPERFECT, QUALIFIED OR QUASI-INTERNATIONAL

PERSONALITIES
Paras lists the incomplete, imperfect, qualified or quasi-international personalities as follows:
"xxx among them are the dependent states (protectorate and suzerainties); belligerent communities
(and in a very, very modified way, insurgent communities, subject to certain conditions); colonies;
dependencies and possessions; mandates and trust territories; certain public and political
corporations or companies; and international administrative bodies." (Paras, 52; underscoring
supplied).
It is noteworthy to state that "international Organizations such as the former League of Nations and
the present United Nations are of course in their own way International Persons." (Paras, 60).
The United Nations, being possessed of juridical personality, has the following capacities:
to contract; to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; and to institute
legal proceedings. (Paras, 63, citing Art. 1, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly on Feb. 13, 1946, in 1 UN Treaty Series 15).
Paras classifies the three (3) groups of International Organizations, aside from the United Nations,
as follows:
1. Inter-governmental bodies, including specialized agencies of the UN, e.g., Food and
Agricultural Organization, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund,
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization;

2. Other Inter-Governmental Bodies, e.g., Permanent Court of Arbitration, International
Criminal Police Commission, Bank of International Settlements;
3. Non-Governmental International Bodies, e.g. International Commission of Jurists, Christian
Family Movement Moral Re-Armament, International Chamber of Commerce, Rotary
International. (cf. Paras, 60-61).
Private Individuals: Developing New Status in International Law
Paras discusses that while traditional writers insist that private individuals are merely
objects and not subjects of international law, some recognized writers in recent years have
accorded to the individual a new status in international law: they say, and with good reason, that
private individuals should now be regarded as subjects in the international order, in view of the
importance laid on them by the following:
1. the Charter of the United Nations Organization, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights;
2. the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Tribunals for War Crimes;
3. the norm of general international law which prohibits piracy;
4. espionage rules; conventions punishing acts of illegitimate warfare; rules of general

international law punishing private individuals for breach of blockade and carriage of
contraband;
5. the practice of certain courts of permitting foreigners to appear and prosecute claims;
6. the Genocide Convention of 1948 which directly holds liable not only states, but also private
individuals, for the mass extermination of a racial group;
7. the existence of rules safeguarding the rights of aliens and minorities;
8. punishment for the illegal use of the flag (Reporter's Note: this refers to vessels using the
flag of s state with which such vessel is not registered);
9. the procedure in admiralty and maritime matters;
10. the special status accorded to refugees, and to displaced persons, such as those fleeing from
South Vietnam, from Cambodia, and, more recently, from Cuba. (cf. Paras, 44-46).
BELLIGERENT AND INSURGENT COMMUNITIES
A status of belligerency recognized under international law may arise if

1. there exists within the State an armed conflict of a general character;
2. the insurgents occupy a substantial portion of the national territory; and
3. They conduct the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war thru organized groups
acting under a responsible authority. (Coquia/Defensor-Santiago, 85).
Recognition of a status of belligerency on the part of other States is necessary for the legal
creation of the status of "belligerent community.(id.).
A fourth requirement that has been suggested for the recognition of belligerency is that there must
exist a circumstance which makes it "necessary" for the recognizing State to define its
attitude to the conflict. Coquia and Defensor-Santiago explains the matter, thus:
The reason for this final requirement is that if the parties to the struggle propose to exercise
belligerent rights on the high seas in such a manner as to affect the recognizing State's
maritime interests, the need for it to define its attitude to the struggle has arisen. If, on the other
hand, a distant inland state with no maritime interests, and in no way affected by the conflict were to
recognize the rebels as belligerents, it could open itself to the charge of encouraging rebellion. (id.,
86).
Recognition of belligerency before the four conditions are fulfilled is considered as contrary
to international law (id., 86, citing Sorensen, 286).
Recognition of belligerency by a State not a party to the contest is frequently announced in a

formal proclamation of neutrality between the two contending parties. Recognition may be
express or implied. (id., 87).
If the foreign government gives aid to the de facto (belligerent) government recognized by
it, and that de facto government is defeated in the war, then the lawful government may
hold the foreign State responsible for an act of unjustifiable aggression and of premature
recognition. (id., citing Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, 13).
The recognized belligerent community lacks the right to send or receive diplomatic agents to join
international organizations, and to benefit in a normal manner from multilateral conventions
concerned with peacetime international relations and activities of States. (id., 86).
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago cite the legal implications of recognition of a belligerent

community, thus:
The granting of recognition of belligerency to rebels is only provisional. While conferring an

equal status to warring groups, it does so only for the purposes and for the duration of the war. For
the purposes and for the duration of the war, the insurgents recognized as a belligerent
power possess for the most part, the duties and rights of States when engaged in war. (id.,
citing Kelsen, 413).
A state of insurgency is not equivalent to a state of belligerency. The former is "a rebellion
which has not yet achieved the standing of a belligerent community xxx, a condition described
as intermediate between internal tranquility and civil war." (Coquia, 88).
The conditions for a state of insurgency are:

1. the insurgents must have a government and a military organization of their own;
2. the insurrection must be conducted in the technical forms of war, that is, it must be
more than a petty revolt and must assume the true characteristics of a war; and
3. the government of the insurgents must in fact control a certain part of the territory of the
State in which the civil war takes place. (id., citing Kelsen, 412).
A related matter is the "government in exile". It has two classes, according to Coquia and
Defensor-Santiago:
The first category consists of governments whose heads and cabinets move from the
national territory temporarily during the moments of crisis. In such cases, no formal act of
recognition is necessary because it is deemed that there is no break in legal continuity.
A second category consist of governments formed abroad, in which case there can be no
legal connection between the government in exile and the government operating on the
national territory at the time. A formal act of recognition is necessary.
The governments under the second category do not have any international status. While
there may be groups assuming governmental powers for their national territory for political or other
reasons, the fact is that they are merely hoping to form a legitimate government or State at some
time in the future.
A recognition accorded during the effective continuance of the lawful (de jure) government
over the greater part of the national territory may be considered as an act of interference in
the national affairs of another State. (id., 97, citing the recognition of the Franco regime in Spain
by Germany and Italy only five months after the Spanish civil war broke out at the time when the
republican government was still in control of the greater part of Spain).
ADDENDUM:
PHILIPPINE TERRITORY IN RELATION TO THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW

OF THE SEA
Article I of the 1987 Philippine Constitution defines the Philippine territory, thus:
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting
of its terrestial, fluvial,a nd aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands
of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of
the Philippines.
Pursuant to Art. 47.1 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which entered into
force on November 16, 1994, the Philippines, as an archipelagic state, may determine its archipelagic
baselines as follows:
It may draw straight archipelagic baselines surrounding itself. This is done by locating "the
outermost points of ... (its) outermost islands and drying reefs" and then by joining such points. It is
required that the main islands are included within the baselines as well as an area in which "the ratio

of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1."
(Magallona, 80, citing Art. 47.1 of UNCLOS).
The "maritime zones" of the Philippines, under the provisions of UNCLOS, consist of the
following:
1. the territorial sea;

2. the contiguous zone; and
3. the exclusive economic zone.
The breadth of its territorial sea is measured from archipelagic baselines up to a distance
seaward not exceeding 12 nautical miles.
If it declares a contiguous zone, this shall not exceed 24 nautical miles from the archipelagic
baselines.
Its exclusive economic zone shall not exceed beyond 200 nautical miles from the
archipelagic baselines.(id., citing Arts. 2, 33.2, and 57 of UNCLOS).
The waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines, which are called
"archipelagic waters," are within Philippine sovereignty. It also extends to "airspace over
archipelagic waters as well as their bed and subsoil, including the resources therein." (id.,
citing Art. 49 of UNCLOS).
Pursuant to Articles 52 and 53 of UNCLOS, "ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent
passage through archipelagic waters" (which includes "internal waters" or the "territorial
sea") and such archipelagic waters may also be subject to "the continuous and expeditious
passage of foreign ships and aircraft, known as the right of archipelagic sealanes." All ships
and aircraft enjoy this right thru designated sea lanes and air routes. The "territorial sea", which is a
zone of Philippine sovereignty, is subject to the right of innocent passage by ships of all states,
including "foreign nuclear-powered ships, those carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or
noxious substances, submarines and warships." Also, the Philippine territorial sea is also restricted
by the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage but "only such portions of the territorial sea adjacent to
the Philippine archipelagic waters." All of the above provisions of UNCLOS pose potential
constitutional problems. (id., 82, citing Arts. 2, 17, 20, 23, 24, 30, 52 and 53 of UNCLOS).
Magallona discusses the legal status of the "contiguous zone" thus:
Adjacent to the territorial sea, it is a zone where the Philippines may exercise certain
protective jurisdiction, i.e., to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations and to punish violation of laws committed within its territory or in the
territorial sea.
The Philippines does not have sovereignty over the contiguous zone. It is a zone of
jurisdiction, not of sovereignty.(id., 82-83, citing Art. 33.1 of UNCLOS).
As to the "exclusive economic zone", the Philippines has sovereign rights over the same
"for purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources"

