DOCTRINE OF ACTUS
NON FACIT REUM, NISI
MENS SIT REA
>A crime is not committed if
the mind of the person
performing the act
complained of is innocent.
Reference:  De Guzman vs
People, GR 166502 (2008)
DOCTRINE OF EQUIPOISE
EVIDENCE RULE
The "equipoise doctrine" is the
rule which states that when the
evidence of the prosecution and
the defense are so evenly
balanced the appreciation of
such evidence calls for tilting of
the scales in favor of the
accused. Thus, the evidence for
the prosecution must be heavier
to overcome the presumption of
innocence of the accused. The
constitutional basis of the rule is
Bill of Rights which finds
expressions in Sec. 1, par. (a),
Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended
(see People v. Argawamon, 215
SCRA 652; People v. Ramilla,
G.R. No. 101435, 8 November
1993; People v. De la Iglesia,
G.R. No. 110991-92, 24 Feb.
1995).
Reference:  Vicario vs CA, GR
124491 (1991)
PRINCIPLE OF DUBIO PRO
REO
The principle of in dubio pro
reo (Latin for "[when] in doubt,
for the accused") means that a
defendant may not be convicted
by the court when doubts about
his or her guilt remain. The rule
of lenity is the doctrine that
ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the more lenient
punishment.
The fundamental principle in
applying and interpreting
criminal laws, including the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, is
to resolve all doubts in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo.
When in doubt, rule for the
accused. This is in consonance
with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused
ought to be presumed innocent
until and unless his guilt is
established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Intimately intertwined with the
in dubio pro reo principle is the
rule of lenity. It is the doctrine
that "a court, in construing an
ambiguous criminal statute
that sets out multiple or
inconsistent punishments,
should resolve the ambiguity
in favor of the more lenient
punishment."
Lenity becomes all the more
appropriate when this case is
viewed through the lens of the
basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law "to
uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness."8
Since the goal of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is
to look kindly on the accused,
the Court should adopt an
application or interpretation that
is more favorable to the
accused.
Reference:  People vs
Temporada, GR 173473 - According to Mr. Chief Justice
Separate Opinion of Justice
Carpio
PRINCIPLE FAVORABILIA
SUNT AMPLIANDA
ADIOSA RESTRIGENDA
Every new law has a
prospective effect. Under
Article 22 of the RPC, however,
a penal law that is favorable or
advantageous to the accused
shall be given retroactive effect
if he is not a habitual criminal.
These are the rules, the
exception, and the exception to
the exception on the effectivity
of laws.
In criminal law, the principle
favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda (penal laws
which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive
effect) is well entrenched. It has
been sanctioned since the old
Penal Code.
x x x as far back as the year
1884, when the Penal Code took
effect in these Islands until the
31st of December, 1931, the
principle underlying our laws
granting to the accused in
certain cases an exception to the
general rule that laws shall not
be retroactive when the law in
question favors the accused, has
evidently been carried over into
the Revised Penal Code at
present in force in the
Philippines through article 22 x
x x. This is an exception to the
general rule that all laws are
prospective, not retrospective,
variously contained in the
following maxims: Lex
prospicit, non respicit (the law
looks forward, not backward);
lex defuturo, judex de proeterito
(the law provides for the future,
the judge for the past); and
adopted in a modified form with
a prudent limitation in our Civil
Code (article 3). Conscience
and good law justify this
exception, which is contained in
the well-known aphorism:
Favorabilia sunt amplianda,
odiosa restringenda. As one
distinguished author has put it,
the exception was inspired by
sentiments of humanity, and
accepted by science.
Manuel Araullo, the principle is
"not as a right" of the offender,
"but founded on the very
principles on which the right of
the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are
based, and regards it not as an
exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule
founded on principles of strict
justice."
Further, case law has shown
that the rule on retroactivity
under Article 22 of the RPC
applies to said Code51 and its
amendments,52 as well as to
special laws,53 such as Act No.
2126,54 Presidential Decree No.
603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A.
