Municipality of Malabang vs.

Benito, 27 SCRA 533 (1969)

FACTS: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun
Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province.
Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386
of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios 1 of the latter municipality.

The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal
officials from performing the functions of their respective office relying on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor that the
statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities
and that Section 68 of Administrative Code from which E.O 386 is based, is unconstitutional.

Respondent's defense: Pelaez case will not apply. Municipalities in Pelaez were not yet created. In this case, Municipality of
Balabagan already existed; hence, already a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was
declared unconstitutional. As a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into
directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

ISSUE: 1) WON the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation, i.e., whether a statute can lend color of validity to an
attempted organization of a municipality despite that such statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional.

2) If nullified, WON the previous acts of the municipality of Balabagan shall also be considered void.

RULING:

1) Municipality of Balabagan is not a de facto corporation. Its creation is void.

Principles on a de facto corporation:

1. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be:

a) A valid law enacted by the legislature.

b) An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either: (1) been upheld for a time by the courts, or (2) not yet been
declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential
existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.
2. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by
some legislative fiat.
3. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face.
4. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization would
clearly be a usurper.

Hence, a de facto municipal corporation may only be recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later
invalidated, if there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization.

In the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot
conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other
valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.

An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Clearly, Executive Order 386 "created no office."
Municipality of Balabagan should be dissolved.

2) While the creation of the municipality of Balabagan is void, its acts are held valid by virtue of Operative Fact Doctrine.

The existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.

The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official.

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would
have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently
restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as to costs.

Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11 (1994)

Facts:

In 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued EO No. 353, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised
Administrative Code, creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of
San Narciso of the same province certain barrios. The EO was issued upon the request of the municipal council of San
Narciso, Quezon.

In 1965, EO No. 174 issued by President Diosdado Macapagal officially recognized the municipal district of San
Andres to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality.
 In 1989, Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the officials of the Municipality of San
Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local
officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions
of their respective offices.
Invoking Pelaez v. Auditor General, the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential
act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of
San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that rightfully belonged to the
corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

Municipality of San Andres’ Arguments:

It was the Municipality of San Narciso that wanted to segregate itself from San Andres and gave life to its existence
through the issuance of Executive Order No. 353. It should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the
new municipality.

The Municipality of San Andres had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed.

Later, Municipality of San Andres filed a new a motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and
academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 particuarly Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities.

Municipality of San Narciso’s arguments:

The above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally
existing municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.

Since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired
a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic
Act 7160 to the petition would violate due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RTC ruled in favour of Municipality of San Narciso and said that whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal
districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160

Issue:

Whether or not the Municipality of San Andres is a de jure municipality

Held:

Yes.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353
creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30)
years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive
order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to
exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a
public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an
action belatedly filed, so also must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision
be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider
the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact
attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.

Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more
than six years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain
governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres.

After more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres
as a fifth class municipality.
 Under Administrative Order No. 33, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit
Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.

Whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest
by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving
"validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested
rights.

Also, the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives,
considered Municipality of San Andres to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon.

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

QUO WARRANTO DEFINED:

The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to
show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise."

It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the
fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an
action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows
an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be
"entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another."

Municipality of Candijay vs. CA, 251 SCRA 530 (1995)

FACTS:

The lower court's decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said
plaintiff municipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control,
possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over
the same barrio" (RTC decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 86).

On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court’s decision. Said Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner
based on certain exhibits with the following grounds:

First, it would in effect includes portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee
Candijay when said barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265
creating the latter.” ): Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction
under the law creating her.

Second, the Court concluded that Executive Order No. 265 (which created Alicia from out of certain barrios of the
municipality of Mabini), and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission (which set forth the respective component
territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay), "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is
NOT MENTIONED AS ONE OF THE BARRIOS constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality OF ALICIA.
Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay."