therein and it as "jurisdictional rights with regard to artificial islands, environmental protection and
maritime scientific research." (id., 83, citing Arts. 52.1 [a] and [b] of UNCLOS).
The Philippines may be required to grant other states access to living resources in its EEZ:
It must determine its capacity to harvest living resources. If it does not have the capacity to
harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall give other states access to the surplus of the
allowable catch by means of agreements consistent with the UNCLOS.
In the EEZ, all states continue to enjoy the freedom of the high seas, subject to the rights of the
Philippines as thus mentioned. Generally, the rules of international law pertaining to the high seas
apply to the EEZ.(id., 84-85, citing Arts. 56.1 [a], 58.1, 58.2, 61.1, and 62.3 of UNCLOS).
There thus appears an apparent incompatibility with the 1987 Constitution. It will be noted that Sec.
2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the State shall protect the nation's marine
wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve it
use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens." (id., 84; original underscoring by the
author).
What is the Philippine "continental shelf" under UNCLOS? Magallona discusses its extent,
thus:
It is the sea-bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas extending beyond the Philippine
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory. It extends up (1) the
outer edge of the continental margin or (2) up to the distance of 200 nautical miles from the
archipelagic baselines, whichever is farthest. (id., 85, citing Art. 76 of UNCLOS).
The continental shelf does not form part of the "Philippine territory." (id., 85). But the
Philippines has the sovereign right for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources. (id., citing Art. 77 and 78 of UNCLOS).
Elucidating further on the "continental shelf", Magallona writes:
The UNCLOS describes these rights (i.e, to explore and exploit natural resources in the
continental shelf) as exclusive in the sense that if the Philippines does not explore the
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without
its consent Rights of the Philippines over the continental shelf "do not depend on occupation,
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. (Art. 77.2, UNCLOS; underscoring supplied).
The Philippines has the exclusive right to construct, to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation and use of artificial islands and installations. (Arts. 60 and 80,
UNCLOS). Its jurisdiction over these is exclusive, in particular with respect to customs, fiscal,
health, safety and immigration regulations. (Art. 60.2, UNCLOS).
The Philippines has exclusive right to authorize as well as to regulate drilling for all
purposes. (Art. 81, UNCLOS). (id., 86, citing Arts. 77.2, 60.2, and 81 of UNCLOS).

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Nota bene:
Q— How may international law become a part of domestic law? Explain.
ANS: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section
21 of the Constitution which provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”
Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
(Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the Phil. v. Health Secretary Duque, et al., G.R. No.
173034, October 19, 2007).
Q — May generally accepted principles of international law form part of the law of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations? Explain.
ANS: Yes. Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it. (Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 397).
Q — State the concept of the term “generally accepted principles of international law” and
give examples.
ANS: “Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or

customary international law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person’s right to life, liberty and
due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of “generally accepted principles
of law” has also been depicted in this wise:

Some legal scholars and judges upon certain “general principles of law” as a primary source
of international law because they have the “character of jus rationale” and are “valid
through all kinds of human societies.” (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South
West Africa Case, 1966, I.C.J. 296). O’Conell holds that certain principles are part of international
law because they are “basic to legal systems generally” and hence part of the jus gentium. These
principles, he believes, are established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all
legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and
determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable solution.
(Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the Phil. v. Sec. of Health Duque, et al., G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007).
Q— What is customary international law? Explain.
ANS: Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris)”. This statement
contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave, and
the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This
includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long.
Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency
and the generality of the practice.
Once the existence of state practice has been established it becomes necessary to determine why
states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it
obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris or the belief
that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is
not law. (Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the Phil. v. Health Secretary Duque, et al., G. R.
No. 173034, October 9, 2007).
Q— What is a soft law? Is it an international law? Explain.
ANS: Soft law is an expression of non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior. (David Fidler, Development Involving SARS, International Law &
Infections Disease Control at the Fifty-Six Meeting of the World Health Assembly, June 2003,
ASIL; Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the Phils. v. Health Secretary Duque, et al., G.R. No.
173034, October 9, 2007). It does not fall under the international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter
III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Q— Give examples of soft law.
ANS: Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category.
(Louis Henkins, et al., International Law, Cases and Materials, 2nd Ed.). The UN Declaration of
Human Rights is an example. This was applied in Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia; Mejoff v. Director of Prisons; 90 Phil. 70 (1951); Mijares v. Ranada;

Shangri-la International Hotel Management Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies Inc., G.R. No.
159938, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 405).
It is resorted to in order to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of constituents
of certain international organizations like the WHO.
THE COUNT BERNADOTTE CASE
The question concerning reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, was
referred to the Court by the General Assembly of the United Nations (Resolution of the General
Assembly dated December 3rd. 1948) in the following terms:
I. In the event of an agent of the IJnited Nations in the performance of his duties suffering
injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as
an Organization, the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible
de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation due in respect
of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons
entitled through him
II. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I (b), how is action by the United Nations to be
reconciled with such rights as may be possessed by the State of which the victim is a
national?
Held:
Accordingly the Court concludes that the Organization possessing as it does rights and obligations,
has at the same time a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an
international plane, although it is certainly not a super-state
On the first point:, I (a), of the Request for Opinion the Court unanimously reached the conclusion
that the Organization has the capacity to bring an international claim against a State
(whether a Member or non-member) for damage resulting from a breach by that State of its
obligations towards the Organization. The Court points out that it is not called upon to
determine the precise extent of the reparation which the Organization would be entitled to recover;
the measure of the reparation should depend upon a number of factors which the Court gives as
examples.
On question I (b) the Court was of opinion by 11 votes against 4 that the Organization has the
capacity to bring an international claim whether or not the responsible State is a Member of
the United Nations.
Finally, on point II, the Court was of opinion by 10 votes against 5 that when the United Nations
as an organization is bringing a claim for reparation for damage caused to its agent, it can
only do so by basing its claim upon a breach of obligations due to itself; respect for this rule
'will usually prevent a conflict between the action of the United Nations and such rights as the
agent's national State may possess; moreover, this reconciliation must depend upon considerations

applicable to each particular case, and upon agreements to be made between the Organization and
individual States.
THE UN CHARTER (refer to 7 principles above)
Universal Declaration on Human Rights
PREAMBLE
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and
women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the
full realization of this pledge,
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION

OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the
end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind,
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of
territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional
or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether
it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of
sovereignty.
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be
prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment.
Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination
in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him.
Article 11.
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees
necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the
time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.
Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
his country.

Article 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from
non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or
religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal
rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending
spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State.
Article 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedures.
Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality.

Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented,
if necessary, by other means of social protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and
to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or
religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the
maintenance of peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to
their children.
Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community,
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.
Article 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as
his economic, social and cultural rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
PART I
Article 1
1. All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All people may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations.

PART II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws
or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
a. To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity;
b. To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop
the possibilities of judicial remedy;
c. To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL

RIGHTS
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free
human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political
rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,

Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
PART I
Article 1
1. All people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All people may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations.
PART II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated
in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may
determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the
present Covenant to non-nationals.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women
to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.
Article 4

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided
by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such
limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than
is provided for in the present Covenant.
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or
existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted
on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes
them to a lesser extent.
PART III
Article 6
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the
right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or
accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization
of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training programmes,
policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and full
and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and
economic freedoms to the individual.
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG VS OLALIA
Respondent was granted bail while in an extradition case with petitioner Hong Kong special
administrative region. Respondent judge granted said bail under the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed

with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Issue:
 Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
 that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has
a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
Held:
The constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, speaking through then
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal
proceedings,". Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De
la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that
the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion"
(Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the
other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is
now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to

states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants
for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events
show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed.
While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director
of Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,
the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguards their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s
ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation
of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this Court

ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may
be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the
Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s
right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is
not in issue.

The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor
is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is
shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of
justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for
the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that
release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of

a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint
of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
"Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time
of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By
any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
THE PRINCIPLE OF PACTA SUNT SERVANDA VS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty,

and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met.
Clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be
used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower
than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a
flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Nota bene:
a. REPRISAL is a coercive measure short of war, directed by a state against another, in

retaliation for acts of the latter and as means of obtaining reparation or satisfaction for
such acts. Reprisal involves retaliatory acts which by themselves would be illegal. For
example, for violation of a treaty by a state, the aggrieved state seizes on the high seas
the ships of the offending state.
b. RETORSION is a legal but deliberately unfriendly act directed by a state against another
in retaliation for an unfriendly though legal act to compel that state to alter its unfriendly
conduct. An example of retorsion is banning exports to the offending state.
c. The DECLARATORY THEORY OF RECOGNITION is a theory according to which

recognition of a state is merely an acknowledgment of the fact of its existence. In other
words, the recognized state already exists and can exist even without such recognition.
For example, when other countries recognized Bangladesh, Bangladesh already existed as
a state even without such recognition.
d. RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY is the formal acknowledgment by a third

party of the existence of a state of war between the central government and a portion of
that state. Belligerency exists when a sizeable portion of the territory of a state is under
the effective control of an insurgent community which is seeking to establish a separate
government and the insurgents are in de facto control of a portion of the territory and

population, have a political organization, are able to maintain such control, and conduct
themselves according to the laws of war. For example, Great Britain recognized a state
of belligerency in the United States during the Civil War,
e. CONTINENTAL SHELF of a coastal state comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the "baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental shelf does not extend
up to that distance.
f. EXEQUATUR is an authorization from the receiving state admitting the head of a

