ANDRES GARCHITORENA, vs.

MANUEL CRESCINI and The following table discloses the votes of the various municipalities
ENGRACIO IMPERIAL to which the protest related, as declared by the provincial board of
inspectors, as well as the result found by both Judges Mina and
Paredes:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Ambos Camarines in an election contest. It appears Election protest Ambos Camarines.
from the record that on the 6th day of June, 1916, an election was
held in said province for governor, and other provincial and
municipal officers. At said election, Andres Garchitorena, Manuel
Crescini, Engracio Imperial, and Francisco Botor were candidates for Municipalit Prov. B. Mina Paredes Gar. Cre.
the office of governor. The election was closed. The returns were ies of Insp.
made by the inspectors of the various municipalities to the
provincial board of inspectors which, after an examination of said
returns, reached the conclusion that Andres Garchitorena had
received 2,468 votes; that Manuel Crescini had received 3,198 Ga Cr Ga Cr Ga Cr G G
P. P. L. L.
votes; that Engracio Imperial had received 1,954 votes and r. e r. e. r. e. . .
Francisco Botor had received 692 votes. Upon that result the
Capalonga 1 6 65 11 6 2 11 6 1 00 0 000
provincial board of inspectors decided that Manuel Crescini had
0 0
received a plurality of all votes cast, made a proclamation declaring
that he had been elected Governor, and issued to him a certificate Minalabac 10 00 10 Ann. 2 Ann. 0 10 0 00
to that effect. 8 0 0

Immediately upon notice of said proclamation, Andres Garchitorena Mambulao 73 00 10 82 2 3 82 2 9 00 2 00

presented a protest against said election, alleging that many frauds 9
and irregularities had been committed in various municipalities of Nabua 16 11 11 16 11 4 16 11 0 00 0 00
said province, and that he had, in fact, received a majority of all 4 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0
legal votes cast. To said protest answer was duly made, issue was
joined, and a trial was had, after which the Honorable Maximino Sagnay 11 17 11 Ann. 1 Ann. 0 11 0 173
Mina, judge, in a very carefully prepared opinion, declared that 3 0 0 0 0
Andres Garchitorena had, in fact, received a majority of the legal
votes cast, and ordered the provincial board of inspectors to correct Baao 6 13 2 5 12 1 5 12 0 1 0 7
its report theretofore made, accordingly. Later, for certain reasons, 3 6 4 6 0 0
a new trial was ordered (37 Phil. Rep., 675), 1 which was had before Bato 32 29 13 Ann. 2 Ann. 0 32 0 292
the Honorable Isidro Paredes, judge, who, after considering all the 2 2 0 0
proof adduced during the trial of the cause, reached exactly the
conclusion which Judge Maximino Mina had theretofore reached, Buhi 39 28 32 52 18 2 50 14 1 00 0 94
and issued the same order to the provincial board of inspectors, 0 6 6 9 3 0
requiring them to correct their report or canvass in accordance with
said decision. From that decision, Manuel Crescini and Engracio Calabanga 81 13 46 62 45 3 62 45 0 19 0 89
Imperial appealed to this Court, briefs were presented, and the 4 1 0 0
cause was finally submitted for decision on the 16th day of Iriga 8 92 66 Ann. 3 Ann. 0 8 0 926
December, 1918.lawphi1.net
 6 5 0 0 The carefully prepared opinions of Judges Mina and Paredes present
such a complete analysis of the proof that we deem them of
Lagonoy 30 91 99 Ann. 5 Ann. 0 30 0 91 sufficient value and importance, in relation with the questions
0 0 presented by the appellants, to attach to and make them a part of
this decision as Exhibits A and B, respectively. 1
Total gains and
3 11 1,67 An examination of the table above inserted shows that because of
losses .......................................................... 2
2 1 2 the frauds mentioned in the decision of Judges Mina and Paredes,
........
the entire vote in the municipalities of Minalabac, Sagnay, Bato,
Iriga, and Lagonoy, were annulled. Judges Mina and Paredes, after
Net losses (total gains subtracted from total 79 1,670
discussion of the various frauds committed in said municipalities,
losses) ...............
arrived at the same conclusion, to wit: that said frauds and
irregularities were such as to absolutely defeat the honest
Total vote as result of this decision: expression of the desires of the voters of said municipalities.
Courts, of course, should be slow in nullifying and setting aside the
(a) election in particular municipalities or precincts, and they should not
Garchitorena ...................................................... nullify the vote until it is shown that the irregularities and frauds
........................ 2389 (3287) are so numerous as to show an unmistakable intention or design to
defraud, and which does actually and in fact defeat the true
expression of the opinion of the voters of said precinct or
(b) municipality. A reading of the evidence adduced during the trial of
Crescini ............................................................. the cause, in relation with the facts stated in connection therewith,
......................... 1428 (1441) in said municipalities, shows an unmistakable intention and design
on the part not only of the election inspectors but of many of the
NOTE. Abbreviations used. voters, to defeat, by the methods adopted, the true expression of
opinion, through the ballot, of the people of said municipalities. The
Prov. B. of Insp. = Provincial Board of Inspectors. presumption is that an election is honestly conducted, and the
burden of proof to show it otherwise is on the party assailing the
return. But when the return is clearly shown to be wilfully, and
Gar. = Garchitorena.
corruptly false, the whole of it becomes worthless as proof. When
the election has been conducted so irregularly and fraudulently that
Cre. = Crescini. the true result cannot be ascertained, the whole return must be
rejected. It is impossible to make a list of all the frauds which will
P. = page. invalidate an election. Each case must rest upon its own evidence.
The rule, however, is so well established that authorities need no
G. = gains. longer be cited in its support, that whenever the irregularities and
frauds are sufficient to defeat the will of the people of the particular
municipality or precinct, the entire vote should be rejected, and
L. = losses. those who are guilty of such frauds and irregularities should be
punished to the very limit of the law. (Patton vs. Watkins, 131 Ala.,
Ann. = annulled. 387; Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. Rep., 521; The
State vs. Sullivan, 44 Kan., 43; Londoner vs. People, 15 Colo., 557;
Washburn vs. Voorhis, 2 Bart., 54 People vs. Cook, 8 N. Y., 67; The
State vs. Malo, 42 Kan., 54, 120, 164.)
The record of the frauds and irregularities committed in the said
municipalities in which Judges Mina and Paredes annulled the entire
vote, not only shows that legal voters were prevented from voting,
but in some instances, legal ballots were tampered with and
destroyed after they had been cast, to such an extent that no
confidence can be placed in the return. The return in no sense
discloses the expressed will of the voters. Search has been made in
vain for cases in jurisprudence in which the frauds and irregularities
committed were more glaring and more atrocious, and in which the
real will of the voters were more effectively defeated, than is found
in the records in said municipalities in the present case. The
statements of fact made by Judges Mina and Paredes relating to
said frauds and irregularities are fully sustained by the evidence
adduced during the trial of the cause.
When two able, impartial, independent and conscientious judges,
such as Judges Mina and Paredes, each examine in detail the proof
adduced in the trial of the cause and in an extended and carefully
prepared opinion, each reach the same conclusion, there is little left
to be added.
After a careful examination of the proof adduced during the trial, we
are fully persuaded that the conclusions reached by the court a
quo is fully supported thereby. While perhaps some errors were
committed in rejecting some of the votes of analfabetos (illiterates
persons), the same, even though they were counted, would not be
sufficient to change the general result.
Therefore, and without a further detailed discussion at this time of
the various assignments of error, of the facts, and of the law, the
judgment and order of Judge Isidro Paredes is hereby confirmed,
with costs against the appellant, Manuel Crescini, with the provision
that whatever costs Engracio Imperial had incurred shall be paid by
him. And it is hereby further ordered and decreed that the record
be immediately returned to the lower court with direction that an
order be entered immediately in accordance herewith. So ordered.
We are not disposed to close this decision without taking note of the
recommendation with reference to the criminal prosecution of the
election inspectors and other persons of various municipalities, who
wilfully and maliciously participated in the various irregularities and
frauds. The record demonstrates that not only the inspectors in said
municipalities, but other persons, wilfully and maliciously violated
the Election Law, and should therefore be punished criminally under
the provisions of section 29 of Act No. 1582, as amended by section
2632 of Act No. 2657 (as amended by section 2639 of Act No.
2711). We most earnestly recommended that the Attorney-General
immediately investigate the conduct of the various election
inspectors and other persons, in the municipalities of Bato, Buhi,
Calabanga, Iriga and Sagnay, as well as others, in which frauds
were committed, who were instrumental in defeating the will of the
voters in the full and legal exercise of their elective franchise, and
to instigate criminal actions against all such persons, if the facts are
found to be sufficient, to the end that in the future voters may be
permitted to participate in the affairs of their government, through
the ballot, untrammelled and unmolested.
In democracies the people, combined, represent the sovereign
power of the State. Their sovereign authority is exercise through
the ballot, of the qualified voters, in duly appointed elections held
from time to time, by means of which they choose their officials for
definite and fixed periods, and to whom they entrust, for the time
being, as their representatives, the exercise of the powers of
government.
It is just such conduct, on the part of those in authority, as is
described in the records in the present case which breeds
dissension, disorder, distrust, and unrest among the people; it
creates enmity, animosity and hatred among otherwise friendly
neighbors; it gives birth to a spirit of anarchism and despair in
organized governments; through it socialists are born and
communism runs riot; it engenders distrust and hatred of public
officials, creates a spirit of nihilism and a disregard for individual
and property rights; it is just such conduct, on the part of public
officers, upon which Bolshevists feed, thrive, and survive, and
which results in the overthrow of governments, and the
establishment of reigns of terror. The pages of history are filled with
incidents showing the disastrous results to governments where the
officials have their winked at, or actually participated in acts which
result in depriving the people of their right to have a voice in the
affairs of their government, and to express it without let, hindrance,
or molestation. And it is not necessary to search ancient history for
examples of what we have said. A people, no matter how patient
and peace-loving, will not endure the deprivation of their rights and
liberties forever.
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in
Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this municipality into a
highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. [2] The
residents of Taguig were asked this question: Do you approve the
conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in
Republic Act No. 8487?