Thus, CA applied the Equiponderance of Evidence Rule (Equipoise Rule), stating:

 When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is NOTHING in the evidence which shall
incline it to one side or the other, THE COURT WILL FIND FOR THE DEFENDANT (Alicia)

Candijay filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA but was DENIED. Thus, Candijay filed the instant petition with the
Supreme Court alleging, among others, that Alicia LACKED juridical personality, as a result of having been CREATED
UNDER A VOID EXECUTIVE ORDER in reference to the pronouncement in Pelaez v. Auditor General

o Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino on September 16, 1949
creating Alicia is NULL AND VOID AB INITIO, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, on which said Executive Order was based, CONSTITUTED AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS (thus, UNCONSTITUTIONAL).

ISSUE:
 WON Municipality of Alicia lacked juridical personality as being created under a void Executive Order?

HELD:

NO, the Municipality of Alicia did NOT lack juridical personality despite being created under a void Executive Order.

LEGAL BASIS: the Supreme Court recalled its ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr.
whereby it upheld Municipality of San Andres as a de jure municipal corporation. The Court said that the instant case of Alicia IS
STRIKINGLY SIMILAR with the case of San Andres.

Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that municipal districts "organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their RESPECTIVE SETS OF ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL
OFFICIALS HOLDING OFFICE at the time of the EFFECTIVITY OF (THE) CODE shall henceforth be considered as
REGULAR MUNICIPALITIES.

Inasmuch as Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, IT SHOULD LIKEWISE BENEFIT FROM
the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de
jure municipality.

Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the
municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of SIXTEEN YEARS when Pelaez vs.Auditor
General was promulgated. And VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL ACTS throughout the years all INDICATE THE STATE'S
RECOGNITION and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-
mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of
Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty
municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.

The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts
done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

Thus, as a de jure municipality, Alicia has juridical capacity.

San Andres Alicia

Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353
had been IN EXISTENCE FOR MORE THAN SIX
YEARS when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated
BUT the case DID NOT specifically declare the
unconstitutionality of EO No. 353 unlike the other EOs
therein
certain GOVERNMENTAL ACTS ALL POINTED to the
STATE'S RECOGNITION of the continued existence of
the Municipality of San Andres
 Executive Order No. 174 classified the
Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality
 Administrative Order No. 33 provides that
Municipality of San Andres had been covered by
the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon
 Under the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon
created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949
IN EXISTENCE for all of SIXTEEN YEARS when Pelaez
vs.Auditor General was promulgated
VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL ACTS throughout the
years all INDICATE THE STATE'S RECOGNITION and
acknowledgment of the existence thereof
 Administrative Order No. 33 provides that
Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th
Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini
 under the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of
twenty municipalities comprising the Third
District of Bohol

*As of the "equiponderance of evidence" issue: The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court
involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182 (1996)

FACTS:
  The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to
§68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, 2 dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of
Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, 3 based on the technical description in
E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of
Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of
Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban.
This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated February
18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as follows:

From a point at Cagayanon Beach follow Macabayao Road until it intersects Tabangag Creek at the back of the
Macabayao Elementary School. Follow the Tabangag Creek until it intersect the Macabayao River at upper Adorable.
Follow the Macabayao River such that the barrio of Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will be a part of Jimenez
down and the sitios of San Vicente, Donan, Estrella, Mapula will be a part of Sinacaban.

 The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving
the agreement between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of
Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), §134. 6 The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated
January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.

 Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City,
Branch 14. The suit was filed against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the
Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive Secretary.
Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 8 the power to create municipalities
is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality
and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part.

RTC denied petition and judgment is hereby rendered declaring a STATUS QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban
shall continue to exist and operate as a regular municipality; declaring the decision dated October 11, 1989 rendered by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan fixing the boundaries between Sinacaban and Jimenez, Misamis Occidental. as null and
void, the same not being in accordance with the boundaries provided for in Executive Order No. 258 creating the
municipality of Sinacaban; dismissing the petition for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs and damages.

