DOCTRINE of PROPER SUBMISSION

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
FACTS:
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections
"from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed
constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution
of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant
to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law
for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971
came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its
capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress
held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof,
Republic Act 6132.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention is
unconstitutional
HELD:
Yes, Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention is unconstitutional.
Section 1, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution states that all amendments to be proposed
must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. The plebiscite being called
for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution.
Hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that direction are null
and void.

NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the
Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by
his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly
elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
Yes, Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

DOCTRINE of STATE IMMUNITY from SUIT

Nixon vs Fitzgerald
457 U.S. 731, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 1982 U.S.
FACTS
The Plaintiff, Ernest Fitzgerald (Plaintiff), was fired from his job with the Air Force as
cost-management analyst because he embarrassed his superiors by testifying about certain costoverruns. The Air Force said he was fired because of reorganization and a reduction in force. An
internal memo was passed through White House staff saying the Plaintiff was a top notch cost
expert but with very low marks of loyalty and recommended that they let him bleed. At a
press conference, the Defendant said he personally made the decision to fire the Plaintiff. The
White House later retracted the statement saying that the Defendant had confused the Plaintiff
with another employee. The Plaintiff brought suit and the Defendant moved for summary
judgment

on

the

ground

of

absolute

immunity

from

suit.

ISSUE:
Does the President have absolute immunity from suit for actions taken in his official capacity?
HELD:
Yes, the President is immune from suit from his official acts as a matter of public policy
rooted in the structure of government mandated by the separation of power principle. This
immunity stems from the Presidents unique position in the constitution scheme and the immense
importance of his duties. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is worried
about diverting the Presidents energies to the concerns related to private lawsuits.