consular post to the exercise of his functions. For example, if the Philippines appoints a
consul general for New York, he cannot start performing his functions unless the
President of the United States issues an exequatur to him,
g. The principle of DOUBLE CRIMINALITY is the rule in extradition which states that
for a request to be honored the crime for which extradition is requested must be a crime
in both the requesting state and the state to which the fugitive has fled. For example,
since murder is a crime both in the Philippines and in Canada, under the Treaty on
Extradition between the Philippines and Canada, the Philippines can request Canada to
extradite a Filipino who has fled to Canada.
h. PROTECTIVE PERSONALITY principle is the principle by which the state exercise

jurisdiction over the acts of an alien even if committed outside its territory, if such acts
are adverse to the interest of the national state.
i. INNOCENT PASSAGE means the right of continuous and expeditious navigation of a

foreign ship through the territorial sea of a state for the purpose of traversing that sea
without entering the internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside
internal waters, or proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or
port facility. The passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal state.
j. JUS COGENS is a peremptory norm of general international law accepted and

recognized by the international community as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character, An example is the prohibition
against the use of force.
SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THE 2009 BAR EXAM QUESTIONS ON PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW
XII.
William, a private American citizen, a university graduate and frequent visitor to the
Philippines, was inside the U.S. embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private
Filipino citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses, he killed the person he was

arguing with. The police came, and brought him to the nearest police station. Upon
reaching the station, the police investigator, in halting English, informed William of his
Miranda rights, and assigned him an independent local counsel. William refused the
services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted by a Filipino lawyer currently based
in the U.S. The request was denied, and the counsel assigned by the police stayed for the
duration of the investigation.
William protested his arrest.
[a] He argued that since the incident took place inside the U.S. embassy, Philippine courts
have no jurisdiction because the U.S. embassy grounds are not part of Philippine territory;
thus, technically, no crime under Philippine law was committed. Is William correct? Explain
your answer. (3%)
Ans. No, William is not correct. While Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides that the premises of a diplomatic mission shall be inviolable, and may not be
entered by the police or by any other agent of the receiving State, except with the consent of the
Ambassador or the head of the mission, it does not alter the fact, however, that such premises are
still part of Philippine territory. The concept of “exterritoriality,” under which diplomatic
premises are deemed to be part of the sovereign territory of the sending State, has not been
adopted in the Vienna Convention. Hence, a crime committed on or within such premises by a
private person like Williams who enjoys no diplomatic immunity falls within the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.
XIII.
A terrorist group called the Emerald Brigade is based in the State of Asyaland. The
government of Asyaland does not support the terrorist group, but being a poor country, is
powerless to stop it.
The Emerald Brigade launched an attack on the Philippines, firing two missiles that killed
thousands of Filipinos. It then warned that more attacks were forthcoming. Through
diplomatic channels, the Philippines demanded that Asyaland stop the Emerald Brigade;
otherwise, it will do whatever is necessary to defend itself.
Receiving reliable intelligence reports of another imminent attack by the Emerald Brigade,
and it appearing that Asyaland was incapable of preventing the assault, the Philippines sent
a crack commando team to Asyaland. The team stayed only for a few hours in Asyaland,
succeeded in killing the leaders and most of the members of the Emerald Brigade, then
immediately returned to the Philippines.
[a] Was the Philippine action justified under the international law principle of “self-
defense”? Explain your answer. (3%)
Ans. Yes, the Philippine action was justified. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter affirms the inherent
right of States to individual or collective self-defence.

The terrorist group Emerald Brigade had already launched actual armed attacks on the Philippines
which killed thousands of Filipinos with a warning that more attacks were forthcoming. Asyland, on
the other hand, had failed to fulfill its obligations, under international law, to prevent the use of its
territory for the staging of terrorist acts against the Philippines. As such, in the face of another
imminent attack by the Emerald Brigade, and it appearing that Asyland was incapable of preventing
the assault, the Philippines was therefore justified in resorting to military action to protect its own
security as an act of self-defence.
[b] As a consequence of the foregoing incident, Asyaland charges the Philippines with
violation of Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter that prohibits “the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” The Philippines
counters that its commando team neither took any territory nor interfered in the political
processes of Asyaland. Which contention is correct? Reasons. (3%)
Ans. The contention of the Philippines is the correct one. State practice and the U.N. Security
Council's actions after 9/11 indicate a trend towards recognizing that a State that suffers
large-scale violence perpetrated by non-State actors located in another State has a right to
use force when (1) that other State proves unwilling or unable to reduce or eliminate the
source of the violence, (2) the use of force is proportional to the threat posed by the non-
State actor, and (3) the use of force is temporary and does not result in non-consensual
occupation or annexation of territory.
Under UN/A/RES/60/288 (2006), known as the UN global counter-terrorism strategy, member

States shall adopt a plan of action, including a number of measures to prevent and combat terrorism,
in particular by denying terrorists access to the means to carry out their attacks, to their targets and
to the desired impact of their attacks.
[c] Assume that the commando team captured a member of the Emerald Brigade and
brought him back to the Philippines. The Philippine Government insists that a special
international tribunal should try the terrorist. On the other hand, the terrorist argues that
terrorism is not an international crime and, therefore, the municipal laws of the Philippines,
which recognize access of the accused to constitutional rights, should apply. Decide with
reasons. (3%)
Ans. Terrorism is an international crime both in peace time and in times of armed conflicts,
and therefore it may be tried by a special international tribunal. The municipal laws of the
Philippines cannot apply because the terrorist acts in question are transnational in nature; that is, not
limited to the territory of the Philippines and they do not fall under the extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction of the Philippines under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
When committed during peacetime, international terrorism may be prosecuted under the different
international conventions on the prevention, suppression and punishment of terrorism, and when
committed during an armed conflict, it may be prosecuted as a distinct category of war crimes.
International law indisputably bans terrorism in time of armed conflict. Article 33(1) of the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits “all measures of terrorism against civilians.” A similar
provision is contained in the Second Additional Protocol of 1977. Article 4(2)(d) prohibits “acts of
terrorism” against all persons who do not take a direct part or have ceased to take part in hostilities.

XIV.
The Philippine Government is negotiating a new security treaty with the United States
which could involve engagement in joint military operations of the two countries’ armed
forces. A loose organization of Filipinos, the Kabataan at Matatandang Makabansa (KMM)
wrote the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of National Defense
(DND) demanding disclosure of the details of the negotiations, as well as copies of the
minutes of the meetings. The DFA and the DND refused, contending that premature
disclosure of the offers and counter-offers between the parties could jeopardize on-going
negotiations with another country. KMM filed suit to compel disclosure of the negotiation
details, and be granted access to the records of the meetings, invoking the constitutional
right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
[a] Decide with reasons. (3%)
Ans. The suit filed by KMM should be dismissed. It is true that the details of the treaty negotiation,
including the offers and counter-offers between the Philippine Government and United States, are
matters of public concern. However, it is also well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right
to information nor the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit
of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature.
As held in the recent case of Akbayan vs. Aquino (G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008), the privileged
character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid
limitations on the right to information, the Supreme Court in Chavez v. PCGG (360 Phil. 133, 764
[1998]) held that “information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of
national interest.” Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in People’s Movement for Press
Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 84642, September 13, 1988) wherein the Supreme Court
stressed that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.”
[b] Will your answer be the same if the information sought by KMM pertains to contracts entered
into by the Government in its proprietary or commercial capacity? Why or why not? (3%)
Ans. No, the answer will be different. Information pertaining to contracts entered into by the
Government in its proprietary or commercial capacity are not covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege. These information are matters of public concern to which the people
have the right to information under Section 7 of the Bill of Rights. Under Section 7, citizens
shall be afforded access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to government
transactions. Moreover, Section 28 of the Declaration of Principles directs the State to adopt and
implement a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
1. What is exterritoriality?
- It is the fiction in international law by virtue of which foreign persons and their
things are exempted from the jurisdiction of the State on the theory that they form an
extension of the territory of their own State.