The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even prior to
the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for forty years before its existence was questioned; that Jimenez did not
have the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban, the same being reserved to the State as represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from questioning the legal
existence of Sinacaban by entering into an agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and that any question
as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had been rendered moot by §442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160), which provides: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code
shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

ISSUES:

(1) whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim, and

(2) if it has, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental which should be used as the basis for adjudicating Sinacaban's territorial claim.

HELD:

1. Yes, the subject municipality has legal personality

The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exists, then it has standing to bring a claim
in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v.
Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was
without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban.

However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its
acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,
10
this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the
fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following
the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and
(3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court
and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all,
it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to
rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense
that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen
years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never
been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim
to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of the Rules of
Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the
time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have
recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated
by §31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for
purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized
Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in
Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning
legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental.
Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., §442(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set
of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities.

Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, §442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new
municipalities. 11

This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new
municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in
Art. XI, §3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal
corporations created before, such as the Municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.

2. EO 258 should govern.

Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban because the barangays which
Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950 the parties entered into an agreement
whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the territory of Jimenez.

E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is
that "Sinacaban contains" those barrios, without saying they are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is that the
technical description, containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation
survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the municipality and consequently the question to which the
municipality the barangays in question belong.

Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities agreed that certain barrios belonged to Jimenez, while certain other ones
belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement was subsequently approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Whether this
agreement conforms to E.O. No. 258 will be determined by the result of the survey. Jimenez contends, however, that regardless of
its conformity to E.O. No. 258, the agreement as embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is binding on
Sinacaban. This raises the question whether the Provincial Board had authority to approve the agreement or, to put it in another
way, whether it had the power to declare certain barrios part of one or the other municipality. We hold it did not if the effect
would be to amend the area as described in E.O. No. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban. At the time the Provincial
Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February 18, 1950, the applicable law was §2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 which provided:

Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How settled. — Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over
places or barrios shall be decided by the provincial boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are situated,
after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial
board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of the
Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by
municipalities situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an
agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior
[Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final.
As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 12 the power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative nature
— involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." It is a power
"to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited
to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the
law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment. 13 If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by
Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decision of October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial
Board. Its action is in accordance with the Local Government Code of 1983, §79 of which provides that in case no settlement of
boundary disputes is made the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province. In 1989, when the action was brought by
Jimenez, this Code was the governing law. The governing law is now the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
§§118-119.

Jimenez's contention that the RTC failed to decide the case "within one year from the start of proceedings" as required by §79 of
the Local Government Code of 1983 and the 90-day period provided for in Article VIII, §15 of the Constitution does not affect
the validity of the decision rendered. For even granting that the court failed to decide within the period prescribed by law, its
failure did not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative
sanction.

Sultan Camid vs. Office of the President (2005)

Facts:

The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General[2] in 1965. As discussed
therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders [3] creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in
Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107. [4]
These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had failed
to pass Congress.[5] President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of
prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No.
2370,[6] and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power. [7]
After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five
justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch, [8] while three
justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced
the power of the Chief Executive over local governments. [9]

Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, [11] suing as a private citizen
and taxpayer whose locus standi is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong,
Province of Lanao del Sur. [12] He alleges that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of
officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents, [13] even though he concedes that since
1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.
[14]
Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and
Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) barangay units with their own respective chairmen. [15] From 1964 until 1972, according
to Camid, the public officials of Andong have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least
(sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal. Since the time of Martial
Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the Interim Officials serving their
constituents in their own little ways and means. [16]
In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by the Office
of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, created under Executive Order No. 107 issued [last]
October 1, 1964.[17] He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the
population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of
governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have
recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-
establishment of Andong.[18]
The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). [19]The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certified as
existing, per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong,
whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga
del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao;
Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and
Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley. [20]

Issue:

WON municipality of Andong is a de facto municipal corporation?

Held:
No.

