Before: (Under Art. 136 of The Constitution of Asnard)

TC-01
Before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ASNARD
IN THE MATTERS CONCERNING
(UNDER ART. 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ASNARD)
HPC Ltd., & AMY SANTIAGO……………………………………………..…PLAINTIFF
v.
STEVE ROVERS…………………..……………………………….... DEFENDANT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

3RD FACULTY OF LAW (INTRA) MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2018-19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authority………………………………………………………………………………..4
Cases Referred ………………………………………………………………………………….5
Statement of Jurisdiction…………………………………………………………………………7
Statement of Facts………………………………………………………………………………..8
Statement of Issues……………………………………………………………………………....9
Summary of Arguments………………………………………………………………………….10
Arguments Advanced…………………………………………………………………………….13
1. ISSUE 1: Whether fraud was committed by Mr. Steve Rovers under Section 17 of the
Indian Contract Act of 1872?............................................................................................12
A. No Intention to Deceive…………………………………………………………...…12
B. Mere silence is no Fraud……………………………………….………………….....13
C. Means of discovering truth ……………………………………………………….…16
D. Plaintiff at his own fault……………………………………………………………..17
E. Burden of proof………………………………………………………………………19
2. ISSUE 2: - Whether the contract dated 14th August 2017 voidable at the option of Mr.
Tony Snark? ......................................................................................................................19
A. Party affected by the factors, has to avoid the contract….……………………….....20
B. Rescission ………………………………………………………………………...…20
C. Ordinary diligence…………………………………………………………………..22
3. ISSUE 3: - Whether Mr. Steve Rovers, is liable to compensate Amy Santiago for the
death of her husband and her subsequent loss of
livelihood? .............................................................................................................................
..............23
A. Damage alleged is not cause by the act of contract…………………………………24
B. Remoteness of Damage ……………………………………..……………………….24
C. Volenti non fit
injuria………………………………………………………………………………...28
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 2.

4. Issue 4:- Whether Mr. Steve Rovers, being the supplier and service provider of LPT
machines, is liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for Breach of
contract?.............................................................................................................................28
A. Discharge of Contract by Performance………………………………………………28
B. Default on the Part of Mr. Tony Snark………………………………………………30
Prayer…………………………………………………………………………………………….31

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
COMMENTARIES REFERRED
1. POLLOCK & MULLA, THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872(7 ed. LEXIS NEXIS 2007).
2. AVTAR SINGH, LAW OF CONTRACT & SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT (12 ed. 2017).
3. DR. R.K. BANGIA, CONTRACT-I (6ed. 2009).
4. MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7 ed. Lexis Nexis 2016).
5. D.D. BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (23 ed. Lexis Nexis 2018).
6. V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF LAW (13 ed. Eastern Book Company Lucknow 2017).
7. DR. R.K. BANGIA, LAW OF TORTS (23 ed. 2013).
DICTIONARIES REFERRED
1. BRYAN A. GARDNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2001)

2. Oxford English Dictionary (2 ed. 2009)
STATUTES REFERRED
1. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872.

2. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.
3. THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963.
WEBSITES REFERRED
1. www.scconline.com
2. www.manupatra.com
3. www.lexisnexis.com

CASES REFERRED: -
S. NO. CASE NAME CITATION
A.L. Mustaneer Establishment v. Varuna 72 (1998) DLT 186.
1. Overseas (p) Ltd
Attwood v. Small (1838) 6 C. & F. 232.
2.
Bindu Sharma v. Ram Prakash Sharma A.I.R. 1997 All. 429.
3.
Davias v. Cundasami Mudali A.I.R. 1986 Kant 14.
4.
Geest plc v. Lansiquot (2002) UKPC 48.
5.
Hegarty v. Shine (1878) 14 Cox C.C. 145.
6.
Horsefall v. Thomas (1862) 1 H. & C. 90.
7.
House of Lords in Hughes v. Lord (1964) 1 QB 518.
8. Advocate
Kamal Kant v. Prakash Devi A.I.R. 1976 Raj. 79.
9.
Keates v. Earl of Cadogan (1851) 10 C.B. 591.
10.
Keshavlal Lallbhulli Patel and Others v. A.I.R. 1958 512.
11. Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills
Kunja Lal Bhuiya v. Hara Lal Bhuiya A.I.R. 1943 Cal 162.
12.
Lampert v. Eastern National Omnibus Co (1954) 1 WLR 1047.
13.
Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison (1939) A.C. 449.
14.
M/s. Venkateswara Minerals V. A.I.R. 1986 Kant 14.
15. JugalKishore
Pazhianappa Chettiyar v. South Indian (1967) 2 MLJ 1.
16. Planting And Industrial Co. Ltd and
Another
R. v. Clarence (1889) 22 QB 23.
17.
R.C. Thakkar v. Gujarat Housing Board A.I.R. 1973 Guj 34.
18.
Senanayke v. Cheng (1966) A.C. 63.
19.
Shoshi Mohunpal Chowdhary v. (1879) I.L.R. 4 C.L. 801.
20. Nobokrishto Poddar
Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 376.
21.

Smith v. Chadwick (1884) 9 A.C. 184.