No. 8293,57 R.A. No. 8294,58
R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No.
10586,60 to cite a few.
The "penal laws" mentioned in
Article 22 of the RPC refer to
substantive laws, not procedural
rules.65 Moreover, the mere
fact that a law contains penal
provisions does not make it
penal in nature.
Reference:  Inmates of the New
Bilibid vs DOJ, GR 212719
(2019 - En Banc)
Ordinance: Formal Test
and the Substantive
Test
Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista
enumerates the requirements for
an ordinance to be valid, legally
binding, and enforceable, to wit:
For an ordinance to be valid
though, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the LGU
to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it should also
conform to the following
requirements: (1) not contrary to
the Constitution or any statute;
(2) not unfair or oppressive; (3)
not partial or discriminatory; (4)
not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) not
unreasonable.
Legaspi v. City of Cebu explains
the two tests in determining the
validity of an ordinance, i.e.,
the Formal Test and the
Substantive Test.  Representatives." The
The Formal Test requires the
determination of whether the
ordinance was enacted within the
corporate powers of the LGU,
and whether the same was
passed pursuant to the
procedure laid down by law.
Meanwhile, the Substantive
Test primarily assesses the
reasonableness and fairness of
the ordinance and significantly
its compliance with the
Constitution and existing
statutes.
Reference:  Meralco vs City of
Muntinlupa, GR 198529 (2021 –
En Banc)
Principle of Non-
Delegation of Powers
On “President’s Stand-by
Authority” to raise the VAT rate
from 10% to 12% under RA
9337: Does it constitute a virtual
abdication by Congress of its
exclusive power to tax.
They argue that VAT (a tax
levied on the sale, barter or
exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale
or exchange of services) cannot
be included within the purview of
tariffs under the exempted
delegation as the latter refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute
payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed
on goods or merchandise
imported or exported.
A logical corollary to the Doctrine
of Separation of Powers is
the Principle of Non-Delegation
of Powers, as expressed in the
Latin maxim: potestas delegata
non delegari potest which means
"what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated."38 This
doctrine is based on the ethical
principle that such as delegated
power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the
instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.
With respect to the Legislature,
Section 1 of Article VI of the
Constitution provides that "the
Legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of
powers
which Congress is prohibited
from delegating are those which
are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely
legislative power, which can
never be delegated, has been
described as the authority to
make a complete law – complete
as to the time when it shall take
effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable – and to determine the
expediency of its enactment.
Thus, the rule is that in order that
a court may be justified in holding
a statute unconstitutional as a
delegation of legislative power, it
must appear that the power
involved is purely legislative in
nature – that is, one appertaining
exclusively to the legislative
department. It is the nature of
the power, and not the liability
of its use or the manner of its
exercise, which determines the
validity of its delegation.
Nonetheless, the general rule
barring delegation of legislative
powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or
exceptions:
1. Delegation of tariff
powers to the President
under Section 28 (2) of
Article VI of the
Constitution;
2. Delegation of emergency
powers to the President
under Section 23 (2) of
Article VI of the
Constitution;
3. Delegation to the people
at large;
4. Delegation to local
governments; and
5. Delegation to
administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and
determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A
sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency
to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be
effected. Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
In People vs. Vera, the Court,
through eminent Justice Jose P.
Laurel, expounded on the
concept and extent of delegation
of power in this wise:
‘The true distinction ... is between
the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter
no valid objection can be made.’
Clearly, the legislature may
delegate to executive officers or
bodies the power to determine
certain facts or conditions, or the
happening of contingencies, on
which the operation of a statute
is, by its terms, made to depend,
but the legislature must prescribe
sufficient standards, policies or
limitations on their authority.
While the power to tax cannot be
delegated to executive agencies,
details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of
such power may be left to them,
including the power to determine
the existence of facts on which
its operation depends.
