POLREVB

No. L-74457. March 20,1987.
*
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
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* EN BANC
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of constitutionality
of legislative measures.—This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in
the first instance by these lower courts.
Same; Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play.—The closed mind
has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an
opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half
of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an
informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each
other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from
one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the
pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance,
or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
Same; Same; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.—In the light of
the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626.
The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no
doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male
and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving
those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
Same; Same; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one
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province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and disposal without a prior court hearing is
violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
to be achieved and for being confiscatory.—But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the
same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with
the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us.
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
Same; Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
Same; Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of
the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for
the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
662

Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see
fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property conf iscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem needs
immediate and urgent correction.—It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and
hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted,
however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of
the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there
was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason
why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that,
as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should
have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
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authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
Same; Same; Damages; A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported in violation of
E.O. 626-A is not liable for damages even if said Executive Order were later declared unconstitutional.—
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police,
to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare
the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial
court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior
authority, to question the order we now annul.
G.R. No. 197930
EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G. SEE, Petitioners

vs
HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, and RICARDO V. PARAS III, in his
capacity as Chief State Counsel, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
Respondents
G.R. No. 225442. August 8, 2017.*
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),** JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN
ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA
JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR.,
petitioners, vs. QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA,
as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR
JOHN REY TIANGCO, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”—
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads: ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Case law explains that the present Constitution has “expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to
then
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* EN BANC.
** Or “Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan”; Rollo, p. 4.
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Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally
demandable and enforceable.”
Grave Abuse of Discretion; It has been held that “[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.”—In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the
Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their
delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the
provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also
claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended,
which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that “[t]here is
grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or
(2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.” In light of the
foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts
requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with
a higher court.—The doctrine of hierarchy of courts “[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-
ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While
this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [CA] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation
of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and especially set out in the petition[.]” This Court is tasked to resolve “the issue of constitutionality
of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,” as in this case. Hence, petitioners’ direct
resort to the Court is justified.
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Judicial Review; No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Supreme Court (SC) unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.—“The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is
that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.” In this case, respondents assail the
existence of the first two (2) requisites.
Same; Expanded Jurisdiction; According to recent jurisprudence, in the Supreme Court’s (SC’s)
exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified “by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act.”—“Basic in
the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence
of an actual case or controversy.” “[A]n actual case or controversy is one which ‘involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.’ In other words, ‘there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.’” According to
recent jurisprudence, in the Court’s exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simplified “by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in
the assailed governmental act.”
Same; A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challeng-
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ing it.—Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.
Same; Locus Standi; The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of
whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court
for adjudication.—“The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether
those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for
adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act.” “‘[I]nterest’ in the question
involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act — as
distinguished from being merely incidental or general.” “The gist of the question of [legal] standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.”
Same; Same; Curfew Ordinances; Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor’s right to travel, because: (a) she
was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court, and, hence, a proper subject of the
Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is,
thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances.—Among the five (5)
individual petitioners, only
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Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor’s right to
travel, because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court, and, hence, a
proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at
night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On
the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan
(Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances’ coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances,
for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.
Same; Same; Same; None of them, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances
violate the parents’ right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before the Supreme
Court (SC) as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed.—None of
them has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents’ right to rear
their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father,
Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged
violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary
right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel
was supposedly infringed. As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no
legal personality to bring an action in court. Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has
no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Same; Same; Same; When those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Supreme Court (SC) may exercise its sound discretion and
take cognizance of the suit.—This Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the
petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case.
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“In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing,
especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show
that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.” This is a
case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial
review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to
rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State’s
authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching
significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others,
the standing requirement.
Statutes; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine; Curfew Ordinances; In this case, petitioners’ invocation of the
void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any
of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice
to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.—“A statute or act suffers
from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.” In this
case, petitioners’ invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not
properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology,
fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly. The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are
absent from this particular claim.
356
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local
authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as
to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances’ lack of
enforcement guidelines.—Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide
the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any
confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances’ lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the
Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government
to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for
vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement
stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes
due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits
and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, it was ratiocinated that: A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective
basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
personal predilections. As above mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of
the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected
minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew
Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.—Any
person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew,
may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any
competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect,
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which — needless to state — should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances.
Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the
erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
Parental Rights and Obligations; The rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the “youth”) for civic
efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but
also as parental duties.—The rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the “youth”) for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental
duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their
children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision
is a reflection of the State’s independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free,
independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are
prepared for additional obligations to society. “[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations]
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship.” “This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.”
Same; In cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents’ qualified right
to control the upbringing of their children.—While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should
be stressed that “when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-
being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests.” Thus, “[i]n cases in
which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare
is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents’ qualified right to control
the upbringing of their children.” As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive
of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision.
358
Same; As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental
obligations.—As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental
obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that “[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the
parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly
conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for
children’s well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility.” The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in
their role of promoting their children’s well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these
ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the
prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed
to potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.
Same; Curfew Ordinances; It should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the
minors are not — whether actually or constructively — accompanied by their parents.—It should be
emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not — whether actually or
constructively (as will be later discussed) — accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State’s deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of
parents’ role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children’s conduct
during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of
parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents’ prerogative to allow minors to remain
in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. In this respect, the
ordinances neither dictate an overall plan of disci-
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pline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to
influence or control their minors’ activities. As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal
— albeit reasonable — infringement upon a parent’s right to bring up his or her child.
Same; Same; A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils
of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children.—It may be well to point out
that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this
situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children’s upbringing.
In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer), the US court observed that the city government “was
entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child’s upbringing.
A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but are
unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children.” Curfews may also aid the “efforts of parents who
prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets.” Reason dictates that these realities
observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which
justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
Curfew Ordinances; Overbreadth Doctrine; The application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases.—Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors’ right
to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the
application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest,
such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less
restrictive means for achieving the government’s interest. In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.
Petitioner’s submissions are partly meritorious. At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners’ invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free
speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern
360
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010), this Court
explained that “the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing
to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.”
Same; Same; Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA
146 (2010), demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial
challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression.—In
the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., it was opined that “[f]acial challenges can only
be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146 (2010), demonstrated how vagueness relates to
violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and
limited to the realm of freedom of expression.” That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake
an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary,
however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
Constitutional Law; Right to Travel; The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access
and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and
religion.—Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty. Liberty
— a birthright of every person — includes the power of locomotion and the right of citizens to be free to use
their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends
of life. The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such
as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.
Same; Same; The restriction on the minor’s movement and activities within the confines of their
residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of
the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and
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criminal activities.—Grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if
made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided, that they: (1) serve the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law. The stated purposes of the Curfew
Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve
the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor’s movement and activities within the confines of
their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability
of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation “be provided by law,” our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing
the State’s duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, as amended, RA 9775, RA 9262, RA
9851, RA 9344, RA 10364, RA 9211, RA 8980, RA 9288, and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 603, as
amended.
Same; Same; With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) before they can travel to a foreign country by
themselves or with a person other than their parents.—The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that
apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that
minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is not coextensive
as those of adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s
and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts
the minors’ exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, the right to execute
contracts, and the right to engage in gainful employment. With respect to the right to travel, minors are
required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they
can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents. These limitations
demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors’ activities than over similar actions of
adults, and overall, reflect the State’s general interest in the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may
impose limitations on the
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minors’ exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
Same; Same; Strict Scrutiny Test; Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial
scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications; Considering that the right to travel is a
fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the
applicable test.—Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes
with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or
(ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve
suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based
on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first
two tests. Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less
by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable test. At this juncture, it should be emphasized
that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over
minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.
Same; Same; Same; Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.—The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar
circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-à-vis the State’s duty as parens patriae to protect
and preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act.
Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the
government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the
means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.
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Same; Same; Same; Compelling State Interest; The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that children’s
welfare and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling
interests to justify regulations by the State.—Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies. This Court has ruled that children’s welfare and the State’s mandate
to protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations
by the State. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give
way. As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in
imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also
highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
Same; Same; Same; While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the
extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State’s compelling interest.—The second
requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may
be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to
address the State’s compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.
Same; Curfew Ordinances; The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2)
ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors’ constitutional rights.—In sum, the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative
of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above
mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto;
as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence of any separability clause. The Quezon
City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors’
constitutional rights.
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Same; Same; Right to Travel; As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under
the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors’ rights of association,
free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.—As compared to the first
two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors’ rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble,
and of free expression. Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees
the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling
minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but
also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are
also covered by these items given that the minors’ attendance in the official activities of civic or
religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right
to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting
attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to travel, the
ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where these activities are
held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly
loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
Same; Same; There is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run
lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours.—To note,
there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or
engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the
deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4,
item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., “[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian,” as
accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court
sees it, this should be the reason-
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able construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic
premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as
the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents’ right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Same; Same; Under our legal system’s own recognition of a minor’s inherent lack of full rational
capacity, and balancing the same against the State’s compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and
prevent juvenile crime, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City
Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional.—Under our
legal system’s own recognition of a minor’s inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same
against the State’s compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court
finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly
drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or
restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from
crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall,
passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
Same; Same; Requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention
program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an
ordinance to promote the welfare of minors.—The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read
to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences.
Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such
as community-based programs recognized under Section 54 of the same law. In this regard, requiring
the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local government
(such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as
they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail
detention. In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and
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legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of
society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.
Administrative Law; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Admonition; The
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in
administrative cases explicitly declare that “a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty.”—
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-
A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor’s
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a “gentle or friendly reproof” or “counsel or warning
against fault or oversight.” The Black’s Law Dictionary defines admonition as “[a]n authoritatively issued
warning or censure”; while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a “gentle or friendly reproof, a mild
rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative
advice or warning.” Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and
our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that “a warning or admonition shall not be
considered a penalty.”
Same; Penalties; The prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states
that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses.”—As worded,
the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that “[n]o penalty shall be
imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses].” Thus, for imposing the
sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of
the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344,
as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
Curfew Ordinances; Strict Scrutiny Test; While the Supreme Court (SC) finds that all three (3) Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test — that is, that the State has sufficiently
shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
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and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the
least restrictive means to achieve this interest.—While the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances
have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test — that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only
the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance
out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their
fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State’s
purpose. Section 4(a) of the said ordinance, i.e., “[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian,” has
also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence,
an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion
of the local government unit.
LEONEN, J., Separate Opinion:
Curfew Ordinances; View that all of the assailed ordinances should have been struck down for failing
to ground themselves on demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt the least restrictive means to
achieve their aims, and for failing to show narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose abuse by
law enforcers.—I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should have been struck down for
failing to ground themselves on demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt the least restrictive means
to achieve their aims, and for failing to show narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose abuse
by law enforcers. The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify these ordinances. While this doctrine enables
state intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must not transgress the constitutionally enshrined
natural and primary right of parents to rear their children.
Same; View that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not con-
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travene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.—Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating
ordinances, Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, 693 SCRA 141 (2013), outlined the test for
determining the validity of an ordinance: The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Same; Strict Scrutiny Test; View that strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental
freedoms or what is involved are suspect classifications.—Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are
fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect classifications. It requires that there be a compelling
state interest and that the means employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually — not only
conceptually — being the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice
that the government contemplated on the means available to it. Rather, it must show an active effort at
demonstrating the inefficacy of all possible alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore all possible
avenues but to even debunk the viability of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course of action is
the sole effective means. To the extent practicable, this must be supported by sound data gathering
mechanisms.
Same; Same; View that cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation of fundamental
rights and the nondiscrimination of protected classes.—Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the
preservation of fundamental rights and the nondiscrimination of protected classes. Thus, in these cases,
the burden falls upon the government to prove that it was impelled by a compelling state interest and that
there is actually no other less restrictive mechanism for realizing the interest that it invokes: Applying strict
scru-
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tiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on
the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to
prove the same.
Same; Same; View that the Constitution itself states that the right [to travel] may be “impaired” in
consideration of: national security, public safety, or public health.—By definition, a curfew restricts mobility.
As effected by the assailed ordinances, this restriction applies daily at specified times and is directed at
minors, who remain under the authority of their parents. Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the
present Petition is the right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 6. The
liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. While a constitutionally guaranteed
fundamental right, this right is not absolute. The Constitution itself states that the right may be “impaired” in
consideration of: national security, public safety, or public health. The ponencia underscores that the
avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is “the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime.” The assailed ordinances, therefore, seem to find justification as a valid exercise of the State’s police
power, regulating — as opposed to completely negating — the right to travel.
Constitutional Law; Right to Liberty; Right to Privacy; View that while not among the rights enumerated
under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of parents with respect to the family is no less a
fundamental right and an integral aspect of liberty and privacy.—There are several facets of the right to
privacy. Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998), identified the right of persons to be secure “in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects,” the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, liberty of abode, the
right to form associations, and the right against self-incrimination as among these facets. While not among
the rights enumerated under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of parents with respect to the
family is no less a fundamental right and an integral aspect of liberty and privacy. Article II, Section 12
characterizes the right of parents in the rearing of the youth to be ‘‘natural and pri-
370
mary.” It adds that it is a right, which shall “receive the support of the Government.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the assailed ordinances are demonstrably incongruent with the
Constitution’s unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose mandate is to “promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.”—The assailed ordinances’
adoption and implementation concern a prejudicial classification. The assailed ordinances are
demonstrably incongruent with the Constitution’s unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and
whose mandate is to “promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.”
This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006, which takes great pains at a nuanced approach to children. Republic Act No. 9344 meticulously
defines a “child at risk” and a “child in conflict with the law” and distinguishes them from the generic
identification of a “child” as any “person under the age of eighteen (18) years.” These concepts were
adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical reduction to a wholesale and indiscriminate concept, consistent
with the protection that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The assailed ordinances’ broad and sweeping
determination of presence in the streets past defined times as delinquencies warranting the imposition of
sanctions tend to run afoul of the carefully calibrated attitude of Republic Act No. 9344 and the protection
that the Constitution mandates. For these, a strict consideration of the assailed ordinances is equally
proper.
Same; Same; Right to Travel; View that with incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local
government units’ justifications of reducing crime and sweeping averments of “peace and order” hardly
sustain a rational basis for the restriction of minors’ movement during curfew hours.—With incomplete and
inconclusive bases, the concerned local government units’ justifications of reducing crime and sweeping
averments of “peace and order” hardly sustain a rational basis for the restriction of minors’ movement during
curfew hours. If at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions ipso facto equate to the reduction of CICLs
appears to be a gratuitous conclusion. It is more sentimental than logical. Lacking in even a rational basis,
it follows that there is no support for the more arduous requirement of demonstrating that the assailed
ordinances support a compelling state interest.
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Same; Strict Scrutiny Test; View that the strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law
be narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling governmental interests, it also requires that the
mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least drastic means to achieve its ends.—The strict
scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law be narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling
governmental interests, it also requires that the mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least
drastic means to achieve its ends: Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise. First Amendment freedoms such as free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. Because Strict
Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic or
infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such
legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government demonstrates otherwise. The government
must show that the statute is supported by a compelling governmental interest and the means chosen to
accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains as follows: . . . The intensive review
associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands a demand not only as to means but also
as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and
statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection:
means had to be shown “necessary” to achieve statutory ends, not merely “reasonably related.” Moreover,
equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal
protection had to be justified by “compelling” state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of “legitimate”
state ends. Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic means available
for achieving the governmental objective.
Curfew Ordinances; Children in Conflict with the Law; View that respondents have not shown
adequate data to prove that an imposition of curfew lessens the number of Children in Conflict with the Law
(CICLs).—Respondents have not shown adequate data to prove that an imposition of curfew lessens the
number of CICLs. Respondents further fail to provide data on the frequency of crimes against unattended
minors during curfew hours. Without this data, it cannot be concluded that the safety of minors is better
achieved if
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they are not allowed out on the streets during curfew hours. While the ponencia holds that the Navotas
and Manila Ordinances tend to restrict minors’ fundamental rights, it found that the Quezon City Ordinance
is narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives.
Same; Same; View that public safety is better achieved by effective police work, not by clearing streets
of children en masse at night.—Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that it can keep
them safe from crime is not the least restrictive means to achieve this objective. Petitioners suggest street
lighting programs, installation of CCTVs in street corners, and visible police patrol. Public safety is better
achieved by effective police work, not by clearing streets of children en masse at night. Crimes can just as
well occur in broad daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an environment. Efficient law
enforcement, more than sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children will be safe regardless of
what time they are out on the streets. The assailed ordinances’ deficiencies only serve to highlight their
most disturbing aspect: the imposition of a curfew only burdens minors who are living in poverty.
Same; Same; View that to lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the government must first alleviate
poverty, not impose a curfew.—An examination of Manila Police District’s data on CICLs show that for most
of the crimes committed, the motive is poverty, not a drive for nocturnal escapades. Thus, to lessen the
instances of juvenile crime, the government must first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty
alleviation programs, not curfews, are the least restrictive means of preventing indigent children from turning
to a life of criminality.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine; View that in assailing the lack of expressed
standards for identifying minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness doctrine.—The assailed
ordinances are deficient not only for failing to provide the least restrictive means for achieving their avowed
ends but also in failing to articulate safeguards and define limitations that foreclose abuses. In assailing the
lack of expressed standards for identifying minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness doctrine. The
doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988): As a rule, a statute or act may be said
to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
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standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.’’ It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
Same; Same; Same; View that while facial challenges of a statute on the ground of vagueness is
permitted only in cases involving alleged transgressions against the right to free speech, penal laws may
nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness “as applied.”—While facial challenges of a statute on the ground
of vagueness is permitted only in cases involving alleged transgressions against the right to free speech,
penal laws may nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness “as applied.” In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369
SCRA 394 (2001): [T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law,
First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that “one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” As has been
pointed out, “vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated
[only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant.” Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner’s claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Statutes; Facial Challenge; As-applied Challenge; View that the difference between a facial challenge
and an as-applied challenge is settled.—The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied
challenge is settled. As explained in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council,
632 SCRA 146 (2010): Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
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assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Parens Patriae; View that the State acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors only when there
is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children are to be
reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents.—The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the
intrusions into parental prerogatives made by the assailed ordinances. The State acts as parens patriae in
the protection of minors only when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or exploitation. It cannot, on
its own, decide on how children are to be reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents. The doctrine
of parens patriae is of Anglo-American, common law origin. It was understood to have “emanate[d] from
the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects who were unable to protect themselves.” It was the
King’s “royal prerogative” to “take responsibility for those without capacity to look after themselves.” At its
outset, parens patriae contemplated situations where vulnerable persons had no means to support or
protect themselves. Given this, it was the duty of the State, as the ultimate guardian of the people, to
safeguard its citizens’ welfare.
Same; Substitute Parental Authority; View that the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere substitute or
supplement to parents’ authority over their children. It operates only when parental authority is established
to be absent or grossly deficient.—As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere substitute or
supplement to parents’ authority over their children. It operates only when parental authority is established
to be absent or grossly deficient. The wisdom underlying this doctrine considers the existence of
harm and the subsequent inability of the person to protect himself or herself. This premise entails the
incapacity of parents and/or legal guardians to protect a child. To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching
and almost absolute power to the State; to allow the Government to arbitrarily exercise its parens
patriae power might as well render the superior Constitutional right of parents inutile. More refined
applications of this doctrine reflect this position. In these instances where the State exercised its powers
over minors on account of parens patriae, it was only because the children were prejudiced and it
was without subverting the authority of the parents themselves when
375
VOL. 835, AUGUST 8, 2017 375
they have not acted in manifest offense against the rights of their children.
G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.*

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM, respondent.
Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases; Standing or locus
standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or
action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case.—Standing or locus standi is the ability of
a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to
support that party’s participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the
principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial
branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
Same; Same; Same; The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.—The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system
derived directly from the Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates
concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of “a
direct and personal interest” presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner’s
standing. In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of
the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984). Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transcendental importance.
Same; Same; Same; Third-Party Standing; American jurisprudence is replete with examples where
parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal
protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.—The concept of third party
standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appro-
_______________
* EN BANC.
417priate. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the United States Supreme Court wrote that: “We
have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a “sufficiently
concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third
party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.”
Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They
rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups
in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a
hindrance for customers to bring suit. American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-
interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection
claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive
health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections
available to their patients. The Court held that: “The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to
be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this
kind of confidential relation to them.”
Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties—generally applied to statutes infringing on
the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights; Motel operators have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.—Assuming arguendo that petitioners
do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth
doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted
to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.
In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of
their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners418have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.
Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; Requisites for Validity.—The test of a valid
ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Police Power; Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.—Police power, while incapable of an exact
definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and
its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These
range from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope
of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s
legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
Bill of Rights; The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.—The apparent goal of the Ordinance is
to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power
of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees
to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and, sometimes
even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Judicial Review; Courts; If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions
that motivate many political decisions,419judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the
judiciary is merely the third political branch of government.—Even as we design the precedents that
establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally
inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political
functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution
emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many
political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third
political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting
as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the
development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most
fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Due Process; The purpose of due process guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.—The primary
constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process
guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships
are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property; Substantive due process completes the
protection envisioned by the due process clause—it inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.—The due pro-cess guaranty has traditionally
been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, “procedural due process”
and “substantive due process.” Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere.
Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. If due process were
confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action,
provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the
protection420envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Same; Same; Same; The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law,
has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms; The due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that
has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.—The question of substantive
due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought
tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may
be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of
constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to
achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the
State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology
that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; “Strict Scrutiny,” “Rational Basis,” and,
“Intermediate Review,” Explained.—The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due
process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S.
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Footnote 4 of the Carolene
Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination
against a “discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.” Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or
restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. A third
standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the
United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often
applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis
examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the421presence of compelling,
rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to
equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.
Same; Same; Liberty; Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is
not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done, but rather an
atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact
with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without
doing harm or injury to others.—One might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial
since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that,
when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not
shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those “trivial” yet fundamental freedoms—which the people reflexively
exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence—that accurately
reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right
in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done;
but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence
as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as
inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
Same; Same; Police Power; A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police
power measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.—That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy
of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of422private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), the
exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this
is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity.
Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice
is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world—the solution to such
perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product, rather, cities
revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of
individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.—The Court has professed its deep sentiment and
tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our
capital city—the Pearl of the Orient—as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those
still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all
evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is
a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such
perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities
revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of
individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail
is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would
be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.423
Same; Same; Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare—the State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.—We reiterate that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of
its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains
the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. The promotion of public welfare and a
sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such
measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. The notion that the promotion of public
morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. The advancement of moral relativism as a school of
philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among
its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an
adequate accommodation of different interests.
Same; Same; Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive
elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to
make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.—The oft-quoted American maxim that
“you cannot legislate morality” is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi,
that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are
widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-
old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they
will remain so oriented. Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance
of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life
to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive
elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to
make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges
themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the em-424bodiment of the rule of law, by
reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are
entrusted by the people to uphold the law.
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC.
and Go CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-
appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as to constitutionality of
ordinance; Evidence is necessary to show invalidity.—An ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors
who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or city
and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be
presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity
for evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. Where there was no factual foundation laid for overthrowing
an ordinance which is not void on its face, the presumption of constitution-ality must prevail.
Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels, etc.—A Manila ordinance regulating the
operation of hotels, motels and lodging-houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals. As such, it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope
of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry.—On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of certain constitutional guarantees,
850

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City
Mayor of Manila
the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license fees.—Municipal license fees can be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are
incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing the amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion
in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise
engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in
the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot
prevent the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public
need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to
the disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal infirmity.—There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness
to the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to
stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of
rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount
851
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City
Mayor of Manila
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state
of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels, etc.— The provision in Ordinance No. 4760
of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged,
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence
of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
Same; Public interest; Government interference.—The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest. If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Statutes; When statute is void because of ambiguity.— What makes a statute susceptible to a charge
that it is void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either forbidding or requiring
the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and diff er as
to its application.
G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008.*

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)** OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,
petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Judicial Review; A constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.—An actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication.
A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a
constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must
show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable
decision of the Court.
Same; Where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.—This notwithstanding,
public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of
their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where
an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
_______________
* EN BANC.
** Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers.
252

Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima
Public Officers; Public Accountability; Public office is a public trust—it must be discharged by its holder
not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust.—Public office is
a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be
responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Same; Presumption of Regularity; The presumption of regularity enjoyed by public officers in the
performance of their duties necessarily obtains in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau
of Customs (BOC) officials and employees.—Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and
employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed
their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection. The presumption is
disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or
denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying
principle to advance a declared public policy.
Same; Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335); Judicial Review; To invalidate RA 9335 based on
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.—A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Same; Same; A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability.—Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public
officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set
253
VOL. 562, AUGUST 14, 2008 253

expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it
recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving
government personnel.
Same; Same; Equal Protection; Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated—it is equality among equals, not similarity
of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be
accomplished.—Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of
persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.
When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), this Court declared: The guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to
the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does
not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
Same; Same; Same; The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary; Since the subject of the
law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to
the said agencies.—The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification
that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA
254

9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.
Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.—Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
Same; Civil Service; Security of Tenure; Inefficiency; Incompetence; The guarantee of security of
tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee; RA 9335 lays down a reasonable
yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection, a standard analogous to inefficiency
and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service
laws.—RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee.
In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when
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the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal
is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural
due process. At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,”
“justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In this case,
the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation of Powers; Legislative Veto; Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se,
meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers, but to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints
on Congress—it may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power, and, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws
and presentment; Any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation—any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution.—It is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints
on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for
enactment of laws and present-
256

ment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based
primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any
action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or
an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove
such regulations before they take effect; Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define
national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence—it can itself formulate the details or
it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in
conformity with those standards.—Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove
such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other
than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. Congress has two options when
enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can
itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary
managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in all
its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is
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left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and
regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts
necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
Congress; Statutes; Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution—in exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the Implementing Rules
and Regulations based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA
9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.—Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules
and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality
and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in
the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Principle of Bicameralism; Presentment Clause; The requirement that the implementing
rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment; A valid exercise of legislative power
requires the act of both chambers—it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a
committee of either or both chambers.—The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected
to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of
bicameralism and the rule on presentment. x x x Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend
and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two
258

chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power
requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a
single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval
or veto and in the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a
law.—Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the
absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-
making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative
veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.
Same; Same; Publication; Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process
clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress—as such, it
is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and
powers to execute the said law.—Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law
it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all
its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to
have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the
statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute.
Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination as to
when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a
law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.
Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
vetoing the law.
Same; Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
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violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.—From the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Same; Statutes; Partial Unconstitutionality; Separability Clause; The general rule is that where part of
a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable
from the invalid, may stand and be enforced; The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.—In Tatad
v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 282 SCRA 361 (1997), the Court laid down the following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part
is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather
than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the
invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed
that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and
valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x The exception to the general rule is that when the
parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements,
or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the
nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected
with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have
enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.260

Administrative Law; To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.—To be effective,
administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation and became effective 15 days thereafter. Until and unless the contrary
is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.
CARPIO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Presidency; Separation of Powers; Delegation of Powers; Administrative Law; Implementation of the
law is indisputably an Executive function—the Executive cannot implement the law without adopting
implementing rules and regulations; The power to adopt implementing rules is inherent in the power to
implement the law.—Implementation of the law is indisputably an Executive function. To implement the law,
the Executive must necessarily adopt implementing rules to guide executive officials how to implement the
law, as well as to guide the public how to comply with the law. These guidelines, known as implementing
rules and regulations, can only emanate from the Executive because the Executive is vested with the power
to implement the law. Implementing rules and regulations are the means and methods on how the Executive
will execute the law after the Legislature has enacted the law. The Executive cannot implement the law
without adopting implementing rules and regulations. The power of the Executive to implement the law
necessarily includes all power “necessary and proper” to implement the law, including the power to adopt
implementing rules and regulations. The grant of executive power to the President in the Constitution is a
grant of all executive power. The power to adopt implementing rules is thus inherent in the power to
implement the law. The power to adopt implementing rules and regulations is law-execution, not law-
making. Within the sphere of its constitutional mandate to execute the law, the Executive possesses the
power to adopt implementing rules to carry out its Executive function. This applies also to the Judiciary,
which also possesses the inherent power to adopt rules to carry out its Judicial function.261
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The inherent power of the Executive to adopt rules and regulations to
execute or implement the law is different from the delegated legislative power to prescribe rules—the
inherent power of the Executive to adopt rules to execute the law does not require any legislative standards
for its exercise while the delegated legislative power requires sufficient legislative standards for its
exercise.—The Constitution mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Without the power to adopt implementing rules and regulations, the Executive cannot ensure the faithful
execution of the law. Obviously, the President cannot personally execute the law but must rely on
subordinate executive officials. The President is inutile without the power to prescribe rules on how
subordinate executive officials should execute the law. Thus, the President must necessarily give
instructions to subordinate executive officials and the public—in the form of implementing rules and
regulations—on how the law should be executed by subordinate officials and complied with by the public.
If the Legislature can withhold from the Executive this power to adopt implementing rules and regulations
in the execution of the law, the Executive is made subordinate to the Legislature, not its separate, co-
ordinate and co-equal branch in Government. The inherent power of the Executive to adopt rules and
regulations to execute or implement the law is different from the delegated legislative power to prescribe
rules. The inherent power of the Executive to adopt rules to execute the law does not require any legislative
standards for its exercise while the delegated legislative power requires sufficient legislative standards for
its exercise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether the rule-making power by the Executive is a delegated legislative
power or an inherent Executive power depends on the nature of the rule-making power involved; The most
important self-executory constitutional power of the President is the President’s constitutional duty and
mandate to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”—Whether the rule-making power by the Executive
is a delegated legislative power or an inherent Executive power depends on the nature of the rule-making
power involved. If the rule-making power is inherently a legislative power, such as the power to fix tariff
rates, the rule-making power of the Executive is a delegated legislative power. In such event, the delegated
power can be exercised only if sufficient standards are prescribed in the law delegating the power. If the
rules are issued by the President in
262

implementation or execution of self-executory constitutional powers vested in the President, the rule-
making power of the President is not a delegated legislative power. The most important self-executory
constitutional power of the President is the President’s constitutional duty and mandate to “ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.” The rule is that the President can execute the law without any
delegation of power from the legislature. Otherwise, the President becomes a mere figure-head and not the
sole Executive of the Government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ordinance Power; The President’s Ordinance Power is the Executive’s
rule-making authority in implementing or executing constitutional or statutory powers—indisputably, there
are constitutional powers vested in the Executive that are self-executory.—Chapter 2, Title 1, Book III of
the Administrative Code of 1987, on the Ordinance Power of the Executive, provides: x x x These
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code do not grant, but merely recognize the President’s Ordinance
Power and enjoin that such power shall be promulgated according to certain nomenclatures. The
President’s Ordinance Power is the Executive’s rule-making authority in implementing or executing
constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers vested in the
Executive that are self-executory. The President may issue “rules of a general or permanent character
in implementation or execution” of such self-executory constitutional powers. The power to issue such rules
is inherent in Executive power. Otherwise, the President cannot execute self-executory constitutional
provisions without a grant of delegated power from the Legislature, a legal and constitutional absurdity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335); RA 9335 is an example of a law that
contains a delegation of legislative power to prescribe rules based on specified legislative standards, as
well as an example of a law that recognizes the inherent power of the Executive to issue implementing rules
and regulations to execute the law.—RA 9335 is an example of a law that contains a delegation of legislative
power to prescribe rules based on specified legislative standards. This is exemplified by Section 7(a). RA
9335 is also an example of a law that recognizes the inherent power of the Executive to issue implementing
rules and regulations to execute the law, which becomes complete after the delegated
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power in Section 7(a) is exercised by the Board. This is exemplified by Section 11. In any event, whether
the rules are issued by Executive agencies pursuant to a delegated legislative power or pursuant to the
Executive’s inherent power to execute the law, the result is the same: the Legislature cannot approve or
disapprove such rules and regulations promulgated by executive agencies. The adoption of such rules and
regulations is purely an Executive function, whether pursuant to a delegated legislative power or pursuant
to the Executive’s inherent power.
Same; Same; A law that invests Executive functions on Legislative officers is unconstitutional for
violation of the separation of powers.—The delegated legislative power, often referred to as regulatory
power of executive agencies, is not inherently an Executive power. However, once delegated in a law, the
exercise of the delegated legislative power becomes a purely Executive function. The Legislature cannot
interfere in such function except through another law. The well-entrenched rule is that Legislative officers
cannot exercise Executive functions. A law that invests Executive functions on Legislative officers is
unconstitutional for violation of the separation of powers. In Springer v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202-203 (1928), the U.S. Supreme Court held: Legislative power, as distinguished
from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged
with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. x x x.
Same; Same; Legislative Veto; The legislative veto is a device for the Legislature to usurp Executive or
Judicial power in violation of the separation of powers.—The approval requirement in Section 12 of RA
9335 is a classic form of the so-called legislative veto. The legislative veto is a device for the Legislature
to usurp Executive or Judicial power in violation of the separation of powers. An American textbook writer
explains the legislative veto in this manner: Congress, in an attempt to maintain more control over the
President and over regulations promulgated by agencies of the federal government’s executive branch, has
in the past incorporated into legislation a provision known as the “legislative veto” or the “congressional
veto.” Congress sought by statute to give itself what the Constitution gives to the President. Congress
typically utilized veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to
264

promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions required the President or an agency
official to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retained a “right” to approve or
disapprove any regulation before they take effect. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress; Legislative Veto; Bicameralism; Legislative power cannot be exercised solely by one of the
two branches of Congress, and legislative power cannot also be exercised by a committee of either or both
chambers for such a committee is not the Congress.—Legislative power is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers. Legislative power cannot be exercised solely by one of the two chambers. This
precludes a one-chamber legislative veto because one chamber alone is not the Congress. The exercise
of legislative power requires the act of both chambers of Congress. Legislative power cannot also be
exercised by a committee of either or both chambers for such a committee is not the
Congress. Consequently, this precludes the exercise of legislative veto by a congressional
committee of either or both chambers.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The justification that the legislative veto is to ensure that the
implementing rules and regulations drafted by the executive agencies conform to the letter and spirit of the
law—that the Oversight Committee will decide whether the implementing rules are contrary to law—is a
usurpation of the power of the Judiciary.—One additional reason advanced to justify the legislative veto in
Section 12 is purportedly to insure that the IRR drafted by the executive agencies and the Civil Service
Commission conform to the letter and spirit of RA 9335. In short, the Oversight Committee will decide
whether the implementing rules are contrary to law. This justification is a usurpation of the power of the
Judiciary for only the courts can determine with finality whether the IRR violate RA 9335.
TINGA, J., Concurring Opinion:
Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335); Legislative Veto; The Court is unanimous that a legislative veto,
such as that contained in Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335 is unconstitutional, a ruling of momentous
consequence, not only because the issue has never been set-
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tled before, but also because many of our statutes incorporate a similarly worded provision that empowers
members of Congress to approve the Implementing Rules of various particular laws.—The controversy
rests on the so-called “legislative veto,” defined by Tribe as “measures allowing [Congress], or one of its
Houses or committees, to review and revoke the actions of federal agencies and executive departments.”
Our Constitution specifically neither prohibits nor allows legislative vetoes, unlike presidential vetoes, which
are formally authorized under Section 27, Article VI. Until today, Court has likewise declined so far to pass
judgment on the constitutionality of a legislative veto. The Court is unanimous that a legislative veto, such
as that contained in Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 9335 is unconstitutional. Such a ruling would be of
momentous consequence, not only because the issue has never been settled before, but also because
many of our statutes incorporate a similarly worded provision that empowers members of Congress to
approve the Implementing Rules of various particular laws. Moreover, the invalidation of legislative vetoes
will send a definite signal to Congress that its current understanding of the extent of legislative powers is
awry.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; The emergence of the legislative veto in the United States coincided
with the decline of the non-delegation doctrine, which barred Congress from delegating its law-making
powers elsewhere.—The emergence of the legislative veto in the United States coincided with the decline
of the non-delegation doctrine, which barred Congress from delegating its law-making powers elsewhere.
Modern jurisprudence has authorized the delegation of lawmaking powers to administrative agencies, and
there are resulting concerns that there is no constitutional assurance that the agencies are responsive to
the people’s will. From that framework, the legislative veto can be seen as a means of limiting agency rule-
making authority by lodging final control over the implementing rules to Congress. “But instead of controlling
agency policy in advance by laying out a roadmap in the statute creating the agency, Congress now
proposes to control policy as it develops in notice-and-comment rulemaking, after the agency’s expert staff
and interested members of the public have had an opportunity to assist in its formation.” It is a negative
check by Congress on policies proposed by the agencies, and not a means for making policy directly.266

Same; Same; Same; The growth of an enormous national bureaucracy, operating for the most part
within the executive branch, may have fundamentally altered the original constitutional framework and
requires some sort of response if the original constitutional concerns are to be satisfied.—One option for
congressional control over executive action is to be very specific and limiting in the delegation of power to
agencies, so that their rulemaking power will in turn be limited. The power to make rules and regulation is
that kind of legislative power which may be delegated. In practice, the United States Congress has engaged
frequently in broad delegations that in effect require agencies to make specific sub-rules—i.e., to exercise
legislative power. This practice has drawn some criticism that power is now concentrated in the executive
branch and that it is thus necessary to restore Congress to its original status of preeminence. The growth
of an enormous national bureaucracy, operating for the most part within the executive branch, may have
fundamentally altered the original constitutional framework and requires some sort of response if the original
constitutional concerns are to be satisfied.
Same; Same; Same; Presidency; Acceding to the President the power to craft Implementing Rules to
legislation even if Congress specifically withholds such power to the Chief Executive would upset the finely
measured schematic of balanced powers, to the benefit of the President.—The Court’s rightful rejection of
Justice Carpio’s premise that the power of the President of promulgate Implementing Rules and
Regulations is inherently executive provides a necessary clarification that is critical to the understanding of
the Court’s ruling today. Had Justice Carpio’s position been adopted by the Court, the result would have
been a presidency much stronger than the Constitution envisioned. Acceding to the President the power to
craft Implementing Rules to legislation even if Congress specifically withholds such power to the Chief
Executive would have upset the finely measured schematic of balanced powers, to the benefit of the
President. Fortunately, with the disavowal of that theory, greater consideration is accorded to legislative
prerogatives without compromising the important functions of the presidency.
G.R. No. 181704. December 6, 2011.*
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National
President (BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, petitioner, vs. HON.
MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON.
NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN
B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Parties; Bureau of Customs Employees Association’s (BOCEA’s) members
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR).—Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus
standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are
rank-and-file
_______________
* EN BANC.
590

Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) vs. Teves
employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA’s members have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Agencies; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of
powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is
supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere; The principle of non-delegation
of powers admits of numerous exceptions.—The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the
three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within
its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means
“what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.” This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. However, this principle
of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative
power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;
Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.—Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
Same; Due Process; The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.—The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side. BOCEA’s apprehension of
591
VOL. 661, DECEMBER 6, 2011 591

deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned
BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without
any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors that may affect
the level of collection.
Same; Statutes; Bill of Attainder; Republic Act No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder; A bill of attainder is
a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial
trial.—On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination
of a Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or Bureau of Customs (BOC) official or employee and provides for
the consequences thereof.—R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not
seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The
democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply
protected.
Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and
to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that
is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.—As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the
veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch.
Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch.
We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from
the manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. We have so declared
in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.592

Sereno, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Actions; Congress must revisit the constitutional provision and weigh the question
of whether it has wrongly and excessively defaulted on the exercise of this constitutional duty to set tariffs
in favor of the President.—For the longest time, Congress has not made its voice heard on this matter and
has simply allowed the President to determine tariff rates by one executive order after another. From the
above language, it would seem that delegated presidential tariff rate setting powers has been designed to
be exercised only as an exception, and not as the norm. Congress must revisit this constitutional provision
and weigh the question of whether it has wrongly and excessively defaulted on the exercise of this
constitutional duty to set tariffs in favor of the President.
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013.*

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN
M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; No question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless
there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.―The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
_______________
**Dropped as a party per Memorandum dated October 17, 2013 filed by counsel for petitioners Atty.
Alfredo B. Molo III, et al. Rollo (G.R. No. 208566), p. 388.
3must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important
and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy
is one which ― involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.―By constitutional fiat,
judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable x x x.” Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which “involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.” In other words, “[t]here must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.” Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
“ripeness,” meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. “A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.” “Withal, courts will decline
to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions.”
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ― Pork Barrel System.―The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satis-
4fied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also,
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — are currently existing
and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and Academic; Neither will
the President’s declaration that he had already ― abolished the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or
nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the
Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that
the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes
that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish
the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the
President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress,
through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies”
carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.”―The “limitation on the power of judicial review to
5actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political
question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed.
2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit that the “[t]he political
branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response
to the specific demands of their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at this
stage.”
Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.―A political question refers to “those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.” The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional
lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is
an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary
the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
6excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution.―It must also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution.” To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must
faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would
not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that
the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the
people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving
a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed
respondents’ plea for judicial restraint.
Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.―“The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of
his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.” Petitioners have come
before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they
“dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite
standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have
been and
7continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and
stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects
of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases.―Res judicata (which means a “matter
adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law principles which both
deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar,
the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases; The Court defines the Pork Barrel
System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations
of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.―Considering petitioners’
submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel
System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The
Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there is the
Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment
measures and/or
8practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators
to wield a collective power; and Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined
as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of
its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government; To the legislative branch of government,
through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,
belongs the power to interpret laws.―The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government.” To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the
power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to
enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret
laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive
has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.”
The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch;
the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or
the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective
8mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self interest assertions of another or others.
Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure allowing
legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.―The Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national
budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr.,
the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of
the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no
money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon
approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there
the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the
Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held
that “[f]rom the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since
the restriction only pertains to “any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself
allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-
enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.10
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution; Towards this end, the Supreme Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory
and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.―Clearly, these post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related
to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been,
in one form or another, authorized to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it —
“the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation
of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated
— from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the
guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters
altogether.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby
declares the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article as well as all other provisions of
law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional.―The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions
11of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed
as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly
observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,
legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the
same; It is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other; Exceptions.―As an
adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body
to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and
the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power
and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.12
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court observes
that the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators
are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which ― as settled in Philconsa
― is lodged in Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as
it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate
must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart
by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013
PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the
same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime example of a constitutional check and
balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.”―A prime
example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
13submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” The
President’s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as
follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object. The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise
his power of item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures” for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As stated in Abakada, the final step in
the law-making process is the “submission [of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
effect as law after the required publication.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of
policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well
as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process; It is meant to “increase the chances in
favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.”―The
justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-
rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s
role in the budgetary process. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court
characterized the President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard
the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority of that body”; phrased differently, it is meant to “increase the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design.”
Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide
for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes.―What beckons
constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be
tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the
appropria-
14tion which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the
appropriation law already indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence, without a proper line-
item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or
undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes.
Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering
that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended
and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral
aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that individual
legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law; Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation
― a matter before another office of government ― renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of
their own office.―The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted
as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
15franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly,
allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation — a matter before another
office of government — renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard,
the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect
in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the
Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of
equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the
former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and
in some years, even the Vice-President — who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel’s original
intent which is “to make equal the unequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds
under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a
16provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the
same for a particular public purpose.―“An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two
minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word “appropriation,”
which means “to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if written into
the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution “does not
provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,’” an appropriation law may —
according to Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to
appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation precisely because it contains post-
enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos to
note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which
effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is
passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under
the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment
determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an “appropriation made by law” since it, in its truest
sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle
as afore-discussed.
Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase
“and for such other purposes
17as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used.―The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the
general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class
it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910
may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from
its text, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored
that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective
18and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an
assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used — as it should be used — only in accordance with
the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special Allotment Release Order (SARO);
Words and Phrases; A Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), as defined by the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur
obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover
expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to
separate approval or clearance by competent authority.”―The Court agrees with petitioners’ posturing for
the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be “released” under legal
contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority issued to
identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the
purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific
laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority.” Based on
this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing
public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under
certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release
of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As
may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments.
Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA); Unless a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) has
been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been “released;” The disbursement
of 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) funds which are only covered by obligated Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO), and without any corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) issued,
must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of
19the general fund.―Unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which
have been “released.” In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only
covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this
Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds
appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions
the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source. This same pronouncement must be equally
applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released — meaning, those merely
covered by a SARO — under the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under
the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these
funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes
not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and
complied with.―It must be stressed that the Court’s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a)
the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar
thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of
the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be
20properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the doctrine merely “reflect[s] awareness
that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality
of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.” “In
the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored.’ ”
Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.―The Court renders
this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the
Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations,
non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated
the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied
the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which
they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature,
despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by
21law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds
under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects,” it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
SERENO, C.J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; View that it has been held that the Supreme Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied.―The guiding principle for the Court should not be to “anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it,” but rather to treat the function of judicial review
as a most important and delicate matter; after all, we cannot replace the wisdom of the elected using our
own, by adding qualifications under the guise of constitutional “interpretation.” While it is true that the
Constitution must be interpreted both in its written word and underlying intent, the intent must be reflected
in taking the Constitution itself as one cohesive, functional whole. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make
the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
Same; Judicial Review; View that the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review must be confined only
to dispositions which are constitutionally supportable.―The Court’s power of judicial review must be
confined only to dispositions which are constitutionally supportable. Aside from the jurisdictional
requirements for the exercise thereof, other guidelines are also mandated, i.e., that the question to be
answered must be in a form capable of judicial resolution; that as previously discussed, the Court will not
anticipate a question in advance of the necessity of deciding it; and, most relevant to the
22present case, that the Court “will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts on which it is to be applied.” Given a controversy that raises several issues, the
tribunal must limit its constitutional construction to the precise facts which have been established. This rule
is most applicable “in determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon.” Thus, the Court is not authorized to take cognizance of an issue too far-removed from the
other.
Same; Lump-Sum Appropriations; View that by its very words, the Constitution does not prohibit lump-
sum appropriations.―The questions surrounding lump-sum appropriations, in the context of how they arose
during the interpellation, are not legal questions. Unlike the first two reasons advanced by the ponencia in
finding for the unconstitutionality of the PDAF, the invalidity of lump-sum appropriations finds no textual
support in the Constitution. By its very words, the Constitution does not prohibit lump-sum appropriations.
In fact, the history of legislative appropriations suggests otherwise.
Same; General Appropriations Bill; View that the form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget must be prescribed by law, and no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein, and such provision
or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.―The form, content,
and manner of preparation of the budget must be prescribed by law, and no provision or enactment shall
be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein, and such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates. Procedures involving appropriations must be uniform. A special appropriations bill must be specific
in purpose and supported or supportable by funds. Only the heads of the branches of government, as well
as the constitutional commissions and fiscally independent bodies may be authorized to augment items in
appropriations. Discretionary funds are regulated. Appropriations of the previous year are automatically
revived if Congress fails to pass a new law. Appropriations for fiscally autonomous agencies are released
23automatically. Furthermore, in relation to all this, the Constitution gives to the President the duty to
faithfully execute the law.
Same; Same; View that once the appropriations law is passed, the day-to-day management of the
national budget is left to the Department of Budget Management and Department of Finance, in accordance
with the appropriate rules and regulations. Simultaneously, the Commission on Audit is tasked to conduct
auditing and post-auditing throughout the fiscal year, with a final audit report presented to the President
and Congress at the end of such year.―Once the appropriations law is passed, the day-to-day
management of the national budget is left to the DBM and DOF, in accordance with the appropriate rules
and regulations. Simultaneously, the COA is tasked to conduct auditing and post-auditing throughout the
fiscal year, with a final audit report presented to the President and Congress at the end of such year. In this
whole process, an appropriation can be made and has been made at the lump-sum level. While not initially
broken down in the budget formulation aspect of the entire expenditure process, the individual expenditures
sourced from these lump-sum appropriations are broken down in journal entries after the fact, during the
auditing process of the COA, which has the power to issue notices of disallowance should it find a particular
expenditure to have been improper under law and accounting rules. Consequently, a lump-sum
appropriation can still be audited and accounted for properly. This recognizes the fact that lump-sum
appropriating is a formal concern of the COA, and all other agencies and instrumentalities of the
government that take part in the appropriations process. In fact, the Administrative Code gives formal
discretion to the President, in the following manner: Section 12. Form and Content of the Budget.—xxx The
budget shall be presented to the Congress in such form and content as may be approved by the President
and may include the following: xxx.
Same; Item-Veto Power; View that it behooves the Supreme Court to step back and not needlessly
create a controversy over the item-veto power when there is none.―In the first place, all cases in which
this Court ruled on the item-veto power were generated by an actual controversy. In stark contrast, the veto
power has never been raised as an issue in this case until raised as a possible issue in the oral arguments.
Neither the President (who should be invoking a direct injury if the power were allegedly denied him) nor
Congress
24(whose product would then be tampered with by a presidential veto) is complaining. It behooves this
Court to step back and not needlessly create a controversy over the item-veto power when there is none.
Same; Lump-Sum Appropriations; View that the use of lump-sum appropriations inherently springs
from the reality that the government cannot completely predict at the beginning of a fiscal year where funds
will be needed in certain instances.―The use of lump-sum appropriations inherently springs from the reality
that the government cannot completely predict at the beginning of a fiscal year where funds will be needed
in certain instances. Since Congress is the source of the appropriation law in accordance with the principle
of separation of powers, it can craft the law in such a way as to give the Executive enough fiscal tools to
meet the exigencies of the year. Lump-sum appropriations are one such tool. After all, the different agencies
of government are in the best position to determine where the allocated money might best be spent for their
needs: [A]n agency’s allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation requires “a complicated balancing
of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise”: whether its “resources are best spent” on
one program or another; whether it “is likely to succeed” in fulfilling its statutory mandate; whether a
particular program “best fits the agency’s overall policies”; and, “indeed, whether the agency has enough
resources” to fund a program “at all.”
Same; Same; Line-Item Budgeting; View that the evolution of the government’s budgeting from a
small amount in past decades, into what is now a massive undertaking that contains complexities, and
involves an exponentially larger sum than before, suggests that a mixture of lump-sum and line-item
budgeting within the same appropriation law could also be a feasible form of budgeting.―The importance
of allowing lump-sum appropriations for budgetary flexibility and good governance has been validated in
other jurisdictions. The evolution of the government’s budgeting from a small amount in past decades, into
what is now a massive undertaking that contains complexities, and involves an exponentially larger sum
than before, suggests that a mixture of lump-sum and line-item budgeting within the same appropriation
law could also be a feasible form of budgeting. At the very least, this Court owes it to Congress to ask it the
question directly, on whether an exclusively line-item
25budgeting system is indeed feasible. Simply put, there appears, even in the United States, a necessity
for the inclusion of lump-sum appropriations in the budget: Congress has been making appropriations since
the beginning of the Republic. In earlier times when the federal government was much smaller and federal
programs were (or at least seemed) much simpler, very specific line-item appropriations were more
common. In recent decades, however, as the federal budget has grown in both size and complexity, a
lump-sum approach has become a virtual necessity.
Same; Same; View that the Administrative Code provides that certain items may be lump-sum funds,
such as the budget for coordinating bodies, the budget for the pool of Foreign Service officers, and merit
increases.―The Administrative Code provides that certain items may be lump-sum funds, such as the
budget for coordinating bodies, the budget for the pool of Foreign Service officers, and merit increases. As
a result, this Court should not read from the text of the Constitution and the law, a mandate to craft the
national budget in a purely line-item format. To do so would be equivalent to judicial legislation, because
the Court would read into the law an additional requirement that is not supported by its text or spirit of the
law, in accordance with its own perceived notion of how a government budget should be formulated. If we
rule out lump-sum budgeting, what happens then to the various provisions of the law, principally the
Administrative Code, that govern lump-sum funds? Is there such a thing as a collateral constitutional attack?
Too many questionable effects will result from a sledgehammer denunciation of lump-sum appropriations.
This Court does not even know how many lump-sum appropriation laws will be affected by such a ruling.
Thus, it is important to emphasize that the fallo only afflicts the 2013 GAA, Article XIV.
CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; View that as taxpayers and ordinary citizens, petitioners
possess locus standi to bring these suits which indisputably involve the disbursement of public funds.―As
taxpayers and ordinary citizens, petitioners possess locus standi to bring these suits which indisputably
involve the disbursement of public funds. As we held in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331
(1960), taxpayers, such as petitioners in
26the present petitions, have “sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.”
Likewise, in Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management, 670
SCRA 373 (2012), we declared that “taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.”
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; View that well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the principle
of separation of powers, which ordains that each of the three great branches of government is supreme in
the exercise of its functions within its own constitutionally allocated sphere; Any encroachment on the
functions of a co-equal branch by the other branches violates the principle of separation of powers, and is
thus unconstitutional.―Under our Constitution, government power is divided among the three co-equal
branches: Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the principle of
separation of powers, which ordains that each of the three great branches of government is supreme in the
exercise of its functions within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Lawmaking belongs to Congress,
implementing the laws to the Executive, and settling legal disputes to the Judiciary. Any encroachment on
the functions of a co-equal branch by the other branches violates the principle of separation of powers, and
is thus unconstitutional.
Same; Separation of Powers; Legislative Power; View that the power to appropriate is the exclusive
legislative power to direct by law the payment of government funds under specified conditions or specified
purposes.―The Administrative Code of 1987 defines “appropriation” as “an authorization made by law or
other legislative enactment directing payment out of government funds under specified conditions or for
specified purposes.” Thus, the power to appropriate is the exclusive legislative power to direct by law the
payment of government funds under specified conditions or specified purposes. The appropriation must
state the specific purpose of the payment of government funds. The appropriation must also necessarily
state
27the specific amount since it is a directive to pay out government funds.
Same; Same; General Appropriations Act; View that the implementation of the General Appropriations
Act belongs exclusively to the President, and cannot be exercised by Congress. The President cannot
share with the Legislature, its committees or members the power to implement the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). The Legislature, its committees or members cannot exercise functions vested in the President
by the Constitution; otherwise, there will be a violation of the separation of powers.―The GAA is a law. The
implementation of the GAA belongs exclusively to the President, and cannot be exercised by Congress.
The President cannot share with the Legislature, its committees or members the power to implement the
GAA. The Legislature, its committees or members cannot exercise functions vested in the President by the
Constitution; otherwise, there will be a violation of the separation of powers. The Legislature, its committees
or members cannot also exercise any veto power over actions or decisions of executive departments,
bureaus or offices because this will divest the President of control over the executive agencies. Control
means the power to affirm, modify or reverse, and even to pre-empt, the actions or decisions of executive
agencies or their officials. Any provision of law requiring the concurrence of the Legislature, its committees
or members before an executive agency can exercise its functions violates the President’s control over
executive agencies, and is thus unconstitutional.
Same; Countrywide Development Fund (CDF); View that it is clear from the Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) provisions of the 1994 General Appropriations Act (GAA) that the authority vested in legislators
was limited to the mere identification of projects; The President could change the projects identified by
legislators without the favorable endorsement of any congressional committee, and even without the
concurrence of the legislators who identified the projects.―It is clear from the CDF provisions of the 1994
GAA that the authority vested in legislators was limited to the mere identification of projects. There was
nothing in the 1994 GAA that made identification of projects by legislators mandatory on the President. The
President could change the projects identified by legislators without the favorable endorsement of
any congressional committee, and even without the concurrence of the legisla-
28tors who identified the projects. The Court ruled in PHILCONSA: The authority given to the members
of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI
of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by members of
Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he
next determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall implement them. In short,
the proposals and identifications made by members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
Same; Funds; Words and Phrases; View that the term “funds” means appropriated funds, whether
savings or not. The term “savings” is much narrower, and must strictly qualify as such under Section 53 of
the General Provisions of the 2013 General Appropriations Act, which is a verbatim reproduction of the
definition of “savings” in previous General Appropriations Act (GAA).―The Constitution expressly states
that what can be realigned are “savings” from an item in the GAA, and such savings can only be used to
augment another existing “item” in the “respective appropriations” of the Executive, Legislature,
Judiciary, and the Constitutional Commissions in the same GAA. The term “funds” in Special Provision
No. 4 is not the same as “savings.” The term “funds” means appropriated funds, whether savings or
not. The term “savings” is much narrower, and must strictly qualify as such under Section 53 of the
General Provisions of the 2013 GAA, which is a verbatim reproduction of the definition of “savings” in
previous GAAs. Section 53 of the 2013 GAA defines “savings” as follows: Sec. 53. Meaning of Savings
and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free
from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance
or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
appropriation balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions
and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriation balances realized from the implementation
of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver
the
29required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
Same; Same; View that the transfer of funds or appropriations is absolutely prohibited, unless the
funds qualify as “savings,” in which case the savings can be realigned to an existing item of appropriation
but only within the same branch or Constitutional Commission.―Funds, or “appropriations” as used in the
first clause of Section 25(5) of Article VI, cannot be transferred from one branch to another branch or to a
Constitutional Commission, or even within the same branch or Constitutional Commission. Thus, funds or
appropriations for the Office of the President cannot be transferred to the Commission on Elections.
Likewise, funds or appropriations for one department of the Executive branch cannot be transferred to
another department of the Executive branch. The transfer of funds or appropriations is absolutely
prohibited, unless the funds qualify as “savings,” in which case the savings can be realigned to an
existing item of appropriation but only within the same branch or Constitutional Commission.
Same; Presidency; Delegation of Powers; View that the President’s constitutional power to realign
savings cannot be delegated to the Department Secretaries but must be exercised by the President
himself.―The President’s constitutional power to realign savings cannot be delegated to the Department
Secretaries but must be exercised by the President himself. Under Special Provision No. 4, the President’s
power to realign is delegated to Department Secretaries, which violates the Constitutional provision that it
is the President who can realign savings. In PHILCONSA, we ruled that the power to realign cannot be
delegated to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines because this power “can be
exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.” In Sanchez, we rejected the transfer of funds
because it was exercised by the Deputy Executive Secretary. We ruled in Sanchez that “[e]ven if the DILG
Secretary had corroborated the initiative of the Deputy Executive Secretary, it does not even appear
that the matter was authorized by the President.” Clearly, the power to realign savings must be exercised
by the President himself.
Same; Same; View that the power to release public funds authorized to be paid under the General
Appropriation Act is an Execu-
30tive function.―The power to release public funds authorized to be paid under the GAA is an Executive
function. However, under Special Provision No. 5, prior approval of either of the Congressional Committees
is required for the release of funds. Thus, the Congressional Committees effectively control the release of
funds to implement projects identified by legislators. Unless the funds are released, the projects cannot be
implemented. Without doubt, the Congressional Committees and legislators are exercising Executive
functions in violation of the separation of powers. The Congressional Committees and the legislators are
also divesting the President of control over the implementing agencies with respect to the PDAF. A law that
invests Executive functions on the Legislature, its committees or members is unconstitutional for violation
of the separation of powers.
Same; Same; Pork-Barrel System; View that the President’s line-item veto in appropriation laws is
intended to eliminate “wasteful parochial spending,” primarily the pork-barrel.―The President’s line-item
veto in appropriation laws is intended to eliminate “wasteful parochial spending,” primarily the pork-barrel.
Historically, the pork-barrel meant “appropriation yielding rich patronage benefits.” In the Philippines, the
pork-barrel has degenerated further as shown in the COA Audit Report on the 2007-2009 PDAF. The pork-
barrel is mischievously included in lump-sum appropriations that fund much needed projects. The President
is faced with the difficult decision of either vetoing the lump-sum appropriation that includes beneficial
programs or approving the same appropriation that includes the wasteful pork-barrel. To banish the evil of
the pork-barrel, the Constitution vests the President with the line-item veto power, which for its necessary
and proper exercise requires the President to propose, and Congress to enact, only line-item
appropriations.
Same; Funds; View that the Constitution allows the creation of discretionary and special funds but
with certain specified conditions. The Constitution requires that these funds must have specific purposes
and can be used only for such specific purposes.―The Constitution allows the creation of discretionary and
special funds but with certain specified conditions. The Constitution requires that these funds must
have specific purposes and can be used only for such specific purposes. As stated in the Constitution:
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
31disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law. x x x x (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which
a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied) The “discretionary funds” and
“special funds” mentioned in the Constitution are sui generis items of appropriation because they are
regulated by special provisions of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Discretionary Funds; View that “discretionary funds” are appropriated for particular
officials who must use the funds only for public purposes in relation to the functions of their public
office.―“Discretionary funds” are appropriated for particular officials who must use the funds only for public
purposes in relation to the functions of their public office. The particular public officials must support the
use of discretionary funds with appropriate vouchers under guidelines prescribed by law. “Discretionary
funds” already existed in GAAs under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. They are items, and not lump-
sums, with specified conditions and guidelines. A valid appropriation includes the payment of funds “under
specified conditions.” The framers of the 1987 Constitution decided to regulate in the Constitution itself
the disbursement of discretionary funds “to avoid abuse of discretion in the use of discretionary funds” in
the light of the experience during the Martial Law regime when discretionary funds “were spent for the
personal aggrandizement of the First Family and some of their cronies.”
Same; Same; Same; View that there is nothing that prevents President Benigno S. Aquino III from
submitting an emergency supplemental appropriation bill that could be approved on the same day by the
Congress of the Philippines.―The balance of the 2013 PDAF, having reverted to the unappropriated
surplus or balances of the General Fund, can be the subject of an emergency supplemental appropriation
to aid the victims of Typhoon Yolanda as well as to fund the repair and reconstruction of facilities damaged
by the typhoon. When the Gulf Coast of the United States was severely damaged by Hurricane Katrina on
29 August 2005, the U.S. President submitted to the U.S. Congress a request for an emergency supple-
32mental budget on 1 September 2005. The Senate passed the request on 1 September 2005 while the
House approved the bill on 2 September 2005, and the U.S. President signed it into law on the same day.
It took only two days for the emergency supplemental appropriations to be approved and passed into law.
There is nothing that prevents President Benigno S. Aquino III from submitting an emergency supplemental
appropriation bill that could be approved on the same day by the Congress of the Philippines. The President
can certify such bill for immediate enactment to meet the public calamity caused by Typhoon Yolanda.
Same; Same; Malampaya Fund; There is only a single subject to be financed by the Malampaya Fund
― that is, the development and exploitation of energy resources. No other government program would be
funded by PD No. 910, except the exploration, exploitation and development of indigenous energy
resources as envisioned in the law’s Whereas clauses.―There is only a single subject to be financed by
the Malampaya Fund — that is, the development and exploitation of energy resources. No other
government program would be funded by PD No. 910, except the exploration, exploitation and development
of indigenous energy resources as envisioned in the law’s Whereas clauses, to wit: WHEREAS, there is
need to intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation
and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth; WHEREAS, it is imperative that
government accelerate the pace of, and focus special attention on, energy exploration, exploitation and
development in the light of encouraging results in recent oil exploration and of world-wide developments
affecting our continued industrial progress and well-being; x x x The rule of ejusdem generis will apply if
there is an enumeration of specific energy sources, such as gas, oil, geothermal, hydroelectric, and nuclear,
and then followed by a general phrase “and such other energy sources,” in which case tidal, solar and wind
power will fall under the phrase “other energy sources.” In PD No. 910, no such or similar enumeration can
be found. Instead, what we find is the sole purpose for which the Malampaya Fund shall be used — that is,
to finance “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
Same; Same; Same; Congress; View that Congress has the exclusive power to appropriate public
funds, and vesting the President
33with the power to determine the uses of the Malampaya Fund violates the exclusive constitutional power
of Congress to appropriate public funds.―Under the 1987 Constitution, determining the purpose of the
expenditure of government funds is an exclusive legislative power. The Executive can only propose, but
cannot determine the purpose of an appropriation. An appropriation cannot validly direct the payment of
government funds “for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President,” absent the
proper application of the ejusdem generis rule. Section 8 of PD No. 910 authorizes the use of the
Malampaya Fund for other projects approved only by the President. To repeat, Congress has the exclusive
power to appropriate public funds, and vesting the President with the power to determine the uses of the
Malampaya Fund violates the exclusive constitutional power of Congress to appropriate public funds.
Same; Same; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Funds; Delegation of
Powers; View that the phrase that the government’s share in the gross earnings of Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) shall be used “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines,” is an undue
delegation of the legislative power to appropriate.―Similar to PD No. 910, PD No. 1869 was issued when
then President Marcos exercised both executive and legislative powers. Under the 1987 Constitution, the
President no longer wields legislative powers. The phrase that the government’s share in the gross earnings
of PAGCOR shall be used “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects x x x as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines,” is an undue delegation
of the legislative power to appropriate.
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; View that the supreme duty of the Supreme Court is to restore the
constitutional check-and-balance that was precisely intended to banish lump-sum appropriations and the
pork-barrel system. The peaceful and constitutional solution to banish all forms of the pork-barrel system
from our national life is for this Court to declare all lump-sum appropriations, whether proposed by the
Executive or enacted by the Legislature, as unconstitutional.―We have seen the outrage of the Filipino
people to the revulsive pork-barrel system spawned by this forbidden Executive-Legislative arrangement.
The Filipino people now realize that
34there are billions of pesos in the annual budget that could lift a large number of Filipinos out of abject
poverty but that money is lost to corruption annually. The Filipino people are now desperately in search of
a solution to end this blighted pork-barrel system. The solution lies with this Court, which must rise to this
historic challenge. The supreme duty of this Court is to restore the constitutional check-and-balance
that was precisely intended to banish lump-sum appropriations and the pork-barrel system. The
peaceful and constitutional solution to banish all forms of the pork-barrel system from our national life is for
this Court to declare all lump-sum appropriations, whether proposed by the Executive or enacted by the
Legislature, as unconstitutional. Henceforth, as originally intended in the Constitution, the President shall
submit to Congress only a line-item NEP, and Congress shall enact only a line-item GAA. The Filipino
people can then see in the GAA for what specific purposes and in what specific amounts their tax money
will be spent. This will allow the Filipino people to monitor whether their tax money is actually being spent
as stated in the GAA.
BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Delegation of Powers; View that no branch of government may delegate its
constitutionally-assigned powers and thereby disrupt the Constitution’s carefully laid out plan of
governance.―A necessary corollary to this arrangement is that no branch of government may delegate
its constitutionally-assigned powers and thereby disrupt the Constitution’s carefully laid out plan of
governance. Neither may one branch or any combination of branches deny the other or others their
constitutionally mandated prerogatives — either through the exercise of sheer political dominance or
through collusive practices — without committing a breach that must be addressed through our
constitutional processes. To be sure, political dominance, whether the brazen or the benign kind, should
be abhorred by our people for we should have learned our lessons by now. Thus, Congress — the
government’s policy making body — may not delegate its constitutionally-assigned power to make laws
and to alter and repeal them, in the same manner that the President — who enforces and implements the
laws passed by Congress — cannot pass on to the Congress or to the Judiciary, its enforcement or
implementation powers.35
Constitutional Law; Congress; General Appropriations Law; View that Congress carries out the power
of the purse through the appropriation of funds under a general appropriations law (titled as the General
Appropriations Act or the GAA) that can easily be characterized as one of the most important pieces of
legislation that Congress enacts each year.―Under our system of government, part of the legislative
powers of Congress is the power of the purse which, broadly described, is the power to determine the
areas of national life where government shall devote its funds; to define the amount of these funds and
authorize their expenditure; and to provide measures to raise revenues to defray the amounts to be spent.
This power is regarded as the “the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can
arm the immediate representatives of the people.” By granting Congress this power, the Constitution allows
the Filipino people, through their representatives, to effectively shape the nation’s future through the control
of the funds that render the implementation of national plans possible. Consistent with the separation of
powers and the check and balance doctrines, the power of the purse also allows Congress to control
executive spending as the Executive actually disburses the money that Congress sets aside and
determines to be available for spending. Congress carries out the power of the purse through the
appropriation of funds under a general appropriations law (titled as the General Appropriations Act or the
GAA) that can easily be characterized as one of the most important pieces of legislation that Congress
enacts each year. For this reason, the 1987 Constitution (and previous Constitutions) has laid down the
general framework by which Congress and the Executive make important decisions on how public funds
are raised and spent — from the policy-making phase to the actual spending phase, including the raising
of revenues as source of government funds.
Same; Funds; Malampaya Funds; General Appropriations Bill; View that Section 22, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution refers only to the general appropriations bill so that there may be no need to report all
sources of government revenue, particularly those emanating from funds like the Malampaya
Fund.―Arguably, Section 22, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to the general appropriations bill
so that there may be no need to report all sources of government revenue, particularly those emanating
from funds like the Malampaya Fund. The power of Congress, however, will be less
36than plenary if this omission will happen as Congress would then be denied a complete picture of
government revenues and would consequently be denied its rightful place in setting national policies on
matters of national importance, among them energy matters. The Constitution would similarly be violated if
Congress cannot also demand that the revenues of special funds (like the Malampaya Fund) be reported
together with a listing of their items of expenditures. Since the denial would be by the Office of the President,
the incapacity of Congress would be because of intrusive action by the Executive into what is otherwise a
congressional preserve.
Same; Lump-Sum Appropriations; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); View that a lump
sum appropriation like the Priority Development Assistance Fund cannot and should not pass Congress
unless the Executive and the Legislative branches collude, in which case, the turn of the Supreme Court to
be an active constitutional player in the budget process comes into play.―A lump sum appropriation like
the PDAF cannot and should not pass Congress unless the Executive and the Legislative branches collude,
in which case, the turn of this Court to be an active constitutional player in the budget process comes into
play. The PDAF, as explained in the Opinions of Justice Carpio and Bernabe, is a prime example of a lump
sum appropriation that, over the years, for reasons beneficial to both branches of government, have
successfully negotiated the congressional legislative process, to the detriment of the general public.
Same; Oversight Power; View that oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.―The last phase of the budgetary process is the budget
accountability phase that Congress is empowered to enforce in order to check on compliance with its
basic intents in allocating measured funds under the appropriation act. At the budget hearings during the
legislation phase, Congress already checks on the need for the recommended appropriations (as Congress
may delete a recommended appropriation that it perceives to be unneeded), and on the propriety, efficiency
and effectiveness of
37budget implementation, both past and impending. Technically, this portion of the budgetary exercise
involves legislative scrutiny that is part of the overall oversight powers of Congress over the budget.
Another part of the oversight authority is legislative investigation. Former Chief Justice Puno expounded
on this aspect of the budgetary process in his Separate Opinion in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,
405 SCRA 614 (2003), and he best sums up the breadth and scope of this power, as follows: Broadly
defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The
power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government.
Same; Funds; Malampaya Funds; Lump-Sum Appropriations; Separation of Powers; View that the
Section 8, P.D. No. 910 funds or the Malampaya Fund consist of two components: the funds “to be used to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects,” and the funds “for such
other purposes as may be...directed by the President.” I join Justice Carpio in the view that the second “for
such other purposes” component is a complete nullity as it is an undue delegation of legislative power. I
submit that this is additionally objectionable for being a part of a constitutionally objectionable lump sum
payment that violates the separation of powers doctrine.―The Section 8, P.D. No. 910 funds or the
Malampaya Fund consist of two components: the funds “to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects,” and the funds “for such other purposes as may
be…directed by the President.” I join Justice Carpio in the view that the second “for such other purposes”
component is a complete nullity as it is an undue delegation of legislative power. I submit that this is
additionally objectionable for being a part of a constitutionally objectionable lump sum payment that violates
the separation of powers doctrine. I will discuss this view under the first component of Section 8. I vote
38to strike down the “energy” component of Section 8, P.D. No. 910 as it is a discretionary lump sum fund
that is not saved at all by its energy development and exploitation purpose. It is a pure and simple pork
barrel granted to the President under a martial law regime decree that could have escaped invalidity then
under the 1973 Constitution and the prevailing unusual times, but should be struck down now for being out
of step with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution. As a fund, it is a prohibited lump sum because it
consists of a fund of indefinite size that has now grown to gigantic proportions, whose accounts and
accounting are far from the usual in government, and which is made available to the President for his
disposition, from year to year, with very vague controls, and free from the legal constraints of the budget
process now in place under the 1987 Constitution. Admittedly, it is a fund raised and intended for special
purposes but the characterization “special purpose” is not reason enough and is not a magical abracadabra
phrase that could whisk a fund out of the constitutional budget process, defying even common reason in
the process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the legitimacy of the present status of the fund is
questionable, particularly its purpose and lack of specificity; its lump sum nature and its disbursement solely
at the discretion of one man, unchecked by any other; how and why a multi-project and multi-activity fund
covering many projects and activities, now and in the future, should be held at the discretion of one man;
and the legal situation where the power of Congress and its participation in national policymaking through
the budget process is disregarded.―I question the legitimacy of the present status of the fund, particularly
its purpose and lack of specificity; its lump sum nature and its disbursement solely at the discretion of one
man, unchecked by any other; how and why a multi-project and multi-activity fund covering many projects
and activities, now and in the future, should be held at the discretion of one man; and the legal situation
where the power of Congress and its participation in national policymaking through the budget process is
disregarded. All these can be encapsulated as violations of the doctrines of separation of powers and
checks and balances which can be addressed and remedied if only the fund can be subjected to the usual
budget processes, with adjustments that circumstances of the fund and its use would require. Lest this
conclusion be misunderstood, I do not per se take the position that all lump sum appropriations should be
disal-
39lowed as this would be an extreme position that disregards the realities of national life. But the use of
lump sums, to be allowed, should be within reason acceptable under the processes of the Constitution,
respectful of the constitutional safeguards that are now in place, and understandable to the people based
on their secular understanding of what is happening in government.
Same; Same; Same; Indirect Contempt; Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular
Letter No. 2013-8; View that the issuance of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular
Letter No. 2013-8 is prima facie an indirect contempt for which the DBM Secretary himself should be liable
unless he can show why he should not be punished.―Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into
direct and indirect or constructive contempt. Direct contempt is misbehavior in the presence of or so near
a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same. Where the act of contumacy
is not committed in facie curiae, or “in the presence of or so near a court or judge, i.e., perpetrated outside
the sitting of the court, it is considered indirect or constructive contempt, and may include “disobedience of
or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a
court or judge,” or “(a)ny abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt,” or “any improper conduct tending, directly, or indirectly to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice.” Based on this definition and classification, the issuance of the
DBM Circular Letter is prima facie an indirect contempt for which the DBM Secretary himself should be
liable unless he can show why he should not be punished. As an element of due process, he must now be
directed by resolution to explain why he should not be penalized for issuing and enforcing Circular Letter
No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 despite the Court’s TRO.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Presidential Social Fund; View
that Title XLIV known as the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) in the 2013 General
Appropriations Act (Republic Act No. 10352) is unconstitutional; The purpose of the Presidential Social
Fund in Title IV, Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended, “to finance the priority
40infrastructure development projects” is also unconstitutional.―Title XLIV known as the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) in the 2013 General Appropriations Act (Republic Act No. 10352) is
unconstitutional. We, thus, overturn the holdings of various cases starting with Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), and Sarmiento v. The Treasurer of the Philippines.
Presidential Decree No. 910 does not sanction the unmitigated and unaccountable use of income derived
from energy resources. The purpose of the Presidential Social Fund in Title IV, Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869, as amended, “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” is also
unconstitutional.
Same; Presidency; Immunity from Suit; View that the doctrine of the non-suability of the President is
well settled. This includes any civil or criminal cases; This does not mean, however, that the President
cannot be made accountable. He may be impeached and removed. Likewise, he can be made criminally
and civilly liable in the proper case after his tenure as President.―The doctrine of the non-suability of the
President is well settled. This includes any civil or criminal cases. It is part of the Constitution by implication.
Any suit will degrade the dignity necessary for the operations of the Office of the President. It will additionally
provide either a hindrance or distraction from the performance of his official duties and functions. Also, any
contrary doctrine will allow harassment and petty suits which can impair judgment. This does not mean,
however, that the President cannot be made accountable. He may be impeached and removed. Likewise,
he can be made criminally and civilly liable in the proper case after his tenure as President.
Same; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; Advisory Opinions; View that basic in litigation
raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or controversy. The
Supreme Court cannot render an advisory opinion.―Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the
requirement that there must be an actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory opinion.
We assume that the Constitution binds all other constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and organs.
We are aware that in the exercise of their various powers, they do interpret the text of the Constitution in
the light of contemporary needs that they should address. A policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for
official acts by the other departments that have not yet been done
41would unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and
weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. Our power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and
binding construction of law. This power should generally be reserved when the departments have
exhausted any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that defines
the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should
the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right, but the impact should be shown to be so grave,
imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine
fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they
legitimately represent.
Same; Same; Same; View that the requirement of an “actual case,” thus, means that the case before
this Court “involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.”―The requirement of an “actual case,” thus, means that the case before
this Court “involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.” Furthermore, “the controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing
upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests.”
Thus, the adverse position of the parties must be sufficient enough for the case to be pleaded and for this
Court to be able to provide the parties the proper relief/s prayed for.
Same; Same; Judicial Department; View that in cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.―The political question doctrine
emerged as a corollary to the nature of judicial review. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the essence of the duty of judicial review was explained, thus: But in the
main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments
42of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where one leaves off and the other begins. In
times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; View that the Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice Davide, defined grave abuse of discretion as “such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duly enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”―This
Court, through Chief Justice Davide, defined grave abuse of discretion as “x x x such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duly enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.” After a review of the facts established in the case and application of the
relevant provisions of law, it then held that the House of Representatives did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Judicial Review; Moot and Academic; View that in SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes,
421 SCRA 656 (2004), the Supreme Court ruled that while the case has become moot, “[n]evertheless,
courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet evading
review.”―In SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 421 SCRA 656 (2004), this Court ruled that while
the case has become moot, “[n]evertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable
of repetition yet evading review.”43
Same; Same; Same; View that in SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 421 SCRA 656 (2004),
Petitions were filed to assail the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion during the
so-called Oakwood occupation in 2003. While the Supreme Court conceded that the case was mooted by
the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, which declared that the state of rebellion ceased to exist, it still
decided the case.―In SANLAKAS, Petitions were filed to assail the issuance of Proclamation No. 427
declaring a state of rebellion during the so-called Oakwood occupation in 2003. While this Court conceded
that the case was mooted by the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, which declared that the state of
rebellion ceased to exist, it still decided the case. This Court pointed out that the issue has yet to be decided
definitively, as evidenced by the dismissal of this Court of previous cases involving the same issue due to
mootness: Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the
AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that
occasion, “ ‘an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and
other deadly weapons’ assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before this
Court assailing the validity of the President’s declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the
President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases
precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent similar questions
from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a
state of rebellion in the exercise of the President’s calling out power, the mootness of the petitions
notwithstanding.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); View that
the concepts of accountability and separation of powers are fundamental values in our constitutional
democracy. The effect of the use of the Priority Development Assistance Fund can have repercussions on
these principles. Yet, it is difficult to discover anomalies if any.―The concepts of accountability and
separation of powers are fundamental values in our constitutional democracy. The effect of the use of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund can have repercussions on these principles. Yet, it is difficult to
discover anomalies if any. It took the Commission on Audit some time to make its special report for a period
ending in
442009. It is difficult to expect such detail from ordinary citizens who wish to avail their rights as taxpayers.
Clearly, had it not been for reports in both mainstream and social media, the public would not have been
made aware of the magnitude.
Remedial Law; Judgments; Stare Decisis; View that stare decisis is a functional doctrine necessary
for courts committed to the rule of law. It is not, however, an encrusted and inflexible canon. Slavishly
adhering to precedent potentially undermines the value of a Judiciary.―Respondents also argued that we
should continue to respect our precedents. They invoke the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis is a
functional doctrine necessary for courts committed to the rule of law. It is not, however, an encrusted and
inflexible canon. Slavishly adhering to precedent potentially undermines the value of a Judiciary.
Constitutional Law; General Appropriations Bill; View that the General Appropriations Bill is
considered by Congress in three readings like other pieces of legislation.―The President first submits to
Congress a “budget of expenditures and sources of financing” in compliance with Article VII, Section 22
which provides thus: The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of
every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources
of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. This budget of expenditures
and sources of financing (also called the National Expenditure Plan) is first filed with the House of
Representatives and can only originate from there. Thus, in Article VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. Thereafter, the General Appropriations Bill is considered by Congress in three readings like
other pieces of legislation. Should it become necessary, a bicameral committee is convened to harmonize
the differences in the Third Reading copies of each Legislative chamber. This is later on submitted to both
the House and the Senate for ratification. The bill as approved by Congress shall then be presented to the
President for approval. The President, in addition to a full approval or veto, is granted the power of an item
veto. Article VI, Section 27 (2) provides: The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
45items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object. We have had, in several cases, interpreted the power of item veto of the President.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); View that nowhere in the Constitution does it
allow specific members of the House of Representatives or the Senate to implement projects and programs.
Their role is clear. Rather, it is the local government units that are given the prerogative to execute projects
and programs.―The Executive is given the task of preparing the budget and the prerogative to spend from
an authorized budget. The Legislature, on the other hand, is given the power to authorize a budget for the
coming fiscal year. This power to authorize is given to the Legislature collectively. Nowhere in the
Constitution does it allow specific members of the House of Representatives or the Senate to implement
projects and programs. Their role is clear. Rather, it is the local government units that are given the
prerogative to execute projects and programs.
Same; Congress; View that the members of the Legislature do not do the formal audit of expenditures.
This is the principal prerogative of the Commission on Audit.―The members of the Legislature do not do
the formal audit of expenditures. This is the principal prerogative of the Commission on Audit. Rather, they
benefit from such formal audits. These formal audits assist the members of the House of Representatives
and the Senators to do their constitutional roles. The formal audits also make public and transparent the
purposes, methods used, and achievements and failures of each and every expenditure made on behalf of
the government so that their constituencies can judge them as they go on to authorize another budget for
another fiscal year.
Same; Same; View that interference in any government project other than that of congressional
activities is a direct violation of Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution in so far as Title XLIV of the
2013 General Appropriations Act allows participation by Congress.―Any system where members of
Congress participate in the execution of projects in any way compromises them. It encroaches on their
ability to do their constitutional duties. The violation is apparent in two ways: their ability to efficiently make
judgments to
46authorize a budget and the interference in the constitutional mandate of the President to be the
Executive. Besides, interference in any government project other than that of congressional activities is a
direct violation of Article VI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution in so far as Title XLIV of the 2013 General
Appropriations Act allows participation by Congress.
Same; Special Allotment Release Order (SARO); View that under National Budget Circular No. 545,
the appropriations shall be made available to the agency of the government upon the issuance by the
Department of Budget and Management of either an Agency Budget Matrix or a Special Allotment Release
Order.―Generally, the first step to budget execution is the issuance by the Department of Budget and
Management of Guidelines on the Release of Funds. For the year 2013, the Department of Budget and
Management issued National Budget Circular No. 545 entitled “Guidelines for the Release of Funds for FY
2013.” Under National Budget Circular No. 545, the appropriations shall be made available to the agency
of the government upon the issuance by the Department of Budget and Management of either an Agency
Budget Matrix or a Special Allotment Release Order. The Agency Budget Matrix will act as a comprehensive
release of allotment covering agency-specific budgets that do not need prior clearance. The Special
Allotment Release Order is required for those allotments needing clearance, among others.
Same; Separation of Powers; View that from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of
law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.―This Court has implied
that the participation of Congress is limited to the exercise of its power of oversight. Any post-enactment
congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following: 1. scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power
of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and 2. investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. x x x As such, it is only
upon its effectivity that a law
47may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.
Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or
vetoing the law. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Same; Same; View that the participation of members of Congress — even if only to recommend —
amounts to an unconstitutional post-enactment interference in the role of the Executive. It also defeats the
purpose of the powers granted by the Constitution to Congress to authorize a budget.―[T]o forestall the
danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic
and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
Executive or Judicial power. When Congress exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.” The participation of members of Congress — even
if only to recommend — amounts to an unconstitutional post-enactment interference in the role of
the Executive. It also defeats the purpose of the powers granted by the Constitution to Congress to
authorize a budget.
Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); View that the Priority Development
Assistance Fund is an appropriation for each Member of the House of Representative and each Senator.
This is why this item in the General Appropriations Act of 2013 is an invalid appropriation. It is allocated for
use which is not inherent in the role of a member of Congress. The power to spend is an Executive
constitutional discretion — not a Legislative one.―The equal allocation among members of the House of
Representatives and more so among Senators shows the true color of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund. It is to give a lump sum for each member of the House of Representatives and the Senate for them
to spend on projects of their own choosing. This is usually for any purpose whether among their constituents
and whether for the present or future. In short, the Priority Development Assistance Fund is an
appropriation for each Member of the House of Representative and
48each Senator. This is why this item in the General Appropriations Act of 2013 is an invalid appropriation.
It is allocated for use which is not inherent in the role of a member of Congress. The power to spend is an
Executive constitutional discretion — not a Legislative one.
Same; Same; Same; View that instead of Congress acting collectively with its elected representatives
deciding on the magnitude of the amounts for spending, it will be the officer who either recommends or
spends who decides what the budget will be. This is not what is meant when the Constitution provides that
“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” When
no discernible purpose is defined in the law, money is paid out for a public official and not in pursuance of
an appropriation.―An item becomes invalid when it is just an amount allocated to an official absent a
purpose. In such a case, the item facilitates an unconstitutional delegation of the power to authorize a
budget. Instead of Congress acting collectively with its elected representatives deciding on the magnitude
of the amounts for spending, it will be the officer who either recommends or spends who decides what the
budget will be. This is not what is meant when the Constitution provides that “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” When no discernible purpose is
defined in the law, money is paid out for a public official and not in pursuance of an appropriation.
Same; Same; Same; View that I cannot join Justice Brion in his view that even the phrase “to be used
to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” in
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 is too broad; The kinds of projects relating to energy resource
development and exploitation are determinable.―I regret, however, that I cannot join Justice Brion in his
view that even the phrase “to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government” in Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 is too broad. This is even
granting that this phrase is likewise qualified with “as may be hereafter determined by the President.” The
kinds of projects relating to energy resource development and exploitation are determinable. There are
obvious activities that do not square with this intent, for instance, expenditures solely for agriculture. The
extent of latitude that the President is given is also commensurate with the
49importance of the energy sector itself. Energy is fundamental for the functioning of government as well
as the private sector. It is essential to power all projects whether commercial or for the public interest. The
formulation, thus, reasonably communicates discretion but puts it within reasonable bounds. In my view,
and with due respect to the opinion of Justice Brion, the challenge of this phrase’s unconstitutionality lacks
the clarity that should compel us to strike it down.
Same; Same; Same; View that a member of the House of Representatives or a Senator is not an
automated teller machine or ATM from which the public could withdraw funds for sundry private purposes;
Their role is to use their experience and their understanding of their constituents to craft policy articulated
in laws.―A member of the House of Representatives or a Senator is not an automated teller machine or
ATM from which the public could withdraw funds for sundry private purposes. They should be honorable
elected officials tasked with having a longer and broader view. Their role is to use their experience and their
understanding of their constituents to craft policy articulated in laws. Congress is entrusted to work with
political foresight. Congress, as a whole, checks the spending of the President as it goes through the annual
exercise of deciding what to authorize in the budget. A level of independence and maturity is required in
relation to the passage of laws requested by the Executive. Poverty and inefficiencies in government are
the result of lack of accountability. Accountability should no longer be compromised.
Same; Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; View that pork barrel funds historically encourage dole-
outs.―Pork barrel funds historically encourage dole-outs. It inculcates a perverse understanding of
representative democracy. It encourages a culture that misunderstands the important function of public
representation in Congress. It does not truly empower those who are impoverished or found in the margins
of our society. There are better, more lasting and systematic ways to help our people survive. A better kind
of democracy should not be the ideal. It should be the norm. We listen to our people as we read the
Constitution. We watch as others do their part and are willing to do more. We note the public’s message:
Politics should not be as it was. Eradicate greed. Exact accountability. Build a government that has a
collective passion for real social justice.
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994.*