There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of the
proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This point shall
be further explained further on.
Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a fit
subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual questions.
There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camids astonishing factual allegations pertaining to the purported continuing
operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the
validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.
The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles governing the
recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it
is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. [26] These municipal
corporations have exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no
charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost. [27]

What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate
powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not have the opportunity to
make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camids
plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the
Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camids seeming
ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant
prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.
It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camids present action. The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by
the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the
annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camids ultimate cause the recognition of Andong. Neither does
the Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on
the present status of Andong. Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather
than a long-standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation
of the Certification to Camids central argument is forlornly strained.

The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out that the
Municipality of Andong never existed.[29] Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared null and void ab
initio in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders. The phrase ab initio means from the
beginning,[30] at first,[31] from the inception.[32]

The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to create
municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized that the President has, for many years, issued executive
orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and in actual operation . . . . [36] However, the Court
ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to
29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement
was made as to the other municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court
deemed unlawful.
Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between
Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating
Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its
alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court.

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are
eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued
by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In
fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, to support the restoration or re-operation of
the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,[61] thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.
We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon
in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the different
legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative
districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter. [62] On
the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,
[63]
Bohol,[64]and Misamis Occidental[65] respectively.
How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the
DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez,legislation was
enacted to reconstitute these municipalities. [66] It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18)
municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by
legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as
against these eighteen (18) other municipalities.
We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or
reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances
or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and
Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially
annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain
inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the
DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally
created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.
And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a hole on
the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back
into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran. [67] These three municipalities
subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur, [68]and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once
belonged to Andong.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Municipality of Sogod vs. Rosal (1991)

FACTS: On June 15, 1950, Congress passed Republic Act No. 522 creating the municipality of Bontoc, formerly a barrio of the
municipality of Sogod in the province of Leyte, which shall be composed of the barrios of Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu,
Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa, Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay and their corresponding sitios.

A boundary dispute however, later arose between the municipality of Bontoc and the municipality of Sogod with the latter
claiming that the former exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios above-mentioned but also over other ten (10) barrios
allegedly belonging to Sogod.

On June 17, 1952, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 617 directing the holding of a plebiscite among the
barrios of Pangi, Taa part of Sta. Cruz, Tuburan, Laogawan and their corresponding sitios. The purpose of the plebiscite is to
determine whether the people in these barrios would like to remain with the municipality of Sogod or with Bontoc. The results
thereof show that more votes were cast in favor of Sogod than those in favor of Bontoc.

On April 4, 1959, the Provincial Board of Leyte issued Resolution No. 519 recommending to the President of the Philippines
and/or to the Congress of the Philippines that Republic Act 522 be amended so as to include in said Act creating the municipality
of Bontoc, the following barrios claimed by Sogod which are in the heart of Bontoc but not included in said law, namely: Baugo,
Himakilo, Esperanza, Hibagwan, Pamahawan, Mahayahay, Bunga, Da-o and Maoylab The Board also recommended that a law
be enacted annexing to the municipality of Sogod the following barrios which are very near Sogod and are claimed by the latter
but are included in the law creating Bontoc, namely: Laogawan, Taa Tuburan, Sta. Cruz and Pangi. The board further
recommended that the boundary line between the two municipalities be placed at Granada Creek.

On December 28, 1959, Carlos P. Garcia, then President of the Philippines, promulgated Executive Order No. 368, which
approved the recommendation of the provincial board of Leyte, and reconstituted the barrios and sitios which shag compose the
municipalities of Bontoc and Sogod. The executive order also specified Granada Creek as the boundary line separating Bontoc
and Sogod.

However, on July 14, 1960, the President of the Philippines, sent a telegram to the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte with
regard to suspension of implementation of EO 368 until a plebiscite is made on the said areas.

Hence, the Provincial Board of Southern Leyte passed Resolution No. 62 suspending the implementation of Executive Order 368
and created a committee to conduct the holding of a plebiscite in the barrios and sitios affected by Executive Order 368 and to
finally settle the boundary dispute.