The rationale for this is that the
preliminary ascertainment of
facts as basis for the enactment
of legislation is not of itself a
legislative function, but is simply
ancillary to legislation. Thus, the
duty of correlating information
and making recommendations is
the kind of subsidiary activity
which the legislature may
perform through its members, or
which it may delegate to others
to perform. Intelligent legislation
on the complicated problems of
modern society is impossible in
the absence of accurate
information on the part of the
legislators, and any reasonable
method of securing such
information is proper. The
Constitution as a continuously
operative charter of government
does not require that Congress
find for itself every fact upon
which it desires to base
legislative action or that it make
for itself detailed determinations
which it has declared to be
prerequisite to application of
legislative policy to particular
facts and circumstances
impossible for Congress itself
properly to investigate.
The case before the Court is not
a delegation of legislative power.
It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and
administration of the increase
rate under the law is contingent.
The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate
effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact
or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the
12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the
executive.
No discretion would be exercised
by the President. Highlighting the
absence of discretion is the fact
that the word shall is used in the
common proviso. The use of the
word shall connotes a mandatory
order.  Congress and not of the
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of
the President to immediately
impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions
specified by Congress. This is a
duty which cannot be evaded by
the President. Inasmuch as the
law specifically uses the word
shall, the exercise of discretion
by the President does not come
into play. It is a clear directive to
impose the 12% VAT rate when
the specified conditions are
present. The time of taking into
effect of the 12% VAT rate is
based on the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or
upon the ascertainment of certain
facts or conditions by a person or
body other than the legislature
itself.
Pimentel, et al. that the word
shall should be interpreted to
mean may in view of the phrase
"upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance." Neither
does the Court find persuasive
the submission of petitioners
Escudero, et al. that any
recommendation by the
Secretary of Finance can easily
be brushed aside by the
President since the former is a
mere alter ego of the latter.
In the present case, in making
his recommendation to the
President on the existence of
either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not
acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her
subordinate. In such instance, he
is not subject to the power of
control and direction of the
President. He is acting as the
agent of the legislative
department, to determine and
declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect.
The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by
which legislative policy is
determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much
broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to
gather and collate statistical data
and other pertinent information
and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress
is present. His personality in
such instance is in reality but a
projection of that of Congress.
Thus, being the agent of
President, the President cannot
alter or modify or nullify, or set
aside the findings of the
Secretary of Finance and to
substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.
Reference:  ABAKADA Guro
Party List vs. Ermita, GR
168056 (2005 – En Banc)
Doctrine of Absorption
of Crimes
For our resolution is the Petition
for Prohibition (with prayer for a
temporary restraining order) filed
by the above-named members of
the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), herein
petitioners, against the AFP
Chief of Staff and the Judge
Advocate General, respondents.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00
a.m., more than 300 heavily
armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP – mostly from
the elite units of the Army’s
Scout Rangers and the Navy’s
Special Warfare Group – entered
the premises of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
In order to avoid a bloody
confrontation, the government
sent negotiators to dialogue with
the soldiers. A total of 321
soldiers, including petitioners
herein, surrendered to the
authorities.
The National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) investigated
the incident and recommended
that the military personnel
involved be charged with coup
d’etat defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Of the original 321 accused in
Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only
243 (including petitioners herein)
filed with the RTC, Branch 148
an Omnibus Motion praying that
the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges
filed with the military tribunal.
They invoked Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7055.
Meanwhile, on November 11,
2003, the DOJ, after conducting
a reinvestigation, found probable
cause against only 31
(petitioners included) of the 321
accused in Criminal Case No.
03-2784. Accordingly, the
prosecution filed with the RTC an
Amended Information.  nature of a military organization
In an Order dated November 14,
2003, the RTC admitted the
Amended Information and
dropped the charge of coup
d’etat against the 290 accused.
... the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel submitted its Final Pre-
Trial Investigation Report 7 to the
JAGO, recommending that,
following the "doctrine of
absorption," those charged with
coup d’etat before the
RTCshould not be charged
before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on
February 11, 2004, issued an
Order stating that "all charges
before the court martial
against the accused…are
hereby declared not service-
connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of
the alleged crime of coup
d’etat." The trial court then
proceeded to hear petitioners’
applications for bail.