22.
Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw A.I.R. 1992 SC 1555.
23. Brothers
State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3110.
24. Suryachandra Rao
Wright v. Lodge A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3110.
25.
Yog Raj v. Kuldeep Raj Gupta A.I.R. 2002 JK 12.
26.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Amy Santiago & HPC Ltd. v. Mr. Steve Rovers

The plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court of Asnard by Special
Leave Petition under Article 1361 of the Constitution of the Asnard.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

HPC Ltd. produced Lobanza capsule for reducing addiction of narcotic drugs, which are strongly
advised not to consume while consuming narcotic substances, doing so may cause serious health
catastrophe. HPC Ltd. is largely owned by Mr. Tony Snark, who owns other leading businesses
and considered as angel investor. Mr. Steve Rovers and Mr. Tony Snark were childhood friends,
who completed their studies together from Hemsworth University and develop in a mechanical
engineer and successful businessman respectively. Steve Rovers designed a machine “Labzo-
Pharma Tech” which increases production on certain medicines and slash production cost
including ‘Lobanza’. HPC Ltd. purchased 1 LPT on 4th June 2017, and it proved to be a boon
for HPC Ltd. On 14th August 2017, HPC Ltd entered into an agreement for purchase of 3 LPT’s
for ‘Lobanza’ capsule production. HPC Ltd. received delivery 4 days later than agreed date but
accepted and paid fully and also used 1 LPT in producing medicine other than ‘Lobanza’. On 1st
September 2017, Mr. Frank Thunderwood, rival of Mr. Steve managed to get an article published
about the infirmities of LPT’s and consequently hampered Steve’s quarterly turnover. Prof.
Aldus conducted research titled, “effects of lobanza on humans”, which states that lobanza has
no side effects but not advisable only to those having allergies. In 2015, Albus’s research paper
was published in an independent Journal, several scholars and professors criticized, but none of
them disapprove Prof. Albus’s assertions. Mr. Pablo, a janitor in government school is prone to
drugs. He saw an advertisement of Lobanza by Riverrum Medicoz. Mrs. Amy Santiago, wife of
Pablo was pushing him to leave drugs due to the strained relation with laws. Pablo bought
Lobanza and started consuming it but couldn’t refrain smoking. A week prior to the sale of LPT,
Mr. Steve got report of patent defect in LPT’s but due to heavy pressure, he failed to disclose the
same. All machine mal-functioned on 22nd October and Mr. Rovers and tech-team appointed for
repair. Also, few cases of illness reported. Mr. Pablo’s health starts falling but he couldn’t refrain
smoking, consequently he dies after 8 days left his wife helpless. Mr. Snark suffered heavy loss
and sued Mr. Steve for ‘fraud’ and Amy Santiago for death of her husband d and consequent loss
of livelihood. Supreme Court transferred their case to High Court; But High Court dismissed the
suit on lack of sufficient merit. Aggrieved by the order, HPC Ltd. appealed before the Supreme
Court of Asnard. Supreme Court ordered parties to advance the contentions and arguments on
17th November, 2018.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. WHETHER FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY MR. STEVE ROVERS UNDER SECTION 17 OF

INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872?
2. WHETHER THE CONTRACT DATED 14TH AUGUST 2017 VOIDABLE AT THE OPTION OF
MR. TONY SNARK?
3. WHETHER MR. STEVE ROVERS IS LIABLE TO COMPENSATE AMY SANTIAGO FOR THE
DEATH OF HER HUSBAND AND HER CONSEQUENT LOSS OF LIVELIHOOD?
4. MR. WHETHER MR. STEVE ROVERS, BEING THE SUPPLIER AND SERVICE PROVIDER OF
LPT MACHINES, IS LIABLE TO COMPENSATE. TONY SNARK FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1: - WHETHER FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY MR. STEVE ROVERS UNDER

SECTION 17 OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asnard that contract dated 14 th
August 2017 is not a contract by fraud under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act 1872 as the
section itself provides that there should be a intent to deceive the other and there should be a
false statement regarding the subject matter of the contract, but defendants didn’t have any
intention to deceive and they didn’t stated any false statement to deceive the plaintiff. The
Section 17 provides the defendant regarding the defects which can be seen with ordinary
diligence that the seller can keep a mere silence regarding the defects which can be seen with
ordinary diligence as in the instant case the plaintiff was asked on the ground of professional
ethics for inspection of the machines but plaintiff neglects and evidently smiled. Defendants
haven’t provide any information regarding the machines the buyer enters in to contract after an
market research and getting a good result and so we haven’t given any false statement regarding
the machines .
ISSUE 2: - WHETHER THE CONTRACT DATED 14TH AUGUST VOIDABLE AT THE OPTION OF
MR. TONY SNARK?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the contract dated 14 th August is
not voidable at the option of HPC Ltd., as their consent was not obtained by coercion, fraud or
misrepresentation. The plaintiffs knows that the machine produce Lobanza capsule at a very low
cost and so to increase their profits they purchased the machines from Mr. Steve Rovers after
doing there market research and getting good results they purchased the machine on 4 th June and
after getting good results from them the plaintiffs again into contract on 14 th August and
purchased 3 more machines, it’s clear that the consent was free consent after sometime the
machines malfunctioned, and HPC Ltd didn’t avoid the contract but appoint Mr. Steve Rovers
and his team for the repairing of malfunctioned machines, they didn’t avoid the contract and
adjusted which means the contract was not avoided by the plaintiffs and so the contract cannot be
rescinded and is not voidable at the option of HPC Ltd.