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON A. GONZALES,
petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON.
VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review, requisites.—When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192
SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1937]).
Same; Same; Veto Power; Parties; A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the
validity of a presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress.—
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation
bill. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of
the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]). To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers
of that institution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp.
353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
508

Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez
Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto, said remedy
is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations, not when the same
is claimed to be ultra vires.—It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art.
VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or
political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the
duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of
legislative jurisdiction begin.
Same; Separation of Powers; Power of Appropriation; Pork Barrel; The power of appropriation carries
with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law.—Under the
Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as “the power of the purse,” belongs to
Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but still
the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress. The power of appropriation carries
with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves
implementation of the priority projects specified in the law while the authority given to members of Congress
is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented.—Exe-cutive function under the Countrywide
Development Fund involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. The authority given
to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President.
Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals
submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was
set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the
locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall
implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of
particular projects or activities under the General Appropriations Act of 1994 is imaginative as it is
innovative.—The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or
activities under Article XLI of the
509
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 509

GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative. The Constitution is a framework of a workable
government and its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant
to the operation of the political branches of government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven
allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of Congress, with the members close to
the Congressional leadership or who hold cards for “horse-trading,” getting more than their less favored
colleagues. The members of Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could
exercise his veto power to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely
to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project.
Same; Appropriations; Fund Transfers; Under the Special Provisions applicable to Congress, the
members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating
expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall approve
the realignment.—Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members
of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their
operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether
there are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their operating
expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are
actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and (2) The transfer of
realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment
is to be made.
Same; Same; Debt Service; Education; The constitutional provision which directs that the State shall
assign the highest budgetary priority to education is merely directory.—While Congress appropriated——
P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only—
P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress
cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the Constitution it should
be education that is entitled to the highest
510

funding. This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 22 (1991), where this Court
held that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory.
Same; Same; Statutes; The repeal of laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations
law.—Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
Same; Same; Veto Power; The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of
the legislative process and the Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a
veto.—The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will
presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz., 485, 53
A.L.R. 258 [1927]). The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article
VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Line Item Veto; Generally, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely
parts, except in regard to general appropriations bills where he may veto any particular item or items, in
which case he has to veto the entire item.—Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the
entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general
veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire
item.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; General Appropriations Bill, explained.—A general
appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Inappropriate Provision”; Any provision which does not
relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered
511
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 511

“an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately from an item.—As the Constitution is
explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must “relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein” and “be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates,”
it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation, is considered “an inappropriate provision” which can be vetoed separately
from an item.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisions which are intended to amend other laws are
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriations bill.—Also to be included in the category of
“inappropriate provisions” are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other
laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of
general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisos which are appropriate provisions cannot be vetoed
separately.—The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on debt
service, including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item “shall be used for payment of
the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness” and that “in no case shall this fund be used
to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.” These provisos are germane to and have
a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to
specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So., 2d., 153). The said provisos, being
appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void.
Same; Same; Prohibition; The writ of prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be
done in contravention of the laws.—Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special
Provision on the ceiling for debt payment is valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for
debt payment without complying with the conditions for automatic appropriation under the provisions of
R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the
Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15). Petitioners cannot
anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of prohibition will not issue on the
fear that official actions will be done in contravention of the laws.
512

Same; Same; Congress may add special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which
cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the
budgetary sense.—The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy
of Congress and the President. While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of the total
appropriation for road maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a
comprehensive study, believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70% would
be more efficient, economical and practical. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and
on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended—70% by administrative and 30% by
contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as
they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases; Congressional Veto, defined; A
congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.—The
requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of
the “congressional or legislative veto.” By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the
legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of legislative control
in the implementation of particular executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is requiring
disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This device
represents a significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to shared
administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash, 56
North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]). A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the
principle of separation of powers.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law
or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.—
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative
veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
513
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 513

disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law
or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Same; Same; Contract Clause; The prohibition on the use of the Modernization Fund for payment of
the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative
of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts.—
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Fund for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of
the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec.
10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore
valid.
Same; Same; Fund Transfers; The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings
to augment the pension fund of the AFP violates Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.—
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the
AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of
savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and
can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases; Power of Impoundment, defined.—This is
the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment
refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is
the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard
Law Review 1505 [1973]).
Same; Same; Same; CAFGU; The appropriations law is not the proper vehicle to express
Congressional intention to deny the President the right to defer or reduce the spending for the deactivation
of the
514

CAFGU.—We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that
would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending,
much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an
appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No.
6758.
Same; Same; Same; Veto Power; Mere reminders in the veto message that disbursements must be
made in accordance with law may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.—Petitioners claim that the
conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court,
the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were
placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the
Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the
second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made
in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws
are faithfully executed.—There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall
be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they
are proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized
by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution
the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the
guidelines.
Same; Judicial Power; The Court’s interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its
enactment.—Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides: “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form a part of the legal
515
VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 515

system of the Philippines.” The Court’s interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its
enactment since the court’s interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA
141 [1985]).
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; Reversal of previous decisions cannot nullify prior acts done in
reliance thereof.—Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make bad laws and
should be reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
PADILLA, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Veto Power; An inappropriate provision is still a provision,
not an item, and, therefore outside the veto power of the Executive.—I therefore disagree with the majority’s
pronouncements which would validate the veto by the President of specific provisions in the appropriations
act based on the contention that such are “inappropriate provisions.” Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is “inappropriate” from the Presidential standpoint, it is
still a provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the
Executive.
VITUG, J., Concurring:
Constitutional Law; Appropriations; Pork Barrel; To give the authority of Congress to appropriate
funds for specific projects to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise would be constitutionally
impermissible.—I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his
colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. I see no legal
obstacle, however, in their making, just like anyone else, the proper recommendations to, albeit not
necessarily conclusive on, the President for the purpose. Neither would it be objectionable for Congress,
by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however,
to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally
impermissible.
[No. L--2044. August 26, 1949]

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and
JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.
1. 1.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENTION OF THE LAW, How ASCERTAINED.—The
intention of an act is to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to
be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions
offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a mle by its results.
1. 2.ID.; ARTICLE VI OP THE CONSTITUTION INTERPRETED.—Article VI of the Constitution

provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been
defined to mean restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined
369
VOL. 84, AUGUST 26, 1949 369
Ara/neta vs. Dinglas&n
1. within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope. The words "limited period" as used
in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration.
1. 3.PRESIDENT; EMERGENCY POWERS; JUSTIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF.—Emergency,

in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said
to be an emergency."
1. 4.ID. ; LEGISLATURE HAD EESTRICTED THE LIPE OF EMERGENCY POWERS.—In the

language of section 3 of Act No. 671, the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to
enemy action or other causes brought on by war.
1. 5.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; AUTOMATICAL EXTINCTION OF Acr No.

671; CONTEMPORARY CoNSTRUCTiON.—Commonwealth. Act No. 671 was only "for a certain
period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatic
extinction. of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new
legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.
They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be
prolonged.
1. 6.ID.; CONTEMPLATED PERIOD FOR ACT No. 671J CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION.—

When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature wcrald hold its next regular session which was to open on
January 1, 1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous
powers upon the President was decided upon with. specific view to the inability of the National
Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation
of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The
enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions
could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and
dislocation of the normal processes of government.
1. 7.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations,
with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison
d'etre for its enactment, was a period coexetensive with the inability of Congress to function, a
period ending with the convening of that body.
370
370 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Araneta vs. Dinglasan
1. 8.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACT NO. 671 BECAME INOPERATIVE WHEN CONGRESS MET IN
REGULAR SESSION; EXECUTIVE ORDERS THEREAFTER ISSUED, VALiDiTY OF.—
Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law.
1. 9.ID.; SYSTEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATION Is PRESERVED FOR

CONGRESS ALL THE TlME.—The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have
given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its
faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for
Conigress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history
of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the
specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another
department—unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to
prescribed standards; no, not even when that Eepublic was fighting a total war, or when it was
engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under cmr concept
of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the
various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are cialled upon "to
perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to thera respectively."
1. 10.JUDGES; DlSQUALIFICATION; MEMBERS OF SlIPREME COURT; OBJECTION SHOULD

BE MADE ON TIME.—A motion to disqualify a member of tlie Supreme Court filed after the said
member had given his opinion on the merits of the case cannot be considered because a litigant
cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort
after decision has been rendered.
1. 11.ID. ; ID. ; MEMBER OF SUPREME COURT FORMERLY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.—The

fact that a member of the Supreme Court while Secretary of Justice had advised the Chief
Executive on the question involved in a certain case, does not disqualify him to act when it is
brought before the court, for he cannot be considered as having acted previously in said case as
counsel of any of the parties when the Chief Executive is not a party thereto.
1. 12.ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; WHO MAY TAKE PART IN THE

ADJTJDICATION; RULE 53, SECTION 1 WITH RULE 58, SECTION 1,
371
VOL. 84, AUGUST 26, 1949 371
Araneta vs. Dinglasan
1. INTERPRETED.—One who is not a member of the court at the time an adjudication is made cannot
take part in that adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated
only by means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding force, must
be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution;
Republic Act No. 296, section 21; Eule 53, section 7, of the Eules of Court). Pronaulgation means
the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication.
1. 18.ID. ; ID. ; ID.; ID.—One who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed
and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision.
1. 14.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EACH OF THE GREAT BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT TO

COMPLY WITH ITS OWN DUTY.—Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will
emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great branches of the
Government, within its own allocated sphere, complies with its own constitutional duty,
tmcompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.
1. 15.EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT LAWS.—Executive Orders, even if issued within the powers
validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in
exactly the same manner as the judgments of the Supreme Court, municipal ordinances and
ordiriary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.
1. 16.ID.—Executive orders issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him under
section 26, Article VI of the Co-nstitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations.
1. 17.JUDGES; REQUIRED NUMBER OP VOTES TO ANNUL EXECUTIVE ORDERS.—There is

nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the votes of eight justices to
nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President. Hence, a mere majority
of six members of the Supreme Court is enough to nullify them.
G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.*

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.,
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ
II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Judicial Review; One of the
greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).—One of the greatest contributions of the American system to
this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). This
concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation—The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained
by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national
government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must
be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate
and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts
exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites; The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts
a “self-starting capacity.”—The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self-
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VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 163

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
starting capacity.” Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are
present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the
decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; An actual case or controversy involves a
conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution—it is “definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest,” a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief.—An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interest”; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The
Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present
petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic Questions; The “moot and academic”
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case; Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.—A moot and academic case is one
that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the
police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must
be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an unconstitutional act is not a law,
164

it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,
inoperative.” The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is defined as “a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Locus standi is defined as “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-
parties-in interest” rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on
his own right to the relief sought.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits, as here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public.—The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other
person. He could be suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or ‘taxpayer.” In either case, he
has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suits; Citizen’s Suits; The plaintiff in a
taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit—in the former, the plaintiff is
165
VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 165

affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the
public concern.—Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer” standing in public
actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public
right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen
to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied.” With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordanheld that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Direct Injury” Test; To prevent just about
any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and
thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme
Court laid down the more stringent “direct injury” test, which test has been adopted in this jurisdiction.—To
prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the
United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent “direct injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later
reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial
power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a
direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public. This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937), it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.”
The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila
Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix.
166

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of
locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, such as in cases of “transcendental
importance,” or where the issues raised have “far-reaching implications.”—Being a mere procedural
technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.
This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), where
the “transcendental importance” of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither
a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275 (1975), this Court resolved to pass upon the
issues raised due to the “far-reaching implications” of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement
that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal
policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that Taxpayers, Voters, Concerned
Citizens and Legislators may be Accorded Standing to Sue; Recent decisions show a certain toughening
in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.—By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from
the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional
issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that
the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Significantly, recent
decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is in the interest of justice that those affected by
Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention
of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.—In G.R. No.
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VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 167

171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also
raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers
incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can
be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their
basic rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that
the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.—In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this
Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994), Kapatiran Ng Mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA
52 (1991), and Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), that when the issue concerns a public right, it is
sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Organizations may be granted standing to assert the
rights of their members.—In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its
right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted
standing to assert the rights of their members. We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office
of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; National officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) have no legal standing where they failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an
institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.—
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz, et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP
as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No.
5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), the Court held that the mere
invocation by the IBP of its
168

duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner
have locus standi.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of a petitioner that she is a media personality
does not aid her where there is no showing that the enforcement of the issuances in question prevented
her from pursuing her occupation, and neither does her submission that she has a pending electoral protest
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal have any relevance where she has not sufficiently shown that PP
1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case.—In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no
personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of
public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a
legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that
the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she
has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has
not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once
more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
Same; Same; Same; Presidency; Parties; It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent—settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law; It
will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such.—It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it
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VOL. 489, MAY 3, 2006 169

is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch,
only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of
the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone.
Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the
mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
Presidency; Calling-Out Power; Declaration of State of National Emergency; Petitioners failed to show
that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual
basis.—As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test
that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,”
but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that “it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by way
of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.” Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by
issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017,
with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the
Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
170

Same; Same; Same; In times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a
certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it
obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.—In the final analysis, the various
approaches to emergency of the above political theorists—from Lock’s “theory of prerogative,” to Watkins’
doctrine of “constitutional dictatorship” and, eventually, to McIlwain’s “principle of constitutionalism”—
ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of
discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense
of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks. Our Constitution has fairly coped with
this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting
the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s “balanced
power structure.” Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress,
and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly
of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the
other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain.
In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain
amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him
to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Facial Challenges; Overbreadth Doctrine; The
overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech
cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases; A plain reading of PP 1017 shows
that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct—it is actually a call upon the AFP
to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.—A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth
doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First
Amendment cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent
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or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno, the US Supreme Court held
that “we have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment”
(freedom of speech).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct”—“overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”—The
overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “constitutionally unprotected
conduct.” In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held: It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when
a law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain
import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional
rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct—
even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state
interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus,
claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only “spoken words” and again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.” Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly
strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored.”—Facial
invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly and only as a last
resort,” and is “generally disfavored”; The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional
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rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied
will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains
further: The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers
to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as applied for” so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes
that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the
speech of those third parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; Related to the
“overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that “a law is facially invalid if men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,” and like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications.—Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too,
is unwarranted. Related to the “overbreadth” doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which holds that
“a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application.” It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that
a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitioners did not even at-
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tempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of
common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. Same; Same; Same;
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion.—Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater
power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater
the power, the greater are the limitations.
Same; Same; Same; In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion but also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest—
indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.—President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state
of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied
on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written,
as in the case of Sanlakas.
Same; Same; Same; Martial Law; PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law—it is plain therein that
what the President invoked was her calling-out power.—Some of the petitioners vehemently
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maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character
of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by
the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must,
upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the
restoration of order and the enforcement of law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from
Former President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081; We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President
Marcos legislative powers.—A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former
President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10,
Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1
of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling
clause states: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by
me personally or upon my direction.” Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by
President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees; President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to
Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars,
and General or Special Orders—she cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President
Marcos under PP 1081.—The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may
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issue any of the following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders.—Acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall
be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.—Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations.—Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders.—Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office
of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars.—Acts of
the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the
attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information
or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.—Acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
shall be issued as general or special orders. President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing
issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they
were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
the 1973 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.”—This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to “laws,” President Arroyo cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like—she can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.—As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has
no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.
With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs
laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can
only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Same; Same; Same; President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment but the exercise of emergency powers, such
as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different
matter.—It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but
also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from
the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the
Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the
President before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence
of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously
quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the
exercise of emergency powers.—Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to
be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a
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constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the
light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted,
relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of
emergency powers.
Same; Same; Same; Emergency Powers; Requisites for Valid Delegation; Generally, Congress is the
repository of emergency powers.—Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during
grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the
Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must
be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause, and the taking over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress—Section 17 refers to Congress,
not the President.—Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to
Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the
existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that
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which is accepted as normal—implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and
perception; Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United States since 1933, have
been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,
b) natural disaster, and c) national security; “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, may include
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide
proportions or effect.—Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term “emergency” under Section
17, Article XII refers to “tsunami,” “typhoon,” “hurricane” and “similar occurrences.” This is a limited view of
“emergency.” Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying
the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this
definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature
or executive in the United States since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations,
classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security.
“Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion,
economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide
proportions or effect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.—Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses
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affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains
to security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible.—
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military
necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in
the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the
press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; Courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although
they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application—
the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.—Settled is the rule that courts are not
at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined
from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular
case. PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power. Its general purpose is to
command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the
end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing
the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is
to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising
from its exertion. This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared
unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this
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were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court,
majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long
time ago.
Same; Same; Same; General orders are “acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines”—they are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law.—President
Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are “acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for
the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between
the official who issues them and the official who receives them. They are based on and are the product of,
a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object. For these reasons, one
requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. G.O. No.
5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.”
Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The plain import of the language of the Constitution is
that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest.—The Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secured in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.”The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police
must stand the protec-
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tive authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants
of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Right of Assembly; Words and Phrases; “Assembly” means a right on the part
of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs—it is a necessary consequence
of our republican institution and complements the right of speech; The right of the people to peaceably
assemble is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.—”Assembly” means a right on the part of the citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our
republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this
right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the
freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not
be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except,
of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and
not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime.—The ringing truth here is
that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They
were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted
the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral
argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon, it was held that peaceable
assembly cannot be made a crime, thus: Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the
conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free
speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting
was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend
the
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bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have
committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace
and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a
peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of
the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent”—tolerance is the rule
and limitation is the exception.—On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their
dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits previously issued
by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Tolerance
is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and
present danger that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show
or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was
eliminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged
with the local government units; When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a
democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.—
Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units.
They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the
determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and
heard on the revocation of their permits.
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The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal
defect. When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to
see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The warrantless search of the Daily Tribune’s offices is
illegal.—G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the
freedom of the press. Petitioners’ narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established
the following: first, the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives
seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the
morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity
of the Daily Tribune offices. x x x The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search
warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section
9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person
or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any
time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of the Press; The search of the Daily Tribune’s offices also
violated freedom of the press; The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of
freedom enjoyed by its media.—The search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a
free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of
Staff this Court held that—As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing
offices of the “Metropolitan
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Mail” and the “We Forum” newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of
the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners’ freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where
a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing
of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials
to media, are plain censorship—it is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the
citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to
say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey; The Supreme Court cannot tolerate the
blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens—freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.—While admittedly,
the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers
in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties.
The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The
Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is
that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed
to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so
rash as to disobey.Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because
of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right
even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights
of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta
principiis.
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Same; Same; Same; PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence but PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President
express or implied power (1) to issue decrees, (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President, and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.—The
Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to
enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not
been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said
G.O.—The Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President—acting as Commander-in-
Chief—addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also
provides a valid standard—that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism”
found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be
deemed deleted from the said G.O. While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media, no law has
been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority
in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
Same; Same; Same; It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive
civil rights are ends in themselves; How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic
without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the
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eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state; Two vital principles of constitutionalism: the
maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and, political responsibility of the government to the
governed.—It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are
ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without
unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state. During
emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not
be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty. Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the
theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government
the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the
maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Concurring Opinion:

Presidency; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Judicial Review; Supreme Court; Some of
those who drafted PP 1017 may be testing the outer limits of presidential prerogatives and the perseverance
of the Supreme Court in safeguarding the people’s constitutionally enshrined liberty.—The Dissent
dismisses all the Petitions, grants no reliefs to petitioners, and finds nothing wrong with PP 1017. It labels
the PP a harmless pronouncement—“an utter superfluity”—and denounces the ponencia as an “immodest
show of brawn” that “has imprudently placed the Court in the business of defanging paper tigers.” Under
this line of thinking, it would be perfectly legal for the President to reissue PP 1017 under its present
language and nuance. I respectfully disagree. Let us face it. Even Justice Tinga concedes that under PP
1017, the police—“to some minds”—“may have flirted with power.” With due respect, this is a masterful
understatement. PP 1017 may be a paper tiger, but—to borrow the colorful words of an erstwhile Asian
leader—it has nuclear teeth that must indeed be defanged. Some of those who drafted PP 1017 may be
testing the outer limits of presidential prerogatives and the perseverance of this Court in safeguarding the
people’s constitutionally enshrined liberty. They are playing with fire, and unless prudently restrained, they
may one day wittingly or unwittingly burn down the country. History will never forget, much less
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forgive, this Court if it allows such misadventure and refuses to strike down abuse at its inception.
Worse, our people will surely condemn the misuse of legal hocus pocus to justify this trifling with
constitutional sanctities.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Presidency; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Section 17, Article XII provision is not self-
executing as to be validly invoked by the President without congressional authorization—the President,
with all the powers vested in her by Article VII, cannot arrogate unto herself the power to take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
Congressional authorization.—The use of the word “State” as well as the reference to “reasonable terms”
under Section 17, Article XII can only pertain to Congress. In other words, the said provision is not self-
executing as to be validly invoked by the President without congressional authorization. The provision
merely declares a state economic policy during times of national emergency. As such, it cannot be taken
to mean as authorizing the President to exercise “takeover” powers pursuant to a declaration of a state of
national emergency. The President, with all the powers vested in her by Article VII, cannot arrogate unto
herself the power to take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without Congressional authorization. To do so would constitute an ultra vires act
on the part of the Chief Executive, whose powers are limited to the powers vested in her by Article VII, and
cannot extend to Article XII without the approval of Congress. Thus, the President’s authority to act in times
of national emergency is still subject to the limitations expressly prescribed by Congress. This is a featured
component of the doctrine of separation of powers, specifically, the principle of checks and balances as
applicable to the political branches of government, the executive and the legislature.
Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; We should bear in mind that in a democracy, constitutional
liberties must always be accorded supreme importance in the conduct of daily life; It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fear.—It cannot be gainsaid that government action to
stifle constitutional liberties guaranteed under the Bill of Rights cannot be preemptive in meeting any and
all perceived or potential threats to the life of the nation.
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Such threats must be actual, or at least gravely imminent, to warrant government to take proper action.
To allow government to preempt the happening of any event would be akin to “putting the cart before the
horse,” in a manner of speaking. State action is proper only if there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil which the state has a right to prevent. We should bear in mind that in a democracy,
constitutional liberties must always be accorded supreme importance in the conduct of daily life. At the
heart of these liberties lies freedom of speech and thought—not merely in the propagation of ideas we love,
but more importantly, in the advocacy of ideas we may oftentimes loathe. As succinctly articulated by
Justice Louis D. Brandeis: Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. x x x It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. x x x
But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech
where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be
immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and
attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear
and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was
advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.
TINGA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; The majority, by its ruling, has imprudently placed the Court in the
business of defanging paper tigers.—I regret to say that the majority, by its ruling today, has imprudently
placed the Court in the business of defanging paper tigers. The immodest show of brawn unfortunately
comes at the expense of an exhibition by the Court of a fundamental but sophisticated understanding of
the extent and limits of executive powers and prerogatives, as well as those assigned to the judicial branch.
I agree with the majority on some points, but I cannot join the majority opinion, as it proceeds to rule on
non-justiciable issues based on fears that have not materialized, departing as they do from the plain
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language of the challenged issuances to the extent of second-guessing the Chief Executive. I
respectfully dissent.
Presidency; Calling-Out Power; The “calling-out” of the police does not derive from the commander-
in-chief clause but from the power of the President as Chief Executive under Section 1, Article VII, and the
power of executive control under Section 18, Article VII.—Insofar as PP 1017 is concerned, the calling out
power is definitely involved, in view of the directive to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to “suppress all
forms of lawless violence.” But there are nuances to the calling out power invoked in PP 1017 which the
majority does not discuss. The directive “to suppress all forms of lawless violence” is addressed not only to
the Armed Forces but to the police as well. The “calling out” of the police does not derive from Section 17,
Article VII, or the commander-in-chief clause, our national police being civilian in character. Instead, the
calling out of the police is sourced from the power of the President as Chief Executive under Section 1,
Article VII, and the power of executive control under Section 18, Article VII. Moreover, while the permissible
scope of military action is limited to acts in furtherance of suppressing lawless violence, rebellion, invasion,
the police can be commanded by the President to execute all laws without distinction in light of the
presidential duty to execute all laws.
Same; Same; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Neither the declaration of a state of
emergency under PP 1017 nor the invocation of the calling out power therein authorizes warrantless
arrests, searches or seizures; the infringement of the right to free expression, peaceable assembly and
association and other constitutional or statutory rights.—If it cannot be made more clear, neither the
declaration of a state of emergency under PP 1017 nor the invocation of the calling out power therein
authorizes warrantless arrests, searches or seizures; the infringement of the right to free expression,
peaceable assembly and association and other constitutional or statutory rights. Any public officer who
nonetheless engaged or is engaging in such extra-constitutional or extra-legal acts in the name of PP 1017
may be subjected to the appropriate civil, criminal or administrative liability.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike in the 1987 Constitution, which was appropriately crafted with an aversion
to the excesses of Marcosian martial rule, the 1935 Constitution under which PP 1081 was issued
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left no intervening safeguards that tempered or limited the declaration of martial law.—Let us examine
the differences between PP No. 1081 and PP 1017. First, while PP 1017 merely declared the existence of
a state of rebellion, an act ultimately observational in character, PP 1081 “placed the entire Philippines
under martial law,” an active implement that, by itself, substituted civilian governmental authority with
military authority. Unlike in the 1986 Constitution, which was appropriately crafted with an aversion to the
excesses of Marcosian martial rule, the 1935 Constitution under which PP 1081 was issued left no
intervening safeguards that tempered or limited the declaration of martial law. Even the contrast in the verbs
used, “place” as opposed to “declare,” betrays some significance. To declare may be simply to acknowledge
the existence of a particular condition, while to place ineluctably goes beyond mere acknowledgement, and
signifies the imposition of the actual condition even if it did not exist before.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Laws and decrees” in PP 1017 do not relate only to those
promulgated by President Arroyo, but other laws enacted by past sovereigns, whether they be in the form
of the Marcos presidential decrees, or acts enacted by the American Governor-General such as the Revised
Penal Code.—Further proof that “laws and decrees” stand as a class distinct from “orders and regulations”
is the qualifying phrase “promulgated by me,” which necessarily refers only to orders and regulations.
Otherwise, PP 1017 would be ridiculous in the sense that the obedience to be enforced only relates to laws
promulgated by President Arroyo since she assumed office in 2001. “Laws and decrees” do not relate only
to those promulgated by President Arroyo, but other laws enacted by past sovereigns, whether they be in
the form of the Marcos presidential decrees, or acts enacted by the American Governor-General such as
the Revised Penal Code. Certainly then, such a qualification sufficiently addresses the fears of the majority
that PP 1017 somehow empowers or recognizes the ability of the current President to promulgate decrees.
Instead, the majority pushes an interpretation that, if pursued to its logical end, suggests that the President
by virtue of PP 1017 is also arrogating unto herself, the power to promulgate laws, which are in the mold of
enactments from Congress. Again, in this respect, the grouping of “laws” and “decrees” separately from
“orders” and “regulations” signifies that the President
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has not arrogated unto herself the power to issue decrees in the mold of the infamous Marcos decrees.
Same; The unique nature of the office affords the President the opportunity to profoundly influence
the public discourse, not necessarily through the enactment or enforcement of laws, but specially by the
mere expediency of taking a stand on the issues of the day.—The unique nature of the office affords the
President the opportunity to profoundly influence the public discourse, not necessarily through the
enactment or enforcement of laws, but specially by the mere expediency of taking a stand on the issues of
the day. Indeed, the President is expected to exercise leadership not merely through the proposal and
enactment of laws, but by making such vital stands. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt popularized the
notion of the presidency as a “bully pulpit,” in line with his belief that the President was the steward of the
people limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or impleaded
by Congress under its constitutional powers.
Same; The President, as head of state, very well has the capacity to use the office to garner support
for those great national quests that define a civilization.—Yet the President is not precluded, in the exercise
of such role, to be merely responsive. The popular expectation in fact is of a pro-active, dynamic chief
executive with an ability to identify problems or concerns at their incipience and to respond to them with all
legal means at the earliest possible time. The President, as head of state, very well has the capacity to use
the office to garner support for those great national quests that define a civilization, as President Kennedy
did when by a mere congressional address, he put America on track to the goal of placing a man on the
moon. Those memorable presidential speeches memorized by schoolchildren may have not, by
themselves, made operative any law, but they served not only merely symbolic functions, but help
profoundly influence towards the right direction, the public opinion in the discourse of the times. Perhaps
there was no more dramatic example of the use of the “bully pulpit” for such noble purposes than in 1964,
when an American President from Texas stood before a Congress populated by many powerful bigots, and
fully committed himself as no other President before to the cause of civil rights with his intonation of those
lines from the civil rights anthem, “we shall overcome.”
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Same; Declaration of a State of National Emergency; The declaration of a state of emergency, on
premises of a looming armed threat which have hardly been disputed, falls within such proper functions of
the President as the defender of the Constitution—it was designed to inform the people of the existence of
such a threat, with the expectation that the citizenry would not aid or abet those who would overturn through
force the democratic government.—The President as Chief Government Spokesperson of the democratic
ideals is entrusted with a heady but comfortable pursuit. But no less vital, if somewhat graver, is the role of
the President as the Chief Defender of the democratic way of life. The “calling out” power assures the
President such capability to a great extent, yet it will not fully suffice as a defense of democracy. There is a
need for the President to rally the people to defend the Constitution which guarantees the democratic way
of life, through means other than coercive. I assert that the declaration of a state of emergency, on premises
of a looming armed threat which have hardly been disputed, falls within such proper functions of the
President as the defender of the Constitution. It was designed to inform the people of the existence of such
a threat, with the expectation that the citizenry would not aid or abet those who would overturn through
force the democratic government. At the same time, the Proclamation itself does not violate the Constitution
as it does not call for or put into operation the suspension or withdrawal of any constitutional rights, or even
create or diminish any substantive rights.
Same; Same; The fact that Section 17, Article XII, is purposely ambivalent as to whether the President
may exercise the power therein with or without congressional approval leads me to conclude that it is
constitutionally permissible to recognize exceptions, such as in extreme situations wherein obtention of
congressional authority is impossible or inexpedient considering the emergency.—I concede that it is
fundamentally sound to construe Section 17 as requiring congressional authority or approval before the
takeover under the provision may be effected. After all, the taking over of a privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest would involve an infringement on the right of private enterprise to
profit; or perhaps even expropriation for a limited period. Constitutionally, the taking of property can only be
accomplished with due process of law, and the enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms
and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers of
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the State under Section 17 stands as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.
The fact that Section 17 is purposely ambivalent as to whether the President may exercise the power therein
with or without congressional approval leads me to conclude that it is constitutionally permissible to
recognize exceptions, such as in extreme situations wherein obtention of congressional authority is
impossible or inexpedient considering the emergency. I thus dissent to any proposition that such
requirement is absolute under all circumstances. I maintain that in such extreme situations, the President
may exercise such authority subject to judicial review. It should be admitted that some emergencies are
graver and more imminent than others. It is not within the realm of impossibility that by reason of a
particularly sudden and grave emergency, Congress may not be able to convene to grant the necessary
congressional authority to the President. Certainly, if bombs from a foreign invader are falling over Manila
skies, it may be difficult, not to mention unnecessarily onerous, to require convening Congress before the
President may exercise the functions under Section 17, Article XII. The proposition of the majority may be
desirable as the general rule, but the correct rule that should be adopted by the Court should not be so
absolute so as to preclude the exercise by the President of such power under extreme situations.
Same; Same; In truth, the Court’s pronouncement on Section 17, Article XII, is actually obiter.—
Considering that the authorized or actual takeover under Section 17, Article XII, is not presented as a
properly justiciable issue. Nonetheless, and consistent with the general tenor, the majority has undertaken
to decide this non-justiciable issue, and to even place their view in the dispositive portion in a bid to enshrine
it as doctrine. In truth, the Court’s pronouncement on this point is actually obiter. It is hoped that should the
issue become ripe for adjudication before this Court, the obiter is not adopted as a precedent without the
qualification that in extreme situations wherein congressional approval is impossible or highly impractical
to obtain, the powers under Section 17, Article XII may be authorized by the President.
Freedom of Expression; Overbreadth Doctrine; “Void for Vagueness” Doctrine; The two concepts of
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, while related, are distinct from each other—the doctrine of
overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom
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of speech while the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that
regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional right (not merely those that regulate speech or other
fundamental constitutional rights).—As I noted in my Separate Opinion in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,
435 SCRA 371, 395-406 (2004), citing Justice Kapunan, there is a viable distinction between “void for
vagueness” and “overbreadth” which the majority sadly ignores. A view has been proffered that “vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws.” These two concepts, while related, are distinct
from each other. On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon
freedom of speech. On the other hand, the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies to criminal laws, not
merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional right. (not merely those that regulate
speech or other fundamental constitutional rights.) The fact that a particular criminal statute does not
infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot
succeed. The distinction may prove especially crucial since there has been a long line of cases in American
Supreme Court jurisprudence wherein penal statutes have been invalidated on the ground that they were
“void for vagueness.” As I cited in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, these cases are Connally v. General
Construction Co., Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, Bouie v. City of Columbia, Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, Kolender v. Lawson, and City of Chicago v. Morales. Granting that perhaps as a general rule,
overbreadth may find application only in “free speech” cases, it is on the other hand very settled doctrine
that a penal statute regulating conduct, not speech, may be invalidated on the ground of “void for
vagueness.” In Romualdez, I decried the elevation of the suspect and radical new doctrine that the “void
for vagueness” challenge cannot apply other than in free speech cases. My view on this point has not
changed, and insofar as the ponencia would hold otherwise, I thus dissent.
Criminal Law; Terrorism; Even without an operative law specifically defining terrorism, the State
already has the power to suppress and punish such acts of terrorism, insofar as such acts are already
punishable, as they almost always are, in our extant general penal laws.—The majority correctly concludes
that General Order No. 5 is generally constitutional. However, they make an unnecessary distinction with
regard to “acts of terrorism,” pointing out that
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Congress has not yet passed a law defining and punishing terrorism or acts of terrorism. That may be
the case, but does the majority seriously suggest that the President or the State is powerless to suppress
acts of terrorism until the word “terrorism” is defined by law? Terrorism has a widely accepted meaning that
encompasses many acts already punishable by our general penal laws. There are several United Nations
and multilateral conventions on terrorism, as well as declarations made by the United Nations General
Assembly denouncing and seeking to combat terrorism. There is a general sense in international law as to
what constitutes terrorism, even if no precise definition has been adopted as binding on all nations. Even
without an operative law specifically defining terrorism, the State already has the power to suppress and
punish such acts of terrorism, insofar as such acts are already punishable, as they almost always are, in
our extant general penal laws. The President, tasked with the execution of all existing laws, already has a
sufficient mandate to order the Armed Forces to combat those acts of terrorism that are already punishable
in our Revised Penal Code, such as rebellion, coup d’etat, murder, homicide, arson, physical injuries, grave
threats, and the like. Indeed, those acts which under normal contemplation would constitute terrorism are
associated anyway with or subsumed under lawless violence, which is a term found in the Constitution
itself. Thus long ago, the State has already seen it fit to punish such acts.
Declaration of a State of National Emergency; Judicial Review; Searches and Seizures; The problem
with directly adjudicating that the injuries inflicted on David, et al., as illegal, would be that such would have
been done with undue haste, through an improper legal avenue, without the appropriate trial of facts, and
without even impleading the particular officers who effected the arrests/searches/ seizures.—I respectfully
disagree with the manner by which the majority would treat the “void as applied” argument presented by
the petitioners. The majority adopts the tack of citing three particular injuries alleged by the petitioners as
inflicted with the implementation of PP 1017. The majority analyzes the alleged injuries, correlates them to
particular violations of the Bill of Rights, and ultimately concludes that such violations were illegal. The
problem with this approach is that it would forever deem the Court as a trier or reviewer at first instance
over questions involving the validity of warrantless arrests, searches, seizures and the dispersal of rallies,
196

all of which entail a substantial level of factual determination. I agree that PP 1017 does not expand
the grounds for warrantless arrests, searches and seizures or dispersal of rallies, and that the proclamation
cannot be invoked before any court to assert the validity of such unauthorized actions. Yet the problem with
directly adjudicating that the injuries inflicted on David, et al., as illegal, would be that such would have been
done with undue haste, through an improper legal avenue, without the appropriate trial of facts, and without
even impleading the particular officers who effected the arrests/searches/seizures.
Same; Same; Same; While the Court will not be harmed by a symbolic reaffirmation of commitment
to the principles in the Bill of Rights, it will be harmed by a ruling that unduly and inappropriately expands
the very limited function of the Court as a trier of facts on first instance.—I understand that the injurious acts
complained of by the petitioners upon the implementation of PP 1017 are a source of grave concern.
Indubitably, any person whose statutory or constitutional rights were violated in the name of PP 1017 or
General Order No. 5 deserves redress in the appropriate civil or criminal proceeding, and even the minority
wishes to makes this point as emphatically clear, if not moreso, as the majority. Yet a ruling from this Court,
without the proper factual basis or prayer for remuneration for the injury sustained, would ultimately be
merely symbolic. While the Court will not be harmed by a symbolic reaffirmation of commitment to the
principles in the Bill of Rights, it will be harmed by a ruling that unduly and inappropriately expands the very
limited function of the Court as a trier of facts on first instance. Same; Same; The function of the Supreme
Court is to make legal pronouncements not based on “obvious” facts, but on proven facts.—In my dissent
in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309, 335-348 (2004), I alluded to the fact that our legal system may
run counter-intuitive in the sense that the seemingly or obviously guilty may still, after trial, be properly
acquitted or exonerated; to the extent that even an accused who murders another person in front of live
television cameras broadcast to millions of sets is not yet necessarily guilty of the crime of murder or
homicide. Hence, the necessity of a proper trial so as to allow the entire factual milieu to be presented,
tested and evaluated before the court. In my theoretical example, the said accused should nonetheless be
acquitted if the
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presence of exempting circumstances is established. The same principle applies in these cases.
Certainly, we in the Court can all agree that PP 1017 cannot be invoked to justify acts by the police or
military officers that go beyond the Constitution and the laws. But the course of prudence dictates that the
pronouncement of such a doctrine, while enforceable in a court of law, should not yet extend itself to specific
examples that have not yet been properly litigated. The function of this Court is to make legal
pronouncements not based on “obvious” facts, but on proven facts.
Same; By deciding non-justiciable issues and prejudging cases and controversies without a proper
trial on the merits, the majority has diminished the potency of the Court’s constitutional power in favor of
rhetorical statements that afford no quantifiable relief—it is for the poet and the politician to pen beautiful
paeans to the people’s rights and liberties, it is for the Court to provide for viable legal means to enforce
and safeguard these rights and liberties.—The country-wide attention that the instant petitions have drawn
should not make the Court lose focus on its principal mission, which is to settle the law of the case. On the
contrary, the highly political nature of these petitions should serve as forewarning for the Court to
proceed ex abundante cautelam, lest the institution be unduly dragged into the partisan mud. The credibility
of the Court is ensured by making decisions in accordance with the Constitution without regard to the
individual personalities involved; with sights set on posterity, oblivious of the popular flavor of the day. By
deciding non-justiciable issues and prejudging cases and controversies without a proper trial on the merits,
the majority has diminished the potency of this Court’s constitutional power in favor of rhetorical statements
that afford no quantifiable relief. It is for the poet and the politician to pen beautiful paeans to the people’s
rights and liberties, it is for the Court to provide for viable legal means to enforce and safeguard these rights
and liberties. When the passions of these times die down, and sober retrospect accedes, the decision of
this Court in these cases will be looked upon as an extended advisory opinion.
[Nos. L-8895 and L-9191. April 30, 1957]

SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET
AL., respondents. EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL., petitioners and appellees, vs. SALVADOR
ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., respondents and appellants.
1. 1.PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

EXECUTIVE ORDER PROPER SUBJECT OF ACTION.—The constitutionality of an executive
order can be ventilated in a declaratory relief proceeding. (Hilado vs. De la Costa, 83 Phil., 471).
1. 2.ID.; APPEALS; EFFECT ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; EXCEPTION.—It is an elementary

rule of procedure that an appeal stays the execution of a judgment. However in injunction,
receivership and patent accounting cases, a judgment shall not be stayed after its rendition and
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal unless otherwise ordered by the
court. (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court):
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; INJUNCTION; ISSUANCE RESTS IN SOUND DISCRETION OF COURT; CASE AT
BAR.—The State's counsel contends that while judgment could be stayed in injunction,
receivership and patent accounting cases, the present complaint, although styled "Injunction
and/or Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction," is one for declaratory relief, there being no
allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the plaintiffs intended it to be one for injunction. But
aside from the title of the complaint, plaintiffs pray for the declaration of the nullity of Executive
Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and for such other
relief as may be deemed just and equitable. This Court has already held that there are only two
requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the right sought to
be protected, and that the acts against which the injunc
329
VOL. 101, APRIL 30, 1957 329
Araneta, et al. vs. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et al.
1. tion is to be directed are violative of said right (North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Serafin Hidalgo,
63 Phil., 664). There is no question that in the case at bar, at least 11 of the complaining trawl
operators were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters of the Philippines, and it is
undeniable that the executive enactments sought to be annulled are detrimental to their interests.
And considering further that the granting or refusal of an injunction, whether temporary or
permanent, rests in the sound discretion of the Court, taking into account the circumstances and
the facts of the particular case (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 42 Off. Gaz., 2439), the trial Court committed
no abuse of discretion when it treated the complaint as one for injunction and declaratory relief
and executed the judgment pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS is ONE AGAINST

GOVERNMENT; BOND REQUIREMENT.—An Action against Government officials sued in their
official capacity, is essentially one against the Government, and to require these officials to file a
bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or damages
that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines (L.
S. Moom and Co. vs. Harrison, 43 Phil., 39; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil., 724-727, and others).
The reason for this pronouncement is understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent
(Tolentino vs. Carlos, 66 Phil., 140; Government of the P. I. vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo,
34 Phil., 157, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez et al. vs. Camus et al., 96 Phil., 114).
1. 5.FISHERIES LAW; TRAWL FISHING; WHO MAY BAN OR RESTRICT TRAWL

FISHING; POWER OF PRESIDENT THROUGH EXECUTIVE ORDERS, TO BAN TRAWL
FISHING.—Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries Law, the restriction and banning of trawl
fishing from all Philippine waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, who, in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution
of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in
Philippine waters. However, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its
functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Section
75, Revised Administrative Code), the President can exercise the same power and authority
through executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations upon recommendation of the
Secretary concerned (Section 79-A, Revised Adminis
330
Araneta, et al. vs. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et al.
1. trative Code). Hence, Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, restricting and banning
of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay (Camarines) are valid and issued by authority of law.
1. 6.ID.; ID.; I D.; ID.; EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.—For the protection of fry or fish eggs and
small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of Act No. 4003, to prohibit
the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete the supply
of sea food, and to that end authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic
resources of the land. In so far as the protection of fish fry or fish eggs is concerned the Fisheries
Act is complete in itself leaving only to the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources the
promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. Consequently, when
the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued
Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised
within the San Miguel Bay, he ,did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the
inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Section 63, Revised
Administrative Code) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. The exercise
of such authority did not, therefore, constitute an undue delegation of the powers of Congress.
G.R. No. 168613. March 5, 2013.*

ATTY. MA. ROSARIO S. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, petitioner, vs. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 185571. March 5, 2013.*
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. MA. ROSARIO S. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; The doctrine of qualified political agency,
also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of
Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939).—The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego
doctrine, was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939).
In said case, the Department of Justice, upon the request
_______________
* EN BANC.
360
Manalang-Demigillo vs. Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP)
of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found him guilty of bribery,
extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to the President the
suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the recommendation, the
Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his suspension,
asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office because there was no
specific law granting such power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was
empowered to suspend local government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his
suspension, holding that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the
Secretary of Interior.
Same; Same; The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the
various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such
heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President
himself should disapprove such acts.—The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that
the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions
taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless
the President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our
presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that
the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the
multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive
Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President
cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Requisites Before a Public Official or Employee May be Dropped
from the Rolls.—Under Section (b), Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998, an official or employee
may be dropped from the rolls provided the following requisites are present, namely: (1) the official or
employee was rated poor in performance for one evaluation period; (2) the official or employee was notified
in writing of the status of her performance not later
361
VOL. 692, MARCH 5, 2013 361
Manalang-Demigillo vs. Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP)
than the 4th month of the rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve her performance
within the remaining period of the semester shall warrant her separation from the service; and (3) such
notice contained adequate information that would enable her to prepare an explanation.
G.R. No. 103702. December 6, 1994.*

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R.
ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C.
UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M.
MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA and
FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA,
MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC,
JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.
Appeals; Certiorari; Practice and Procedure; Where the petitioners raise in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rules 42 and 45 the issue of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction, they intend to submit their case under Rule 65.—Petitioners consider the instant petition to be
one for “review on certiorari” under Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they
question the orders of the lower court for having been issued with “grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct said Orders, to protect their rights and to secure a
final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues involved.” Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to
submit their case in this instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.
Actions; Quo Warranto; Municipal Corporations; Parties; When the inquiry is focused on the legal
existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other
direct proceeding.—The special civil action of quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by which the Government
can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.”
_______________
* EN BANC.
12
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr.
When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State
in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct proceeding. It must be brought “in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines” and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal “when directed by the
President of the Philippines x x x.” Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action “at
the request and upon the relation of another person” with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court
also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be
done when he claims to be “entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.” While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the
authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
Same; Same; Same; A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision
must be timely raised.—Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued
on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality
of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal
District, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority
of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question
his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly
filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the
lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Even if Executive Order No. 353 creating the Municipality
of San Andres is a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
the peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Municipality to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact
attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.—Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete
nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to
have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue
of Executive Order
13
VOL. 239, DECEMBER 6, 1994 13
No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24
December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a
similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On
the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of
the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order
No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the
income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment
of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits
organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been
covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
Same; Same; Same; Local Government Code; The power to create political subdivisions is a function
of the legislature; Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code converted municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders into regular municipalities.—At the present time, all
doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Repre-sentatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution,
the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing
the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government
Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” No pretension of
unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful
whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function
of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Curative statutes are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.—Curative laws, which
14
in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving “validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,” are validly accepted in this jurisdiction,
subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
No. L-23825. December 24, 1965.