2. What is extra-territoriality?
- It is the exemption of foreign persons from laws and jurisdiction of a State in which
they presently reside, an exemption which can only exist by virtue of a treaty
stipulation to this effect.
3. What is imperium?
- The right of the State to pass or enact its own laws and employ force to secure
obedience, maintain peace and order within its territorial limits, defend the State
against foreign invasion, and do any other act of governance over its people and
territory.
4. What is dominium?
- It refers to the independent proprietary right of possession, use, conservation,

disposition or sale, and control by the State over its territorial lands.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF STATES
Intervention
Under the basic principles of international law:
1. The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations;
2. The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state, in accordance with the Charter;
3. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
4. The principle of sovereign equality of states; and
Sovereignty
- Independence from outside control; the Montivedeo Convention expresses this in positive
terms as including the capacity to enter into relations with other States; this latter element of
sovereignty, however, is dependent on recognition; an entity may in fact possess all elements

of a state but if one or more states do not extend recognition to it, the entity would not be
able to establish relations with those states.
Concept of res nullius

- The definition of res nullius is "A thing which has no owner or A thing which has been
abandoned by its owner is as much res nullius as if it had never belonged to anyone."
- The Philippines bases its claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys on the issues of res nullius
and geography. When Japan renounced its sovereignty over the islands in the San Francisco
Treaty in 1951, the islands became res nullius and available for annexation.
- Two modes of territorial acquisition in International Law; namely, occupation and
prescription:
 Occupation is an original mode of territorial acquisition, and is effected through
possession and administration of the territory by or in behalf of the acquiring State.
The prime object of settlement by occupation is the incorporation of unappropriated
territory into the national domain of the acquiring State. Only such territory as is
not within the dominion of any State may be the object of occupation. In
other words, the territory must be res nullius or terra nullius. The term res
nullius, as has been interpreted, does not require that the territory be
uninhabited, but that it be not already occupied by a people or State whose
political organization is such as to cause its prior rights of occupancy to be
recognized.
 We must concede that in the past European powers did not recognize the title of
settled peoples whose civilization was allegedly below the European standard. The
emergence of non-European powers, and the growing importance of new nations in
the Afro-Asian bloc, have eroded away this concept. At any rate, insofar as the
British Government is concerned, it is precluded from claiming that the Sultan of
Sulu had a title or a political organization below the European standard. All we need
to do is to refer back to the text, of Lord Granville's correspondence.
Outer space – outer space begins where sovereignty over air space ends
- Outer space, wherever that might be, and celestial bodies, are not susceptible to
appropriation by any state.
- Under the 1967 Treaty on the exploration and use of outer space
 Exploration and use of the moon and other celestial bodies are for the benefit and
interest of all countries
 Outer space and the moon shall be free for exploration and use by all states
 Outer space and the moon not subject to national appropriation
 Parties to treaty agree not to place in orbit around earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction install such on celestial
bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner
 Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states for peaceful purposes.
 Astronauts are envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render them assistance in
every accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another state party
or on the high seas. They shall be safely and promptly returned to the state of
registry of their space vehicle.

Jurisdiction
- The authority to affect legal interests. Corresponding to the powers of the government,
jurisdiction can be
1. Jurisdiction to prescribe norms of conduct (legislative jurisdiction)
2. Jurisdiction to enforce the norms prescribed (executive jurisdiction)
3. Jurisdiction to adjudicate (judicial jurisdiction)
Diplomatic immunity
CALLADO VS IRRI
Callado was terminated by IRRI. Filed charges with the NLRC. IRRI set defense of immunity.
Labor arbiter said no immunity in labor case.
Held:
 IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed.

Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil
and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by
the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.
 IRRI enjoy(s) immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been
held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government.
 in WHO v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino:
- It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to
embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted
doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of
the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
- Further, we held that "(t)he raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.
- The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to . . . and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their
international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of
partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat
the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control
by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered the performance of their functions.

CONSULS AND CONSULAR IMMUNITIES
Consuls are not concerned with political matters. They attend rather to administrative and economic
issues such as the issuance of visas.
The head of a consular post may be admitted through an authorization letter from the receiving
state termed an exequatur. He may be declared persona non grata by the receiving state, and in such
event would be recalled or his functions with the consular post terminated.
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular relations, pertinent provisions relating to their functions
are the following:
Art. 34 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (subject to laws and regulations, movement and

travel in the territory of the receiving State by the members of the consular post)
Art. 35 FREEDOM OF COMMUNICAITON
Art. 36 COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT WITH NATIONALS OF THE
SENDING STATE
Art. 41 PERSONAL INVIOLABILITY OF CONSULAR OFFICERS
 Not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial except of a grave crime
Art. 42 NOTIFICATION OF ARREST, DETENTION OR PROSECUTION
Receiving state shall notify head of the consular post
Art. 43 IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
 Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the
jurisdiction of judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving state with
respect to acts performed in the exercise of consular functions
 First paragraph shall not apply with respect to a civil action either:
 Arising out of a contract concluded by the consular officer or consular
employee in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an
agent of the sending state;
 By a third party for damages arising from an accident in the
receiving state, caused by a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft.
Art. 44 LIABILITY TO GIVE EVIDENCE
Art. 45 WAIVER OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
 Sending state may waive, with regard to the consular post, any of the privileges
and immunities provided for in Art. 41, 43, 44
Case concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran
 Iran did not break off diplomatic relations with the US government and in no time declared the
members of the consular staff persona non grata. They did not employ remedies in ending the
crisis. It allowed the group of militants to attack and occupy the US Embassy by force and held
the diplomatic and consular staff hostage;
 The Iranian authorities' decision to continue the subjection of the Embassy to occupation, and
of its staff to detention as hostages, gave rise to repeated and multiple breaches of Iran's treaty
obligations, additional to those already committed at the time of the seizure of the Emtbassy
(1961 Convention: Arts. 22,24,25,26,27 and 29; 1963 Convention: inter alia, Art. 33; 1955
Tkaty, Art. iI (4)).

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Diplomatic Immunity (2000)
No XX -A foreign ambassador to the Philippines leased a vacation house in Tagaytay for his
personal use. For some reason, he failed to pay rentals for more than one year. The lessor filed an
action for the recovery of his property in court.
a) Can the foreign ambassador invoke his diplomatic immunity to resist the lessor's action?
(3%)
b) The lessor gets hold of evidence that the ambassador is about to return to his home country. Can
the lessor ask the court to stop the ambassador's departure from the Philippines?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No, the foreign ambassador cannot invoke his diplomatic immunity to resist the action, since he is
not using the house in Tagaytay City for the purposes of his mission but merely for vacation. Under
Article 3(l)(a) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent has no
immunity in case of a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of
the receiving State unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for purposes of the mission.
b) No, the lessor cannot ask the court to stop the departure of the ambassador from the Philippines.
Under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention, a diplomatic agent shall not be liable to any form of
arrest or detention. (per Dondee) The grounds cited by YZ is tenable on the basis that the precept
that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit
and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of
state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts
giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred
by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a
state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. (KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003)
Diplomatic Immunity (2001)
No XX - Dr. Velen, an official of the World Health Organization (WHO) assigned in the
Philippines, arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport with his personal effects contained in
twelve crates as unaccompanied baggage. As such, his personal effects were allowed free entry from
duties and taxes, and were directly stored at Arshaine Corporation's warehouse at Makati, pending

Dr. Velen's relocation to his permanent quarters. At the instance of police authorities, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati issued a warrant for the search and seizure of Dr. Velen's personal
effects in view of an alleged violation of the Tariff and Custom's Code. According to the police, the
crates contained contraband items. Upon protest of WHO officials, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
formally advised the RTC as to Dr. Velen's immunity. The Solicitor General likewise joined Dr.
Velen's plea of immunity and motion to quash the search warrant. The RTC denied the motion. Is
the denial of the motion to quash proper? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The denial of the motion is improper. As held in World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA
242 (1972). as an official of the World Health Organization, Dr. Velen enjoyed diplomatic immunity
and this included exemption from duties and taxes. Since diplomatic immunity involves a political
question, where a plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the Executive
Department, it is the duty of the court to accept the claim of immunity
EXTRADITION
WRIGHT VS CA
Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty
of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate
on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing
that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with.
Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty
amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?
HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies
only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so,
there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining
the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming
into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court
of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a
criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.
III. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
PACTA SUNT SERVANDA VS REBUS SIC STANTIBUS
Pacta sunt servanda

 (Latin for "agreements must be kept"), is a brocard, a basic principle of civil law and of
international law.
 In its most common sense, the principle refers to private contracts, stressing that
contained clauses are law between the parties, and implies that non-fulfilment of
respective obligations is a breach of the pact. The general principle of correct behaviour
in commercial praxis — and implies the bona fide — is a requirement for the efficacy of the
whole system, so the eventual disorder is sometimes punished by the law of some systems
even without any direct penalty incurred by any of the parties.
 With reference to international agreements, "every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Pacta sunt servanda is
based on good faith. This entitles states to require that obligations be respected and to rely
upon the obligations being respected. This good faith basis of treaties implies that a
party to the treaty cannot invoke provisions of its municipal (domestic) law as
justification for a failure to perform.
 The only limit to pacta sunt servanda is the peremptory norms of general international law,
called jus cogens (compelling law). The legal principle clausula rebus sic stantibus, part
of customary international law, also allows for treaty obligations to be unfulfilled due to a
compelling change in circumstances.
Rebus sic stantibus
 In public international law, clausula rebus sic stantibus (Latin for "things thus standing") is the
legal doctrine allowing for treaties to become inapplicable because of a fundamental
change of circumstances. It is essentially an "escape clause" that makes an exception to the
general rule of pacta sunt servanda (promises must be kept).
 Because the doctrine poses a risk to the security of treaties as its scope is relatively unconfined, it
requires strict regulations as to the conditions in which it may be invoked.
 The doctrine is part of customary international law, but is also provided for in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties under Article 62 (Fundamental Change of
Circumstance), although the doctrine is never mentioned by name. Article 62 provides the only
two justifications of the invocation of rebus sic stantibus: first, that the circumstances
existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty were indeed objectively essential to
the obligations of treaty (sub-paragraph A) and the instance wherein the change of
circumstances has had a radical effect on the obligations of the treaty (sub-paragraph
B).
 If the parties to a treaty had contemplated for the occurrence of the changed
circumstance the doctrine does not apply and the provision remains in effect. Clausula
rebus sic stantibus only relates to changed circumstances that were never contemplated by
the parties. This principle is clarified in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v.
Iceland, 1973).
 Although it is clear that a fundamental change of circumstances might justify terminating or
modifying a treaty, unilateral denunciation of a treaty is prohibited; a party does not have
the right to denounce a treaty unilaterally.
IV. PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