ISSUE 3: - WHETHER MR. STEVE ROVERS, IS LIABLE TO COMPENSATE MS. AMY SANTIAGO
FOR THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND AND HER CONSEQUENT LOSS OF LIVELIHOOD?
Its humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Democratic Republic Of Asnard that
the death to Mr. Pablo Escocar is not caused by our act of keeping silence regarding the patent
defects, the capsule was manufactured in the HPC Ltd and the contract was between the
deceased and the HPC Ltd and not between defendants and the deceased. The act of keeping
silence regarding the patent defect which can be seen by the plaintiff with ordinary diligence
cannot lead to the death of Mr. Pablo Escocar as the Capsules are produced by the HPC Ltd and
if the death is caused by the capsule than the HPC Ltd is responsible. The factsheet clearly
suggests that the husband of the deceased without consulting any doctor consumed the medicine,
which means he voluntarily agrees to consume the medicine and therefore agrees to bear the risk
which can arise after consuming a medicine, maxim is volenti non fit injuria.
ISSUE4:-MR WHETHER MR. STEVE ROVERS, BEING THE SUPPLIER AND SERVICE
PROVIDER OF LPT MACHINES, IS LIABLE TO COMPENSATE. TONY SNARK FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT?
It’s humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asnard ,that the defendants are not
liable to compensate HPC Ltd for the breach of contract as the defendants have already
performed there part of contract, therefore they are discharged by the contract. Section 55 of
Indian Contract Act provides that if there is a delay in a performance of a contract and the
performance is to be performed on a fixed date than the party will be held liable for the
compensation but if there is a delay in the performance and the promisee didn’t show any
apprehension and agrees to the extension of time and accept the performance, the promisee
cannot ask the compensation. And when the contract is performed and accepted by the promisee
than the promise is done and the promisor can’t be held liable for any liability or right of
performance arising after the performance. In the instant case the defendants, have performed
there part of contract, machines have been delivered, accepted by the defendant, defendant gives
the payment , the contract has been performed. The delay is also accepted and so the contract is
performed and there after no liability arises to compensate.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: WHETHER FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY MR. STEVE ROVERS UNDER SECTION 17 OF INDIAN
CONTRACT ACT, 1872?
1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asnard that the defendant have not
committed any fraud within the preview of Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 as section
itself speak that there are two elements to constitute fraud:-
(a) Intention to deceive,
(b) False statement of facts,2
2. Here, in the instant case there is absence of intention to deceive, which fails to attract the
liability of ‘fraud’ mentioned under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
A. NO INTENTION TO DECEIVE
3. Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads as “Fraud means and includes any of the
following acts committed by party to a contract , or with his connivance ,or by his agent ,with
intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent ,or to induce him to enter into the
contract………”3
So, fraud is any act to deceive and induce the other party to enter into contract. So, the
foundation stone of “fraud” lies in the intention to deceive another party in order to gain by
another’s loss.
4. In A.L. Mustaneer Establishment v. Varuna Overseas (p) Ltd 4, it was held that “Fraud is a facet
of dishonesty.”
5. In R C Thakkar v. Gujarat Housing Board5, A public authority had invited tenders and
mentioned the cost estimates in the tender notices and other related papers. The work did not
involve as much cost. It was held the mention of the estimates amounting to the authority’s
representation to the intending tenderers that the work would cost a particular amount. It related
to material fact, as the intending contractors would be led to believe about the cost of the work,
2
State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Suryachandra Rao, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3110.
3
§17, Indian Contract Act, 1872
4
72 (1998) DLT 186.
5
A.I.R. 1973 Guj 34.

because the authority would have worked out the correct estimate according to the directions
contained in the P.W.D. Manual. It was held that “The suggestion of fact should be made with
intent either to deceive or to induce the other party to enter into contract”
6. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Suryachandra Rao 6 the court held that “fraud is an act of
deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of
another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an
advantage.”
7. In the instant case, Mr. Steve Rovers was an inspiring innovator and an immensely passionate
mechanical engineer, wanted to make significant inroads into developing cutting edge
technology for ‘Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Equipment’ and he is facing extreme pressure to
meet the rising demand7 and have no intention to deceive his childhood friend, Mr. Tony Snark.
So, the basic element to constitute ‘fraud’ i.e. intention to deceive is absent and consequently,
Mr. Steve Rovers cannot be liable for “fraud” under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
B. MERE SILENCE IS NO FRAUD
8. A contracting party is under no obligation to disclose the whole truth to the other party or to
give him the whole information in his possession affecting the subject-matter of the contract.
It is under the principle that a trader may keep silent about a change in prices. A seller who
puts forth an unsound horse foe sell, but says nothing about its quality, commits no fraud.
9. In a case before the Supreme Court, Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University 8, a candidate,
who had full knowledge of the fact that he was short of attendance, did not mention this fact
in his examination form. This was held to be no fraud, it being the duty of the University to
scrutinize forms and to call for verification or information in case of doubts. The University
having failed to do so was estopped from cancelling the examination of the candidate.
10. In the instant case, Mr. Steve Rovers simply without any intention to deceive to Mr. Tony
Snark, does not disclose the fact regarding the defect in his machinery. Such mere silence of
Mr. Steve Rovers does not amount to ‘fraud’ under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
6
Supra Note 2.
7
¶ 2, Moot Preposition.
8
A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 376.

(a) Caveat Emptor
11. A contracting party is not obliged to disclose each and every thing to the other party. If a
person is selling his goods, he is under no duty to disclose the defects in his goods. If he
makes false statement as to the quality of the goods, it would be fraud, but if he merely
keeps silence as regard the defect in them, there is no fraud. In case of sell of goods the rule
is ‘Caveat Emptor’ i.e., Buyer Beware, which means that it is a duty of buyer to be careful
while purchasing the goods and there is no implied condition or warrants by the seller as to
the quality or fitness of goods for any particular purpose.
12. Every silence is not a fraud. According to Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872, Mere
silence as to the facts does not amount to fraud. A party to the contract is owing no gratitude
to disclose the whole truth to the other party.
13. In Keates v. Earl of Cadogan9, A house was let off for three years without disclosing to the
tenant that it was in such a ruinous and dangerous state as to be dangerous to be occupy, a
fact in the land lords knowledge. When the tenant discovered this fact he applied to have the
contract set aside, arguing that the landlord should have disclosed the real state of the house.
The court did not allow the relief. There was no warranty that the house was fit for
immediate occupation. No misrepresentation was made, nor it was the case that the plaintiff
was acting upon the impression produced by any conduct on the part of the owner as to the
state of the house or that he was not to make investigation before he began to reside in it.
There was no obligation on the owner to say anything about the state of the house.
14. In the instant case, it is the duty of Mr. Tony Snark to investigate 3 LPT Machines properly
and find “Patent Defects” in them, which can be seen by reasonable check. Failure of Mr.
Tony Snark to properly check the machines gives rise to the principle of “Caveat Emptor”,
which means that Mr. Tony Snark i.e., buyer should be beware and check to machine
properly to find the defects in the machines. Hence, here lies the default on the part of Mr.
Tony Snark and consequently Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable of ‘fraud’ under Section 17 of
Indian Contract Act, 1872.
9
(1851) 10 C.B. 591.