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Administrative law; Power of President to create municipalities.—Since January 1, 1960, when
Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding" provincial board "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This statutory denial of the presidential authority to
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists
of several barrios.
Same; Same; Nature of power to create municipalities.—Whereas the power to f ix a common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake
of an administrative nature—involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the
law creating" said municipalities—the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature,
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for valid delegation of power.—Although Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential that said
570
Pelaez vs. Auditor General
law: (a) be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable—to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of due delegation of power not met by Section 68 of
Revised Administrative Code.—Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to the
President the power to create municipalities, does not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Abdication of powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.—
If the validity of said delegation of powers, made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, were
upheld. there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to
do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of
authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring
about a total collapse of the democratic system established by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Nature of powers dealt with in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.—
It is true that in Calalang vs. WiIliams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of
the authority to execute the law. But the doctrine laid down in these cases must be construed in relation to
the specific facts and Issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have
no binding effect. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of
their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the
powers dealt with in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The creation of municipalities being
essentially and eminently legislative in character, the question whether or not "public interest" demands the
exercise of such power is not one of fact It is purely a legislative question (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs.
Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof that issuance of Executive Orders in question enteils exercise of
purely legislative functions.—The fact that Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 128 to 129, creating
thirty-three municipalities, were issued
571
VOL. 15, DECEMBER 24, 1965 571
after the legislative bills for the creation of the said municipalities had failed to pass Congress, is the
best proof that their issuance entails the exercise of purely legislative functions.
Same; Same; Same; Power of control over local governments.—The power of control under Section
10 (a) of Article X of the Constitution implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus or offices of the
national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to
the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law
permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere
with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may
not, for instance, suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against
him, 'except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. If, on the other hand, the
President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of' its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would
thereby become vacant (Section 2179, Revised Administrative Code). Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality, without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to
his dictation; thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 68, Revised Administrative Code repealed by the Constitution.—
The power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices under Section 10(a)
of Article X of the Constitution implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof
or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the
authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence,
the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the 'exercise
by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in
him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over
executive departments, bureaus or offices. Even if, therefore, it did not entail an undue delegation of
legislative powers, as
572
it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10,
1967, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. (De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289,
298299.)
Same; Same; Same; Municipal officials concerned duly represented in present case.—lt is contended
that not all the proper parties have been impleaded in the present case. Suffice it to say that the records do
not show, and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of the municipalities concerned have been
appointed or elected and have assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on
behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government
of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of
the municipalities involved in this case, which involves a political, not proprietary function. said local officials,
if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case has
accordingly been duly represented. (Mangubat vs. Osmeña, Jr., G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959; City of
Cebu vs. Judge Piccio, G.R. Nos L-13012 & 14876. December 81, 1960.)
Same; Same; Action not premature.—The present action cannot be said to be premature simply
because respondent Auditor General has not yet acted on any of the executive orders in question and has
not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is a matter of common knowledge that the
President has for many years issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same
have been organized and are in actual operation, thus indicating without peradventure or doubt, that the
expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing
Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe that respondent would adopt a different policy as
regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and
none has been made by him.
G.R. No. 124360. November 5, 1997.*

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Courts; The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law.—Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary
to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.
Same; Same; Same; The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where
the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.—The effort of
respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too
lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where
the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental sig-
_______________
* EN BANC.
331
VOL. 281, NOVEMBER 5, 1997 331

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy
nificance to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, we
stressed: “x x x Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and
in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure
and has taken cognizance of these petitions.”
Same; Same; Same; Court holds that Section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.—In G.R. No. 124360
where petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential
violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal
construction of the one title—one subject rule. We have consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully
index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated
in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. We hold that section 5(b)
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our
country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.
Same; Same; Same; Two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power.—“There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running
332

riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.”
Same; Same; Same; Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test.—Given the groove of the Court’s rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the
ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A.
No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any
event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation.
Same; Same; Same; Court holds that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards
set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund.—But
petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the
depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997.
A perusal of Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be
considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF
fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the
debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to
deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We therefore hold that the Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair
competition.—R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that “if for any reason, any
section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall
remain in full force and effect.” This separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending
333
VOL. 281, NOVEMBER 5, 1997 333

provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.A. No.
8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.
Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing
inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market
forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these
vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no
real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing
and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain
unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their
pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where
competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.
KAPUNAN, J., Separate Opinion
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Courts; The tariff differential between imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products defeats the purpose of the law and should thus be struck down.—Since the prospective
oil companies do not (as yet) have local refineries, they would have to import refined petroleum products,
on which a 7% tariff duty is imposed. On the other hand, the existing oil companies already have domestic
refineries and, therefore, only import crude oil which is taxed at a lower rate of 3%. Tariffs are part of the
costs of production. Hence, this means that with the 4% tariff differential (which becomes an added cost)
the prospective players would have higher production costs compared to the existing oil companies and it
is precisely this factor which could seriously affect its decision to enter the market. Viewed in this light, the
tariff differential between imported crude oil and refined petroleum products becomes an obstacle to the
entry of new players in the Philippine oil market. It defeats the purpose of the law and should thus be struck
down.
PANGANIBAN, J., Concurring Opinion
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Courts; Court has the duty, not just the power, to determine whether a
law or a part thereof offends
334

the Constitution and, if so, to annul and set aside.—Under the Constitution, this Court has—in
appropriate cases—the DUTY, not just the power, to determine whether a law or a part thereof offends the
Constitution and, if so, to annul and set aside. Because a serious challenge has been hurled against the
validity of one such law, namely RA 8180—its criticality having been preliminary determined from the
petition, comments, reply and, most tellingly, the oral argument on September 30, 1997—this Court, in the
exercise of its mandated judicial discretion, issued the status quo order to prevent the continued
enforcement and implementation of a law that was prima facie found to be constitutionally infirm. Indeed,
after careful final deliberation, said law is now ruled to be constitutionally defective thereby disabling
respondent oil companies from exercising their erstwhile power, granted by such defective statute, to
determine prices by themselves.
Same; Same; Same; Court has the prerogative to uphold the Constitution and to strike down and
annul a law that contravenes the Charter.—Concededly, this Court has no power to pass upon the wisdom,
merits and propriety of the acts of its co-equal branches in government. However, it does have the
prerogative to uphold the Constitution and to strike down and annul a law that contravenes the Charter.
From such duty and prerogative, it shall never shirk or shy away.
MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Courts; The submissions of petitioners require a review of issues that
are in the nature of political questions, hence, clearly beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.—The instant
petitions do not raise a justiciable controversy as the issues raised therein pertain to the wisdom and
reasonableness of the provisions of the assailed law. The contentions made by petitioners, that the
“imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products will not
foster a truly competitive market, nor will it level the playing fields” and that said imposition “does not
deregulate the downstream oil industry, instead, it controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of
the law,” are clearly policy matters which are within the province of the political departments of the
government. These submissions require a review of issues that are in the nature of political questions,
hence, clearly beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.
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VOL. 281, NOVEMBER 5, 1997 335

Same; Same; Same; Political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
the legality, of a particular measure.—A political question refers to a question of policy or to issues which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
Generally, political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular measure.
Same; Same; Same; Actions; The existence of a constitutional issue in a case does not per se confer
or clothe a legislator with locus standi to bring suit.—The petitioners do not have the necessary locus
standi to file the instant consolidated petitions. Petitioners Lagman, Arroyo, Garcia, Tanada, and Tatad
assail the constitutionality of the above-stated laws through the instant consolidated petitions in their
capacity as members of Congress, and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. However, the existence of a
constitutional issue in a case does not per se confer or clothe a legislator with locus standi to bring suit.
In Phil. Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) v. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994]), we held that members
of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government only
upon showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators.
In Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Morato, et al. (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), this Court further clarified that “if the
complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the power of Congress, legislators do not have standing to
question the validity of any law or official action.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8180 clearly does not violate or impair prerogatives,
powers, and rights of Congress, or the individual members thereof.—Republic Act No. 8180 clearly does
not violate or impair prerogatives, powers, and rights of Congress, or the individual members thereof,
considering that the assailed official act is the very act of Congress itself authorizing the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Neither can petitioners sue as taxpayers or concerned citizens.—Neither
can petitioners sue as taxpayers or concerned citizens. A condition sine qua non for the institution of a
taxpayer’s suit is an allegation that the assailed action is an unconstitutional exercise of the spending
powers of Congress or that it constitutes an illegal disbursement of public funds. The instant
336

consolidated petitions do not allege that the assailed provisions of the law amount to an illegal
disbursement of public money. Hence, petitioners cannot, even as taxpayers or concerned citizens, invoke
this Court’s power of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must
be direct and personal.—Further, petitioners, including Flag, FDC, and Sanlakas, can not be deemed
proper parties for lack of a particularized interest or elemental substantial injury necessary to confer on
them locus standi. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. Petitioners have not established such kind of
interest.
Same; Same; Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the “one title-one subject” rule
under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.—Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative
of the “one title-one subject” rule under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. It is not required that a
provision of law be expressed in the title thereof as long as the provision in question is embraced within the
subject expressed in the title of the law. The “title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents
and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title.” (Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343
[1989]) An “act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general object.”
Same; Same; Same; The conference committee can even include an amendment in the nature of a
substitute so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bill before it.—As regards the power
of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its
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VOL. 281, NOVEMBER 5, 1997 337

report an entirely new provision that is neither found in the House bill or Senate bill, this Court already
upheld such power in Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994]), where we ruled that the
conference committee can even include an amendment in the nature of a substitute so long as such
amendment is germane to the subject of the bill before it.
FRANCISCO, J., Dissenting Opinion
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Courts; Congress is not required to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein.—The interpretation of “one subject-one title” rule, however, is never intended to impede or stifle
legislation. The requirement is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction and it would be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the enactment are
germane and material to the general subject. Congress is not required to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. All that is required is that the title should not cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by
no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection.
Same; Same; Same; If a particular statute is within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact,
it should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment.—Perhaps it bears
reiterating that the question of validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of
the government, and the courts will resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts will assume
that the validity of the statute was fully considered by the legislature when adopted. The wisdom or
advisability of a particular statute is not a question for the courts to determine. If a particular statute is within
the constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be sustained whether the courts agree or not
in the wisdom of its enactment. This Court continues to recognize that in the determination of actual cases
and controversies, it must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative branches of government. Thus, the presumption is always
in favor of constitutionality for it is likewise always presumed that in the enactment of a law or the adoption
of a policy it is the people who speak through their representatives. This principle is one of
338

caution and circumspection in the exercise of the grave and delicate function of judicial review.
[No. L-2662. March 26, 1949]
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. M AJOR GENERAL RAFAEL JALANDONI, BRIGADIER GENERAL CALIXTO
DUQUE, COLONEL MARGARITO TORALBA, COLONEL IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, COLONEL PEDRO TABUENA,
M AJOR FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68 ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL W AR CRIMES
OFFICE.—Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day
of July, 1947, is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3 that "The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."
2.INTERNATIONAL LAW; VIOLATORS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF W AR, OF HUMANITY AND CIVILIZATION,
LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF.—In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international
law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant pre-
cedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or
civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and
customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor*
3.ID.; POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.—In the promulgation and enforcement of Executive
Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted
principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.
4.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES.—The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers
as Commander in Chief of all our armed forces.
172
kurada vs. Jalandoni
5.ID. ; ID.—The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect
of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of
Executive Order No. 68.
6.INTERNATIONAL LAW; HAGUE AND GENEVA CONVENTIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES; EVEN
IF THE PHILIPPINES WAS NOT SIGNATORY THEREOF, PROVISIONS OF PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN
COMPREHENSIVE TO THAT EFFECT.—The rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions
form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who
were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of
our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government
may have been or shall be a signatory.
7.ID.; RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A NATION WERE NOT ERASED BY ASSUMPTION OF FULL SOVEREIGNTY; RIGHT
TO TRY AND PUNISH CRIMES THERETOFORE COMMITTED.—When the crimes charged against petitioner
were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we
were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations
contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased
by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the
right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.—War crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth, are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
9.MILITARY COMMISSION GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAW.—Military Commission is a special military tribunal
governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts.
10.MILITARY COMMISSION; COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE IT NOT NECESSARILY A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE
BAR.—There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before said
commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules
of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the
173
VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949 173
parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
11.ID.; TRIAL OF W AR CRIMES BEFORE PHILIPPINE COURTS; ALLOWANCE OF AMERICAN ATTORNEYS TO
REPRESENT UNITED STATES.—The appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our
national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication
of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty, it
has not been by our government but by the United States Government Which has yielded to us the trial
and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them
representation in said trials.
12.ID.; ID.; ID.—It is of common knowledge that the United States and its people have been equally, if not
more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military
Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the
vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
13.ID.; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT W ILL NOT INTERFERE WITH DUE PROCESSES OF MILITARY
COMMISSION.—The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction
over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody; this court will not
interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. Per Perfecto, J., dissenting:
14.ATTORNEYS AT LAW; ALIENS CANNOT PRACTICE LAW.—It appearing that Attys. Hussey and Port are aliens
and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, they cannot appear as prosecutors
in a case pending before the War Crimes Commission.
15.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS; EXCEPTION.—While there is no express
provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by agencies other than
Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the constitu-
tional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to, the
veto power of the President, to his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to place any part of the
Philippines under martial law, and to
174
the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
16.ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWERS OF DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS.—Because the powers vested
by our Constitution to the several departments of the government are in the nature of grants, not a
recognition of pre-existing powers, no department of the government may exercise any power or
authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue of express authority of the
Constitution.
17.ID.; ID.; POWER OF PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE EXECUTIVE ORDER DEFINING AND ALLOCATING JURISDICTION
FOR PROSECUTION OF W AR CRIMES ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS.—The provision in Executive Order No. 68
(series of 1947) of the President of the Philippines, that persons accused as war criminals shall be tried
by military commissions, is clearly legislative in nature and intends to confer upon military commissions
jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war crimes. But, the power to define and allocate jurisdiction
for the prosecution of persons accused of crimes is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress.
18.ID.; ID.; POWER TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT OFFICE.—Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War
Crimes Office; but, the power to establish government offices is essentially legislative.
19.ID.; RULE-MAKING POWER OF SUPREME COURT; PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER, MUCH LESS DELEGATE SUCH A
POWER, TO PROVIDE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCT OF TRIALS.—Executive Order No. 68 provides
rules of procedure for the conduct of trials before the War Crimes Office. This provision on procedural
subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court. It further authorizes military commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the President
of the Philippines cannot exercise the rulemaking power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commissions.
20.ID,; LEGISLATIVE POWER VESTED IN CONGRESS; USURPATION OF POWER TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS.—
Executive Order No. 68 appropriates funds for the expenses of the National War Crimes Office. This
constitutes another usurpation of legislative power, as the power to vote appropriations belongs to
Congress.
21.ID.; EMERGENCY POWERS OF PRESIDENT UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACTS NOS. 600, 620 AND 671.—
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the President of the Philippines emergency
powers to promulgate rules and regulations during national emergency has ceased to have effect since
the liberation
175
VOL. 83, MARCH 26, 1949 175
of the Philippines, or, at latest, upon the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945. The absurdity of the
contention that these emergency acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan cannot be
gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation, and even before the surrender of Japan, the Congress
started to function normally. To let the hypothesis on continuance prevail will result in the existence of
two distinct, separate and independent legislative organs—the Congress and the President of the
Philippines. Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President, a possibility that
no one can dispute, the President may take advantage of the long recess of Congress (two-thirds of
every year) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable
system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
22.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRESUMPTION THAT LEGISLATIVE BODY DID NOT INTEND TO VIOLATE
CONSTITUTION.—It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation
(embodied in Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671) beyond the emergency created by war, as
to extend it farther would be violative of the express provisions of the Constitution. We are of the opinion
that there is no doubt on this question; but, if there could still be any, the same should be resolved in
favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.
23.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.—Executive Order No. 68 violates
the fundamental guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law, because it permits the
admission of many kinds of evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal, and by
which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilt or not beyond all reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS
Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO, respondents.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Ill-Gotten Wealth; Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG); Armed Forces of the Philippines; The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who have either (a) accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or
close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationships, or (b) involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President
assigns their cases to the PCGG.—The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories
mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth
during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence
x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to the PCGG.
_______________
*EN BANC.
11
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 11
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Ejusdem Generis; Words and
Phrases; Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a “subordinate” as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos; The term “subordinate” as used in EO Nos. 1 and 2 refers to one who enjoys a close
association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative
and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business association, dummy, agent or nominee in
EO No. 2—there must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.—Mere position held by
a military officer does not automatically make him a “subordinate” as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President
Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise: A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders
will readily show what is contemplated within the term ‘subordinate.’ The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1
express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad. EO No. 2 freezes ‘all assets
and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos,
their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest
or participation.’ Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is—‘[W]here
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning,
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].’ [T]he
term “subordinate” as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in
EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2. x x x It does
not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the
administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army
with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make the occupant a “subordinate” of former President
Marcos for purpose of EO No. 1 and its amendments.—Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of
the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make him a “subordinate” of former
President
12
Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima
facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that
business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such
close association is manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence
in Ramas’ own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose,
and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.—Thus,
although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioner’s case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers
must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was
accumulated by a “subordinate” of former Pres. Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG.—Petitioner forgets
that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a “subordinate” of
former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1 clearly premises the creation of the
PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was
not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments.—The proper
government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling
under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or
before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General. The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No.
6770 (“RA No. 6770”) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file
forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.
13
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 13
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; The PCGG should have recommended the instant
case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary
unexplained wealth and graft cases.—After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still
pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a “subordinate” of former
President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of
authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and
its amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state
that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas’
case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary
unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino: [But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the
PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019
and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action
that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of
government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Jurisdictions, Waivers; Where there is no jurisdiction to
waive, as the PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it, then the
respondent could not be deemed to have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by filing an
answer with counterclaim; Parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.—Petitioner’s
argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting
their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well. Petitioner has no jurisdiction over
private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise
investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers are specific and limited. Unless
given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over
a case. Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and
prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the
Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only
filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack
of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this
case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action.
14
Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; International Law; The resulting
government following the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as
the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.—The EDSA Revolution took
place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25
March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.” The
resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal
limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as thede jure government in the
Philippines, assumed under international law.
Same; Same; Same; During the interregnum—i.e., after the actual and effective take-over of power
by the revolutionary government up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution)—a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights then.—We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
was not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals
under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum,
the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right
under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
Same; Same; Same; Sequestration Orders; To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG
before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution.—To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the
Philippine Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution.
The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere
executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses
of the Bill of Rights. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative
of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during
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VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 15
the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; International Law; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“Covenant”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”); Even during the interregnum the
Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found
in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.—Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
remained in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders
from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and
the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary
government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good
faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant
requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rightsrecognized in the present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.” The Declaration, to which the Philippines is
also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”
Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a
declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Declaration is part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.—
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects
of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not
repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de
jure government, the revolu-
16
tionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on
25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher
municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.—It was only upon the adoption
of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and
orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The
Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the
absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; A raiding team exceeds its authority when it seizes items
not included in the search warrant unless contraband per se.—It is obvious from the testimony of Captain
Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these
items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore
void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person
from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of
these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold
these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Revolutionary Governments; The question of
whether the Filipinos were bereft of fundamental rights during the one month interregnum between February
26 and March 24, 1986 is not as perplexing as the question of whether the world was without a God in the
three days that God the Son descended into the dead before He rose to life.—While I concur in the result
of the ponencia of Mr. Justice Carpio, the ruling on whether or not private respondent Dimaano could invoke
her rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence resulting therefrom
compels this humble opinion. The ponencia states that “(t)he correct issue is whether the Bill of Rights was
operative during the interregnum from February 26, 1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath as
President) to March 24, 1986
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VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 17
(immediately before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution).”The majority holds that the Bill of
Rights was not operative, thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke the right against unreasonable
search and seizure and the exclusionary right as her house was searched and her properties were seized
during the interregnum or on March 3, 1986. My disagreement is not with the ruling that the Bill of Rights
was not operative at that time, but with the conclusion that the private respondent has lost and cannot
invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary right. Using a different lens
in viewing the problem at hand, I respectfully submit that the crucial issue for resolution is whether she can
invoke these rights in the absence of a constitution under the extraordinary circumstances after the 1986
EDSA Revolution. The question boggles the intellect, and is interesting, to say the least, perhaps even to
those not half-interested in the law. But the question of whether the Filipinos were bereft of fundamental
rights during the one month interregnum is not as perplexing as the question of whether the world was
without a God in the three days that God the Son descended into the dead before He rose to life. Nature
abhors a vacuum and so does the law.
Same; Same; Same; Natural Law; With the establishment of civil government and a constitution, there
arises a conceptual distinction between natural rights and civil rights, difficult though to define their scope
and delineation.—With the establishment of civil government and a constitution, there arises a conceptual
distinction between natural rights and civil rights,difficult though to define their scope and delineation. It has
been proposed that natural rights are those rights that “appertain to man in right of his existence.” These
were fundamental rights endowed by God upon human beings, “all those rights of acting as an individual
for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others.” On the other
hand, civil rights are those that “appertain to man in right of his being a member of society.” These rights,
however, are derived from the natural rights of individuals since: “Man did not enter into society to
become worse off than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights
better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all his rights.” Civil rights, in this sense, were those
natural rights—particularly rights to security and protection—which by themselves, individuals could not
safeguard, rather requiring the collective support of civil society and government, Thus, it is said: “Every
civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of
which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The distinction between natural and civil rights is
“between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which he
throws into the common stock as a member of society.”—The distinction between
18
natural and civil rights is “between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into
society, and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of society.” The natural rights
retained by the individuals after entering civil society were “all the intellectual rights, or rights of the
mind,” i.e., the rights to freedom of thought, to freedom of religious belief and to freedom of expression in
its various forms. The individual could exercise these rights without government assistance, but government
has the role of protecting these natural rights from interference by others and of desisting from itself
infringing such rights. Government should also enable individuals to exercise more effectively the natural
rights they had exchanged for civil rights—like the rights to security and protection—when they entered into
civil society.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Natural Rights” and “Civil Rights,” Distinguished.—American
natural law scholars in the 1780s and early 1790s occasionally specified which rights were natural and
which were not. On the Lockean assumption that the state of nature was a condition in which all humans
were equally free from subjugation to one another and had no common superior, American scholars tended
to agree that natural liberty was the freedom of individuals in the state of nature. Natural rights were
understood to be simply a portion of this undifferentiated natural liberty and were often broadly categorized
as the rights to life, liberty, and property; or life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. More specifically, they
identified as natural rights the free exercise of religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and
press, right to self-defense, right to bear arms, right to assemble and right to one’s reputation. In contrast,
certain other rights, such as habeas corpus and jury rights, do not exist in the state of nature,but exist only
under the laws of civil government or the constitution because they are essential for restraining government.
They are called civil rights not only in the sense that they are protected by constitutions or other laws, but
also in the sense that they are acquired rights which can only exist under civil government. In
his Constitutional Law,Black states that natural rights may be used to describe those rights which belong
to man by virtue of his nature and depend upon his personality. “His existence as an individual human
being, clothed with certain attributes, invested with certain capacities, adapted to certain kind of life, and
possessing a certain moral and physical nature, entitles him, without the aid of law, to such rights as are
necessary to enable him to continue his existence, develop his faculties, pursue and achieve his destiny.”
An example of a natural right is the right to life. In an organized society, natural rights must be protected by
law, “and although they owe to the law neither their existence nor their sacredness, yet they are effective
only when recognized and sanctioned by law.”Civil rights include natural rights as they are taken into the
sphere of law. However, there are civil rights which are not natural rights such as the right of trial by jury.
This right is not founded in the nature of man, nor
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VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 19
does it depend on personality, but it falls under the definition of civil rights which are the rights secured
by the constitution to all its citizens or inhabitants not connected with the organization or administration of
government which belong to the domain of political rights. “Natural rights are the same all the world over,
though they may not be given the fullest recognition under all governments. Civil rights which are not natural
rights will vary in different states or countries.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Similar to natural rights and civil rights, human rights as the
refurbished idea of natural right in the 1940s, eludes definition—the usual definition that is the right which
inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity seemingly begs the question.—Similar to natural rights
and civil rights, human rights as the refurbished idea of natural right in the 1940s, eludes definition. The
usual definition that it is the right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity seemingly begs
the question. Without doubt, there are certain rights and freedoms so fundamental as to be inherent and
natural such as the integrity of the person and equality of persons before the law which should be
guaranteed by all constitutions of all civilized countries and effectively protected by their laws. It is nearly
universally agreed that some of those rights are religious toleration, a general right to dissent, and freedom
from arbitrary punishment. It is not necessarily the case, however, that what the law guarantees as a human
right in one country should also be guaranteed by law in all other countries. Some human rights might be
considered fundamental in some countries, but not in others. For example, trial by jury which we have
earlier cited as an example of a civil right which is not a natural right, is a basic human right in the United
States protected by its constitution, but not so in Philippine jurisdiction. Similar to natural rights, the definition
of human rights is derived from human nature, thus understandably not exact. The definition that it is a
“right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity,” however, can serve as a guideline to identify
human rights. It seems though that the concept of human rights is broadest as it encompasses a human
person’s natural rights (e.g., religious freedom) and civil rights created by law (e.g. right to trial by jury).
Same; Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Though the Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican
constitution and the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution would have
nevertheless been republican because the Filipinos were satisfied with their experience of a republican
government—a Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also included because the people had been
accustomed to the role of a Bill of Rights in the past organic acts.—Aside from the heavy American
influence, the Constitution also bore traces of the Malolos Constitution, the German Constitution, the
Constitution of the Republic of Spain, the Mexican Constitution, and the Constitutions of several South
American countries, and
20
the English unwritten constitution. Though the Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican
constitution and the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution would have
nevertheless been republican because the Filipinos were satisfied with their experience of a republican
government; a Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also included because the people had been
accustomed to the role of a Bill of Rights in the past organic acts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Because of the wide-scaled violation of human rights during the
dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution contains of Bill of Rights which more jealously safeguards the people’s
“fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional democracy.”—Pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution, the 1986 Constitutional Commission drafted the 1987 Constitution which was ratified and
became effective on February 2, 1987. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, it retained a republican
system of government, but emphasized and created more channels for the exercise of the sovereignty of
the people through recall, initiative, referendum and plebiscite. Because of the wide-scale violation of
human rights during the dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution contains a Bill of Rights which more jealously
safeguards the people’s “fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional democracy,” in the words
of ConCom delegate Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. It declares in its state policies that “(t)he state values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” In addition, it has a separate
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, under which, the Commission on Human Rights was created.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Considering the American model and
origin of the Philippine constitution, it is not surprising that Filipino jurist and legal scholars define and
explain the nature of the Philippine constitution in similar terms that American constitutional law scholars
explain their constitution.—Considering the American model and origin of the Philippine constitution, it is
not surprising that Filipino jurists and legal scholars define and explain the nature of the Philippine
constitution in similar terms that American constitutional law scholars explain their constitution. Chief Justice
Fernando, citing Laski, wrote about the basic purpose of a civil society and government, viz.: “The basic
purpose of a State, namely to assure the happiness and welfare of its citizens is kept foremost in mind. To
paraphrase Laski, it is not an end in itself but only a means to an end, the individuals composing it in their
separate and identifiable capacities having rights which must be respected. It is their happiness then, and
not its interest, that is the criterion by which its behavior is to be judged; and it is their welfare, and not the
force at its command, that sets the limits to the authority it is entitled to exercise.” (emphasis supplied)
21
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 21
Same; Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The power to search in England was first used
as an instrument to oppress objectionable publications.—The power to search in England was first used as
an instrument to oppress objectionable publications. Not too long after the printing press was developed,
seditious and libelous publications became a concern of the Crown, and a broad search and seizure power
developed to suppress these publications. General warrants were regularly issued that gave all kinds of
people the power to enter and seize at their discretion under the authority of the Crown to enforce
publication licensing statutes. In 1634, the ultimate ignominy in the use of general warrants came when the
early “great illuminary of the common law,” and most influential of the Crown’s opponents, Sir Edward Coke,
while on his death bed, was subjected to a ransacking search and the manuscripts of his Institutes were
seized and carried away as seditious and libelous publications.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Privacy; From Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616, 625
(1885), it may be derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, which is an almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect rights to security of
person and property as well as privacy in one’s home and possessions.—When the Convention patterned
the 1935 Constitution’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures after the Fourth
Amendment, the Convention made specific reference to the Boyd case and traced the history of the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure back to the issuance of general warrants and writs of
assistance in England and the American colonies. From the Boyd case, it may be derived that our own
Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is an almost exact copy of
the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect rights to security of person and property as well as privacy in one’s
home and possessions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While there has been a shift in focus of the Fourth
Amendment in American jurisdiction, from protection of the individual from arbitrary and oppressive conduct
to protection of privacy rather that property, the essence of his right in Philippine jurisdiction has consistently
been understood as respect for one’s personality, property, home privacy.—In the United States,
jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment continued to grow from the Boyd case. The United States
Supreme Court has held that the focal concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the individual from
arbitrary and oppressive official conduct. It also protects the privacies of life and the sanctity of the person
from such interference. In later cases, there has been a shift in focus: it has been held that the principal
purpose of the guarantee is the protection of privacy rather than property, “[f)or the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.” The tests that have more recently been formulated in interpreting the provision
focus on privacy rather than intru-
22
sion of property such as the “constitutionally protected area” test in the 1961 case of Silverman v.
United States and the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard in Katz v. United States which held that
the privacy of communication in a public telephone booth comes under the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Despite the shift in focus of the Fourth Amendment in American jurisdiction, the essence of
this right in Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been understood as respect for one’s personality,
property, home, and privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; It is said that the exclusionary rule has
three purposes—the major and the most often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the second is the “imperative of judicial integrity,” and the third is the more recent purpose
pronounced by some members of the United States Supreme Court which is that “of assuring the people—
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—that the government would not profit from its lawless
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.”—It is said that the
exclusionary rule has three purposes. The major and most often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable
searches and seizures as stated in Elkins v. United States and quoted in Mapp: “(t)he rule is calculated to
prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for constitutional guaranty in the only effective
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Second is the “imperative of judicial integrity,” i.e.,
that the courts do not become “accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold . . . by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . A ruling admitting
evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the
evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.” Third is the
more recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United States Supreme Court which is that “of
assuring the people—all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—that the government would not
profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.” The focus of concern here is not the police but the public. This third purpose is implicit in
the Mappdeclaration that “no man is to be conceived on unconstitutional evidence.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Invoking natural law because the history, tradition
and moral fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an altogether different story, for ultimately,
in our political and legal tradition, the people are the source of all government authority and the courts are
their creation—while it may be argued that the choice of a school of legal thought is a matter of opinion,
history is a fact against which one cannot argue.—In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solely a matter
of the judge’s personal preference, invites criticism that the
23
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 23
decision is a performative contradiction and thus self-defeating. Critics would point out that while the
decision invokes natural law that abhors arbitrariness, that same decision is tainted with what it abhors as
it stands on the judge’s subjective and arbitrary choice of a school of legal thought. Just as one judge will
fight tooth and nail to defend the natural law philosophy, another judge will match his fervor in defending a
contrary philosophy he espouses. However, invoking natural law because the history, tradition and moral
fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an altogether different story, for ultimately, in our
political and legal tradition, the people are the source of all government authority, and the courts are their
creation. While it may be argued that the choice of a school of legal thought is a matter of opinion, history
is a fact against which one cannot argue—and it would not be turning somersault with history to say that
the American Declaration of Independence and the consequent adoption of a constitution stood on a
modern natural law theory foundation as this is “universally taken for granted by writers on government.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It could confidently be asserted that the spirit and
letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and the Bill of Rights were
concerned, still prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution.—It is also well-settled in Philippine history
that the American system of government and constitution were adopted by our 1935 Constitutional
Convention as a model of our own republican system of government and constitution. In the words of Claro
M. Recto, President of the Convention, the 1935 Constitution is “frankly an imitation of the American
Constitution.” Undeniably therefore, modern natural law theory, specifically Locke’s natural rights theory,
was used by the Founding Fathers of the American constitutional democracy and later also used by the
Filipinos. Although the 1935 Constitution was revised in 1973, minimal modifications were introduced in the
1973 Constitution which was in force prior to the EDSA Revolution. Therefore, it could confidently be
asserted that the spirit and letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and
the Bill of Rights were concerned, still prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution. Even the 1987
Constitution ratified less than a year from the EDSA Revolution retained the basic provisions of the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions on the system of government and the Bill of Rights, with the significant difference
that it emphasized respect for and protection of human rights and stressed that sovereignty resided in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although Filipinos have given democracy its own
Filipino face, it is undeniable that our political and legal institutions are American in origin; When
government not only defaults in its duty but itself violates the very rights it was established
24
to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could be replaced with
one to which the people consent, and this highest of rights the Filipino people exercised in the EDSA
Revolution of February 1986.—Two facts are easily discernible from our constitutional history. First, the
Filipinos are a freedom-loving race with high regard for their fundamental and natural rights. No amount of
subjugation or suppression, by rulers with the same color as the Filipinos’ skin or otherwise, could obliterate
their longing and aspiration to enjoy these rights. Without the people’s consent to submit their natural rights
to the ruler, these rights cannot forever be quelled, for like water, seeking its own course and level, they will
find their place in the life of the individual and of the nation; natural right, as part of nature, will take its own
course. Thus, the Filipinos fought for and demanded these rights from the Spanish and American
colonizers, and in fairly recent history, from an authoritarian ruler. They wrote these rights in stone in every
constitution they crafted starting from the 1899 Malolos Constitution. Second, although Filipinos have given
democracy its own Filipino face, it is undeniable that our political and legal institutions are American in
origin. The Filipinos adopted the republican form of government that the Americans introduced and the Bill
of Rights they extended to our islands, and were the keystones that kept the body politic intact. These
institutions sat well with the Filipinos who had long yearned for participation in government and were jealous
of their fundamental and natural rights. Undergirding these institutions was the modern natural law theory
which stressed natural rights in free, independent and equal individuals who banded together to form
government for the protection of their natural rights to life, liberty and property. The sole purpose of
government is to promote, protect and preserve these rights. And when government not only defaults in its
duty but itself violates the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand
obedience of the governed and could be replaced with one to which the people consent. The Filipino people
exercised this highest of rights in the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Revolutionary Governments; It is implicit from the
pledge in Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25, 1986 that the president and the vice president pledged
“to do justice to the numerous victims of human rights violations” that the new government recognized and
respected human rights.—I shall first deal with the right against unreasonable search and seizure. On
February 25, 1986, the new president, Corazon Aquino, issued Proclamation No. 1 where she declared
that she and the vice president were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people and
pledged “to do justice to the numerous victims of human rights violations.” It is implicit from this pledge that
the new government recognized and respected human rights. Thus, at the time of the search on March 3,
1986, it may be asserted that the government had the duty, by its own pledge, to uphold human rights.
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VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 25
This presidential issuance was what came closest to a positive law guaranteeing human rights without
enumerating them. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a positive law granting private respondent
Dimaano the right against unreasonable search and seizure at the time her house was raided, I respectfully
submit that she can invoke her natural right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rights against unreasonable search and
seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life, liberty and property.—The right against unreasonable
search and seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life, liberty and property. Our well-settled
jurisprudence that the right against unreasonable search and seizure protects the people’s rights to security
of person and property, to the sanctity of the home, and to privacy is a recognition of this proposition. The
life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government
he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security
in life and property dates back even earlier than the modern philosophers and the American and French
revolutions, but pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence, thus it has
been described, viz.: “The right to personal security emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the
right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful
desires of the individual.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A natural right to liberty indubitably includes the
freedom to determine when and how an individual will share the private part of his beings and the extent of
his sharing; Truly, the drapes of a man’s castle are but an extension of the drapes on his body that cover
the essentials—in unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes and the invasive hands of the
government prevent the individual from enjoying his freedom to keep himself and to act undisturbed within
his zone of privacy.—A natural right to liberty indubitably includes the freedom to determine when and how
an individual will share the private part of his being and the extent of his sharing. And when he chooses to
express himself, the natural right to liberty demands that he should be given the liberty to be truly himself
with his family in his home, his haven of refuge where he can “retreat from the cares and pressures, even
at times the oppressiveness of the outside world,” to borrow the memorable words of Chief Justice
Fernando. For truly, the drapes of a man’s castle are but an extension of the drapes on his body that cover
the essentials. In unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes and the
26
invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from enjoying his freedom to keep to himself
and to act undisturbed within his zone of privacy. Finally, indispensable to the natural right to property is
the right to one’s possessions. Property is a product of one’s toil and might be considered an expression
and extension of oneself. It is what an individual deems necessary to the enjoyment of his life. With
unreasonable searches and seizures, one’s property stands in danger of being rummaged through and
taken away. In sum, as pointed out in De Los Reyes, persons are subjected to indignity by an unreasonable
search and seizure because at bottom, it is a violation of a person’s natural right to life, liberty and property.
It is this natural right which sets man apart from other beings, which gives him the dignity of a human being.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A reflective grasp of what it means to be human
and how one should go about performing the functions proper to his human nature can only be done by the
rational person himself in the confines of his private space—only he himself in his own quiet time can
examine his life knowing that an unexamined life is not worth living.—It is understandable why Filipinos
demanded that every organic law in their history guarantee the protection of their natural right against
unreasonable search and seizure and why the UDHR treated this right as a human right. It is a right inherent
in the right to life, liberty and property; it is a right “appertain(ing) to man in right of his existence,” a right
that “belongs to man by virtue of his nature and depends upon his personality,” and not merely a civil right
created and protected by positive law. The right to protect oneself against unreasonable search and seizure,
being a right indispensable to the right to life, liberty and property, may be derived as a conclusion from
what Aquinas identifies as man’s natural inclination to self-preservation and self-actualization. Man
preserves himself by leading a secure life enjoying his liberty and actualizes himself as a rational and social
being in choosing to freely express himself and associate with others as well as by keeping to and knowing
himself. For after all, a reflective grasp of what it means to be human and how one should go about
performing the functions proper to his human nature can only be done by the rational person himself in the
confines of his private space. Only he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life knowing that an
unexamined life is not worth living.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Revolutionary Governments; A revolution is
staged only for the most fundamental of reasons—such as the violation of fundamental and natural rights—
for prudence dictated that “governments long established should not be changed for light and transient
reasons.”—Every organic law the Filipinos established (the Malolos, 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions)
and embraced (the Instruction, Philippine Bill of 1902, and Jones Law) in the last century included a
provision guaranteeing the people’s right against unrea-
27
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 27
sonable search and seizure because the people ranked this right as fundamental and natural. Indeed,
so fundamental and natural is this right that the demand for it spurred the American revolution against the
English Crown. It resulted in the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent establishment of the
American Constitution about 200 years ago in 1789. A revolution is staged only for the most fundamental
of reasons—such as the violation of fundamental arid natural rights—for prudence dictates that
‘governments long established should not be changed for light and transient reasons.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot claim that a person was not
entitled to the right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the time the
search was conducted—this right precedes the constitution and does not depend on positive law since it is
part of natural rights; Even in the absence of the constitution, individuals had a fundamental and natural
right against unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.—Considering that the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot claim that private respondent
Dimaano is not entitled to the right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at
the time the search was conducted. This right of the private respondent precedes the constitution, and does
not depend on positive law. It is part of natural rights. A violation of this right along with other rights stirred
Filipinos to revolutions. It is the restoration of the Filipinos’ natural rights that justified the establishment of
the Aquino government and the writing of the 1987 Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a
constitution, private respondent Dimaano had a fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search
and seizure under natural law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The exclusionary rule is likewise a natural
right that can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution guaranteeing such right; To be sure, though,
the status of the exclusionary right is a natural right is admittedly not as indisputable as the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported by philosophy and deeply entrenched in
history.—We now come to the right to the exclusion of evidence illegally seized.
From Stonehill quoting Mapp, we can distill that the exclusionary rule in both the Philippine and American
jurisdictions is a freedom “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” for it is a necessary part of the guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which in turn is “an essential part of the right to privacy” that
the Constitution protects. If the exclusionary rule were not adopted, it would be to “grant the right (against
unreasonable search and seizure) but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.” Thus, the inevitable
conclusion is that the exclusionary rule is likewise a
28
natural right that private respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a constitution
guaranteeing such right. To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right is admittedly not
as indisputable as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported by
philosophy and deeply entrenched in history. On a lower tier, arguments have been raised on the
constitutional status of the exclusionary right. Some assert, on the basis of United States v. Calandra,that
it is only a “judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” Along the same line,
others contend that the right against unreasonable search and seizure merely requires some effective
remedy, and thus Congress may abolish or limit the exclusionary right if it could replace it with other
remedies of a comparable or greater deterrent effect. But these contentions have merit only if it is conceded
that the exclusionary rule is merely an optional remedy for the purpose of deterrence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Without the strength of history and with
philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary right’s status as a fundamental and natural right
stands on unstable ground—the conclusion that it can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution also
rests on shifting sands.—Unlike in the right against unreasonable search and seizure, however, history
cannot come to the aid of the exclusionary right. Compared to the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, the exclusionary right is still in its infancy stage in Philippine jurisdiction, having been etched only
in the 1973 Constitution after the 1967 Stonehill ruling which finally laid to rest the debate on whether
illegally seized evidence should be excluded. In the United States, the exclusionary right’s genesis dates
back only to the 1885 Boyd case on the federal level, and to the 1961 Mapp case in the state level. The
long period of non-recognition of the exclusionary right has not caused an upheaval, much less a revolution,
in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions. Likewise, the UDHR, a response to violation of human
rights in a particular period in world history, did not include the exclusionary right. It cannot confidently be
asserted therefore that history can attest to its natural right status. Without the strength of history and with
philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary right’s status as a fundamental and natural right
stands on unstable ground. Thus, the conclusion that it can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution
also rests on shifting sands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The exclusionary right is available to
someone who invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Constitution and the 1987
Constitution.—Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private respondent Dimaano as she
invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Consti-
29
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 29
tution and the 1987 Constitution. The AFP Board issued its resolution on
Ramas’ unexplained wealth only on July 27, 1987. The PCGG’s petition for forfeiture against Ramas
was filed on August 1, 1987 and was later amended to name the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff and
to add private respondent Dimaano as co-defendant. Following the petitioner’s stance upheld by the
majority that the exclusionary right is a creation of the Constitution, then it could be invoked as a
constitutional right on or after the Freedom Constitution took effect on March 25, 1986 and later, when the
1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Revolutionary Governments; I cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos
during the one month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their rights, including
their natural rights as human beings—with the extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the
EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not without
fundamental rights.—The Filipino people have fought revolutions, by the power of the pen, the strength of
the sword and the might of prayer to claim and reclaim their fundamental rights. They set these rights in
stone in every constitution they established. I cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos during that one
month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their rights, including their natural
rights as human beings. With the extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the EDSA
Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not without
fundamental rights. In that brief one month, they retrieved their liberties and enjoyed them in their rawest
essence, having just been freed from the claws of an authoritarian regime. They walked through history
with bare feet, unshod by a constitution, but with an armor of rights guaranteed by the philosophy and
history of their constitutional tradition. Those natural rights inhere in man and need not be granted by a
piece of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The 1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one that borders the
miraculous—it was the first revolution of its kind in Philippine history, and perhaps even in the history of this
planet—and fittingly, this separate opinion is the first of its kind in this Court, where history and philosophy
are invoked not as aids in the interpretation of a positive law, but to recognize a right not written in a papyrus
but inheres in man as man.—I wish to stress that I am not making the duty of the Court unbearably difficult
by taking it to task every time a right is claimed before it to determine whether it is a natural right which the
government cannot diminish or defeat by any kind of positive law or action. The Court need not always
twice measure a law or action, first utilizing the constitution and second using natural law as a yardstick.
However, the 1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one that borders the miraculous. It was the first
revolution of its kind in Philippine history, and
30
perhaps even in the history of this planet. Fittingly, this separate opinion is the first of its kind in this
Court, where history and philosophy are invoked not as aids in the interpretation of a positive law, but to
recognize a right not written in a papyrus but inheres in man as man. The unnaturalness of the 1986 EDSA
revolution cannot dilute nor defeat the natural rights of man, rights that antedate constitutions, rights that
have been the beacon lights of the law since the Greek civilization. Without respect for natural rights, man
cannot rise to the full height of his humanity.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Political Law: Revolutionary Governments; Words and Phrases; A revolution results in a complete
overthrow of established government and of the existing legal order; A rebellion or insurrection may change
policies, leadership, and the political institution, but not the social structure and prevailing values; A coup
d’etat in itself changes leadership and perhaps policies but not necessarily more extensive and intensive
than that; A war of independence is a struggle of one community against the rule by an alien community
and does not have to involve changes in the social structure of either community.—A revolution is defined
by Western political scholars as being a “rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant
values and myths of a society in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity
and policies.” A revolution results in a complete overthrow of established government and of the existing
legal order. Notable examples would be the French, Chinese, Mexican, Russian, and Cuban revolutions.
Revolution, it is pointed out, is to be distinguished from rebellion, insurrection, revolt, coup, and war of
independence. A rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and the political institution, but
not the social structure and prevailing values. Acoup d’etat in itself changes leadership and perhaps policies
but not necessarily more extensive and intensive than that. A war of independence is a struggle of one
community against the rule by an alien community and does not have to involve changes in the social
structure of either community.
Same; Same; Proclamation No. 3 is an acknowledgment by the Aquino government of the continued
existence, subject to its exclusions, of the 1973 Charter.—The proclamations issued, as well as the
Provisional Constitution enacted by the Aquino administration shortly after being installed, have revealed
the new government’s recognition of and its intention to preserve the provisions of the 1973 Constitution
on individual rights. Proclamation No. 1, dated 25 February 1986, has maintained that “sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them.” It has expressed that the government
would be “dedicated to uphold justice, morality and decency in government, freedom and democracy.” In
lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
31
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 31
throughout the Philippines, for, among other reasons, the “Filipino people have established a new
government bound to the ideals of genuine liberty and freedom for all,” Proclamation No. 2 of March 1986,
has declared: “Now, therefore, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution and the Filipino people, do hereby x x x lift the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus x x x.” What Constitution could the proclamation have been referring to? It
could not have been the Provisional Constitution, adopted only later on 25 March 1986 under Proclamation
No. 3 which, in fact, contains and attests to the new government’s commitment to the “restoration of
democracy” and “protection of basic rights,” announcing that the “the provisions of Article I (National
Territory), Article III (Citizenship), Article IV (Bill ofRights), Article V (Duties and Obligations of Citizens),
and Article VI (Suffrage) of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, (shall) remain in force and effect,”
(emphasis supplied), superseding only the articles on “The Batasang Pambansa,” “The Prime Minister and
the Cabinet,” “Amendments,” and “Transitory Provisions.” Verily, Proclamation No. 3 is an acknowledgment
by the Aquino government of the continued existence, subject to its exclusions, of the 1973 Charter.
Same; Public International Law; It is no longer correct to state that the State could only be the medium
between international law and its own nationals, for the law has often fractured this link as and when it fails
in its purpose; At bottom, the Bill of Rights (under the 1973 Constitution), during the interregnum from 26
February to 24 March 1986 remained in force and effect not only because it was so recognized by the 1986
People Power but also because the new government was bound by international law to respect the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.—It might then be asked whether an individual is a proper subject
of international law and whether he can invoke a provision of international law against his own nation state.
International law, also often referred to as the law of nations, has in recent times been defined as that law
which is applicable to states in their mutual relations and to individuals in their relations with states. The
individual as the end of the community of nations is a member of the community, and a member has status
and is not a mere object. It is no longer correct to state that the State could only be the medium between
international law and its own nationals, for the law has often fractured this link as and when it fails in its
purpose. Thus, in the areas of black and white slavery, human rights and protection of minorities, and a
score of other concerns over individuals, international law has seen such individuals, being members of the
international community, as capable of invoking rights and duties even against the nation State. At bottom,
the Bill of Rights (under the 1973 Constitution), during the interregnum from 26 February to 24 March 1986
remained in force and effect not only because it was so recognized by the 1986 People Power but also
because the new gov-
32
ernment was bound by international law to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
TINGA, J., Separate Opinion:
Political Law; Revolutionary Governments; The Freedom Constitution made the Bill of Rights in the
1973 Constitution operable from the incipiency of the Aquino government.—Going back to the specific
question as to the juridical basis for the nullification of the questioned confiscation, I respectfully maintain
that it is no less than the Freedom Constitution since it made the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution
operable from the incipiency of the Aquino government. In the well-publicized so-called “OIC cases,” this
Court issued an en bane resolution dismissing the petitions and upholding the validity of the removal of the
petitioners who were all elected and whose terms of office under the 1973 Constitution were to expire on
June 30, 1986, on the basis of Article III, Section 2 of the Freedom Constitution, which reads: SEC. 2. All
elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,
1986. This Court perforce extended retroactive effect to the above-quoted provision as the petitions except
one were filed before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution on March 25, 1986. That being the case,
with greater reason should the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution be accorded retroactive application
pursuant to the Freedom Constitution.
Same; Same; It was unmistakable thrust of the Freedom Constitution to bestow uninterrupted
operability to the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution.—But the more precise statement is that it was the
unmistakable thrust of the Freedom Constitution to bestow uninterrupted operability to the Bill of Rights in
the 1973 Constitution. For one thing, the title itself of Proclamation No. 3 which ordained the Freedom
Constitution, as well as one of the vital premises or whereas clauses thereof, adverts to the “protection of
the basic rights” of the people. For another, the Freedom Constitution in Article 1, Section 1 mandates that
the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Freedom Constitution specified therein “remain in force and
effect and are hereby adopted in toto as part of this Provisional Constitution.”
Same; Same; Even if it is supposed that the Freedom Constitution had no retroactive effect or it did
not extend the effectivity of the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution, still there would be no void in the
municipal or domestic law at the time as far as the observance of the fundamental right is concerned—the
Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution would still be in force, independently of the Freedom Constitution, or
at least the pro-
33
VOL. 407, JULY 21, 2003 33
visions thereof proscribing unreasonable search and seizure and excluding evidence in violation of
the proscription.—Of course, even if it is supposed that the Freedom Constitution had no retroactive effect
or it did not extend the effectivity of the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution, still there would be no void in
the municipal or domestic law at the time as far as the observance of fundamental rights is concerned. The
Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution would still be in force, independently of the Freedom Constitution, or
at least the provisions thereof proscribing unreasonable search and seizure and excluding evidence in
violation of the proscription. Markedly departing from the typical, the revolutionary government installed by
President Aquino was a benign government. It had chosen to observe prevailing constitutional restraints.
An eloquent proof was the fact that through the defunct Philippine Constabulary, it applied for a search
warrant and conducted the questioned search and seizure only after obtaining the warrant. Furthermore,
President Aquino definitely pledged in her oath of office to uphold and defend the Constitution, which
undoubtedly was the 1973 Constitution, including the Bill of Rights thereof.
G.R. No. 96409. February 14, 1992.*

CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
Administrative Law; The presidential power of control was held to mean the power of the President to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.—This presidential power of control over
the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean “the power
of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be
at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
Same; Same; The “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency” equally accepted as a corollary rule to the
control powers of the President.—Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise
his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.
Same; Same; Same; The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members
of the Cabinet who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdiction in the executive department.—Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”
Same; National Police Commission; There is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM
under Section 51.—We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that “there is no
_______________
*EN BANC.
291
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 14, 1992 291
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary
usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same
provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. XXX
As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions
under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as
acts of the NAPOLCOM.”
Same; Same; Same; The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP Members to the People’s Law
Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the Commission’s power of
control over the PNP.—The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the “People’s Law
Enforcement Boards” (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the
Commission’s power of control over the PNP.
Same; Same; The police force not being integrated with the military is not a part of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.—It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives
muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-
in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the
military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it
properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
Same; Same; Same; The President, as Commander-in-Chief is not a member of the Armed Forces.—
Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides
for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat,
abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view,
that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian
whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed
upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief
is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military.”
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC. March 7, 2017.*
RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF

JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to
have some form of belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or
even an outright rejection of religion.—The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have
some form of belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even
an outright rejection of religion. Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity of
our people as reflected in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 (2014), as follows: At the outset, it cannot
be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has
embraced minority groups and is tolerant to-
_______________
* EN BANC.
314
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall
of Justice Building in Quezon City
wards all — the religious people of different sects and the nonbelievers. The undisputed fact is that
our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to Who they called for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Same; Same; The right to religious profession and worship has a two (2)-fold aspect — freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs.—Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is “designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good.” “The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect — freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief
is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare.”
Same; Same; Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and
State.—Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State. In
fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The State is aware of the existence of
religious movements whose members believe in the divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it does not implement
measures to suppress the said religious sects. Such inaction or indifference on the part of the State gives
meaning to the separation of Church and State, and at the same time, recognizes the religious freedom of
the members of these sects to worship their own Supreme Being. As pointed out by Judge Lutero, “the
Roman Catholics express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to
repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are government
employees, are allowed to worship their Allah even during office hours inside their own offices. The Seventh
Day Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from
working on a Saturday. Even Christians have been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their own
offices. All these have been allowed in respect of the workers’ right to the free exercise of their religion.”
315
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 315
Same; Same; Religious freedom is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest.—Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the
QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees in the
performance of their official functions.
Same; Same; Policy of Accommodation; In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of
religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation.—In order to give life to the constitutional right of
freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the
reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the
reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the
exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such
right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
Same; Same; Same; Several laws have been enacted to accommodate religion.—Several laws have
been enacted to accommodate religion. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 has declared Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, and Christmas Day as regular holidays. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9177 proclaimed
the first day of Shawwal, the tenth month of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the observance
of Eidul Fitr (the end of Ramadan). R.A. No. 9849 declared the tenth day of Zhul Hijja, the twelfth month of
the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul Adha. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, expressly allows a Filipino
Muslim to have more than one (1) wife and exempts him from the crime of bigamy punishable under Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The same Code allows Muslims to have divorce.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) recognized that the observance of Ramadan as
integral to the Islamic faith and allowed Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from
7:30 in the morning to 3:30 in the afternoon without any break during the period.—In Re: Request of Muslim
Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City (Re: Office Hours), 477 SCRA 648 (2005),
316
the Court recognized that the observance of Ramadan as integral to the Islamic faith and
allowed Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 in the morning to 3:30 in
the afternoon without any break during the period. This is a clear case of accommodation because Section
5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, enjoins all civil servants, of
whatever religious denomination, to render public service of no less than eight (8) hours a day or forty (40)
hours a week.
Same; Same; Establishment Clause; The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation
between Church and State.—On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that “no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,” otherwise known as the non-establishment
clause. Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more
imperative to understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society’s perspective. The
non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State. It simply means that
the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion
over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or
whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly
participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the
state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.
Same; Same; Same; Policy of Accommodation; The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of
the Quezon City (QC) Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation.—It is our
considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case
of establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly
constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the
basement. Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their
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faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion
from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings
and air-conditioning continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the
basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently
appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other
religions.
Same; Same; Same; Section 29(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, “No public money or
property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage
or leprosarium.”—Section 29(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, “No public money or property
shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.” The word “apply” means “to use or employ for a particular purpose.” “Appropriate” means “to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct
use, or for the payment of a particular demand.”
Statutory Construction; Principle of Noscitur a Sociis; Words and Phrases; Under the principle
of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of
words in which it is found or with which it is associated.—Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or
with which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other
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words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; That a priest belongs to a particular church and the latter
may have benefited from the money he received is of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public
funds is merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and for which other persons, who will
perform the same services will also be compensated in the same manner.—The phrase “directly or
indirectly” refers to the manner of appropriation of public money or property, not as to whether a particular
act involves a direct or a mere incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution
would have placed it before “use, benefit or support” to describe the same. Even the exception to the same
provision bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are paid
to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. That a priest belongs
to a particular church and the latter may have benefited from the money he received is of no moment, for
the purpose of the payment of public funds is merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and
for which other persons, who will perform the same services will also be compensated in the same manner.
Same; Same; Establishment Clause; What is proscribed is the passage of any law which tends to
establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.—Ut magis valeat quam pereat.
The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. As such, the foregoing interpretation finds support in the
Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is proscribed is the passage of any
law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.
Same; Same; Same; No undue religious bias is being committed when the subject basement is
allowed to be temporarily used by the
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Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people and for other
purposes.—Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the
sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics. Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic
chapel for the exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciano. Judge Maceren reported that
the basement is also being used as a public waiting area for most of the day and a meeting place for
different employee organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch break period
from twelve (12) o’clock to one (1) o’clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that masses
run for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious bias is being
committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily used by the Catholics to celebrate mass,
as the same area can be used by other groups of people and for other purposes. Thus, the basement of
the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the holding of
Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
Same; Same; Same; That the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City (QC) Hall of
Justice may offend non-Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an
unconditional tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the
majority or to the minority.—That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may
offend non-Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional
tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the
minority. It is emphatic in saying that “the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
shall be without discrimination or preference.” Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere
lip service. One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in reality,
refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same for
others.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; View that it is a mistake to trivialize the import of the ruling
in Estrada v. Escritor, 408
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SCRA 1 (2003), in the case at bar which involves a lawful exercise of religious freedom.—I respectfully
submit that it is a mistake to trivialize the import of the ruling in Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), in
the case at bar which involves a lawful exercise of religious freedom. While this case does not concern an
immoral act nor a criminal offense, Estrada v. Escritor is a jurisprudential gem that painstakingly,
comprehensively, and exhaustively considered numerous cases of different factual background before
passing upon the issue in said case. It traced the Old World antecedents of the American religion clauses,
particularly the history and background of the concepts, jurisprudence and standards of the two religion
clauses in the United States — the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause — and the history
of religious freedom in the Philippines from the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Malolos
Constitution of 1899, the laws and regulations enforced in the Philippines during the American regime, and
the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution dealing with the religious clauses and the
jurisprudence that applied the said provisions to diverse factual settings which called upon the Court to
determine “what the clauses specifically require, permit and forbid.” The standards and the tests in the
balancing of the interaction between the two religious clauses that jurisprudence has laid down throughout
the long history of these clauses are valuable guides in the resolution of this case.
Same; Same; View that religious freedom can be invoked not only against a facially-neutral law that
unduly impairs such freedom but any regulation or practice that has the same effect unless it passes the
accepted test or standard laid down by jurisprudence to protect the freedom of religion that occupies a
preferred status in the hierarchy of human rights.—Religious freedom can be invoked not only against a
facially neutral law that unduly impairs such freedom but any regulation or practice that has the same effect
unless it passes the accepted test or standard laid down by jurisprudence to protect the freedom of religion
that occupies a preferred status in the hierarchy of human rights. Moreover, religion has an admitted
moralizing influence that can contribute in the nurturing of high moral values among public servants which
will have a beneficial effect in the discharge of their duties. At the outset, it must be stressed that the holding
of the masses at the premises of the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not sponsored or supported by the said
Court. It was at the own initiative of the Catholic faithful. Neither were the masses
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endorsed by the Court or any of its officials with the intention of propagating the Catholic religion to
the detriment of other religions. The assumption that inequality of treatment is promoted has no factual
basis. No person has complained that his/her religious practice has been discriminated upon. Hence, the
holding of masses during lunch break would not amount to an excessive entanglement between the courts
and religion.
Same; Same; View that to require the faithful to go to nearby churches to attend masses or to pray
will make the exercise of religious freedom too burdensome, notwithstanding that no prejudice to public
service nor discrimination of other religions is shown.—To require the faithful to go to nearby churches to
attend masses or to pray will make the exercise of religious freedom too burdensome, notwithstanding that
no prejudice to public service nor discrimination of other religions is shown. The obligations demanded of
a public servant to comply with the highest standards of integrity, morality and commitment in the efficient
delivery of public service almost always coincide with the obligations dictated by his religion, which has
been defined in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957), also cited in Estrada v.
Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), as follows: [Religion] has reference to one’s views of his relations to His
Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His
Will.
Same; Same; View that Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), ruled not that “urgent and compelling
need” must be shown before religious freedom can be exercised, but instead, it is the State that bears a
heavy burden to show a compelling State interest to hinder the exercise of religious freedom.—The
Dissenting Opinion reverses the test enunciated in the Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), case when
it posits that there must be an “urgent and compelling need” for allowing religious rituals or the exercise of
one’s religious freedom. The said case ruled not that “urgent and compelling need” must be shown before
religious freedom can be exercised, but instead, it is the State that bears a heavy burden to show a
compelling State interest to hinder the exercise of religious freedom.
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Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; Establishment Clause; View that tolerating and allowing
court personnel to hold and celebrate daily masses within public Halls of Justice is a clear violation of the
Constitutional prohibition against the State’s establishment of a religion.—Tolerating and allowing court
personnel to hold and celebrate daily masses within public Halls of Justice is a clear violation of the
Constitutional prohibition against the State’s establishment of a religion. It has no secular purpose other
than to benefit and, therefore, promote a religion. It has the effect of imposing an insidious cultural
discrimination against those whose beliefs may be different. Religious rituals should be done in churches,
chapels, mosques, synagogues, and other private places of worship. To provide that all faiths of all
denominations may likewise avail of the same public space within courts of law is a painful illusion. Apart
from violating Sections 5 and 29(2) of Article III of the Constitution, it is a privilege that is not available to
those who profess nonbelief in any god or whose conviction is that the presence or absence of god is
unknowable. It likewise undermines religious faiths, which fervently believe that rituals that worship icons
and symbols are contrary to their conception of god. Furthermore, the majority opinion invites judges to
excessively entangle themselves with religious institutions and worship. Decisions on the duration,
frequency, decorations, and other facets of religious rituals are not judicial functions. This also should
certainly not be a governmental one. By holding daily Catholic masses or any religious ritual within court
premises, courts unnecessarily shed their impartiality. It weakens our commitment to protect all religious
beliefs.
Same; Same; Same; View that allowing the exercise of religious rituals within government buildings
violate both Section 5, Article III and Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution.—Allowing the exercise of
religious rituals within government buildings violate both Section 5, Article III and Section 29(2), Article VI
of the Constitution. Section 5, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
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Same; Same; Same; View that the sponsorship of these rituals within the halls of justice will not be
acceptable to atheists, who fervently believe that there is no god; or to agnostics, who fundamentally believe
that the existence of a supernatural and divine being cannot be the subject of either reason or blind faith.—
It will take great strides in both humility and sensitivity to understand that religious practices within
government buildings are offensive to those who do not believe in any of the denominations or sects of
Christianity. Those who do believe in a god but do not practice any ritual that worships their supernatural
being or their deity will also find the allowance of the full Catholic sacrament of the Holy Eucharist
demeaning. Definitely, the sponsorship of these rituals within the halls of justice will not be acceptable to
atheists, who fervently believe that there is no god; or to agnostics, who fundamentally believe that the
existence of a supernatural and divine being cannot be the subject of either reason or blind faith. As
correctly underscored by the Chief Attorney, courts are not simply venues for the resolution of conflict. Our
Halls of Justice should symbolize our adherence to the majesty and impartiality of the rule of law.
Unnecessary sponsorship of religious rituals undermines the primacy of secular law and its impartiality. It
consists of physical manifestations of a specific kind of belief which can best be done in private churches
and chapels, not in a government building. There is no urgency that it be done in halls of justice.
Same; Same; Benevolent Neutrality; View that benevolent neutrality in reality may turn out to be an
insidious means for those who believe in a majority decision to maintain their dominance in the guise of
neutral tolerance of all religions.—Since Estrada v. Escritor’s promulgation, benevolent neutrality has been
constantly but erroneously quoted as a talisman to erase all legitimate constitutional objections to religious
activity that impinges upon secular government policy. Yet, in the 2003 Decision, where the two-part test
was formulated, only five Justices fully concurred with Justice Puno’s ponencia. Two other Justices wrote
separate concurring opinions. There were five other Justices who dissented, with Justice Carpio leading in
the dissent. That benevolent neutrality is even doctrine is, therefore, suspect. More importantly, benevolent
neutrality in reality may turn out to be an insidious means for those who believe in a majority decision to
maintain their dominance in the guise of neutral tolerance of all religions. Not all Buddhists have as active,
collective,
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and public a ritual that requires a public space as Catholics. Agnostics do not practice any ritual.
Opening space in our Halls of Justice for rituals such as the Holy Eucharist in effect provides further
advantage to an already dominant religion. Since the number of Catholics in Quezon City far outnumbers
any other denomination, the number of requests to make use of public spaces within the Halls of Justice
will likely dwarf any other Christian denomination or religion. This is true in Quezon City. This is also true in
most other Halls of Justice, including portions of the Supreme Court Compound. Catholic rituals dominate.
Benevolent neutrality in practice, thus, favors the already dominant.
Same; Same; Establishment Clause; View that the proscription in Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution against the State’s establishment of a religion covers not only official government
communication of its religious beliefs. It likewise generally prohibits support and endorsement of a religious
organization or any of their activities or rituals.—The proscription in Section 5, Article III of the Constitution
against the State’s establishment of a religion covers not only official government communication of its
religious beliefs. It likewise generally prohibits support and endorsement of a religious organization or any
of their activities or rituals. The non-establishment clause can be appreciated in two basic ways. First, it
can be a corollary to the Constitutional respect given to each individual’s freedom of belief and freedom of
exercise of one’s religion. Second, it is also a restatement of the guarantee of equality of each citizen. That
is, that no person shall be discriminated against on the basis of her or his creed or religious beliefs.
Same; Same; View that there is no urgency in holding masses within the Halls of Justice. The Catholic
Church owns many elegant places of worship. There are churches and chapels accessible to court
personnel in the Quezon City (QC) Hall of Justice during their lunch hour. There are some, which are
walking distance from their offices.—Any unnecessary endorsement, policy, or program that privileges,
favors, endorses, or supports a religious practice or belief per se therefore would be constitutionally
impermissible. It communicates a policy that contrary beliefs are not so privileged, not so favored, not so
endorsed and unsupported by the Constitutional order. It implies that those whose creeds or whose faiths
are different may not be as part of the political community as the other citizens who
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understand the rituals that are supported. It is to install discrimination against minority faiths or even
against those who do not have any faith whatsoever. There is no urgency in holding masses within the
Halls of Justice. The Catholic Church owns many elegant places of worship. There are churches and
chapels accessible to court personnel in the Quezon City Hall of Justice during their lunch hour. There are
some, which are walking distance from their offices. Allowing masses to be held within Halls of Justice
therefore have no other purpose except to allow a sect, or religious denomination to express its beliefs. The
primary purpose of the policy that is favored by the majority of this Court is not secular in nature, but
religious. This is contrary to the existing canons of our Constitutional law.
Same; Same; Establishment Clause; View that Section 5, Article III does not allow the endorsement
by the State of any religion; Exception.—Section 5, Article III does not allow the endorsement by the State
of any religion. The only exception would be if such incidental endorsement of a religious exercise is in the
context of a governmental act that satisfies the following three-part test: it has a “secular legislative
purpose”; “its primary effect [is] that [which] neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and that it “must not
foster ‘an excessive entanglement with religion.’”
Same; Same; Same; View that directing our Executive Judges to regulate and closely monitor the
holding of masses and other religious practices within our courts promotes excessive entanglements
between courts and various religions.—Directing our Executive Judges to regulate and closely monitor the
holding of masses and other religious practices within our courts promotes excessive entanglements
between courts and various religions. This close monitoring will result in an unnecessary interaction
between the church and the State. It will take time from our Executive Judges, who, instead of monitoring
the holding of religious rituals, could otherwise be performing their secular functions such as reducing court
dockets. They will be asked to arbitrate between religions.
Same; Same; Same; View that our Halls of Justice were not built for religious purposes. Allowing the
performance of religious rituals in our Halls of Justice runs roughshod over the rights of non-believing
employees and other litigants who, for nonreligious purposes, are present in the courthouse but are
involuntarily exposed to
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the religious practice.—Any moralizing effect of religion notwithstanding, religion should correctly
remain to be “a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice.” As Justice
Jardeleza points out, setting and context determine whether the use of a religious symbol effectively
endorses a religious belief. There is no violation of the establishment clause if we allow an employee to
privately pray the rosary within the confines of his or her workspace. The case is different, however, if the
religious ritual is collectively and publicly performed. Our Halls of Justice were not built for religious
purposes. Allowing the performance of religious rituals in our Halls of Justice runs roughshod over the rights
of nonbelieving employees and other litigants who, for nonreligious purposes, are present in the courthouse
but are involuntarily exposed to the religious practice.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Constitution specifically prohibits public property from being
“employed for the benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of
religion.”—The Constitution specifically prohibits public property from being “employed for the benefit or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion.” This provision allows
for no qualification. Allowing Catholic masses to be celebrated daily within the Halls of Justice definitely
employs public property for the “benefit or support” of the Catholic religion. Catholicism is a “church,”
“denomination,” and a “system of religion.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the religious use of public property is proscribed in its totality. This
proscription applies to any religion.—Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution is straightforward and
needs no statutory construction. The religious use of public property is proscribed in its totality. This
proscription applies to any religion. This is especially so if the accommodation for the use of public property
is principally, primarily, and exclusively only for a religious purpose. This holistic interpretation of the
Constitution is more sensitive to those who disbelieve — the agonistics and the atheists — who are equally
protected under the Constitution. It is also more sensitive to the concept that the state remains neutral in
matters pertaining to faith: that no institutional religion, due to their dominance or resources, may have any
form of advantage over another act of religious belief.
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Same; Same; Same; View that projecting the verses of Catholic prayers in a public building, using
powerful sound systems to proclaim one’s faith, selecting a space in the center of a Hall of Justice where
the rituals resonate will not be obviously offensive to Catholics in the majority. However, it is utter
callousness to say that it will offend no one.—The non-establishment clause is the normative protection
that ensures and mandates tolerance. It is meant to sharpen the sensitivity of those who are powerful so
that they understand the point of view of others who have different beliefs. It is a sovereign command that
those who hold important public offices — such as judges and justices — be conscious that their fervent
personal and religious beliefs should not be mirrored in the doctrines and results of their cases. Projecting
the verses of Catholic prayers in a public building, using powerful sound systems to proclaim one’s faith,
selecting a space in the center of a Hall of Justice where the rituals resonate will not be obviously offensive
to Catholics in the majority. However, it is utter callousness to say that it will offend no one. It causes
discomfort to all those who will pass and do not share or have objections to the teachings broadcast in the
Holy Eucharist. It offends those who believe that the State should endeavor to be neutral and impartial and
avoid situations where this will be compromised.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is no urgent and compelling need to allow a certain sect to
exercise their rituals within the Halls of Justice on a regular basis.—Certainly, there is no urgent and
compelling need to allow a certain sect to exercise their rituals within the Halls of Justice on a regular basis.
There are churches, chapels, mosques, synagogues, and private spaces available for worship. “Benevolent
neutrality” to render state regulation impotent in a situation where a religion dominates becomes a painful
illusion to those at the margins of our society. For this Court to adopt this facade is to reward the dominant.
It is to maintain the status quo and reify the hegemony of those who have power. This will not be lost to
those that pass our Halls of Justice.
Same; Same; Same; View that religious rituals in our Halls of Justice, no matter the justification, breed
contempt for the impartiality of the Rule of Law.—To reward the dominant would be to further ensure
divisiveness, distrust, and intolerance. It will ultimately result in the accommodation of fundamentalist views
embedded in popular religions. The marginalized will perceive no succor in the
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system. They will see no opening and no space for their own freedoms. Religious rituals in our Halls
of Justice, no matter the justification, breed contempt for the impartiality of the Rule of Law.
Jardeleza, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Religion; Free Exercise Clause; View that the Free Exercise Clause
mandates an absolute protection of the freedom to believe.—The Free Exercise Clause mandates an
absolute protection of the freedom to believe. Thus, a person is free to worship any god he or she may
choose or none at all. The difficulty and the beauty of the Free Exercise Clause, however, are found in its
application in the realm of actions. While a person is free to believe what he or she may choose, he or she
is not absolutely free to act on his or her beliefs. In constitutional adjudication, the challenge has often been
the determination of whether a governmental act jeopardizes the freedom to act on one’s belief, and
whether the freedom to exercise a religion justifies an exemption from a law or government regulation. We
have had the opportunity to rule on cases involving the Free Exercise Clause, and we have consistently
endeavored to find the delicate balance between the secular interest of the state and the freedom of religion
of the individual.
Same; Same; Establishment Clause; View that the Establishment Clause, in its strict sense, bars a
state from creating a state religion or espousing an official religion.—The Establishment Clause, in its strict
sense, bars a state from creating a state religion or espousing an official religion. There are, however,
several gradations in the application of the Establishment Clause. It extends its prohibition not only to official
acts establishing a state religion but also to government acts that have the effect of endorsing religion or
favoring one over others. In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529 (1996), we held that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the state from leaning in favor of religion. “Neutrality alone is its fixed and
immovable stance.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the Establishment Clause must not be construed so literally so as to
impose an absolute separation between the affairs of the state and the church.—The Establishment Clause
must not be construed so literally so as to impose an absolute separation between the affairs of the state
and the church. It exists
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not in the pursuit of separation for its own sake. Rather, the goal of the Establishment Clause is to
create constitutional space where religion may flourish. The Establishment Clause bars the state from
favoring any religion so that it may not inhibit religious belief by rewarding other religious beliefs. The
Establishment Clause has never been intended, and as such, should not be interpreted to serve as a tool
to alienate the church from the state.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Establishment Clause upholds freedom of religion by enforcing
neutrality and making volunteerism the determining factor in an individual’s religious choices.—The Religion
Clauses are unique in that while their application oftentimes creates tension, they also exist to protect the
essential need to promote liberty of conscience — the choice to believe or not to believe in a greater being.
The Free Exercise Clause insures this by insulating the individual from any government act that may
prevent or burden his or her right to practice his or her faith within the limits of the law. The Establishment
Clause upholds freedom of religion by enforcing neutrality and making volunteerism the determining factor
in an individual’s religious choices. The state is neutral to all religions. It does not espouse any of them so
that an individual will be free, without any kind of compulsion, to make the choice for himself or herself.
Same; Same; Benevolent Neutrality; View that benevolent neutrality, as held in Estrada v. Escritor,
408 SCRA 1 (2003), is an approach to the Religion Clauses which leaves room for the accommodation of
religion.—In 2003, we promulgated Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1, which became an essential case in
our growing jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses. Here, we categorically and unequivocally declared that
in resolving claims involving religious freedom benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory
or permissive, is the spirit, intent, and framework underlying the Religion Clauses in our Constitution.
Benevolent neutrality, as held in Estrada, is an approach to the Religion Clauses which leaves room for the
accommodation of religion. In explaining the concept of accommodation and how it is compatible with the
Establishment Clause, we quoted the American case Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), which said
— The First Amendment, however, does not say that, in every and all respects there shall be a separation
of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the
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specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one or the other. That is the
common sense of the matter. Otherwise, the state and religion would be aliens to each other — hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly.
Same; Same; Establishment Clause; View that the Establishment Clause exists not for the sake of
separation per se but as a tool to allow all religion (as well as the choice not to have one) to thrive and
flourish.—This is the path that our jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses has taken. It is one that chooses
accommodation, where there is no danger of breaching the wall of separation, instead of a blind and literal
adherence to the concept of a separate church and state. To repeat, the Establishment Clause exists not
for the sake of separation per se but as a tool to allow all religion (as well as the choice not to have one) to
thrive and flourish. Our Establishment Clause, existing in the context of a unique Filipino culture, has
developed its own narrative. It is this narrative that must permeate any understanding of what it means for
our constitutional democracy to uphold the separation of church and state.
Same; Same; Same; View that not every governmental action that has religious undertones must be
automatically struck down as a breach of the wall of separation.—Not every governmental action that has
religious undertones must be automatically struck down as a breach of the wall of separation. In Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that each case requires courts to
scrutinize whether the challenged official conduct, in reality, establishes a religion or tends to do so. Each
case thus requires line-drawing. In this task, Lynch applied the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), which involves an inquiry as to whether the official act has a secular purpose, whether its
principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement
of government with religion.
Same; Same; View that in accordance with the protection accorded to freedom of religion, every
person in the judiciary is free to pray in the way he or she desires or not at all.—In accordance with the
protection accorded to freedom of religion, every person in the judiciary is free to pray in the way he or she
desires or not at all. The Ecumenical and Centennial prayers exist merely as options for members and
employees of the judiciary to express their prayer in
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VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 331
one particular way. These prayers exist to support the practice of religious faith but they do not impose
a monopoly or a singular standard on the proper expression of prayers. Consistent with the Religion
Clauses, these practices allow all religions to flourish while leaving sufficient room for people to practice
their faith or lack thereof in the manner they deem proper. Supreme Court employees also hold first Friday
masses within the Court premises. These employees have done so voluntarily during lunch break for years
now. This Court has not deemed it necessary to prevent them from doing so. We merely regulate the time
and place for the holding of the masses so as to insure that there will be no prejudice to public service. It is
worth highlighting that this Court, while it has not prohibited the holding of first Friday masses, has refused
to designate one particular room where the masses may be held. These employees are free to hold their
masses during lunch break within the Court’s premises provided that the area they intend to use is not
currently needed for any official Court activity. The Court has, and continues to exercise, the right to regulate
the use of rooms within the Court premises for the purpose of these first Friday masses. To me, this practice
is an eloquent example of the proper understanding of our Religion Clauses and their narrative within the
unique Filipino culture.
Same; Courts; View that how the Constitution should be applied in a matter involving the
administration of our courts is a matter that ultimately lies within the province of the Supreme Court (SC).
While recommendations of the Court Administrator and Chief Attorney are important, they are not
definitive.—I note that in 2003, the Office of the Chief Attorney recommended to then Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide that the request to hold a one-day vigil in honor of the Our Lady of Caysasay be rejected on
constitutional grounds. Specifically, the Chief Attorney opined that this would violate the wall of separation
between the Church and the State. Certainly while the recommendations of the Chief Attorney, and even
of the Court Administrator, are given due consideration, they are nonetheless not binding on the Supreme
Court. How the Constitution should be applied in a matter involving the administration of our courts is a
matter that ultimately lies within the province of the Supreme Court. While recommendations of the Court
Administrator and Chief Attorney are important, they are not definitive. This Court determines for itself what
the rule is.
332
Same; Freedom of Religion; Establishment Clause; View that for as long as these Catholic masses
are not being used to discriminate against any other religion or against the choice to believe, the Quezon
City (QC) trial courts’ acquiescence ought not to be interpreted as endorsing a religion.—That these
Catholic masses are being held within the Quezon City Hall of Justice is, by no means, an indication that
the trial court endorses Catholicism. For as long as these Catholic masses are not being used to
discriminate against any other religion or against the choice to believe, the Quezon City trial courts’
acquiescence ought not to be interpreted as endorsing a religion. Rather, the Quezon City trial courts are
simply allowing people of a particular faith to practice it. In Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different
Courts in Iligan City (Re: Office Hours), 477 SCRA 648 (2005), we allowed our Muslim employees to hold
office within flexible hours during the period of Ramadan. We have pursued a policy of creating a work
environment where our employees may be free to worship as they see fit, the only limitation being that
public service is not prejudiced. As the Catholic masses in this case are being held during lunch break and
only for 30 minutes, the Catholic employees who persist in pursuing the practice of their faith cannot be
said to have sacrificed their duty to serve the public.
Same; Same; Religious Tolerance; View that religious tolerance, a doctrine essential to our religious
clauses, mandates that, within the bounds of law, we give space for religion even if to us, it is unusual or
unnecessary.—That Mr. Valenciano and other non-Catholics may be offended by these Catholic masses
is no reason to declare the practice unconstitutional. Religious tolerance, a doctrine essential to our
religious clauses, mandates that, within the bounds of law, we give space for religion even if to us, it is
unusual or unnecessary. As the United States Supreme Court pronounced in Town of Greece v. Galloway,
12-696 (2014), offense itself is not sufficient for a finding of unconstitutionality. We protect speech even if
it is offensive as it is essential to the freedom of speech. The Bill of Rights, in truth, realizes its purpose and
reaffirms its value in instances where what is sought to be protected is the exercise of a right that does not
seem traditional, acceptable, or normal. In the realm of religion, it is in the lawful practice of religious
activities that may seem odd or unusual that we are challenged, as a society, to further extend the limits of
our religious tolerance. It is in questions like this that we are called to choose between an interpretation of
the law that is
333
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 333
humane or one that is literal, strict, and blind to the dictates of conscience. The Establishment Clause,
as well as the Bill of Rights, speaks to our humanity.
Same; Same; View that faithful among public servants to hear mass in the workplace, insofar as it
renews in them daily their desire to achieve the highest principles of morality, can only better equip them
to meet their secular obligation to be at all times accountable to the people.—There is an important secular
purpose achieved when employees are allowed to practice their religion during their free time in the
workplace, under defined restrictions that ensure they do not obstruct their delivery of public service. The
Constitution declares that public office is a public trust. In Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937), we
recognized that religion exerts an elevating influence in human affairs because it instills into human minds
the purest principles of morality. Among the many general concessions indiscriminately accorded to
religious sects and denominations, we declare certain religious holy days as legal holidays “because of the
secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results.” Allowing the faithful among
public servants to hear mass in the workplace, insofar as it renews in them daily their desire to achieve the
highest principles of morality, can only better equip them to meet their secular obligation to be at all times
accountable to the people. That other public servants may draw their sense of morality from other faiths, or
no religion at all, or find no need for any morality to define or guide their discharge of the public trust, is of
no moment. This is what religious tolerance is all about.
Same; Same; View that in a very real sense, choosing not to interfere with what employees decide to
do in their free time, whether it is to attend mass, pray, or participate in sports activities, provided it does
not affect their work and the delivery of public service, carries an important secular purpose. It creates a
satisfying working environment for our employees who can then perform their work with better efficiency.—
From this management perspective, allowing Catholic employees to group together in prayer and in
Catholic masses serves an important human resources purpose. By choosing to allow Catholic masses
instead of stifling them, these Catholic employees are made to feel that their spiritual well-being, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, is important to the Judiciary. At the same time, the Court, as administrator, must
emphasize that all religions represented within
334
the Judiciary are free to express their religious beliefs, provided they similarly do not interfere with
public service and do not coerce others to participate. In the same vein, nonbelievers can pursue their own
interests without prejudice or bias against them. In a very real sense, choosing not to interfere with what
employees decide to do in their free time, whether it is to attend mass, pray, or participate in sports activities,
provided it does not affect their work and the delivery of public service, carries an important secular purpose.
It creates a satisfying working environment for our employees who can then perform their work with better
efficiency.
Same; Same; View that I see no distinction between allowing employees to group together to attend
mass in the Quezon City (QC) Hall of Justice in their free time and allowing them to use their workspace to
pray, which Justice Leonen concedes in his dissent as valid.—There is no breach of the proscription against
using public property to benefit a religion. I see no distinction between allowing employees to group together
to attend mass in the Quezon City Hall of Justice in their free time and allowing them to use their workspace
to pray, which Justice Leonen concedes in his dissent as valid. These two situations involve similar religious
acts done in government property. It is not as if we allowed or funded the construction of a particular portion
of the Quezon City Hall of Justice for the sole purpose of allowing Catholic Masses to be held there. The
Quezon City Hall of Justice’s basement remains to be an area dedicated for the use of the courts. That it
sometimes becomes a venue, for a brief thirty-minute period during lunch break, of the activities of certain
employees does not change the situation into one where the judiciary is allotting a public property for the
benefit of a religion.
Same; Same; View that I agree with the recommendation of the Court Administrator that Catholic
images used for the Catholic mass must not be permanently stationed in the area.—I note, however, that
the matter of the display of Catholic images may be a different matter. I agree with the recommendation of
the Court Administrator that Catholic images used for the Catholic mass must not be permanently stationed
in the area. This is to avoid any impression that the Quezon City Trial Courts are endorsing a particular
religion by allowing the building of a chapel exclusive for the use of Catholic employees. There is here a
greater danger that we become entangled in the religious practice of Catholicism as well as greater
likelihood
335
VOL. 819, MARCH 7, 2017 335
that we be misconstrued to espouse Catholicism as a favored religion. This threatens to breach the
wall of separation, and thus must be avoided.
Same; Same; Establishment Clause; View that to ensure that no espousal or sponsoring of the
Catholic faith arises out of this case, the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Quezon City (QC) should be allowed to regulate the time, place, and manner of the
holding of the Catholic masses at the QC Hall of Justice.—To ensure that no espousal or sponsoring of the
Catholic faith arises out of this case, the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Court of Quezon City should be allowed to regulate the time, place, and manner of the holding of the
Catholic masses at the Quezon City Hall of Justice. While the Catholic mass is traditionally held during
lunch break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice, the Executive Judges of the trial courts
should retain the authority to order its transfer to another area or its conduct at another time before or after
office hours, when public service so demands. Allowing Executive Judges to regulate the time, place, and
manner of the Catholic masses by no means leads to excessive entanglement by the government in
religious matters.
[No. 47800. December 2, 1940]
M AXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 548; DELEGATION OP LEGISLATIVE
POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC W ORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC W ORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS.—The provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public
policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
727
VOL. 70, DECEMBER 2, 1940 727
Calalang vs. Williams et al.
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when
and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic
thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
2.ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY.—Commonwealth Act No. 548 was
passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act,
by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U. S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may
be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3.ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE.—Social justice is "neither communism,
728

Calalang vs. Williams et al.
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est supremo, lex. Social justice, therefore,
must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units
of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good
to the greatest number."
G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON.
EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON.
EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH
LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA, NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS,
CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS
HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON, REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A.
BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ,
JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004.*

REV. ELLY VELEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Election Law; Equal Access to Public Office; There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and, particularly, to seek the presidency—what is recognized is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law.—Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring
“equal access to opportunities for public office” is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or
hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the
plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Declaration of Principles and State Policies; The provisions under
the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the “equal access” provision—like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.—The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment
to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not
contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Words and phrases such as
“equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to
their inherent impreciseness.—The provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as
the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can
be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as “equal
access” “opportuni-
_______________
*EN BANC.
97
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 97
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections
ties” and “public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
Same; Same; The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations; Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy.—As earlier noted, the privilege of equal
access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
“Nuisance Candidates” and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the
instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations
are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there
is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
Same; Same; Nuisance Candidates; The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office
is easy to divine—the State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly; Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election—a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith
in our democratic institutions.—The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine.
The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not
to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At
the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but
a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held: [T]here is
surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing
98
of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its
candidates on the ballot—the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of
the democratic [process].
Same; Same; Same; Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the
State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, “their trips to the moon
on gossamer wings.”—The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of
“nuisance candidates” to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates
for public office, such as watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the
receipt of electoral contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of
which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election. Given these considerations, the
ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election
with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious
intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to
mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body
would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed
at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance
candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, “their trips to the moon on gossamer wings.”
Same; Same; Same; The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the
concept is satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.—The Omnibus Election Code and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and
credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract
from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections
and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of
free, orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates
for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The determination of bona
fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the
Omnibus Election Code.
Same; Same; Same; The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal
and factual.—Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly
evincing
99
VOL. 427, APRIL 13, 2004 99
his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts,
can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the
Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments. The question of whether a
candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is
not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
G.R. No. 96681. December 2,1991.*

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture 6,
Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila,
petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and
APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court declares the Commission on
Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged
human rights violations involving civil or political rights.—The threshold question is whether or not the
Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court
of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to
try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
________________
*EN BANC.
484
Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights
rights violations in volving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights
to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the
Commission. in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations invoking civil and political rights.—
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power
pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt
in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct
of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
485
VOL. 204, DECEMBER 2, 1991 485
Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.—But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Human Rights having merely the
power to investigate cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775.—Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power “to investigate,” cannot and should not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do
so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.—These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law,
and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
G.R. No. 211362. February 24, 2015.*
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented by
his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING,
petitioners, vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE
HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), respondents.
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own
behalf, petitioner-intervenor.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined
must be a ministerial act or duty.—Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
_______________
* EN BANC.
470
Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed “[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or
corporation’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” The tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is
opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the
duty.
Same; Same; Same; For a writ of mandamus to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act
sought to be mandated.—Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed
against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For a
writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an
imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.
Same; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The rationale behind the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that “courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should
not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.”—In
general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is that “courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain
suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities,
who are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to
act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.” In the U.S. case
of Ringgold v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 698 (1976), which was cited by respondents, it was specifically
held that in a typical case involving a decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies
within the military before appealing to the court, the doctrine being
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designed both to preserve the balance between military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial
resources. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to
judicial remedies if any of the following is present: 1. when there is a violation of due process; 2. when the
issue involved is purely a legal question; 3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; 4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury; 6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 7. when to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; 8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; 9.
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; 10. when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and 11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope
of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.—Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is
still formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of
judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
472
Same; The present Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military.—No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution
declares it as a matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. Consistent
with the republican system of checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by
necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity
of any assailed legislative or executive action.
Schools; Military Academy; To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights
and liberties for the good of the group.—Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to
subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one
that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. In fact, the Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, “[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society
which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his
peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good
of the group.”
Same; Same; A cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally
protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the
bounds of procedural due process is a must.—It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson v.
Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (1967), and Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (1972), which were adopted
by Andrews v. Knowlton, 509 F.2d 898 (1975), that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for
misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason, the PMA
is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due
process clause must be satisfied. Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled
from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer
and of probably being forever denied that career.
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Same; Same; Academic Freedom; Philippine Military Academy; As the premiere military educational
institution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in accordance with Section 30, Article III of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of
Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (“Administrative Code of 1987”), the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) is
an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.—As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30,
Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292
(“Administrative Code of 1987”), the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 265 (2000), it was held that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to
instill and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College
of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 591 (1993), and Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, 222 SCRA 644 (1993),
the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of discipline
and honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP. For respondents, Cadet 1CL Cudia
cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC’s decision to recommend his
dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or
should have been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the corresponding
penalty for failing to abide by these standards.
Same; Academic Freedom; School-Student Relationship; The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the
school-student relationship is contractual in nature; Such contract is imbued with public interest because of
the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions.—We have ruled that the school-student relationship is
contractual in nature. Once admitted, a student’s enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the
entire period he or she is expected to complete it. An institution of learning has an obligation to afford its
students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. Such contract is imbued with public
interest because of the high priority given by the Constitution to
474
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions.
Same; Same; Same; The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable
them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.—The school-student
relationship has also been held as reciprocal. “[It] has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind — it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes
to provide students with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its
rules and regulations.”
Same; Same; Same; An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may
be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college.—Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our
Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, 68 SCRA 277 (1975), this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), which enumerated “the four essential
freedoms” of a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be
taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study. An educational institution has the
power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident
to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the college. It can
decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some restraint. Indeed,
“academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a
correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every ‘person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
perform-
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ance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.’”
Same; Same; Same; The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their
academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.”—The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students
is subsumed in their academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.” As a Bohemian proverb puts it: “A
school without discipline is like a mill without water.” Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school’s
disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating. In this regard, the Court has always
recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or
expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.
Same; Same; Same; The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after
graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto.—The power of the school to impose disciplinary
measures extends even after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto. In University of the
Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 404 (1999), We upheld the university’s withdrawal
of a doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have committed intellectual
dishonesty in her dissertation.
Same; Same; Same; Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.—It must be borne in mind that schools
are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values,
ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. Essentially, education
must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence. Under the rubric of “right to
education,” students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. Every citizen
has a right to select a
476
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine Military Academy; Honor Code; As the primary training and
educational institution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and
the Honor System in particular.—The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational
institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal
rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular. The Honor Code is a
set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and
serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet’s action. It is the cadet’s responsibility to maintain the highest
standard of honor. Throughout a cadet’s stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as
well the members of the Cadet Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called “Long Gray Line.”
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets’ character development. It defines the
desirable values they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so
essential in a military organization; and it makes them professional military soldiers. As it is for character
building, it should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with
the end view of applying it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.
Procedural Due Process; In Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986), the Supreme
Court (SC) held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process.—In Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986), the Court held that there are
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process, to wit: (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall
be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
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Same; It has been said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its primary business
is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing military
determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to accomplish this task.—Like in other institutions of
higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military
academy. It has been said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its primary business
is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing military
determinations necessarily gives soldiers less time to accomplish this task. Extensive cadet investigations
and complex due process hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that
last for several days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and procedural points,
and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay,
and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive delays cannot be
tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the
Armed Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and
efficiency.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is well-settled that by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the
factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Supreme
Court (SC), unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
where the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.—It is well-settled that by reason of
their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their
respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not
finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion; where the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed;
or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. In the case of Cadet 1CL
Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule.
478
Administrative Proceedings; Right to Counsel; The administrative body is under no duty to provide the
person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.—Consistent
with Lumiqued v. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 (1997) and Nera v. The Auditor General, 164 SCRA 1 (1988),
there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be
represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Further,
in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304 (2001), the Court held that “a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and
of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel.” Hence, the administrative body is under no duty to provide the person
with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.
Same; Same; U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel,
as a function of due process, in military academy disciplinary proceedings.—To note, U.S. courts, in
general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel, as a function of due process, in
military academy disciplinary proceedings. This rule is principally motivated by the policy of “treading lightly
on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to
govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process” and the courts’ views that
disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in nature and should be kept informal, and that literate and
educated cadets should be able to defend themselves.
Same; Same; Not to be missed out are the facts that the offense committed by Cadet First Class
(1CL) Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the Honor Committee (HC) and the Cadet
Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) were investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet 1CL Cudia’s
excellent academic standing puts him in the best position to look after his own vested interest in the
Academy.—In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1CL Cudia was given
the option or was able to seek legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he
was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the
case. The requirement of due process is already satisfied since, at the very least, the
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counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an
observer who had no right to actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the cross-
examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the offense committed by Cadet 1CL Cudia
is not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the HC and the CRAB were investigative and not
adversarial; and that Cadet 1CL Cudia’s excellent academic standing puts him in the best position to look
after his own vested interest in the Academy.
Ostracism; While not something new in a military academy, ostracism’s continued existence in the
modern times should no longer be countenanced.—The Court cannot close its eyes though on what
appears to be an admission of Cadet 1CL Mogol during the CHR hearing that, upon consultation with the
entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order against Cadet
1CL Cudia. While not something new in a military academy, ostracism’s continued existence in the modern
times should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the “silence” is a punishment
resulting in the loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory
the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty by the HC. Furthermore, in Our mind,
ostracism practically denies the accused cadet’s protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or
her behalf and to be presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.
Philippine Military Academy; Honor Committee; The Honor Committee (HC), acting on behalf of the
Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating and determining whether or not the alleged offender has
actually violated the Honor Code; The results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no
binding effect.—The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of
investigating and determining whether or not the alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code. It
is given the responsibility of administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely
investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a means of encouraging self-
discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the
function of identifying suspected violators. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the HC does not
480
have the authority to order the separation of a cadet from the Academy. The results of its proceedings
are purely recommendatory and have no binding effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an
indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1CL Cudia’s case, the PMA-CRAB investigated de novo. In the
U.S., it was even opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the Honor Committee level
because it is only a “charging body whose decisions had no effect other than to initiate de novo proceedings
before a Board of Officers.”
Quibbling; In this case, the Supreme Court (SC) agrees with respondents that Cadet First Class (1CL)
Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.—In this case, the Court agrees
with respondents that Cadet 1CL Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term “Quibbling” has been defined in one U.S. case as
follows: A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what
he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to
deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying. The
above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely telling the cause
of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts,
thereby, telling a half-truth.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Evidence of Prior Good Conduct; While his Transcript of Records (TOR)
may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct
during his four (4)-year stay in the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), it does not necessarily follow that he
is innocent of the offense charged.—Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1CL Cudia. While
his Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but his
excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA, it does not necessarily follow
that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to say that “evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time.” While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student,
it does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific Honor Code
violation.
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Administrative Agencies; Commission on Human Rights; The findings of fact and the conclusions of
law of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to
the Supreme Court (SC).—The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR’s constitutional
mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991), and a number of
subsequent cases, the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It
is not empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to
investigate is not the same as adjudication.
G.R. No. 171212. August 4, 2014.*
INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., petitioner, vs. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; The delineation between the jurisdiction of regular courts and
labor courts over cases involving workers and their employers has always been a matter of dispute. It is up
to the Courts to lay the line after careful scrutiny of the factual milieu of each case.—The delineation
between the jurisdiction of regular courts and labor courts over cases involving workers and their employers
has always been a matter of dispute. It is up to the Courts to lay the line after careful scrutiny of the factual
milieu of each case. Here, we find that jurisdiction rests on the regular courts.
Same; Same; Same; Reasonable Causal Connection Rule; If there is a reasonable causal connection
between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of
the labor courts; and in the absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction.—We have also
recognized that not all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by our labor courts, specifically
when the law provides otherwise. For this reason, we have formulated the “reasonable causal connection
rule,” wherein if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-
employee relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the absence thereof,
it is the
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. vs. Adviento
regular courts that have jurisdiction. Such distinction is apt since it cannot be presumed that money
claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee relationship, and
which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by
the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters
on an exclusive basis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) ruled in the recent case of Portillo v. Rudolf
Lietz, Inc., 683 SCRA 568 (2012), that not all disputes between an employer and his employees fall within
the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals such that when the claim for damages is grounded on the “wanton
failure and refusal” without just cause of an employee to report for duty despite repeated notices served
upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence, the same falls within the purview of Civil
Law.—We ruled in the recent case of Portillo v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc., 683 SCRA 568 (2012), that not all
disputes between an employer and his employees fall within the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals such that
when the claim for damages is grounded on the “wanton failure and refusal” without just cause of an
employee to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application
for leave of absence, the same falls within the purview of Civil Law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Labor Arbiters; Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for
damages under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter (LA), must have
a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article.—Indeed, jurisprudence
has evolved the rule that claims for damages under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code, to be cognizable
by the LA, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article.
Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can a claim for damages be considered as arising
from employer-employee relations.
Labor Law; The maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases.—
True, the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases. More, the acts
complained of appear to constitute matters involving employee-employer relations since respondent used
to be the Civil Engineer of petitioner. However, it should be stressed that respon-
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Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. vs. Adviento
dent’s claim for damages is specifically grounded on petitioner’s gross negligence to provide a safe,
healthy and workable environment for its employees — a case of quasi-delict.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result
of a trial.—It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations
made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim
asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial. Neither can jurisdiction of a
court be made to depend upon the defenses made by a defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. In
this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for damages arising
from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court’s jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Quasi-Delicts; Requisites to Sustain Claims for Liability Under Quasi-
Delicts.—To sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The cause of action herein pertains to the consequence of
petitioner’s omission which led to a work-related disease suffered by respondent, causing harm or damage
to his person. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts.—It also bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief under
the Labor Code of the Philippines. He neither claims for reinstatement nor backwages or separation pay
resulting from an illegal termination. The cause of action herein pertains to the consequence of petitioner’s
omission which led to a work-related disease suffered by respondent, causing harm or damage to his
person. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs
to the regular courts.
G.R. No. 158693. November 17, 2004.*

JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE ANGELES,
respondents.
Labor Law; Administrative Law; If the factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are
conflicting, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings.—
It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded not only respect
but even finality if the findings are supported by substantial evidence. This is especially so when such
findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, if the factual findings of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter are con-
_______________
*EN BANC.
574
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
flicting, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the
questioned findings. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, after a careful review of the facts, ruled that
petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had abandoned their employment and were already
working for another employer.
Same; Dismissal of Employees; To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a
just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself.—To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause
but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a) serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter’s
representative in connection with the employee’s work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of
his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
Same; Same; Abandonment; Words and Phrases; Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment—it is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for
termination of employment by the employer.—Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1)
the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by
overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to
discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
Same; Same; Same; Moonlighting; Subcontracting for another company clearly shows the intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship; The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in
575
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 575
determining the penalty that should be meted out to him.—In February 1999, petitioners were
frequently absent having subcontracted for an installation work for another company. Subcontracting for
another company clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship with private
respondent. This was not the first time they did this. In January 1996, they did not report for work because
they were working for another company. Private respondent at that time warned petitioners that they would
be dismissed if this happened again. Petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to
sever their employer-employee relationship. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in
determining the penalty that should be meted out to him.
Same; Same; The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons whose
continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his interests.—The law imposes many obligations on
the employer such as providing just compensation to workers, observance of the procedural requirements
of notice and hearing in the termination of employment. On the other hand, the law also recognizes the
right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence,
but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons
whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his interests.
Same; Same; Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the
employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow
the employer to terminate employees.—Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions
attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor
Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires
payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full
backwages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was
unjust, separation pay may be granted.
Same; Same; Due Process; Notice Requirement; Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employer must give the employee two written notices and
a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee
576
before terminating the employment, and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under
Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment
written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation; Failure to observe due process in a dismissal
for just or authorized cause does not invalidate the dismissal but makes the employer liable for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.—Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based
on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing
or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after
hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department
of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. From the
foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article
282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284,
and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was
observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the
dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. In the first situation, the
dismissal is undoubtedly valid and the employer will not suffer any liability. In the second and third situations
where the dismissals are illegal, Article 279 mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement. In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot
be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the employee may not be residing in the address indicated
in the employer’s records does not excuse the employer from sending the notices to the employee’s last
known address.—The present case squarely falls under the fourth
577
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 577
situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned
their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements
and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because
they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse
because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it
should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court believes that the ruling in Serrano v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 323 SCRA 445 (2000), did not consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code
which provision means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or authorized
causes provided by law and that payment of backwages and other benefits, including reinstatement, is
justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed; The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness
and injustice which elicited strong dissent has prompted the Court to revisit the doctrine.—The rationale for
the re-examination of the Wenphil doctrine in Serrano was the significant number of cases involving
dismissals without requisite notices. We concluded that the imposition of penalty by way of damages for
violation of the notice requirement was not serving as a deterrent. Hence, we now required payment of full
backwages from the time of dismissal until the time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or authorized
cause. Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to “dismiss now and pay later” by imposing full
backwages. We believe, however, that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the full meaning of Article 279
of the Labor Code which states: ART. 279. Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up
to the time of his actual reinstatement. This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of
the justified or authorized causes provided by law. Payment of backwages and other benefits, including
reinstate-
578
ment, is justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed. The fact that the Serrano ruling can
cause unfairness and injustice which elicited strong dissent has prompted us to revisit the doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions
and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history.—To be sure, the Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system
of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. Due process is that which
comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just. It is a constitutional restraint on the
legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with
constitutional due process—constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and
assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings while statutory due process found
in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just
cause after notice and hearing.—Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has
two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor
Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal
are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of
these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process should be
differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process. Constitutional due process protects the
individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;
while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from
being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
579
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 579
Same; Same; Same; The better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 170 SCRA 69 (1989), by holding that the dismissal was for just
cause but imposing sanctions on the employer, which sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed
in Wenphil.—After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on
employment termination, we believe that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of
the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to
follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer.
Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be
able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well.
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a
sword to oppress employers—the commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent it from
sustaining the employer when it is in the right.—The unfairness of declaring illegal or ineffectual dismissals
for valid or authorized causes but not complying with statutory due process may have far-reaching
consequences. This would encourage frivolous suits, where even the most notorious violators of company
policy are rewarded by invoking due process. This also creates absurd situations where there is a just or
authorized cause for dismissal but a procedural infirmity invalidates the termination. Let us take for example
a case where the employee is caught stealing or threatens the lives of his co-employees or has become a
criminal, who has fled and cannot be found, or where serious business losses demand that operations be
ceased in less than a month. Invalidating the dismissal would not serve public interest. It could also
discourage investments that can generate employment in the local economy. The constitutional policy to
provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this
Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right, as in
this case. Certainly, an employer should not be compelled to pay employees for work not actually performed
and in fact abandoned. The employer should not be compelled to continue employing a person who is
admittedly guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently inimical to
the employer.
580
The law protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer.
Same; Same; Social Justice; An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282
should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution—social justice must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life; Social justice is not based on rigid formulas set in stone—it has to allow for changing times and
circumstances.—An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be
protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be
used only to correct an injustice. As the eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel observed, social justice must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” This is
not to say that the Court was wrong when it ruled the way it did in Wenphil, Serrano and related cases.
Social justice is not based on rigid formulas set in stone. It has to allow for changing times and
circumstances.
Same; Same; Due Process; The violation of an employee’s right to statutory due process by the
employer warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances.—The
violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment
of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing
circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages
would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At
the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under
the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
581
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 581
Same; Evidence; Payment; Burden of Proof; As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it—even where the employee must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to prove non-payment.—We
affirm the ruling of the appellate court on petitioners’ money claims. Private respondent is liable for
petitioners’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without deductions. As a general
rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the employee must allege non-
payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment, rather than on the
employee to prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls,
records, remittances and other similar documents—which will show that overtime, differentials, service
incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid—are not in the possession of the worker but in
the custody and absolute control of the employer.
Same; Wages; Thirteenth Month Pay; The 13th month pay is included in the definition of wage under
Article 97(f) of the Labor Code from which the employer is prohibited under Article 113 from making any
deductions without the employee’s knowledge and consent.—Anent the deduction of SSS loan and the
value of the shoes from petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay, we find the same to be unauthorized.
The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th
month pay to employees not already receiving the same so as “to further protect the level of real wages
from the ravages of world-wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay is included in
the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code, to wit: (f) “Wage” paid to any employee shall
mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money
whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the
same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment
for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable
value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished
by the employer to the employee . . .” from which an employer is prohibited under Article 113 of the same
Code from making any deductions without the em-
582
ployee’s knowledge and consent. In the instant case, private respondent failed to show that the
deduction of the SSS loan and the value of the shoes from petitioner Virgilio Agabon’s 13th month pay was
authorized by the latter. The lack of authority to deduct is further bolstered by the fact that petitioner Virgilio
Agabon included the same as one of his money claims against private respondent.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; I respectfully dissent and maintain my view that
the workingman’s right to job security and due process of law cannot be measured with a reduced price
tag.—While I appreciate the view of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago that “[t]he indemnity to be imposed
should be stiffer in order to discourage the abhorrent practice of ‘dismiss now, pay later,’ ” the majority,
however, simply retained, if not diminished, the indemnity granted to the dismissed employees.
Consequently, I respectfully dissent and maintain my view that the workingman’s right to job security and
due process of law cannot be measured with a reduced price tag. The majority opinion treats an employee’s
right to due process as no more than an abstract declaration. I am unwilling to diminish petitioners’
constitutional right to procedural due process which is necessary to protect their security of tenure.
Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; Words and Phrases; Constitution is an ode to social justice;
Social justice is that virtue by which individuals and groups fulfill their obligations to human society by
contributing positively to the complete well-being of their fellowmen considered as members of society, and
hence regulate all their actions accordingly.—Our Constitution is an ode to social justice. The Court should
give due obeisance to this ode for social justice is not a mere euphony of words. In other countries, political
debates over the last two centuries continue to rage on whether social rights should be given constitutional
protection. In our jurisdiction, however, constitutional social rights have long been embedded in all our
Constitutions, and thus at the very least should be respected and protected by our courts. Social justice is
that virtue by which individuals and groups fulfill their obligations to human society by contributing positively
to the complete well-being of their fellowmen considered as members of that society, and hence regulate
all their actions accordingly. Social justice as a creed in the 1935 Constitution was crafted by Delegate Jose
C. Locsin. He persistently pounced on the necessity
583
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 583
of including social justice in the Constitution to protect those who have little in life.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Substantive rights are not to be weakened by a diminished procedural
right, for in weakening the procedure, we weaken the substantive right.—Courts at all times should give
meaning and substance to constitutional postulates in favor of the workingman. The 1987 Constitution is
fraught with provisions protecting the workingman, e.g., Secs. 9, 10 and 18, Art. II, and Sec. 3, Art. XIII, a
legacy of the evolution of rights. These constitutional creeds should not be dwarfed by deeds. A contrary
posture would convert these creeds as “meaningless constitutional patter.” The principle of social justice
was not embedded in the fundamental law for demogoguery. It was meant to be a vital, articulate,
compelling principle of public policy. Social justice should be a living reality and not a mere high level
abstraction. Thus, while the Constitution must be read as a whole, even if we do not invoke its Due Process
Clause, the coherent application of the separate constitutional creeds on social justice and labor is enough
to uphold the workers’ constitutional right to work and their consequent right to job security. These
substantive rights are not to be weakened by a diminished procedural right. For in weakening the procedure,
we weaken the substantive right. The importance of the procedure to protect the exercise of the right to
work Cannot be overemphasized.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.—The
constitution puts the employee on equal footing with his employer. As between an employee, usually poor
and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to
demand from the latter stricter compliance. For, social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.
As Mr. Chief Justice Fernando stressed in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission—To repeat, courts should ever be on the alert lest through inadvertence or faulty analysis the
expected opposition from management be appraised much more favorably than warranted. The unfortunate
result would be that both the social justice concept and the complementary constitutional command of
protection to labor would be disregarded and set at naught. There is no higher duty cast on the judiciary
than to guard against such an undesirable possibility, fraught as it is with consequences truly to be deplored.
584
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has long extended constitutional due process in labor cases
involving private action.—This Court has long extended constitutional due process in labor cases involving
private action. Prior to Wenphil, the rule etched in stone is that an employer can validly dismiss an erring
employee only after giving him notice and hearing. Thus, decades ago, this Court in Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals ruled that “the failure of petitioner to give the private respondent the
benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement on his constitutional right to due
process of law.” In De Leon v. National Labor Relations Commission where an employee was dismissed
without notice, it was held that “[t]here is in this case a clear denial of due process, a constitutional right
which must be safeguarded at all times especially when what is at stake is petitioner’s position as his only
means of livelihood.” In Reyes v. Philippine Duplicators, Inc., where petitioner Reyes was dismissed from
the service in 1977 without any investigation or hearing, this Court found that the dismissal was arbitrary
as Reyes was denied due process. Hence, even the non-compliance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule XIV, Book
V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code pursuant to the amendments of P.D. No.
850 which was issued in 1975, requiring a prior clearance from the Department of Labor to terminate the
services of an employee, rendered the termination illegal and nullified the dismissal of the employee.
Same; Same; Same; The posture that the constitutional due process requirement limits government
action alone and does not apply to private action is already passé—modern notions of violations of due
process which may fairly be attributed to the State have expanded considerably in recent decades.—The
posture that the constitutional due process requirement limits government action alone and does not apply
to private action is already passé. Thus, even in the United States, the application of due process to private
conduct has gained approval and has become a settled norm. For, as expressed by Professor Laurence
H. Tribe, a noted constitutionalist—But particularly where ostensibly “private” power is the primary source
of the coercion and violence that oppressed individuals and groups experience, it is hard to accept with
equanimity a rigid legal distinction between state and society. The pervasive system of racial apartheid
which existed in the South for a century after the Civil War, for example, thrived only because of the
resonance of society and politics
585
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 585
. . . the close fit between private terror, public discrimination, and political exclusion. So too, where it
is the state’s persistent inaction in the face of patterns of deprivation for which the state and society seem
to many to bear collective responsibility, the premise that only identifiable state “action” may be called
constitutional account is deeply troubling. Accordingly, modern notions of violations of due process which
may fairly be attributed to the State have expanded considerably in recent decades. Seemingly private
conducts have arguably been treated as adequate state actions. Individual invasions of individual rights in
certain instances have become proper subjects of constitutional restraints. In fine, as Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter put it in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, “ ‘[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances x x x.
Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a delicate process of adjustment
inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding
of the process.” Beyond argument, the Constitution was designed to embody and celebrate values and to
inculcate proper acceptance of them, as much as to compel governments to abide by them.
Same; Same; Same; An employee who is denied procedural due process is entitled to reinstatement,
nothing less.—An employee who is denied procedural due process is entitled to reinstatement. Nothing
less. This Court, in carrying out the constitutional directive of the 1973 Constitution requiring the State to
“assure the rights of workers to x x x security of tenure x x x” has quite consistently nullified, simply on
constitutional grounds, dismissals in violation of procedural due process, notwithstanding the absence of
an express provision of any statute. The Court has done the same under the 1987 Constitution which
admittedly has given more protection to labor than any of our previous charters—through a four-paragraph
section in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights which details the protective mantle accorded to
labor alone. Thus, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution decrees that “[t]he State shall afford full
protection to labor x x x and promote full employment x x x (All workers) shall be entitled to security of
tenure x x x” Art. XII, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that “[t]he State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.” All told, this Court
for almost three
586
decades has set aside, on constitutional grounds, dismissals in violation of procedural due process—
until Wenphil came along, with the interests of the employer tailing and suddenly enjoying preference. To
uphold Wenphil, Serrano, and now Agabon, is to dilute the protection to those who need it most despite the
constitutional mandate which in the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo speaks with “a reverberating clang
that drowns all weaker sounds.” With due respect, the grant of indemnity to the dismissed employee “as
both penalty and disincentive” as the majority provides in the instant case does not square with the
protection accorded by the Constitution to labor. There is only one main relief in cases of dismissal without
notice and hearing—reinstatement.
Same; Same; Same; Compliance with procedural due process is not a burden on employers.—
Compliance with procedural due process is not a burden on employers. There is no valid reason why
employers should have any difficulty according procedural due process to their employees. The rules are
fairly simple.
Same; Same; Same; Dismissal without due process debases human dignity.—Verily, dismissal
without due process debases human dignity. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the employer to conduct a
formal investigation and inform the employee of the specific charges against him. Most certainly, the
resolution of extreme cases, e.g., where the employee threatens the life of the employer, are the exceptions
rather than the ordinary and usual cases. As such, rules governing them should not be used as the general
rule. Rather, employers should be reminded that under our system of government, even the most hardened
criminals are given their day in court. Employees are not entitled to anything less.
Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; In the hierarchy of rights of an employee, the right to security
of tenure is high, if not the highest.—In the hierarchy of rights of an employee, the right to security of tenure
is high, if not the highest. Its paramount value is recognized and guaranteed under our new Constitution.
Consequently, the first paragraph of Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, extends the protective
mantle of the Constitution to all of labor including the promotion of full employment. The second paragraph
specifies the guaranteed right to security of tenure. All other rights, e.g., the right to collective bargaining
and negotiations,
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VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 587
the right to peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike and form unions, and the right to due
process, merely complement the right to job security. All these complementary rights are meaningless to
an unemployed Juan De la Cruz.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Workers need work more than anything else—work is a defining feature
of human existence.—Workers need work more than anything else. For a wageworker, a job is important.
While there is work, there is food on the table. Take away work, replace it with a meager lump sum, and
the food will disappear. Through work, the breadwinner satisfies his basic needs and those of his family.
He also provides himself with a means to express himself, transform, develop and perfect his skills and
talents. Through work, he interacts and establishes relations with others. Work is a defining feature of
human existence. It is the means of sustaining life and meeting essential needs. It is also an activity through
which individuals affirm their own identity, both to themselves and to those around them. It is crucial to
individual choice, to the welfare of families and to the stability of societies. Every man has the right to work,
to a chance to develop his qualities and his personality in the exercise of his profession, to equitable
remuneration which will enable him and his family to lead a worthy life on material, social, cultural and
spiritual level. Shylock said it well: “You take my life when you do take the means whereby I live.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; To simply allow payment of nominal damages for violation of employee’s
right to due process is to give undue advantage to employers—the right to security of tenure and due
process is beyond monetary valuation.—To simply allow payment of nominal damages for violation of
employee’s right to due process is to give undue advantage to employers. One does not need to have a
stratospheric mind to know that the Constitution gave greater rights to employees over their employers. The
intent is to equalize the fight of the underprivileged against the overprivileged. We cannot allow the
employers to marginalize the right of the workingman to due process for a few pesos without mocking the
protection accorded by the Constitution to the powerless. The deprivation of the right to security of tenure
and due process is beyond monetary valuation.In fine, to lengthen the longevity of Serrano is to sharpen
the dangerous divide between the haves and have-nots in our society. But Agabon is not merely
extending Serrano. Agabon is far worse than Serrano.
588
Same; Same; Same; Same; In these times when our lowly workers can hardly maintain body and soul
together due to their meager means, I find it hard to believe that the majority in Wenphil, in Serrano, and
now in the instant case Agabon, persists in weakening our employee’s right to job security.—In these times
when our lowly workers can hardly maintain body and soul together due to their meager means, I find it
hard to believe that the majority in Wenphil, in Serrano, and now in the instant case Agabon, persists in
weakening our employee’s right to job security. The stance simply offends a basic principle of justice so
entrenched in our tradition and etched in our conscience. An employee may not have a Torrens title to his
job but it is not too much to require that before he is dismissed by his employer, he should be given a simple
notice of the cause of his dismissal and a summary hearing to present his side. All our constitutional and
statutory precepts on social justice and the protection of labor will go to naught if we perpetuate our ruling
that a dismissal without the required prior notice is valid and if we just penalize with the payment of
pennies violations of the employee’s right to due process. Without doubt, Wenphil and Serrano have
lengthened the queue of the unemployed. Agabon will stretch it out even more.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court should protect labor and it should walk the talk.—In
the case at bar, where petitioners Jenny Agabon and Virgilio Agabon were dismissed from the service for
abandonment of work without the due process requirements of two (2) notices and hearing, I submit that
the dismissals should be nullified and set aside, and petitioners immediately reinstated without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges. This Court should protect labor and it should walk the talk.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; I respectfully submit that nothing has transpired in
the past four and half years since Serrano was issued, that justifies further diminution of whatever
constitutional rights to due process and security of tenure our workers still enjoy.—With due respect, I
strongly oppose the Court’s inexplicable turnaround. This ruling is a setback on labor’s rights. Thus, I
reiterate my Dissent in Serrano, in that case, I was grateful enough that the Court had decided to reexamine
and modify the ten-year Wenphil doctrine. In the process, it had at least increased the monetary award that
should go to the dismissed employee—from a
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nominal sum in the concept of “indemnity or damages” to “full back wages.” I respectfully submit that
nothing has transpired in the past four and a half years since Serrano was issued, that justifies further
diminution of whatever constitutional rights to due process and security of tenure our workers still enjoy. On
the contrary, nothing is more evident than the inescapable fact that their empowerment makes them better
partners in the country’s development and global competence. Any further trampling of their rights is
undeserved.
Same; Same; Same; When an employee is dismissed without due process, the legal effect is an illegal
dismissal, and the appropriate sanction is full back wages plus reinstatement, not merely full back wages
(or separation pay), much less merely “indemnity of one month salary for every year of service.”—As
explained in my Dissenting Opinion in Serrano, the notice requirement finds basis not only in the Labor
Code but, more important, in the due process clause of the Constitution. Consequently, when an employee
is dismissed without due process, the legal effect is an illegal dismissal; and the appropriate sanction is full
back wages plus reinstatement,not merely full back wages (or separation pay), much less merely “indemnity
of one month salary for every year of service.” It is jurisprudential settled that when procedural due process
is violated, the proceedings—in this case, the dismissal—shall be voided, and the parties returned to
their status quo ante; that is, the employees should be given back their old jobs and paid all benefits as if
they have never been dismissed. In ruling that the dismissal should be deemed legal, the majority has
virtually rendered nugatory the employees’ right to due process as mandated by law and the Constitution.
It has implicitly allowed the employer simply to ignore such right and just pay the employee. I respectfully
submit that illegal dismissal results not only from the absence of a legal cause, in accordance with Articles
282 to 284 of the Labor Code, but likewise from the failure to observe due process. There are many labor
and other cases in which acts violative of due process have unequivocally been declared illegal by the
Court. They range from similar cases of employment termination to criminal prosecutions to administrative
cases and election cases as well. I made a summary of these Decisions in my aforesaid Serrano Opinion,
which I shall no longer repeat here.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The traditional doctrine that constitutional rights may be
invoked only against the State
590
should be modified to enable the judiciary to cope with new paradigms and to continue protecting the
people from new forms of abuses.—True, traditional doctrine holds that constitutional rights may be invoked
only against the State, which in the past was the only entity in a position to violate these rights, including
the due process clause. However, with the advent of liberalization, deregulation and privatization, the State
tended to cede some of its powers to the “market forces.” Hence, corporate behemoths and even individuals
may now be sources of abuses and threats to human rights and liberties. I believe, therefore, that this
traditional doctrine should be modified to enable the judiciary to cope with new paradigms and to continue
protecting the people from new forms of abuses.
TINGA, J., Separate Opinion:
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; The importance of sending the notice of
termination should not be trivialized—the termination letter serves as indubitable proof of loss of
employment, and its receipt compels the employee to evaluate his or next options.—The importance of
sending the notice of termination should not be trivialized. The termination letter serves as indubitable proof
of loss of employment, and its receipt compels the employee to evaluate his or her next options. Without
such notice, the employee may be left uncertain of his fate; thus, its service is mandated by the
Implementing Rules. Non-compliance with the notice rule, as evident in this case, contravenes the
Implementing Rules. But does the violation serve to invalidate the Agabons’ dismissal for just cause?
Same; Same; Same; The Court, prior to the enactment of the Labor Code, was ill-receptive to the
notion that termination for just cause without notice or hearing violated the constitutional right to due
process.—Clearly, the Court, prior to the enactment of the Labor Code, was ill-receptive to the notion that
termination for just cause without notice or hearing violated the constitutional right to due process.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized an award of damages as the appropriate remedy. In Galsim v. PNB, the
Court held: Of course, the employer’s prerogative to dismiss employees hired without a definite period may
be with or without cause. But if the manner in which such right is exercised is abusive, the employer stands
to answer to the dismissed employee for damages.
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Same; Same; Same; The Labor Code, in its inception, did not require notice or hearing before an
employer could terminate an employee for just cause.—The Termination Pay Law was among the repealed
laws with the enactment of the Labor Code in 1974. Significantly, the Labor Code, in its inception, did not
require notice or hearing before an employer could terminate an employee for just cause. As Justice
Mendoza explained: Where the termination of employment was for a just cause, no notice was required to
be given to the employee. It was only on September 4, 1981 that notice was required to be given even
where the dismissal or termination of an employee was for cause. This was made in the rules issued by the
then Minister of Labor and Employment to implement B.P. Blg. 130 which amended the Labor Code. And
it was still much later when the notice requirement was embodied in the law with the amendment of Art.
277(b) by R.A. No. 6715 on March 2, 1989.
Same; Same; Same; It cannot be denied though that the thinking that absence of notice or hearing
prior to termination constituted a constitutional violation has gained a jurisprudential foothold with the
Court.—It cannot be denied though that the thinking that absence of notice or hearing prior to termination
constituted a constitutional violation has gained a jurisprudential foothold with the Court. Justice Puno, in
his Dissenting Opinion, cites several cases in support of this theory, beginning with Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of Appeals wherein we held that “the failure of petitioner to give the private
respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement on his
constitutional right to due process of law.” Still, this theory has been refuted, pellucidly and effectively to my
mind, by Justice Mendoza’s disquisition in Serrano.
Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Judicial Legislation; Theories, no matter how entrancing,
remain theoretical unless adopted by legislation, or more controversially, by judicial opinion.—Justice Puno
characterizes the notion that constitutional due process limits government action alone as “passé,” and
adverts to nouvelle vague theories which assert that private conduct may be restrained by constitutional
due process. His dissent alludes to the American experience making references to the post-Civil War/pre-
World War II era when the US Supreme Court seemed overly solicitous to the rights of big business over
those of the workers. Theories, no matter
592
how entrancing, remain theoretical unless adopted by legislation, or more controversially, by judicial
opinion. There were a few decisions of the US Supreme Court that, ostensibly, imposed on private persons
the values of the constitutional guarantees. However, in deciding the cases, the American High Court found
it necessary to link the actors to adequate elements of the “State” since the Fourteenth Amendment plainly
begins with the words “No State shall . . .” More crucially to the American experience, it had become
necessary to pass legislation in order to compel private persons to observe constitutional values. While the
equal protection clause was deemed sufficient by the Warren Court to bar racial segregation in public
facilities, it necessitated enactment of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 to prohibit segregation as enforced by
private persons within their property. In this jurisdiction, I have trust in the statutory regime that governs the
correction of private wrongs. There are thousands of statutes, some penal or regulatory in nature, that are
the source of actionable claims against private persons. There is even no stopping the State, through the
legislative cauldron, from compelling private individuals, under pain of legal sanction, into observing the
norms ordained in the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; The strained analogy between the State and a private employer does not square
since the attributes of an employer are starkly incongruous with those of the State—employers plainly do
not possess the awesome powers and the tremendous resources which the State has at its command.—
Justice Panganiban’s Separate Opinion asserts that corporate behemoths and even individuals may now
be sources of abuses and threats to human rights and liberties. The concern is not unfounded, but
appropriate remedies exist within our statutes, and so resort to the constitutional trump card is not
necessary. Even if we were to engage the premise, the proper juristic exercise should be to examine
whether an employer has taken the attributes of the State so that it could be compelled by the Constitution
to observe the proscriptions of the Bill of Rights. But the strained analogy simply does not square since the
attributes of an employer are starkly incongruous with those of the State. Employers plainly do not possess
the awesome powers and the tremendous resources which the State has at its command. The differences
between the State and employers are not merely literal, but extend to their very essences. Unlike the State,
the raison d’etre of employers in business is to accumulate profits. Perhaps the State
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and the employer are similarly capacitated to inflict injury or discomfort on persons under their control,
but the same power is also possessed by a school principal, hospital administrator, or a religious leader,
among many others. Indeed, the scope and reach of authority of an employer pales in comparison with that
of the State. There is no basis to conclude that an employer, or even the employer class, may be deemed
a de facto state and on that premise, compelled to observe the Bill of Rights. There is simply no nexus in
their functions, distaff as they are, that renders it necessary to accord the same jurisprudential treatment.
Same; Same; Same; The remedy to rightward judicial bias is not leftward judicial bias—the more
proper judicial attitude is to give due respect to legislative prerogatives, regardless of the ideological sauce
they are dipped in.—It may be so, as alluded in the dissent of Justice Puno, that a conservative court system
overly solicitous to the concerns of business may consciously gut away at rights or privileges owing to the
labor sector. This certainly happened before in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century,
when the progressive labor legislation such as that enacted during President Roosevelt’s New Deal
regime—most of them addressing problems of labor—were struck down by an arch-conservative Court.
The preferred rationale then was to enshrine within the constitutional order business prerogatives, rendering
them superior to the express legislative intent. Curiously, following its judicial philosophy at the time the
U.S. Supreme Court made due process guarantee towards employers prevail over the police power to
defeat the cause of labor. Of course, this Court should not be insensate to the means and methods by
which the entrenched powerful class may maneuver the sociopolitical system to ensure self-preservation.
However, the remedy to rightward judicial bias is not leftward judicial bias. The more proper judicial attitude
is to give due respect to legislative prerogatives, regardless of the ideological sauce they are dipped in.
Same; Same; Same; While the Bill of Rights maintains a position of primacy in the constitutional
hierarchy, it has scope and limitations that must be respected and asserted by the Court, even though they
may at times serve somewhat bitter ends.—While the Bill of Rights maintains a position of primacy in the
constitutional hierarchy, it has scope and limitations that must be respected and asserted by the Court,
even though they may at times serve somewhat
594
bitter ends. The dissenting opinions are palpably distressed at the effect of the Decision, which will
undoubtedly provoke those reflexively sympathetic to the labor class. But haphazard legal theory cannot
be used to justify the obverse result. The adoption of the dissenting views would give rise to all sorts of
absurd constitutional claims. An excommunicated Catholic might demand his/her reinstatement into the
good graces of the Church and into communion on the ground that excommunication was violative of the
constitutional right to due process. A celebrity contracted to endorse Pepsi Cola might sue in court to void
a stipulation that prevents him/her from singing the praises of Coca Cola once in a while, on the ground
that such stipulation violates the constitutional right to free speech. An employee might sue to prevent the
employer from reading outgoing e-mail sent through the company server using the company e-mail
address, on the ground that the constitutional right to privacy of communication would be breached.
Same; Same; Same; We must avoid overarching declarations in order to justify an end result
beneficial to labor.—The above concerns do not in anyway serve to trivialize the interests of labor. But we
must avoid overarching declarations in order to justify an end result beneficial to labor. I dread the doctrinal
acceptance of the notion that the Bill of Rights, on its own, affords protection and sanctuary not just from
the acts of State but also from the conduct of private persons. Natural and juridical persons would hesitate
to interact for fear that a misstep could lead to their being charged in court as a constitutional violator.
Private institutions that thrive on their exclusivity, such as churches or cliquish groups, could be forced to
renege on their traditional tenets, including vows of secrecy and the like, if deemed by the Court as
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Indeed, that fundamental right of all private persons to be let alone would
be forever diminished because of a questionable notion that contravenes with centuries of political thought.
Same; Same; Same; It is not difficult to be enraptured by novel legal ideas—their characterization is
susceptible to the same marketing traps that hook consumers to new products; Before we join the mad
rush in order to proclaim a theory as “brilliant,” a rigorous test must first be employed to determine whether
it complements or contradicts our own system of laws and juristic thought; Just as patriotism is the last
refuge of scoundrels, the broad constitutional claim
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that the Bill of Rights may be invoked to invalidate actions by private entities against private individuals
is the final resort of the desperate litigant.—It is not difficult to be enraptured by novel legal ideas. Their
characterization is susceptible to the same marketing traps that hook consumers to new products. With the
help of unique wrapping, a catchy label, and testimonials from professed experts from exotic lands, a
malodorous idea may gain wide acceptance, even among those self-possessed with their own heightened
senses of perception. Yet before we join the mad rush in order to proclaim a theory as “brilliant,” a rigorous
test must first be employed to determine whether it complements or contradicts our own system of laws
and juristic thought. Without such analysis, we run the risk of abnegating the doctrines we have fostered
for decades and the protections they may have implanted into our way of life. Should the Court adopt the
view that the Bill of Rights may be invoked to invalidate actions by private entities against private individuals,
the Court would open the floodgates to, and the docket would be swamped with, litigations of the scurrilous
sort. Just as patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels, the broad constitutional claim is the final resort of
the desperate litigant.
Same; Labor Law; Due Process; It was only after the enactment of the Labor Code that the doctrine
relied upon by the dissenting opinions became en vogue.—It is quite apparent that the constitutional
protection of labor was entrenched more than eight decades ago, yet such did not prevent this Court in the
past from affirming dismissals for just cause without valid notice. Nor was there any pretense made that
this constitutional maxim afforded a laborer a positive right against dismissal for just cause on the ground
of lack of valid prior notice. As demonstrated earlier, it was only after the enactment of the Labor Code that
the doctrine relied upon by the dissenting opinions became en vogue. This point highlights my position that
the violation of the notice requirement has statutory moorings, not constitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss,
formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution—ultimately, therefore,
Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the
dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing.—
596
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as
self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any
enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be
impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being
overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of “full protection to labor” and “security of tenure,” when
examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket
shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies
an unimpeachable right to continued employment—a utopian notion, doubtless—but still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these
guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the
employers’ as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating
their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution. Ultimately, therefore, Section 3
of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an
employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several
framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their
enforceability.
Same; Same; Same; The Court’s reference to laws other than the Constitution in resolving the issue
of dismissal is an implicit acknowledgment that the right to security of tenure, while recognized in the
Constitution, cannot be implemented uniformly absent a law prescribing concrete standards for its
enforcement.—The necessity for laws concretizing the constitutional principles on the protection of labor is
evident in the reliance placed upon such laws by the Court in resolving the issue of the validity of a worker’s
dismissal. In cases where that was the issue confronting the Court, it consistently recognized the
constitutional right to security of tenure and employed the standards laid down by prevailing laws in
determining whether such right was violated. The Court’s reference to laws other than the Constitution in
resolving the issue of dismissal is an implicit acknowledgment that the right to security of tenure, while
recognized
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in the Constitution, cannot be implemented uniformly absent a law prescribing concrete standards for
its enforcement. As discussed earlier, the validity of an employee’s dismissal in previous cases was
examined by the Court in accordance with the standards laid down by Congress in the Termination Pay
Law, and subsequently, the Labor Code and the amendments thereto. At present, the validity of an
employee’s dismissal is weighed against the standards laid down in Article 279, as well as Article 282 in
relation to Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, for a dismissal for just cause, and Article 283 for a dismissal
for an authorized cause.
Labor Law; Dismissal of Employees; Due Process; The circumstances distinguishing just and
authorized causes are too markedly different to be subjected to the same rules and reasoning in
interpretation.—Before I proceed with my discussion on dismissals for just causes, a brief comment
regarding dismissals for authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code. While the justiciable
question in Serrano pertained to a dismissal for unauthorized cause, the ruling therein was crafted as
definitive to dismissals for just cause. Happily, the Decision today does not adopt the same unwise tack. It
should be recognized that dismissals for just cause and dismissals for authorized cause are governed by
different provisions, entail divergent requisites, and animated by distinct rationales. The language of Article
283 expressly effects the termination for authorized cause to the service of written notice on the workers
and the Ministry of Labor at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination. This constitutes
an eminent difference than dismissals for just cause, wherein the causal relation between the notice and
the dismissal is not expressly stipulated. The circumstances distinguishing just and authorized causes are
too markedly different to be subjected to the same rules and reasoning in interpretation.
Same; Same; Same; There is no express provision in the Labor Code that voids a dismissal for just
cause on the ground that there was no notice or hearing—based on reading Section 279 alone, the
existence of just cause by itself is sufficient to validate the termination.—There is no express provision in
the Labor Code that voids a dismissal for just cause on the ground that there was no notice or hearing.
Under Section 279, the employer is precluded from dismissing an employee except for a just cause as
provided in Section 282, or an authorized cause under Sections 283 and 284. Based on reading
598
Section 279 alone, the existence of just cause by itself is sufficient to validate the termination.
Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement; The remedy of reinstatement despite termination for just cause
is simply not authorized by the Labor Code.—The failure to substantially comply with the standards of due
process, including the notice and hearing requirement, may give rise to an actionable claim against the
employer. Under Article 288, penalties may arise from violations of any provision of the Labor Code. The
Secretary of Labor likewise enjoys broad powers to inquire into existing relations between employers and
employees. Systematic violations by management of the statutory right to due process would fall under the
broad grant of power to the Secretary of Labor to investigate under Article 273. However, the remedy of
reinstatement despite termination for just cause is simply not authorized by the Labor Code. Neither the
Labor Code nor its implementing rules states that a termination for just cause is voided because the
requirement of notice and hearing was not observed. This is not simply an inadvertent semantic failure, but
a conscious effort to protect the prerogatives of the employer to dismiss an employee for just cause.
Notably, despite the several pronouncements by this Court in the past equating the notice-hearing
requirement in labor cases to a constitutional maxim, neither the legislature nor the executive has adopted
the same tack, even gutting the protection to provide that substantial compliance with due process suffices.
The Labor Code significantly eroded management prerogatives in the hiring and firing of employees.
Whereas employees could be dismissed even without just cause under the Termination Pay Law, the Labor
Code affords workers broad security of tenure. Still, the law recognizes the right of the employer to terminate
for just cause. The just causes enumerated under the Labor Code—serious misconduct or willful
disobedience, gross and habitual neglect, fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a crime by the
employee against the employer, and other analogous causes—are characterized by the harmful behavior
of an employee against the business or the person of the employer. These just causes for termination are
not negated by the absence of notice or hearing. An employee who tries to kill the employer cannot be
magically absolved of trespasses just because the employer forgot to serve due notice. Or a less extreme
example, the gross and habitual neglect of an employee will not be improved upon
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just because the employer failed to conduct a hearing prior to termination.
Same; Same; Same; The Labor Code presents no textually demonstrable commitment to invalidate a
dismissal for just cause due to the absence of notice or hearing.—The Labor Code presents no textually
demonstrable commitment to invalidate a dismissal for just cause due to the absence of notice or hearing.
This is not surprising, as such remedy will not restore the employer or employee into equity. Absent a
showing of integral causation, the mutual infliction of wrongs does not negate either injury, but instead
enforces two independent rights of relief.
Same; Same; Separation Pay; Supreme Court; Equity Jurisdiction; The award of separation pay as a
measure of social justice has no statutory basis, but clearly emanates from the Court’s so-called “equity
jurisdiction.”—The award of separation pay as a measure of social justice has no statutory basis, but clearly
emanates from the Court’s so-called “equity jurisdiction.” The Court’s equity jurisdiction as a basis for
award, no matter what form it may take, is likewise unwarranted in this case. Easy resort to equity should
be avoided, as it should yield to positive rules which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Abstract
as the concept is, it does not admit to definite and objective standards.
Same; Same; Social Justice; Social justice should be the aspiration of all that we do, yet I think it the
more mature attitude to consider that it ebbs and flows within our statutes, rather than view it as an
independent source of funding.—I consider the pronouncement regarding the proper monetary awards in
such cases as Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, Reta, and to a degree, even Serrano as premised in part on equity.
This decision is premised in part due to the absence of cited statutory basis for these awards. In these
cases, the Court deemed an indemnity award proper without exactly saying where in statute could such
award be derived at. Perhaps, equity or social justice can be invoked as basis for the award. However, this
sort of arbitrariness, indeterminacy and judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives is precisely the source
of my discontent. Social justice should be the aspiration of all that we do, yet I think it the more mature
attitude to consider that it ebbs and flows within our statutes, rather than view it as an independent source
of funding.
600
Same; Criminal Law; Under Art. 288 of the Labor Code, which is a penal provision, the penalty should
be paid to the State, and not to the person or persons who may have suffered injury as a result of the
violation; Art. 288 clearly serves as a punitive fine, rather than a compensatory measure—nothing in its
language indicates an intention to compensate or remunerate a private person for injury he may have
sustained.—It is apparent that Article 288 is a penal provision; hence, the prescription for penalties such as
fine and imprisonment. The Article is also explicit that the imposition of fine or imprisonment is at the
“discretion of the court.” Thus, the proceedings under the provision is penal in character. The criminal case
has to be instituted before the proper courts, and the Labor Code violation subject thereof duly proven in
an adversarial proceeding. Hence, Article 288 cannot apply in this case and serve as basis to impose a
penalty on Riviera Homes. I also maintain that under Article 288 the penalty should be paid to the State,
and not to the person or persons who may have suffered injury as a result of the violation. A penalty is a
sum of money which the law requires to be paid by way of punishment for doing some act which is prohibited
or for not doing some act which is required to be done. A penalty should be distinguished from damages
which is the pecuniary compensation or indemnity to a person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury,
whether to his person, property, or rights, on account of the unlawful act or omission or negligence of
another. Article 288 clearly serves as a punitive fine, rather than a compensatory measure, since the
provision penalizes an act that violates the Labor Code even if such act does not cause actual injury to any
private person. Independent of the employee’s interests protected by the Labor Code is the interest of the
State in seeing to it that its regulatory laws are complied with. Article 288 is intended to satiate the latter
interest. Nothing in the language of Article 288 indicates an intention to compensate or remunerate a private
person for injury he may have sustained.
Same; Damages; The proper legal basis for holding the employer liable for monetary damages to the
employee dismissed for just cause is the Civil Code.—As earlier stated, Wenphil allowed the payment of
indemnity to the employee dismissed for just cause is dependent on the facts of each case and the gravity
of the omission committed by the employer. However, I considered Wenphil flawed insofar as it is silent as
to the statutory basis for the indemnity award. This failure, to my mind, renders it unwise for to reinstate
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the Wenphil rule, and foster the impression that it is the judicial business to invent awards for damages
without clear statutory basis. The proper legal basis for holding the employer liable for monetary damages
to the employee dismissed for just cause is the Civil Code. The award of damages should be measured
against the loss or injury suffered by the employee by reason of the employer’s violation or, in case of
nominal damages, the right vindicated by the award. This is the proper paradigm authorized by our law,
and designed to obtain the fairest possible relief.
Same; Same; The damages referred under Section 217(4) of the Labor Code are those available
under the Civil Code, it being the law that regulates the private relations of the members of civil society,
determining their respective rights and obligations with reference to persons, things, and civil acts.—The
damages referred under Section 217(4) of the Labor Code are those available under the Civil Code. It is
but proper that the Civil Code serve as the basis for the indemnity, it being the law that regulates the private
relations of the members of civil society, determining their respective rights and obligations with reference
to persons, things, and civil acts. No matter how impressed with the public interest the relationship between
a private employer and employee is, it still is ultimately a relationship between private individuals. Notably,
even though the Labor Code could very well have provided set rules for damages arising from the employer-
employee relationship, referral was instead made to the concept of damages as enumerated and defined
under the Civil Code.
G.R. Nos. 103501-03. February 17, 1997.*