Article 33 The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means.
Article 34 The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35 Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of
the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or
of the General Assembly.
A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to
which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the
obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its

attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36 The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in
Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or
methods of adjustment.
The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the
settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take
into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the
parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court.
Article 37 Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it
by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall
decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of
settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38 Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if
all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties
with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
V. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Jus ad bellum
The rules of jus ad bellum are addressed, first and foremost, to heads of state. Since political leaders
are the ones who inaugurate wars, setting their armed forces in motion, they are to be held
accountable to jus ad bellum principles. If they fail in that responsibility, then they commit war
crimes. In the language of the Nuremberg prosecutors, aggressive leaders who launch unjust wars
commit “crimes against peace.” What constitutes a just or unjust resort to armed force is disclosed
to us by the rules of jus ad bellum. Just war theory contends that, for any resort to war to be
justified, a political community, or state, must fulfil each and every one of the following six
requirements:
1. Just cause
This is clearly the most important rule; it sets the tone for everything which follows. A state may
launch a war only for the right reason. The just causes most frequently mentioned include: self-
defence from external attack; the defence of others from such; the protection of innocents from
brutal, aggressive regimes; and punishment for a grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected.
Vitoria suggested that all the just causes be subsumed under the one category of “a wrong received.”
Walzer, and most modern just war theorists, speak of the one just cause for resorting to war being
the resistance of aggression. Aggression is the use of armed force in violation of someone else's
basic rights.
The basic rights of two kinds of entity are involved here: those of states; and those of their
individual citizens. International law affirms that states have many rights, notably those to political
sovereignty and territorial integrity. It thus affirms that aggression involves the use of armed
forces—armies, navies, air forces, marines, missiles—in violation of these rights. Classic cases would
be Nazi Germany into Poland in 1939, and Iraq into Kuwait in 1990, wherein the aggressor used its
armed forces to invade the territory of the victim, overthrow its government and establish a new
regime in its place. Crucially, the commission of aggression causes the aggressor to forfeit its own
state rights, thereby permitting violent resistance. An aggressor has no right not to be warred against
in defence; indeed, it has the duty to stop its rights-violating aggression.
But why do states have rights? The only respectable answer seems to be that they need these rights
to protect their people and to help provide them with the objects of their human rights. As John
Locke, and the U.S. Founding Fathers, declared: governments are instituted among people to realize
the basic rights of those people. If governments do so, they are legitimate; if not, they have neither
right nor reason to exist. This is vital: from the moral point of view, only legitimate governments
have rights, including those to go to war. We need a theory of legitimate governance to ground just
war theory, and Aquinas perhaps saw this more clearly than any classical member of the tradition.
This connection to legitimacy is consistent with the perspective on war offered so far: war, at its
heart, is a violent clash over how a territory and its people are to be governed.

Based on international law (see Roth), it seems like there are three basic criteria for a legitimate
government. If these conditions are met, the state in question has rights to govern and to be left in
peace. They are as follows. First, the state is recognized as legitimate by its own people and by the
international community. There is an uncoerced general peace and order within that society, and the
state is not shunned as a pariah by the rest of the world. Second, the state avoids violating the rights
of other legitimate states. In particular, legitimate governments don't commit aggression against
other societies. Finally, legitimate states make every reasonable effort to satisfy the human rights of
their own citizens, notably those to life, liberty and subsistence. States failing any of these criteria
have no right to govern or to go to war. We can speak of states satisfying these criteria as legitimate,
or “minimally just,” political communities.
Why do we need to talk about these rights? First, to give state rights moral legitimacy and to avoid
fetishizing state rights for their own sake. Second, to describe what is wrong about aggression and
why it justifies war in response. Aggression is so serious because it involves the infliction of physical
force in violation of the most elemental entitlements people and their communities have: to survive;
to be physically secure; to have enough resources to subsist at all; to live in peace; and to choose for
themselves their own lives and societies. Aggression thus attacks the very spine of human civilization
itself. This is what makes it permissible to resist with means as severe as war, provided the other jus
ad bellum criteria are also met. Third, talk of legitimacy is essential for explaining justice in a civil
war, wherein there isn't classical, cross-border aggression between competing countries but, rather, a
vicious fight over the one state between rival communities within a formerly united society. The key
to discerning morality in such cases revolves around the idea of legitimacy: which, if any, side has
minimal justice? Which side is defending—or is seeking to establish—a legitimate political structure
in our three-fold sense? That's the side which it is permissible to: a) be part of; or b) if you're an
outsider, to support.
How does this conception of just cause impact on the issue of armed humanitarian intervention?
This is when a state does not commit cross-border aggression but, for whatever reason, turns
savagely against its own people, deploying armed force in a series of massacres against large numbers
of its own citizens. Such events happened in Cambodia and Uganda in the 1970s, Rwanda in 1994,
Serbia/Kosovo in 1998-9 and in Sudan/Darfur from 2004 to the present. Our definitions allow us
to say it's permissible to intervene on behalf of the victims, and to attack with defensive force the
rogue regime meting out such death and destruction. Why? There's no logical requirement that
aggression can only be committed across borders. Aggression is the use of armed force in violation
of someone else's basic rights. That “someone else” might be: a) another person (violent crime); b)
another state (international or “external” aggression); or c) many other people within one's own
community (domestic or “internal” aggression). The commission of aggression, in any of these
forms, causes the aggressor to forfeit its rights. The aggressor has no right not to be resisted with
defensive force; indeed, the aggressor has the duty to stop and submit itself to punishment. If the
aggressor doesn't stop, it is entirely permissible for its victims to resort to force to protect
themselves—and for anyone else to do likewise in aid of the victims. Usually, in humanitarian
intervention, armed aid from the international community is essential for an effective resistance
against the aggression, since domestic populations are at a huge disadvantage, and are massively
vulnerable, to the violence of their own state.
Terrorists can commit aggression too. There's nothing to the concept which excludes this: they, too,
can deploy armed force in violation of someone else's basic rights. When they do so, they forfeit any
right not to suffer the consequences of receiving defensive force in response. Indeed, terrorists

almost always commit aggression when they act, since terrorism is precisely the use of random
violence—especially killing force—against civilians, with the intent of spreading fear throughout a
population, hoping this fear will advance a political objective. On 9/11, the al-Qaeda terrorist group
clearly used armed force, both to gain control of the planes and then again when using the planes as
missiles against the targets in The Pentagon and The World Trade Center. This use of armed force
was in violation of America's state rights to political sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to all
those people's human rights to life and liberty. The terrorist strikes on 9/11 were aggression—
defiantly so, deliberately modelled after Pearl Harbor. As such, they justified the responding attack
on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Taliban had sponsored and enabled al-Qaeda's attack, by
providing resources, personnel and a safe haven to the terrorist group.
An important issue in just cause is whether, to be justified in going to war, one must wait for the
aggression actually to happen, or whether in some instances it is permissible to launch a pre-emptive
strike against anticipated aggression. The tradition is severely split on this issue. Vitoria said you
must wait, since it would be absurd to “punish someone for an offense they have yet to commit.”
Others, like Walzer, strive to define the exceptional criteria, stressing: the seriousness of the
anticipated aggression; the kind and quality of evidence required; the speed with which one must
decide; and the issue of fairness and the duty to protect one's people. If one knows a terrible attack
is coming soon, one owes it to one's people to shift from defense to offense. The best defense, as
they say, is a good offense. Why let the aggressor have the upper hand of the first strike? But that's
the very issue: can you attack first and not, thereby, yourself become the aggressor? Can striking first
still be considered an act of defence from aggression? International law, for its part, sweepingly
forbids pre-emptive strikes unless they are clearly authorized in advance by the UN Security Council.
These issues, of course, were highlighted in the run-up to the 2003 U.S.-led pre-emptive strike on
Iraq. The U.S. still maintains, in its National Security Strategy, the right to strike first as part of its
war on terror. Many other countries find this extremely controversial.
2. Right intention.
A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its just cause. Having the right reason for
launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally
appropriate. Ulterior motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or
ethnic hatred, are ruled out. The only right intention allowed is to see the just cause for resorting to
war secured and consolidated. If another intention crowds in, moral corruption sets in. International
law does not include this rule, probably because of the evidentiary difficulties involved in
determining a state's intent.
3. Proper authority and public declaration.
A state may go to war only if the decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, according
to the proper process, and made public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). The
“appropriate authority” is usually specified in that country's constitution. States failing the
requirements of minimal justice lack the legitimacy to go to war.
4. Last Resort.
A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the
conflict in question, in particular diplomatic negotiation. One wants to make sure something as