C. MEANS OF DISCOVERING TRUTH
15. In cases where silence is fraudulent, but the other party can discover the truth by ordinary
diligence, he cannot avoid the contract. In this connection, the provision in the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 is as under:
“If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the
meaning of Section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose
consent was so caused has the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence.”
16. In Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University10, Shri Krishan, a candidate for the L.LB. Part I
examination of the University did not complete the prescribed numbers of lectures which
could make him eligible for appearing the examination. He, however, filled the examination
form for appearing in the examination without mentioning the fact that his attendance was
short. The University authorities could have discovered the truth by proper scrutiny. The
University wanted to cancel the candidature of the candidate on the ground of fraud. It was
held that there was no fraud in this cases the candidate had just kept silent as to certain facts
and further, the University authorities could have discovered the truth with ordinary
diligence.
17. In Kamal Kant v. Prakash Devi11, the plaintiff, Kamal Kant filled a suit against his mother,
Prakash Devi and some other seeking cancellation of a trust deed on the ground that his
signature to it were obtained by a fraud by falsely telling him that it was a general power of
attorney. The deed in this case was attested by the plaintiff’s father and an advocate. The
plaintiff was an educated man and had all the means to know the content of the document.
Under these circumstances, it was held that there was no fraud in this case.
18. In Horsefall v. Thomas12, the plaintiff contracted to manufacturer for the defendant and
supplies the same to him. The gun was made for the defendant and supplied to him, but the
defendant never examined the gun and he started using it. There was a defect in the gun, and
if the defendant had carefully examined the gun, he could have detected the same and then
he would have been justified in rejecting it. The defendant accepted two bills of exchange
10
Supra Note 8.
11
A.I.R. 1976 Raj. 79.
12
(1862) 1 H. & C. 90.

towards the payment of the gun. After sometime the gun bursts and flew to pieces. One of
the bills was paid by him, but when the second one was not paid, the plaintiff sued him for
the same. In this stage the defendant contented that because of a concealed defect in the gun,
it was weak and consequently it has burst and broken to pieces and if it amounted to fraud,
as such he is not liable to pay. The plaintiff was held entitled to get payment.
19. In Bindu Sharma v. Ram Prakash Sharma 13, the petitioner (wife) was having higher
academic qualifications than her husband. The respondent gave her consent for marriage on
a representation by the husband that he was having a regular attractive job. In fact, the
respondent was undergoing apprenticeship training in a factory. It was held to be a case of
misrepresentation and on that ground a decree for annulment of marriage was granted to the
petitioner. In case it appears from the facts that even though there was a false statement but
the other party has the means to know the correct position and ought to have known the
truth, there is no fraud.
20. Machines have “Patent defect”, which means such defects which can be identified by
ordinary diligence by reasonable inspection. Hence, it is the duty of Mr. Tony Snark to
reasonably inspect the machines before buying and identify ‘patent defect’. So, it is the
careless and reckless behavior of Mr. Tony Snark which lead to the malfunction LPT’s.
Thus, Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable for ‘fraud’ as defined under Section 17 of Indian
Contract Act, 1872.
D. PLAINTIFF AT OWN FAULT
21. When one party to the contract is itself on default, he cannot allege other. As, Mr. Tony
Snark itself on default at various place, so, he cannot make Mr. Steve Rovers liable to
‘fraud’ or ‘misrepresentation’.
(a) MR. TONY SNARK USED LPT MACHINES AGAINST PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
22. “On 14th August 2017, HPC Ltd. entered into an agreement with, Mr. Steve, regarding the
purchase of 3 more LPT Machines for Lobanza Capsule’s production. Mr. Steve agreed to
the terms of the agreement………………………………HPC Ltd. also used one of its LPT
13
A.I.R. 1997 All. 429.

Machine to manufacture other medicine with different chemical compositions, apart from
Lobanza.”14
23. Para 6 of the Fact-sheet clearly says that agreement between HPC Ltd. & Mr. Steve Rovers
for purchase of three LPT Machines is for only production of “Lobanza Capsules” but HPC
Ltd. have used one LPT Machine for the production of other medicine, 15 whose chemical
composition is different from Lobanza and LPT Machines is customized for production of
Lobanza only as agreed by term of contract.
24. Thus, Plaintiff is at own default and acted against the terms and conditions of contract and
cannot make the defendant liable for ‘fraud’ under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
(b) Mr. Tony Snark acted upon the independent report, not on fiduciary relationship.
25. If person’s mind has not been influenced by the false statement when he enters into the
contract, there is no fraud.
26. In Attwood v. Small16, the seller of a mine made some statement exaggerating the earning
capacity of the mine. The buyer instead of relying on the statement got it verified from
independent agents, who were supposed to be competent and experienced in judging the
same. In an action by the buyer to rescind the contract on the ground of misrepresentation, it
was held that such an action could not succeed because the buyer, while making the decision
to purchase the mine, did not rely on the vendor’s statements, but acted only on an
independent report.
27. In Smith v. Chadwick17, it has been held that the prospectus of a company contains a false
statement that a particular person would be on the board of directors, but the plaintiff’s mind
is not influenced by the statement he cannot claim relief on that basis.
28. Para 4 of the fact-sheet states, “……In March 2017, as Mr. Snark planning to buy the LPT
in order to speed up the production of the Lobanza Capsule, he conducted a market
research to test the viability of his new project…..”
29. So, Mr. Tony Snark has conducted market research and then acted upon the market research
and not on the fiduciary relationship with Mr. Steve Rovers. So, Mr. Steve Rovers had not
14
15
Ibid.
16
(1838) 6 C. & F. 232.
17
(1884) 9 A.C. 184.