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 103507. February 17, 1997.
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
Criminal Law; Malversation; Criminal Procedure; Right to be Informed; Malversation is committed
either intentionally or by negligence and even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.—We do not agree with Tabuena and
Peralta on this point. Illuminative and controlling is “Cabello v. Sandiganbayan” where the Court passed
upon similar protestations raised by therein accused-petitioner Cabello whose conviction for the same crime
of malversation was affirmed, in this wise: “x x x even on the putative assumption that the evidence against
petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation,
under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be
in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in
the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime,
but a distinct crime, designated as a quasi-offense in the Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful
offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.—In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., we held that an accused charged with willful or intentional
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Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan
falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus: ‘While a criminal
negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of
Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995, but a distinct crime in our Penal Code, designated as
a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under
an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged
with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in
effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act
with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of
the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which
charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the
rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided
by this Tribunal.
Same; Same; Good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused.—Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is
a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the
accused. Thus, in the two (2) vintage, but significant malversation cases of “US v. Catolico” and “US v.
Elviña,” the Court stressed that: “To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such
by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea—a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.”
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstances; Obedience to Lawful Order of Superior; As a recipient of a
directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good faith should be read on a subordinate
government official’s compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with said order.—In so far as
Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum, we are
swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of
such memorandum.
334
From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that would buttress his innocence
of the crime of malversation. First, Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was
what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly
comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos
was undeniably Tabuena’s superior—the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words,
Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as for
instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried
out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no less, good
faith should be read on Tabuena’s compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS
Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.” The subordinate-superior relationship
between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS
Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to
another (PNCC).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not
aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed
in good faith.—Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its
illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.
Such is the ruling in “Nassif v. People.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The subordinate who, in following an order of a superior, failed to
observe all auditing procedures of disbursement, cannot escape responsibility for such omission but where
he acted in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, not criminal.—But this
deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time to
observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS Memorandum
enjoined his “immediate compliance” with the directive that he forward to the President’s Office the P55
Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But
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since he was acting in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not
criminal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The good faith of a subordinate in having delivered the money to the
President’s office, in strict compliance with the President’s memorandum, is not at all affected even if it later
turns out that the intended payee never received the money.—It must be stressed that the MARCOS
Memorandum directed Tabuena “to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru
this office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION . . . .,” and that was what Tabuena precisely did when he
delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez. Such delivery, no doubt, is in effect delivery to the Office of the
President inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos’ secretary then. Furthermore, Tabuena had reasonable
ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55 Million since he was certainly aware
that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and control over government agencies. And the
good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the President’s office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict
compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC
never received the money.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; No criminal liability can be imputed to a subordinate who, pursuant to the
President’s directive, delivers money which is subsequently malversed where no conspiracy is established
between him and the real embezzlers.—Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the
MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-out public money for the personal benefit of those then in power,
still, no criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do
whatsoever with the execution of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the
felonious scheme. In short, no conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of
the P55 Million. In the cases of “US v. Acebedo” and “Ang v. Sandiganbayan,” both also involving the crime
of malversation, the accused therein were acquitted after the Court arrived at a similar finding of non-proof
of conspiracy.
Same; Same; Compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious
disobedience.—This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of
a duly executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than
contumacious disobedience. In the case at
336
bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President
himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on
its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact,
coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est
legis essentia.
Same; Same; Due Process; Criminal Procedure; An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case
open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in
the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.—But what
appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused’s basic
constitutional right to due process. “Respect for the Constitution,” to borrow once again Mr. Justice Cruz’s
words, “is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.”
While going over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised
this as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter as additional basis for
a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes
the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from
whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Confrontation,” “Probing,” and “Insinuation,” Explained.—
Confrontation.—Confrontation consists of confronting the witness with damaging facts which he cannot
deny and which are inconsistent with his evidence. It is a destructive technique, but when it fails to destroy
it may still succeed in weakening. Probing.—Probing consists of inquiring thoroughly into the details of the
story to discover the flaws. Insinuation.—Insinuation consists of leading or forcing the witness by adding
facts at one point and modifying details at another, to give a version of his evidence which is more favorable
to the other side. The Technique of Advocacy, by John H. Munkman, pp. 66-67; p. 75; pp. 91-92.
Same; Same; Same; Judges; The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due process
is certainly denied the accused
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when the court assumes the dual role of magistrate and advocate.—This Court has acknowledged
the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point
which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination
be limited to asking “clarificatory” questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule
is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct
of the trial. Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in
proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their
cross-examinations supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter’s
questions in length. The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due process was certainly
denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate
and advocate.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Constitutional Law; As between a mere apprehension of a
“dangerous precedent” and an actual violation of constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter
that merits the Supreme Court’s immediate attention.—Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of
a “dangerous precedent” and an actual violation of constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter
that merits our immediate attention. For the most dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to
be carried away by such fears so that it becomes lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the
fearful. In our eagerness to bring to justice the malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to
the temptation to commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting:
Due Process; Judges; The trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and
they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a
result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material fact upon
which the judgment of the case should turn.—There is no showing at all that the extensive participation by
the Justices of the Sandiganbayan in questioning the appellants and their witness indicated prejudgment
338
of guilt, bias, hatred, or hostility against the said appellants. On the contrary, the quoted portions of
the questions propounded by the Justices manifest nothing but a sincere desire to ferret out the facts to
arrive at the truth which are crucial in the determination of the innocence or guilt of the appellants. These
Justices, as trial magistrates, have only exercised one of the inherent rights of a judge in the exercise of
judicial function. What this Court stated eighty-three years ago in United States v. Hudieres needs
repeating: It is very clear, however, from a review of the whole proceedings that the only object of the trial
judge in propounding these questions was to endeavor as far as possible to get at the truth as to the facts
to which the witnesses were testifying. The right of a trial judge to question the witnesses with a view to
satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he
presides is too well established to need discussion. The trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both
the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a
miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop
some material fact upon which the judgment of the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge sees
that the degree of credit which he is to give the testimony of a given witness may have an important bearing
upon the outcome, there can be no question that in the exercise of a sound discretion he may put such
questions to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or willingness of
the witness to tell the truth.
Same; Same; Waiver; Rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.—Even
granting arguendo that the conduct of the Justices constituted such a violation, the appellants are forever
estopped from raising that issue on ground of waiver. This Court would risk an accusation of undue partiality
for the appellants were it to give them premium for their torpor and then reward them with an acquittal. Such
waiver is conclusively proven in these cases. From the quoted portions of the testimonies of the witnesses
for the appellants, it is clear that their counsel did not object to, or manifest on record his misgivings on, the
active participation of the Justices in the examination (or cross-examination) of the witnesses. Nothing could
have prevented the counsel for the appellants from doing so. Then, too, as correctly pointed out in
the ponencia, they made no assignment of error on the matter. In our jurisdiction, rights may be waived
unless
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the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or is prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.
Same; Same; Same; I submit that the right to an impartial trial is waivable.—In the cases below, the
perceived violation, if at all it existed, was not of the absolute totality of due process, but more appropriately
of the right to an impartial trial, which is but an aspect of the guarantee of due process. I submit that the
right to an impartial trial is waivable.
Criminal Law; Malversation; Justifying Circumstances; Obedience to Lawful Order of Superior; When
then President Marcos ordered immediate payment, he should not have been understood as to order
suspension of the accepted budgeting, accounting, and auditing rules on the matter—he must only be
understood to order expeditious compliance with the requirements to facilitate immediate release of the
money.—Being responsible accountable officers of the MIAA, they were presumed to know that, in light of
“the undeferred portion of the repayment” of PNCC’s advances in the amount of P63.9 million, the MIAA’s
unpaid balance was only P34.5 million. They also ought to know the procedure to be followed in the
payment of contractual obligations. First and foremost there were the submission by the PNCC of its claims
with the required supporting documents and the approval of the claims by the appropriate approving
authority of MIAA. When then President Marcos ordered immediate payment, he should not have been
understood as to order suspension of the accepted budgeting, accounting, and auditing rules on the matter.
Parenthetically, it may be stated here that although President Marcos was a dictator, he was reported to
be, and even projected himself as, a “faithful” advocate of the rule of law. As a matter of fact, he did not
hesitate to issue a decree, letter of instruction, or any presidential issuance in anticipation of any planned
actions or activities to give the latter the facade or semblance of legality, wisdom, or propriety. When he
made the order to appellant Tabuena, President Marcos must only be understood to order expeditious
compliance with the requirements to facilitate immediate release of the money. There was no way for
Tabuena to entertain any fear that disobedience to the order because of its unlawfulness or delay in the
execution of the order due to compliance with the requirements would cause his head or life. He offered no
credible evidence for such fear. This Court should not provide one for him. That Tabuena served Mr. Marcos
until the end of the latter’s regime and even
340
beyond only proved a loyalty not based on fear but on other considerations.
ROMERO, J., Dissenting:
Criminal Law; Malversation; It is one thing to be ordered to pay a due and demandable obligation, it
is another to make such payment to someone other than the lawful obligee and worse, when the
subordinate is forced to breach official channels to comply with the order.—In the case at bar, Tabuena
was allegedly ordered by President Marcos to pay the PNCC from MIAA’s fund, thus ostensibly meeting
the first requirement but not the others. For there is a qualification which significantly changes the picture.
The payment was to be in cash and immediately made through the Office of the President. It is to be pointed
out that it is one thing to be ordered to pay a due and demandable obligation; it is another to make such
payment to someone other than the lawful obligee and worse, when the subordinate is forced to breach
official channels to comply with the order.
Same; Same; Judgments; Dissenting Opinions; The corroborative value of a dissenting opinion is
minimal—precisely, it supports a position contrary to, and obviously unacceptable to the majority.—
The ponente cites a dissenting opinion of Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Pandogar to uphold his ponencia. Need we remind our respected colleague that the corroborative value
of a dissenting opinion is minimal? Precisely, it supports a position contrary to, and obviously unacceptable
to the majority.
Same; Same; The Sandiganbayan’s finding that the accused converted and misappropriated the P55
million cannot simply be brushed aside upon the accused’s claim that the money was delivered in good
faith to the Office of the President under the mistaken assumption that the President was entitled to receive
the same.—The Sandiganbayan’s finding that petitioners converted and misappropriated the P55 million
cannot simply be brushed aside upon petitioners’ claim that the money was delivered in good faith to the
Office of the President under the mistaken assumption that the President was entitled to receive the same.
They rely on the case of People v. Fabian, which declared that “(g)ood faith in the payment of public funds
relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation.” But the very same decision also cites Article 217
to the effect that
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malversation may be committed by an accountable public officer by negligence if he permits any other
person to take the public funds or property in his custody. It is immaterial if petitioners actually converted
or misappropriated MIAA’s funds for their own benefit, for by their very negligence, they allowed another
person to appropriate the same.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Accountability of Public Officers; Rank may have its privileges but
certainly a blatant disregard of law and administrative rules is not one of them—it must be etched in the
minds of public officials that the underside of privileges is responsibilities.—The fact that no conspiracy was
established between petitioners and the true embezzlers of the P55 million is likewise of no moment. The
crime of malversation, as defined under Article 217 of the Code, was consummated the moment petitioners
deliberately turned over and allowed the President’s private secretary to take custody of public funds
intended as payment of MIAA’s obligations to the PNCC, if obligation there was at all. That petitioner
Tabuena who was then General Manager of MIAA personally and knowingly participated in the misfeasance
compounds the maleficence of it all. Rank may have its privileges but certainly a blatant disregard of law
and administrative rules is not one of them. It must be etched in the minds of public officials that the
underside of privileges is responsibilities.
Courts; Judges; Due Process; The true test for the appropriateness or inappropriateness of court
queries is not their quantity but their quality, that is, whether the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court’s
actions.—The numerous questions asked by the court a quo should have been scrutinized for any possible
influence it may have had in arriving at the assailed decision. The true test for the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of court queries is not their quantity but their quality, that is, whether the defendant was
prejudiced by such questioning. To repeat, petitioners did not feel prejudice by the trial court’s actions;
otherwise, they would have raised this issue in the instant petition.
PUNO, J., Dissenting:
Criminal Law; Doctrine of Mistake of Fact; This Court has never applied the doctrine of mistake of fact
when negligence can be imputed to the accused.—For the same reason, the majority cannot rely on the
doctrine of mistake of fact as ground to acquit petitioners. It found as a fact that “x x x Tabuena acted under
the honest belief
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that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt x x x.” This Court has never applied the doctrine
of mistake of fact when negligence can be imputed to the accused. In the old, familiar case of People vs.
Ah Chong, Mr. Justice Carson explained that ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of
fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charged (e.g., in larceny animus furandi, in murder, malice, etc.), cancels the presumption of intent and
works an acquittal, except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence. Hence, Ah Chong was acquitted when he mistook his houseboy
as a robber and the evidence showed that his mistake of fact was not due to negligence. In the case at bar,
the negligence of the petitioners screams from page to page of the records of the case. Petitioners
themselves admitted that the payments they made were “out of the ordinary” and “not based on normal
procedure.”
Same; Constitutional Law; Justifying Circumstances; Obedience to Lawful Order of
Superior; President; One of the gospels in constitutional law is that the President is powerful but is not more
paramount than the law, and in criminal law, our catechism teaches us that it is loyalty to the law that saves,
not loyalty to any man.—In effect, petitioners’ shocking submission is that the President is always right, a
frightening echo of the antedeluvian idea that the King can do no wrong. By allowing the petitioners to walk,
the majority has validated petitioners’ belief that the President should always be obeyed as if the President
is above and beyond the law. I cannot accept this dangerous ruling even if I look at it through the eyes of
faith. One of the gospels in constitutional law is that the President is powerful but is not more paramount
than the law. And in criminal law, our catechism teaches us that it is loyalty to the law that saves, not loyalty
to any man. Let us not bid goodbye to these sacrosanct principles.
PANGANIBAN, J., Dissenting:
Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Obedience to Lawful Order of Superior; The defense of
“obedience to a superior’s order” is already obsolete.—The defense of “obedience to a superior’s order” is
already obsolete. Fifty years ago, the Nazi war criminals tried to justify genocide against the Jews and their
other crimes against humanity by alleging they were merely following the orders of Adolf Hitler, their
adored fuehrer. However, the International Military
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Tribunal at Nuremberg in its Judgment dated October 1, 1946, forcefully debunked this Nazi argument
and clearly ruled that “(t)he true test x x x is not the existence of the order but whether moral choice was in
fact possible.”
Same; Same; Allowing the petitioners to walk deprives this Court of the moral authority to convict any
subaltern of the martial law dictator who was merely “following orders.”—Resurrecting this internationally
discredit Nazi defense will, I respectfully submit, set a dangerous precedent in this country. Allowing the
petitioners to walk deprives this Court of the moral authority to convict any subaltern of the martial law
dictator who was merely “following orders.” This ludicrous defense can be invoked in all criminal cases
pending not only before this Court but more so before inferior courts, which will have no legal option but to
follow this Court’s doctrine.
G.R. No. 215847. January 12, 2016.*
GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P. ALDON,

and RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, respondents.
Election Law; Election Period; The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and the starting
date of the election period to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.—No less than
the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of the election period. Article IX-C, Section 9
provides: Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period
shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Congress,
through the Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority: Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods.—
Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the Commission on Elections, which hereinafter shall be
referred to as the Commission, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the
election and shall end thirty days thereafter. (emphases supplied) Evidently, the 120-day period is merely
the default election period. The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of
the election period to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. This is not merely a
statutory but a constitutionally granted power of the Commission.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; Formal Hearing; A formal hearing is not always necessary
and the observance of technical rules of procedure is not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.—
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. A formal
hearing is not always necessary and the observance of technical rules of procedure is not strictly applied
in administrative proceedings. The essence of administrative due process is the right to be heard and to be
given an opportunity to explain one’s side. Where the Commission hears both sides and considers their
contentions, the requirements of administrative due process are complied with.
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* EN BANC.
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VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 207
Javier vs. Commission on Elections
Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules
specifically authorize the Commission to suspend the strict application of its rules in the interest of justice
and the speedy disposition of cases.—The COMELEC Rules specifically authorize the Commission to
suspend the strict application of its rules in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases. In
this case, the Commission suspended Rule 18, Section 1. The Commission, as a body, dispensed with the
preparation of another ponencia and opted to vote on the legal positions of Commissioners Yusoph and
Guia. Nevertheless, the decision was evidently reached through consultation. Then Chairman Sixto
Brillantes, Jr., Commissioner Lucenito Tagle, and Commissioner Arthur Lim concurred with Commissioner
Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert Lim joined Commissioner Guia’s dissent. Chairman Brillantes, Jr.
and Commissioner Arthur Lim also wrote separate concurring opinions. The Court does not see any
arbitrariness or infirmity in this internal arrangement that would have deprived the petitioner of due process.
Administrative Law; Judges; Judges and other quasi-judicial officers cannot sit back, relax, and refuse
to do their work just because they are nearing retirement or are near the end of their term.—The
Commission resorted to this arrangement because, as the petitioner pointed out, three Commissioners
were retiring soon. There was a need to resolve the cases because the impending vacancies would have
resulted in further delay. Contrary to the petitioner’s insinuations, “midnight decisions” are not illegal. Judges
and other quasi-judicial officers cannot sit back, relax, and refuse to do their work just because they are
nearing retirement or are near the end of their term. As civil servants, they are expected to diligently carry
out their duties until their separation from service. Thus, the Commission’s suspension of its rules and use
of an internal arrangement to expedite its internal proceedings is not at all unusual in collegial bodies. We
note that the vote was divided and dissents were filed, thereby indicating the absence of any malicious
departure from the usual procedures in arriving at the Commission’s ruling on the case.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Promulgation of Judgments; Words and Phrases;
Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the
public, or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel.—With
respect to the absence of
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a promulgation date on the first page of the assailed order, this Court directs the petitioner’s attention
to the last page stating that the Order was “Given this 12th day of January 2015, Manila, Philippines.”
Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the
public, or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel. The
order was evidently promulgated on January 12, 2015.
Same; Same; Same; “Error of Judgment” and “Error of Jurisdiction,” Distinguished.—No less than the
Constitution empowers the Commission to decide all questions affecting elections except those involving
the right to vote. It is the sole arbiter of all issues involving elections. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by COMELEC cannot be reviewed even by this Court.
An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; they only involve
errors in the court or tribunal’s appreciation of the facts and the law. An error of jurisdiction is one where
the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Statutes; Repeal of Statutes; In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms
of the new and the old laws.—A repeal may be express or implied. An express repeal is one wherein a
statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number
or title, is repealed. An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a substantial conflict exists
between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms
of the new and the old laws.
Same; Same; A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from
the moment the repealing law becomes effective.—A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist
and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective. The discussion on implied
repeals by the Yusoph resolution, (and the concurring opinion of Chairman Brillantes, Jr.), including the
concomitant discussions on the absence of irreconcil-
209
VOL. 780, JANUARY 12, 2016 209
able provisions between the two laws, were thus misplaced. The harmonization of laws can only be
had when the repeal is implied, not when it is express, as in this case.
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; Preliminary Investigation; Pursuant
to Sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), the power of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the
purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice.—With the express repeal
of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer existed. As we held in Jalosjos, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), [t]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates
is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are
beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to
Sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct
of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice.
G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012.*
CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, petitioner, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an
IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK,
ARLENE “KAKA” BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS,
RODOLFO FARIÑAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI,
NERI COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES), respondents.
Constitutional Law; Congress; Impeachment; Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to
remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution.―Impeachment
refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in
the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens
and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers
of the US Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment
Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors
_______________
* EN BANC.
564
Corona vs. Senate of the Philippines
and counsel during the trial.―By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an
Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,
prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the
part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political
question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.
Moot and Academic; An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.―An issue
or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial
relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
No. L-46272. June 13, 1986.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO OPIDA y QUIAMBAO and VIRGILIO
MARCELO, accused-appellants.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as
to create the impression that he is allied with the prosecution. In this case the judge even practically
conducted the direct examination of a defense witness for the purpose of discrediting her testimony.—What
is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two accused and their
lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times, irrelevant, at worst
malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge had allied himself with the
prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the defense.
Same; Same; Same.—Besides belaboring Opida’s criminal activities and his tattoos, the judge asked
him if he had “ever been con-
_______________
* EN BANC.
296
People vs. Opida
victed at the National Mental Hospital”—with what else but malice?—and suggested to him that his
claim of manhandling by the police was a lie because investigators leave no mark when they torture a
suspect. This was a point that could have been validly raised by the prosecution but certainly not by the
court. The judge also made it of record that the witness was gnashing his teeth, was showing signs of
hostility, that he was uneasy, and that he was restless. “Now, whom do you want to fool,” the judge asked,
“the prosecutor, your lawyer, or the court?”
Same; Same; Same.—In the hearing of September 22, 1976, the interrogation of Virgilio Marcelo, the
other accused, was conducted almost wholly by the judge who started cross-examining the witness even
before the defense counsel could ask his first question, and took over from the prosecution the task of
impeaching Marcelo’s credibility. The judge asked him about his drug addiction, his membership in the
Commando gang, his tattoos, his parentage, his activities, his criminal record—all when he was supposed
to be under direct examination by his own lawyer. Defense counsel could hardly put in a word edgewise
because the judge kept interrupting to ask his own questions.
Same; Same; A judge should limit himself to asking clarificatory questions, not adversary questions.—
The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not adversary, they were irrelevant,
and sometimes also cruel. At one point, the judge drew from the witness the statement that his mother was
living with another man; forthwith he suggested that the mother was unfaithful to his father. We deplore this
sadistic treatment of the witness, especially as, for all his supposed “toughness,” he could not answer back.
We fail to see what possible connection the mother’s infidelity could have had, by any stretch of the
imagination, with the instant prosecution.
Same; Same; Confessions extracted by force are not admissible. Judges should look deeper into the
validity of challenged confessions.—We have consistently held that the rights guaranteed during a custodial
investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the suspect, especially if he is unlettered,
but must be painstakingly explained to him so he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover,
manhandling of any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and renders
it inadmissible in evidence against him. Those principles were given
297
VOL. 142, JUNE 13, 1986 297
People vs. Opida
mere lip service by the judge, who did not bother to look deeper into the validity of the challenged
confessions.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Convictions should be based on actual commission of crimes not
appearance of the accused who bore tattoos in his body.—The scales of justice must hang equal and, in
fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no
matter how dark and repellent his past. Despite their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best
dubious adornments only and surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad taste perhaps, but not
of crime. In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the accused but on his actual
commission of crime, to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law
for all without favor or malice and always with justice.
GR No. 127158. March 5, 2001.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ “JUN TAGAY”
and NONITO JAMILA, JR. y CANTO, accused. JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ “JUN
TAGAY,” accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Treachery; Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence as clearly as the killing itself.—There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure the execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. We agree with appellant that nowhere in the assailed judgment is it shown how
the trial court arrived at its conclusion that the killing of Delara was attended by treachery. In convicting
appellant of
_______________
18People vs. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264, 286 (1999).

*SECOND DIVISION.
651
VOL. 353, MARCH 5, 2001 651
People vs. Herida
murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court gave great weight to the testimony
of prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid. The latter testified, however, that he only peeped through the
window some ten (10) minutes after the gunshots had ceased and after hearing a commotion outside his
house. He saw the three assailants, appellant included, ganging up on the victim who was already lying on
the ground, but nonetheless doing his best to fend off the attack. Clearly, when Baniquid looked outside,
the tumult was already well in progress. There is absolutely no showing from his testimony how the attack
commenced; no indicia whether the attack was so sudden and unexpected that it afforded the victim no
chance to defend himself. In the absence of this information, treachery cannot be established from the
circumstances. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as
clearly as the killing itself. Where the attack was not treacherous, the number of aggressors would constitute
abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength, therefore, qualifies the killing as murder.
Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Requisites for Evident Premeditation to be
Appreciated; Absent all these, the conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified the killing
of Delara is devoid of any factual mooring.—For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must
be proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating
that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In the instant case, however,
there is no showing of the time when appellant and his confederates decided to commit the crime. Neither
is there proof to show how appellant and the other two assailants planned the killing of the victim. Nor is
there any evidence showing how much time elapsed before the plan was executed. Absent all these, the
conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified the killing of Delara is devoid of any factual
mooring.
Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the
parties to commit the crime.—Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be shown
by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime. It may be inferred from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
crime which point to a joint design, concerted action and commonality of sentiment or interest. Once proved,
the act of one becomes
652
People vs. Herida
the act of all. All the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their
participation.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by counsel.—
The intensive questioning of the witnesses, however, was necessary. The sworn affidavits of the material
witnesses were adopted as their direct testimonies, subject to cross-examination. Since affidavits are
generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer, the trial court had to ask many questions to clarify important matters. The judge’s
behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered biased or prejudiced. Judges are, after all, not mere
referees in a boxing bout, whose only task is to watch and decide the results. Judges have as much interest
as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that
would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the
points that are overlooked by counsel.
Same; Same; Witnesses; The testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction even for murder.—Prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid positively identified
appellant as one of the three assailants who, acting in concert, assaulted and killed Herlito Delara. Appellant
has shown no reason why Baniquid, who has been his long-time neighbor, should falsely testify against
him. Against such positive identification, appellant’s bare denial of any participation in the killing of Delara
must fall. The testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction
even for murder. We find that the prosecution has successfully proven appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and the award of damages to “the heirs” of the victim is legally justified.
G.R. No. 143802. November 16, 2001.*

REYNOLAN T. SALES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division), OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and THELMA BENEMERITO, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; To deny the accused’s claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.—As this Court pointed
out in Duterte
______________
55 Ibid.
56 See the lower court’s Order dated January 4, 2000; records, p. 54.
* FIRST DIVISION.
294
Sales vs. Sandiganbayan
v. Sandiganbayan, “[t]he purpose of a preliminary investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind,
before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless
and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component
part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being
bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty,
is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused’s claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.”
Same; Same; A preliminary investigation is a judicial proceeding; An act becomes a judicial
proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of evidence,
and a decision is rendered thereon.—Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended
to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates
or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether
or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, preliminary investigation is in effect a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be
adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act
becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and
weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.
Same; Same; While the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a “judge” by the nature of his
functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary investigation is
considered a judicial proceeding; A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted
so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage.—
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary
investigation is no less than a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating
officer, strictly speaking, is not a “judge” by the nature of his functions, he is and must be considered to be
a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding. A preliminary
investigation should there-
295
VOL. 369, NOVEMBER 16, 2001 295
Sales vs. Sandiganbayan
fore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be
protected from any material damage.
Same; Same; Filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation
proper.—The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper.
There is no dispute that the Information was filed without first affording petitioner-accused his right to file a
motion for reconsideration. The denial thereof is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation.
Same; Warrant of Arrest; The task of determining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant
of arrest is a responsibility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges.—In the order of
procedure for criminal cases, the task of determining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of
arrest is a responsibility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges. People v. Inting clearly
delineated the features of this constitutional mandate, viz: 1.] The determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the
judge alone makes this determination; 2.] The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the
judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits,
the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s
certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and 3.] Judges
and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or be released.
G.R. No. 176033. March 11, 2015.*
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ, petitioners, vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO
B. JOSON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Parties; The public respondent should have granted petitioners’
motion to expunge, and treated De Castro’s motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect, as it was
filed by one who is not a party to that case.—Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
462
Aguinaldo vs. Ventus
the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest was filed by one Levita De Castro who is not a party to Criminal
Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness
for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private
respondents to part with their P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners’
filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Same; Same; Arraignment; In Samson v. Judge Daway, 434 SCRA 612 (2004), the Court explained
that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of sixty (60) days reckoned from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.—In Samson v. Judge
Daway, 434 SCRA 612 (2004), the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore,
that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion
to defer arraignment.
Same; Same; Same; With more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the petition
for review and petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the sixty (60)-day period counted from the filing of the petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) had long lapsed.—With the Information for estafa against
petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting
their arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes
that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time petitioners filed their petition for
review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to September 14, 2005 when the trial court finally set their
arraignment, was more than ample time to give petitioners the
463
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 463
opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very liberal
with petitioners in applying Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of
arraignment to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years
having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now
high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period
counted from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.—Both petitioners cannot,
therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete preliminary investigation as part of their right to due
process. After all, “[d]ue process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when
the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.”
Same; Right to Speedy Trial; Petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to speedy trial because
Section 9(3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial must commence the
delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the
Court of Appeals (CA) and the Supreme Court (SC).—Considering that this case had been held in abeyance
long enough without petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial
court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or the
“Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled ‘An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All
Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes.’” In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to
speedy trial because Section 9(3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial
must commence the delay resulting from
464
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA and the
Court.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; In order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for review is not a cause
for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only
take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists.—In order to avoid delay in the proceedings,
judges are reminded that the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition
for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the quashal of a
warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges
should take note of the following: 1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the proceedings upon
motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the public
prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on or before the period fixed by the court, which
in no instance could be more than the period fixed by the court counted from the granting of the motion to
suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without
further delay. 2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend the
proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and
direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules
which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review before
the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
G.R. No. 176033. March 11, 2015.*
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ, petitioners, vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO
B. JOSON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Parties; The public respondent should have granted petitioners’
filed by one who is not a party to that case.—Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to
Reinstate
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
462
the Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest was filed by one Levita De Castro who is not a party to Criminal
Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not even a private complainant, but a mere witness
for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private
respondents to part with their P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners’
filed by one who is not a party to that case.
Same; Same; Arraignment; In Samson v. Judge Daway, 434 SCRA 612 (2004), the Court explained
that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited
provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of sixty (60) days reckoned from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial
court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.—In Samson v. Judge
Daway, 434 SCRA 612 (2004), the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore,
that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion
to defer arraignment.
Same; Same; Same; With more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the petition
for review and petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the
merits in the criminal case below, as the sixty (60)-day period counted from the filing of the petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) had long lapsed.—With the Information for estafa against
petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003, the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting
their arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The Court believes
that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the time petitioners filed their petition for
review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to September 14, 2005 when the trial court finally set their
arraignment, was more than ample time to give petitioners the
463
VOL. 752, MARCH 11, 2015 463
opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In fact, the public respondent had been very liberal
with petitioners in applying Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of
arraignment to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years
having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now
high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period
counted from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.—Both petitioners cannot,
therefore, claim denial of their right to a complete preliminary investigation as part of their right to due
process. After all, “[d]ue process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when
the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.”
Same; Right to Speedy Trial; Petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to speedy trial because
Section 9(3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial must commence the
delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the
Court of Appeals (CA) and the Supreme Court (SC).—Considering that this case had been held in abeyance
long enough without petitioners having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial
court for trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or the
“Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled ‘An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All
Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes.’” In this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to
speedy trial because Section 9(3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time within which trial
must commence the delay resulting from
464
extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA and the
Court.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; In order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for review is not a cause
for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only
take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists.—In order to avoid delay in the proceedings,
judges are reminded that the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition
for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the quashal of a
warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges
should take note of the following: 1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the proceedings upon
motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct the public
prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on or before the period fixed by the court, which
in no instance could be more than the period fixed by the court counted from the granting of the motion to
suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without
further delay. 2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend the
proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and
direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules
which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review before
the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
G.R. Nos. 205904-06, October 17, 2018
GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 213181. August 19, 2014.*

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar Council; Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides
for the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Supreme Court (SC) was given supervisory
authority over it.—Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The
Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads: Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Jardeleza vs. Sereno
Same; Same; Supervision; Supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.—As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition
and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity
are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves
do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to
it that the rules are followed.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty; There is no question
that the Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC’s) duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to
do something.—The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. Mandamus lies to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer
where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do
something.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.—Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorari on the
ground that it does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ
of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. “Judicial functions are
exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights
of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to
the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to inves-
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tigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature.” It asserts that in the performance of its
function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Hence, the resort to such remedy to question its actions is improper.
Same; Same; Same; It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.—It has been judicially
settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality
of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions. In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court
does not find passivity as an alternative. The impasse must be overcome.
Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has been tasked to screen
aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President
are all qualified and suitably best for appointment.—The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably
rooted in the categorical constitutional declaration that “[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in
every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among
others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial
appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.
Same; Same; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) may even conduct a discreet background check
and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits
of which shall be verified and checked.—As disclosed by the
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guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, “integrity” is closely
related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an
applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials
and nongovernmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and
the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive
feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall
be verified and checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, “integrity is the
quality of person’s character.”
Same; Same; Unanimity Rule; The “unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral
character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to
an applicant’s moral uprightness.—Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the “unanimity rule,”
contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides: SEC.
2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged.—In every case where the integrity
of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote
of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination. A
simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is
absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question
arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes “unanimous”
instead of the “majority vote” required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term
“integrity” as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher
hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe
conclusion that “integrity” as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the
“unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no
application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness.
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Attorneys; A lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to
him provided that he lives up to his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and that he exert
his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law.—Verily, disagreement in
legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction among members of the legal community.
A lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him provided that
he lives up to his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts
to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of
victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian
ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind
remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his moral
choices.
Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; Unanimity Rule; To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC)-009, there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral
character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional.—The Court notes the zeal shown by the
Chief Justice regarding international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian
Dredging case. Her efforts in the determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while
commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of a connection between the act complained of
and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
009, there must be a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the
person and not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition perceives, therefore, is the
inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its invocation.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Judges; Immorality; A lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed
to have failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the
Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never gone physical or intimate
could still be subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to
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having a relationship which was more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than
friendly.—Unlike the first ground which centered on Jardeleza’s stance on the tactical approach in pursuing
the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid
relation to his moral character. Jurisprudence is replete with cases where a lawyer’s deliberate participation
in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on one’s ethical and moral principles. The
bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe.
In fact, even relationships which have never gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of
immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more than
professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly. As the Court has held: Immorality has not
been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate attitude toward
good order and public welfare. Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality. To have a good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristic of being good. It is
not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion generally entertained about a person
or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. Hence, lawyers
are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.
Same; Same; Same; Insider Trading; Insider trading involves the trading of securities based on
knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the time.—Insider trading is an offense that
assaults the integrity of our vital securities market. Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including
insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. When someone trades
in the market with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other
participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of stock market
scandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of
capital. And investors would eventually feel more secure with their
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money invested elsewhere. In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities
based on knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of
insider trading involves the propensity of a person to engage in fraudulent activities that may speak of his
moral character.
Judicial and Bar Council; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), as a body, is not required by law to hold
hearings on the qualifications of the nominees.—The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings
on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence
akin to a criminal or administrative offense but to ascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the
requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights insisted
upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most,
discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the
June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose to tread on his view that the Chief
Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.
Attorneys; It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Supreme
Court (SC) into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.—The fact that a
proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an
applicant’s entitlement to due process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. Hence,
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.
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In such posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. On the whole,
disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verify and finally determine, if a lawyer charged is
still qualified to benefit from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.
Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; The Supreme Court (SC) subscribes to the view that in cases where
an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor
renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to recommend.—
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. The
Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to
recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its
adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an
applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an
unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly
apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of
discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Same; Same; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing
when an objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to accomplish
its objective.—The conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the
part of the JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary
for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument
suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to an applicant’s
integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds,
“what is mandatory, however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor in a
hearing,
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due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor.”
Same; Same; Any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within
ten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates.—As threshed out beforehand, due
process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances
still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the
procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat,
as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary
within ten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the
more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period is only applicable to the
public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the
first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members
of the Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did
not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council
agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a resource
person would shed light on the matter.
Due Process; In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises
a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.—In criminal and
administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule may well be
applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To
this, the Court shall not concede. As the branch of government tasked to guarantee that the
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protection of due process is available to an individual in proper cases, the Court finds the subject short
list as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the
original ground against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s
discretion in the selection of nominees, but its application of the “unanimity rule” must be applied in
conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure
four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the
JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him
a rightful spot in the short list submitted to the President.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that while I may agree with the Judicial and Bar
Council’s (JBC’s) proposition that mandamus cannot be availed of to compel the performance of a
discretionary act, it is already settled that a petition for certiorari is nonetheless a proper remedy to question,
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the act of any branch or instrumentality of government,
regardless of the nature of its functions.—While I may agree with the JBC’s proposition
that mandamus cannot be availed of to compel the performance of a discretionary act, it is already settled
that a petition for certiorari is nonetheless a proper remedy to question, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, the act of any branch or instrumentality of government, regardless of the nature of its functions.
The most recent articulation of this doctrine can be found in Araullo v. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1 (2014), where
we held: [T]he remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section
1 [Article VIII of the Constitution].
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Judicial and Bar Council; View that the Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC’s) functions are not judicial
such that a formal, trial-type of hearing would be not be required in the discharge of its duties.—I am willing
to grant that the JBC’s functions are not judicial such that a formal, trial-type of hearing would be not be
required in the discharge of its duties. However, even in administrative or nonformal types of proceedings,
there are minimum requirements that must be met to protect the due process rights of the persons subjected
to an investigation, or in this case, an inquiry into their qualifications for judicial office. We have held that
“in administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person
so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.”
The Court has also previously stated that “the observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is
at the very heart of procedural due process.”
Same; Judges; Constitutional Law; View that as mandated by the Constitution, a Member of the
Supreme Court (SC) must be a natural-born Filipino, at least forty (40) years of age, and must have been
for fifteen (15) years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.—
As mandated by the Constitution, a Member of the Supreme Court must be a natural-born Filipino, at least
forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines. In addition to these basic qualifications, all members of the Judiciary must
be persons of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. In order to ensure that a candidate
to a judicial position has the foregoing qualifications, the JBC set forth the evidence that it may receive for
each type of qualification. Rule 3 of JBC-009 deals with how the JBC shall determine the competence of
applicants in terms of education, experience and performance. Rule 4 of JBC-009 involves guidelines on
evaluating an applicant’s integrity. Rule 5 and Rule 6 of JBC-009 provide for proof that may be considered
for demonstrating an applicant’s probity/independence and his or her soundness of physical, mental, and
emotional condition.
Same; Same; View that under Section 1, Rule 7 of Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)-009, the JBC En
Banc or any panel of its members shall conduct personal interviews of candidates for positions in
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the Judiciary and certain positions in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the case of positions in the
Supreme Court (SC), the Court of Appeals (CA), the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman, the interviews
shall be conducted in public.—Under Section 1, Rule 7 of JBC-009, the JBC En Banc or any panel of its
members shall conduct personal interviews of candidates for positions in the Judiciary and certain
positions in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the case of positions in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman, the interviews shall be conducted in public. In order
to promote transparency and public awareness of JBC proceedings in relation to its function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary and to the positions of Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman
and pursuant to Section 1, Rule 7 of JBC-009, the JBC issued JBC-10 which contain the procedure for
submission and evaluation of complaints or oppositions against a candidate.
Same; Same; View that under Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)-10, it is mandatory that any opposition
on whatever ground, including integrity questions, must be in writing and under oath.—JBC-10 requires that
names of the candidates be published and the public is informed of the deadline to file written and sworn
oppositions to the candidates so named for consideration. Under JBC-10, it is mandatory that any
opposition on whatever ground, including integrity questions, must be in writing and under oath. The
candidate is given a copy of the opposition and a period of five days within which to respond, if he so
wishes. There are deadlines for the filing of oppositions and the answers thereto for it is apparent on the
face of JBC-10 that all submissions must be done before the interview which is a second opportunity for a
candidate to address all complaints or oppositions against him in a public proceeding which shall be
recorded in writing.
Same; Same; View that a written complaint/opposition not only informs the candidate of the charges
against him but more importantly, it limits the issues that he needs to answer to those stated in the
complaint/opposition.—It is not difficult to glean why JBC-10 requires the complaint or opposition to be in
writing. A written complaint/opposition not only informs the candidate of the charges against him but more
importantly, it limits the issues that he needs to answer to those stated in the complaint/opposition.
This prior delimitation of issues is crucial to due process such that, at the
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public interview or any subsequent hearing to be conducted, the candidate will not be surprised by
any new matter for which he has not been given an adequate opportunity to prepare his defense. The
complaint must also be under oath not only to protect the candidate from untruthful charges but also to
avoid wasting the JBC’s time investigating and evaluating frivolous complaints. It is presumed that only
those who have meritorious complaints will file sworn statements as the threat of opening themselves to a
charge of perjury would be sufficient deterrent to nuisance filings.
Same; Same; View that a candidate for a judicial position does not lose his constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process simply because the oppositor to his candidacy is the Chair or a member of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC).—To be sure, there is no legal or logical reason to exempt an oppositor who also
happens to be a member of the JBC from the requirement of setting forth his or her opposition to a candidate
in writing and under oath within the time limit given to the general public and to give such candidate a fair
period to respond to the opposition in writing or during his public interview as provided for in JBC-10. A
candidate for a judicial position does not lose his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process simply
because the oppositor to his candidacy is the Chair or a member of the JBC. Moreover, if the JBC sees fit
to exempt one of its own from the application of its published rules of procedure, it becomes susceptible to
an accusation of abuse of power or arbitrary exercise of discretion.
Same; Same; View that while it is not mandatory that the candidate be given the right to cross-examine
a witness (that is, a witness other than the oppositor since Section 3, Rule 4 of Judicial and Bar Council
JBC-009 expressly grants the candidate the right to cross-examine an oppositor), there must be an official
and accurate account of that witness’s testimony which should be disclosed to the candidate.—Moving on
to another point, it is true that it is discretionary on the part of the JBC to hear testimony on a complaint
against a candidate but having decided to hear such testimony, procedural due process demands that the
candidate at least be present to hear the substance of that testimony and for that testimony to be made
part of the record. While it is not mandatory that the candidate be given the right to cross-examine a witness
(that is, a witness other than the oppositor since Section 3, Rule 4 of JBC-009 expressly grants the
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candidate the right to cross-examine an oppositor), there must be an official and accurate account of
that witness’s testimony which should be disclosed to the candidate. This disclosure should likewise be
made prior to the opportunity to be heard that will be accorded to the candidate, in this case prior to the
session on June 30.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; View that an individual’s constitutional right to due process cannot
be sacrificed in the name of confidentiality.—If the subject matter of the opposition against a candidate
involves information of a highly confidential nature and divulging the privileged matter could not be avoided,
would that justify dispensing with written notices, submissions and accurate records of the proceedings?
The answer should be a resounding no. An individual’s constitutional right to due process cannot be
sacrificed in the name of confidentiality. The JBC should still require a written complaint and allow the
candidate reasonable time to submit a written answer if he so wishes or allow him to be heard orally at a
hearing for which accurate records should be kept but all submissions and records of the proceedings
shall be treated with the utmost confidentiality.
Same; Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) was created
under the Constitution as an independent body tasked with the delicate function of vetting the qualifications
of applicants to judicial positions, among others.—The JBC seems oblivious to the conflict of interest
situation that arises when the oppositor under Section 2, Rule 10 is a member of the JBC. The JBC was
created under the Constitution as an independent body tasked with the delicate function of vetting the
qualifications of applicants to judicial positions, among others. Although I agree with the JBC that this
function cannot exactly be termed judicial or quasi-judicial, I take exception to the proposition that the
Council is not engaged in fact-finding or that it need not determine the truth or falsity of an opposition against
a candidate. If that is so, why does it even require objectors to swear to their opposition and submit
supporting evidence? In this regard, JBC members do function similarly to impartial investigators or fact-
finders who are supposed to make an unbiased recommendation on the fitness of a candidate for judicial
office to the President based on a determination of relevant facts.
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Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; View that as a matter of practice, when the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) submits the short list to the President the candidates are ranked by the number of votes that they
gathered during the deliberation.—As a matter of practice, when the JBC submits the short list to the
President the candidates are ranked by the number of votes that they gathered during the deliberation. This
ranking is meant to indicate the strength of the JBC’s recommendation for each candidate in relation to the
others on the list. The JBC contends that, when petitioner’s integrity was challenged and the JBC Member-
oppositor inhibited from the voting on his candidacy, he should have gotten the affirmative vote of all five
remaining JBC Members eligible to vote on his candidacy. Now, suppose he did get the unanimous vote of
the non-objectors. In theory, that would be a perfect score.
Same; Same; View that that petitioner was “disloyal” to the Republic is not a fact; it is but an opinion
or conclusion, which should have been supported with facts, that is, documentary evidence and sworn
testimonies or affidavits from witnesses with personal knowledge of the matter involved.—That petitioner
was “disloyal” to the Republic is not a fact; it is but an opinion or conclusion, which should have been
supported with facts, that is, documentary evidence and sworn testimonies or affidavits from witnesses with
personal knowledge of the matter involved. The Chief Justice could not possibly have personal knowledge
of the internal deliberations and discussions in the Executive department regarding the aforesaid
international case because if she does then I would fear the erosion of the separation of powers in our
government. Secretary De Lima, who is part of the Cabinet, would even state that she was not clear when
and how the strategy complained of by the Chief Justice happened and if this was the petitioner’s idea.
More importantly, Secretary De Lima did not question petitioner’s integrity and voted for his inclusion in the
short list. Neither is there anything on record to independently corroborate the morality issue or the stock
transaction issue which were allegedly reported to the Chief Justice.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; View that every law student knows that matters
attested to by a person with no personal knowledge of the same shall be deemed hearsay which has no
probative value.—Every law student knows that matters attested to by a person with no personal knowledge
of the same shall be
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deemed hearsay which has no probative value. The Court held in Jose v. Angeles, 708 SCRA 506
(2013): Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is
anchored on three reasons: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3)
absence of oath. Basic under the rules of evidence is that a witness can only testify on facts within his or
her personal knowledge. This personal knowledge is a substantive prerequisite in accepting testimonial
evidence establishing the truth of a disputed fact. Corollarily, a document offered as proof of its contents
has to be authenticated in the manner provided in the rules, that is, by the person with personal knowledge
of the facts stated in the document. (Citations omitted) Hearsay, whomever the source, is still hearsay.
Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; View that as an independent, constitutional screening body that is
held in high regard by the public, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) should base its determination that a
candidate does not have the requisite integrity to hold judicial office on something more than speculation,
rumor or unverified report.—I fully agree with Justice Brion that although the JBC rules allow the JBC to
undertake a discreet background check, if such an investigation yields a matter that may be subject of an
opposition then such opposition should be in writing. Reliance on informal complaints reaching the ears of
JBC Members cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with due process, especially when the nature of
the complaint may trigger an application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 that would set one candidate
apart from the others in terms of the required vote to be included in the short list. Hard-earned reputations
may likewise be summarily destroyed by a public announcement that a candidate for judicial office who
otherwise garnered a majority vote was excluded from the short list by the JBC on the ground of lack of
integrity. As an independent, constitutional screening body that is held in high regard by the public, the JBC
should base its determination that a candidate does not have the requisite integrity to hold judicial office on
something more than speculation, rumor or unverified report.
Same; Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) should categorically decide by majority
vote on the existence of a substantial integrity issue which will warrant the application of
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Section 2, Rule 10 to a particular candidate.—After an integrity challenge has been made in
compliance with the procedural requirements under JBC-10, the JBC should take a preliminary vote on
whether such challenge to a candidate truly involved a question of integrity based on each Council
member’s appreciation of the material facts and they must determine if the issue is substantial enough to
require application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. The JBC should not rely on the oppositor’s
characterization of his own objection as an integrity question as what happened in this case. The JBC
should categorically decide by majority vote on the existence of a substantial integrity issue which will
warrant the application of Section 2, Rule 10 to a particular candidate. Only then should the JBC vote on
the nominations of the candidates to determine who will be short listed. Before the second voting, it should
be clear to the JBC how many votes each candidate should garner to be nominated. In view of the highly
prejudicial effect of an integrity challenge to a candidate, my proposed two-step voting procedure will
ensure that a majority vote is first reached on the existence of the integrity issue before the JBC will require
a unanimous vote on the fitness of a specific candidate for nomination. During the second voting, each JBC
Member is put on notice that if he or she does not vote for that candidate’s nomination it will mean exclusion
of that candidate from the short list for lack of a unanimous vote. The second vote will clearly evince the
intent of the nonvoting member(s) to so exclude a candidate. Through this procedure, the JBC can avoid
the pernicious situation of a minority being able to prejudice a candidate’s application on their mere
manifestation that they are invoking Section 2, Rule 10 on an integrity question.
Same; Same; View that the President’s exercise of his power to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
(SC) within the deadline is a constitutional mandate that may not be enjoined by any court.—I concur with
the JBC that the President’s exercise of his power to fill a vacancy in this Court within the deadline is a
constitutional mandate that may not be enjoined by any court. In any event, petitioner’s prayer for a
temporary restraining order would be rendered moot and academic by the Court’s disposition of this case
on the merits, whether favorably or unfavorably.
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Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Judicial and Bar Council; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) dwelt with matters that
Jardeleza could no longer controvert in this case without risking the lapse of the presidential time limit on
appointments to the Supreme Court (SC).—To top all the above characteristics and to Jardeleza’s
great prejudice, the JBC dwelt with matters that Jardeleza could no longer controvert in this case without
risking the lapse of the presidential time limit on appointments to the Supreme Court. Additionally, the terms
of this Supplemental Comment are, on their faces, sickening as they are no less than daggers used in a
character assassination made in the guise of a Supplemental Comment. Expressly, it alleged that Jardeleza
had been “disloyal to the country.” The Supplemental Comment also laid bare aspects of the government
arbitration case that no responsible government official, more so if she is Chief Justice, would so
openly discuss. To be sure, to be called disloyal to one’s country is no laughing matter that one can easily
brush aside and forget. At the very least, it is a career-killer, not to mention the personal stigma it leaves
on one’s person, family and all past accomplishments. What elevates this charge to the level of malice is
that it appears to have been purposely timed to be embodied in the Supplemental Comment at the stage
of the case when it could no longer be refuted. Those who have read Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar can
readily appreciate that Jardeleza can now very rightly say: Et tu, Chief Justice who should be the chief
guardian of people’s personal rights through the due process clause?
Same; View that the Judiciary has no business passing judgment, however informally, on internal
developments within the Executive Department, a coordinate and coequal branch, unless the developments
are facts in issue in a case.—I do not share, too, CJ Sereno’s view that we can discuss and be judgmental
about a matter that wholly lies within Executive domain and whose public discussion at this point may work
to the prejudice and detriment of the country. The Judiciary has no business passing judgment, however
informally, on internal developments within the Executive Department, a coordinate and coequal branch,
unless the developments are facts in issue in a case. Even in the latter case, we should particularly be
careful in our actions when these actions may possibly entail risk to the national interests. If the Chief
Justice is adventurous
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enough to take such risks, then this Opinion and like actions from individual Justices of this Court, will
at least signal to the Executive and to the nation that the Court itself as an institution does not share
the Chief Justice’s views. If indeed she had an awareness of the sensitivity of the matters brought up to
the level of the JBC, she should have taken measures and safeguards to ensure their confidentiality, or,
must have at least consulted with the offices concerned on how best to handle possible national interest
concerns. Ironically, as events in this case unfolded, she even initiated the full exposition in the
Supplemental Comment of matters that may possibly involve national interest risks.
Due Process; View that from the perspective of strict legality, J. Lagman’s phone call and invitation to
Jardeleza on June 16 and 17, 2014, cannot therefore serve as a notice sufficient for due process
purposes.—From the perspective of strict legality, J. Lagman’s phone call and invitation to Jardeleza on
June 16 and 17, 2014, cannot therefore serve as a notice sufficient for due process purposes. Jardeleza
was invited to come and was only generally informed that there would be an objection against his integrity.
As further discussed below, despite his subsequent June 24, 2014 letter to the Court and to CJ Sereno, he
was not informed of the details of the objection and was more in the dark rather than informed and
enlightened, when he attended the June 30, 2014 JBC meeting.
Judicial and Bar Council; View that supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed,
but they themselves do not lay down these rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace
them.—The JBC functions as a collegial body that recommends to the President a short list of nominees
for vacant judicial positions, from which list the President then chooses his appointee. It is a constitutional
body created under the 1987 Constitution to replace the highly-political process of judicial appointments in
the past, and was meant to make the selection process more competence-based. It also seeks to shield
the judiciary from political pressure from the other branches of government. To partly quote the wording of
the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 8(1) and (5) provide that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court… It may exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.” Supervision, as a legal concept, has been defined as the power of
oversight, or the
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authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It involves ensuring that the law or the
rules governing the conduct of a government body or subordinate officer are followed. Supervising officials
merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down these rules, nor do they
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done
or redone, but only to conform to the rules.
Constitutional Law; Judiciary; Jurisdiction; Certiorari; View that the present Constitution not only
integrates the traditional definition of judicial power, but introduces as well a completely new expanded
power to the Judiciary under the last phrase — “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”—As I have noted in several cases in the past, the 1987 Constitution granted the Court an
expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed by a government
agency or instrumentality, viz.: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Under these terms, the present
Constitution not only integrates the traditional definition of judicial power, but introduces as well
a completely new expanded power to the Judiciary under the last phrase — “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Under this expanded judicial power,
justiciability expressly and textually depends only on the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion, as distinguished from a situation where the issue of constitutional validity is raised within a
“traditionally” justiciable case which demands that the requirement of actual controversy based on specific
legal rights must exist. Notably, even if the requirements under the traditional definition of judicial power
are applied, these requisites are complied with once grave abuse of discretion is prima facie shown to have
taken place. The presence
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or absence of grave abuse of discretion is the justiciable issue to be resolved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; New Code of Conduct for Judicial Officials in the Philippine Judiciary;
View that through its practices, the Supreme Court (SC) has allowed the use of certiorari as a remedy to
invoke the Court’s expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been
committed.—Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reflects the traditional jurisdiction of the Court, and thus requires
that a petition for certiorari be directed towards a judicial or quasi-judicial act. Jurisprudence after the 1987
Constitution’s enactment, however, has repeatedly invoked the Court’s expanded jurisdiction
— albeit without expressly naming it — by carving out exceptions on the requirements for justiciability.
Recent cases, however, have been more cognizant of the Court’s expanded jurisdiction. Thus, through its
practices, the Court has allowed the use of certiorari as a remedy to invoke the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed. The Court has so acted
regardless of whether the assailed act is quasi-judicial or not.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that to successfully invoke the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the
petitioner must prima facie show that the assailed act constitutes grave abuse of discretion by any branch
or instrumentality of government.—To successfully invoke the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, the petitioner
must prima facie show that the assailed act constitutes grave abuse of discretion by any branch or
instrumentality of government. In my view, Jardeleza complied with this requirement with his narration of
the facts that transpired during the selection process vis-à-vis the JBC Rules of Procedure, which
allegations the JBC did not essentially contradict.
Judicial and Bar Council; Due Process; View that I cannot agree with the Judicial and Bar Council’s
(JBC’s) contention that the investigative nature of the selection process automatically means that the due
process rights of applicants cannot be invoked against it.—The uniqueness and novelty of the JBC’s
selection process give it ample but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties. It cannot conduct
its proceedings in violation of individual fundamental rights or other provisions of the
Constitution. For this reason, I cannot agree with the JBC’s contention that the
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investigative nature of the selection process automatically means that the due process rights of
applicants cannot be invoked against it. As a body vested with governmental functions, it interacts
with, and its actions affect, individuals whose rights must be considered.
Same; Same; View that involved here is a reputation built-up over the years as an outstanding student,
a preeminent law practitioner, and a high-ranking government official now officially representing no less
than the Government.—Involved here is a reputation built-up over the years as an outstanding student, a
preeminent law practitioner, and a high-ranking government official now officially representing no less than
the Government. Jardeleza’s noninclusion in the list — despite being considered by many as a strong
contender, taken together with the statement from the Court’s Public Information Office announcement that
there should have been five nominees, had it not been for an invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of
JBC-009 — cannot but signal doubts about Jardeleza’s integrity. That Jardeleza was the excluded nominee
had been confirmed by subsequent judicial proceedings before this Court, that has been the subject of
media attention through various articles speculating on his integrity. Thus, the JBC’s failure to apply
procedural due process has prejudiced Jardeleza’s private interest: he was excluded from the short list of
nominees, to the prejudice of his reputation and despite the required majority votes he garnered.
Conceivably, the accusation against him — if left unresolved — would also affect his continued stay in his
post as Solicitor General since the media continues to speculate on the matter. Further inaction from this
Court would further taint Jardeleza’s reputation, given the allegations already made at the JBC and in these
proceedings.
Same; Same; Procedural Due Process; View that procedural due process is a flexible concept, and
the required safeguards and procedures to ensure it may change based on the nature of the case and the
attendant facts.—Procedural due process is a flexible concept, and the required safeguards and procedures
to ensure it may change based on the nature of the case and the attendant facts. But at the heart of
procedural due process is fairness, as embodied in its most basic requirements: the meaningful
opportunity to be heard (audi alteram partem) by an impartial decision-maker (nemo judex in parte
sua). Due process, as it originated from England,
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embodied these two interlocking principles, which ultimately prohibits partiality and fosters impartiality.
Same; Same; View that as the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) selection process is a sui generis
proceeding, no existing jurisprudential standard can definitively be used as judicial precedent for the due
process required in the selection process.—As the JBC selection process is a sui generis proceeding, no
existing jurisprudential standard can definitively be used as judicial precedent for the due process required
in the selection process. But, at the very least, the most rudimentary aspect of procedural due process
should apply: there should be meaningful opportunity to present one’s case and the consideration must be
made by an impartial judge. Unfortunately, neither of these aspects had been observed in the present case.
On the contrary, what appears from the records on a collective reading of seemingly disparate incidents, is
a determined effort to discredit Jardeleza’s integrity without giving him the benefit of impartial consideration.
Same; Same; View that the proceedings before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) showed that some
of its members were aware that opposition to an applicant’s inclusion in the short list and his response
thereto should be in writing.—The selective application of the JBC’s rules is also highly suspect. The
proceedings before the JBC showed that some of its members were aware that opposition to an applicant’s
inclusion in the short list and his response thereto should be in writing. The JBC, upon CJ Sereno’s
insistence, chose to ignore this rule — which embodied procedural due process — for the sole reason that
it would be “messy.”
Same; Same; View that once the discreet background investigation produces an opposition to the
application, then such opposition should be in writing.—Admittedly, both JBC-009 and JBC-010 allow the
conduct of a discreet background information on the applicant. It is my view, however, that once the
discreet background investigation produces an opposition to the application, then such opposition
should be in writing. True, the JBC has the discretion to motu proprio entertain or discard an opposition.
That is the import of the word ‘may’ in Section 3, Rule 4. But regardless of the JBC’s action or inaction
to it, the opposition should be in writing. Both Section 3, Rule 4 of JBC-009 and Section 2 of JBC-010
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require that an opposition or complaint against an applicant be in writing, while the latter even requires
that this be supported by annexes. In short, the JBC can receive an opposition to an application only if it is
in writing, and cannot choose to receive verbal objections.
Same; View that since the Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC’s) main function is to recommend
appointees to the judiciary, this constitutional design was put in place in order to reinforce another
constitutional mandate granted to the Supreme Court (SC): its administrative supervision over all courts
and personnel thereof.—The JBC is under the supervision, not just of a member of the Supreme Court but
of this Court as a collegial body. Since the JBC’s main function is to recommend appointees to the judiciary,
this constitutional design was put in place in order to reinforce another constitutional mandate granted to
this Court: its administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof.
Same; Mandamus; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot issue a writ of mandamus to compel
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to include Jardeleza in the short list, since mandamus can only be
directed to oblige the performance of a ministerial act; The decision to include a particular candidate in the
short list of nominees is a discretionary action on the part of the JBC.—Compelling the JBC to exercise its
discretion of including a person in a list of nominees, however, is another matter. The Court cannot issue a
writ of mandamus to compel the JBC to include Jardeleza in the short list, since mandamus can only be
directed to oblige the performance of a ministerial act. On the contrary, the decision to include a particular
candidate in the short list of nominees is a discretionary action on the part of the JBC.
Peralta, J., Separate Opinion:
Judicial and Bar Council; Due Process; View that Solicitor General Jardeleza was unduly deprived of
his right to due process in the proceedings before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and, further, the
Supreme Court’s (SC’s) constitutional power of supervision over the JBC must be upheld.—After going
over and pondering upon the ponencia and the opinions of the other Justices, I am registering
my concurrence with the opinion of my esteemed colleague
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Justice Jose Catral Mendoza and, likewise, adopt the separate concurring opinions of my respected
colleagues Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Arturo D. Brion. Verily, Solicitor General Jardeleza
was unduly deprived of his right to due process in the proceedings before the JBC and, further, the Court’s
constitutional power of supervision over the JBC must be upheld.
Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; View that it is the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) that determines
the extent of competence, independence, probity, and integrity that should be possessed by an applicant
before he or she is included in the list of nominees prepared for the President.—The Constitution grants to
the Judicial and Bar Council the sole and exclusive power to vet not only the qualifications but also the
fitness of applicants to this court. It is the Judicial and Bar Council that determines the extent of competence,
independence, probity, and integrity that should be possessed by an applicant before he or she is included
in the list of nominees prepared for the President. By constitutional design, this court should wisely resist
temptations to participate, directly or indirectly, in the nomination and appointment process of any of its
members. In reality, nomination to this court carries with it the political and personal pressures from the
supporters of strong contenders. This court is wisely shaded from these stresses. We know that the quality
of the rule of law is reduced when any member of this court succumbs to pressure.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; View that the separation of powers inherent in our
Constitution is a rational check against abuse and the monopolization of all legal powers.—The separation
of powers inherent in our Constitution is a rational check against abuse and the monopolization of all legal
powers. We should not nullify any act of any constitutional organ unless there is grave abuse of discretion.
The breach of a constitutional provision should be clearly shown and the necessity for the declaration of
nullity should be compelling. Any doubt should trigger judicial restraint, not intervention. Doubts should be
resolved in deference to the wisdom and prerogative of coequal constitutional organs.
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Same; Same; Judicial and Bar Council; View that there is nothing in the Constitution which allows the
Supreme Court (SC) to interfere with the Council’s exercise of its discretion in the execution of its
constitutional mandate.—There is nothing in the Constitution which allows this court to interfere with the
Council’s exercise of its discretion in the execution of its constitutional mandate. At most, this court’s
supervision is merely administrative.
Judicial and Bar Council; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) correctly underscores that its
proceedings is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature.—The Judicial and Bar Council correctly
underscores that its proceedings is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature. An administrative body is
deemed to be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when it is authorized to adjudicate upon the
rights and obligations of the parties before it. It must have both judicial discretion and the authority to render
judgment that affects the parties.
Same; View that the principal role of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is to recommend appointees
to the judiciary; There is nothing in this function that makes it a quasi-judicial office or agency.—The
principal role of the Judicial and Bar Council is to recommend appointees to the judiciary. It serves as a
constitutional body that scrutinizes applicants and recommends to the President not only those who are
qualified but, in its discretion, the most fit among the applicants to be included in a short list from which the
President can make appointments to the judiciary. There is nothing in this function that makes it a quasi-
judicial office or agency.
Constitutional Law; Mandamus; View that the determination by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) of
the qualifications and fitness of applicants for positions in the judiciary is not a ministerial duty; Mandamus
cannot compel the amendment of any list already transmitted, and it cannot be made available to compel
the Council to transmit a name not in the original list.—The determination by the Judicial and Bar Council
of the qualifications and fitness of applicants for positions in the judiciary is not a ministerial duty. It is
constitutionally part of its discretion. Mandamus cannot compel the amendment of any list already
transmitted, and it cannot be made available to compel the Council to transmit a name not in the original
list.
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Same; View that the absence of any objection by the members of the Council, orally and in the letter
of transmittal submitted to the President, should conclusively show that the manner of selection and the
results were accepted by all concerned.—The absence of any objection by the members of the Council,
orally and in the letter of transmittal submitted to the President, should conclusively show that the manner
of selection and the results were accepted by all concerned. Again, it bears repeating, that the short list
transmitted to the Office of the President was signed by all the members of the Council without
exception, thereby expressing their unanimity as to its contents. Mandamus, therefore, does not lie to
amend this list.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that a showing of grave abuse of discretion should refer to a
demonstrably clear breach of a constitutional duty that is “arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.”—A showing
of grave abuse of discretion should refer to a demonstrably clear breach of a constitutional duty that
is “arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.” Our constitutional duty and power of review is not to accept the
arguments of petitioner because it is plausible. Judicial review is also not a license to impose our own
plausible interpretation of the rules of the Council over their own. Judicial review requires as an absolute
predicate, a showing that the Council’s interpretation and application of its rules is so bereft of reason and
so implausible. We do not analyze the cogency of the arguments of petitioner or the interpretation
that we would have put had we been in the Council. Rather, the mode of analysis in our exercise of
judicial review is to scrutinize whether there are no viable reasonable bases for the interpretation,
application, and actions of the Judicial and Bar Council.
Judicial and Bar Council; View that any amendment to the rules of the Council through our
interpretation given the parties impleaded in this case should be prospective and applicable only to future
processes for nomination and appointment to our courts.—Any change in the interpretation of the rules of
the Council should not inequitably prejudice third parties who relied on the existence of these rules.
Petitioner was not the sole applicant to the position vacated by the retirement of a member of this court.
There are four (4) individuals that passed the Council’s determination of qualifications and fitness in the list
transmitted to the President. There are
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six (6) other individuals who did not make it to the list. Thus, even if we assume, without conceding,
that there was “grave abuse of discretion” on the part of respondents, it will be both inequitable and a
violation of the rights of the other applicants and the other nominees to simply require the amendment of
the list transmitted to the President. Petitioner chose not to implead them. They did not benefit from an
opportunity to be heard by this court. Any amendment to the rules of the Council through our
interpretation given the parties impleaded in this case should, thus, be prospective and applicable
only to future processes for nomination and appointment to our courts.
Same; View that the rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is its interpretation as to how it is to
go about with its duty to determine the “competence, integrity, probity and independence” that is
constitutionally required of every member to the Supreme Court (SC).—The rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council is its interpretation as to how it is to go about with its duty to determine the “competence, integrity,
probity and independence” that is constitutionally required of every member to this court. How the Council
go about with its duty is primarily and presumptively addressed to it solely as an independent constitutional
organ attached only to this court through administrative supervision. The constitutional provisions do not
require a vote requirement on the part of the members for a finding of either competence, integrity, probity,
or independence. Neither does it textually provide for the meaning of these terms. It is up to the Judicial
and Bar Council to find a reasonable construction of the fundamental requirements.
Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is the only constitutional body with the power to
interpret its rules to determine the competence, integrity, probity, and independence of applicants to the
judiciary.—The interpretation of any of the Council’s rules is constitutionally addressed to the Council’s
discretion. It is the only constitutional body with the power to interpret its rules to determine the competence,
integrity, probity, and independence of applicants to the judiciary. We cannot superimpose this court’s
interpretation even if in our view it would be a better one.
Same; Integrity; View that the acts which lead to questions relating to integrity may be different for
each candidate.—There is
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nothing inherently unconstitutional with the lack of statutory or procedural definition of integrity. This
remains within the purview of the members of the Council. It is a matter that is addressed to their reasoned
judgment. The Judicial and Bar Council is designed to act collegially. This is where contending views
coming from various sectors affected by every nomination and represented in the discussions may be taken
into consideration. Integrity can mean different things for different people. Like all significant words, it has
a sufficient set of meanings that can frame expectations but at the same time is left malleable to address
the needs at present. The acts which lead to questions relating to integrity may be different for each
candidate. Thus, the past actions of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, a Solicitor General, or a Dean of a
College of Law who is aspiring for the position of Associate Justice of this court that will be assessed by
the Judicial and Bar Council will be different.
Same; Same; View that it is the quality of integrity of each member that inspires us to have the courage
to use our constitutional duty to speak to power.—In this court, it is the quality of integrity of each member
that inspires us to have the courage to use our constitutional duty to speak to power. We speak to power
whether this is sourced formally from the authority of the Constitution or informally when it comes from the
political influence, commercial standing, or the ability of a party, litigant, or lawyer to mold media opinion.
While theoretically and constitutionally protected, we are hounded by the same human fears as any person
occupying a public office. We all know that we disgrace the privilege of our office if we succumb to fear or
favor.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; View that before the due process clause of the Constitution may be
invoked, there must first be an encroachment to one’s “life, liberty, or property.”—Before the due process
clause of the Constitution may be invoked, there must first be an encroachment to one’s “life, liberty, or
property.” Petitioner carries the burden of showing that an act of government affects an indubitable vested
right protected by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Judges; View that a nomination is not a right that is protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution.—No person has a constitutionally vested right to be nominated to a judicial position.
Just because a person meets the qualifications does not
308
entitle him or her to a nomination. The Judicial and Bar Council must render a finding of his or her
fitness which results in the inclusion of his or her name in the list. A nomination is not a right that is protected
by the due process clause of the Constitution. It is rather a privilege granted to one who has successfully
passed the application process and has qualified. The attainment of the majority vote of Council members
is not an “absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable” basis to garner a place in the short
list. As discussed, under the present rules, when integrity is at stake, the vote requirement may be unanimity
in the vote of the remaining members excluding the member who invoked Rule 10, Section 2 of the rules
of the Judicial and Bar Council. Moreover, the list of qualified candidates is still subject to the final
deliberation of the Council in an executive session before the list is submitted to the Office of the President.
Judicial and Bar Council; Due Process; View that for applicants to a vacancy in the Supreme Court
(SC) and in the process of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the right to be considered for purposes of
an assessment of his or her qualifications and fitness also certainly does not require a forum for cross-
examination.—Fairness as embodied in the due process clause of the Constitution takes its form in relation
to the right invoked and the forum where it is invoked. Certainly, when the accused invokes his or her right
in criminal trial, this takes the form among others of the right to full-blown cross-examination of all witnesses
presented by the prosecution. For applicants to a vacancy in the Supreme Court and in the process of the
Judicial and Bar Council, the right to be considered for purposes of an assessment of his or her
qualifications and fitness also certainly does not require a forum for cross-examination. The Council is
possessed with a wide latitude to draw information so that it may, consistent with its constitutional duty,
make a selection of at least three (3) names from a field of so many applicants.
Due Process; Procedural Due Process; View that petitioner’s insistence, therefore, that the Council
must adhere to a procedure he suggested, using his interpretation of the Judicial and Bar Council’s
(JBC’s) own rules, goes beyond the minimum required by jurisprudence.—The essence of procedural due
process is simply the right to be heard. Petitioner’s insistence, therefore, that the Council must adhere to a
procedure he suggested, using his interpretation of the
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Judicial and Bar Council’s own rules, goes beyond the minimum required by jurisprudence.
Same; Judicial and Bar Council; View that the Council may receive written opposition and may require
the applicant to comment on the opposition. The use of the word “may” is permissive, not mandatory.—The
Council may receive written opposition and may require the applicant to comment on the opposition. The
use of the word “may” is permissive, not mandatory. The Council retains the discretion to require that
opposition be written. It also retains the discretion not to require comment on any of the opposition filed.
This may apply when the basis of the opposition is too trivial or when the members determine that they are
already possessed with sufficient information necessary for them to vote their preferences. But this is not
what happened in this case.
Same; Same; View that the reluctance of the Chief Justice (CJ) to put the matter in writing was
reasonable considering that it was a matter of national security.—The reluctance of the Chief Justice to put
the matter in writing was reasonable considering that it was a matter of national security. According to the
minutes of the executive session held on June 30, 2014, “the Members agreed that it is best that this be
kept as confidential as possible to avoid problems for the country.” The confidentiality observed by the
Council was not for the purpose of denying petitioner his rights. The Council merely had the best interests
of the nation in mind.
Judicial and Bar Council; Judges; View that the power to appoint members of the judiciary from a list
of names transmitted by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is a prerogative of the President which cannot
be delegated to the Executive Secretary.—The power to appoint members of the judiciary from a list of
names transmitted by the Judicial and Bar Council is a prerogative of the President which cannot be
delegated to the Executive Secretary. Thus, for issues raised by petitioner and for the relief he prays for,
the Executive Secretary cannot act as an alter ego of the President.
Temporary Restraining Orders; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot, by way of temporary
restraining order (TRO), delay the running of the period mandated by the Constitution.—The Constitution
mandates that the President make an appointment 90 days
310
from the occurrence of the vacancy. Justice Abad’s retirement on his birthday which was May 22,
2014 caused the vacancy in the present court. The President, therefore, has until August 20, 2014 to make
an appointment for the vacancy. A temporary restraining order is a writ in equity provided for only in the
rules of procedure promulgated by this court. This court cannot, by way of temporary restraining order,
delay the running of the period mandated by the Constitution.
Same; View that there is no right that exists that could be protected by the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) since petitioner has no vested right.—There is no right that exists that could be
protected by the issuance of a temporary restraining order since petitioner has no vested right. He has not
shown that he possesses a clear and unmistakable right. Therefore, there is no material and substantial
invasion that must be prevented through a writ from this court.
Judicial and Bar Council; View that those who were nominated deserve the benefit of the presumption
of constitutionality of the rules under which they were vetted.—The proper remedy would be for this court
to order that the four individuals currently in the list of nominees transmitted to the President be impleaded
and the opportunity to be heard given. They deserve to be heard before this court even considers diluting
their chances of being appointed. Alternatively, any relief should, therefore, be prospective and should not
affect their vested rights. Assuming without conceding that the majority will vote to nullify Rule 10, Section
2 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, its effects should be prospective. Those who were nominated
deserve the benefit of the presumption of constitutionality of the rules under which they were vetted.
Same; View that as much as petitioner believes in the importance of defending himself in this court,
respondents are also entitled to believe that it is institutionally important for them to defend the integrity of
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).—In my view, it is the insistence of petitioner not to respond directly to
the objections during the in camera and confidential discussions of the Council on June 30, 2014 that has
now caused both sides to lay bare their full arguments. Surely, as much as petitioner believes in the
importance of defending himself in this court, respondents are also entitled to
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believe that it is institutionally important for them to defend the integrity of the Judicial and Bar Council.
For petitioner to claim due process of law is the more important question. For respondents, petitioner was
accorded his opportunity to be heard, and the more important question is there would have been an
anomaly in our arbitral claims.
Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), by transmitting a list without petitioner’s name,
has acceded to the invocation of lack of integrity by one of its members.—The Judicial and Bar Council, by
transmitting a list without petitioner’s name, has acceded to the invocation of lack of integrity by one of its
members. Excluding the vote of the Chief Justice, he was not able to garner unanimity among the remaining
members of the Council as required by the rules.
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY;