momentous and serious as war is declared only when it seems the last practical and reasonable shot
at effectively resisting aggression.
5. Probability of Success.
A state may not resort to war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the
situation. The aim here is to block mass violence which is going to be futile. International law does
not include this requirement, as it is seen as biased against small, weaker states.
6. Proportionality.
A state must, prior to initiating a war, weigh the universal goods expected to result from it, such as
securing the just cause, against the universal evils expected to result, notably casualties. Only if the
benefits are proportional to, or “worth”, the costs may the war action proceed. (The universal must
be stressed, since often in war states only tally their own expected benefits and costs, radically
discounting those accruing to the enemy and to any innocent third parties.)
Just war theory insists all six criteria must each be fulfilled for a particular declaration of war to be
justified: it's all or no justification, so to speak. Just war theory is thus quite demanding, as of course
it should be, given the gravity of its subject matter. It is important to note that the first three of
these six rules are what we might call deontological requirements, otherwise known as duty-based
requirements or first-principle requirements. For a war to be just, some core duty must be violated:
in this case, the duty not to commit aggression. A war in punishment of this violated duty must itself
respect further duties: it must be appropriately motivated, and must be publicly declared by (only)
the proper authority for doing so. The next three requirements are consequentialist: given that these
first principle requirements have been met, we must also consider the expected consequences of
launching a war. Thus, just war theory attempts to provide a common sensical combination of both
deontology and consequentialism as applied to the issue of war.
Jus in bello
Jus in bello refers to justice in war, to right conduct in the midst of battle. Responsibility for state
adherence to jus in bello norms falls primarily on the shoulders of those military commanders,
officers and soldiers who formulate and execute the war policy of a particular state. They are to be
held responsible for any breach of the principles which follow below. Such accountability may
involve being put on trial for war crimes, whether by one's own national military justice system or
perhaps by the newly-formed International Criminal Court (created by the 1998 Treaty of Rome).
We need to distinguish between external and internal jus in bello. External, or traditional, jus in bello
concerns the rules a state should observe regarding the enemy and its armed forces. Internal jus in
bello concerns the rules a state must follow in connection with its own people as it fights war against
an external enemy.
There are several rules of external jus in bello:
1. Obey all international laws on weapons prohibition.

Chemical and biological weapons, in particular, are forbidden by many treaties. Nuclear weapons
aren't so clearly prohibited but it seems fair to say a huge taboo attaches to such weapons and any
use of them would be greeted with incredible hostility by the international community.
2. Discrimination and Non-Combatant Immunity.
Soldiers are only entitled to use their (non-prohibited) weapons to target those who are, in Walzer's
words, “engaged in harm.” Thus, when they take aim, soldiers must discriminate between the civilian
population, which is morally immune from direct and intentional attack, and those legitimate
military, political and industrial targets involved in rights-violating harm. While some collateral
civilian casualties are excusable, it is wrong to take deliberate aim at civilian targets. An example
would be saturation bombing of residential areas. (It is worth noting that almost all wars since 1900
have featured larger civilian, than military, casualties. Perhaps this is one reason why this rule is the
most frequently and stridently codified rule in all the laws of armed conflict, as international law
seeks to protect unarmed civilians as best it can.)
3. Proportionality.
Soldiers may only use force proportional to the end they seek. They must restrain their force to that
amount appropriate to achieving their aim or target. Weapons of mass destruction, for example, are
usually seen as being out of proportion to legitimate military ends.
4. Benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (POWs).
If enemy soldiers surrender and become captives, they cease being lethal threats to basic rights. They
are no longer “engaged in harm.” Thus it is wrong to target them with death, starvation, rape,
torture, medical experimentation, and so on. They are to be provided, as The Geneva Conventions
spell out, with benevolent—not malevolent—quarantine away from battle zones and until the war
ends, when they should be exchanged for one's own POWs. Do terrorists deserve such protection,
too? Great controversy surrounds the detainment and aggressive questioning of terrorist suspects
held by the U.S. at jails in Cuba, Iraq and Pakistan in the name of the war on terror.
5. No Means Mala in Se. Soldiers may not use weapons or methods which are “evil in
themselves.”
These include: mass rape campaigns; genocide or ethnic cleansing; using poison or treachery (like
disguising soldiers to look like the Red Cross); forcing captured soldiers to fight against their own
side; and using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled, like biological agents.
6. No reprisals.
A reprisal is when country A violates jus in bello in war with country B. Country B then retaliates
with its own violation of jus in bello, seeking to chasten A into obeying the rules. There are strong
moral and evidentiary reasons to believe that reprisals don't work, and they instead serve to escalate
death and make the destruction of war increasingly indiscriminate. Winning well is the best revenge.
Internal jus in bello essentially boils down to the need for a state, even though it's involved in a war,
nevertheless to still respect the human rights of its own citizens as best it can during the crisis. The

following issues arise: is it just to impose conscription, or press censorship? Can one curtail
traditional civil liberties, and due process protections, for perceived gains in national security?
Should elections be cancelled or post-poned? May soldiers disobey orders, e.g. refuse to fight in wars
they believe unjust? A comprehensive theory of wartime justice must include consideration of them,
and not merely focus on what one may do to the enemy. For some of the worst atrocities in wartime
have occurred within, and not between, national borders. Some states, historically, have used the
cloak of war with foreign powers to engage in massive internal human rights violations, usually
against some disfavoured group. Other states, which are otherwise decent, panic amidst the wartime
situation and impose emergency legislation which turns out to have been complete overkill, and
which they later regret and view as the product of fear rather than reason.
Jus post bellum
Jus post bellum refers to justice during the third and final stage of war: that of war termination. It
seeks to regulate the ending of wars, and to ease the transition from war back to peace. There is little
international law here—save occupation law and perhaps the human rights treaties—and so we must
turn to the moral resources of just war theory. But even here the theory has not dealt with jus post
bellum to the degree it should. There is a newness, unsettledness and controversy attaching to this
important topic. To focus our thoughts, consider the following proposed principles for jus post
bellum:
1. Proportionality and Publicity.
The peace settlement should be measured and reasonable, as well as publicly proclaimed. To make a
settlement serve as an instrument of revenge is to make a volatile bed one may be forced to sleep in
later. In general, this rules out insistence on unconditional surrender.
2. Rights Vindication.
The settlement should secure those basic rights whose violation triggered the justified war. The
relevant rights include human rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and
sovereignty. This is the main substantive goal of any decent settlement, ensuring that the war will
actually have an improving affect. Respect for rights, after all, is a foundation of civilization, whether
national or international. Vindicating rights, not vindictive revenge, is the order of the day.
3. Discrimination.
Distinction needs to be made between the leaders, the soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated
country one is negotiating with. Civilians are entitled to reasonable immunity from punitive post-war
measures. This rules out sweeping socio-economic sanctions as part of post-war punishment.
4. Punishment #1.
When the defeated country has been a blatant, rights-violating aggressor, proportionate punishment
must be meted out. The leaders of the regime, in particular, should face fair and public international
trials for war crimes.

5. Punishment #2. Soldiers also commit war crimes. Justice after war requires that such soldiers,
from all sides to the conflict, likewise be held accountable to investigation and possible trial.
6. Compensation.
Financial restitution may be mandated, subject to both proportionality and discrimination. A post-
war poll tax on civilians is generally impermissible, and there needs to be enough resources left so
that the defeated country can begin its own reconstruction. To beggar thy neighbor is to pick future
fights.
7. Rehabilitation.
The post-war environment provides a promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an

aggressor regime. Such reforms are permissible but they must be proportional to the degree of
depravity in the regime. They may involve: demilitarization and disarmament; police and judicial re-
training; human rights education; and even deep structural transformation towards a minimally just
society governed by a legitimate regime. This is, obviously, the most controversial aspect of jus post
bellum.
The terms of a just peace should satisfy all these requirements. There needs, in short, to be an ethical
“exit strategy” from war, and it deserves at least as much thought and effort as the purely military
exit strategy so much on the minds of policy planners and commanding officers.
Any serious defection, by any participant, from these principles of just war settlement should be
seen as a violation of the rules of just war termination, and so should be punished. At the least,
violation of such principles mandates a new round of diplomatic negotiations—even binding
international arbitration—between the relevant parties to the dispute. At the very most, such
violation may give the aggrieved party a just cause—but no more than a just cause—for resuming
hostilities. Full recourse to the resumption of hostilities may be made only if all the other traditional
criteria of jus ad bellum—proportionality, last resort, etc.—are satisfied in addition to just cause.
Perhaps a few additional thoughts on coercive regime change should here be added, in light of
controversial recent events, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Can coercive regime change ever be
justified, or is it essentially an act of imperialism? In my view, forcible post-war regime change can
be permissible provided: 1) the war itself was just and conducted properly; 2) the target regime was
illegitimate, thus forfeiting its state rights; 3) the goal of the reconstruction is a minimally just regime;
and 4) respect for jus in bello and human rights is integral to the transformation process itself. The
permission is then granted because the transformation: 1) violates neither state nor human rights; 2)
its expected consequences are very desirable, namely, satisfied human rights for the local population
and increased international peace and security for everyone; and 3) the post-war moment is
especially promising regarding the possibilities for reform. And the transformation will be successful
when there's: 1) a stable new regime; 2) run entirely by locals; which is 3) minimally just. There is
extensive historical evidence that this kind of success probably takes from 8 to 12 years to achieve
(essentially, a decade). Note that successful, rights-respecting coercive regime change can be done,
contrary to some pessimistic views; it was actually done in Germany and Japan from 1945-55, and so
it is neither conceptually nor empirically impossible. It's very difficult, to be sure—and, in some
cases, it's not a wise thing to do—but it's not literally impossible.