G.R. No. L-38204

With this, the Municipality of Sogod filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with CFI of Southern Leyte, to enjoin the
provincial board and provincial governor from taking cognizance of the long pending boundary dispute between the two
municipalities. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. MR is denied.
Hence, this petition.

G.R. No. 38205

On December 7, 1970, the municipality of Sogod filed with CFI of Southern Leyte for recovery of taxes with receivership against
the municipality of Bontoc. alleging that Bontoc exercised jurisdiction not only over the barrios enumerated in Republic Act No.
522 but also over ten (10) barrios belonging to the complainant municipality of Sogod. The complaint prayed that the
municipality of Bontoc be ordered to pay Sogod onehalf of the total amount of taxes collected by the former.

The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the right to collect taxes would ultimately depend on the previous civil case
(one under G.R. No. L-38204) which was already dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that the issue as to boundary dispute
have not yet been decided in a plebiscite for that purpose. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
above order of the judge.

ISSUE: WON the trial court have jurisdiction on these cases.

RULING: NO. Trial is correct in dismissing the two cases.

Jurisdiction has been defined as the power and authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. It is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties nor can it be acquired or diminished by any act of
the parties. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of action.
In this case the pertinent laws are the following: 1) Republic Act No. 522, creating the municipality of Bontoc; 2) Republic Act
No. 3590, the Revised Barrio Charter, revising Republic Act No. 2370; and 3) Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917.

Republic Act No. 522: It defines the jurisdiction of the municipality of Bontoc. It clearly enumerates the barrios which shag
compose the municipality of Bontoc, to wit: Bontoc, Divisoria, Onion, Pacu, Beniton, Catmon, Hilaan, Taa Sta. Cruz, Mahayahay
and their corresponding sitios. This means that all the other barrios in Southern Leyte which are not included in the law creating
the municipality of Bontoc are deemed to remain under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sogod. Although the said law is
clear as to which territories shall belong to each municipality, the law is silent however, as to the specifications of the boundary
line which will separate the two municipalities.

Revised Barrio Charter: Barrios may be created and their boundaries altered only by Act of Congress or by the corresponding
provincial board upon petition of the majority of the voters in the area affected and the recommendation of the municipality in
which the proposed barrios are situated. Thus, the provincial board was empowered under the law to determine and alter
boundaries of municipalities and barrios. Further, the law then vested the right to settle boundary disputes between municipalities
on the provincial board pursuant to Section 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code. Based on the same code, decisions shall be
appealable to the Secretary of the Interior.

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the authority to hear and resolve municipal boundary disputes belongs to the provincial
boards and not to the trial courts. Records in the instant case show that when petitioner municipality filed the civil actions in 1970
before the trial court, the provincial board of Southern Leyte had not yet conducted a plebiscite as ordered by the Executive
Department in 1960 or rendered any order settling the dispute. Petitioner municipality should have elevated the matter of delay to
the then Secretary of Interior for action instead of bringing it to the trial court (Secretary of Interior or the Executive Department
for that matter, was not precluded during that time from taking necessary steps for the speedy settlement of the boundary dispute
but was subsequently disallowed under Pelaez vs Auditor General).

Hence, we find that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the cases for want of jurisdiction and in allowing the provincial
board to continue with the pending investigation and proceedings on the boundary dispute.

Further, in view of the length of time this Court finds that this matter should be referred to the Congress of the Philippines for
whatever legislative action that may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Note: The 1987 Constitution and LGC of 1991 already provided new powers to the provincial board.

Municipality of Kananga vs. Madrona, (2003)

The case:

Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the decision of the RTC of Ormoc City denying the Municipality of
Kananga's Motion to Dismiss.

Facts:

A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the
issue to amicable settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Kananga. No amicable settlement was reached.