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 212140-41. January 21, 2015.*

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and
ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Counter-Affidavits; What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and
the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent.—What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman
to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
_______________
* EN BANC.
2
Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-
affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, “[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses]
have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits
and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x.” At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any
respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
not the affidavits of the corespondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the corespondents are not
part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to
the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.—It should be underscored that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely
implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is
not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights
of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law. A preliminary
investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-
founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
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VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 3
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima
facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by
the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; A preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.—The rights to
due process in administrative cases as prescribed in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635
(1940), as amplified in GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 514 (1998), are granted by the Constitution;
hence, these rights cannot be taken away by mere legislation. On the other hand, as repeatedly reiterated
by this Court, the right to a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory right, not part of the “fundamental
and essential requirements” of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay and amplified in GSIS. Thus, a
preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The constitutional right of an accused to confront
the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary
investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the witnesses against him. A preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under
the due process clause to a fair trial.
Same; Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does
not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.—Probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible
in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial
evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the
same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as am-
4
plified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in
determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; The Supreme Court (SC) has reiterated in numerous
decisions that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari.—A
motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal errors.
Sen. Estrada, however, failed to present a compelling reason that the present Petition falls under the
exceptions to the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is required prior to the filing of
a petition for certiorari. This Court has reiterated in numerous decisions that a motion for reconsideration
is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.—The rule against forum shopping is not
limited to the fulfillment of the requisites of litis pendentia. To determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Undergirding
the principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once
regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public
policy that the same matter should not be the subject of controversy in court more than once in order that
possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake of the stability in the rights and status of
persons.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Counter-Affidavits; Both the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to
furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting
witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of
the affidavits of his corespondents.—The Ombudsman,
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VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 5
in furnishing Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents, fully
complied with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Section 4,
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7. Both the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require
the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and
affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of his corespondents. The right of the respondent is only “to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant,” as expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga v. Drilon, 196
SCRA 86 (1991), that “Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides
that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the
parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine.” Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c) of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure, read
together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the
complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to
furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his corespondents.
VELASCO, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; View that Sen. Estrada’s motion for reconsideration to the Joint
Resolution is clearly not the “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” that can
bar a Rule 65 recourse to question the propriety of the Ombudsman’s refusal to furnish him copies of the
affidavits of his corespondents. Otherwise stated, Sen. Estrada’s present recourse is not premature.—I
cannot acquiesce with respondents’ assertion that the motion for reconsideration to the Joint Resolution
finding probable cause to indict petitioner is, vis-à-vis the denial Order of March 27, 2014, equivalent to the
“plain, speedy, and adequate remedy” under Rule 65. This Court has defined such remedy as “[one] which
(would)
6
equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some time in the future
will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy
which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the
inferior court or tribunal concerned.” This in turn could only mean that only such remedy that can enjoin the
immediate enforceability of the assailed order can preclude the availability of the remedy under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Notably, Section 7(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman is
categorical that even a motion for reconsideration to an issuance finding probable cause cannot bar the
filing of the information: Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration.—x x x x x x x x x b) The filing of a motion
for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in
Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. Hence, Sen.
Estrada may very well be subjected to the rigors of a criminal prosecution in court even if there is a pending
question regarding the Ombudsman’s grave abuse of its discretion preceding the finding of a probable
cause to indict him. His motion for reconsideration to the Joint Resolution is clearly not the “plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” that can bar a Rule 65 recourse to question the
propriety of the Ombudsman’s refusal to furnish him copies of the affidavits of his corespondents. Otherwise
stated, Sen. Estrada’s present recourse is not premature.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; There is a violation of the rule against forum shopping when the
requisites for the existence of litis pendentia are present.—There is a violation of the rule against forum
shopping when the requisites for the existence of litis pendentia are present. Thus, there is forum shopping
when the following requisites concur: (1) identity of parties in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case. I submit that there is no subsistence of these elements in the present case, as the majority
posits.
Same; Same; Moot and Academic; View that the Supreme Court (SC) has time and again declared
that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in
resolving a case.—This Court has time and again declared
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VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 7
that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in
resolving a case. A court may take cognizance of otherwise moot and academic cases, if it finds that (a)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount
public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; View that a preliminary investigation is a safeguard intended
to protect individuals from an abuse of the overwhelming prosecutorial power of the state.—A preliminary
investigation is a safeguard intended to protect individuals from an abuse of the overwhelming prosecutorial
power of the state. It spells for a citizen the difference between months, if not years, of agonizing trial and
jail term, on one hand, and peace of mind and liberty on the other hand. In Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman,
556 SCRA 73 (2008), We ruled: A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and
public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It is also
intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory
rather than constitutional, it is a component of due process in administering criminal justice. The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for trial and before being exposed to the
risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny
the accused’s claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive him of the full measure of his right
to due process.
Same; Same; Same; View that a preliminary investigation is not a one-sided affair; it takes on
adversarial quality where the due process rights of both the state and the respondents must be
considered.—A preliminary investigation is not a one-sided affair; it takes on adversarial quality where the
due process rights of both the state and the respondents must be considered. It is not merely intended to
serve the purpose of the prosecution. Rather, its purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of public trial. At the same
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VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 8
time, it is designed to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.
Same; Same; Same; View that a respondent in a preliminary investigation cannot be denied copies
of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents should they contain evidence that will likely incriminate him
for the crimes charged.—A respondent in a preliminary investigation cannot, therefore, be denied copies of
the counter-affidavits of his corespondents should they contain evidence that will likely incriminate him for
the crimes charged. In other words, it behooves the Office of the Ombudsman to treat a respondent’s
counter-affidavit containing incriminating allegations against a corespondent as partaking the nature of a
complaint-affidavit, insofar as the implicated respondent is concerned. Thus, it is my opinion that the Office
of the Ombudsman should follow the same procedure observed when a complaint is first lodged with it, i.e.,
furnish a copy to the respondent incriminated in the counter-affidavit and give him sufficient time to answer
the allegations contained therein. It need not wait for a request or a motion from the implicated respondent
to be given copies of the affidavits containing the allegations against him. A request or motion to be
furnished made by the respondent alluded to in the counter-affidavits makes the performance of such duty
by the Office of the Ombudsman more urgent.
Same; Same; Same; View that the fact that, in a preliminary investigation, a respondent is not given
the right to confront nor to cross-examine does not mean that the respondent is likewise divested of the
rights to be informed of the allegations against him and to present countervailing evidence thereto.—To be
sure, a preliminary investigation is not part of trial and the respondent is not given the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers. Nonetheless, a preliminary investigation is an essential component part of due
process in criminal justice. A respondent cannot, therefore, be deprived of the most basic right to be
informed and to be heard before an unfavorable resolution is made against him. The fact that, in a
preliminary investigation, a respondent is not given the right to confront nor to cross-examine does not
mean that the respondent is likewise divested of the rights to be informed of the allegations against him
and to present countervailing evidence thereto. These two sets of rights are starkly different.
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VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 9
Same; Same; Due Process; View that the right to the disclosure of the evidence against a party prior
to the issuance of a judgment against him is a vital component of the due process of law, a clear disregard
of such right constitutes grave abuse of discretion.—The right to the disclosure of the evidence against a
party prior to the issuance of a judgment against him is, to reiterate, a vital component of the due process
of law, a clear disregard of such right constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As this Court has held, grave
abuse of discretion exists when a tribunal violates the Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing
jurisprudence. In other words, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that
rendered the decision or resolution is deemed ousted of jurisdiction. As the Court held in Montoya v. Varilla,
574 SCRA 831 (2008) — The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that in a Rule 65 petition, the scope of the Court’s
review is limited to the question: whether the order by the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—In a Rule 65 petition, the scope of the Court’s review is limited
to the question: whether the order by the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such “capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or
to act in manner not in contemplation of law.”
10
Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; View that jurisprudence has recognized instances
when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration.—While it is true that, as a rule, a motion for reconsideration must — as an indispensable
condition — be filed before an aggrieved party may resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari, this
established rule is not without exception. Jurisprudence has recognized instances when the filing of a
petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration. These
instances include the situation when a motion for reconsideration would be useless, and when the
petitioner had been deprived of his due process rights and relief was urgently needed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 7(b), Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules provides that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration to the finding of probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
Information; a motion for reconsideration to an order denying the lesser request for documents cannot but
have the same effect.—Section 7(b), Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules provides that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration to the finding of probable cause cannot bar the filing of the Information; a motion for
reconsideration to an order denying the lesser request for documents cannot but have the same effect.
More importantly, the violations of due process rights in this case — committed through the March 27, 2014
denial of Estrada’s Request and the Ombudsman’s subsequent finding of probable cause — necessarily
result in the Ombudsman’s failure to hear and fully appreciate Estrada’s defenses or possible defenses
against his corespondents’ allegations. This kind of situation should support the need for immediate resort
to the remedy of a writ of certiorari as a motion for reconsideration could not have prevented the filing of
Information in court — the consequence of the violation of Estrada’s due process rights.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Forum Shopping; View that Estrada’s motion for reconsideration before
the Ombudsman did not and could not have led to the existence of litis pendentia that would give rise to
prohibited forum shopping. For one, the parties involved in Estrada’s motion for reconsideration (to the
Ombudsman’s March 28, 2014 Probable Cause Resolution) are different from those in the present petition,
i.e., Estrada and the National Bureau of Investiga-
11
VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 11
tion (NBI) and Field Investigation Office (FIO) in the former, and Estrada and the Ombudsman in the
latter.—Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present. To determine whether
prohibited forum shopping transpired, the existence of litis pendentia is imperative, i.e., an action must
already be pending when a second action is filed. This pendency requires the identity of parties in both
actions; identity, likewise of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as the reliefs are founded on the
same facts; and the resulting judgment, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case. From this perspective, Estrada’s motion for reconsideration before the
Ombudsman did not and could not have led to the existence of litis pendentia that would give rise to
prohibited forum shopping. For one, the parties involved in Estrada’s motion for reconsideration (to the
Ombudsman’s March 28, 2014 Probable Cause Resolution) are different from those in the present
petition, i.e., Estrada and the NBI and FIO in the former, and Estrada and the Ombudsman in the latter.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; View that a preliminary investigation is not simply a process
plucked out of the blue to be part of the criminal justice process; it reflects a policy with specific purposes
and objectives, all of which are relevant to the orderly working of society and should thus be closely
followed.—The process has been put in place before any trial can take place “to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect
the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.” Thus, a preliminary investigation is not simply a
process plucked out of the blue to be part of the criminal justice process; it reflects a policy with specific
purposes and objectives, all of which are relevant to the orderly working of society and should thus be
closely followed. Significantly, no constitutional provision expressly mentions or defines a preliminary
investigation. In this sense, it is not one of those specifically guaranteed fundamental rights under the Bill
of Rights. Rather than an express constitutional origin, preliminary investigation traces its roots to statute.
But this status is not reason enough to simply look at the Rules of Court and from its bare wording literally
decide what the process means.
12
Same; Same; Same; View that a necessary starting point in considering how preliminary investigation
and its set of rights are to be viewed is the mother of rights under the Bill of Rights — the Due Process
Clause under Section 1: “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.”—Note that under the Constitution, from the police custodial investigation to the criminal trial, are rights
guaranteed to the individual against State action as the State is the active party in these trials; it stands for
the People of the Philippines and prosecutes the case, i.e., seeks the filing of the criminal Information and
the conviction of the accused, in behalf of the People and against the individual. A necessary starting point
in considering how preliminary investigation and its set of rights are to be viewed is the mother of rights
under the Bill of Rights — the Due Process Clause under Section 1: “[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.” This guarantee, no less, lies at the bedrock of preliminary
investigation process as life, liberty and property all stand to be affected by State action in the
criminal justice process.
Same; Same; Same; View that a public prosecutor conducting preliminary investigation exercises
discretion in deciding the factual issues presented and in applying the law to the given facts, all for the
purpose of determining whether probable cause exists that a crime has been committed and the respondent
probably committed it. This exercise of power to determine facts and to apply the law using discretion
outside of the courts is undoubtedly quasi-judicial in character.—Among the terms of our Constitution
deemed included within the terms of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules
is the Bill of Rights — a significant and perhaps a most unique part of our Constitution — and its due process
clauses namely: Section 1 (the general provision that guarantees life, liberty and property of individuals
against arbitrary State action) and Section 14(1) on criminal due process. I note that the public
prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. To be precise, a
public prosecutor conducting preliminary investigation exercises discretion in deciding the factual issues
presented and in applying the law to the given facts, all for the purpose of determining whether probable
cause exists that a crime has been committed and the respondent probably committed it. This exercise of
power to determine facts and to apply the law
13
VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 13
using discretion outside of the courts is undoubtedly quasi-judicial in character.
Same; Same; Same; Reinvestigation; View that should the investigating officer find the need to
reinvestigate the case so that the objectives of a preliminary investigation may be served, he may do so,
provided he first secures the permission of the court, following the rule that the court now has control and
disposition of the case.—The filing of the Information in court initiates the criminal action. The court acquires
jurisdiction and the accompanying authority to hear, control and decide the case up to its full disposition.
After an Information is filed, the exercise of discretion and authority of the investigating officer over the
criminal complaint ends; he loses control and discretion regarding its disposition. Should the investigating
officer find the need to reinvestigate the case so that the objectives of a preliminary investigation may be
served, he may do so, provided he first secures the permission of the court, following the rule that the court
now has control and disposition of the case. Should a reinvestigation be allowed, the investigating officer,
after the reinvestigation and consistent with the court’s jurisdiction over the case, must submit his findings
and recommendation to the court for the court’s disposition.
Same; Same; Warrant of Arrest; View that the issuance of an arrest warrant is governed primarily, by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and secondarily, by Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.—A
warrant of arrest is a legal process issued by competent authority, directing the arrest of a person or persons
upon grounds stated therein. The issuance of an arrest warrant is governed primarily, by Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution, and secondarily, by Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, the trial court judge may issue a warrant of arrest within ten (10) days from the
filing of the Information upon a finding of probable cause that the accused should be placed under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Notably, the issuance of an arrest
warrant and the preliminary investigation both require the prior determination of probable cause; the
probable cause determination in these two proceedings, however, differs from one another.
14
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Due Process; View that Due process
takes a different form in a preliminary investigation as compared with its form in a criminal action.—Due
process takes a different form in a preliminary investigation as compared with its form in a criminal action.
In Artillero v. Casimiro, 671 SCRA 357 (2012): The law is vigilant in protecting the rights of an accused.
Yet, notwithstanding the primacy put on the rights of an accused in a criminal case, even they cannot claim
unbridled rights in [p]reliminary [i]nvestigations. In Lozada v. Hernandez, we explained the nature of a
[p]reliminary [i]nvestigation in relation to the rights of an accused, to wit: It has been said time and again
that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part thereof but is merely preparatory thereto,
its only purpose being to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe the accused guilty thereof. The right to such investigation is not a fundamental right
guaranteed by the constitution. At most, it is statutory. And rights conferred upon accused persons to
participate in preliminary investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which
such rights are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase “due process of law.” (Emphasis supplied)
The right to due process of accused respondent in a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory grant. It
is not a constitutional guarantee. Thus, the validity of its procedures must be related to the purpose for
which it was created.
Same; Same; Same; View that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding similar to
that conducted by other agencies in the executive branch. The prosecutor does not pass judgment on a
respondent; he or she merely ascertains if there is enough evidence to proceed to trial. It is a court of law
which ultimately decides on an accused’s guilt or innocence.—It can be recalled that in Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), this court observed that although quasi-judicial agencies “may
be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements[,] [it] does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.” It presupposes that the administrative
investigation has the
15
VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 15
effect of an adjudication on respondent’s guilt or innocence. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-

judicial proceeding similar to that conducted by other agencies in the executive branch. The prosecutor
does not pass judgment on a respondent; he or she merely ascertains if there is enough evidence to
proceed to trial. It is a court of law which ultimately decides on an accused’s guilt or innocence.
Same; Same; Same; View that the “invalidity or absence of preliminary investigation does not affect
the jurisdiction of the court.”—Preliminary investigation is not part of the criminal action. It is merely
preparatory and may even be disposed of in certain situations. The “invalidity or absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.” Thus, in People v. Narca, 275 SCRA 696 (1997):
It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not the venue for the full exercise of the rights
of the parties. This is why preliminary investigation is not considered as a part of trial but merely preparatory
thereto and that the records therein shall not form part of the records of the case in court. Parties may
submit affidavits but have no right to examine witnesses though they can propound questions through the
investigating officer. In fact, a preliminary investigation may even be conducted ex parte in certain cases.
Moreover, in Section 1 of Rule 112, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is only to determine a well-
grounded belief if a crime was “probably” committed by an accused. In any case, the invalidity or absence
of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance
of the information nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; View that the alleged violation of due process during the
preliminary investigation stage, if any, does not affect the validity of the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
accused.—Thus, after determination of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan, the best venue to fully
ventilate the positions of the parties in relation to the evidence in this case is during the trial. The alleged
violation of due process during the preliminary investigation stage, if any, does not affect the validity of the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the accused. There is, of course, a fundamental difference between a
government agency allegedly committing irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary investigation and the
failure of a government agency in conducting a preliminary investigation. The first
16
is a question of procedure while the second involves a question of whether the government agency
deprived respondent of a statutory right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the right to due process of law applies to both the prosecution
representing the people and the accused.—The right to due process of law applies to both the prosecution
representing the people and the accused. Even as the Constitution outlines a heavy burden on the part of
law enforcers when a person is “under investigation for the commission of an offense” and when a person
is actually under prosecution, it does not do away with the guarantee of fairness both for the prosecution
and the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that irregularities committed in the executive determination of
probable cause do not affect the conduct of a judicial determination of probable cause.—A defect in the
procedure in the statutory grant of a preliminary investigation would not immediately be considered as a
deprivation of the accused’s constitutional right to due process. Irregularities committed in the executive
determination of probable cause do not affect the conduct of a judicial determination of probable cause.
The Constitution mandates the determination by a judge of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
against an accused. This determination is done independently of any prior determination made by a
prosecutor for the issuance of the information.
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; View that the phrase “to be determined personally” means that
the judge determines the existence of probable cause himself or herself. This determination can even be
ex parte since the Constitution only mentions “after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he [or she] may produce.”—It is a constitutional requirement that before a warrant can
be issued, the judge must first determine the existence of probable cause. The phrase “to be determined
personally” means that the judge determines the existence of probable cause himself or herself. This
determination can even be ex parte since the Constitution only mentions “after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he [or she] may produce.” The judicial determination of
probable cause is considered separate from the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation. In People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788
17
VOL. 748, JANUARY 21, 2015 17
(1990): Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted
in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial — is the function of the Prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that once the information is filed and the court acquires jurisdiction,
it is the Sandiganbayan that examines whether, despite the alleged irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, there still is probable cause to proceed to trial.—Once the information is filed and the court
acquires jurisdiction, it is the Sandiganbayan that examines whether, despite the alleged irregularity in the
preliminary investigation, there still is probable cause to proceed to trial. The actions or inactions of the
Ombudsman or the investigating prosecutor do not bind the court.
G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.*
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent
RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior
Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, petitioners, vs. MARY
JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact,
respondent.
Writs of Amparo; Nature; Words and Phrases; The Writ of Amparo—a protective remedy against
violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security—does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance; Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts; Accountability
refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.—This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ
of Amparo—a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty
and security. It embodies, as a remedy,
_______________
* EN BANC.
599
, 599
the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability,
for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal
and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand,
refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and
his liberty and security are restored.
Same; Same; The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer
points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress
may promulgate.—We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique
situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to
address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary
court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this
Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer
points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress
may promulgate.600
Same; Pleadings and Practice; While, as in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details, in an Amparo
petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty—the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the
victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim
is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance.—The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the
pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of
the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her,
or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those
who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token
gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the
Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty
and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather
than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements—namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty
or security—are present.601
, 601
Same; Same; Where the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a
verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.—If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is
its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary
nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule
incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the
affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that
necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner
has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.
We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her
witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18,
2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot
be faulted.
Same; Same; Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition—that otherwise is
not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action—as a means to “fish” for
evidence.—These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police
authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and
results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the
police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts,
should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately
specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the
manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the
respondent’s frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circum-
602
stances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken
are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition forward. Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule
to prevent the use of a petition—that otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a
proper cause of action—as a means to “fish” for evidence. The petitioners contend that the respondent’s
petition did not specify what “legally available efforts were taken by the respondent,” and that there was an
“undue haste” in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent
immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.
Same; Extralegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances; The phenomenon of enforced
disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night
and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941; In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances
resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000,
were reported to have “disappeared” during the military regime in Argentina.—The phenomenon of enforced
disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night
and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was
directed at persons in occupied territories “endangering German security”; they were transported secretly
to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect,
the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted
persons. In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and
outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
“disappeared” during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America,
and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use
by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor and during the Dirty War in the 1970s
and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as
part of governments’ counter-insurgency
603
, 603
campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin
American media standardized the term “disappearance” to describe the phenomenon. The victims of
enforced disappearances were called the “desaparecidos,” which literally means the “disappeared ones.”
Same; Same; Three Different Kinds of “Disappearance” Cases.—In general, there are three different
kinds of “disappearance” cases: 1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive
identification of the arresting agents and are never found again; 2) those of prisoners who are usually
arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks or months while their
families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody
until they eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and 3) those of victims of “salvaging” who
have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Although the writ of amparo specifically covers “enforced
disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction; As the law now stands,
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately
from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and
are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.—The Amparo Rule expressly provides
that the “writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” We note that
although the writ specifically covers “enforced disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules
(Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental
definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of
several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The
Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power
604
to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may
intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts
should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the
country’s constitutional scheme and power structure.
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act
under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional
rights of individuals to life, liberty and security—the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.—Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own
constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional
rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such
does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can
be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its
605
, 605
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities
to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention
can make a difference—even if only procedurally—in a situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; The Court’s intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance
has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose
the appropriate remedies to address it; The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations,
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold: the first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and
investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are
less than what the individual situations require; and, the second is to address the disappearance, so that
the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.—Lest this Court intervention
be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our
criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define
and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in
these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts
at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In
these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated
until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of
the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared
606
person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the
commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Same; Same; International Law; From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced
disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.—From the International Law perspective,
involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights. It does not only
violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the
denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus,
enforced disappearances have been said to be “a double form of torture,” with “doubly paralyzing impact
for the victims,” as they “are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing
the whereabouts of their detained loved ones” and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty
that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner. The UN General Assembly first
considered the issue of “Disappeared Persons” in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The
Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from “reports from various parts of the
world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances,” and requested the “UN Commission on Human
Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making appropriate
recommendations.”
Same; Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Convention); In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had
become a global phenomenon, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and fourteen years later (or on December 20,
2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance.—In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced
disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
607
, 607
Disappearance (Declaration). This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular
clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows: Deeply concerned that in many
countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are
arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of
different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on
behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government,
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the
law. Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). The Convention
was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced
disappearance as follows: For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced disappearance” is considered
to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert
that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable.—The
Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to
enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable. It provides that no one shall be subjected to
enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any
other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable
with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. It also rec-
608
ognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the
truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation.
Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall
not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention,
so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime.—
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet
committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal
law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every
enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme
Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court
is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by
its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on
humans rights.—Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in
acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and
by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights.
Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to “promote universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion.” Although
no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the “human rights and fundamental
freedoms” guaranteed to all by the Charter, it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced
disappearance, and this Declaration states: Any act of enforced disappearance is
609
, 609
an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international
instruments in this field. As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made
in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given
our own adherence to “generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today
is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”—The most widely accepted
statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law.” The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and
national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the
same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General
Assembly. Sometimes referred to as “evidence” of international law, these sources identify the substance
and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the “State practice” and “opinio juris”
requirements of international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law,
which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.—While the Philippines is not
yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the
610
specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a
specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been
repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted
principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we
should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that
bind us.
Same; Same; Past experiences in other jurisdictions relative to enforced disappearances show that
the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold: first, there may be a deliberate concealment of the
identities of the direct perpetrators; second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the
disappearance is a distinct possibility; and, third is the element of denial.—These difficulties largely arise
because the State itself—the party whose involvement is alleged—investigates enforced disappearances.
Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold. First,
there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. Experts note that
abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police
forces. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct
possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance—i.e., the corpus delicti or the
victim’s body—is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one
that may have begun. The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to
pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case
of Velasquez Rodriguez that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the
State’s power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt
by the State to commit the perfect crime. Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State
authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. “Deniability” is central to the
policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape
611
, 611
the application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights. Experience shows that
government officials typically respond to requests for information about desaparecidos by saying that they
are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled the country, or that their names
have merely been invented.
Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The characteristics of the Amparo Rule of being summary
and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance
of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings)—reveal the clear intent of the framers
to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo
situations; In these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance
and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence, and once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond
and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required.—These characteristics—namely, of
being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual
preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings)—reveal the clear intent
of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required—the duty of public officials
and employees to observe extraordinary diligence—point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in
the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only
to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed
above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The
rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances
showing a violation of the victim’s constitu-
612
tional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
Same; Same; Same; Quantum of Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Words and Phrases; The landmark
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), provided the Court its first opportunity
to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings.—The
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define
the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly
quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute
provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The fair and proper rule is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced—we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason, i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence.—Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique
circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the
standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot
be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and
cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only
613
, 613
compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other
hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the
usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as
a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial
evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account. The fair
and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with
the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason—i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other
pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.
Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; Elements
of Enforced Disappearance.—The Convention defines enforced disappearance as “the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” Under this definition, the elements
that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: (a) arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State; (c) followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and (d) placement of
the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; As a rule, minor inconsistencies indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication and only
614
tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing
on every detail — the latter cannot but generate witnesses that the material circumstances they testified to
were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.—Upon deeper consideration of these
inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed
or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The
inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the
credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points. We note, for
example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and
confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these
indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast
to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion
that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated
story. Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced
disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her
friends, based on the informant’s letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been
under surveillance since January 2007, was “in good hands” and under custodial investigation for
complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain “Santos” of Bulacan,
a “Balik Islam” charged with terrorism. The respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply
be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the
critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted
destruction of this letter—effectively, a suppression of this evidence—raises the presumption that the letter,
if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed. For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what
Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the “Kasim evidence.”615
, 615
Same; Same; Same; The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture
of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and
profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as
the situation may require—the Court has no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in
enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.—To say that this piece of
evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge—as
the petitioners effectively suggest—that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss
the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that
the Amparo Rule—despite its terms—is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties
that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token
gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely
remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.
Same; Same; Same; In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details
on the depth and extent of the investigation made—to be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the
personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful
investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for the missing
subject; Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary
diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.—As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation
was at best haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even
secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts
616
themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments
and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a “black” operation because it was
unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis,
too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on
record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation
made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to
investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative
reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very
beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
Same; Same; Same; The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot
but point to the conclusion that there was government complicity in the disappearance, for why would the
government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what
they already knew of the disappearance?—Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s
disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point
to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if
the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s
cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and
developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and
quoted, the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government
denials and
617
, 617
haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of
the law—a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
Same; Same; Same; The Court believes and so holds that the government in general, through the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (PNP-CIDG), and in
particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for
the enforced disappearance of Tagitis—the Court holds these organizations accountable through their
incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that
extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced
disappearnce of Tagitis.—Following the lead of this Turkish experience—adjusted to the Philippine legal
setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments
of this case—we believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG,
and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the “PNP Law,” specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate “to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal
offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.” The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane
Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the “investigative arm” of the PNP and is mandated to
“investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those
considered as heinous crimes.” Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to
investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates against organized
crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the
investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI. Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-
CIDG officials and members were the
618
ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organization accountable through
their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that
extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis.
Same; Same; Same; The Court holds Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath
information relating to the enforced disappearance, and for the purpose of this accountability, he is
impleaded as a party to this case.—We hold Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose under oath
information relating to the enforced disappearance. For the purpose of this accountability, we order that
Col. Kasim be impleadead as a party to this case. The PNP is similarly held accountable for the suppression
of vital information that Col. Kasim could and did not provide, and, as the entity with direct authority over
Col. Kasim, is held with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. We shall deal with
Col. Kasim’s suppression of evidence under oath when we finally close this case under the process outlined
below.
G.R. Nos. 235937-40, July 23, 2018
JOHANNE EDWARD B. LABAY, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, AND PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
[No. 46496. February 27, 1940]

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
1. 1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.—The nature of the Court of Industrial
Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—The Court of

Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R.
No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from
the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.—There are cardinal primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of
636
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
1. this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While
the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only
must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or
any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.—In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a
conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in
his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation
which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp
the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction
that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth in the decision.
G.R. No. 188646. September 21, 2016.*

GEORGE C. CORDERO, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF NURSING, respondent.
Administrative Agencies; Professional Regulation Commission; Jurisdiction; Under Section 5 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8981, the Philippine Regulatory Commission (PRC) is mandated to establish
and maintain a high standard of admission to the practice of all professions and at all times ensure
and safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations.—The PRC is responsible for the
administration, implementation and enforcement of regulatory policies on the regulation and
licensing of various professions and occupations under its jurisdiction. Under Section 5 of RA No.
8981, the PRC is mandated to establish and maintain a high standard of admission to the practice
of all professions and at all times ensure and safeguard the integrity of all licensure examinations.
Under the same law, the various professional regulatory boards of the PRC, the Board of Nursing
included, are given the following powers, functions and responsibilities: Sec. 9. Powers, Functions
and Responsibilities of the Various Professional Regulatory Boards.—The various, professional
regulatory boards shall retain the following powers, functions and responsibilities: (a) To regulate
the practice of the professions in accordance with the provisions of their respective professional
regulatory laws; x x x (c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their
respective laws, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder and their Codes of Ethics
and, for this purpose, may issue summons, subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to alleged
violators and/or witnesses to compel their attendance in such investigations or hearings: Provided,
That, the decision of the Professional Regulatory Board shall, unless appealed to the Commission,
become final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of judgment or decision;
x x x (g) After due process, to suspend, revoke or reissue, reinstate certificate of registration or
licenses for causes provided by law.
2. _______________
3. * THIRD DIVISION.
4.
5.
6. 660
Cordero vs. Board of Nursing
7. Administrative Proceedings; In proceedings before quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, the

general rule has always been liberality.—In proceedings before quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies, the general rule has always been liberality. Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in
administrative cases is not required by law. We have previously ruled that the allegation of improper
venue and the fact that a complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal
of a complaint. We held: x x x Well to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such,
technical rules of procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The intention is to resolve disputes brought
before such bodies in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible.
8. Same; In an administrative proceeding involving government employees, the Supreme Court (SC)
ruled that an administrative charge filed by the head or chief of the office concerned need not be
under oath, for it is only when the complaint be filed by another person that it be required to be
under oath to protect respondents from malicious complaints filed only for the purpose of harassing
them.—On the requirement that the complaint/Formal Charge be under oath, we agree with the
Board that the signature of Chairperson Abaquin is sufficient, considering that it is the Board itself
which is the complainant. In an administrative proceeding involving government employees, we
ruled that an administrative charge filed by the head of chief of the office concerned need not be
under oath, for it is only when the complaint be filed by another person that it be required to be
under oath to protect respondents from malicious complaints filed only for the purpose of harassing
them. In the same manner, there is no need for the formal charge to be under oath in this case
since the Board itself initiated the charge and its Chairperson signed the same in her capacity as
head of the Board of Nursing and under her oath of office. The danger of a malicious complaint is
no longer present.
9. Administrative Cases; The power to institute an administrative case motu proprio, as well as the
conduct of the proceedings by the special prosecutors and hearing officers delegated by the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) or the Board is provided for in the
10.
11.
12. 661
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 21, 2016 661
Cordero vs. Board of Nursing
13. PRC Rules.—The Board’s jurisdiction to hear and decide administrative cases against nursing
professionals is inherent in its authority to supervise and regulate the nursing profession.
Meanwhile, the power to institute an administrative case motu proprio, as well as the conduct of
the proceedings by the special prosecutors and hearing officers delegated by the PRC or the Board
is provided for in the PRC Rules. As explained by the Board, it participates in the administrative
proceedings in its capacity as adjudicating body and does not wield any amount of control or
supervision relative to the prosecution of the case, and decides motu proprio cases based on the
presence or absence of evidence and not in any way on the basis of the formal charge it initiated.
The prosecution of the case is left to the special prosecutors who are under the direct control and
supervision of the Legal and Investigation Division of the PRC.
14. Administrative Proceedings; Hearing Officers; The only prohibition under Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 is that no hearing officer shall engage in both adjudicatory and
prosecutory functions.—The only prohibition under Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 is
that no hearing officer shall engage in both adjudicatory and prosecutory functions. Besides, any
perceived error on the decision of the Board is appealable to the PRC, and thereafter, to the CA.
Moreover, on a more practical note, the composition of the Board of Nursing changes every three
years. The current Board is now composed of new members. Therefore, the evil of having a partial
tribunal is no longer extant.
15. Same; Procedural Due Process; Procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain
one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.—We
emphasize that in administrative proceedings, such as the case at bar, procedural due process
simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. To reiterate, Cordero was informed of the subject matter of the
charges against him. He was given the opportunity to dispute the charges through his Answer.
Cordero cannot fully claim that he was not afforded due process, or even claim partiality on the part
of the Board at this stage because the administrative proceedings have only reached the pretrial
stage, due mainly to Cordero’s numerous pleadings asserting violation of due process. All told,
Cordero’s right to due process was not violated.
G.R. No. 217872. August 24, 2016.*
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) and ATTY. MARIA
CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, in her own behalf and as President of ALFI, JOSE S. SANDEJAS,
ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS, EILEEN Z. ARANETA,
SALVACION C. MONTIERO, MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T.
UMALI and MILDRED C. CASTOR, petitioners, vs. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary-
Designate of the Department of Health, NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of Health,
Officer-in-Charge, Food and Drug Administration, and MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO,
Officer-in-Charge, Center for Drug Regulation and Research, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Prohibition; Mandamus; Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify acts of
legislative and executive officials when there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.—As to the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
454
Alliance for the Family Foundation, Philippines, Inc. (ALFI) vs. Garin
contention that the subject recourse is improper as it involves the FDA’s exercise of its regulatory
powers, suffice it to say that the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Constitutional Law; Courts; The Constitution mandates that judicial power include the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.—
Consequently, the Court dismisses the notion that the recertification of contraceptive drugs and
devices by the FDA in exercise of its regulatory function is beyond judicial review. After all, the
Constitution mandates that judicial power include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Same; Due Process; Due process of law has two (2) aspects: substantive and procedural due
process.—Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order
that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be
compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof.
Same; Same; Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the
rights of a person to his property.—Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law
that interferes with the rights of a person to his property.
Same; Remedial Law; Due Process; Procedural due process means compliance with the
procedures or steps prescribed by the statute.—Procedural due process, on the other hand, means
compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the
455
VOL. 801, AUGUST 24, 2016 455
statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those
who are called upon to administer it.
Due Process; Administrative Proceedings; Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic
and fundamental principles such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.—
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such
as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.
Same; Same; Where the denial of the right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.—The violation of a party’s right to due process
raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Republic Act No. 9711; Food and Drug Administration; A party aggrieved by the orders, rulings or
decision of the Director-General of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has the remedy of
appeal to the Secretary of Health.—The Court notes that Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720, as amended
by R.A. No. 9711, and its implementing rules provide that a party aggrieved by the orders, rulings
or decision (or inaction) of the Director General of the FDA has the remedy of appealing the same
to the Secretary of Health.
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Administrative Agencies; Procedural rules, whether issued by
quasi-judicial agencies or embodied in the statutes enacted by Congress, are subject to alteration
or modifications by the Court in the exercise of its constitutional rule-making power.—Procedural
rules, whether issued by quasi-judicial agencies or embodied in statutes enacted by the Congress,
are subject to alteration or modification by the Court in the exercise of its constitutional rule-making
power.
Remedial Law; Petition for Review; The enumeration of the agencies mentioned in Section 1 of
Rule 43 as subject of a petition for review to the Court of Appeals (CA) is not exclusive.—The fact
that
456
the FDA is not among the agencies enumerated in Rule 43 as subject of a petition for review to the
CA is of no consequence. In Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, 574 SCRA 439 (2008), the Court
disagreed with the opinion of the CA that the enumeration of the agencies mentioned in Section 1
of Rule 43 was exclusive.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
United States Supreme Court
BUCK v. BELL(1927)
No. 292
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PA. v. CASEY(1992)
No. 91-744
G.R. No. 211356. September 29, 2014.*
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON.

MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL
FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO,
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP
CHIEF, BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY
POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Special Civil Actions; Declaratory Relief; An action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder.—An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief
is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or
contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending
controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies
the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations,
an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Requisites for Certiorari to Prosper.—For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner
must establish the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: 1. The writ is directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
with-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
146
Aquino vs. Municipality of Malay, Aklan
out or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and 3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
Same; “Judicial Function” and “Quasi-Judicial Function,” Distinguished.—To contrast, a party is said
to be exercising a judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights
of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial function is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature.” In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s
finding that Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is
illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial functions,
against which the special writ of certiorari may lie.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of
certiorari.—In a litany of cases, We have held that it is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety
of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant
need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled
and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
Civil Law; Nuisance; Words and Phrases; Article 694 of the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the
health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
147
VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 147
street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.—Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything
else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
Same; Same; No Build Zones; In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the Local
Government Unit (LGU) effectively made a determination that constructions therein, without first securing
exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety.—In
establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination that
constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they
pose a threat to public safety. No build zones are intended for the protection of the public because the
stability of the ground’s foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present
threat of high rising storm surges also justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline.
Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection to the
residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.
Same; Same; Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens.—As
jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens.
The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct
menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law
of necessity. The second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its
existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized
to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
Same; Same; No Build Zones; Had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove
could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not
a nuisance per se, but to the Court’s mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.—In the case at bar, the hotel,
in itself, cannot be con-
148
sidered as a nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation,
or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident –– its location –– and not its inherent qualities
that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay
West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the
hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
Same; Same; Same; Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the
Supreme Court (SC) still finds in this case that the Local Government Unit (LGU) may nevertheless properly
order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare
clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government.—Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We
still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because,
in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated,
the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses
and occupations to promote the general welfare.
Same; Same; Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its
function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving
property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.—One such piece
of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear
issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and
removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
149
VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 149
Same; Same; Petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and
exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay,
Aklan.—In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and
exemptions before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan.
To recall, petitioner declared that the application for zoning compliance was still pending with the office of
the mayor even though construction and operation were already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could
no longer be denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Same; Same; Mandamus; Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could have filed, as
an alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent mayor to exercise discretion and resolve
the controversy pending before his office.—Instead of taking the law into his own hands, petitioner could
have filed, as an alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent mayor to exercise discretion
and resolve the controversy pending before his office. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters
involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued
to compel action in those matters, when refused. Whether or not the decision would be for or against
petitioner would be for the respondent mayor to decide, for while mandamus may be invoked to compel the
exercise of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in a particular way. What would
have been important was for the respondent mayor to immediately resolve the case for petitioner to be able
to go through the motions that the zoning clearance application process entailed.
Same; Same; Illegal Constructions; Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the
mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.—
Petitioner opted to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He consciously chose to violate not only the
Ordinance but also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement of building permits, which provides:
Section 301. Building Permits.—No person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of
the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any building or structure or
cause the same to be done
150
without first obtaining a building permit therefor from the Building Official assigned in the place where
the subject building is located or the building work is to be done. This twin violation of law and ordinance
warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec. 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which power is separate and distinct from
the power to summarily abate nuisances per se. Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are
concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure
and demolition.
Same; Same; No Build Zones; The hotel’s incident that qualified it as a nuisance per accidens — its
being constructed within the no build zone — further resulted in the non-issuance of the necessary permits
and clearances, which is a ground for demolition under the Local Government Code (LGC). Under the
premises, a court order that is required under normal circumstances is hereby dispensed with.—Given the
presence of the requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, whether the building constituted a
nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens becomes immaterial. The hotel was demolished not exactly
because it is a nuisance but because it failed to comply with the legal requirements prior to construction. It
just so happened that, in the case at bar, the hotel’s incident that qualified it as a nuisance per accidens –
– its being constructed within the no build zone –– further resulted in the non-issuance of the necessary
permits and clearances, which is a ground for demolition under the LGC. Under the premises, a court order
that is required under normal circumstances is hereby dispensed with.
Same; Forestlands; Forestlands, although under the management of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial
jurisdiction.—The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT are not unbridled. Forestlands, although
under the management of the DENR, are not exempt from the territorial application of municipal laws, for
local government units legitimately exercise their powers of government over their defined territorial
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and the limitations circumscribed in the
ordinance are not mutually exclusive and are, in fact, cumulative.
151
VOL. 737, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 151
Same; National Building Code; Petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to secure a building permit
pursuant to Sec. 301 of the National Building Code (NBC).—Aside from complying with the provisions in
the FLAgT granted by the DENR, it was incumbent on petitioner to likewise comply with the no build zone
restriction under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in force even before the FLAgT was
entered into. On this point, it is well to stress that Sections 6 and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner
from complying with the restrictions since these provisions adverted to grant exemptions from the ban on
constructions on slopes and swamps, not on the no build zone. Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse
petitioner from complying with PD 1096. As correctly pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot
and will not amend or change the law because a legislative act cannot be altered by mere contractual
agreement. Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to secure a building permit pursuant to Sec.
301 of the National Building Code.
Same; Demolition; No Build Zones; Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-
judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments.—Based on law and jurisprudence,
the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments. This
power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of
the LGU under Sec. 17(b)(2)(ii), as above quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that
the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no
moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection,
conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality
of the structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from
the root cause of this debacle — compliance.
G.R. No. 175057. January 29, 2008.*

MA. ROSARIO SANTOS-CONCIO, MA. SOCORRO V. VIDANES, MARILOU ALMADEN, CIPRIANO
LUSPO, MORLY STEWART NUEVA, HAROLD JAMES NUEVA, NORBERT VIDANES, FRANCISCO
RIVERA, MEL FELICIANO, and JEAN OWEN ERCIA, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION-NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS
created under Department of Justice Department Order No. 165 dated 08 March 2006, LEO B.
DACERA III, as Chairman of the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors, and DEANA P. PEREZ, MA.
EMILIA L. VICTORIO, EDEN S. WAKAY-VALDES and PETER L. ONG, as Members of the Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors, the EVALUATING PANEL created under Department of Justice
Department Order No. 90 dated 08 February 2006, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA as Chairman of the
Evaluating Panel, and MERBA WAGA, RUEL LASALA and ARNOLD ROSALES, as Members of the
Evaluating Panel, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; The measures taken by the Evaluating Panel do not
partake of a criminal investigation, they having been done in aid of evaluation in order to relate the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
71
VOL. 543, JANUARY 29, 2008 71

Santos-Concio vs. Department of Justice
incidents to their proper context.—The measures taken by the Evaluating Panel do not partake of a
criminal investigation, they having been done in aid of evaluation in order to relate the incidents to their
proper context. Petitioners’ own video footage of the ocular inspection discloses this purpose. Evaluation
for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary
investigation entails not only reading the report or documents in isolation, but also deems to include
resorting to reasonably necessary means such as ocular inspection and physical evidence examination.
For, ultimately, any conclusion on such sufficiency or insufficiency needs to rest on some basis or
justification.
Same; Same; A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a
complaint for purposes of instituting a criminal prosecution; Being generally inquisitorial, the preliminary
investigation stage is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime, to enable the preparation of a complaint or information.—A complaint for purposes
of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a complaint for purposes of instituting a criminal
prosecution. Confusion apparently springs because two complementary procedures adopt the usage of the
same word, for lack of a better or alternative term, to refer essentially to a written charge. There should be
no confusion about the objectives, however, since, as intimated during the hearing before the appellate
court, preliminary investigation is conducted precisely to elicit further facts or evidence. Being generally
inquisitorial, the preliminary investigation stage is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the preparation of a complaint or information.
Same; Same; The complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is treated
as a component of the com-plaint.—As clearly worded, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the
complainant, for the affidavit is treated as a component of the complaint. The phraseology of the above-
quoted rule recognizes that all necessary allegations need not be contained in a single document. It is
unlike a criminal “complaint or information” where the aver-ments must be contained in one document
charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it vulnerable to a motion to quash.
72

Santos-Concio vs. Department of Justice
Same; Same; A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any
competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the
law enforcer as the nominal complainant.—A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis
of an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having
been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise.
The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate, 356 SCRA 443 (2001), does not appear to dent this
proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even
raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held
only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution
of the case in court.
G.R. Nos. 92319-20. October 2, 1990.*

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) AND HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ in his capacity as Solicitor General, and
the HON. OMBUDSMAN, respondents, MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT and JOSE R. ELEAZAR, JR.,
intervenors.
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Presidential Commission on Good Government;
Executive Order Nos. 1 & 14; The PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute ill-gotten wealth cases
of the former President, his relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be
assigned by the President to the PCGG; The PCGG's power to investigate includes the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations.—From the foregoing provisions of law, particularly Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of
Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the
power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and
associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the PCGG to
be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the PCGG includes the
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation of these types of cases by the promulgation of the said Executive
Order Nos. 1 and 14 whereby the PCGG was vested concurrent jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct
such preliminary investigation and to prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan. The power of the
PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the aforementioned types of cases has been recognized by
this Court in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co. Inc. (BASECO) vs. PCGG.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Public Officers; Republic Act 6770; The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government like the PCGG.—Under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No.
6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so
that it may take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the
______________
* EN BANC.
227
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 2, 1990 227

Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Gov't.
government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial
and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts
and municipal circuit trial courts. In other words, the aforestated provision of the law has opened up the
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all
investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under
Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman
may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Since the PCGG had already found a prima facie case
against the petitioner and intervenors when it caused the sequestration of the properties and the issuance
of the freeze order of the properties of petitioner, it cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of
said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as it has prejudged the matter.—The
Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier instances, the PCGG had already found a prima
facie case against the petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the sequestration of
the properties and the issuance of the freeze order of the properties of petitioner. Thereafter, acting as a
law enforcer, in collaboration with the Solicitor General, the PCGG gathered the evidence and upon finding
cogent basis therefor filed the aforestated civil complaint. Consequently the Solicitor General filed a series
of criminal complaints. It is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such preliminary investigation the
PCGG could even make a turn about and take a position contradictory to its earlier findings of a prima
facie case against petitioner and intervenors. This was demonstrated in the undue haste with which I.S.
Nos. 74 and 75 was investigated and the informations were filed in court even as the petitioner and
intervenors questioned its authority, invoked the denial of due process and promptly informed the PCGG
of ,the filing of this petition. In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal
investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint. It is to say
the least arbitrary and unjust. It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at
the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a
228

law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own
complaint, this time as a public prosecutor. The circumstances of the instant petition are even worse. To
repeat, the PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against
petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent
criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. While ostensibly,
it is only the Solicitor General who is the complainant in the criminal cases filed with the PCGG, in reality
the PCGG is an unidentified co-complainant. Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and
freeze orders against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were
ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court
finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with
the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. Add to this the fact that there are
many suits filed by petitioner and the intervenors against the PCGG and vice versa.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion
PCGG; Ombudsman; Preliminary Investigation; The PCGG should no longer continue conducting
preliminary investigations and should instead leave this task to the impartial and more competent
Ombudsman.—In the light of the unquestioned jurisdiction given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution
and statute, the PCGG should no longer continue conducting preliminary investigations. It should limit itself
to the preparation and filing of civil cases. Its conduct of preliminary investigations is so colored by the basic
reason for its creation, its institutional structure, and its obsession to recover everything that it perceives
and suspects to be ill gotten wealth that it cannot help but run roughshod over fundamental requirements
of fair play in criminal cases. xxx. Apart from its having been created for the sole purpose of recovering the
ill gotten wealth of ex-President Marcos, his relatives and cronies, the make-up of the PCGG prevents it
from being independent. The Chairman and members serve at the absolute pleasure of the President. The
law prescribes no qualifications for their appointment. The law does not mention future appointments. x x
x. As earlier stated, the appointment, tenure, functions, and objectives of the PCGG prevent it from being
fair and objective. Its actions in this case show that indeed it cannot be fair and objective. It is a temporary
office given a fixed mission. It has to accomplish that mission. On the other hand, the Ombudsman is
created by the Constitution. It is
229
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 2, 1990 229

vested with "independent" powers. It enjoys fiscal autonomy. It is insulated from interference by the
political departments.
G.R. No. 195145. February 10, 2016.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SULPICIO and PATRICIA RAMOS,
respondents.
Electric Power Industry; Electricity Pilferage; Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994; Republic Act (RA) No. 7832 was enacted by Congress to afford electric service
providers multiple remedies to protect themselves from electricity pilferage. These remedies include the
immediate disconnection of the electric service of an erring customer, criminal prosecution, and the
imposition of surcharges.—The State also recognizes that electricity is the property of the service provider.
R.A. 7832 was enacted by Congress to afford electric service providers multiple remedies to protect
themselves from electricity pilferage. These remedies include the immediate disconnection of the
electric service of an erring customer, criminal prosecution, and the imposition of surcharges. However,
the service provider must avail of any or all of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
598
Manila Electric Company vs. Ramos
these remedies within legal bounds, in strict compliance with the requirements and/or conditions set
forth by law. Section 4(a) of R.A. 7832 provides that the discovery of an outside connection attached on
the electric meter shall constitute as prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person
who benefits from the illegal use if the discovery is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer
of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). With the
presence of such prima facie evidence, the electric service provider is within its rights to immediately
disconnect the electric service of the consumer after due notice.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 7832 has two (2) requisites for an electric service provider
to be authorized to disconnect its customer’s electric service on the basis of alleged electricity pilferage:
first, an officer of the law or an authorized Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) representative must be present
during the inspection of the electric facilities; and second, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use
of electricity and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto committing the acts under Section 4(a), the
customer must still be given due notice prior to the disconnection.—R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an
electric service provider to be authorized to disconnect its customer’s electric service on the basis of alleged
electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an authorized ERB representative must be present during
the inspection of the electric facilities; and second, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of
electricity and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto committing the acts under Section 4(a), the
customer must still be given due notice prior to the disconnection.
Same; Same; Same; Differential Billings; Words and Phrases; Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7832 defines differential billing as “the amount to be charged to the person concerned for the unbilled
electricity illegally consumed by him.”—Section 6 of R.A. 7832 defines differential billing as “the amount to
be charged to the person concerned for the unbilled electricity illegally consumed by him.” Clearly, the law
provides that the person who actually consumed the electricity illegally shall be liable for the differential
billing. It does not ipso facto make liable for payment of the differential billing the registered customer whose
electrical facilities had been tampered with and utilized for the illegal use of electricity.
599
VOL. 783, FEBRUARY 10, 2016 599
Same; Same; Same; Public Utilities; System Losses; While the Supreme Court (SC) recognizes the
right of Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) as a public utility to collect system losses, the courts cannot
and will not blindly grant a public utility’s claim for differential billing if there is no sufficient evidence to prove
entitlement.—While this Court recognizes the right of MERALCO as a public utility to collect system losses,
the courts cannot and will not blindly grant a public utility’s claim for differential billing if there is no sufficient
evidence to prove entitlement. As MERALCO failed to sufficiently prove its claim for payment of the
differential billing, we rule that the respondents cannot be held liable for the billed amount.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Disconnection of Electric Service; Damages; With Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) in bad faith for its failure to follow the strict requirements under Republic Act (RA)
No. 7832 in the disconnection of the respondents’ electric service, the Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the
Court of Appeals (CA) that the award of damages is in order.—With MERALCO in bad faith for its failure to
follow the strict requirements under R.A. 7832 in the disconnection of the respondents’ electric service, we
agree with the CA that the award of damages is in order. However, we deem it proper to modify the award
in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages; Aside from having to spend eight (8)
months in the dark at their own residence, Patricia testified that they suffered extreme social humiliation,
embarrassment, and serious anxiety as they were subjected to gossip in their neighborhood of stealing
electricity through the use of an illegal connection.—After due consideration of the manner of disconnection
of the respondents’ electric service and the length of time that the respondents had to endure without
electricity, we find the award of moral damages proper. Aside from having to spend eight (8) months in the
dark at their own residence, Patricia testified that they suffered extreme social humiliation, embarrassment,
and serious anxiety as they were subjected to gossip in their neighborhood of stealing electricity through
the use of an illegal connection. The damage to the respondents’ reputation and social standing was
aggravated by their decision to move to a new residence following the absolute refusal of MERALCO to
restore their electric services.
600
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; In numerous cases, the Supreme
Court (SC) found that Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) failed to comply with the requirements under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7832 before a disconnection of a customer’s electric service could be effected. In
these cases, we aptly awarded exemplary damages against MERALCO to serve as a warning against
repeating the same actions.—Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. The
award of exemplary damages is allowed by law as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the
repetition of socially deleterious actions. In numerous cases, this Court found that MERALCO failed to
comply with the requirements under R.A. 7832 before a disconnection of a customer’s electric service could
be effected. In these cases, we aptly awarded exemplary damages against MERALCO to serve as a
warning against repeating the same actions. In this case, MERALCO totally failed to comply with the two
requirements under R.A. 7832 before disconnecting the respondents’ electric service. While MERALCO
insists that R.A. 7832 gives it the right to disconnect the respondents’ electric service, nothing in the records
indicates that it attempted to comply with the statutory requirements before effecting the disconnection.
[No. L-9430. June 29, 1957]

EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, petitioner vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch
V, and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. GARCIA, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, respondents.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS; SECRETARY'S DISCRETIONARY POWERS TO REVOKE PASSPORT
WITHOUT HEARING; PASSPORT HOLDER FACING CRIMINAL CHARGE.—Where the holder of a
passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot
be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due
process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer
vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the
passport holder hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of
his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process law clause of the Constitution; and
the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed
834

Suntay vs. People of the Phil., et al.
whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing.
G.R. No. 188829. June 13, 2016.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration, HON. ARTHEL B. CAROÑONGAN, HON. TEODORO B. DELARMENTE, HON.
JOSE D. CABOCHAN, and HON. FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacity as members of the Board
of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, petitioners, vs. DAVONN MAURICE C. HARP,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Heirs of Rodolfo Crisostomo v. Rudex International
Development Corp., 656 SCRA 205 (2011), the Supreme Court (SC) explained that the limited period of
appeal was instituted to prevent parties from intentionally and unreasonably causing a delay in the
administration of justice.— The one-day delay in the filing of the Petition is excusable. In Heirs of Rodolfo
Crisostomo v. Rudex International Development Corp., 656 SCRA 205 (2011), the Court explained that the
limited period of appeal was instituted to prevent parties from intentionally and unreasonably causing a
delay in the administration of justice. The dismissal of a petition is unwarranted if the element of intent to
delay is clearly absent from a case. Here, it is apparent that the delay in the filing of the Petition was for a
valid reason, i.e., respondent had to wait for the RTC Order allowing him to withdraw his then pending
Petition. It is likewise clear that he did not intend to delay the administration of justice, as he in fact filed the
appeal with the CA on the very same day the RTC issued the awaited Order.
Department of Justice; Jurisdiction; As the agency tasked to “provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services” and “implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of
aliens,” the Department of Justice (DOJ) has the power to authorize the recognition of citizens of the
Philippines.—As the agency tasked to “provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services” and
“implement the laws governing citizenship and the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
166
Republic vs. Harp
admission and stay of aliens,” the DOJ has the power to authorize the recognition of citizens of the
Philippines. Any individual born of a Filipino parent is a citizen of the Philippines and is entitled to be
recognized as such. Recognition is accorded by the BI and the DOJ to qualified individuals, provided the
proper procedure is complied with and the necessary documents are submitted. In this case, respondent
was accorded recognition as a citizen on 24 February 2000. On 24 October 2000, he was issued
Identification Certificate No. 018488, which confirmed his status and affirmed his entitlement to all the rights
and privileges of citizenship.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Without more, the Supreme Court (SC) finds no
reason to set aside the rule that public documents, particularly those related to the civil register, are “prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.”—The evidence relied upon by the DOJ and the BI is simply
not enough to negate the probative value of the documentary evidence submitted by respondent to prove
his Philippine citizenship. Without more, the Court finds no reason to set aside the rule that public
documents, particularly those related to the civil register, are “prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.” Hence, we rely on these documents to declare that respondent is a citizen of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Deportation; In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853
(1991), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated the doctrine that citizens may resort to courts for protection if
their right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation
proceeding.—It is settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by the BI against
citizens of the Philippines. In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), the Court
reiterated the doctrine that citizens may resort to courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without
molestation from any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation proceeding.
No. L-82544. June 28, 1988.*

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSIONER
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Search Warrant; Right against unreasonable searches and seizures available to
all persons including aliens whether accused of crime or not; A valid search warrant or warrant of arrest
must be based upon probable cause; Definition of probable cause.—There can be no question that the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs.
People’s Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]). One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or
warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as
referring to “such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.”
Same; Same; Existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
841
VOL. 162, JUNE 28, 1988 841

Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago
warrant.—In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of
probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without
warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance
of Rizal, L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143).
Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence
(Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; The fundamental rule is that a Writ of Habeas Corpus will not
be granted when the confinement is or has become legal although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning.—But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
records show that formal depor-tation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4
March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 “for violation of Sections 37, 45
and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code.” A hearing is presently being
conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal.
The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823,
February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). “Where a person’s detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order
in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for habeas corpus becomes
moot and academic” (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). “It is a fundamental rule
that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although
such confinement was illegal at the begin-ning.”
Same; Same; Same; Fact that petitioners were not caught in the act does not make their arrest
illegal; while “pedophilia” is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth.—That
petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young
boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the
CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed “pedophilia” defined as
“psycho-sexual perversion involving chil-dren” (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis, p. 555; “Paraphilia (or
842

unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object” (Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General’s Return of the Writ, on p. 10]. While not a
crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared
policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth.
Same; Same; Same; Filing by petitioners of a petition for bail considered a waiver of any irregularity
attending, their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity.—At any rate, the filing by petitioners of
a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest
and estops them from questioning its validity.
Same; Deportation; Charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section
37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code.—The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section
37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Section 37(a) provides in part: “(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.
Same; Same; Same; Section 37(a) not constitutionally proscribed; Nature of deportation
proceedings.—Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are substantially
identical, contemplates prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other
hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is a
preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court
proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Ruling in Vivo vs. Montessa is not invocable in the case at bar.—The ruling in
Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of warrants of arrest
by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of
deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution” (referring to
843
VOL. 162, JUNE 28, 1988 843

the 1935 Constitution) is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner’s Warrant of Arrest issued
on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported.
They were issued specifically “for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code.” Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against
them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible
deportation.
Same; Same; Bail; In deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but of discretion
on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.—The denial by respondent Commissioner
of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings,
the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that
“any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration.”The use of the word “may” in said
provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-9700, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 442). “Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail.”
(Tiu Chun Hai, et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said
proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).
Same; Same; Power to deport aliens is an act of state, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power; Respondent acted in the interest of the state in instituting deportation proceedings against
petitioners.—Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such
grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil.
682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens
whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic
tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]).
844

Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of
children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the
interests of the State.
G.R. No. 198140. January 25, 2016.*
IA1 ERWIN L. MAGCAMIT, petitioner, vs. INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE-PHILIPPINE DRUG

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, as represented by SI V ROMEO M. ENRIQUEZ and DIRECTOR GENERAL
DIONISIO R. SANTIAGO, respondents.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; As a rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed
in administrative proceedings in order “to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses.”—Administrative determinations of contested cases
are by their nature quasi-judicial; there is no requirement for strict adherence to technical rules that are
observed in truly judicial proceedings. As a rule, technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed in
administrative proceedings in order “to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses.” By relaxing technical rules, administrative agencies
are, thus, given leeway in coming up with a decision. Nonetheless, in deciding disciplinary cases pursuant
to their quasi-judicial powers, administrative agencies must still comply with the fundamental principle of
due process. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and essen-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
574
Magcamit vs. Internal Affairs Service-Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency
tial requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them.
Due Process; For as long as the parties were given fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard before
judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met.—Due process in administrative
cases, in essence, is simply an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling. For as long as the parties were given fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard before judgment
was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met. The cardinal primary rights and principles
in administrative proceedings that must be respected are those outlined in the landmark case of Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), quoted below: (1) The first of these rights is the right to
a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial.
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The
Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
575
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 575
Agency
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; For conspiracy to exist, it must be proven or at least inferred from the acts
of the alleged perpetrator before, during, and after the commission of the crime.—We discern no showing
from this allegation that Magcamit extorted money from Jaen, or that he was among those who took part in
the division of the money allegedly extorted from Jaen. For conspiracy to exist, it must be proven or at least
inferred from the acts of the alleged perpetrator before, during, and after the commission of the crime. It
cannot simply be surmised that conspiracy existed because Magcamit was part of the team that took part
in the buy-bust operation which resulted in Jaen’s arrest. In other words, respondents failed to pinpoint
Magcamit’s participation in the extortion that would make him administratively liable. After evaluating the
totality of evidence on record, we find that the records are bereft of substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that Magcamit should be held administratively liable for grave misconduct; Magcamit was
dismissed from the service based on evidence that had not been disclosed to him. By affirming this
dismissal, the CA committed a grave reversible error.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; View that if the party has been given the right to controvert
the allegations and evidence against him, as when the party is able to file a motion for reconsideration,
there is no deprivation of due process.—In administrative proceedings, the requirement of due process is
satisfied if the party has had the opportunity to be heard. If the party has been given the right to controvert
the allegations and evidence against him, as when the party is able to file a motion for reconsideration,
there is no deprivation of due process.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied in administrative cases.—Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
in administrative cases. In the National Labor Relations Commission, evidence introduced on appeal may
still be considered so long as the adverse party is given the opportunity to rebut the evidence. This rule
should equally apply in this administrative case since it involves employment, albeit of a public officer.
576
Agency
Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Grave Misconduct; View that the May 7, 2008 Affidavit is
substantial to prove that petitioner consented to and shared in the money extorted from Luciana M. Jaen.
This constitutes grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.—The May 7, 2008 Affidavit is
substantial to prove that petitioner consented to and shared in the money extorted from Luciana M. Jaen.
This constitutes grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service. The Internal Affairs Service,
the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals did not err in their respective Decisions.
G.R. No. 189698. December 1, 2009.*
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of because
it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-
judicial function.—The petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their
petition is a resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to
question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners actually seek from the Court is a
determination of the proper construction of a
_______________
* EN BANC.
259
VOL. 606, DECEMBER 1, 2009 259

Quinto vs. Commission on Elections
statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory
relief, over which this Court does not exercise original jurisdiction.
Actions; Parties; Locus Standi; Court finds that while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the
standing to raise the constitutional challenge simply because they are qualified voters; Both candidates and
voters may challenge on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting
rights.—The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing
to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy,
such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. The Court believes that both
candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its
impact on voting rights.
Same; Same; Same; Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.—In recent cases, this Court has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Review; Exercise by the Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies stressed in prior decisions.—We have also
stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination
and resolution of actual cases and controversies. The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or
controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforce-
260

ment and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they
would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provision—they would file their
CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation
upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to
petitioners’ candidacy.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; Requisites of Valid Classification.—In order that there
can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of
equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
Same; Same; The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.—Applying the four requisites to the instant
case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the
challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even
to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting
the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending
to their campaign rather than to their office work.261
VOL. 606, DECEMBER 1, 2009 261
PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:
Statutory Construction; Specific provisions of a particular law should be harmonized not only with the
other provisions of the same law but with the provisions of other existing laws as well.—Petitioners maintain
that this interpretation is the better approach, since it reconciles and harmonizes the perceived conflict
between that portion of Section 13 of RA 9369, which states that “[a]ny person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy” and the subsequent proviso in the same section which provides
that “any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her candidacy,” in a
manner that is consistent with the apparent intent of the legislators to treat an appointive government official
who files his certificate of candidacy as a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. However, this
argument fails to consider that the second proviso was precisely carved out as an exception to the general
rule, in keeping with the principle that appointive officials are prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity and taking part in any election, except to vote. Specific provisions of a particular law should
be harmonized not only with the other provisions of the same law, but with the provisions of other existing
laws as well. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus.
Remedial Law; Obiter Dictum; Meaning of Obiter Dictum; Court’s pronouncement on the equal
protection issue in Fariñas, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. cannot be characterized as obiter dictum.—
An obiter dictum has been defined as a remark or opinion uttered, ‘by the way.’ It is a statement of the court
concerning a question which was not directly before it. It is language unnecessary to a decision, a ruling on
an issue not raised, or an opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the
court, and is made without argument or full consideration of the point. It is an expression of opinion by the
262

court or judge on a collateral question not directly involved, or not necessary for the decision.
Accordingly, it lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such. Prescinding
from these principles, our pronouncement on the equal protection issue in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al., 417 SCRA 503 (2003) cannot be characterized as obiter dictum.
Same; Same; An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered as obiter dictum.—An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered as obiter dictum. This rule applies to all pertinent questions, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any
statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated. For that reason, a point expressly decided
does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on
some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have
been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.
Same; Same; Case of Mancuso v. Taft heavily relied upon by the ponencia has been effectively
overruled.—Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft,
which was heavily relied upon by the ponencia, has effectively been overruled. As it is no longer good
law, the ponencia’s exhortation that we should follow Mancuso “[since] the Americans, from whom we
copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,]”
is misplaced and unwarranted.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 which reiterates
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code is not violative of the equal protection clause.—In the instant
case, I respectfully submit that Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, is not violative of the equal protection clause. It is crystal clear that these deemed resignation
provisions substantially
263
VOL. 606, DECEMBER 1, 2009 263

serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people
rather than to party, (ii) avoiding the appearance of “political justice” as to policy, (iii) avoiding the danger
of a powerful political machine, and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and
that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity), which are important
enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective
office.
Same; Same; Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed; What the clause simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification.—Equal protection requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. What
the clause simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars.
Same; Same; The equal protection clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for
the classification.—The equal protection clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for
the classification. The statute is accorded a strong presumption of validity, and the challenger must bear
the burden of showing that the act creates a classification that is “palpably arbitrary or capricious”;
otherwise, the legislative determination as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will
not be overthrown. The challenger must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment,
whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment. The case law is to uphold
the statute if we “can conceive of any reason to justify the classification”; that the constitutionality of the law
must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is “fairly debatable.”264

Same; Same; Fact that a legislative classification is underinclusive will not render it
unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.—The ponencia faults Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code because “whether one holds an appointive office or an elective
one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.” This reasoning, however, fails to appreciate
the well-settled rule that, by itself, the fact that a legislative classification is underinclusive will not
render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. The Legislature is free to choose to remedy only part
of a problem, as it may “select one phase of a field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” Stated
differently, there is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to
which it might be applied; that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or
none. The state is free to regulate one step at a time, recognizing degrees of harm and addressing
itself to phases of a problem which presently seem most acute to the legislative mind. For when the
Legislature creates a statute, it is not required to solve all the evils of a particular wrong in one fell swoop.
Same; Same; The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is germane to the
purposes of the law.—The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore
germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric
of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
Same; Same; The restriction in Section 4 (a) of Republic Act No. 8678 applies only to the candidacies
of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections;
The overbreadth challenge leveled against Section 4 (a) is clearly unsustainable.—A perusal of Resolution
8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth
265
VOL. 606, DECEMBER 1, 2009 265

therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of
registered political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution
8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it
must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA
8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. On this score alone, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section
4(a) is clearly unsustainable.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Appointive Public Officials; Certificate of Candidacy; Appointive public officials are deemed
automatically resigned from office upon filing their certificates of candidacy.—The law is plain, clear and
unequivocal that appointive public officials are deemed automatically resigned from office upon filing
their certificates of candidacy.
Same; Same; Civil Service; Civil service officers and employees cannot engage in any electioneering
or partisan political activity except to vote.—The Constitution expressly prohibits civil service officers and
employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political activity. x x x Since the Constitution
also provides that suffrage “may be exercised by all citizens,” Section 2(4) of Article IX-B does not prohibit
civil service officers and employees from voting. Thus, civil service officers and employees cannot engage
in any electioneering or partisan political activity except to vote. This is clear from the second paragraph
of Section 3(3), Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; An appointive public official who files a certificate of candidacy violates the
express constitutional ban on civil service officers from engaging in any partisan political activity except to
vote.—Filing a certificate of candidacy is in itself a partisan political activity. It is a public announce-
266

ment that one is running for elective public office. It is a necessary act for election to public office, and
promotes one’s candidacy to public office. Running for public office, or exercising the right to be voted for,
is different from, and not part of, the right to vote. The only partisan political activity allowed to civil service
officers and employees is to vote. Filing a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity not allowed
to civil service officers and employees. An appointive public official who files a certificate of candidacy
violates the express constitutional ban on civil service officers from engaging in any partisan
political activity except to vote.
Same; Same; Same; The law may validly provide that an appointive public official is automatically
deemed resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy.—The law may validly provide that an appointive
public official is automatically deemed resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy. This merely
implements the constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees from engaging in any partisan
political activity except to vote.
CARPIO-MORALES, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Certificate of Candidacy; Partisan Political Activities; Filing of the certificate of candidacy is already
deemed as a partisan political activity.—To allow appointive officials to hang on to their respective
posts after filing their certificate of candidacy will open the floodgates to countless charges of violation of
the prohibition on partisan political activity. The filing of the certificate of candidacy is already deemed as
a partisan political activity, which also explains why the appointive official is considered ipso
facto resigned from public office upon the date of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, and not the date
of the start of the campaign period.
G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003.*

RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN
BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003.*

CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality
of a statute to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is “to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”—The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their
capacities as members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and registered voters. Generally,
a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The rationale for requiring
a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege
_______________
* EN BANC.
504

Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is “to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; The principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which the Court had declared in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA 779 (1991), as deriving
its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed
by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006, is one of “overarching significance” that justifies the Court's
adoption of a liberal stance vis-a-vis the procedural matter on standing.—Certainly, the principal issue
posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had
declared in Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public
officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of “overarching significance”
that justifies this Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover,
with the national elections barely seven months away, it behooves the Court to confront the issue now and
resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite apropos: . . . All await the
decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that
[its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of the
situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the
national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand.
Same; Statutory Construction; The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
purpose of the law.—Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of the law. It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the
Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. And where the acts of the other branches of
government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.
Statutes; Riders; The proscription in Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution requiring every bill
passed to embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is aimed against the evils
of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious
505
VOL. 417, DECEMBER 10, 2003 505

and/or unconsidered encroaches; Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.—The
proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to
its subject finding expression in its title. To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the
rule that—Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
Same; Same; An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.—The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep.
Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title
is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the
one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on
the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has
held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Policy matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court—
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.—The
legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination
that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when
the President of the
506
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 506

Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy
matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic
theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment
of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance.
Same; Same; Same; Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 of Omnibus Election Code
by the ruling in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the
same case that the provision has a laudable purpose.—Congress is not precluded from repealing Section
67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find
it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount
objective of election laws—the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress—
is achieved.
Same; Same; The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title page is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the
legislators and the public; It cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by
members of the House of Representatives.—Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive
that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received
the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the
legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was
amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as
members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to
casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
507
VOL. 417, DECEMBER 10, 2003 507

Equal Protection Clause; Public Officers; Administrative Law; Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between elective officials and appointive officials.—Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled
to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial
distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil
Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or
officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.
Statutes; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of
a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.—The petitioners, thus, urge
the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the “enrolled bill
doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification
of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A
review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate
from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the
internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House.
This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House
or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No 9006 must be resolved in its favor.
The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying
forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation
of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any
rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that ‘Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
508

courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’ Consequently,
‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.’ ”
Same; Effectivity Clauses; An effectivity clause which provides that the law “shall take immediately
upon its approval” is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid—the law takes effect fifteen days
after its publication in the Official Gazzette or a newspaper of general circulation.—Finally, the “Effectivity”
clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect immediately upon its
approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this
Court laid down the rule: . . . the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without
its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended . . . . Following Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006 notwithstanding its express statement,
took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
G.R. No. 189185. August 16, 2016.*
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA LAWAGON, CRISPIN ALCOMENDRAS,

CORAZON SABINADA, VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, and LEDEVINA ADLAWAN,
petitioners, vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVAO FRUITS
CORPORATION, and LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
G.R. No. 189305. August 16, 2016.*
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO BANANA

GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION (PBGEA), DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, and
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; To be considered as a
valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two (2)-pronged test: the formal and the
substantive.—To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged
test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government
unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
Same; Same; The corporate powers of the local government units (LGUs) confer the basic authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in
order to promote general welfare.—The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic
authority to enact
_______________
* EN BANC.
314
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters
Association, Inc.
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in
order to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by
Congress through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in
Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government
unit to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain
local autonomy.
Same; Same; Police Power; Ordinances; A valid ordinance must be enacted within the corporate
powers of the local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.—A valid
ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it
must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
it must not be unreasonable.
Same; Same; Same; A local government unit (LGU) is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers if it satisfies the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.—A local
government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Ordinances; In exercising its police power the local government unit (LGU) must
not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose.—
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government’s action. This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as
the ordinance realistically serves a
315
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 315
Association, Inc.
legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that
purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process
challenge.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The constitutional right to equal protection requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.—The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
protection secures every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
the State’s duly constituted authorities.
Same; Same; Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.—Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all
persons or things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality
among equals determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.
Same; Same; To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three (3) levels of
scrutiny, viz.: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.—To determine the propriety of
the classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz.: the rational scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
Same; Same; The rational basis scrutiny demands that the classification reasonably relate to the
legislative purpose.—The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis
test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test
often applies in
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cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
Same; Same; To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important
governmental interest but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on
broad generalizations.—Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To
survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not
depend on broad generalizations.
Same; Same; The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a
suspect class.—The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class.
The Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Same; Same; Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be
overinclusive because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose.—Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance
also tends to be “overinclusive” because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no
relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a
burden on a wider range of individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of
the law.
Same; Same; A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the
governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends.—A substantially overinclusive or
underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental claim that the classification serves
legitimate political ends. Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater
discriminatory or burdensome effect than necessary. In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6
of Ordi-
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Association, Inc.
nance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal
Protection Clause.
Precautionary Principle; The principle of precaution involves matters of evidence in cases where there
is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
effect.—The principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the courts
may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and
protecting the environment.
Same; The precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three (3) elements,
namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm.—The precautionary
principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of
environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively certain,
or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the probability
of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken.
Same; The precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying should not apply if
little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the
residents within and near the plantations.—We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining
the ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial
spraying may bring to the health of the residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and
balance of the environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would be
adverse even in the absence of evidence.
Local Government Code; Police Power; Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code (LGC) accords a
liberal interpretation to its general welfare provisions.—Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords
a liberal interpretation to its general welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with
the spirit of local autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power
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and discretion to accelerate their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their
constituents.
Same; Same; Local Government Units; Because the police power of the local government units
(LGUs) flows from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in
strictissimi juris.—Because the police power of the local government units flows from the express delegation
of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising
out of the terms used in granting the power should be construed against the local legislative units.
Same; Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Ordinances; Municipal corporations have no right to
enact ordinances dissonant with the State’s laws and policy.—Although the Local Government Code vests
the municipal corporations with sufficient power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and
activities, they definitely have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State’s laws and policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Local Government Code (LGC) is not intended to vest in the
local government unit (LGU) the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to
legislate upon in the guise of serving the common good.—The Local Government Code has been fashioned
to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to guide each local government unit in exercising its
delegated powers with the view of making the local government unit a fully functioning subdivision of the
State within the constitutional and statutory restraints. The Local Government Code is not intended to vest
in the local government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate
upon in the guise of serving the common good.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The devolved functions to the local government units (LGUs) do
not include the regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.—The enumerated
devolved functions to the local government units do not include the regulation and control of pesticides and
other agricultural chemicals. The noninclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City from
enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07, for otherwise it would be arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit the
aerial application of pesticides in derogation of the authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential
Decree No. 1144.
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Association, Inc.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Every local government unit (LGU) only derives its legislative
authority from Congress.—For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from
Congress. In no instance can the local government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its
ordinance cannot run against or contravene existing laws, precisely because its authority is only by virtue
of the valid delegation from Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Devoid of the specific delegation to its legislative body, the City
of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07.—Devoid of the specific
delegation to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact
Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also for being an ultra
vires act on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City.
Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; View that Ordinance No.
0309-07, Series of 2007 passed by Davao City is too broad in that it prohibits aerial spraying in agriculture
regardless of the substance and the method of aerial spraying involved.—I concur in the result. Ordinance
No. 0309-07, Series of 2007 passed by Davao City is too broad in that it prohibits aerial spraying in
agriculture regardless of the substance and the method of aerial spraying involved. This Court’s Decision
should be read in this narrow sense.
G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010.*
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
respondent.
G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010.*
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and
REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
respondents.
Public Officers; Philippine Truth Commission (PTC); Words and Phrases; Truth commissions have
been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2)
they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3)
they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State; The
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have
been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies “to establish the facts and context of
serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a country’s past.”—The PTC is
different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and
non-judicial fact-finding bodies “to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of
international humanitarian law in a country’s past.” They are usually established by states emerging from
periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine
only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a
particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report
containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or
empowered by the State. “Commission’s members are usually empowered to conduct research, support
victims, and propose policy
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may
aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare
the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.”
Judicial Review; Requisites.—Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of
judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
Same; Locus Standi; An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress.—The
Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail
Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress
as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as
members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235
SCRA 506 (1994)—“To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act
of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can
have a resort to the courts.”
Same; Same; The Supreme Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.—The Court leans on the doctrine
that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Asso-
80

ciation, Inc. v. Torres, 465 SCRA 47 (2005), the Court held that in cases of paramount importance
where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit
may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and
general interest shared in common with the public.
Presidency; Philippine Truth Commission (PTC); Reorganizations; Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O.
292); Words and Phrases; To say that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is borne out of a restructuring
of the Office of the President under Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, is
a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration
of an existing structure”—the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the
enactment of Executive Order No. 1.—The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation
of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any
function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring
any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the
provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy
or redundancy of functions. These points to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much
less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the
PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration of an existing
structure.” Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the
enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The power of control is entirely different from the power
to create public offices—the former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.—In the
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same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the
power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the
Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to
faithfully execute the laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Court declines to recognize Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office—P.D. No. 1416, as amended by
P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.—The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416
as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and
inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer
appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last “Whereas” clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government. Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability
and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon
the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Same; Same; Faithful Execution Clause; The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed.—While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster
on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the
three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws—in this case, fundamental laws
on public account-
82

ability and transparency—is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
Same; Same; Same; Residual Powers; The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution—one of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees, a power which flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.—The Executive is
given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of
the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, 457 SCRA 438 (2005), the authority of
the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase
of medicines was upheld.
Same; Same; Same; The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.—It should be
stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance
of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited,
this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO,
the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes
in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just
because the direction of the political winds have changed.
Same; Same; Appropriations; There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power to
appropriate funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.—On
the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the
operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no ap-
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propriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly,
there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further,
there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in
the words of the Solicitor General, “whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission.” Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated
to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; No quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it; Quasi-judicial powers
involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law.—Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have
been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said
that “Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law.” In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-
judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the
legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
Same; Same; Same; “Power to Investigate,” and “Power to Adjudicate,” Distinguished.—The
distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court
in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991). Thus: “Investigate,” commonly
understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of “investigate” is “to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: “to search or inquire
into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry.” The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion
of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to
the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of “investigate” is essentially the same: “(t)o follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and
84

accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;” “to
inquire; to make an investigation,” “investigation” being in turn described as “(a)n administrative function,
the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters.” “Adjudicate,”
commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as “to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge.” And
“adjudge” means “to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy x x.” In the legal sense, “adjudicate” means: “To settle in the exercise
of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;” and “adjudge”
means: “To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.”
Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the Department of Justice (DOJ) or erode their respective powers—if at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices; The Ombudsman’s power to
investigate under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies.—Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman
or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to
prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding
investigation.” The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the
charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, “when in the course
of its investigation,” under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation
from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. At any rate, the
Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies.
Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept
of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play.—One of the
basic principles
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on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been
embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
Same; Same; Same; The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective; The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature.—According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.” It “requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.” “The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by
its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.” “In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.” The equal
protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites; Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.—It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction.
What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. “Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.”86
Same; Same; Same; For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.—For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. “The classification
will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as
that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to
him.”
Same; Same; Same; The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class—it must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.—The classification must
not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number
included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or “underinclude” those that should otherwise fall into
a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974),
and reiterated in a long line of cases, The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice,
is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
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fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; Same; Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction—the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations, not a class of its own.—Applying these precepts to this case,
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate
of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order. Specifically, these are: * * * In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class
of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Same; Same; Same; The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be
taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished
by similar widespread reports of impropriety.—Though the OSG enumerates several differences between
the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to
merit the restriction of the investigation to the “previous administration” only. The reports of widespread
corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from
earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are
not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
“Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.”88

Same; Same; Same; The fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification—the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC), to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth,
must not exclude the other past administrations.—Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the
Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a century’s worth of graft cases. However,
the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its
mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.
Same; Same; Same; While with regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk
of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked, in Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
inadvertence.—The Court is not unaware that “mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law
under the equal protection clause.” “Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing
and does not include all the evils within its reach.” It has been written that a regulation challenged under
the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.
In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or
regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the
“step by step” process. “With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing
the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil
that might conceivably have been attacked.” In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence.
That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the
fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that
Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike
the investigative commissions created in the past. “The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful
and intentional discrimination.”89
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Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Supreme Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not
imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is
done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution.—To answer this
accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: “And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them.” Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing
its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in
consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the
Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution;
Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth
and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment.—Lest it be misunderstood, this
is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a
revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it
to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of
the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow
itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for
the truth must be within constitutional bounds for “ours is still a government of laws and not of men.”
CORONA, C.J., Separate Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; While the right to the truth is yet to be established as a right under
customary law or as a general principle of international law, it has nevertheless emerged as a “legal concept
at the national, regional and international levels, and relates to the obligation of the state to provide
information to victims or to their families or even society as a whole
90

about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights.”—The fundamental base
upon which a truth commission is created is the right to the truth. While the right to the truth is yet to be
established as a right under customary law or as a general principle of international law, it has nevertheless
emerged as a “legal concept at the national, regional and international levels, and relates to the obligation
of the state to provide information to victims or to their families or even society as a whole about the
circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights.” A truth commission has been generally
defined as a “body set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country
...,” and includes four elements: ... First, a truth commission focuses on the past. Second, a truth
commission is not focused on a specific event, but attempts to paint the overall picture of certain human
rights abuses, or violations of international humanitarian law, over a period of time. Third, a truth
commission usually exists temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist with the
submission of a report of its findings. Finally, a truth commission is always vested with some sort of
authority, by way of its sponsor, that allows it greater access to information, greater security or protection
to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report.
Presidency; Separation of Powers; Public Office; It is settled that, except for the offices created by the
Constitution, the creation of a public office is primarily a legislative function.—The separation of powers is
a fundamental principle in our system of government. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our
constitutional democracy and it cannot be eroded without endangering our government. The 1987
Constitution divides governmental power into three co-equal branches: the executive, the legislative and
the judicial. It delineates the powers of the three branches: the legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive department to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies. Each branch is independent and supreme within
its own sphere and the encroachment by one branch on another is to be avoided at all costs. The power
under scrutiny in this case is the creation of a public office. It is settled that, except for the offices created
by the Constitution, the creation of a public office is primarily a legislative function. The legislature decides
what offices are suitable, necessary or convenient for the administration of government.
Same; Philippine Truth Commission; Equal Protection Clause; The identification of the Arroyo
administration as the subject of the Truth Commission’s investigation does not pass the jurisprudential test
of reasonableness.—Given the indubitably clear mandate of E.O. No. 1, does the identifica-
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tion of the Arroyo administration as the subject of the Truth Commission’s investigation pass the
jurisprudential test of reasonableness? Stated differently, does the mandate of E.O. No. 1 violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution? Yes.
Same; Same; What the President granted the Truth Commission is the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints of graft and corruption against his immediate predecessor and her
associates.—The scope of the investigatory powers and functions assigned by the President to the Truth
Commission encompasses all “public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration.” There is no doubt in my
mind that what the President granted the Truth Commission is the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints of graft and corruption against his immediate predecessor and her associates.
Same; Same; Ombudsman; Separation of Powers; The Constitution has vested in Congress alone
the power to grant to any office concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases of graft and corruption.—The power of control and supervision of the President
includes the power to discipline which in turn implies the power to investigate. No Congress or Court can
derogate from that power but the Constitution itself may set certain limits. And the Constitution has in fact
carved out the preliminary investigatory aspect of the control power and allocated the same to the following:
(a) to Congress over presidential appointees who are impeachable officers (Article XI, Sections 2 and 3);
(b) to the Supreme Court over members of the courts and the personnel thereof (Article VIII, Section 6);
and (c) to the Ombudsman over any other public official, employee, office or agency (Article XI, Section 13
(1)). However, even as the Constitution has granted to the Ombudsman the power to investigate other
public officials and employees, such power is not absolute and exclusive. Congress has the power to further
define the powers of the Ombudsman and, impliedly, to authorize other offices to conduct such investigation
over their respective officials and personnel. The Constitution has vested in Congress alone the power
to grant to any office concurrent jurisdiction with the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases of graft and corruption.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Without any law authorizing him, the President cannot legally create a
committee to extend his investigatory reach across the boundaries of the executive department to “public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
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during the previous administration” without setting apart those who are still in the executive
department from those who are not—only the Ombudsman has the investigatory jurisdiction over them
under Article XI, Section 13.—Although pursuant to his power of control the President may supplant and
directly exercise the investigatory functions of departments and agencies within the executive department,
his power of control under the Constitution and the Administrative Code is confined only to the executive
department. Without any law authorizing him, the President cannot legally create a committee to extend
his investigatory reach across the boundaries of the executive department to “public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration” without setting apart those who are still in the executive department from those
who are not. Only the Ombudsman has the investigatory jurisdiction over them under Article XI, Section 13.
There is no law granting to the President the authority to create a committee with concurrent investigatory
jurisdiction of this nature.
Same; Same; Same; It is patent from the provisions of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 itself that quasi-
judicial powers are indeed vested in the Truth Commission, particularly in Section 2, paragraphs (b) and
(g).—Despite respondents’ denial that the Truth Commission is infused with quasi-judicial powers, it is
patent from the provisions of E.O. No. 1 itself that such powers are indeed vested in the Truth Commission,
particularly in Section 2, paragraphs (b) and (g): “b) Collect, receive, review, and evaluate
evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, …
x x x g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities,
by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers
and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course
of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe they are liable for graft
and corruption under pertinent applicable laws; x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The powers to “evaluate evidence” and “find reasonable
ground to believe that someone is liable for graft and corruption” are not merely fact-finding or
investigatory—these are quasi-judicial in nature.—The powers to “evaluate evidence” and “find reasonable
ground to believe that someone is liable for graft and corruption” are not merely fact-finding or investigatory.
These are quasi-judicial in nature because they actually go into the weighing of evidence, drawing up of
legal conclusions from them as basis for their official action and the exercise of discretion of a judicial or
quasi-judicial nature.93
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Same; Same; Same; The power to establish if there is reasonable ground to believe that certain
persons are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws is quasi-judicial in nature because
it is akin to the discretion exercised by a prosecutor in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation.—The power to establish if there is reasonable ground to believe that certain
persons are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws is quasi-judicial in nature because
it is akin to the discretion exercised by a prosecutor in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation. It involves a judicial (or quasi-judicial) appraisal of the facts for the purpose of
determining if a violation has in fact been committed.
Same; Same; Same; As a mere creation of the executive and without a law granting it the power to
investigate person and agencies outside the executive department, the Truth Commission can only perform
administrative functions, not quasi-judicial functions.—As a mere creation of the executive and without a
law granting it the power to investigate person and agencies outside the executive department, the Truth
Commission can only perform administrative functions, not quasi-judicial functions. “Administrative
agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals.”
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Presidency; Faithful Execution Clause; To execute faithfully the law, the President must first know the
facts that justify or require the execution of the law, and to know the facts, the President may have to
conduct fact-finding investigations.—Executive power is vested exclusively in the President. Neither the
Judiciary nor the Legislature can execute the law. As the Executive, the President is mandated not only to
execute the law, but also to execute faithfully the law. To execute faithfully the law, the President must first
know the facts that justify or require the execution of the law. To know the facts, the President may have to
conduct fact-finding investigations. Otherwise, without knowing the facts, the President may be blindly
or negligently, and not faithfully and intelligently, executing the law. Due to time and physical
constraints, the President cannot obviously conduct by himself the fact-finding investigations. The President
will have to delegate the fact-finding function to one or more subordinates. Thus, the President may appoint
a single fact-finding investigator, or a collegial body or committee.94

Same; Same; The power to find facts, or to conduct fact-finding investigations, is necessary and
proper, and thus inherent in the President’s power to execute faithfully the law.—The power to find facts,
or to conduct fact-finding investigations, is necessary and proper, and thus inherent in the President’s
power to execute faithfully the law. Indeed, the power to find facts is inherent not only in Executive power,
but also in Legislative as well as Judicial power. The Legislature cannot sensibly enact a law without
knowing the factual milieu upon which the law is to operate. Likewise, the courts cannot render justice
without knowing the facts of the case if the issue is not purely legal.
Same; Same; Philippine Truth Commission; The President can create the Truth Commission as a
public office in his Office pursuant to his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper.—The
creation of a public office must be distinguished from the creation of an ad hoc fact-finding public body. The
power to create a public office is undeniably a legislative power. There are two ways by which a public
office is created: (1) by law, or (2) by delegation of law, as found in the President’s authority to reorganize
his Office. The President as the Executive does not inherently possess the power to reorganize the
Executive branch. However, the Legislature has delegated to the President the power to create public
offices within the Office of the President Proper, as provided in Section 31(1), Chapter 10, Title III, Book III
of EO 292. Thus, the President can create the Truth Commission as a public office in his Office pursuant
to his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. In such a case, the President is exercising
his delegated power to create a public office within the Office of the President Proper. There is no dispute
that the President possesses this delegated power.
Same; Same; Same; In the alternative, the President can also create the Truth Commission as an ad
hoc body to conduct a fact-finding investigation pursuant to the President’s inherent power to find facts as
basis to execute faithfully the law.—In the alternative, the President can also create the Truth Commission
as an ad hoc body to conduct a fact-finding investigation pursuant to the President’s inherent power to find
facts as basis to execute faithfully the law. The creation of such ad hoc fact-finding body is
indisputably necessary and proper for the President to execute faithfully the law. In such a case, members
of the Truth Commission may be appointed as Special Assistants or Advisers of the President, and then
assigned to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The President can appoint as many Special Assistants or
Advisers as he may need. There is no public office created and members of the Truth Commission are
incumbents already holding public office in gov-
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ernment. These incumbents are given an assignment by the President to be members of the Truth
Commission. Thus, the Truth Commission is merely an ad hoc body assigned to conduct a fact-finding
investigation.
Same; Same; Same; The creation of ad hoc investigating bodies, as well as the appointment of ad
hoc investigators, does not result in the creation of a public office.—The creation of such ad
hoc investigating bodies, as well as the appointment of ad hoc investigators, does not result in the creation
of a public office. In creating ad hoc investigatory bodies or appointing ad hoc investigators, executive and
judicial officials do not create public offices but merely exercise a power inherent in their primary
constitutional or statutory functions, which may be to execute the law, to exercise disciplinary authority, or
both. These fact-finding bodies and investigators are not permanent bodies or functionaries, unlike public
offices or their occupants. There is no separate compensation, other than per diems or allowances, for
those designated as members of ad hoc investigating bodies or as ad hoc investigators.
Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The power of control does not involve the power to create a
public office, neither does the President’s power to find facts or his broader power to execute the laws give
the President the power to create a public office.—The President’s power to create ad hoc fact-finding
bodies does not emanate from the President’s power of control over the Executive branch. The President’s
power of control is the power to reverse, revise or modify the decisions of subordinate executive officials,
or substitute his own decision for that of his subordinate, or even make the decision himself without waiting
for the action of his subordinate. This power of control does not involve the power to create a public office.
Neither does the President’s power to find facts or his broader power to execute the laws give the President
the power to create a public office. The President can exercise the power to find facts or to execute the
laws without creating a public office.
Same; Philippine Truth Commission; Words and Phrases; There is no language in Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 1 granting the Truth Commission quasi-judicial power, whether expressly or impliedly, because
the Truth Commission is not, and was never intended to be, a quasi-judicial body; Quasi-judicial power is
the power of an administrative body to adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties under its jurisdiction
in a manner that is final and binding, unless there is a proper appeal.—There is no language in EO 1
granting the Truth Commission quasi-judicial power, whether expressly or impliedly, because the Truth
Commission is not, and was never intended to be, a quasi-judicial body. The power of the President to
create offices within the Office of the President Proper is a power to create only executive or ad-
96

ministrative offices, not quasi-judicial offices or bodies. Undeniably, a quasi-judicial office or body can
only be created by the Legislature. The Truth Commission, as created under EO 1, is not a quasi-judicial
body and is not vested with any quasi-judicial power or function. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions
involves the determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is, what the legal rights
and obligations of the contending parties are, and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. The tribunal, board or officer exercising quasi-
judicial functions must be clothed with the power to pass judgment on the controversy. In short, quasi-
judicial power is the power of an administrative body to adjudicate the rights and obligations of
parties under its jurisdiction in a manner that is final and binding, unless there is a proper appeal.
Same; Same; Same; That Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 declares that the Truth Commission “will act
as an independent collegial body” cannot invalidate EO 1—this provision merely means that the President
will not dictate on the members of the Truth Commission on what their findings and recommendations
should be.—That EO 1 declares that the Truth Commission “will act as an independent collegial body”
cannot invalidate EO 1. This provision merely means that the President will not dictate on the members of
the Truth Commission on what their findings and recommendations should be. The Truth Commission is
free to come out with its own findings and recommendations, free from any interference or pressure from
the President. Of course, as EO 1 expressly provides, the President, Congress and the Ombudsman are
not bound by such findings and recommendations.
Same; Same; Three Types of Fact-Finding Investigations in the Executive Department.—There are
three types of fact-finding investigations in the Executive branch. First, there is the purely fact-finding
investigation the purpose of which is to establish the facts as basis for future executive action, excluding
the determination of administrative culpability or the determination of probable cause. Second, there is the
administrative investigation to determine administrative culpabilities of public officials and
employees. Third, there is the preliminary investigation whose sole purpose is to determine probable cause
as to the existence and perpetrator of a crime. These three types of fact-finding investigations are separate
and distinct investigations.
Same; Same; Ombudsman; Purely fact-finding investigations to improve administrative procedures
and efficiency, to institute administrative measures to prevent corruption, to provide the President with
policy options, to recom-
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mend to Congress remedial legislation, and even to determine whether there is basis to file a formal
administrative charge against a government official or employee, do not fall under the “primary jurisdiction”
of the Ombudsman.—The Ombudsman has “primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.” The cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are criminal cases as well as quasi-criminal
cases like the forfeiture of unexplained wealth. “[I]n the exercise of this primary jurisdiction” over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman “may take over x x x the investigation of such cases”
from any investigatory agency of the Government. The cases covered by the “primary jurisdiction” of
the Ombudsman are criminal or quasi-criminal cases but not administrative cases. Administrative
cases, such as administrative disciplinary cases, are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. With more
reason, purely fact-finding investigations conducted by the Executive branch are not cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Purely fact-finding investigations to improve administrative procedures and efficiency, to
institute administrative measures to prevent corruption, to provide the President with policy options, to
recommend to Congress remedial legislation, and even to determine whether there is basis to file a formal
administrative charge against a government official or employee, do not fall under the “primary jurisdiction”
of the Ombudsman. These fact-finding investigations do not involve criminal or quasi-criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Same; Same; Same; If the Ombudsman has the exclusive power to conduct fact-finding
investigations, then even the Judiciary and the Legislature cannot perform their fundamental functions
without the action or approval of the Ombudsman.—If the Ombudsman has the exclusive power to conduct
fact-finding investigations, then even the Judiciary and the Legislature cannot perform their fundamental
functions without the action or approval of the Ombudsman. While the Constitution grants the Office of the
Ombudsman the power to “[i]nvestigate on its own x x x any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency,” such power is not exclusive. To hold that such investigatory power is exclusive to the
Ombudsman is to make the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary wholly dependent on the Ombudsman for
the performance of their Executive, Legislative and Judicial functions.
Same; Same; The Truth Commission, a body authorized to take testimony, can administer oaths and
issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum pursuant to Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 292.—Section 2(e) of EO 1 confers on the Truth Commission the power to “[i]nvite or subpoena
witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, ad-
98

minister oaths or affirmation as the case may be.” Thus, the Truth Commission, a body authorized to
take testimony, can administer oaths and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum pursuant to Section
37, Chapter 9, Book I of EO 292. In fact, this power to administer oaths and to issue subpoena
and subpoena duces tecum is a power of every administrative fact-finding investigative body created in the
Executive, Legislative or Judicial branch. Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of EO 292 grants such power
to every fact-finding body so created.
Same; Same; Contempt Power; There is no provision in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 that gives the
Truth Commission the power to cite persons for contempt; To require every administrative fact-finding body
to have coercive or contempt powers is to invalidate all administrative fact-finding bodies created by the
Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government.—There is no provision in EO 1 that gives the
Truth Commission the power to cite persons for contempt. As explained by Solicitor General Jose Anselmo
I. Cadiz, if the person who refuses to obey the subpoena, take oath or give testimony is a public officer, he
can be charged with “defiance of a lawful order,” which should mean insubordination if his superior had
ordered him to obey the subpoena of the Truth Commission. If the person is not a public officer or employee,
he can only be dealt with in accordance with law, which should mean that the Truth Commission could file
a petition with the proper court to cite such private person in contempt pursuant to Sections 1 and 9 of Rule
21 of the Rules of Court. However, the mere fact that the Truth Commission, by itself, has no coercive
power to compel any one, whether a government employee or a private individual, to testify before the
Commission does not invalidate the creation by the President, or by the Judiciary or Legislature, of a purely
administrative fact-finding investigative body. There are witnesses who may voluntarily testify, and bring
relevant documents, before such fact-finding body. The fact-finding body may even rely only on official
records of the government. To require every administrative fact-finding body to have coercive or contempt
powers is to invalidate all administrative fact-finding bodies created by the Executive, Legislative and
Judicial branches of government.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; There is much ado about the words “Truth Commission” as the
name of the fact-finding body created under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1—there is no law or rule
prescribing how a fact-finding body should be named.—There is much ado about the words “Truth
Commission” as the name of the fact-finding body created under EO 1. There is no law or rule prescribing
how a fact-finding body should be named. In fact, there is no law or rule prescribing how permanent
govern-
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ment commissions, offices, or entities should be named. There is also no law or rule prohibiting
the use of the words “Truth Commission” as the name of a fact-finding body. Most fact-finding bodies
are named, either officially or unofficially, after the chairperson of such body, which by itself, will not give
any clue as to the nature, powers or functions of the body. Thus, the name Feliciano Commission or Melo
Commission, by itself, does not indicate what the commission is all about. Naming the present fact-finding
body as the “Truth Commission” is more descriptive than naming it the Davide Commission after the name
of its chairperson.
Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; To prioritize based on reasonable and even compelling
grounds is not to discriminate, but to act sensibly and responsibly.—These are not only reasonable but
also compelling grounds for the Truth Commission to prioritize the investigation of the Arroyo
administration. To prioritize based on reasonable and even compelling grounds is not to
discriminate, but to act sensibly and responsibly. In any event, there is no violation of the equal
protection clause just because the authorities focus their investigation or prosecution on one particular
alleged law-breaker, for surely a person accused of robbery cannot raise as a defense that other robbers
like him all over the country are not being prosecuted. By the very nature of an investigation or prosecution,
there must be a focus on particular act or acts of a person or a group of persons.
Same; Same; Same; To require that “earlier past administrations” must also be included in the
investigation of the Truth Commission, with the Truth Commission expressly empowered “to investigate all
past administrations,” before there can be a valid investigation of the Arroyo administration under the equal
protection clause, is to prevent absolutely the investigation of the Arroyo administration under any
circumstance.—The majority opinion goes on to suggest that EO 1 could be amended “to include the
earlier past administrations” to allow it “to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to
the Constitution.” The majority opinion’s reasoning is specious, illogical, impractical, impossible to comply,
and contrary to the Constitution and well-settled jurisprudence. To require that “earlier past
administrations” must also be included in the investigation of the Truth Commission, with the Truth
Commission expressly empowered “to investigate all past administrations,” before there can be a valid
investigation of the Arroyo administration under the equal protection clause, is to prevent absolutely the
investigation of the Arroyo administration under any circumstance.100

Same; Same; Same; Classifying the “earlier past administrations” in the last 111 years as just one
class is not germane to the purpose of investigating possible acts of graft and corruption.—The “earlier
past administrations” prior to the Arroyo administration cover the Presidencies of Emilio Aguinaldo,
Manuel Quezon, Jose Laurel, Sergio Osmeña, Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos
Garcia, Diosdado Macapagal, Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, and Joseph Estrada, a
period spanning 102 years or more than a century. All these administrations, plus the 9-year Arroyo
administration, already constitute the universe of all past administrations, covering a total period of 111
years. All these “earlier past administrations” cannot constitute just one class of administrations because
if they were to constitute just one class, then there would be no other class of administrations. It is like
saying that since all citizens are human beings, then all citizens belong to just one class and you cannot
classify them as disabled, impoverished, marginalized, illiterate, peasants, farmers, minors, adults or
seniors. Classifying the “earlier past administrations” in the last 111 years as just one class is not
germane to the purpose of investigating possible acts of graft and corruption. There are prescriptive periods
to prosecute crimes. There are administrations that have already been investigated by their successor
administrations. There are also administrations that have been subjected to several Congressional
investigations for alleged large-scale anomalies. There are past Presidents, and the officials in their
administrations, who are all dead. There are past Presidents who are dead but some of the officials in their
administrations are still alive. Thus, all the “earlier past administrations” cannot be classified as just one
single class—“a class of past administrations”—because they are not all similarly situated.
Same; Same; Same; To insist that “earlier past administrations” must also be investigated by the Truth
Commission, together with the Arroyo administration, is utterly bereft of any reasonable basis other than to
prevent absolutely the investigation of the Arroyo administration.—A fact-finding investigation of “earlier
past administrations,” spanning 111 years punctuated by two world wars, a war for independence, and
several rebellions—would obviously be an impossible task to undertake for an ad hoc body like the Truth
Commission. To insist that “earlier past administrations” must also be investigated by the Truth
Commission, together with the Arroyo administration, is utterly bereft of any reasonable basis other than to
prevent absolutely the investigation of the Arroyo administration. No nation on this planet has even
attempted to assign to one ad-hoc fact-finding body the investigation of all its senior public officials in the
past 100 years.101
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Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; If courts cannot exercise the Executive’s “special
province” to decide whether or not to indict, which is the equivalent of determination of probable cause, with
greater reason courts cannot exercise the Executive’s “special province” to decide what or what not to
investigate for administrative fact-finding purposes.—In the present case, no one has been charged before
the prosecutor or the courts. What petitioners want this Court to do is invalidate a mere administrative fact-
finding investigation by the Executive branch, an investigative phase prior to preliminary investigation.
Clearly, if courts cannot exercise the Executive’s “special province” to decide whether or not to indict, which
is the equivalent of determination of probable cause, with greater reason courts cannot exercise the
Executive’s “special province” to decide what or what not to investigate for administrative fact-finding
purposes. For this Court to exercise this “special province” of the President is to encroach on the exclusive
domain of the Executive to execute the law in blatant violation of the finely crafted constitutional separation
of power. Any unwarranted intrusion by this Court into the exclusive domain of the Executive or Legislative
branch disrupts the separation of power among the three co-equal branches and ultimately invites re-
balancing measures from the Executive or Legislative branch.
Same; Same; Same; A claim of selective prosecution that violates the equal protection clause can be
raised only by the party adversely affected by the discriminatory act.—A claim of selective prosecution
that violates the equal protection clause can be raised only by the party adversely affected by the
discriminatory act. In Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982), this Court declared: ‘x x x Those
adversely affected may under the circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show
that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason.’ x x x.
(Emphasis supplied) Here, petitioners do not claim to be adversely affected by the alleged selective
prosecution under EO 1. Even in the absence of such a claim by the proper party, the majority opinion
strikes down EO 1 as discriminatory and thus violative of the equal protection clause. This is a gratuitous
act to those who are not before this Court, a discriminatory exception to the rule that only those “adversely
affected” by an alleged selective prosecution can invoke the equal protection clause. Ironically, such
discriminatory exception is a violation of the equal protection clause. In short, the ruling of the majority
is in itself a violation of the equal protection clause, the very constitutional guarantee that it seeks to
enforce.102

Same; Same; Same; The majority opinion’s requirement that “earlier past administrations” in the last
111 years should be included in the investigation of the Truth Commission to comply with the equal
protection clause is a recipe for all criminals to escape prosecution.—The majority opinion’s requirement
that “earlier past administrations” in the last 111 years should be included in the investigation of the Truth
Commission to comply with the equal protection clause is a recipe for all criminals to escape prosecution.
This requirement is like saying that before a person can be charged with estafa, the prosecution must also
charge all persons who in the past may have committed estafa in the country. Since it is impossible for the
prosecution to charge all those who in the past may have committed estafa in the country, then it becomes
impossible to prosecute anyone for estafa.
Same; Same; Same; A fact-finding investigation in the Executive or Judicial branch, even if limited to
specific government officials—whether incumbent, resigned or retired—does not violate the equal
protection clause.—A fact-finding investigation in the Executive or Judicial branch, even if limited to specific
government officials — whether incumbent, resigned or retired — does not violate the equal protection
clause. If an anomaly is reported in a government transaction and a fact-finding investigation is conducted,
the investigation by necessity must focus on the public officials involved in the transaction. It is ridiculous
for anyone to ask this Court to stop the investigation of such public officials on the ground that past public
officials of the same rank, who may have been involved in similar anomalous transactions in the past, are
not being investigated by the same fact-finding body. To uphold such a laughable claim is to grant immunity
to all criminals, throwing out of the window the constitutional principle that “[p]ublic office is a public trust”
and that “[p]ublic officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the people.”
Same; Same; Same; Accountability of Public Officers; The majority opinion completely ignores the
constitutional principle that public office is a public trust and that public officials are at all times accountable
to the people.—The majority opinion’s requirements that EO 1 should also include “earlier past
administrations,” with the Truth Commission empowered “to investigate all past administrations,” to
comply with the equal protection clause, is a requirement that is not only illogical and impossible to comply,
it also allows the impunity to commit graft and corruption and other crimes under our penal laws. The
majority opinion completely ignores the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust and that
public officials are at all times accountable to the people.103
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 7, 2010 103
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Court, in striking down Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 creating
the Truth Commission, overrules the manifest will of the Filipino people to start the difficult task of putting
an end to graft and corruption in government, denies the President his basic constitutional power to
determine the facts in his faithful execution of the law, and suppresses whatever truth may come out in the
purely fact-finding investigation of the Truth Commission.—Neither the Constitution nor any existing law
prevents the incumbent President from redeeming his campaign pledge to the Filipino people. In
fact, the incumbent President’s campaign pledge is merely a reiteration of the basic State policy, enshrined
in Section 27, Article II of the Constitution, that: Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity
in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. (Emphasis
supplied) The incumbent President’s campaign pledge also reiterates the constitutional principle that
“[p]ublic office is a public trust” and that “[p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people.” This Court, in striking down EO 1 creating the Truth Commission, overrules the manifest will
of the Filipino people to start the difficult task of putting an end to graft and corruption in government, denies
the President his basic constitutional power to determine the facts in his faithful execution of the law, and
suppresses whatever truth may come out in the purely fact-finding investigation of the Truth Commission.
This Court, in invoking the equal protection clause to strike down a purely fact-finding investigation, grants
immunity to those who violate anti-corruption laws and other penal laws, renders meaningless the
constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, and makes public officials unaccountable to the
people at any time.
CARPIO-MORALES, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Equal Protection Clause; Petitioners with legal standing as legislators
cannot properly assert the equal protection claim of the previous administration—the peculiarity of the locus
standi of legislators necessarily confines the adjudication of their petition only on matters that tend to impair
the exercise of their official functions.—Petitioners in G.R. No. 193036, with legal standing as
legislators, cannot properly assert the equal protection claim of the previous administration. While
legislators have locus standi in certain cases, their legal standing as such is recognized only insofar as the
assailed issuance affects their functions as legislators. In the absence of a claim that the issuance in
question violated the rights of petitioner-legislators or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the
Legislature, they have no legal standing to institute the present action
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in their capacity as members of Congress. No doubt, legislators are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action upon a claim of usurpation of legislative power. That is why, not every time that
a Senator or a Representative invokes the power of judicial review, the Court automatically clothes them
with locus standi. The Court examines first, as the ponencia did, if the petitioner raises an issue pertaining
to an injury to Congress as an institution or a derivative injury to members thereof, before proceeding to
resolve that particular issue. The peculiarity of the locus standi of legislators necessarily confines the
adjudication of their petition only on matters that tend to impair the exercise of their official functions.
Same; Same; Same; Breach of the equal protection clause, as presently raised by petitioner-
legislators on behalf of the Executive Department of the immediate past administration, has nothing to do
with the impairment of the powers of Congress.—Breach of the equal protection clause, as presently raised
by petitioner-legislators on behalf of the Executive Department of the immediate past administration, has
nothing to do with the impairment of the powers of Congress. Thus, with respect to the issue in Pimentel,
Jr. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 (2005), that did not involve any impairment of the prerogatives
of Congress, some Senators who merely invoked their status as legislators were not granted standing.
Moreover, petitioner-legislators cannot take the cudgels for the previous administration/s, unless they admit
that they are maintaining a confidential relation with it/them or acting as advocates of the rights of a non-
party who seeks access to their market or function.
Equal Protection Clause; Philippine Truth Commission; There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in
the Truth Commission’s defined scope of investigation.—The ponencia holds that the previous
administration has been denied equal protection of the laws. To it, “[t]o restrict the scope of the
commission’s investigation to said particular administration constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction.” I find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the Truth Commission’s
defined scope of investigation. In issues involving the equal protection clause, the test developed by
jurisprudence is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Same; Same; Presidency; Separation of Powers; The Court could not, in any way, determine or dictate
what information the President would be needing in fulfilling the duty to ensure the faithful execution of laws
on public
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accountability.—This Court could not, in any way, determine or dictate what information the
President would be needing in fulfilling the duty to ensure the faithful execution of laws on public
accountability. This sweeping directive of the ponencia to include all past administrations in the probe
tramples upon the prerogative of a co-equal branch of government. The group or class, from which to elicit
the needed information, rests on substantial distinction that sets the class apart.
Same; Same; Same; The exclusion of other past administrations from the scope of investigation by
the Truth Commission is justified by the substantial distinction that complete and definitive reports covering
their respective periods have already been rendered.—The Executive Department’s determination of the
futility or redundancy of investigating other administrations should be accorded respect. Respondents
having manifested that pertinent and credible data are already in their hands or in the archives, petitioners’
idea of an all-encompassing de novo inquiry becomes tenuous as it goes beyond what the Executive
Department needs. The exclusion of other past administrations from the scope of investigation by the Truth
Commission is justified by the substantial distinction that complete and definitive reports covering their
respective periods have already been rendered. The same is not true with the immediate past
administration. There is thus no undue favor or unwarranted partiality. To include everybody all over again
is to insist on a useless act.
Philippine Truth Commission; The purpose of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 is to produce a report
which, insofar as the Truth Commission is concerned, is the end in itself—the purpose of the report is
another matter which is already outside the control of E.O. No. 1.—The purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to produce
a report which, insofar as the Truth Commission is concerned, is the end in itself. The purpose of the
report is another matter which is already outside the control of E.O. No. 1. Once the report containing the
needed information is completed, the Truth Commission is dissolved functus officio. At that point, the
endeavor of data-gathering is accomplished, and E.O No. 1 has served its purpose. It cannot be said,
however, that it already eradicated graft and corruption. The report would still be passed upon by
government agencies. Insofar as the Executive Department is concerned, the report assimilates into a
broader database that advises and guides the President in law enforcement. To state that the purpose of
E.O. No. 1 is to stamp out acts of graft and corruption leads to the fallacious and artificial conclusion that
respondents are stamping out corrupt acts of the previous administration only, as if E.O. No. 1 represents
the entire anti-corruption efforts of the Executive Department.106