RULING
The trial court aggravated its
error when it justified its ruling by
holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed
and in furtherance to the alleged
crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the
doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’
is peculiar to criminal law
and generally applies to crimes
punished by the same statute,
unlike here where different
statutes are involved. Secondly,
the doctrine applies only if the
trial court has jurisdiction over
both offenses. Here, Section 1
of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts
of jurisdiction over service-
connected offenses, including
Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Thus, the doctrine of absorption
of crimes is not applicable to this
case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley
v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184
[1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military
constitutes an armed
organization requiring a system
of discipline separate from that of
civilians (see Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]).
Military personnel carry high-
powered arms and other lethal
weapons not allowed to civilians.
History, experience, and the
dictate that military personnel
must be subjected to a separate
disciplinary system not applicable
to unarmed civilians or unarmed
government personnel.
A civilian government employee
reassigned to another place by
his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a
temporary restraining order or
injunction from a civil court.
However, a soldier cannot go to
a civil court and ask for a
restraining or injunction if his
military commander reassigns
him to another area of military
operations. If this is allowed,
military discipline will collapse.
Reference:  Gonzales vs
Abaya, GR 164007 (2006 - En
Banc)
Doctrine of Jurisdiction
Over Subject Matter
It is a settled rule
that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined
by the allegations in the
complaint. It is not affected by
the pleas or the theories set up
by the defendant in an answer or
a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon
the whims of the defendant.  there was no specific law
Also illuminating is the Court’s
pronouncement in Go v.
Distinction Properties
Development and Construction,
Inc.:
Basic as a hornbook principle is
that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and
determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise
a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in
the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted
therein. 
Reference:  Medical
Plaza
Makati Condominium
Corporation vs
Cullen, GR
181416 (2013)
Doctrine of Alter Ego
 The doctrine of qualified political
agency, also known as the alter
ego doctrine, was introduced in
the landmark case of Villena v.
The Secretary of Interior. In said
case, the Department of Justice,
upon the request of the Secretary
of Interior, investigated Makati
Mayor Jose D. Villena and found
him guilty of bribery, extortion,
and abuse of authority. The
Secretary of Interior then
recommended to the President
the suspension from office of
Mayor Villena. Upon approval by
the President of the
recommendation, the Secretary
of Interior suspended Mayor
Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena
challenged his suspension,
asserting that the Secretary of
Interior had no authority to
suspend him from office because
granting such power to the
Secretary of Interior; and that it
was the President alone who was
empowered to suspend local
government officials. The Court
disagreed with Mayor Villena and
upheld his suspension, holding
that the doctrine of qualified
political agency warranted the
suspension by the Secretary of
Interior. 
Justice Laurel, writing for the
Court, opined:
After serious reflection, we have
decided to sustain the contention
of the government in this case on
the broad proposition, albeit not
suggested, that under the
presidential type of government
which we have adopted and
considering the departmental
organization established and
continued in force by paragraph
1, section 12, Article VII, of our
Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the
various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or
the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive.
Fear is expressed by more than
one member of this court that the
acceptance of the principle of
qualified political agency in this
and similar cases would result in
the assumption of responsibility
by the President of the
Philippines for acts of any
member of his cabinet, however
illegal, irregular or improper may
be these acts. The implications, it
is said, are serious. Fear,
however, is no valid argument
against the system once
adopted, established and
operated. Familiarity with the
essential background of the type
of Government established under
our Constitution, in the light of
certain well-known principles and
practices that go with the system,
should offer the necessary
explanation. With reference to
the Executive Department of the
government, there is one
purpose which is crystal-clear
and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight,
and that is the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The
first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins
with the enunciation of the
principle that "The executive
power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines."
This means that the President of
the Philippines is the Executive
of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The
heads of the executive
departments occupy political
positions and hold office in an
advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson,
"should be of the President’s
bosom confidence" (7 Writings,
Ford ed., 498), and in the
language of Attorney-General
Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-
General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President."
Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the
various departments, their
personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the
President. Stated otherwise, and
as forcibly characterized by Chief
Justice Taft of the Supreme
Court of the United States, "each
head of a department is, and
must be, the President's alter ego
in the matters of that department
where the President is required
by law to exercise authority."  Management Support Sector
The doctrine of qualified
political agency essentially
postulates that the heads of
the various executive
departments are the alter egos
of the President, and, thus, the
actions taken by such heads in
the performance of their
official duties are deemed the
acts of the President unless
the President himself should
disapprove such acts. This
doctrine is in recognition of the
fact that in our presidential form
of government, all executive
organizations are adjuncts of a
single Chief Executive; that the
heads of the Executive
Departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive;
and that the multiple executive
functions of the President as the
Chief Executive are performed
through the Executive
Departments. The doctrine has
been adopted here out of
practical necessity, considering
that the President cannot be
expected to personally perform
the multifarious functions of the
executive office.
--------------------------------------------
-------------------------
Reference: Demigillo vs
TIDCORP, GR 168613 (2013 -
En banc)  effected
Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee was renamed
Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the
Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant
to RA 8494.
Petitioner was appointed as
Senior Vice President (PG 15)
with permanent status, and was
assigned to the Legal and
Corporate Services Department
(LCSD) of TIDCORP.
On the basis of OGCC Opinion,
the Board of Directors approve a
so-called Organizational
Refinement/Restructuring Plan to
implement a new organizational
structure and staffing pattern, a
position classification system,
and a new set of qualification
standards.
During the implementation of the
plan, the LCSD was abolished.
Demigillo, albeit retaining her
position as a Senior Vice
President, was assigned to head
the Remedial and Credit
(RCMSS).
Among the issues, Demigillo
filed before this Court a petition
for review on certiorari assailing
the CA decision that the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP was an
alter ego of the President who
had the continuing authority to
reorganize TIDCORP.
Ruling of the SC:
Does the Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency extends to
Board of TIDCORP?  
But the doctrine could not be
extended to the acts of the
Board of Directors of
TIDCORP despite some of its
members being themselves the
appointees of the President to
the Cabinet.
Under PD 1080, as amended by
RA 8494, the Cabinet members
sitting on the Board of Directors
of TIDCORP ex officio, or by
reason of their office or function,
not because of their direct
appointment to the Board by the
President. Evidently, it was the
law, not the President, that sat
them in the Board.
Under the circumstances, when
the members of the Board
the assailed
reorganization, they were acting
as the responsible members of
the Board of TIDCORP, not as
the alter egos of the President.
Nonetheless, we uphold the
reorganization and declare it
valid for being done in
accordance with the exclusive
and final authority expressly
granted under RA 8494, further
amending PD 1080, the law
creating TIDCORP itself.
Having found the 2002
reorganization to be valid and
made pursuant to RA 8494, we
declare that there are no legal
and practical bases for
reinstating Demigillo to her
former position as Senior Vice
President in the LCSD. To be
sure, the reorganization plan
abolished the LCSD, and put in
place a set-up completely
different from the previous one,
including a new staffing pattern
in which Demigillo would be
heading the RCMSS, still as a
Senior Vice President of
TIDCORP. With that abolition,
reinstating her as Senior Vice
President in the LCSD became
legally and physically impossible.

That the RCMSS was a unit

smaller than the LCSD did not
necessarily result in or cause a
demotion for Demigillo. Her new
position was but the
consequence of the valid
reorganization, the authority to
implement which was vested in
the Board of Directors by RA
8494.

Indeed, we do not consider to be

a violation of the civil servant’s
right to security of tenure the
exercise by the agency where
she works of the essential
prerogative to change the work
assignment or to transfer the civil
servant to an assignment where
she would be most useful and
effective. More succinctly put,
that prerogative inheres with the
employer,31 whether public or
private.