On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers

(PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other
election returns, declared that the No votes won, indicating that the
people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC
reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns,
CAYETANO VS COMELEC eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and
Before us for resolution are two (2) petitions for certiorari: counting of votes, private respondents, filed with the COMELEC
[1] a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the
plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The
1. G.R. No. 166388 COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as
EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
The petition in this case, filed by Congressman Alan Peter S. Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to
Cayetano, representing the District of Taguig-Pateros, against the dismiss the petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Ma. Salvacion Buac and jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He
Antonio Bautista, mainly assails the Resolution of the COMELEC en alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election
banc dated December 8, 2004 in EPC No. 98-102 declaring the protest.
ratification and approval, through a plebiscite, of the conversion of The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting
the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, into a highly urbanized petitioners motion and dismissing the petition to annul the results
city. Private respondents are residents and duly registered voters of of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en
Taguig. banc affirmed this Resolution.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed with this Court a
2. G.R. No. 166652 petition for certiorari and mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 155855,
entitled Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista vs. COMELEC and
The petition here, filed by the same petitioner against the Alan Peter S. Cayetano. On January 26, 2004, we rendered a
same respondents, questions the (a) COMELEC Resolution dated Decision reversing the COMELECs Resolution. We held that the
January 28, 2005 declaring the said Resolution of December 8, controversy on the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is a matter that
2004 final and executory; and (b) the recording of the said involves the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
Resolution in the COMELECs Book of Entry of Judgments dated plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under
January 28, 2005. Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution authorizing it to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
The facts are: conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
Thus, we directed the COMELEC to reinstate the petition to annul
the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide it without
delay. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but we denied
the same in a Resolution dated February 24, 2004.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second
Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102 constituting the
committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings
commenced and upon its termination, the Committees on Revision
submitted their complete and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for
hearing. As no witnesses were presented by petitioner, the parties
were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they
did.
However, the COMELEC Second Division failed to render a
decision as the required number of votes among its members could
not be obtained. Consequently, pursuant to Section 5 (b), [3] Rule 3
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the case was elevated to the
Commission en banc for resolution.[4]
On November 24, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued an
Order considering the case submitted for resolution. On December
8, 2004, it issued the assailed Resolution declaring and confirming
the ratification and approval of the conversion of
the Municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Considering that 21,105 affirmative votes
represent the majority and the highest votes
obtained during the 1998 Taguig Plebiscite, this
Commission
hereby DECLARES andCONFIRMS the RATIFICAT
ION and APPROVAL of the conversion of
the municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized
city.
Let the Election Officer of Taguig and the
Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) implement this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 166388, alleging that in rendering the
said Resolution, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On January 28, 2005, the COMELEC en banc, upon motion
of private respondents, issued an Order declaring its Resolution
of December 8, 2004 final and executory as of January 9, 2005 in
conformity with Section 13 (a),[5] Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. On the same date, the Resolution of December 8,
2004 was recorded in its Book of Entry of Judgments.
On January 31, 2005, petitioner again filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 166652, challenging
the COMELEC en banc Order of January 28, 2005 and the
corresponding Entry of Judgment. Subsequently, we directed that
the case be consolidated with G.R. No. 166388.[6]
At the outset, petitioner himself makes it clear that for the
record, as the representative of Taguig and Pateros he is for the
cityhood of Taguig. Conversion of a municipality into a highly
urbanized city per se is not appalling; in fact, efforts towards its
realization should be welcomed. But (he) firmly believes that Taguig
must become a city the right way, by a fair count of votes and
not by twisting the electoral will.[7]
Petitioner contends that the revision of the plebiscite ballots
cannot be relied upon for the determination of the will of the
electorate because the revision is incomplete.[8]He claims that:
Based on the Final Report of the Committee
on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision
Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a total
of 15,802 votes for Yes and a total of 12,602 votes
for No. The revision committee thus canvassed only
a total of 28,404 ballots.[9]
Besides, many irregularities, frauds and anomalies attended the
revision proceedings.[10] He maintains that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in confirming the ratification and approval of the
conversion of Taguig into a highly urbanized city.
In their respective comments, the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the COMELEC, and the private respondents vehemently
disputed petitioners allegations and prayed that the instant
petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
Both petitions must fail.
It is clear from petitioners allegations that the matters being raised
the alleged incomplete canvass of plebiscite votes during the
revision proceedings and the irregularities, frauds, and anomalies
purportedly committed therein are factual in nature. They involve
an examination of the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence
presented during the revision proceedings before the COMELEC.
Certainly, this we cannot do in the present special civil actions
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Section 1 of the same Rule confines the power of this
Court to resolve issues mainly involving jurisdiction, including grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction attributed to the public respondent.[11]
Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice and considering
likewise the interest of the residents and voters of the City
of Taguig, we still reviewed the evidence and found that petitioner
erred when he alleged that the revision of ballots yielded a total
of 15,802 votes for Yes and a total of 12,602 votes for No.
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only
the total number of votes reflected in the Final Canvassing Report
of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the
physical count of the ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested
precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots, all
summed up and tallied as follows:[12]
Affirmative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC
19,413
Canvassing Report
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted
from the Plebiscite Returns After
Physical Count (Table D) 0 petition for mandamus filed by the PRA, represented by its Chair,
Plus: Number of Votes Added After
1,936
Physical Count (Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 The facts are as follows:
Total 21,105
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by
evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but finality.[13] This is so
because the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result
have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular
courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is
best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body
exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the
COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and
related laws.[14] Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. [15]
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution
and Order in these twin petitions, the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
GR 140560: JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, vs. COMELEC, DBM,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA,
GR 140714: PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY
CITY, herein represented by its Chairman, RICHARD
ADVINCULA vs. THE COMELEC, DBM, COA, JOVITO CLAUDIO
Facts: These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by
the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay City (PRA) in the
Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-005 entitled IN THE
MATTER OF THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
NO. 01, S-1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR THE RECALL OF
MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF PASAY CITY. G.R. No. 140560 is a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the
resolution,[1] dated October 18, 1999, of the COMELEC giving due
course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as
mayor of Pasay City. On the other hand, G.R. No. 140714 is a
Richard Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for the
holding of recall elections in Pasay City pursuant to the aforecited
resolution of the COMELEC.
Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly
elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. He
assumed office on July 1, 1998.
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of
several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the possibility
of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair
Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone 4, Pasay City, several
barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of
convening the PRA. Richard Advincula, private respondent in G.R.
No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714, was designated
chair.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of
barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of
Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled
RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS
MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. In a letter
dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the
Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13)
Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal submission to the
Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for
recall. Mesm
As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999,
accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office
of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of
the petition were posted on the bulletin boards of the local
COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public
market at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the
Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos St., all in Pasay City. Subsequently,
a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution
was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City
designated by the COMELEC.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio,
Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural
and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures
affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at
the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only
representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there
merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA
took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election
case,[2] filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the
annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of
Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against
petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to
obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that
10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited
members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had
withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits
of retraction. Slx
In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the
petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. On the
issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its
members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who
attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to
constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total
membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that
the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since
only a majority is required to constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority
had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the
verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC
found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On
whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of
petitioner was a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it
was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the
case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition
for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective
official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative,
holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the
petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999,
exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of
office, it was held that the petition was filed on time.
Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in
Baguio City on April 4, 2000, after which the Court, by the vote of 8
to 6 of its members,[3] resolved to dismiss the petition in G.R. No.
140560 for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed a grave
abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the Court unanimously
dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 140714 on the ground that the
issue raised therein had become moot and academic.
We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution.
In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set
the date of the recall elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000.
Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to
compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay
City is no longer tenable. We are thus left with only petitioner
Claudio's action for certiorari and prohibition.
The bone of contention in this case is 74 of the Local Government
Code (LCG)[4] which provides: Scslx
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official
may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to office or
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
As defined at the hearing of these cases on April 4, 2000, the issues
are:
WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) ...
A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a
process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the
recall resolution.
B. The term "regular local election" in the last
clause of paragraph (b) includes the election period
for that regular election or simply the date of such
election.
(1)
On Whether the Word "Recall"
in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the
Local Government Code Includes
the Convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly
and the Filing by it of a Recall
Resolution
Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in 74(b) refers to a
process, in contrast to the term "recall election" found in 74(a),
which obviously refers to an election. He claims that "when several
barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and
unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the taking of
votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a
resolution to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay
City for loss of confidence, the process of recall began" and, since
May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the
PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings held thereafter,
including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null
and void. Slxsc
The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of
recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and ends with
the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for
recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a
day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was validly
initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.
Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term
"recall" as used in 74 refers to a process. They disagree only as to
when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in
paragraph (b) of 74.
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the
convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of
the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election,
and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. [5] However,
as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself
by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their
local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited
in support of this conclusion.
First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact
entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, 69 provides that
"the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of
a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs."
Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate
recall proceedings[6] but the power to elect an official into office, the
limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b)
refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA
and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the
gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
petition for recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan
Province in 1993) or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC -
there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may
be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose
of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise
of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is
this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to
initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by
providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v.
COMELEC[7] where two objections were raised against the legality of
PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the
sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to
PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect
unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten the term of office of
incumbent elective local officials. Both objections were dismissed on
the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With
respect to the first objection, it was held that it is the power to
recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave
to the people. With respect to the second objection, it was held that
a recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned
before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be
allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their
sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in
office . . . ." Sdaadsc
If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the
electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy
the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b)
against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's
assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to
recall election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself.
There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls:
(1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of
assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall
shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular
local election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis
for judging the performance of an elective local official. In
the Bower case[8] cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC,[9] it
was held that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for
requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall
election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to
remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to
evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year
limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall
because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided
that "no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he
has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however
the period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is
that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis
for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in
this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year
period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held
even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.
It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated
before the official concerned has been in office for one-year would
be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already
stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall
resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the
official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that
does. Therefore, as long as the recall election is not held before the
official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be
judged on his performance prematurely. Rtcspped
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including
the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the
performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly
restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its
members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the
election to decide on the performance of their officials. The
crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes
time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and
opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most
cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that
such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the
contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the
incumbent.
Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the
purpose of the one-year period in paragraph (b) is to provide the
local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his]
attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by
disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law
cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in
politics. From the day an elective official assumes office, his acts
become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy
to determine when criticism of his performance is politically
motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the
baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense
and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such
shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics
may, have the incidental effect of providing respite from
partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on
recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a
sufficient basis for evaluating and judging the performance of an
elected local official.
In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as
politically unassailable as recalls initiated directly by the people."
Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the people of
[Kaloocan City's] Preparatory Recall Assembly" when, instead of
ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.
Two points may be made against this argument.
One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing
election the local official whose recall is sought is actually reelected.
Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for the
holding of plebiscites during which the question of cityhood is
submitted to the people for their approval are not always approved
by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good
judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In the case of recall
elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA was
resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the
incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the
voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some
plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the
people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.
Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of
a local government unit cannot be more representative of the
sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose
members represent the entire electorate in the local government
unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to
political maneuverings or manipulations as are those composing
PRAs. Korte
The other point regarding Justice Punos claim is that the question
here is not whether recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better.
The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph
(b) includes the convening of the PRA. Given that question, will
convening the PRA outside this period make it any more
representative of the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the
registered voters is claimed to be?
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall
election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall -
1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to
69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a
local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right
except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall
proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in
paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to
provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official,
and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including
the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of
speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more
than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city,
we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
(2)
On Whether the Phrase "Regular
Local Election" in the Same
Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local
Government Code includes the
Election Period for that Regular
Election or Simply the Date of
Such Election
Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for
the recall election is within the second period of prohibition in
paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in
paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local
election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period
as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately
before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning
March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held. Sclaw
This contention is untenable.
The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take
place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the
campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election
Code,[10] it could have expressly said so.
Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period
during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no
recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of
office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following
his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the
following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year.
This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To
construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the
campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the
right of recall which is designed to make local government units"
more responsive and accountable." Sclex
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign
period. Under the Omnibus Election Code,[11] unless otherwise fixed
by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days
before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter.
Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation
in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate
even more a vital right of the people.
To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, 74 imposes
limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph (a)
prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the
term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph (b)
prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date
the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the
holding of a recall election within one year immediately preceding a
regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC,
[12]
"[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."
(3)
On Whether the Recall
RESOLUTION was Signed by a
Majority of the PRA and Duly
Verified
Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the
resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall election.
He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of
the PRA was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign
the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed
their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their
attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is
shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the
page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised
for the first time in this case. It was not raised before the
COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of
the names in the petition were double entries, that some members
had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Wenceslao
Trinidad's pending election protest was a prejudicial question which
must first be resolved before the petition for recall could be given
due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the stipulations
of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not
include the issue now being raised by petitioner. Xlaw
Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is
apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out
by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for
the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to
believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall
resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more
probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their
concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question
are part.
The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in
the COMELEC was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who
notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but
for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not
raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised
now.
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit,
while the petition in G.R. No. 140714 is DISMISSED for having been
rendered moot and academic.
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER
WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V.
OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO
represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona
Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr.
Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its
Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by
Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR.
DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for
Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA
THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M.
TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT
INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO
BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President,
MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA
KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL
TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND
CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and
SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL,
JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August
2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due
course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul
L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August
2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%)
of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The
Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND
VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM
TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition
with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due
course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of
the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give
due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding
precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition
deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign
people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court
require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why
they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification
of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition
despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated
the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor
General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to
grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General
proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules
"as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings
supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The
supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the
other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and
maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing
intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file
the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and
verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the
minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an
initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions
and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735
limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on
26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the
Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring
RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative.
Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present
petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's
glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave
abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain
the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say
some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when
they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam
President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is
ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who
prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
 MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them and they are asked
whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare
that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of
the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready
and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal
on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus,
an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on
the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition
must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that
every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had
seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of
people's initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all
States15 which allow initiative petitions, the unbending
requirement is that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their
assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in
several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State
Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if
the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and
more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A
person permitted to describe orally the contents of an
initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer
having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead
the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even
flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might
not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person
giving the description is the drafter of the petition,
who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it
gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon
explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to
amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar
terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement
 is to provide sufficient information so that registered
voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the
initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of
amended constitutional provision required because it is
"essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is
proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote
intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in
many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of
signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and
failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state
that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular,
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly
reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition containing such
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private
capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do
not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents,
or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September
2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The
signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the
signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on
7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the
signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are
the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Verified
Legislative Barangay:
District: Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF
ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY,
SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987
Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support
for the filing thereof.
 Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification 10
Number
Last Name, MM/DD/YY
First Name,
M.I. _______________ _______________ ________________
__ __ __
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and (Print Name and (Print Name and
1 Sign) Sign) Sign)