duty to disclose the whole fact of his machines, Thereby, Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable for
‘fraud’ under Section 17 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
E. BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE PLAINTIFF
30. When a party to the contract alleges another for fraud or misrepresentation, the burden to
prof the ‘fraud’ or ‘misrepresentation’ lies on the part of the plaintiff, and he has to give
sufficient merit in favor of proving ‘fraud’ or ‘misrepresentation’ in order to make the
defendant liable for ‘fraud’ or ‘misrepresentation’.
31. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers 18, “Fraud is essentially a question fact, and
the person who alleges that has to prove the same.” If the plaintiff seeks the annulment of
the decree on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, he has to specifically plead the same
and mention the circumstances which lead to the conclusion of the existence of fraud or
misrepresentation.
32. In Yog Raj v. Kuldeep Raj Gupta19, it was held that, “Merely making a mention of fraud or
misrepresentation in the pleadings is not enough.”
33. In the instant case, burden of proof lies on the part of part of Mr. Tony Snark and it is the on
his part to give reasonable and enough merit to attract liability of ‘fraud’ towards the
defendant.
ISSUE 2: - WHETHER THE CONTRACT DATED 14TH AUGUST 2017 VOIDABLE AT THE OPTION
OF MR. TONY SNARK?
34. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asnard that the Contract dated 14 th
August 2017, is not voidable at the option of Mr. Tony Snark as the consent of Mr. Tony Snark
is a ‘free consent’ as defined under Section 14 20 of Indian Contract Act, 1872; and not obtained
by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation. As under Section 19 21 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 to
avoid contract coercion, fraud and misrepresentation are the essentials and should be established.
A. CONTRACT NEEDS TO BE AVOIDED, BEFORE IT BECOME UNAVOIDABLE

18
A.I.R. 1992 SC 1555.
19
A.I.R. 2002 JK 12.
20
§14, Contract Act.
21
§19, Contract Act.

35. The parties to the Contract, whose consent has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation or
coercion can avoid the contract as their consent is not ‘Free Consent’22, which is a pre-requisite
condition of the Contract, Such party has to avoid it because if not avoided than it will remains
valid and effective and cannot be avoided later.
36. In the case of HD Hanumanthappa v Mohd. Sab it was held that “the contract will be held
voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so obtained and the party affected by the
factors has to avoid the contract and if not avoided it will remain valid and will not be a
voidable contract.”
37. In the case of Kunja Lal Bhuiya v. Hara Lal Bhuiya23, it was held that, “If a person, by express
or notice or by conduct, elects to affirm, he cannot later seek to avoid the contract and if he has
elected to avoid, he cannot later be allowed to affirm.”
38. In the instant case, Factsheet states, “….Consequently, on certain occasions, HPC Ltd.
encountered frequent problems with few LPT Machines, and unfortunately on 22nd October 2017
all machines malfunctioned. Mr. Tony appointed Mr. Steve and his tech-team for repair.”
Evidently, after malfunction of all LPT Machines on 22 nd October 2017, instead of filling a suit
against Mr. Steve Rovers, the plaintiff appointed him and his tech-team for repair. Thus,
appointment of Mr. Steve Rovers and his tech-team for repairing mal-functioned LPT’s amounts
to affirmation and thereby, Contract is not avoided at the option of Mr. Tony Snark and Contract
dated 14th August 2017 is valid and effective.
B. RESCISSION
39. The express and unequivocal cancellation of contract by one party is ‘rescind’. The rescission
needs to be communicated in the same manner as the acceptance of the proposal or the proposal
is communicated to the other party. Rescission is available under the cases where consent of a
party is obtained by fraud or coercion or by misrepresentation. It’s submitted that the consent of
HPC Ltd was not obtained by any fraud or by any misrepresentation as no deceit and no
intention to deceive was there.
(a) LIMITS OF RESCISSION
22
§14, Contract Act.
23
A.I.R. 1943 Cal 162.

40. There are certain limits to the right of rescission as if the person entitle to rescind has agrees or
implies or expresses to put out the things in the former condition or state or agrees to repair the
things than that means the person has lost the right to rescind because of his agreeing which
ultimately ulters the main subject or object of the main contract.
 AFFIRMATION
41. If the party affirms then the election of that party is determined forever which means that the
party after finding out about the facts affecting the contract then to affirms and gives consent to
continue the contracts means the contract is not avoided and so not a voidable contract .
42. As in the case of Senanayke v. Cheng24 plaintiff purchased a lorry on the representation of being
‘in first class condition was found to have some defects when driven on the business purposes
.The seller agreed to pay half the price for removing those defects .It was taken for business
purposes, but it broke down again .In an action for rescission for innocent misrepresentation the
court held that even if the plaintiff has the right to rescission he lost it in the circumstances of the
case.
43. Under Section 27 of Specific Relief Act, 196325:-
Section 27(1): Any person interested in a contract may sue to have it rescinded, and such
rescission may be adjust by the court in any of the following cases, namely:-
a. Where Contract is voidable or terminable by the plaintiff
b. Where the Contract is unlawful for causes not apparent on its face and the defendant is
not to blamed than the plaintiff
Section 27(2): Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Court may refuse to
rescind the Contract-
a. Where the plaintiff has expressly or impliedly ratified the contract; or

b. Where, owing to the change of circumstances which have taken place since the making of
the contract(not being due to any act of the defendant himself), the parties cannot be
substantially restored to the position in which they stood when the contract was made; or
c. Where third parties have ,during the subsistence of the contract , acquired rights in good
faith without notice and for value; or
24
(1966) A.C. 63.
25
§27, Special Relief Act, 1963.