Same; Equal Protection Clause; Laws that are limited in duration (e.g., general appropriations act) do
not circumvent the guarantee of equal protection by not embracing all that may, in the years to come, be in
similar conditions even beyond the effectivity of the law.—The Truth Commission is an ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President. The nature of an ad hoc body is that it is limited in scope. Ad hoc means
for the particular end or case at hand without consideration of wider application. An ad hoc body is
inherently temporary. E.O. No. 1 provides that the Truth Commission “shall accomplish its mission on or
before December 31, 2012.” That the classification should not be limited to existing conditions only, as
applied in the present case, does not mean the inclusion of future administrations. Laws that are limited in
duration (e.g., general appropriations act) do not circumvent the guarantee of equal protection by not
embracing all that may, in the years to come, be in similar conditions even beyond the effectivity of the law.
The requirement not to limit the classification to existing conditions goes into the operational details of the
law. The law cannot, in fine print, enumerate extant items that exclusively compose the classification,
thereby excluding soon-to-exist ones that may also fall under the classification.
NACHURA, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; Public Office; Given the powers conferred upon it, as spelled out in
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, there can be no doubt that the Truth Commission is a public office, and the
Chairman and the Commissioners appointed thereto, public officers.—A public office is defined as the right,
authority, or duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some sovereign power of government
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. Public offices are created either by the Constitution, by
valid statutory enactments, or by authority of law. A person who holds a public office is a public officer.
Given the powers conferred upon it, as spelled out in E.O. No. 1, there can be no doubt that the Truth
Commission is a public office, and the Chairman and the Commissioners appointed thereto, public officers.
Presidency; Power of Control; Take Care Clause; The President’s power of control is derived directly
from the Constitution and not from any implementing legislation, while, on the other hand, the power to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed makes the President a dominant figure in the administration of the
government.—Relevant to this disquisition are two specific powers that flow from this “plenitude of
authority.” Both are found in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. They are commonly referred to as
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the power of control and the take care clause. Section 17 is a self-executing provision. The President’s
power of control is derived directly from the Constitution and not from any implementing legislation. On the
other hand, the power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed makes the President a dominant
figure in the administration of the government. The law he is supposed to enforce includes the Constitution
itself, statutes, judicial decisions, administrative rules and regulations and municipal ordinances, as well as
the treaties entered into by our government. At almost every cusp of executive power is the President’s
power of control and his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
Same; Same; Same; It is abundantly clear that the overarching framework in the President’s power
of control enables him to assume directly the powers of any executive department, bureau or office—
whatever powers conferred by law upon subordinate officials within his control are powers also vested in
the President of the Philippines; When the power of control is juxtaposed with the constitutional duty to
ensure that laws be faithfully executed, it is obvious that, for the effective exercise of the take care clause,
it may become necessary for the President to create an office, agency or commission, and charge it with
the authority and the power that he has chosen to assume for himself.—From these cited decisions, it is
abundantly clear that the overarching framework in the President’s power of control enables him to assume
directly the powers of any executive department, bureau or office. Otherwise stated, whatever powers
conferred by law upon subordinate officials within his control are powers also vested in the President of the
Philippines. In contemplation of law, he may directly exercise the powers of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
the Secretary of National Defense, the Commissioner of Customs, or of any subordinate official in the
executive department. Thus, he could, for example, take upon himself the investigatory functions of the
Department of Justice, and personally conduct an investigation. If he decides to do so, he would be at
liberty to delegate a portion of this investigatory function to a public officer, or a panel of public officers,
within his Office and under his control. There is no principle of law that proscribes his doing so. In this
context, the President may, therefore, create an agency within his Office to exercise the functions, or part
of the functions, that he has assumed for himself. Even the ponencia admits that this can be done. When
this power of control is juxtaposed with the constitutional duty to ensure that laws be faithfully executed, it
is obvious that, for the effective exercise of the take care clause, it may become necessary for the President
to create an office, agency or commission, and charge it with the authority and the power that he has chosen
to assume for himself. It will not simply be an exercise of the power of
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control, but also a measure intended to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Same; Philippine Truth Commission; That the Truth Commission is a derivative of the reorganization
of the Office of the President should brook no dissent.—That the Truth Commission is a derivative of the
reorganization of the Office of the President should brook no dissent. The President is not precluded from
transferring and re-aligning the fact-finding functions of the different Departments regarding certain and
specific issues, because ultimately, the President’s authority to reorganize is derived from the power-and-
duty nexus fleshed out in the two powers granted to him in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
Same; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Even with the Court’s expanded power of judicial
review, we still cannot refashion, and dictate on, the policy determination made by the President concerning
what function, of whichever Department, regarding specific issues, he may choose to directly assume and
take cognizance of.—I earnestly believe that, even with this Court’s expanded power of judicial review, we
still cannot refashion, and dictate on, the policy determination made by the President concerning what
function, of whichever Department, regarding specific issues, he may choose to directly assume and take
cognizance of. To do so would exceed the boundaries of judicial authority and encroach on an executive
prerogative. It would violate the principle of separation of powers, the constitutional guarantee that no
branch of government should arrogate unto itself those functions and powers vested by the Constitution in
the other branches.
Same; Same; The Truth Commission is a public office validly created by the President of the
Philippines under authority of law, as an adjunct of the Office of the President—to which the President has
validly delegated the fact-finding and investigatory powers [of the Department of Justice] which he had
chosen to personally assume.—In fine, it is my submission that the Truth Commission is a public office
validly created by the President of the Philippines under authority of law, as an adjunct of the Office of the
President — to which the President has validly delegated the fact-finding and investigatory powers [of the
Department of Justice] which he had chosen to personally assume. Further, it is the product of the
President’s exercise of the power to reorganize the Office of the President granted under the Administrative
Code.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The word “independent,” as used in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,
cannot be understood to mean total separateness
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or full autonomy from the Office of the President—it should be interpreted as an expression of the
intent of the President: that the Truth Commission shall be accorded the fullest measure of freedom and
objectivity in the pursuit of its mandate, unbound and uninhibited in the performance of its duties by
interference or undue pressure coming from the President.—This conclusion inevitably brings to the
threshold of our discussion the matter of the “independence” of the Truth Commission, subject of an
amusing exchange we had with the Solicitor General during the oral argument, and to which the erudite
Justice Arturo D. Brion devoted several pages in his Separate Concurring Opinion. The word “independent,”
as used in E.O. No. 1, cannot be understood to mean total separateness or full autonomy from the Office
of the President. Being a creation of the President of the Philippines, it cannot be totally dissociated from
its creator. By the nature of its creation, the Truth Commission is intimately linked to the Office of the
President, and the Executive Order, as it were, is the umbilical cord that binds the Truth Commission to the
Office of the President. The word “independent,” used to describe the Commission, should be interpreted
as an expression of the intent of the President: that the Truth Commission shall be accorded the fullest
measure of freedom and objectivity in the pursuit of its mandate, unbound and uninhibited in the
performance of its duties by interference or undue pressure coming from the President. Our exchange
during the oral argument ended on this note: that while the Truth Commission is, technically, subject to the
power of control of the President, the latter has manifested his intention, as indicated in the Executive Order,
not to exercise the power over the acts of the Commission.
Equal Protection Clause; Standards of Review; Words and Phrases; The “rational basis” test is one
of three “levels of scrutiny” analyses developed by courts in reviewing challenges of unconstitutionality
against statutes and executive action.—The “rational basis” test is one of three “levels of scrutiny” analyses
developed by courts in reviewing challenges of unconstitutionality against statutes and executive action.
Carl Cheng, in his dissertation, “Important Right and the Private Attorney General Doctrine,” enlightens us,
thus: “[I]n the area of equal protection analysis, the judiciary has developed a ‘level of scrutiny’ analysis for
resolving the tensions inherent in judicial review. When engaging in this analysis, a court subjects the
legislative or executive action to one of three levels of scrutiny, depending on the class of persons and the
rights affected by the action. The three levels are rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and
strict scrutiny. If a particular legislative or executive act does not survive the appropriate level of scrutiny,
the act is held to be unconstitutional. If it does survive, it is deemed constitutional.
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The three tensions discussed above and, in turn, the three judicial responses to each, run parallel to
these three levels of scrutiny. In response to each tension, the court applies a specific level of scrutiny.”
Same; Same; Laws classify in order to achieve objectives, but the classification may not perfectly
achieve the objective.—Laws classify in order to achieve objectives, but the classification may not perfectly
achieve the objective. Thus, in Michael M. v. Supreme Court of Sonoma County, the U.S. Supreme Court
said that the relevant inquiry is not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but
whether the line chosen [by the legislature] is within constitutional limitations. The equal protection clause
does not require the legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may well be incapable of enforcement.
Same; Same; Under the rational basis test, the presence of any plausible legitimate objective for the
classification, where the classification serves to accomplish that objective to any degree, no matter how
tiny, would validate the classification.—In the determination of whether the classification is invidious or
arbitrary, its relation to the purpose must be examined. Under the rational basis test, the presence of any
plausible legitimate objective for the classification, where the classification serves to accomplish that
objective to any degree, no matter how tiny, would validate the classification. To be invalidated on
constitutional grounds, the test requires that the classification must have one of the following traits: (1) it
has absolutely no conceivable legitimate purpose; or (2) it is so unconnected to any conceivable objective,
that it is absurd, utterly arbitrary, whimsical, or even perverse.
Same; Same; Pursuing a system of priorities does not translate to suspect classification resulting in
violation of the equal protection guarantee.—The initial categorization of the issues and reports which are
to be the subject of the Truth Commission’s investigation is the President’s call. Pursuing a system of
priorities does not translate to suspect classification resulting in violation of the equal protection guarantee.
In his assignment of priorities to address various government concerns, the President, as the Chief
Executive, may initially limit the focus of his inquiry and investigate issues and reports one at a time. As
such, there is actually no differential treatment that can be equated to an invalid classification.
Presidency; Constitutional Law; Peculiar to our nation is a verbose Constitution; Although the Solicitor
General may have made certain declarations, read as admissions by the other Members of this Court, these
cannot bind the
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Supreme Court in interpreting the constitutional grant of executive power—the matter is simply a
failure of articulation which cannot be used to diminish the power of the executive.—Considering all the
foregoing discussion, I must, regrettably, disagree with the suggestion. Peculiar to our nation is a verbose
Constitution. Herein enshrined are motherhood statements—exhortations for public officers to follow. A
quick perusal of E.O. No. 1 bears out a similar intonation. Although the Solicitor General may have made
certain declarations, read as admissions by the other Members of this Court, these cannot bind the
Supreme Court in interpreting the constitutional grant of executive power. The matter is simply a failure of
articulation which cannot be used to diminish the power of the executive. On the whole, the erroneous
declarations of the Solicitor General, preempting and interpreting the President’s exercise of executive
power beyond the articulated purpose of E.O. No. 1, are not equivalent to the wrongful exercise by the
President of executive power.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; Words and Phrases; Obviously, the title given to the Commission is
meant to convey the message that it is independent of the Office of the President—the creation of the
Philippine Truth Commission and its naming as such were done as a deliberate reference to the tradition
of independent truth commissions as they are conceived in international law, albeit adapted to a particular
factual situation in this jurisdiction.—With due respect, I disagree with Justice Antonio T. Carpio’s opinion
that the naming of the body created by EO No. 1 as the “Philippine Truth Commission” was a mere attempt
to be novel, to depart from the tired and repetitious scheme of naming a commission after its appointed
head/leader or of calling it a “fact-finding” body. Obviously, the title given to the Commission is meant to
convey the message that it is independent of the Office of the President. Those who dissent from the
majority position gloss over the fact that EO No. 1 itself expressly states that the Commission’s members
shall “act as an independent collegial body.” During oral arguments, the Solicitor General confirmed that
what EO No. 1 intended is for the Commission to be an independent body over which the President has no
power of control. The Solicitor General further claimed that one of the functions of the Commission is “truth-
telling.” Verily, the creation of the Philippine Truth Commission and its naming as such were done as a
deliberate reference to the tradition of independent truth commissions as they are conceived in international
law, albeit adapted to a particular factual situation in this jurisdiction.
Same; Separation of Powers; If this Philippine Truth Commission is an office independent of the
President and not subject to the latter’s control and
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supervision, then the creation of the Commission must be done by legislative action and not by
executive order.—If this Philippine Truth Commission is an office independent of the President and not
subject to the latter’s control and supervision, then the creation of the Commission must be done by
legislative action and not by executive order. It is undisputed that under our constitutional framework only
Congress has the power to create public offices and grant to them such functions and powers as may be
necessary to fulfill their purpose. Even in the international sphere, the creation of the more familiar truth
commissions has been done by an act of legislature.
Same; There is nothing in Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 that indicates that the Commission is a part
of the executive department or of the Office of the President Proper.—There is nothing in EO No. 1 that
indicates that the Commission is a part of the executive department or of the Office of the President Proper.
Indeed, it is Justice Carpio who suggests that the President may appoint the commissioners of the
Philippine Truth Commission as presidential special assistants or advisers in order that the Commission be
subsumed in the Office of the President Proper and to clearly place EO No. 1 within the ambit of Section
31. To my mind, the fact that the commissioners are proposed to be appointed as presidential advisers is
an indication that the Philippine Truth Commission was initially planned to be independent of the President
and the subsequent appointment of the commissioners as presidential advisers will be merely curative of
the patent defect in the creation of the Commission by an Executive Order, as an independent body.
Same; Whether by name or by nature, the Philippine Truth Commission cannot be deemed politically
“neutral” so as to assure a completely impartial conduct of its purported fact-finding mandate.—EO No. 1
itself is replete with provisions that indicate that the existence and operations of the Commission will be
dependent on the Office of the President. Its budget shall be provided by the Office of the President and
therefore it has no fiscal autonomy. The reports of the Commission shall be published upon the directive of
the President. Further, if we follow the legal premises of our dissenting colleagues to their logical
conclusion, then the Commission as a body created by executive order may likewise be abolished (if it is
part of the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System of the Office of the President Proper) or
restructured by executive order. EO No. 1 may be amended, modified, and repealed all by executive order.
More importantly, if the Commission is subject to the power of control of the President, he may reverse,
revise or modify the actions of the Commission or even substitute his own decision for that of the
Commission. Whether by name or by nature, the Philippine Truth Commission cannot be deemed politically
“neutral” so as to assure a completely impartial conduct of
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its purported fact-finding mandate. I further concur with Chief Justice Corona that attempts to “sugar
coat” the Philippine Truth Commission’s functions as “harmless” deserve no credence.
Same; Judicial Review; The Court cannot place its stamp of approval on executive action that is
constitutionally abhorrent even if for a laudable objective, and even if done by a President who has the
support of popular opinion on his side.—The constitutional mandate for public accountability and the
present administration’s noble purpose to curb graft and corruption simply cannot justify trivializing
individual rights equally protected under the Constitution. This Court cannot place its stamp of approval on
executive action that is constitutionally abhorrent even if for a laudable objective, and even if done by a
President who has the support of popular opinion on his side. For the decisions of the Court to have value
as precedent, we cannot decide cases on the basis of personalities nor on something as fickle and fleeting
as public sentiment. It is worth repeating that our duty as a Court is to uphold the rule of law and not the
rule of men.
BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; Words and Phrases; The first problem of the Executive Order (E.O.) is
its use of the title “Truth Commission” and its objective of truth-telling; these assume that what the Truth
Commission speaks of is the “truth” because of its title and of its truth-telling function—anything other than
what the Commission reports would either be a distortion of the truth, or may even be an “untruth.”—The
first problem of the EO is its use of the title “Truth Commission” and its objective of truth-telling; these
assume that what the Truth Commission speaks of is the “truth” because of its title and of its truth-telling
function; thus, anything other than what the Commission reports would either be a distortion of the truth, or
may even be an “untruth.” This problem surfaced during the oral arguments on queries about the effect of
the title “Truth Commission” on the authority of the duly constituted tribunals that may thereafter rule on the
matters that the Commission shall report on. Since the Commission’s report will constitute the “truth,” any
subsequent contrary finding by the Ombudsman would necessarily be suspect as an “untruth;” it is up then
to the Ombudsman to convince the public that its findings are true.
Same; Ombudsman; Faced with the findings of the Commission, the Ombudsman who enters a
contrary ruling effectively carries the burden of proving that its findings, not those of the Commission, are
correct; What the Executive Order (E.O.) patently expresses as a primary role for the Commis-
114

sion is negated in actual application by the title Truth Commission and its truth-telling function.—In
other words, faced with the findings of the Commission, the Ombudsman who enters a contrary ruling
effectively carries the burden of proving that its findings, not those of the Commission, are correct. To say
the least, this resulting reversal of roles is legally strange since the Ombudsman is the body officially
established and designated by the Constitution to investigate graft and other crimes committed by public
officers, while the Commission is a mere “creation” of the Executive Order. The Ombudsman, too, by
statutory mandate has primary jurisdiction over the investigation and prosecution of graft and corruption,
while the Commission’s role is merely recommendatory. Thus, what the EO patently expresses as a
primary role for the Commission is negated in actual application by the title Truth Commission and
its truth-telling function. Expressed in terms of the forums the EO spawned, the EO’s principal intent to
use the Truth Commission as a second forum instrument is unmasked; the first forum—the officially
sanctioned forum for the prosecution of crimes—becomes merely a convenient cover for the second
forum.
Same; Even the Supreme Court will be perceived to have sided with an “untruth” when and if it goes
against the Commission’s report.—The effects of truth-telling could go beyond those that affect the
Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman concurs with the Commission and brings the recommended graft and
corruption charges before the Sandiganbayan—a constitutionally-established court—this court itself would
be subject to the same truth-telling challenge if it decides to acquit the accused. For that matter, even this
Court, will be perceived to have sided with an “untruth” when and if it goes against the Commission’s
report. Thus, the authority, independence, and even the integrity of these constitutional bodies—the
Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan, and the Supreme Court—would have been effectively compromised, to
the prejudice of the justice system. All these, of course, begin with the premise that the Truth Commission
has the mandate to find the “truth,” as it name implies, and has a truth-telling function that it can fully
exercise through its own efforts and through the media.
Same; At the very least, the widely-publicized conclusions of the Truth Commission shall serve as a
mechanism for “priming” the public, even the Ombudsman and the courts, to the Commission’s way of
thinking.—The present Truth Commission operating under the terms of the EO, however, introduces a new
twist that the public and the country have not met before. For the first time, a Truth Commission, tasked
with a truth-telling function, shall speak on the “truth” of what acts of graft and corruption were actually com-
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mitted and who the guilty parties are. This official communication from a governmental body—the
Truth Commission—whose express mandate is to find and “tell the truth” cannot but make a difference in
the public perception. At the very least, the widely-publicized conclusions of the Truth Commission shall
serve as a mechanism for “priming” the public, even the Ombudsman and the courts, to the
Commission’s way of thinking. Pervasively repeated as an official government pronouncement, the
Commission’s influence can go beyond the level of priming and can affect the public environment
as well as the thinking of both the decision makers in the criminal justice system and the public in
general. Otherwise stated, the Commission’s publicly announced conclusions cannot but assume the
appearance of truth once they penetrate and effectively color the public’s perception, through repetition
without significant contradiction as official government findings. These conclusions thus graduate to the
level of “truth” in self-fulfillment of the name the Commission bears; the subtle manipulation of the
Commission’s name and functions, fades in the background or simply becomes explainable incidents that
cannot defeat the accepted truth.
Same; To be sure, the shortcut to the emergence of truth, fashioned under the terms of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 1, finds no justification after the 1987 Constitution and its rights, freedoms and guarantees
have been fully put in place.—In the context of the EO, the Executive can investigate within the limits of its
legal parameters and can likewise publicize the results of its investigations to the full limit of allowable
transparency. But in so doing, it cannot act as catalyst by labelling the action of the Commission it has
created as officially-sanctioned and authoritative truth-telling before the officially-designated bodies—the
Ombudsman and the courts—have spoken. While the emergence of truth is a basic and necessary
component of the justice system, the truth-seeking and truth-finding processes cannot be speeded up
through steps that shortcut and bypass processes established by the Constitution and the laws. As
heretofore mentioned, the international experiences that gave rise to the title Truth Commission were
transitional situations where, for peculiar reasons (such as the temporary absence of an established judicial
system or the need to speed up the transition to democratic rule), the use of ad hoc commissions were
called for. In the Philippine setting, the closest similar situation would be the immediate aftermath of the
1986 EDSA Revolution as the country struggled in the transition from authoritarian martial law regime into
a full-fledged democracy. To be sure, the shortcut to the emergence of truth, fashioned under the
terms of EO 1, finds no justification after the 1987 Constitution and its rights, freedoms and
guarantees have been fully put in place.116

Same; Ombudsman; The extrajudicial intervention of the Commission, as provided in the Executive
Order (E.O.), even for the avowed purpose of “assisting” the Ombudsman, directly disrupts the established
order, as the Constitution and the law do not envision a situation where fact-finding recommendations,
already labelled as “true,” would be submitted to the Ombudsman by an entity within the Executive
branch.—The extrajudicial intervention of the Commission, as provided in the EO, even for the avowed
purpose of “assisting” the Ombudsman, directly disrupts the established order, as the Constitution and the
law do not envision a situation where fact-finding recommendations, already labelled as “true,” would be
submitted to the Ombudsman by an entity within the Executive branch. This arrangement is simply not
within the dispensation of justice scheme, as the determination of whether probable cause exists cannot
be defeated, rendered suspect, or otherwise eroded by any prior process whose results are represented to
be the “truth” of the alleged criminal acts. The Ombudsman may be bound by the findings of a court,
particularly those of this Court, but not of any other body, most especially a body outside the regular criminal
justice system. Neither can the strictly judicial aspect of the justice system be saddled with this type of fact-
finding, as the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused lies strictly and solely with the courts.
Nor can the EO cloak its intent of undercutting the authority of the designated authorities to rule on the
merits of the alleged graft and corruption through a statement that its findings are recommendatory; as has
been discussed above, this express provision is negated in actual application by the title Truth Commission
and its truth-telling function.
Same; Once the door is opened to the Truth Commission approach and public opinion enters as a
consideration in the judicial handling of criminal cases, then the rules of judging would have effectively
changed—reliance on the law, the rules and jurisprudence would have been weakened to the extent that
judges are on the lookout, not only for what the law and the rules say, but also for what the public feels
about the case; The primacy of public opinion may, without doubt, appeal to some but this is simply not the
way of a Judiciary constitutionally-designed to follow the rule of law.—Because of truth-telling and its
consequence of actively bringing in public opinion as a consideration, standards and usages other than
those strictly laid down or allowed by the Constitution, by the laws and by the Rules of Court will play a part
in the criminal justice system. For example, public comments on the merits of cases that are still sub
judice may become rampant as comments on a truth commission’s findings, not on the cases pending
before the courts. The commission’s “truthful” findings, made without respect for the rules on evidence
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and the rights of the accused, would become the standards of public perception of and reaction to
cases, not the evidence as found by the courts based on the rules of evidence. Once the door is opened to
the Truth Commission approach and public opinion enters as a consideration in the judicial handling of
criminal cases, then the rules of judging would have effectively changed; reliance on the law, the rules and
jurisprudence would have been weakened to the extent that judges are on the lookout, not only for what
the law and the rules say, but also for what the public feels about the case. In this eventuality, even a noisy
minority can change the course of a case simply because of their noise and the media attention they get.
(Such tactics have been attempted in the immediate past where pressure has been brought to bear on this
Court through street demonstrations bordering on anarchy, the marshalling of opinions locally and
internationally, and highly partisan media comments.) The primacy of public opinion may, without doubt,
appeal to some but this is simply not the way of a Judiciary constitutionally-designed to follow the rule of
law.
Same; Presidency; Separation of Powers; The President of the Philippines, through an executive or
administrative order and without authority of law, cannot introduce changes or innovations into the justice
system and significantly water down the authoritative power of the courts and of duly designated
constitutional bodies in dispensing justice.—To be sure, the President of the Philippines, through an
executive or administrative order and without authority of law, cannot introduce changes or innovations into
the justice system and significantly water down the authoritative power of the courts and of duly designated
constitutional bodies in dispensing justice. The nobility of the President’s intentions is not enough to render
his act legal. As has been said often enough, ours is a government of laws, not of men.
Same; Ombudsman; The independence of the Ombudsman and its freedom from interference from
all other departments of government in the performance of its functions is a barrier that cannot be breached,
directly or indirectly, except only as the Constitution and the laws may allow.—While the Executive
participates in the dispensation of justice under our constitutional and statutory system through its
investigatory and prosecutory arms and has every authority in law to ensure that the law is enforced and
that violators are prosecuted, even these powers have limits. The independence of the Ombudsman and
its freedom from interference from all other departments of government in the performance of its functions
is a barrier that cannot be breached, directly or indirectly, except only as the Constitution and the laws may
allow. No such exception has been allowed or given to the President
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other than through the prosecution the Department of Justice may undertake when the Ombudsman
has not asserted its primary jurisdiction. The concurrent jurisdiction given to the Department of Justice to
prosecute criminal cases, incidentally, is a grant specific to that office, not to any other office that the
Executive may create through an executive order.
Same; Presidency; Separation of Powers; While under his broad powers to execute the laws the
President can undoubtedly create ad hoc bodies for purposes of investigating reported crimes, he, however,
has to observe the limits imposed on him by the constitutional plan: he must respect the separation of
powers and the independence of other bodies which have their own constitutional and statutory
mandates.—Under his broad powers to execute the laws, the President can undoubtedly create ad
hoc bodies for purposes of investigating reported crimes. The President, however, has to observe the limits
imposed on him by the constitutional plan: he must respect the separation of powers and the independence
of other bodies which have their own constitutional and statutory mandates, as discussed above. Contrary
to what J. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura claims in his Dissent, the President cannot claim the right to create
a public office in the course of implementing the law, as this power lodged exclusively in Congress. An
investigating body, furthermore, must operate within the Executive branch; the President cannot create an
office outside the Executive department.
Same; Same; The President cannot create an office within the Executive branch that is independent
of his control—under the constitutional plan, the creation of this kind of office with this kind of independence
is lodged only in the Legislature.—All these necessarily lead to the question: can the President really create
an office within the Executive branch that is independent of his control? The short answer is he cannot, and
the short reason again is the constitutional plan. The execution and implementation of the laws have been
placed by the Constitution on the shoulders of the President and on none other. He cannot delegate his
executive powers to any person or entity outside the Executive department except by authority of the
Constitution or the law (which authority in this case he does not have), nor can he delegate his authority to
undertake fact-finding as an incident of his executive power, and at the same time take the position that he
has no responsibility for the fact-finding because it is independent of him and his office. Under the
constitutional plan, the creation of this kind of office with this kind of independence is lodged only in the
Legislature. For example, it is only the Legislature which can create a body like the National Labor Relations
Commission whose decisions are final and are neither appealable to the President nor to his alter
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ego, the Secretary of Labor. Yet another example, President Corazon Aquino herself, because the
creation of an independent commission was outside her executive powers, deemed it necessary to act
pursuant to a legislative fiat in constituting the first Davide Commission of 1989.
Same; Truth-telling as envisioned under the Executive Order (E.O.), carries prejudicial effects on the
persons it immediately targets, namely, the officials, employees and private individuals alleged to have
committed graft and corruption during the previous administration.—Separately from the above effects,
truth-telling as envisioned under the EO, carries prejudicial effects on the persons it immediately targets,
namely: the officials, employees and private individuals alleged to have committed graft and corruption
during the previous administration. This consequence proceeds from the above discussed truth-telling
premise that—whether the Commission reports (recommending the charging of specific individuals) are
proven or not in the appropriate courts—the Commission’s function of truth-telling function would have been
served and the Commission would have effectively acted against the charged individuals. The most obvious
prejudicial effect of the truth-telling function on the persons investigated is on their persons, reputation and
property. Simply being singled out as “charged” in a truth-telling report will inevitably mean disturbance of
one’s routines, activities and relationships; the preparation for a defense that will cost money, time and
energy; changes in personal, job and business relationships with others; and adverse effects on jobs and
businesses. Worse, reputations can forever be tarnished after one is labelled as a participant in massive
graft and corruption.
Same; Judicial Review; Evidence is hardly necessary where the prejudicial effects are self-evident,
i.e., given that the announced and undisputed government position that truth-telling per se, in the manner
envisioned by the Executive Order (E.O.) and its implementing rules, is an independent objective the
government wants to achieve; In testing the validity of a government act or statute, such potential for harm
suffices to invalidate the challenged act—evidence of actual harm is not necessary in the way it is necessary
for a criminal conviction or to justify an award for damages.—These prejudicial effects may be dismissed
as speculative arguments that are not justified by any supporting evidence and, hence, cannot effectively
be cited as factual basis for the invalidity of the EO. Evidence, however, is hardly necessary where the
prejudicial effects are self-evident, i.e., given that the announced and undisputed government position that
truth-telling per se, in the manner envisioned by the EO and its implementing rules, is an independent
objective the gov-
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ernment wants to achieve. When the government itself has been heard on the “truth,” the probability
of prejudice for the individual charged is not only a likelihood; it approaches the level of certainty. In testing
the validity of a government act or statute, such potential for harm suffices to invalidate the challenged act;
evidence of actual harm is not necessary in the way it is necessary for a criminal conviction or to justify an
award for damages. In plainer terms, the certainty of consequent damage requires no evidence or further
reasoning when the government itself declares that for as long as the “story” of the allegedly massive graft
and corruption during the past administration is told, the Commission would have fulfilled one of its functions
to satisfaction; under this reckless approach, it is self-evident that the mistaken object of the “truth” told
must necessarily suffer.
Same; Due Process; Presumption of Innocence; When the Commission’s report itself is characterized,
prior to trial, and held out by the government to be the true story of the graft and corruption charged, the
chances of individuals to have a fair trial in a subsequent criminal case cannot be very great; The
presumption of innocence in law cannot serve an accused in a biased atmosphere pointing to guilt in fact
because the government and public opinion have spoken against the accused.—The essence of the due
process guarantee in a criminal case, as provided under Section 14(1) of the Constitution, is the right to a
fair trial. What is fair depends on compliance with the express guarantees of the Constitution, and on the
circumstances of each case. When the Commission’s report itself is characterized, prior to trial, and held
out by the government to be the true story of the graft and corruption charged, the chances of individuals
to have a fair trial in a subsequent criminal case cannot be very great. Consider on this point that not even
the main actors in the criminal justice system—the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan and even this Court—
can avoid the cloud of “untruth” and a doubtful taint in their integrity after the government has publicized
the Commission’s findings as the truth. If the rulings of these constitutional bodies themselves can be
suspect, individual defenses for sure cannot rise any higher. Where the government simply wants to tell its
story, already labelled as true, well ahead of any court proceedings, and judicial notice is taken of the kind
of publicity and the ferment in public opinion that news of government scandals generate, it does not require
a leap of faith to conclude that an accused brought to court against overwhelming public opinion starts his
case with a less than equal chance of acquittal. The presumption of innocence notwithstanding, the
playing field cannot but be uneven in a criminal trial when the accused enters trial with a government-
sponsored badge of guilt on his forehead. The presumption of innocence in law cannot serve an
accused in a biased
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atmosphere pointing to guilt in fact because the government and public opinion have spoken
against the accused.
Same; Same; Standards of Review; “Fundamental rights” whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution; In the present case, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 infringes the personal due process rights of
the investigated persons, as well as their constitutional right to a fair trial.—“Fundamental rights” whose
infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. Justice Carpio-Morales, although in dissent in Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, elaborated on this point when she said: “Most
fundamental rights cases decided in the United States require equal protection analysis because these
cases would involve a review of statutes which classify persons and impose differing restrictions on the
ability of a certain class of persons to exercise a fundamental right. Fundamental rights include only
those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. And precisely
because these statutes affect fundamental liberties, any experiment involving basic freedoms
which the legislature conducts must be critically examined under the lens of Strict
Scrutiny. Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation, the
right to marry, the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms such as free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.” [Emphasis
supplied] In the present case, as shown by the previously cited grounds for the EO’s invalidity, EO No. 1
infringes the personal due process rights of the investigated persons, as well as their constitutional
right to a fair trial. Indisputably, both these rights—one of them guaranteed under Section 1, Article III,
and under Section 14 of the same Article—are, by jurisprudential definition, fundamental rights. With these
infringements, the question now thus shifts to the application of the strict scrutiny test—an exercise not
novel in this jurisdiction.
Same; In the absence of any specific guiding principle or directive, indicative of its rationale, the
conclusion is unavoidable that the Executive Order (E.O.) carries no special compelling reason to single
out officials of the previous administration—what is important is that the graft be attributed to the previous
administration.—If the EO’s terms are to be the yardstick, the basis for the separate focus is the “extent
and magnitude” of the reported graft and corruption which “shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibili-
122

ties of the people.” What this “extent and magnitude” is or what specific incidents of massive graft are
referred to, however, have been left vague. Likewise, no explanation has been given on why special
measures—i.e., the special focus on the targeted officials, the creation of a new office, and the grant of
truth-telling authority—have been taken. Effectively, by acting as he did, the President simply gave the
Commission the license to an open hunting season to tell the “truth” against the previous administration;
the Commission can investigate an alleged single billion-peso scam, as well as transactions during the past
administration that, collectively, may reach the same amount. Only the Commission, in its wisdom, is to
judge what allegations or reports of graft and corruption to cover for as long as these were during the past
administration. In the absence of any specific guiding principle or directive, indicative of its rationale, the
conclusion is unavoidable that the EO carries no special compelling reason to single out officials of the
previous administration; what is important is that the graft be attributed to the previous administration. In
other words, the real reason for the EO’s focus lies elsewhere, not necessarily in the nature or extent of the
matters to be investigated.
PERALTA, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; Public Office; The Truth Commission was not created in the nature of
the previous ad hoc investigating/fact-finding bodies—it was created more in the nature of a public office.—
The President has the power to create ad hoc committees to investigate or inquire into matters for the
guidance of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, I am of the view that the Truth
Commission was not created in the nature of the aforementioned ad hoc investigating/fact-finding bodies.
The Truth Commission was created more in the nature of a public office. Based on the creation of ad
hoc investigating bodies in Department of Health v. Camposano and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the members of an ad hoc investigative body are heads and
representatives of existing government offices, depending on the nature of the subject matter of the
investigation. The ad hoc investigating body’s functions are primarily fact-finding/investigative and
recommendatory in nature. In this case, the members of the Truth Commission are not officials from existing
government offices.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; There is no substantial distinction cited between public officers who
may be involved in reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration and public
officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft and corruption during prior administra-
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tions in relation to the purpose of ending graft and corruption.—The distinctions cited by the OSG are
not substantial to separate the previous administration as a distinct class from prior administrations as
subject matter for investigation for the purpose of ending graft and corruption. As stated by
the ponencia, the reports of widespread corruption in the previous administration cannot be taken as a
substantial distinction, since similar reports have been made in earlier administrations. Moreover, a valid
classification must rest upon material differences between the persons, or activities or thing included and
excluded. Reasonable grounds must exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class
and those who do not. There is no substantial distinction cited between public officers who may be involved
in reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration and public officers who may be
involved in reported cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations in relation to the purpose of
ending graft and corruption. To limit the investigation to public officers of the previous administration is
violative of the equal protection clause.
BERSAMIN, J., Separate Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; Public Office; Separation of Powers; The power to create a public office
is essentially legislative, and, therefore, it belongs to Congress.—A public office may be created only
through any of the following modes, namely: (a) by the Constitution; or (b) by statute enacted by Congress;
or (c) by authority of law (through a valid delegation of power). The power to create a public office is
essentially legislative, and, therefore, it belongs to Congress. It is not shared by Congress with the
President, until and unless Congress enacts legislation that delegates a part of the power to the President,
or any other officer or agency.
Same; Same; The Truth Commission has not existed before Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1 gave it life
on 30 July 2010—it is a new office; If the Truth Commission is an entirely new office, then it is not the result
of any reorganization undertaken pursuant to Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of the Administrative Code
of 1987.—The Truth Commission has not existed before E.O. No. 1 gave it life on July 30, 2010. Without a
doubt, it is a new office, something we come to know from the plain words of Section 1 of E.O. No. 1 itself,
to wit: “Section 1. Creation of a Commission.—There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION”, which shall primarily seek and find the truth
on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock
and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, com-
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mitted by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action
or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an
independent collegial body.” If the Truth Commission is an entirely new office, then it is not the result of any
reorganization undertaken pursuant to Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Thus, the contention of the Solicitor General is absolutely unwarranted.
Same; Ombudsman; The Truth Commission replicates and usurps the duties and functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman.—I find that the Truth Commission replicates and usurps the duties and functions
of the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the Truth Commission is superfluous and may erode the public
trust and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman.
ABAD, J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
Equal Protection Clause; As an element of due process, the equal protection clause bars arbitrary
discrimination in favor of or against a class whether in what the law provides and how it is enforced.—The
idea behind the “equal protection clause” is that public authorities should treat all persons or things equally
in terms of rights granted to and responsibilities imposed on them. As an element of due process, the equal
protection clause bars arbitrary discrimination in favor of or against a class whether in what the law provides
and how it is enforced.
Same; It would be just as unfair and discriminatory if people who hardly share anything in common
are grouped together and treated similarly.—But it would be just as unfair and discriminatory if people who
hardly share anything in common are grouped together and treated similarly. The equal protection clause
is not violated by a law that applies only to persons falling within a specified class, if such law applies equally
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who
fall within it and those who do not.
Same; Time differentiation should not be so easily dismissed as superficial.—The majority holds that
picking on the “previous administration” and not the others before it makes the Commission’s investigation
an “adventure in partisan hostility.” To be fair, said the majority, the search for truth must include corrupt
acts not only during the previous administration but also
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during the administrations before it where the “same magnitude of controversies and anomalies” has
been reported. The majority points out that corruption in the previous administration and corruption in the
administrations before it have no substantial difference. And what difference they have, the majority adds,
is not relevant to the purpose of Executive Order 1, which is to uncover corrupt acts and recommend their
punishment. Superficial difference like the difference in time in this case does not make for a valid
classification. But time differentiation should not be so easily dismissed as superficial. The world in which
people live has two great dimensions: the dimension of space and the dimension of time. Nobody can say
that the difference in time between two acts or events makes for a superficial difference. Such difference is
the substance of human existence.
Same; Recognizing the irreversibility of time is indispensable to every sound decision that people
make in their lives everyday.—Recognizing the irreversibility of time is indispensable to every sound
decision that people make in their lives everyday, like not combing the hair that is no longer there. In time,
parents let their married children leave to make their own homes. Also, when a loved one passes away, he
who is left must know that he cannot bring back the time that is gone. He is wise to move on with his life
after some period of mourning. To deny the truth that the difference in time makes for substantial difference
in human lives is to deny the idea of transition from growth to decay, from life to death, and from relevant
to irrelevant.
Same; Time erodes the evidence of the past.—Time erodes the evidence of the past. The likelihood
of finding evidence needed for conviction diminishes with the march of time. Witnesses, like everyone else,
have short memories. And they become scarce, working overseas, migrating, changing addresses, or just
passing away. Official or private documents needed as evidence are easily overwhelmed by the demand
to file and keep even more documents generated by new activities and transactions. Thus, old documents
are stored away in basements, garages, or corridors, and eventually lost track of, misplaced, or simply
destroyed, whether intentionally or not. In a government that is notorious for throwing away or mishandling
old records, searching for a piece of document after ten years would be uncertain, tedious, long, and costly.
Philippine Truth Commission; Limiting the Truth Commission’s investigation to the 9 years of the
previous administration gives it the best chance of yielding the required proof needed for successful action
against the offenders.—It would be a waste of effort and time to scour all of 66 years of the administrations
before the last, looking for evidence that would produce
126

conviction. Time has blurred the chance of success. Limiting the Truth Commission’s investigation to
the 9 years of the previous administration gives it the best chance of yielding the required proof needed for
successful action against the offenders.
Same; You cannot order five men to pull a train that a thousand men cannot move.—The Truth
Commission is a collegial body of just five members with no budget or permanent staffs of its own. It simply
would not have the time and resources for examining hundreds if not thousands of anomalous government
contracts that may have been entered into in the past 75 years up to the time of President Quezon. You
cannot order five men to pull a train that a thousand men cannot move.
Same; Directing the investigation of reported corrupt acts committed during the previous
administration is consistent with good housekeeping.—Directing the investigation of reported corrupt acts
committed during the previous administration is, as the Solicitor General pointed out, consistent with good
housekeeping. For example, a new treasurer would be prudent to ensure that the former treasurer he
succeeds has balanced his accounts and submitted himself to a closing audit even after the new treasurer
has taken over. This prevents the latter having to unfairly assume the liabilities of his predecessor for
shortages in the cash box. Of course, the new treasurer is not required to look farther into the accounts of
the earlier treasurers.
Same; Presidency; Since, as the majority concedes, the creation of the Truth Commission is within
the constitutional powers of the President to undertake, then to him, not to the Court, belongs the discretion
to define the limits of the investigation as he deems fit.—That is the first point. The second point is that the
Court needs to stand within the limits of its power to review the actions of a co-equal branch, like those of
the President, within the sphere of its constitutional authority. Since, as the majority concedes, the creation
of the Truth Commission is within the constitutional powers of President P-Noy to undertake, then to him,
not to the Court, belongs the discretion to define the limits of the investigation as he deems fit. The Court
cannot pit its judgment against the judgment of the President in such matter.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; To act capriciously and whimsically is to act freakishly, abruptly,
or erratically, like laughing one moment and crying the next without apparent reason.—And when can the
Supreme Court interfere with the exercise of that discretion? The answer is, as provided in Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, only when the President gravely abuses his exercise of such discretion. This
means that, in restricting
127
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 7, 2010 127

the Truth Commission’s investigation only to corruptions committed during the previous
administration, he acted capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic manner. To act
capriciously and whimsically is to act freakishly, abruptly, or erratically, like laughing one moment and crying
the next without apparent reason. Does this characterize the President’s action in this case, considering
that he merely acted to set a feasible target, neutralize political bias, assign the Commission a task suitable
to its limited capacity, and observe correct housekeeping procedures? Did he act arbitrarily in the manner
of little children changing the rules of the game in the middle of the play or despotically in the manner of a
dictator? Unless he did, the Court must rein in its horses. It cannot itself exceed the limits of its power of
review under the Constitution.
PEREZ, J., Separate Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; Ombudsman; In light of the constitutionally declared and amply
underscored independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, which declaration is winnowed wisdom from
the experienced inherent defects of presidential creations, so real and true that the Ombudsman’s
constitutionalization was adopted to completion even if from the charter of an overthrown regime, Executive
Order No. 1 cannot pass the present constitutional test.—In light of the constitutionally declared and amply
underscored independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, which declaration is winnowed wisdom from
the experienced inherent defects of presidential creations, so real and true that the Ombudsman’s
constitutionalization was adopted to completion even if from the charter of an overthrown regime, Executive
Order No. 1 cannot pass the present constitutional test. Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional precisely
because it was issued by the President. As articulated by Commissioner Colayco of the Commission that
resurrected the Ombudsman, “our proposal is to constitutionalize the office so that it cannot be touched by
the Presidents as they come and go.” And as this Court stated, repeating the observation regarding the
erstwhile presidential anti-graft commissions, such commissions failed to realize their objective because
they did not enjoy the political independence necessary for the effective performance of a government critic.
Same; Same; The Philippine Truth Commission is a defiance of the constitutional wisdom that
established the politically independent Ombudsman.—The Philippine Truth Commission is a defiance of
the constitutional wisdom that established the politically independent Ombudsman for one of its reasons for
being is the very campaign battlecry of the President “kung
128

walang corrupt, walang mahirap.” Not that there is anything wrong with the political slogan. What is
wrong is the pursuit of the pledge outside the limits of the Constitution. What is wrong is the creation by the
President himself of an Ombudsman-like body while there stands established an Ombudsman,
constitutionally created especially because of unsuccessful presidential antecedents, and thus made
independent from presidential prerogative.
Same; Same; Constitutional history, specific constitutional provisions, jurisprudence and current
statute combine to say that after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987, no body can be given “by law”
any of the powers, functions and duties already conferred on the Ombudsman by Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution.—Constitutional history, specific constitutional provisions, jurisprudence and current
statute combine to say that after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987, no body can be given “by law”
any of the powers, functions and duties already conferred on the Ombudsman by Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution. As already shown, the Truth Commission insofar as concerns the mentioned third level
officers or higher of the previous administration appropriates, not just one but virtually, all of the powers
constitutionally enumerated for the Ombudsman. The violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 13 of
Article XI of the Constitution is evident.
Same; Same; Executive Order No. 1 itself pronounces that what it empowers the Philippine Truth
Commission with is the authority of preliminary investigation.—Executive Order No. 1 itself pronounces that
what it empowers the Philippine Truth Commission with is the authority of preliminary investigation. Section
2(g) of the executive order states: “Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the
appropriate prosecutional authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all
evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplice
or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable
ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws.” (Underscoring
supplied.) Investigation to find reasonable ground to believe “that they are liable for graft and corruption
under applicable laws” is preliminary investigation as defined in Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which states: “Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required.—Preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.”129
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 7, 2010 129

Same; Same; In the case of the Philippine Truth Commission, the Ombudsman not only shares its
constitutional power but, over and above this, it is divested of any and all investigatory power because the
Philippine Truth Commission’s finding of “reasonable ground” is final and unreviewable and is turned over
to the Ombudsman solely for “expeditious prosecution.”—In other words, under existing Rule which follows
the statutorily defined primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman in obeisance to the constitutional conferment
of authority, the Ombudsman reviews and may reverse or modify the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. In the case of the Philippine Truth Commission, the Ombudsman not only shares its
constitutional power but, over and above this, it is divested of any and all investigatory power because the
Philippine Truth Commission’s finding of “reasonable ground” is final and unreviewable and is turned over
to the Ombudsman solely for “expeditious prosecution.”
Same; Same; Fact gathering, fact finding, indeed truth finding is, as much as investigation as
preliminary investigation, also constitutionally conferred on the Ombudsman.—Fact gathering as basis for
preliminary investigation and not as preliminary investigation itself and basis for prosecution, is, seemingly,
the function respondents want to attribute to the Philippine Truth Commission to escape the obvious
unconstitutional conferment of Ombudsman power. That is no route out of the bind. Fact gathering, fact
finding, indeed truth finding is, as much as investigation as preliminary investigation, also constitutionally
conferred on the Ombudsman. Section 12 of Article XI states: “Section 12. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.”
SERENO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Philippine Truth Commission; Equal Protection Clause; Public Officers; The majority Decision defeats
the constitutional mandate on public accountability—it effectively tolerates impunity for graft and corruption,
and its invocation of the constitutional clause on equal protection of the laws is an unwarranted misuse of
the same and is a disservice to those classes of people for whom the constitutional guarantee was created
as a succor.—The majority Decision defeats the constitutional mandate on public accountability; it
effectively tolerates impunity for graft and corruption. Its invocation of the constitutional clause on equal
protection of the laws is an unwarranted misuse of
130

the same and is a disservice to those classes of people for whom the constitutional guarantee was
created as a succor. The majority Decision accomplished this by completely disregarding “reasonableness”
and all its jurisprudential history as constitutional justification for classification and by replacing the analytical
test of reasonableness with mere recitations of general case doctrines to arrive at its forced conclusion. By
denying the right of the President to classify persons in Executive Order No. (EO) 1 even if the classification
is founded on reason, the Decision has impermissibly infringed on the constitutional powers of the
President. It wafts the smell of hope onto the air towards those who seek the affirmance of EO 1 by saying:
“... [T]his is not a death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration.
Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow
it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution... but the scent of hope, as
will be demonstrated, is that which emanates from a red herring. Since Ferdinand Marcos’s presidency, no
Court has stifled the powers of the Philippine presidency as has this Court through the majority Decision.
Same; Same; Prioritization per se is not classification.—At the outset, it must be emphasized that EO
1 did not, for purposes of application of the laws on graft and corruption, create two classes—that of
President Arroyo and that of other past administrations. Rather, it prioritized fact-finding on the
administration of President Arroyo while saying that the President could later expand the coverage of EO 1
to bring other past administrations under the same scrutiny. Prioritization per se is not classification. Else,
as all human activities require prioritization, everyone in a priority list for regulation or investigation can
make out a case that there is prima facie classification, and that the prioritization is not supported by a
reasonable objective. All acts of government would have to come to a halt and all public offices would need
to justify every plan of action as to reasonableness of phases and prioritization. The step-by-step approach
of legislative and regulatory remedies—recognized as valid in Quinto v. COMELEC and in the case law
cited by the Decision—in essence says that prioritization is not classification, much less invalid
classification.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; A judicial analysis must not stop at reciting legal doctrines which are
its mere beginning points, but, especially in equal protection claims, it must move forward to examine the
facts and the context of the controversy.—A judicial analysis must not stop at reciting legal doctrines which
are its mere beginning points, but, especially in equal protection claims, it must move forward to examine
the facts and the context of the
131
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 7, 2010 131

controversy. Had the majority taken pains to examine its own cited cases, it would have discovered
that the cases, far from condemning EO 1, would actually support the constitutionality of the latter.
Same; Same; Fact-finding or investigation can only begin by identifying the phenomenon, event or
matter that is to be investigated.—Fact-finding or investigation can only begin by identifying the
phenomenon, event or matter that is to be investigated. Then it can only proceed if the fact-finder, or the
authority under whom he works, identifies or selects the persons to be investigated.
Same; Same; To support a claim of selective prosecution, a defendant must establish a violation of
equal protection and show that the prosecution (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.—Although such discretion is broad, it is not without limit. In order to constitute
denial of equal protection, selective enforcement must be deliberately based on unjustifiable or arbitrary
classification; the mere failure to prosecute all offenders is no ground for the claim of a denial of equal
protection. To support a claim of selective prosecution, a defendant must establish a violation of equal
protection and show that the prosecution (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) was motivated by
a discriminatory purpose. First, he must show that “he has been singled out for prosecution while other
similarly situated generally have not been proceeded against for the type of conduct forming the basis of
the charge against him.” Second, he must prove that his selection for prosecution was invidious or in bad
faith and was “based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the desire to prevent
the exercise of constitutional rights.” In American constitutional history, it is the traditionally oppressed—
racial or religious minorities and the politically disenfranchised—who have succeeded in making a case of
unequal protection when their prejudiced status is shown to be the principal invidious or bad faith
consideration for the selective prosecution. The standard for demonstrating selective prosecution therefore
is demanding: a “presumption of regularity supports prosecutorial decisions and in the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official functions.”
Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; The fact that other administrations are not the subject of the
Philippine Truth Commission’s (PTC’s) investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that violates
equal protection—the Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal prosecution and enjoys clear
presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof; The presumption of good faith must
be observed, especially when the
132

action taken is pursuant to a constitutionally enshrined state policy such as the taking of positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption.—In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are
not the subject of the PTC’s investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that violates equal
protection. The Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal prosecution and enjoys clear
presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof. For petitioners to overcome that
presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a preliminary step to selective
prosecution, and that it is laden with a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. However,
petitioner has sorely failed in discharging that burden. The presumption of good faith must be observed,
especially when the action taken is pursuant to a constitutionally enshrined state policy such as the taking
of positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. For this purpose, the President created the
PTC. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the Court must uphold the
classification, as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.
Same; Same; To strike down the Philippine Truth Commission’s (PTC’s) mandate to investigate the
previous administration simply because other administrations are not immediately included is tantamount
to saying that a police investigation of a recent murder case is violative of equal protection because there
are other prior yet equally heinous murders that remain uninvestigated and unsolved by the police.—EO 1
activities are at most initiatory investigations. There is no preliminary investigation – much less prosecution
– to be conducted under the auspices of EO 1. The PTC is tasked to “collect, receive, review and evaluate
evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption,” tasks that constitutes nothing more
than a general inquiry into such reported cases in the previous administration. Similar to an initiatory police
investigation, the PTC is tasked with general fact-finding to uncover the truth of the events pertaining to an
alleged unsolved crime. To strike down the PTC’s mandate to investigate the previous administration simply
because other administrations are not immediately included is tantamount to saying that a police
investigation of a recent murder case is violative of equal protection because there are other prior yet
equally heinous murders that remain uninvestigated and unsolved by the police.
Same; Same; What renders the plaint regarding an alleged violation of the equal protection clause
ridiculous is that it is being raised at the inception stage for the determination of possible criminal liability,
where threat to liberty is most absent.—What renders the plaint regarding an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause ridiculous is that it is being raised at the incep-
133
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 7, 2010 133

tion stage for the determination of possible criminal liability, where threat to liberty is most absent. In
contrast, with respect to petitions to stop later and more freedom-threatening stages in the determination
of criminal liability such as in formal criminal investigations and prosecutions, Philippine courts instinctively
reject the defense of a suspect or accused that the investigation is illegitimate because others who may
have also violated the relevant rule, are not being investigated. In Gallardo v. People, 456 SCRA 494
(2005), the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the equal protection clause when the
Ombudsman recommended the filing of an information against a public officer, even if it had previously
dismissed sixteen (16) other cases of similar factual circumstances:
Same; Official acknowledgment of the truth is extremely powerful in the healing process, especially in
an atmosphere previously dominated by official denial.—Truth commissions operate on the premise that
the truth – if faced squarely, documented thoroughly, and acknowledged officially – will reduce the likelihood
that a repetition of government abuses will recur in the future. Official acknowledgment of the truth is
extremely powerful in the healing process, especially in an atmosphere previously dominated by official
denial. Aside from their cathartic value, truth commissions like the PTC can be useful in uncovering the
causes and patterns that led to such corruption, if it indeed existed, so that it may be prevented in the future.
The absence of any form of accountability for public officials’ past misconduct of a grave nature and massive
scale will promote a culture of impunity. If the present administration does not demonstrate that it can hold
accountable persons who committed acts of corruption, such inability may be interpreted as a “license to
engage in further acts of corruption” and embolden public officials to steal from the government coffers
more often and in greater quantity.
Same; By ignoring the Filipino public’s experience as a witness to the frustration of attempts to hold
the past administration accountable for its reported misdeeds, and framing it instead as a group that stands
ready to convict past officials at the bar of public opinion, the Concurring Opinion of Justice Brion turns
social reality on its head. It minimizes the status of the Filipino people as a group wronged by the imbalance
of power and the betrayal of public trust.—By ignoring the Filipino public’s experience as a witness to the
frustration of attempts to hold the past administration accountable for its reported misdeeds, and framing it
instead as a group that stands ready to convict past officials at the bar of public opinion, the Concurring
Opinion turns social reality on its head. It minimizes the status of the Filipino people as a group wronged
by the imbalance of power and the betrayal of public trust. It ignores the need of this group to see these
rectified. It ascribes
134

an excess of strength to public opinion and grounds its logic on fear of the public acting as an angry
mob. It does not attribute the proper importance to the active, participatory role the Filipino people desire
to take in the process of dealing with the possible misdeeds of the past.
Same; It does not follow that repetition of information guarantees the acceptance of its veracity—to
make that logical leap in this instance is to insinuate that repetition would rob the Filipino people of the
capacity to make distinctions between what to accept and what to reject; The public does not need
sheltering from the “potentially prejudicial effects of truth-telling.”—Implicit in Justice Brion’s Concurring
Opinion are the roles the public is expected to take: that of passive observer, receiver of information and
susceptible to the branding of “truth” and its repetition; and that of a source of pressure. In the latter role,
the Concurring Opinion envisions the Filipino people, having adjudged guilt according to what it was told
by the PTC and the media, wielding the threat of public disapproval against the Ombudsman and the
judiciary so as to shift the burden to these bodies to demonstrate proof and the basis for their actions if they
were to disagree with the findings of the PTC. This is gross speculation. It does not follow that repetition of
information guarantees the acceptance of its veracity; to make that logical leap in this instance is to
insinuate that repetition would rob the Filipino people of the capacity to make distinctions between what to
accept and what to reject. Neither does it follow that the Ombudsman and the judiciary must inevitably
accede to public clamor, or that the entry of public opinion into the discussion would cause a “qualitative
change in the criminal justice system” and weaken “reliance on the law, the rules and jurisprudence.” The
public does not need sheltering from the “potentially prejudicial effects of truth-telling.” Nor is the public to
be viewed as unwitting victims to “a noisy minority [who] can change the course of a case simply because
of their noise and the media attention they get.” The Filipino people have a genuine stake in the addressing
of abuses possibly committed by the past administration and are entitled to information on the same.
Same; To declare the Filipino public undeserving of the truth on the grounds of its supposed lack of
capacity to deal with the truth and its alleged susceptibility to the “priming” effect of the Philippine Truth
Commission’s (PTC’s) findings, while ignoring the public’s need to know the truth and to seek redress for
wrongs, is to deny the public the means to move towards social justice.—While it is true that public opinion
will be influenced by the information that the public can access, it would be specious to claim that the
possible turning of the tide of public opinion against those subject to investigation is tantamount to a
conviction before the court of the Filipino people. To
135
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 7, 2010 135
declare the Filipino public undeserving of the truth on the grounds of its supposed lack of capacity to
deal with the truth and its alleged susceptibility to the “priming” effect of the PTC's findings, while ignoring
the public’s need to know the truth and to seek redress for wrongs, is to deny the public the means to move
towards social justice.
Same; State Capture; Words and Phrases; State capture encompasses the state’s “capture” as
evinced in the “formation of laws, rules, and decrees by a wider range of state institutions, including the
executive, ministries and state agencies, legislature, and the judiciary”; State capture alters the “rules of
the game” in favor of those who have captured the state; The fundamental characteristic of state capture is
that it is channeled through illicit, informal, and non-transparent means of providing private gains to public
officials as incentives for these very officials to influence the formation of laws and prejudice the rules to
these captors’ narrow advantage.—This last point regarding situations wherein the former regime still
possesses a certain degree of influence over the system is especially salient in the light of state capture.
According to the World Bank, state capture may be treated as akin in essence to regulatory capture as it is
used in economics literature: state regulatory agencies are considered “captured” when they “regulate
businesses in accordance with the private interests of the regulated as opposed to the public interest for
which they were established.” State capture, then, encompasses the state’s “capture” as evinced in the
“formation of laws, rules, and decrees by a wider range of state institutions, including the executive,
ministries and state agencies, legislature, and the judiciary.” State capture alters the “rules of the game” in
favor of those who have captured the state. While state capture encompasses a variety of situations, its
fundamental characteristic is that it is channeled through illicit, informal, and non-transparent means of
providing private gains to public officials as incentives for these very officials to influence the formation of
laws and prejudice the rules to these captors’ narrow advantage. If public officials are perceived to have
been captured, the credibility of official processes—such as rendering decrees, forming laws, and shaping
policies—will suffer. It is not difficult to see how state capture may render traditional means such as
prosecution completely ineffective against those who may have captured the state.
Same; Equal Protection Clause; Unlawful discrimination, as shown in American cases on equal
protection claims in criminal investigation and prosecution, is not inherently an argument of the powerful,
but that of the traditionally oppressed.—Unlawful discrimination, as shown in American cases on equal
protection claims in criminal investigation and prosecution, is not inherently an argument of the powerful,
but that of the traditionally
136

oppressed. This is because the politically powerful, as in the past administration, still contain all the
advantages that such past formal political power begot. It is the height of incongruity that an administration
that held power for nine years, successfully evaded all congressional investigations, and effectively invoked
all legal defenses from investigation for all those nine years will be extended the same immunity that the
former presidential office gave it. The Philippines will be the laughing stock of the world, incapable of
correcting any error, unable to erase the perception by many that it is a country where the law only serves
the ends of the powerful.
Same; Judicial Review; Invalidating the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is an unconstitutional
denial of the legitimate exercise of executive power and a stinging reproach against the people’s sovereign
right; Rather than exercise judicial restraint, the majority has pushed the boundaries of judicial activism
bordering on what former Chief Justice Puno once described as an imperial judiciary.—If the Court is to
avoid illegitimacy in its actions as suggested by Professor Bickel, then it must ensure that its discharge of
the duty to prevent abuse of the President’s executive power does not translate to striking down as invalid
even a legitimate exercise thereof, especially when the exercise is in keeping with the will of the people.
Invalidating the PTC is an unconstitutional denial of the legitimate exercise of executive power and a
stinging reproach against the people’s sovereign right. Sadly, there is a wide fissure between the public’s
hunger for governance justice through the successful delivery by President Aquino of his promise to get
behind the stories on corruption of the former administration, and the Court’s confirmation of an alleged
violation of former President Arroyo’s equal protection right. To emphasize, it is not even former President
Arroyo who is officially raising this matter before the Court. Rather than exercise judicial restraint, the
majority has pushed the boundaries of judicial activism bordering on what former Chief Justice Puno once
described as an imperial judiciary.
Same; When forgotten, history does have a tendency to repeat itself—unless an official and
comprehensive narrative of findings of fact on large-scale corruption that reportedly occurred during the
previous administration is made public, the country may find the same alleged patterns of corruption
repeating themselves.—When forgotten, history does have a tendency to repeat itself. Unless an official
and comprehensive narrative of findings of fact on large-scale corruption that reportedly occurred during
the previous administration is made public, the country may find the same alleged patterns of corruption
repeating themselves. Worse, public officials subject of the investigation—and who may actually be guilty—
with continued possession or access to power may spin these events and cause a revision of our history
to
137
VOL. 637, DECEMBER 7, 2010 137

make those allegations of wrongdoing appear nothing more than unsubstantiated rumors whispered
in secret and perpetuated by bitter opponents. The PTC is a step towards national healing over a sordid
past. The Court must allow the nation to move forward and the people’s faith in a just and accountable
government to be restored.

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No. L-74457. March 20,1987.

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 661

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 663

G.R. No. 197930

EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G. SEE, Petitioners

G.R. No. 225442. August 8, 2017.*

G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.*

850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851

G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008.*

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 562, AUGUST 14, 2008 253

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 562, AUGUST 14, 2008 255

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 562, AUGUST 14, 2008 257

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 562, AUGUST 14, 2008 259

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 562, AUGUST 14, 2008 261

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 562, AUGUST 14, 2008 265

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 661, DECEMBER 6, 2011 591

592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013.*

G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994.*

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 509

510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 511

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 513

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 235, AUGUST 19, 1994 515

PADILLA, J., Concurring and Dissenting:

VITUG, J., Concurring:

[No. L--2044. August 26, 1949]

1. 2.ID.; ARTICLE VI OP THE CONSTITUTION INTERPRETED.—Article VI of the Constitution

1. 3.PRESIDENT; EMERGENCY POWERS; JUSTIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF.—Emergency,

1. 4.ID. ; LEGISLATURE HAD EESTRICTED THE LIPE OF EMERGENCY POWERS.—In the

1. 5.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; AUTOMATICAL EXTINCTION OF Acr No.

1. 6.ID.; CONTEMPLATED PERIOD FOR ACT No. 671J CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION.—

1. 9.ID.; SYSTEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATION Is PRESERVED FOR

1. 10.JUDGES; DlSQUALIFICATION; MEMBERS OF SlIPREME COURT; OBJECTION SHOULD

1. 11.ID. ; ID. ; MEMBER OF SUPREME COURT FORMERLY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.—The

1. 12.ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; WHO MAY TAKE PART IN THE

1. 14.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EACH OF THE GREAT BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT TO

1. 17.JUDGES; REQUIRED NUMBER OP VOTES TO ANNUL EXECUTIVE ORDERS.—There is

G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.*

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