2
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
3 proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court
on 26 September 2006.

4 The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people

approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does
5 not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes
before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the
signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the
Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause
6 in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the

signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino
7
Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies
of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25
August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also
8 circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August
2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and
stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August
9 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006
petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they
prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost
seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started
gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's
"Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as
of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC,
states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended]
Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for
and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of
the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the
full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE
PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common
stand on the approach to support the proposals of the
People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint
Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the
members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the
House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in
October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on
Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend
amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its
final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political
developments in Congress which militates against the use
of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional
members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has
unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE
UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE
PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special
meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel,
Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner
Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30
August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the
Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through
people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987
Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative
Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of
the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August
2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative
Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from
the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed
revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National
Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that
the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino
Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII
of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new
Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or
more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006
petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of
the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months
before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino
Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together
with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino
Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized
that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more
specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of
Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the
petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to
the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering.
Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August
2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition
or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that
they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in
their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed
copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The
signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft
petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-
Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here
there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h.
Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.]
Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature
sheets circulated together with the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed
to have understood the proposition contained in the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people
"the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an
afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and
Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not
contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated
Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition
for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended
petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum,
stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to
a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the
ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The
Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even
the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed
change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition
itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed
amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative
petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino
Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached
to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus
Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed,
circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-
gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they
filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than
candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and
circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or
amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-
gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating
only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly
admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft
petition they filed more than six months later with the
COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he
could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other
supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court
of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused
the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October
2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner
Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x." 25 This admission
binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt
that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who
signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could
have received with certainty one copy each of the petition,
assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty.
Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each
signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for
ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000
signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number
of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be
physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million
signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the
signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories
the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain
the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the
signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the
signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino
admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission
binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a
mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with
the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in
the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed
changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and
effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
 1. The term limits on members of the legislature will
be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-
elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function
indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of
their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed
changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated
in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed
the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly
controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these
proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the
contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he
and his group assured the people during the signature-
gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would
be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes
were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of
the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as
found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the
election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular
Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections.
This section merely requires that the elections for the regular
Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local
elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of
the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next"
before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This
would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament
would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of
the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next"
allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the
expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent
members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond
their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond
the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations
of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group
deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present
initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million
signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes
would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the
people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes
mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article
XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of
these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene
to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
(Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision
is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore
it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the
Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from
the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system.
American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling -
when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter
in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they
can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing
them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions,
one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify
the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter.
Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal
constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit.
The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts
to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is
voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic
explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The
ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed
amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in
the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the
proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and
effect and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air
Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned
against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of
the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent
are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the
deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an
initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
"inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-
initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining
silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative
to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters
will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More
importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the
several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for
further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim
Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would
be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim
Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4)
to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the
Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed
changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of
the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion
whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the
proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this
rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The
signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or
revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to
make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the
nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an
initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the
people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed
changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino
Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section
4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010
shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth
day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as
member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However,
there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the
House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on
30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present
Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010.
Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the
President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for
the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will
come only from the present members of the House of
Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the
Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be
used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not
have known that their signatures would be used to limit,
after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime
Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is
most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on
the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative
must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" -
meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of
the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed,
faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the
wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this
trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text
of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people
before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the
petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional
because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the
Constitution provides:
 ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending
the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-
fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's
initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,
applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution."
In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode,
applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction
was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last
night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee
Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on
the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to
be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should be
limited to amendments to the Constitution and should
not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution,
so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x
x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting
an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as
another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited
to the matter of amendment and should not expand
into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of
the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed
by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
 MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms
envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam
President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision"
as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments"
and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the
United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court
of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by
amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to
the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws
and amendments to the Constitution' and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x
It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a
revised constitution proposed by a convention called for
that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the
scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter
termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if
such measure became law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate
until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v.
Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the
manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be
altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other
change only through the use of one of the specified means.
The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference
between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious
from an examination of the measure here in question that it
is not an amendment as that term is generally understood
and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document
appears to be based in large part on the revision of the
constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional
Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x
and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to
receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of
both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence
failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the
measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a
thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
 Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such
a measure as can be submitted to the people through the
initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of
Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only
be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided
in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's
initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since
the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can
be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes
of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by
6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific
modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative
Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can
only be revised or amended in the manner prescribed
by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to
revise a constitution in a manner other than the one
provided in the instrument is almost invariably
treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x
x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are
sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution
and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing
so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in
adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by
which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to
change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed
restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the
Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure
compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a
people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an
amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's
initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment
and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that
recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in
this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of
the people that the underlying principles upon which
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term
"amendment" implies such an addition or change within the
lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it
was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers
or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts
have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration
of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of
the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether
the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature
of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan
also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances." 39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino
Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two
articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially
the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary,
and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-
balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes
will radically alter the framework of government as set forth
in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific
portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the
entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should
be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential
system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional
structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a
unicameral system be because of its effect on other
important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the
amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on
whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of
[the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the
initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as
follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the
1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of
the Constitution but provides for a change in the form
of the legislative branch of government, which has
been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of
 the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest
days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a
Senate is basic in the American form of government. It
would not only radically change the whole pattern of
government in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the
physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed
amendment were adopted by the people at the General
Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail
to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the
numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result,
or if after submission of appropriate amendments the
people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would
prevail in the government of this State. The same result
would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1
of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to
detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds
of men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in
bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a
workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we
were to hold that it could be amended in the manner
proposed in the initiative petition here.43 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to
the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks
a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative
in Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of
the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's
present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the
Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino
Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the
structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative
body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called "revisions" because members of the
deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the
same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative,
are called "amendments" because the changes are made by
ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their
theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the
constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators
and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions
expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of
the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is
based on the actual experience of the people, that on one
hand the common people in general are not expected to
work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution
because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation;
while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional
convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the
same matter because that is their occupation, profession or
vocation. Thus, the difference between the words
"revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the
process or procedure of coming up with the
corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
 100. Stated otherwise, the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x
(Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes
that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes
would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino
Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present
initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the changes. However, since the
Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes,
the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the
fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where
the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are
clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical
intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary
to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so,
if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form
of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory,
devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in
the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino
Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change
involving a radical structural change in government does not
constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative
proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance
without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His
theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides
a procedure by which the legislature can propose a
revision of the constitution, but it does not affect
proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes
a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be
enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the
distinction between amendment and revision is determined
by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed
enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal
overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot
measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of
the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the
government's relationship with a defined group of citizens.
Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure
"will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon
constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it
violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the
ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII,
section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court
concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be
accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of
Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1,
authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending
the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction
for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating
to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional
revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through
the initiative, may place such a measure before the
electorate." x x x x
 Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article
XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which
negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one
end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions.
Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties
arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision.
The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the
red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a
radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the
three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching
amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of
the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the
change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18
years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a
change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from
100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not
a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of
sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific
provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches. These three examples are
located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red
end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one
sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican"
with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II 50 of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government
and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus,
each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the
existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the
altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On
the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not
have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24
which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are
hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2,
ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with
the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is
irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails.
This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the
Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of
such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable
provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a
future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment,
petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments
that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In
short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory
construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in
case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as
that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section
2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes.
The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government,"
and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do
the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed
changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish,
German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which
have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the
signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of
government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant
for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in
many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in
the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's
initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative
to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal
of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to
the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass
upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on
some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement
the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution,
this will not change the result here because the present petition
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid
initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA
6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735
which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of
RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August
2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the
COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato,
and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended
petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group,
claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely
attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did
not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the
Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a)
of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1)
subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The
proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the
interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in
the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more
than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid,
the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion
in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC
en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's
ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC.
On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright
dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling
in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution
of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the
utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No
one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or
revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the
Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by
every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today
a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally
prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that
comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not
augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3
percent of the total votes cast53 approved our Constitution in a
national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the
people's sovereign will. That approval included the
prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution
contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign
capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The
alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding
the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should
never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is
sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let
the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing
the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise,
the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides
enduring stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to
manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures
through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's
voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their
"people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the
incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the
Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign
will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect
the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's
sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to
defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a
desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and
MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO,
DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON
(DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP) and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this
system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country,
except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987
Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through
the original proponent[1] and the main sponsor[2] of the proposed
Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution,
characterized this system as innovative.[3] Indeed it is, for both
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of
proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. [4] For this and
the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due
course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin
filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter,
COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition)
[5]
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and
the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions
of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers,
in establishing signing stations at the time and on the
dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of
the Movement for Peoples Initiative, [6] a group of citizens desirous
to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power;
that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers
intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC;
that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country, with the
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the
signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the
Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose
be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is
likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on
which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of
general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of
the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to
be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article
VII,[8] and Section 8 of Article X[9] of the Constitution. Attached to
the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution[10] embodying the proposed amendments which consist
in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions
concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be
submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per
cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given
the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its
Chairman, issued an Order [11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal,
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and
the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general
circulation at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00
a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the
following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;
representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco,
together with his two other lawyers; and representatives of, or
counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest
Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).
[12]
Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin
and the oppositors to file their memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda within five days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the
following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional
Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on
local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.
This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the
law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as
implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers
only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter
take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to
govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative
and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since
the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the
exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of
the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples
initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government
department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for
prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC
grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative spearheaded by
PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general
re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to
mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues
raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling
for the admission of a taxpayers and legislators suit. [14] Besides,
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents
to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten
days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra,
filed their Comment[15] on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE
NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED
BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND
EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED
COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and
TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND
TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY
JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE
ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION
OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY
16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE
COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS
BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES
AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290
CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE
POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY
BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT. (SEC.
12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
IS NOT A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN
AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR
A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION
CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED.
(PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his
own behalf a Comment[16] which starts off with an assertion that the
instant petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a draft Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution ... which is not formally filed
yet. What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an Initiatory Pleading
or Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the
signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the
movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin
maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No.
6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is
not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the
proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is
contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of
R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only
a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically,
only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin
considers petitioners estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only
the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a
plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a
priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of
the sovereign power of the people.
 In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed
also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends
that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend
the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly
affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative
on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that
system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked
pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing
therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof
that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section
20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The
rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of
R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro
tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned
Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed
by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters
Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for
the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6
January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his
Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set
the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for
Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in
Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in
Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but
a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J.,[18] it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure;
and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and
on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.
[19]
A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express
provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits
provided for all other national and local elective officials are based
on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to
as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper
empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for
the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate
and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative,
particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended
as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if
they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials,
but not as a premium for good performance.[20]
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called
the enabling law that implements the peoples initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper
parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before
whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering
the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative
district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the
verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h)
the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such peoples
initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied
by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without
authority to legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function
exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does
not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does
not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention.[21] He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law
that implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional
amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that
the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to
promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication
because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated
under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in
an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for
initiative which is signed by the required number of registered
voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional
amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of
signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution
is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative
petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to
which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following
arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the
required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it
does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which
can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention. [22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting
the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the
IBP, as well asthe Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI,
and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c)
requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of
five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in
Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in
Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from
notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a
nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in
Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties
argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated
in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so
far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re:
Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local
officials, as proposed in the draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to,
the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication
of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty
days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention
wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main
Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of
action and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of
portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No.
21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the
proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their
Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator
Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23] The parties thereafter filed, in
due time, their separate memoranda.[24]
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course
to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall
first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial
procedural question.
I. THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid
no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for
this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there
is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes
imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing
out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior
court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v.
Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in
view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences
on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The
consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs
for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme
Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty
of the Constitution.[25]
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the
COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition.[26] The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because
after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at
the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit
within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.
[27]
Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave
due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by
setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs failure to act on Rocos
motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition
rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the
said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of
signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise
be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his
Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:[28]
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of
the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure.
II. R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE
SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while
the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of
the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed
Resolution No. 332).[30] That section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for
in Article ____ Section ____ of the Constitution. [31]
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments,
the Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of
initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call
attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of
the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru
initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
Report No. 7.[32]
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for
carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory
questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at
least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to
carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving
this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long
as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on
this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee
hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be
called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the
legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after
five years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be
proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be
after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year
period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate
rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details
on how this is to be carried out - is it possible that, in effect, what
will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude
that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even
the legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment,
maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-
fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly
and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the
process of an initiative.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention
in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend
the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the
proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the
drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I
would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of
Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all
other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal
mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of
constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that
would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions
are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or
the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be
placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately
cover all the conceivable situations.[33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that the
aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND -- not to
REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that
this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article
on Amendment or Revision.[34]
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing
this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a
while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee.[35]
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter
introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the
Committee accepted.Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute
the entire Section 2 with the following:
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed
amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted
by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read
as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed
amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment.[36]
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act
which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it
possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry
out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent
the legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in
proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to
legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of
the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to
initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by
the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified
amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to -- NOT
REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when
he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." [38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of
proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous
and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal,
what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of
amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than
probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law
proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I
cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the
Committee on the Legislative because it would require another
voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a
requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a
proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall
take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly
on plenary sessions.[39]
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected
to amendments, and the final version, which the Commission
approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended,
reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.[40]
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was
approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. [41] Thereafter, upon his
motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to
introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved
on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. [42]
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the
approved Section 2 be amended by changing percent to per centum
and thereof to therein and deleting the phrase by law in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress[43] shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.[44] This
amendment was approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise
of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like
the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act.This is the essence or rationale of the last
minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute
the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right.
 This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of
a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the
right. The rules means the details on how [the right] is to be carried
out.[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and
Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on
the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No.
497,[47] which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned in
Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House
Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No.
497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of
Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17[49] solely dealt
with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions
of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a
draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate[50] and by the House of Representatives. [51] This approved bill
is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty
of Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC,
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under
a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power
to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do
so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that
this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which
solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and
referendum and appropriately used the phrases propose and enact,
approve or reject and in whole or in part.[52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the
Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements
as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative,
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative
on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the
provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as
follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the
top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed only strengthens the
conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on
the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than
the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and
Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum)
leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on
the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed
to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass. It is local initiative if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on
Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms --
xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing
to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there
should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the
subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1)
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of
the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to
indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments;
thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the
COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the
petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for
both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under
subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, [54] since
the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or
preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to
enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence
and care in providing for the details in the implementation of
initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby
giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so
on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act
provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition
and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the
required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the
proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines;
and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. [55]
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of
registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body
concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act
thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a
consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its
official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the
required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the
proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must
be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines
initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of
the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite
as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d)
reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus
delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service.[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act.[58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
potest.[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2)
of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section
23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a
form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must
be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.It is valid only if the
law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable -- to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.[61] A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.[62]
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution
is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS
IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or
(b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to
initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested
upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself
admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the
purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive
to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition;[63] (2) to issue through its Election Records and
Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered
voters in each legislative district;[64] (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;
[65]
and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter
knew that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely
entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing
more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors
to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of
whether the proposal to lift the term limits of the elective national
and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should
be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the
cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and
strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with
the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed
to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996
is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
LEON G. MAQUERA, vs. JUAN BORRA, CESAR MIRAFLOR, and
GREGORIO SANTAYANA, in their respective capacities as
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections, and
the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
FELIPE N. AUREA and MELECIO MALABANAN, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Upon consideration of case G.R. No. L-24761, "Leon G. Maquera vs.
Juan Borra, et al.," and case G.R. No. L-24828, "Felipe N. Aurea and
Melecio Malabanan vs. Commission on Elections," and it appearing:
1. That Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for
national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a
surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or
emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate,
which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the
candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at
least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has
filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more than
four (4) candidates for the same office;"
2. That, in compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the
Commission on Elections had, on July 20, 1965, decided to
require all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives to file a surety
bond, by a bonding company of good reputation, acceptable
to the Commission, in the sums of P60,000.00 and
P40,000.00, for President and Vice-President, respectively,
and P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives;
3. That, in consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and
the aforementioned action of the Commission on Elections,
every candidate has to pay the premium charged by
bonding companies, and, to offer thereto, either his own
properties, worth, at least, the amount of the surety bond,
or properties of the same worth, belonging to other persons
willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in
favor of said bonding companies;
4. That the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is,
therefore, to prevent or disqualify from running for
President, Vice-President, Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives those persons who, although having the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefore,
cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure
to pay the premium charged by the bonding company
and/or lack of the property necessary for said counter-
bond;
5. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, likewise, the effect
of disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective
offices, persons who, although possessing the qualifications
prescribed by law therefor, cannot pay said premium and/or
do not have the property essential for the aforementioned
counter-bond;
6. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, accordingly, the
effect of imposing property qualifications in order that a
person could run for a public office and that the people
could validly vote for him;
7. That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the
nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in
our Constitution and the principle of social justice
underlying the same, for said political system is premised
upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them, and this, in
turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the
individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes
equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that,
accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be
denied the chance to be elected to public office; and
8. That the bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the
confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the
necessity of defraying certain expenses or of compensating
 services given in connection with elections, and is,
therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.
The Court RESOLVED, without prejudice to rendering an extended
decision, to declare that said Republic Act No. 4421 is
unconstitutional and hence null and void, and, hence, to enjoin
respondents herein, as well as their representatives and agents,
from enforcing and/or implementing said constitutional enactment.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:.
A democratic form of government requires that political rights be
enjoyed by the citizens regardless of social or economic distinctions.
Such is our government. As far back as 1899, the Representatives
of the Filipino people adopted a Political Constitution at Malolos,
Bulacan, providing that: "The political association of all the
Filipinos constitutes a nation, whose state is called the Philippine
Republic"; "The Philippine Republic is free and independent"; and
"Sovereignty resides exclusively in the people." (Arts. 1, 2 and 3.) A
generation later, in 1935, the Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Divine Providence, ordained and promulgated the present
Constitution of the Philippines, stating the same principle: "The
Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." (See. 1, Art.
II). Clearly and solemnly, therefore, our citizenry have thus been
given the supreme guaranty of a democratic way of life, with all its
freedom and limitations, all its rights and duties.
Among the political rights of a Filipino citizen is the right to vote
and be voted for a public office. The Constitution has given the right
of suffrage to "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to
read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the election." (Sec. 1, Art. V.)
It is within the power of Congress, however, to prescribe the
manner of exercising political rights so long as it does not run
counter to the Constitution. The Revised Election Code (RA 180) is
the chief instance of the exercise of such legislative power.
Republic Act 4421, effective June 19, 1965, incorporated to the
Revised Election Code:
SEC. 36-A. Posting of bond by candidates; exception;
forfeiture. All candidates for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices shall post a surety bond equivalent to the
one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he
is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the
national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned
if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to
obtain at least ten per cent of the votes cast for the office
to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy there being
not more than four candidates for the same office.
The Commission on Elections, implementing Sec. 36-A
aforementioned, adopted on July 20, 1965 the following guidelines
for the purpose of the November 9, 1965 elections:
1. WHO SHALL POST SURETY BOND All candidates for
national offices shall post a surety bond. A candidate who
withdraws his candidacy or ceases to be one, may ask for
the return or cancellation of his bond. A party may post
surety bond for each of its official candidates.
2. WHEN TO FILE On or before September 10, 1965, to
coincide with the last day for filing certificates of candidacy,
to facilitate processing of both bond and certificates of
candidacy by the Law Department.
3. WHERE TO FILE The surety bond shall be filed with the
Cash Division, Commission on Elections. Cash bonds may
be allowed and the same to be filed in the Commission.
4. AMOUNT OF BOND The surety bond shall be equivalent
to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to
which he is a candidate, to wit:
President P60,000 (R.A. 4134)
Vice-President P40,000 do
Senators P32,000 do
 Congressmen P32,000 do