d. Where only a part of contract is sought to be rescinded and such part is not severable
from the rest of the contract.
44. In the instant case, Appointment of Mr. Steve Rovers and his Tech-Team amounts to the
affirmation to continue the contract and Section 27(2) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 Rescission
cannot be provided if the plaintiff expressly or impliedly ratified the contract. Thus, Contract
dated 14th August 2017 is not voidable at the option of Mr. Tony Snark.
C. ORDINARY DILIGENCE
45. If a party or a person can found with ordinary diligence that the misrepresentation has been
made but still he continues to the contract then the party or person whose consent is so obtained
and who is affected by the misrepresentation person cannot avoid the contract.
46. Ordinary diligence is an exception to the Section 19 of Indian Contract Act of 187226, and it
applies where the party who is affected might with diligence, have discovered ,or had the means
of so discovering the misrepresentation before he had enter into the contract; in such a case, he
was deceived by the misrepresentation.
47. As in the case of Shoshi Mohunpal Chowdhary v. Nobokrishto Poddar27A purchaser of rice stood
up at a place to which he had an easy access refused to take delivery on the ground that the rice
was of an inferior quality to the contracted for, it was held that he could not rescind the contract,
for he could have discovered the inferiority of the quality by using ‘ordinary diligence’. Failure
by a person to make such enquiries as an ordinary prudent person would make, may be evidence
of the fact that such person was not deceived.
48. The exception is also applicable to silence amounting to fraud as person buying the goods should
check it properly, when there is means of discovering truth by ordinary diligence.
49. In the instant case the defendant have not obtained the consent of the plaintiffs by causing
coercion ,fraud or misrepresentation as it’s clear from the factsheet that the plaintiffs comes to
form contract by doing there research from which they got good result and then they form
contract, so nowhere the consent is taken by fraud or coercion or by misrepresentation ,the
defendants were silent on the fact that the machine have a patent defect but exception to Section
19 of Indian Contract Act,1872 provides if we are silent on certain fact which can be seen by
26
§19, Contract Act.
27
(1879) I.L.R. 4 C.L. 801.

ordinary diligence, then the contract can’t be held voidable. As there is no violation on behalf of
defendants of any of the essentials of Section 19 of Indian Contract Act Of 1872, and the
plaintiffs also affirms to continue the contract and appointed Mr. Steve and tech to repair the
machines and so the conduct of Mr. Tony Snark implies that he continued the contract and didn’t
avoid which means the contract remains valid and not voidable at option of Mr. Tony Snark.
ISSUE 3: - WHETHER MR. STEVE ROVERS IS LIABLE TO COMPENSATE AMY SANTIAGO FOR
THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND AND HER SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF LIVELIHOOD?
50. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asnard that Ms. Amy Santiago, a
pregnant lady with 8 years old daughter, lost her husband, who was the sole bread earner of the
family, as a consequence of the death of her husband she has lost her livelihood 28. But, Mr. Steve
Rovers, being supplier and service provider of LPT Machines could not liable to compensate
Amy Santiago as he is not the producer of ‘Lobanza’ and it is the chemical composition forming
‘Lobanza’ responsible for the death of Amy’s husband. Moreover, Amy’s husband, Pablo
Escocar started to consume ‘Lobanza’ without prescribing any doctor and also smoking while
consuming ‘Lobanza’ whereas doing this is strongly prohibited.
51. The court awards compensation to the plaintiff for the injury or damage which is caused to him
by the wrongful act of defendant. The court decides to compensate after enquiring into:
1) Damage alleged caused by the wrongful act of Defendant?
2) Was it remote?
A. DAMAGE NOT CAUSED BY DEFENDANT
52. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asnard that, if the damage caused is
not by the wrongful act of defendant and so he will not be liable to pay damages, and if the
damage is not occurred by the fault of defendant then the plaintiff cannot claim the damages.
28

After an act is committed, there can be consequences of an act, may be endless or there may be
consequences of consequences.
53. In the instant case, the plaintiff HPC Ltd. came in the contract with Steve Rovers and purchased
machine having patent defects which can be seen with due diligence and so the plaintiff was at
own fault as he was negligent and omitted to check the machines after that the HPC Ltd.
produced Lobanza capsules with the machines and sold them in market, the plaintiff alleges that
the death of Mr. Pablo Escocar is due to the patent defects in the machine but there is no duty to
disclose all the facts regarding machines as defects are ‘patent’ in nature and could be discovered
by ordinary means of diligence. So, there is no default on the part of the defendant but on the
other hand, it is the plaintiff, who is at default.
B. REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES
54. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Asnard that, in the instant case the
death is in relation to an act, the act is just a mere silence regarding to the patent defects, and
mere silence didn’t amount to fraud or deceit, which means that defendants didn’t commit any
fraud and perform his duty of care instead of breaching it. So, Mr. Steve Rovers has no default
on his part and it is the duty of Mr. Tony Snark to check patent defects in LPT Machines, and
default on the part of Pablo Escocar, who without consulting doctor started to consume
‘Lobanza’ and did not refrain smoking although it is strongly advised by HPC Ltd. Hence, Mr.
Steve Rovers is not liable to compensate Amy Santiago for the death of her husband and her
consequent loss of livelihood.
55. Problem of remoteness:-
Illustration-
“A cyclist negligently hits a pedestrian who was a carrying a bomb in his pocket .When the
pedestrian falls down the bomb explodes and due to which the explosion of bomb injured many
individuals around him the act of cyclist leads to the explosion of bomb which was in the pocket
of the pedestrian but the cyclist was held responsible only for the hit to pedestrian.”
As Lord Wright has said, “the law cannot take account of everything that follows a wrongful
act; it regards some subsequent matters as outside the scope of its selection, because it was
infinite for the law to judge the cause of causes, or consequences of consequences. In the varied