 A review of the literature suggests something of a 10-point recipe for transforming a defeated
aggressive regime into one which is minimally just:
 Adhere diligently to the laws of war during the regime take-down and occupation.
 Purge much of the old regime, and prosecute its war criminals.
 Disarm and demilitarize the society.
 Provide effective military and police security for the whole country.
 Work with a cross-section of locals on a new, rights-respecting constitution which features
checks and balances.
 Allow other, non-state associations, or “civil society”, to flourish.
 Forego compensation and sanctions in favour of investing in and re-building the economy.
 If necessary, re-vamp educational curricula to purge past poisonous propaganda and cement new
and better values.
 Ensure, in a timely fashion, that the benefits of the new order will be: 1) concrete; and 2) widely,
and not narrowly, distributed. The bulk of the population must feel their lives after the regime
change are clearly better than their former lives for the change to be sustainable.
 Follow an orderly, not-too-hasty exit strategy when the new regime can stand on its own two
feet. Again, this will probably take a decade of intensive effort.
To summarize this whole section, just war theory offers rules to guide decision-makers on the
appropriateness of their conduct during the resort to war, conduct during war and the termination
phase of the conflict. Its over-all aim is to try and ensure that wars are begun only for a very narrow
set of truly defensible reasons, that when wars break out they are fought in a responsibly controlled
and targeted manner, and that the parties to the dispute bring their war to an end in a speedy and
responsible fashion that respects the requirements of justice.
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT VS NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED

CONFLICT
International humanitarian law distinguishes two types of armed conflicts, namely:

· international armed conflicts, opposing two or more States, and
· non-international armed conflicts, between governmental forces and nongovernmentalarmed
groups, or between such groups only. IHL treaty law also establishes a distinction between
non-international armed conflicts in the meaning of common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and non-international armed conflicts falling within the definition
provided in Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II.
Legally speaking, no other type of armed conflict exists. It is nevertheless important to underline
that a situation can evolve from one type of armed conflict to another, depending on the facts
prevailing at a certain moment.
I. International Armed Conflict (IAC)

1) IHL Treaties
Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 states that: "In addition to the provisions which
shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized

by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance". According to this provision,
IACs are those which oppose "High Contracting Parties", meaning States. An IAC occurs when one
or more States have recourse to armed force against another State, regardless of the reasons or the
intensity of this confrontation. Relevant rules of IHL may be applicable even in the absence of open
hostilities. Moreover, no formal declaration of war or recognition of the situation is required. The
existence of an IAC, and as a consequence, the possibility to apply International Humanitarian Law
to this situation, depends on what actually happens on the ground. It is based on factual conditions.
For example, there may be an IAC, even though one of the belligerents does not recognize the
government of the adverse party2. The Commentary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 confirms
that "any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference
how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place". Apart from regular, inter-state armed conflicts,
Additional Protocol I extends the definition of IAC to include armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes in the exercise of their right
to self-determination (wars of national liberation).
2) Jurisprudence
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) proposed a general definition
of international armed conflict. In the Tadic case, the Tribunal stated that "an armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States".5 This definition has been adopted by other
international bodies since then.
3) Doctrine
The doctrine gives useful comments concerning the definition of an international armed conflict.
According to D. Schindler, "the existence of an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2 common to the
Geneva Conventions can always be assumed when parts of the armed forces of two States clash with each other. […]
Any kind of use of arms between two States brings the Conventions into effect". H.-P. Gasser explains that "any
use of armed force by one State against the territory of another, triggers the applicability of the Geneva Conventions
between the two States. […] It is also of no concern whether or not the party attacked resists. […] As soon as the
armed forces of one State find themselves with wounded or surrendering members of the armed forces or civilians of
another State on their hands, as soon as they detain prisoners or have actual control over a part of the territory of the
enemy State, then they must comply with the relevant convention".
The German Joint Services Regulations (ZDv) 15/2 says that "an international armed conflict exists if one
party uses force of arms against another party. […] The use of military force by individual persons or groups of persons
will not suffice".
II. Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC)
1) IHL Treaties
Two main legal sources must be examined in order to determine what a NIAC under international
humanitarian law is: a) common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; b) Article 1 of
Additional Protocol II:
a) Non-International Armed Conflicts within the Meaning of Common Article 3

Common Article 3 applies to "armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties". These include armed conflicts in which one or more non-governmental
armed groups are involved. Depending on the situation, hostilities may occur between governmental
armed forces and non-governmental armed groups or between such groups only. As the four
Geneva Conventions have universally been ratified now, the requirement that the armed conflict
must occur "in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" has lost its importance in practice.
Indeed, any armed conflict between governmental armed forces and armed groups or between such
groups cannot but take place on the territory of one of the Parties to the Convention. In order to
distinguish an armed conflict, in the meaning of common Article 3, from less serious forms of
violence, such as internal disturbances and tensions, riots or acts of banditry, the situation must
reach a certain threshold of confrontation. It has been generally accepted that the lower threshold
found in Article 1(2) of APII, which excludes internal disturbances and tensions from the definition
of NIAC, also applies to common Article 3.
Two criteria are usually used in this regard:
 First, the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity. This may be the case, for
example, when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the government is obliged
to use military force against the insurgents, instead of mere police forces.11
 Second, non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as "parties to
the conflict", meaning that they possess organized armed forces. This means for example
that these forces have to be under a certain command structure and have the capacity to
sustain military operations.
b) Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Meaning of Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II
A more restrictive definition of NIAC was adopted for the specific purpose of Additional Protocol
II. This instrument applies to armed conflicts "which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Protocol". This definition is narrower than the notion of NIAC
under common Article 3 in two aspects. Firstly, it introduces a requirement of territorial control, by
providing that non-governmental parties must exercise such territorial control "as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol". Secondly, Additional
Protocol II expressly applies only to armed conflicts between State armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organised armed groups. Contrary to common Article 3, the Protocol does
not apply to armed conflicts occurring only between non-State armed groups. In this context, it
must be reminded that Additional Protocol II "develops and supplements" common Article 3 "without
modifying its existing conditions of application".14 This means that this restrictive definition is relevant for
the application of Protocol II only, but does not extend to the law of NIAC in general. The Statute
of the International Criminal Court, in its article 8, para. 2 (f), confirms the existence of a definition
of a non-international armed conflict not fulfilling the criteria of Protocol II.
2) Jurisprudence
Case law has brought important elements for a definition of an armed conflict, in particular
regarding the non-international armed conflicts in the meaning of common Article 3 which are not

expressly defined in the Conventions concerned. Judgments and decisions of the ICTY throw also
some light on the definition of NIAC. As mentioned above, the ICTY went on to determine the
existence of a NIAC "whenever there is […] protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organised armed groups or between such groups within a State". The ICTY thus confirmed that the definition
of NIAC in the sense of common Article 3 encompasses situations where "several factions [confront]
each other without involvement of the government's armed forces". Since that first ruling, each judgment of the
ICTY has taken this definition as a starting point.
3) Doctrine
Several recognized authors also commented very clearly on what should be considered as a non-
international armed conflict. Their comments are relevant in first place to the conflicts which do not
fulfil the strict criteria foreseen in Additional Protocol II and provide useful elements to ensure the
application of the guarantees provided in common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
According to H.-P. Gasser, it is generally admitted that "non-international armed conflicts are armed
confrontations that take place within the territory of a State between the government on the one hand and armed
insurgent groups on the other hand. […] Another case is the crumbling of all government authority in the country, as a
result of which various groups fight each other in the struggle for power"18.
D. Schindler also proposes a detailed definition: "The hostilities have to be conducted by force of arms and
exhibit such intensity that, as a rule, the government is compelled to employ its armed forces against the insurgents
instead of mere police forces. Secondly, as to the insurgents, the hostilities are meant to be of a collective character, [i.e]
they have to be carried out not only by single groups. In addition, the insurgents have to exhibit a minimum amount of
organization. Their armed forces should be under a responsible command and be capable of meeting minimal
humanitarian requirements". M. Sassoli, writes "common Article 3 refers to conflicts 'occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties,' whereas Article 1 of Protocol II refers to those 'which take place in the territory
of a High Contracting Party.' According to the aim and purpose of IHL, this must be understood as simply recalling
that treaties apply only to their state parties. If such wording meant that conflicts opposing states and organized armed
groups and spreading over the territory of several states were not ‘non•international armed conflicts’, there would be a
gap in protection, which could not be explained by states’ concerns about their sovereignty. Those concerns made the law
of non•international armed conflicts more rudimentary. Yet concerns about state sovereignty could not explain why
victims of conflicts spilling over the territory of several states should benefit from less protection than those affected by
conflicts limited to the territory of only one state. Additionally, Articles 1 and 7 of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda extend the jurisdiction of that tribunal called to enforce, inter alia, the law of non-
international armed conflicts, to the neighbouring countries. This confirms that even a conflict spreading across borders
remains a non•international armed conflict. In conclusion, internal conflicts are distinguished from international armed
conflicts by the parties involved rather than by the territorial scope of the conflict."
III. Conclusion
On the basis of the analysis set out above, the ICRC proposes the following definitions, which
reflect the strong prevailing legal opinion:
1. International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more States.
2. Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between

governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups

arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must
reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of
organization.
VI. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
GATT/WTO
GATT-WTO Ratification
In December 1994, the Philippine Congress ratified the Philippine accession to the Uruguay
Round General Agreement on Tariff and Trade under the World Trade Organization
(GATT-WTO). Specifically, under the GATT-WTO, and other external agreements
congruent to WTO, the Philippines was committed to the following:
1. Removal of Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) and Conversion of QRs into their Tariff
Equivalents.
2. Reduction of Tariffs on Agricultural Products. Developing countries to reduce average tariffs by
24% with a minimum 10% cut per tariff lines from 1995 to 2004.
3. Reduction of Production Subsidies. For developing countries, reduction of trade distorting
domestic subsidies by 13% from 1995 to 2004. However, under the “de minimis” principle of
the agreement, no reductions are required if the domestic support is no more than 10%.
4. Minimum Access Volume (MAV). The allowing of annual imports at a lower tariff of volumes
equivalent to 3% of 1986-1988 consumption for 1995, increasing to 5% of 1986-1988
consumption by 2004.
5. Tariff Bindings. Countries will bind tariff rates at levels beyond which no further increases will
be imposed.
6. Prohibition of Additional Non-Tariff Measures. No new non-tariff measures, such as import
licensing, variable import levies, import quotas, and import bans may be imposed.
7. Plant Variety Registration and Protection. Intervention and ownership of biological products
such as plant and microorganisms should be protected under patent or the sui generis system or
both.
To cushion the impact of trade reforms under GATT-WTO, the Philippine government
committed safety net measures to neutralize temporary adjustments and dislocations in the
sector and to enhance farmer’s competitiveness. Some of these internal commitments of the
Philippine Government include:
1. Tariff Reduction on Inputs. For those inputs directly used for agricultural modernization, the
tariff rates were reduced to zero.
2. Trade Remedies. These are measures that provide industries relief from import surges, declining
import prices and/or dumping.
3. Reforms in the VAT for Agricultural Processors. Exemptions from the value-added tax (VAT)
of food and non-food agricultural products and marine commodities.
4. Budgetary Support in Agriculture. Under the Uruguay Action Plan of DA, the budget support
for agriculture from 1995 to1998 was estimated at P72.9B. Fifty-eight percent of this should
have come from DA-GAA and the rest from DAR, DPWH-GAA, Asset Privatization Thrust
(APT), Minimum Access Proceeds, Savings and Reserves.

UNCITRAL
Composed of a diverse composition of member States, the UNCITRAL carries out the goals of
harmonizing and unifying international trade laws.16 “The Commission has established six working
groups to perform the substantive preparatory work on topics within the Commission’s program of
work. Each working group is comprised of all member States of the Commission.”17 Located in
Vienna, Austria, the Secretariat of UNCITRAL “carries out legal research on subject matters within
the program of work of UNCITRAL and prepares reports, preliminary draft texts and commentaries
on draft legal texts.”18 This research forms the basis for topics that will be addressed by the working
groups. In addition to researching substantive legal issues, the Secretariat also “organizes
administrative services for meetings of the Commission and of its working groups and groups of
experts.
Scope
The scope of work originally carried out by the Commission was far narrower than the wide range
of topics addressed today. Over the past thirty-six years, the Commission has addressed and
recommended laws, rules, and legal guides on topics ranging from international commercial
arbitration22 to rules governing commercial conciliation23 to a model law governing electronic
commerce. “It is noteworthy that UNCITRAL’s program of work avoids such critical problems as
tariffs, import quotas, export restrictions, and exchange controls.”25 Other techniques to promote
the harmonization and unification of international trade laws include the creation of international
conventions, model treaty provisions, legal guides that “identify legal issues arising in a particular
area,” and recommendations to governments and international organizations.26
Also, the Commission provides “updated information on case law and enactments of uniform
commercial law, technical assistance in law reform projects,” and offers regional and national
seminars to promote the Commission’s work. “In 1969, [UNCITRAL] authorized the Secretary
General to establish a Yearbook which would make the work of the Commission more widely known
and readily available.” Published in 1971, the first Yearbook discussed UNCITRAL’s activities in
1968- 1970, the first three years of UNCITRAL’s operation. The Yearbook demonstrates a genuine
effort toward educating the member States and provides “a rich store of information on the most
ambitious attempt yet at unification of private law on an international scale.” Additionally, the
Commission has worked, or is working, on topics such as the international sale of goods and related
transactions, international transport of goods, international commercial arbitration and conciliation,
public procurement and infrastructure development, construction contracts, international payments,
electronic commerce, and cross-border insolvency.31 Currently, the six working groups are assigned
the topics of privately financed infrastructure projects, international arbitration and conciliation,
transport law, electronic commerce, insolvency law, and security interests.
Salient points
The Rules are divided into four sections: Section I – Introductory Rules (Articles 1-4), Section II –
Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal (Articles 5-14), Section III – Arbitral Proceedings (Articles 15-
30), and Section IV – The Award (Articles 31-41) In Section I, the Rules set out the basic
prerequisites for arbitration, such as the requirement of writing, conveniently supplying the
prospective parties to a contract (and, ergo, to a dispute) with a model arbitration clause in a note to
Article 1. Section II calls for the selection of an odd number of one (1) to three (3) arbitrators, three

(3) being the default rule (Article 5). With respect to the appointment of arbitrators, the Rules had to
provide a solution for the composition of the tribunal in the absence of consensus by the parties
since UNCITRAL is not an institution. Hence, the Rules introduced the notion of a party-agreed
upon appointing authority (or, if parties cannot agree, either party may request the Secretary General
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague to designate an appointing authority). In
appointing the sole or the third arbitrator, the so-called “list procedure,” a concept borrowed from
the AAA practice,46 shall be used.47 The issues of challenging procedure, covered in Articles 9- 12,
center on the standard of “justifiable doubts as to . . . impartiality or independence.” Article 10
clarifies that these standards apply to party-appointed arbitrators, whereas paragraph 2 allows for a
challenge of a party’s own arbitrator, though not unconditionally.
The Rules cover the arbitral proceedings in great detail in Section III. Skipping the provisions
regarding the place of arbitration, language, claims, defenses, amendments, time periods,
Kompetenz- Kompetenz (Article 21(1)),48 and separability49 (Article 21(2)), we turn to the matters
of evidence and hearings in Articles 24 and 25. The Rules do not provide for discovery, and Article
25(4) leaves the tribunal free to determine the manner in which witnesses are examined (viz.,
whether it be under the common law tradition of examination primarily by the lawyer and cross-
examination by the other party’s lawyer, or under the civil law tradition of examination from the
bench, or perhaps a mixture). Another discrepancy between civil and common law was resolved by
adhering to a civil law norm – experts are tribunal-appointed (Article 27(1)). The question of interim
measures shall be separately discussed later, but the Rules do provide for arbitral-tribunal ordered
measures (Article 26), and a rather narrowly defined requirement of “security for the costs of such
measures.” Turning to the arbitral award, Article 31 calls for a majority of arbitrators to agree, while
Article 32 sets out the requirements of writing, reasons, and signature. Consent of the parties is
needed for publication of the award.51 According to Article 33, the arbitrators may decide on the
merits either according to the applicable law designated by the parties, or absent such designation,
“the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which they consider applicable” (Article 33(1)), or
as amiables compositeurs, if expressly authorized by the parties (Article 33(2)). However, the conflict
of laws approach is considered outdated and is rarely used. The Model Law approach of direct
choice is widely followed. Article 34 provides for an award on agreed terms, or award by consent,
and Articles 38-41 cover the issue of costs – with the requirement that the tribunal, when fixing its
fees, shall take into account the schedule of fees of the appointing authority (Article 39(2)). The
latter was necessary, as UNCITRAL is not an arbitral institution and, consequently, has no schedule
of fees.

Political Law Reviewer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Political Law Reviewer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

Definition of Political Law

Background of the 1987 Constitution

1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution

2. Adoption of the Constitution

a. Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members.

3. Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution: February 2

Chickoy 2011 Page 1

Chickoy 2011 Page 2

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

Chickoy 2011 Page 3

Chickoy 2011 Page 4

Chickoy 2011 Page 5

II. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

ART. II: PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Chickoy 2011 Page 6

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Chickoy 2011 Page 7

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral

The Concept of State

Chickoy 2011 Page 8

The Elements of a State

 The national territory comprises the

 with all the islands and waters embraced therein,

 consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,

 The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the

Citizenship (Art. 4, 1987 Constitution)

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

Chickoy 2011 Page 9

In Angat v. Republic, we held:

Chickoy 2011 Page 10

Government is defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an

Immunity from suit

Chickoy 2011 Page 11

PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs SAN DIEGO

ACTS JURE IMPERII AND JURE GESTIONIS, DISTINGUISHED. –

Chickoy 2011 Page 12

Art. XII, Sec. 10:

MANILA PRINCE vs GSIS

Chickoy 2011 Page 13

Chickoy 2011 Page 14

Chickoy 2011 Page 15

III. THE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

The Congress (Art. 6)

3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,

BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELEC

Chickoy 2011 Page 16

Chickoy 2011 Page 17

Sec. 9 of RA 7941 lists the qualifications of nominees, as follows:

4. able to read and write;

5. twenty-five years of age; and

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen

Chickoy 2011 Page 18

Chickoy 2011 Page 19

BENGZON VS BLUE RIBBON

Chickoy 2011 Page 20

1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.

2. WON the SBRC’s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.

4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process.

Chickoy 2011 Page 21

In Watkins vs United States: The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in

Chickoy 2011 Page 22

3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,

TOLENTINO VS SEC. OF FINANCE