5. CONDITION OF THE BOND That the bond shall be

forfeited in favor of the national government if the
candidate, except when declared the winner, fails to obtain
at least ten percent of the votes cast for the office to which
he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not
more than four candidates for the same office.

6. FAILURE TO POST SURETY BOND If a candidate fails to

post the required surety bond, the Commission on Elections
shall refuse to give due course to the certificate of
candidacy of said candidate.

7. SURETY A bonding company of good reputation and

acceptable to the Commission.

8. FORFEITURE The 10% required number of votes shall

be based on and determined by the certificate of canvass
and proclamation.

At bar are petitions that question the constitutionality of Republic

Act 4421 in the ground that the same is undemocratic and contrary
to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

The avowed purpose of Republic Act 4421 in requiring a candidate

to post a bond equal to a year's salary of the office for which he will
run is to curb the practice of so-called nuisance candidates. Said
the explanatory note to said law:

We have had sad experiences along that line. When a

person, having the same name as that of a strong
candidate, files his candidacy for the same position sought
by the latter, this act has the ultimate effect of frustrating
the true intent of the voters. While their intent was to vote
for the publicly known strong candidate, their votes could
be credited to the nuisance candidate. If this practice is not
curbed, the Filipino people may find the wrong men elected
to an office.
1awphl.nt
Such an objective is indeed within the competence of the legislature
to provide for. Nonetheless, the purpose alone does not resolve the
constitutionality of a statute. It must also be asked whether the
effect of said law is or is not to transgress the fundamental law.
Does the law, it may then be asked, operate to bar bona
fide candidates from running for office because of their financial
inability to meet the bond required? For this the test must be the
amount at which the bond is fixed. Where it is fixed at an amount
that will impose no hardship on any person for whom there should
be any desire to vote as a nominee for an office, and yet enough to
prevent the filing of certificates of candidates by anyone, regardless
of whether or not he is a desirable candidate, it is a reasonable
means to regulate elections. On the otherhand, if it puts a real
barrier that would stop many suitable men and women from
presenting themselves as prospective candidates, it becomes
unjustifiable, for it would defeat its very objective of securing the
right of honest candidates to run for public office.
Foremost democracies have similar measure to discourage "freak
and propaganda candidates. One was adopted in the electoral
system of England. A candidate for the House of Commons, where
each member receives 3,250 pounds annual compensation
(formerly 1,000 pounds) is required, by the Representatives of the
People Act of 1918, to deposit 150 pounds with the returning officer
at the time of nomination, the money to be forfeited if he failed to
secure 1/8 of the votes. *
In the United States of America a fee system obtains in some states
whereby candidates are required to pay filing fees frequently to
help defray costs of election services ranging from one dollar
upwards or a certain percentage of the annual salary of the office
sought, the percentage being from 1/4% to 5%. **
It should be noted that in the foregoing the deposits or fees are
based on or constitute a certain percentage of the yearly salary.
The amount of the bond required by RA 4421 is, as noted, equal to
the one-year salary or emolument of the office. It is quite evident,
therefore, that several or a considerable number of deserving,
honest and sincere prospective candidates for that office would be
prevented from running in the election solely due to their being less
endowed with the material things in life. It is worth remembering
that Section 48 of the Revised Election Code provides: "No
candidate shall spend for his election campaign more than the total
amount of the emoluments for one year attached to the office for
which he is a candidate." Thus, the amount of a one-year salary is
considered by the law itself to be substantial enough to finance the
entire election campaign of the candidate. For Congress, therefore,
to require such amount to be posted in the form of surety bond,
with the danger of forfeiting the same in the event of failure to
obtain the required percentage of votes, unless there are more than
four candidates, places a financial burden on honest candidates that
will in effect disqualify some of them who would otherwise have
been qualified and bona fide candidates.
The Constitution, in providing for the qualification of Congressmen,
sets forth only age, citizenship, voting and residence qualifications.
No property qualification of any kind is thereunder required. Since
the effect of Republic Act 4421 is to require of candidates for
Congress a substantial property qualification, and to disqualify
those who do not meet the same, it goes against the provision of
the Constitution which, in line with its democratic character,
requires no property qualification for the right to hold said public
office.
Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general
election implies the right to freely choose from all qualified
candidates for public office. The imposition of unwarranted
restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified candidates from
running is, therefore, violative of the constitutional guaranty of
freedom in the exercise of elective franchise. It seriously interferes
with the right of the electorate to choose freely from among those
eligible to office whomever they may desire. ***
Republic Act 4421, moreover, relates a person's right to run for
office to the degree of success he will show at the polls. A
candidate, however, has no less a right to run when he faces
prospects of defeat as when he is expected to win. Consequently,
for the law to impose on said candidate should he lose by the
fatal margin a financial penalty not imposed on others would
unreasonably deny him equal protection of the law. It is, also, in my
opinion, unconstitutional on this account. (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III, Phil. be classified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be
Const.) considered components of the provinces where they are
geographically located.
Nuisance candidates, as an evil to be remedied, do not justify the The City of Baguio, because of its special functions as the summer
adoption of measures that would bar poor candidates from running capital of the Philippines, shall be classified as a highly urbanized
for office. Republic Act 4421 in fact enables rich candidates, city irrespective of its income.
whether nuisance or not, to present themselves for election. The registered voters of a component city may be entitled to vote in
Consequently, it cannot be sustained as a valid regulation of the election of the officials of the province of which that city is a
elections to secure the expression of the popular will. component, if its charter so provides. However, voters registered in
a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall not participate
nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the
I fully concur, therefore, with the majority opinion.
highly urbanized city is geographically located.
RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J.
To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for
ROSAL and ALEJANDRO R. ALINSUG, petitioners,
short) adopted Resolution No. 1421, which reads as follows:
vs.
WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 in calling for the election of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and
provincial governor, provincial vice-governor and members of the
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in each province classified the chartered
cities of the Philippines into highly urbanized and component
DECISION
cities based on the annual regular income of each city, and provided
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
that the registered voter of a component city may be entitled to
Petition for prohibition and mandamus moth a prayer for a writ of
vote in the election of the officials of the province of which that city
preliminary injunction.
is a component, if its charter provides, but that voters registered
On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted
in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the
Batas Blg. 51 providing for local elections on January 30, 1980.
election of the officials of the province in which the highly urbanized
Section of the statute provides:
city is geographically located;
SEC. 3. Cities. There shall be in each city such elective local
WHEREAS, inasmuch as the charters of the different cities vary with
officials as provided in their respective charters, including the city
respect to the right of their registered voters to vote for the
mayor, the city vice-mayor, and the elective members of the
provincial officials of the provinces where they are located, there is
sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom shall be elected by the
need to study the various charters of the cities and determine what
qualified voters in the city. In addition thereto, there shall be
cities shall and shall not vote for provincial officials pursuant to
appointive sangguniang panglungsod members consisting of the of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51;
the city association of barangay councils, the President of the city
WHEREAS, the voters in the cities should be accordingly informed if
federation of the kabataang barangay, and one representative each
they are going to vote for provincial officials or not, for their proper
from the agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be
guidance;
appointed by the President (Prime Minister) whenever, as de by the
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the
sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in
powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election
the city to warrant representation.
Code and Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 (51) RESOLVED, as it hereby
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component
RESOLVES, that the qualified voters in each city shall or shall not be
cities in accordance with the standards established in the Local
entitled to vote for the provincial officials of the province where
Government Code as provided for in Article XI, Section 4(1) of the
they are geographically located, to wit:
Constitution. any city now existing with an annual regular derived
A. Cities not entitled to participate in the election of pro- provincial
from infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million
officials
pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this Act shag
 counts lawyers among its members, and extends free legal
. Baguio
1
11. Mandaue assistance to citizens regardless of economic and social status in
meritorious cases involving violation of civil liberties and basic
human rights. They vigorously assail Section 3 of Batas Pambansa
2. Bais 12. Manila
Blg. 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as the basis
for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly
3. Canlaon 13. Naga urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the election of
provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically
located; and Republic Act No. 5519, otherwise known as the
4. Caloocan 14. Ormoc Charter of Mandaue City, which went into effect without the benefit
of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or
5. Cebu 15. Oroquieta referendum. They pray that upon filing of the instant petition, a
restraining order be issued temporarily prohibiting the holding of
election for Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials
6. Cotabato 16. Ozamis in the province where the 18 cities listed by the respondent
COMELEC are located, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, and
7. Dagupan 17. Pasay temporarily prohibiting the National Treasurer to release public
funds and the COA to pass in audit said funds in connection with
and for the purpose of holding local elections in said provinces; and
8. Davao 18. Quezon after hearing, to make the injunction permanent declaring
unconstitutional and therefore void Section 96, Art. XVIII of the
Charter of Mandaue, otherwise known as RA 5519, and should the
9. General Santo 19. San Carlos (Pangasinan)
stopping of the provincial elections in the provinces concerned be
not possible, the respondent COMELEC be directed to allow the
10. Iloilo 20. Zamboanga qualified registered voters in the cities listed by said respondent,
particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, to participate in the
Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147,64, it is election of, and vote for, the Provincial Governor and other elective
classified as a highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot provincial officials and preparing the corresponding official ballots
take part in the election of the elective provincial officials of the for this purpose which shall provide spaces therein for Provincial
province of Cebu, although the Charter of Cebu City 1 allows the Governor and other elective provincial officials of the provinces
qualified voters of the city to vote in the election of the provincial concerned, particularly the province of Cebu.
officials of the Province of Cebu. The petitioners contend that Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 3 insofar
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not as it classifies cities including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the
less than ?40 million, is classified as a component city. But the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial
registered voters of the city cannot vote for the provincial elective officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
officials because its Charter 2 expressly provides that the registered classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
voters of the city cannot participate in the election of the provincial purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the
officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate therefor. exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are members of a We find no merit in the petition. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution
civic and non-partisan group known as D-O-E-R-S (an accronym for is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the
DEMOCRACY OR EXTINCTION: RESOLVED TO SUCCEED) which Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The
state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities. 4 To this end, the
Constitution directs the National Assembly to enact a local
government code which may not thereafter be amended except by
the majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive
and accountable local government structure with an effective
system of recall, allocating among the different local governments
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the
qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers,
functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating
to the organization and operation of local government units, 5 and
empowered local government units to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, subject to limitations as may be
provided by law. 6 Art. XI, Section 4(1) of the said Constitution
places highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory power of the
province where they are geographically located. This is as it should
be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly
urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic
activity which require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the
right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the
selection of elective provincial officials since these provincial officials
have ceased to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and authority
over said city. Thus, in the case of Teves vs. Commission on
Election 7 this Court, in holding that the registered voters of the City
of Dumaguete cannot vote for the provincial officials of Negros
Oriental because the charter of the city does not expressly allow the
voters in the city to do so, ruled:
The creation of Dumaguete City has made it a political entity
separate from and independent of the province of Negros Oriental.
The purpose of an election is to enable the electorate to choose the
men that will run their government, whether national, provincial,
municipal or city. It so, no useful end will be served by allowing
in the absence of express legislative preference the voters of a
city to ceased to have any governmental jurisdiction and authority
over said city.
To confirm our view that the city of Dumaguete has been
segregated from the province of Oriental Negros for purposes of
provincial elections, we should point to the penultimate section of
the charter providing that until otherwise provided by law, the City
of Dumaguete shall continue as part of the first representative
district of the Province of Oriental Negros. This is an express
exception to the general effect of separation an exception that
serves to reiterate or even establish the rule. In other words, the
Congress meant that the inhabitants of the city may not vote for
provincial officials, but may vote for their representative in
Congress.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and
component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is
based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would
show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as
a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It
would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or
industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province
where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need
the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying
the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial
officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are
denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other
component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The
contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one
component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same
privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of
legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the
voters right of suffrage. In the case of Teves v. Commission on
Election 8 the Court said.
Petitioners contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete City is
silent as to the right of its qualified voters to participate in the
election of provincial officials of Negros Oriental and as said voters
are residents of the province, they are clearly entitled to vote for
said provincial officials.
The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on the
matter. Thus, in the case of Bacolod, Cabanatuan Legaspi Naga, and
Ormoc, their charters expressly prohibit the residents therein from
voting for provincial officials of the province to which said cities
formerly belonged. Upon the other hand, the charters of Cagayan
de Oro, Butuan, Cavite, Iloilo, Calbayog Lipa San Pablo, and
Dagupan contain provisions extending their part in the election of
the provincial official cities were previously included.
The question that presents itself has reference to the effect of the
omission in the charter of Dumaguete City of an express provision
on the right of its residents to vote for provincial officials of Negros
Oriental, in the light of the legislative practice that, when desired,
the right is either recognized or withdrawn expressly. We are
inclined to overrule petitioners position.
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the
enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by law. It would
have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the
law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the
city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another
individual or groups of voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners
rights of suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter
in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province where the
city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective
city officials in local elections which the questioned statues neither
withdraw nor restrict.
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city
from voting for elective provincial officials would impose a
substantial requirement on the exercise of suffrage and would
violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to the provisions of Art.
VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition contemplated in
the Constitution, however, has reference to such requirements, as
the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board of
Elections, 9 or the New York requirement that to be eligible to vote
in a school district, one must be a parent of a child enrolled in a
local public school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free School
District, 395 U.S. 621, which impose burdens on the right of
suffrage without achieving permissible estate objectives. In this
particular case, no such burdens are imposed upon the voters of
the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their
rights without any other requirement, save that of being registered
voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot
is maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle
of republicanism as it would deprive a citizen his right to participate
in the conduct of the affairs of the government unit through the
exercise of his right of suffrage. It has been pointed out, however,
that the provincial government has no governmental supervision
over highly urbanized cities. These cities are independent of the
province in the administration of their affairs. Such being the case,
it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of the
provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are
vitally affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly
urbanized cities.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as
unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents of the
city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or
alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio
should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected 10 is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution.
It is prospective 11 in character and therefore cannot affect the
creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June
21, 1969.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering
motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of
the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of
Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick
and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, 234,582
are from Cebu City and 44,358 come from Mandaue City, so that
278,940 electors, or close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province
of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of
the province of Cebu. Such charge has no factual and legal basis.
Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an
unfair advantage to the party in power. 12 The questioned statutes
in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The
said representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been
shown that there is an unfair advantage in favor of the candidates
of the party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed out, it may