The City of Ormoc filed a complaint before the RTC of Ormoc City. The Municipality of Kananga moved to dismiss on the
following grounds:

1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; and

2) a condition precedent has not been complied with.

RTC’s ruling: It has jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and that Section 118 of the LGC had been
substantially complied with because both parties had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC may exercise original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent
component city

HELD:

Yes. The RTC has original jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. However, this jurisdiction is not vested by Section
118 of the LGC as it is not applicable in this case. This provision only applies in disputes between a component city or a
municipality on the one hand a highly urbanized city on the other -- or between two or more highly urbanized cities. While
Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city.
The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section 19(6) of this law provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxxxxxxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions[.]

Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes
between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly
withheld from their plenary powers.

ADD-ONS:

IMPORTANCE OF TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES:

The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare (Mariano vs COMELEC).

SECTION 118 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary disputes between and among local
government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.

(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the
sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.

(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement
to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or
two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred
thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.

Barangay Sangalang vs. Barangay Maguihan (2009)

Since the documents presented by respondent are sourced from the very agency primarily tasked with the survey of

lands, more credence must be given to the same in the absence of proof that would cast doubt on the contents thereof.

FACTS:

The controversy has its roots in a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner Barangay Sangalang and respondent
Barangay Maguihan, both situated in Lemery, Batangas.

Sangalang claims that the said lot is within their territorial jurisdiction while Maguihan claims that it is within their territorial
boundary.

The case was lodged before the Sangguniang Bayan, which referred it to a hearing committee. In turn, the committee
formed rendered a report[4] to the effect that the properties in dispute belonged to petitioner Brgy. Sangalang. This was affirmed
by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB).
 The decision was appealed by Maguihan to RTC which overturned the decision of the SB, and declared the disputed
land to belong to Maguihan.

Sec. 119 LGC: Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the
decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute.
The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of
the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes.

Aggrieved, Sangalang filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the appeal citing that the petitioner availed
of the wrong remedy. The proper remedy was Rule 42 (Petition for Review) because the decision of RTC was in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. It further said, that even if it could have filed an appeal under Rule 41, it would still be dismissed
because the submitted appellants brief failed to contain a subject index and page references to the records requirement in its
Statement of Facts and Case and Argument. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issues: (pubcorp related)

WON the RTC erred in ruling that the disputed lot belonged to the jurisdiction of Maguihan.

HELD:

NO. Ideally, herein petition should be remanded to the CA, as the same inherently involves a question of fact. However, since this

case has been pending for almost 13 years now, this Court deems it best to once and for all settle the controversy.

Petitioner presents the following documents to prove its claim:

1. Copy of a certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor stating that the area covered by Tax
Declaration are all within the territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Sangalang, Lemery, Batangas; [29]

2. Copies of Tax Declaration

3. Old Map of Barangay Sangalang.[31]

Respondent, for its part, presents the following documents:

1. Certified copy of the cadastral map of the Lemery Cadastre, which was approved on March 17, 1983 by
the Director of Lands, Department of Environment and Natural Resources; [32] and

2. Certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources dated September 9, 1997.[33]

Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, outlines the

procedures governing boundary disputes, including the documents that should be attached to the petition, to wit:

Art. 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. The following procedures shall govern the settlement of
boundary disputes:
xxxx

(c) Documents attached to petition - The petition shall be accompanied by:

1. Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the LGU or any other
document showing proof of creation of the LGU;

2. Provincial, city, municipal, or barangay map, as the case may be, duly
certified by the LMB.

3. Technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs concerned;

4. Written certification of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor, as the case

may be, as to territorial jurisdiction over the disputed area according to records in
custody;

5. Written declarations or sworn statements of the people residing in the

disputed area; and
 6. Such other documents or information as may be required by
the sanggunian hearing the dispute.

The RTC observed that neither of the parties satisfied the requirement that all the enumerated documents must

be attached to the petition. Hence, like the RTC, this Court is left with no other option but to select which between the

documents presented by the parties carries greater weight in proving its claim. The documents presented by petitioner were

sourced from the tax assessors office, whereas the documents presented by respondent were sourced from the land

management bureau. The answer is very apparent and needs little discussion.