web of affairs, the law must abstract some consequences as relevant, not perhaps on ground of
pure logic but simply for practical reasons.” 29
Which means that a person cannot be made liable for all the consequences of consequences. He
can only be made responsible for the direct consequences of his wrongful act and the
consequences which are foreseeable and not remote.
56. In the instant case also the mere silence was just to the HPC Ltd and not to the husband of Ami
Santiago, Mr. Pablo Escocar consumed the medicine which was produced by the companions of
the wife of Late Pablo Escocar in the suit against us. There may have been a change of chemical
composition because of the defects in the machines or if the capsule were not in a condition to be
consumed then why they were supplied for the sale to the market, the plaintiffs HPC Ltd our
making us liable for their own fault, they didn’t check them or they were having a bad chemical
composition.
57. In order that the action against plaintiff succeeds, it has to be shown that the defendant’s
wrongful act is the main reason for the damage. In the case of Lampert v. Eastern National
Omnibus Co.30, due to the negligence of the defendants, the plaintiff, a married woman, was
injured and that resulted in her severe disfigurement. Sometime afterwards she was deserted by
her husband. She wanted to claim damages for the same. It was found that the real cause of the
desertion of the plaintiff was not her disfigurement but the estranged relations between the
plaintiff and her husband, which existed even before the accident, and therefore the defendant
was held not liable on that account to pay compensation.
58. To measure the damage there are two test ‘The test of reasonable foresight’ and ‘the test of
directness’. More importance is given to test of reasonable foresightedness over test of
directness.
(a) The test of reasonable foresight:

This test is based on the case of Wagon mound; the facts of the case are as:
The Wagon Mound, an oil burning vessel, was chartered by the appellants, Overseas Tankship
Ltd., and it was taking fuel oil at Sydney port. At a distance of about 600 feet, the respondents,
Morts Dock Company owned a wharf, where the repairs of a ship, including, some welding
operations were going on. Due to the negligence of appellant’s servants, a large quantity of oil
29
Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison, (1939) A.C. 449.
30
(1954) 1 WLR 1047.

was split on the water. The oil which was spread over the water was carried to the respondent’s
wharf .About 60 hours thereafter, molten metal from the respondent’s wharf fell on floating
cotton waste, which ignited the fuel oil on the water and the fire caused great damage to the
wharf and equipment. It was also found that the appellants could not foresee that the oil so split
would catch fire.
The Lordships held that, It is a principle of civil liability ,subject only to qualifications which
have no present relevance, that a man must be considered responsible for the probable
consequence of his act and for the man who can reasonably foresee the damage will be held
liable .31
59. The House of Lords in Hughes v. Lord Advocate, Jolly v. Sutton London Borough Council and
the court of Appeal in Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co.32 accepted the Privy Council
decision in Wagon Mound case that if the damage suffered is altogether different in kind, the test
of foreseeability is not satisfied, and the plaintiff cannot recover.
60. Intervening acts or events , this principle of intervention by other acts or events is based on the
maxim Novus Actus Interveniens, if a an act has been committed and that act set causation in
motion than the party who committed the first act will not be responsible for the breach of duty
and so will not be held liable for the damage as in the case of Wright v. Lodge 33recklessness of a
third party as distinguished from his mere negligence may break the chain of causation and a car
was broke down at night in fog on dual carriageway .the driver of the car was negligent and
leave the car on the carriageway and didn’t move the car on verge , a lorry driver recklessly
collided with the stationary car and overturned on the opposite side of the carriageway , two
other cars collided with the overturned lorry. It was held that the lorry driver’s reckless driving
broke the chain of causation and so, the lorry driver is responsible and not the defendant.
A defendant is not liable for all loss suffered by the plaintiff in consequence of his so acting a
defendant is only liable for such part of plaintiff’s loss as is properly ,to be regarded as caused
by the defendant’s breach of duty. Held in the case of Geest plc v.Lansiquot34.
61. The starting point is that a defender is not liable for a consequence of a kind which is not
foreseeable , while a defender is not liable for a damage that was not reasonably foreseeable, it
does not follow that he is liable for all damage that was reasonably foreseeable: depending on the
31
Mount Wagon Case, (1961) 1 All ER 404.
32
(1964) 1 QB 518.
33
A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3110.
34
(2002) UKPC 48.

circumstances, the defender may not be liable for the damage which caused by novus actus
interveniens or unreasonable conduct on the part of pursuer, even if it was reasonably
foreseeable. In the case of Cobb v. G.W. Ry Co., the plaintiff alleged that he had suffered
damage through being robbed while a passenger on the defendant’s railway and that through the
refusal of defendant’s servants to stop the train and afford him facilities for arresting the persons
who had robbed him; he was prevented from recovering the property stolen. It was held that the
damages claimed were too remote and can’t be given.
48. In the Hegarty v. Shine35, it has, however, been held that mere concealment may not be such a
fraud as to vitiate consent. There the plaintiff paramour have infected her with venereal disease
and she, therefore, brought an action for assault. The action failed partly on the ground that mere
non-disclosure of the disease by the plaintiff was not such a fraud as to vitiate consent, and partly
on the ground as to vitiate consent.
49. In the case of R v.Clarence36, it was held that a husband will not be liable for an offence when
the intercourse with his wife infected her with veneral disease, even though the husband failed to
make her aware about the conditions.
50. In the instant case, the act of concealing the fact by the defendant that his LPT Machines have
‘patent defect’ is not amounting to the negligence under torts or fraud under Section 17 of Indian
Contract Act, 1872 as patent defects are those defects, which can be seen by reasonable
inspection and when there is means of discovering the truth by ordinary diligence, the act of
concealment is not reckless, careless or fraud. When there is no breach of duty then, the
defendant, Mr. Steve Rovers will not be liable for any damage. So, Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable
to compensate Amy Santiago for the death of her husband and her consequent loss of livelihood.
C. RIGHT OF LIVELIHOOD IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND, IS AVAILABLE ONLY

AGAINST STATE
35
(1878) 14 Cox C.C. 145.
36
(1889) 22 QB 23.