even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of the
administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned
statutes will work to their disadvantage.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
Costs against the petitioners.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
 [G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE,
ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom
the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a
precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,
[1]
that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those
who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which
raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The
issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated
breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one
of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or
is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish
and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of
civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid
of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly
Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions -first, Allan
F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19
January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2)
a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita
Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an
English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification
issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives
Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the
effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary
pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of
births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald
Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo
Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477
and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h)
a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office
during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003
for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824,
would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,
and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier,"
and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G.
Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that,
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to
have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that
FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it
by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which
would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to
deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate.
 Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 [2] in an action
for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date
of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution
provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law which power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No.
161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance
of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our
people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make
a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the
highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.
R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
[4]
as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on
21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting
an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and
Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and
the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the
Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be
the members of the tribunal.Although the subsequent adoption of
the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory
set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a
post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election
protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies,
would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule
13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992,
would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing
of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a
petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not
include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for
President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against
a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule
again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would
not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief
historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that
given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the
"citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of
justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle saw its significance
if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he
described as being composed of such persons who would be
adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. [7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected.Citizenship was seen to deal with rights
and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active
in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private
interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the
centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and
large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for
individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century
saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in
the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An
ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the
Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In
church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low
regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their
sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made
to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to
whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the
subject of differing views among experts; [15] however, three royal
decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,
[16]
the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of
13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the
Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,
according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this
country was included, would be governed by special laws. [19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this
jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was
forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on
civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898
between Spain and the United States. [21] Under Article IX of the
treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined
by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory
over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the
right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they
shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they
may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making,
before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their
decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the
United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not
become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens"
under American laws and were thus issued passports describing
them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of
the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the
first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as
the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April,
1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was
an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the
11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include
1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period
no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to
the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that
period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the
following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of
"Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word
"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act
of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other country;
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is
hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11
April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not
a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether
or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law,
by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens
of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken
together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which
provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women
from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still
elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking
to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens
of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further
provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed,
under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the
1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20
August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through
its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption
of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to
indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the
father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father,
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced
by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of
the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In
the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years
old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be
twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The
birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old
and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent
and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish
the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for
respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were
submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to
show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate
relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San
Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three
documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ,constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to
the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4)
the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure
of such errors as might have occurred. [31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he
died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born
sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of
Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation
(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an
illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according
to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30
August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only
if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a
public document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that
-
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed
and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove
voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate
was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of
such requirement rendered the same useless as being an
authoritative document of recognition. [33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,
[34]
the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was
enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth
certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the
registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having
been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment,
may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents,
there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that
might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say
that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public
document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also
be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that
the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both
parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to
have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof
of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public
documents, those executed by private individuals which must
be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public document
pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition
may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate
child who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural.Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally
in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last
during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however,
could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for
purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public
instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172,
Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which
to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied;
Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, [36] the Court has
ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural
child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this
Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body
of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be
given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt
to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in
favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions
are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of
the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or
illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed,
provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the
domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has
thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and
regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of a
society for the protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they
reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a
civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their
support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the
rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons
and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is
best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is
significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations. [40] In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the
child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his
rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the
Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary
and successional rights of members of the family, provided
distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In
the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance
of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the
concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood
was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were
codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination
survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of
our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or
impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining
his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and
not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law
purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a
person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship
between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20
before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan
F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent
FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently
residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in
accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of
Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at
St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and
became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that
same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first
child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three
children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II,
and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo
St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945,
except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed
with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
 18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact
that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day
of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley
Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless
we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner,
prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ
an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no
less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that
FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an
American mother who were married to each other a year later, or
on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ
an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate
child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an
American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court
in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra
vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus
curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in
each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus
sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a
decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if
the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court
to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child
of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson
who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The
issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not
have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of
a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before
the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the
1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother.The issue was whether one who was
already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case
was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was
the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no
valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio
was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was
not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with
an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio,
Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because
Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a
contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the
case.x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating
the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no
textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First,
it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child
and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was
established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the
distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children
rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction
for one purpose but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective
public service? What possible state interest can there be for
disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It
was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why
deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his
own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there
is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the
distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former
member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of
petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking
after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the
child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child
of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to
support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law
prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ,
can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions
nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of
the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review,
possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed
under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC
for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit,
the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention
that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both
having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as
the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential
election contest under the Constitution.Evidently, the primary
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not
before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse
of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary
to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether
or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections,
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X.
Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on
Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective
operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which
this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution
seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and
not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK
TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the
aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for
the filing of the same having already lapsed on
March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate
of Candidacy should have been filed on or before
the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila
on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA
No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day.
In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in
filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced
that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed
her intended registration by writing a letter stating
that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion
of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner
filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the
town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove
respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also
filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen,
seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District,
to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not
pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit
along with respondent for the judgment and verdict
of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections
on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity
of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of
the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second
Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her
Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was
a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment
should subsequently be allowed. She averred that