To this Courts mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was approved by the Director of Lands, should be given

more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the assessors office. Said map was approved on March 17, 1986,

which was approximately 10 years before the controversy in hand developed. Hence, the same should be controlling in the

absence of proof that such document is invalid or inaccurate. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the hearing committees

recommendation to rule in favor of petitioner, the committee itself stated in its report that the cadastral map submitted by

respondent was authentic.[34]

This Court shares the view of the RTC. It is undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal

government agency tasked with the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given to the documents relating to

its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the ordinary course of business. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax

assessor, the conclusion is inevitable that it is the formers certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is

controlling, absent any finding of abuse of discretion. As correctly observed by respondent and the RTC, the duty of provincial

and municipal assessors is primarily the assessment of taxes and not the survey of lands.

In sum, this Court does not belittle the documents presented by petitioner or the duties of the provincial and municipal

assessors; however, since the documents presented by respondent are sourced from the very agency primarily tasked with the

survey of lands, more credence must be given to the same in the absence of proof that would cast doubt on the contents thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The October 17, 2002 Decision and August

25, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 27, 2000 Decision and

December 20, 2000 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Lemery, Batangas, in Barangay Jurisdiction Dispute No. 1, are

hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Calanza vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) (2009)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Service (DENR Region XI) of Davao City, applications for
small-scale mining permits for the purpose of extracting gold. In their applications, petitioners stated that the area where they will
conduct mining operations was in the Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental.

The governor of Davao Oriental, Rosalind Y. Lopez, approved the applications and issued six small-scale mining permits in favor
of the petitioners.3 Since the mining areas applied for by petitioners were within the respondent Paper Industries Corporation of
the Philippines’ (PICOP) logging concession area under Timber License Agreements (TLAs), petitioners negotiated with PICOP
for their entry into the mining site at Barangay Catihan, Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental.

PICOP refused petitioners’ entry into the mining area on the grounds that it has the exclusive right of occupation, possession and
control over the area being a logging concessionaire thereof; that petitioners’ mining permits are defective since they were issued
by the governor of Davao Oriental when in fact the mining area is situated in Barangay Pagtilaan, Municipality of Lingig,
Surigao del Sur
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney’s Fees
against PICOP and its officers before the RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental.

PICOP countered that the RTC of Davao Oriental has no jurisdiction over the complaint of petitioners since the disputed area is
situated in the Province of Surigao del Sur.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The RTC opined that Barangay Pagtilaan (as claimed by PICOP) or Catihan (as claimed by
petitioners) is within the territory of the Province of Davao Oriental. Citing Section 465, paragraph (b), Sub-paragraph (3)iv of
Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 which states to the effect that the governor has the power to issue
licenses and permits, the RTC ruled that the governor is vested with the power to issue the small-scale mining permits to the
petitioners.

Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and dismissed the complaint of respondents. It stated that the RTC erred in passing
upon the issue of the boundary dispute between the provinces of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur since the resolution of the
boundary dispute primarily resides with the sangguniang panlalawigans of the two provinces and the RTC has only appellate
jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court of Appeals also said that the governor has
no power to issue small-scale mining permits since such authority under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7076 is vested with the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board.

ISSUE: Does the RTC has original jurisdiction in settling boundary disputes?

HELD: NO

There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by
two or more LGUs.7 In settling boundary disputes, Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute. – Boundary disputes between and among local
government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.

(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.

(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement
to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or
two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred
thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.1avvphi1

Under paragraph (c) of Section 118, the settlement of a boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of
different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians or the provincial boards of the different
provinces involved. Section 119 of the Local Government Code gives a dissatisfied party an avenue to question the decision of
the sanggunian to the RTC having jurisdiction over the area, viz:

Section 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of
the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute x x x.