she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence
of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District,
to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated
that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, to which she always intended to
return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to
her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City so
that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not
to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and
instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in
Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets
to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite
Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was
her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item
no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly
of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek
to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an
honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is
devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an
amendment may be made, she cited the case
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of
respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The
case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations
which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to
secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The
Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered
as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in
the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which
adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended
certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven
(7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to
allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this
Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7
months residency the respondent indicated in her
certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her
entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects
that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for
6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex
A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by
her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List
of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates
of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from
Metro Manila only for such limited period of time,
starting in the last week of August 1994 which on
March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to
believe in the respondent's contention that it was an
error.
 xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing
discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement
of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always
been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for
like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto
Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez
vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991,
the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San
Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is
pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has
been a resident of the First District since childhood
is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the
facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit.
Except for the time that she studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her
husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided
in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a
registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she was again a registered voter. In
1978, she served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro
Manila. She could not have served these positions if
she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992,
she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list
of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These
facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places, including
Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack
of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registered as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was a resident
of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such
place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how
one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words there must basically be animus
manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring
that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed
to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent
her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not
sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative
of such intention. Respondent's statements to the
effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to
prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. Respondent has not presented any
evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior
the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban.
Worse, what was evident was that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was
not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since
childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have
not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for
more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out
that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as
a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since
it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But
her failure to prove that she was a resident of the
First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had
been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration,
the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new
substantial matters having been raised therein to
warrant re-examination of the resolution granting
the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however,
the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred
that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass
showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running
for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the
public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental
Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general
areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for
election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the
period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division
reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile,
the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which
the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent
be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in
favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we
laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and
residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place
and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no
length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon
vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election
law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated
that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a
loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence
qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt
the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in
election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember
that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for
the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in
the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation
given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
 Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section
7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised
the same point that "resident" has been interpreted
at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that
Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this
Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda
Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is
the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating
her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there
is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an
honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for
the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the
space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed
in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit
with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make
her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa,
not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual
residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which
she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A
close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION
PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I
SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of
actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her
legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second
requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece
of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not
possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that
"except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative
of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First,
according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in
1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have
served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro
Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not
lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence
from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or
to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a
person who has his own house wherein he lives with
his family in a municipality without having ever had
the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered
as an elector in the other municipality in question
and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34
We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for
"greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve
his lot, and that, of course includes study in other
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in
business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire
to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other
reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up
or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who
are to run the government especially in national
 elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence
of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a
place other than his residence of origin has not
been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment
or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return
to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be
overcome by positive proof of abandonment for
another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited
statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not
only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and
the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which
establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over
8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the
Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949
when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine
Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the
Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-
President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as
a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of
the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she
lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her
family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate
of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC,
what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for
various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the
height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones
in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter
century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew:
the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not
petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until
she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years
and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by
merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not
agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite
of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was
her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not
established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte
contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria,
the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks
the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing
(domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage
to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference
between domicile and residence. Both terms imply
relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in
domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of
the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts
of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon
marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde
quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta
obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia
a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in
the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this
interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el
marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means,
"when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or
place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of
transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often
as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony
with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for
the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband
to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V
under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to
live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity
and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and
wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order
that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of
their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word
"residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question
of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and
intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they
are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
 xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring
to the physical presence of a person in a place. A
person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is
acquired by living in place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the
place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there
be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the
husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to
live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain
a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously
practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being
allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this
Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain
new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In
instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live
separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife
could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of
contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are
convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of
the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we
are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may
be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium. At best such an order
can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof;
and he experience of those countries where the
courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy
of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court
entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal
rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and
if the facts were found to warrant it, that court
would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by
process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other
and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt
bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon
v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent
to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in
England, could be obtained by the injured spouse,
but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment;
though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a
stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United
States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other;
and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed
his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann.,
70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil
Code. It was decided many years ago, and the
doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the
State of Louisiana. In other states of the American
Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process
of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme
Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of
the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a
wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects
then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property,
all income, rents, and interest which might accrue
to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does
not appear that this order for the return of the wife
to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other
penalty than the consequences that would be
visited upon her in respect to the use and control of
her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have
been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman
Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of
the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence
fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had
several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr.
Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence,
what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did
not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial
domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code
drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights
in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product
of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may
mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted
to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived
from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a
new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following
her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly
but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost
by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG
when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our)
ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's
house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have
gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes"
and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro
Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not
domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out
specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of
the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband
absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist
within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile
enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the
facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already
lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on
April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article
VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment
within a specified time is generally construed to be merely
directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate
the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such
result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between
a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory
provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results
to the general public by disregarding than enforcing
the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the
interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the
validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that
which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the Legislature or some incident of the essential
act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 Leyte.
in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II Youth,
decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z.
even after the elections. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY
ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN,
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO,
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners,
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins [G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001]
only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS MEHOL SADAIN,
jurisdiction over the question. RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH
LANTION, FLORENTINO TUASON and RESURRECCION
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the BORRA, all of the Commission on Election
1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make (COMELEC), respondents.
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a DECISION
ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of
election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during BUENA, J.:
the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including
the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she petitions[1] before us is the exercise of a right so indubitably
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves cherished and accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no less
to repeat the mistakes of the past. than by the fundamental law - the right of suffrage.
 Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. The
sector - seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to deadline for the continuing voters registration under R.A. 8189 is
conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General December 27, 2000.
Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners,
around four million youth failed to register on or before the To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for hakot
December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under system, certain restrictive parameters were discussed. The
Republic Act No. 8189.[2] following guidelines to serve as safeguards against fraudulent
applicants:
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator
Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, 1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of
Suffrage, and Peoples Participation, through a Letter dated January age or less and will be registering for the first time on
25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose May 14, 2001;
of discussing the extension of the registration of voters to
accommodate those who were not able to register before the 2. The applicants shall register in their places of
COMELEC deadline.[3] residences; and

Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, 3. The applicants shall present valid identification
together with Consultant Resurreccion Z. Borra (now documents, like school records.
Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate, New GSIS Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are
Headquarters Bldg., Pasay City. likewise agreed:

On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion 1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses
submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the Report on the immediately prior to the actual registration of the
Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only, applicants;
excerpts of which are hereto quoted:

2. The Comelec field officers will be given the opportunity

Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing to verify the voters enumerators list or conduct ocular
called by the Senate Committee on electoral Reforms, Suffrage and inspection;
Peoples Participation presided over by the Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its
Committee Chairman to date at the Senate, New GSIS
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and
Headquarters Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is the
request by youth organizations to hold additional two days of
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and
registration. Thus, participating students and civic leaders along
honest conduct of the registration and drum up interest
with Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is legally
to register among the new voters.
feasible to have a two-day additional registration of voters to be
The rationale for the additional two-day registration is the renewed
political awareness and interest to participate in the political
process generated by the recent political events in the country
among our youth. Considering that they failed to register on
December 27, 2000 deadline, they approved for special registration
days.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to
discuss all aspects regarding this request with directives to
the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified
available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy
Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) for the estimated
costs of additional two days of registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for
consultation on the practical side and logistical requirements of
such additional registration days. The meeting will be set at 1:30
p.m. at the Office of ED.[4]
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation
meeting among regional heads and representatives and a number
of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod
Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of
Director Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the request for
additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of
R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.[5]
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
3584, the decretal portion of which reads:
Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct
a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and
18, 2001.
Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted
to deny the request while Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco
and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students
request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its
Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP,
UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the
instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
147066, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs
Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A.8189 unconstitutional
insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement
of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners
pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to
admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young
Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General
Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student
of the University of the Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for
Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179, praying that this Court
direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day
under the continuing registration provision under the Election Code.
On March 13, 2001, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
petitions and further required respondents to file their Comment
thereon within a non-extendible period expiring at 10:00 A.M. of
March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court resolved to set the
consolidated cases for oral arguments on March 16, 2001. [6]
 On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation
and Motion in lieu of Comment, recommended that an additional
continuing registration of voters be conducted at the soonest
possible time in order to accommodate that disenfranchised voters
for purposes of the May 14, 2001 elections.
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present
petitions, is tasked to resolve a two-pronged issue focusing on
respondent COMELECs issuance of the assailed Resolution dated
February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by and large,
argue to have undermined their constitutional right to vote on the
May 14, 2001 general elections and caused the disenfranchisement
of around four (4) million Filipinos of voting age who failed to
register before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a) Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution
dated February 8, 2001;
b) Whether or not this Court can compel respondent
COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of
mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new
voters during the period between the COMELECs
imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14,
2001 general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of
suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of rights
embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must
properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature,
which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively
insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the
democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded
against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein
petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of
the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law.Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO
ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE
RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN
THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX
MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY,
PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE
IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is
necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he
must undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise
his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by
the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as
the Voters Registration Act of 1996.
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable
precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and
parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the
election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument,
registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly
stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the
significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to
vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed
by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner
one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing
order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic
operational considerations bear great weight in the adjudication of
the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, which provides
a system of continuing registration, is explicit, to wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal
filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily
in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period
starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
(Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks
of a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the
exclusion of voters from the permanent voters list, provides:
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List Any
registered voter, representative of a political party x x x may file x x
x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election xxx.
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent
COMELEC in its Comment:
x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to
registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of
protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the
like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of
securing the voters substantive right to be included in the list of
voters.
In real-world terms, this means that if a special voters registration
is conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for
exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date. If we do not,
then no one can challenge the Voters list since we would already be
well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant
breach of the principles of due process, this would open the
registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the
integrity of the voters list, and consequently, that of the entire
election.
x x x It must be remembered that the period serve a vital role in
protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the
prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to
evaluate the evidence on the application. We would be obliged to
simply take them at face value. If we compromise on these safety
nets, we may very well end up with a voters list full of flying voters,
overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows
and ghosts x x x.
x x x The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the
entire process of registration within the last 60 days will give rise to
haphazard list of voters, some of whom might not even be qualified
to vote. x x x the very possibility that we shall be conducting
elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud
of doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the
unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections, regardless
of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own
results. x x x
 Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so
called standby powers or residual powers of the COMELEC, as
provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29, Republic Act
No. 6646[7] and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No.
8436,[8] thus:
SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-
election Acts - If it should no longer be possible to observe the
periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts,
the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure
accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived of
their right to suffrage.
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very
nature, a pre-election act. Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189,
registration, as a process, has its own specific definition, precise
meaning and coverage, thus:
a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a
sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the
election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval
by the Election Registration Board;
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provisions of Section
29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A.
8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from contradicting
each other, actually share some common ground. True enough, both
provisions, although at first glance may seem to be at war in
relation to the other, are in a more circumspect perusal, necessarily
capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that
changes made by the legislature in the form of amendments to a
statute should be given effect, together with other parts of the
amended act. It is not to be presumed that the legislature, in
making such changes, was indulging in mere semantic
exercise. There must be some purpose in making them, which
should be ascertained and given effect.[9]
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection
with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter
and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can
be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. [10] Interpretare
et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means
that the best method of interpretation is that which makes laws
consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of justice, when
confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to
reconcile them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one
against the other. Courts should harmonize them, if this is possible,
because they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature. [11]
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of
R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding
the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions,
considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that
respondent COMELEC may validly and legally conduct a two-day
special registration, through the expedient of the letter of Section
28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A.
8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are
susceptible of performance within the available period prior to
election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436
is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain
pre-election acts are still capable of being reasonably
performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election
and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required
under the law.
 In its Comment, respondent COMELECwhich is the
constitutional body tasked by no less than the fundamental charter
(Sec. 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except
those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including registration of voterspainstakingly and thoroughly
emphasized the operational impossibility [12] of conducting a special
registration, which in its on language, can no longer be
accomplished within the time left to (us) the Commission. [13]
Hence:
xxx xxx xxx.
19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last
60 days will not be a walk in the park for the
Comelec. Allow us to outline what the Commission has
yet to do, and the time to do it in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by
the 19th of March. The Projects of Precincts Indicate
the total number of established precincts and the
number of registered voters per precincts in a city or
municipality. Without the final Project of Precincts, we
cannot even determine the proper allocation of official
ballots, election returns and other election forms and
paraphernalia. More succinctly said, without the Project
of Precincts, we wont know how many forms to print
and so were liable to come up short.
21) More Importantly, without a completed Project of
Precincts, it will be impossible to complete the rest of
the tasks that must be accomplished prior to the
elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be
constituted on or before the 4th of March. In addition,
the list of the members of the BEI including the
precinct where they are assigned and the barangay
where that precinct is located - must be furnished by
the Election Officer to all the candidates and political
candidates not later than the 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the
approved Voter Registration Records of registered
voters in particular precinct, must be inspected,
verified, and sealed beginning March 30, until April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters List must be finalized
and printed out of use on election day; and finally
25) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and
distribution of the Voters Information Sheet must be
completed on or before April 15.
26) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities,
the Comelec will have roughly a month that will act as
a buffer against any number of unforeseen occurrences
that might delay the elections. This is the logic and the
wisdom behind setting the 120-day prohibitive
period. After all, preparing for an election is no easy
task.
27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from
being Illegal, whittle that approximately 30-day margin
away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do not -
contrary to popular opinion - refer only to the act of
going to the Election Officer and writing our names
down. Registration is, In fact, a long process that takes
about three weeks to complete not even counting how
 long it would take to prepare for the registration in the
first place.
29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the Comelec,
the other Commissioners, prepared a time-table in
order to see exactly how the superimposition of special
registration would affect the on-going preparation for
the May 14 elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to
hold the special registration on April 16 and 17. These
are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it takes in
account the fact that we only have about 800,000
Voters Registration Forms available, as against an
estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it would
take about 14 days If we were to declare special
registrations today to print up the difference and to
verify these accountable forms. After printing and
verification, the forms would have to be packed and
shipped - roughly taking up a further two and a half
weeks. Only then can we get on with registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course, filling the
application for registration with the Election Officer. The
application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is
then set for hearing, with notice of that hearing being
posted in the city or municipal bulletin board for at
least one week prior. Thus, if we held registrations on
the 16th and the 17th the posting requirement would
be completed by the 24th. Considering that time must
be allowed for the filling of oppositions, the earliest
that the Election Registration Board can be convened
for hearing would be the May 1st and 2nd.
32) Assuming and this is a big assumption that there are
nit challenges to the applicants right to register, the
Election registration Board can immediately rule on the
Applicants registration, and post notices of its action by
the 2nd until the 7th of May. By the 10th, copies of the
notice of the action taken by the Board will have
already been furnished to the applicants and the heads
of registered political parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once again
focus on the business of getting ready for the
elections. Once the results of the special registration
are finalized, they can be encoded and a new
Computerized Voters List generated - at the earliest, by
May 11, after which the new CVL would be
posted. Incidentally, it we were to follow the letter of
the law strictly, a May 11 posting date for the new CVL
would be improper since the R.A. 8189 provides that
the CVL be posted at least 90 days before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the
inspection, verification, and sealing of the Book if
Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the
May 14, election date, and still not have finished our
election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the
allocation of Official Ballots, Election Returns, and other
Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for the
new registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the
contracts would be awarded, the various forms printed,
delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the
different municipalities. All told, this process would
take approximately 26 days, from the 15th of May until
June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold
the elections.
xxx xxx xxx.[14]
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the
determination of administrative agency as to the operation,
implementation and application of a law would be accorded great
weight considering that these specialized government bodies are,
by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what
they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not
require that the impossible be done. [15] The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur
ad impossible.[16] In other words, there is no obligation to do an
impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a
statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what
it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally [17], it
must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an
interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the
realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the
interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with
logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are
of the considered view that the stand-by power of the respondent
COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the
possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners bare allegation that they were
disenfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged the registration
deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of January 13, 2001 the
day before the period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections
commences is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is
no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are
bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an
application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the
COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC
alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election
Officer to register between the period starting from December 28,
2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or
barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his application for
registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC set the
registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the
Firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to
avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a
different manner, the petitioners in the instant case are not without
fault or blame. They admit in their petition [18] that they failed to
register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and
came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle not realizing,
so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo
accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction
that the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their
rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm view that
respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of discretion, much
less be adjudged to have committed the same in some patent,
whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No. 3584
which, in respondents own terms, resolved to deny the request to
conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February
17 and 18, 2001.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of laws. [19]
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC, in
denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration,
acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the
matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution,
respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, [20] inter alia, questions relating to the
registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which
squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-
mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the
exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters
involving voters registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the
legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of
grave abuse of power of discretion on the part of respondent
COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and
meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent
COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law
with independence.
As to petitioners prayer for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus, we hold that this Court cannot, in view of the very
nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without
transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is
required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised
and not that of the court.[21]
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus
lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm
belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this
Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary
writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a
special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or
not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible,
possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual
date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot
be controlled by mandamus.
In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related
cases,[22] we enunciated that the Courts function, as sanctioned by
Article VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In
the absence of a showing...(of) grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court
to exercise its corrective power... It has no power to look into what
it thinks is apparent error.[23]
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that
the President has issued Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a
Special Session on March 19, 2001, to allow the conduct of Special
Registration of new voters. House Bill No. 12930 has been filed
before the Lower House, which bill seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to
the 120-day prohibitive period provided for under said
law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276[24] was filed before the Senate,
with the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect,
allow the conduct of special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections. This Court views the foregoing factual
circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the
executive and legislative departments that a legal obstacle indeed
stands in the way of the conduct by the Commission on Elections of
a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions
for certiorari and mandamus are hereby DENIED.