Article 17, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing The Local Government Code of 1991 outlines the procedures
governing boundary disputes, which succinctly includes the filing of the proper petition, and in case of failure to amicably settle,
a formal trial will be conducted and a decision will be rendered thereafter. An aggrieved party can appeal the decision of the
sanggunian to the appropriate RTC. Said rules and regulations state:

Article 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. – The following procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary
disputes:

(a) Filing of petition - The sanggunian concerned may initiate action by filing a petition, in the form of a resolution, with
the sanggunian having jurisdiction over the dispute.

(b) Contents of petition - The petition shall state the grounds, reasons or justifications therefore.

(c) Documents attached to petition - The petition shall be accompanied by:

1. Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the LGU or any other document showing proof of creation of the LGU;
2. Provincial, city, municipal, or barangay map, as the case may be, duly certified by the LMB.

3. Technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs concerned;

4. Written certification of the provincial, city, or municipal assessor, as the case may be, as to territorial jurisdiction over the
disputed area according to records in custody;

5. Written declarations or sworn statements of the people residing in the disputed area; and

6. Such other documents or information as may be required by the sanggunian hearing the dispute.

(d) Answer of adverse party - Upon receipt by the sanggunian concerned of the petition together with the required documents, the
LGU or LGUs complained against shall be furnished copies thereof and shall be given fifteen (15) working days within which to
file their answers.

(e) Hearing - Within five (5) working days after receipt of the answer of the adverse party, the sanggunianshall hear the case and
allow the parties concerned to present their respective evidences.

(f) Joint hearing - When two or more sanggunians jointly hear a case, they may sit en banc or designate their respective
representatives. Where representatives are designated, there shall be an equal number of representatives from each sanggunian.
They shall elect from among themselves a presiding officer and a secretary. In case of disagreement, selection shall be by
drawing lot.

(g) Failure to settle - In the event the sanggunian fails to amicably settle the dispute within sixty (60) days from the date such
dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to the effect and copies thereof shall be furnished the parties concerned.

(h) Decision - Within sixty (60) days from the date the certification was issued, the dispute shall be formally tried and decided by
the sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision shall, within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation thereof, be furnished the
parties concerned, DILG, local assessor, COMELEC, NSO, and other NGAs concerned.

(i) Appeal - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of
the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the dispute by filing therewith the
appropriate pleading, stating among others, the nature of the dispute, the decision of the sanggunian concerned and the reasons
for appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Decisions on
boundary disputes promulgated jointly by two (2) or more sangguniang panlalawigans shall be heard by the Regional Trial Court
of the province which first took cognizance of the dispute.

The records of the case reveal that the instant case was initiated by petitioners against respondents predicated on the latter’s
refusal to allow the former entry into the disputed mining areas. This is not a case where the sangguniang panlalawigans of
Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur jointly rendered a decision resolving the boundary dispute of the two provinces and the same
decision was elevated to the RTC. Clearly, the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no
petition that was filed and decided by the sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the
RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the Local Government Code allocates such power to the
sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur.

Since the RTC has no original jurisdiction on the boundary dispute between Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur, its decision is a
total nullity. We have repeatedly ruled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
attacked anytime.8 It creates no rights and produces no effect.

OTHER ISSUE: WON the Governor approve small-scale mining?

Petitioners’ small-scale mining permits are legally questionable. Under Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale
miners are processed with the Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took
effect10 on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts are vested in the
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Composed of the DENR representative, a representative from the small-scale mining
sector, a representative from the big-scale mining industry and a representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked
to approve small-scale mining permits and contracts.

In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining permits on 23 August 1991, making them bound by the
procedures provided for under the applicable and prevailing statute, Republic Act No. 7076. Instead of processing and obtaining
their permits from the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the governor of Davao del
Norte. Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void.

Based on the discussions above, the Court of Appeals is correct in finding that petitioners have no right to enter into and to
conduct mining operations within the disputed lands under the infirmed small-scale mining permits.