ISSUE4. WHEATHER MR. STEVE ROVERS, BEING THE SUPPLIER AND SERVICE PROVIDER OF
LPT MACHINES, IS LIABLE TO COMPENSATE MR. TONY SNARK FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT?
51. It is humbly submitted before the Honorable Supreme Court of Asnard that the defendant has
performed his duty by delivering LPT Machines, although ‘patent’ defects in Machines does not
amount to any breach of duty on the part of the defendant as it is the duty of plaintiff to take
reasonable care at the time of delivery of machine and if the defects can be discovered with
ordinary diligence. So, there is no breach on the part of Mr. Steve Rovers as he has discharged
contract by performance of delivering LPT Machine to Mr. Tony Snark. So, Mr. Steve Rovers is
not liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for breach of Contract.
A. DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT BY PERFORMANCE
52. Each party to a contract is bound to perform his part of the obligation. After the parties have
made due performance of there part of the contract, their liability under the contract comes to
such a discharged contract, and nothing remains – neither any right to see performance or any
dispute.
53. The law provides that if there is a fixed date up to which the party needs to perform there part of
duty then the party needs to perform before or up to the date and if the person or party did not
perform their part before or up to the date than that means there is a breach of contract. But if the
other party is comfortable with late delivery or late performance of the contract than the
performance of contract will be considered valid and in consequence of that the party will be
discharged from the contract.
54. As in the case of Keshavlal Lallbhulli Patel and Others v. Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills 37 in this case
there was variance in date of performance by express representation by the defendants, agreed to
by the forbearance on the part of the plaintiffs.
55. In the another case of Pazhianappa Chettiyar v. South Indian Planting And Industrial Co. Ltd
and Another38 it was held that the contract was started with the fixed date for performance but
within the circumstance the date changes and so the contract was valid.
37
A.I.R. 1958 512.
38
(1967) 2 MLJ 1.

56. As in the case of Davias v. Cundasami Mudali39 held that if the promise grants extension of time
for the contract and no consideration is needed for the same.
57. As in the another case of Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel v. Lalbhai Trikumal Mills40 in this case it
was held that the extension of time must be by mutual understanding and not solely the decision
of the promise for his own benefit.
58. In the case of M/s Venkateswara Minerals V. JugalKishore41 for the valid extension of time the
plaintiffs should be aware about the extension of time.
59. In the another case of Muthaiya V. Lekha the seller cannot delay in the delivery of the goods on
his own just claim more money as on the next the prices are going to be high the seller will not
get the price which is expensive but the fixed one.
60. In the instant case, the defendants have performed there part of the duty on time but there was a
delay of 4 days in delivering the goods , but the goods were accepted by the HPC Ltd and they
didn’t show any apprehension on delays and paid the sum of 30 million dollars as the
consideration for the machines . According to the above stated Case Laws and according to the
Section 63 if the plaintiffs have accepted the extension of delay and the goods than there is no
essence of time which means in the instant case the defendants have performed there part of
contract and so they are not liable to compensate the plaintiffs. So, there is no breach on the part
of the defendant and Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark for breach of
Contract.
B. DEFAULT ON THE PART OF MR. TONY SNARK
61. Mr. Tony Snark is at default in the whole transaction as he has not only acted recklessly,
carelessly, and negligently but also does breach to the terms of contract by using LPT Machine
39
(1896) ILR 19 Mad 398.
40
(1959) SCR 292.
41
A.I.R. 1986 Kant 14.

for the production of other medicines with different chemical compositions, not agreed in the
terms of Contract.
(a) NO APPREHENSIONS TO DELAY IN DELIVERY

62. Section 55 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 talks about effect in delay of performance if the contract
is to perform on fixed time and if the performance is not done on fixed time then the contract is
voidable at the option of the promisee and law don’t give any remedy to promisor but if the
performance is accepted other than the time which is decided then , the promisee cannot claim
the loss occasioned due to the delay in performance, and if promisee is effected by the delay,
than the promisee have to give the notice to the other party about the loss and not accepting the
performance42, but if accepted than the performer is discharge by the duty and if discharge by the
duty than also discharge by the contract and so there after no liability arises to see the contract
working or not.
63. In the instant case the defendants have performed there part of duty, they have delivered the
machines to HPC Ltd and the HPC Ltd have accepted them , they also paid us after taking the
possession of the machines and they didn’t question the delay and didn’t shows any
apprehension regarding the delay of machines, defendants have not committed any fraud,
defendants didn’t misrepresented anything, the consent was free and so the contract can’t be
avoided , when the machines malfunctioned , Mr. Tony Snark appointed Mr. Steve Rovers and
his team for the repairing of machines and they didn’t avoid the contract so there is no breach of
contract on our part and so we are not liable to compensate HPC Ltd.
(b) USING LPT MACHINE AGAINST TERMS OF CONTRACT

64. In the instant case, Mr. Tony Snark used LPT Machine against the terms and condition of the
Contract dated 14th August 2017, as this was agreed that LPT Machines are required to produce
‘Lobanza’ Capsule but Mr. Tony Snark used it in the production of medicines with different
chemical compositions, which lead to the malfunction of machines. Hence, Mr. Steve Rovers is
not liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark as the defendant has not breach of contract and the
plaintiff is himself at fault.
42
§55, Contract Act.

(c) CARELESS AT INSPECTING LPT MACHINES

65. The nature of defect in the LPT Machines are “Patent”, which could be discovered by reasonable
inspection and if a person have means of discovering the truth by ordinary diligence, then the
defendant could not be liable for any breach. Thus, Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable to compensate
Mr. Tony Snark as the plaintiff is himself at his part.
66. Thus, Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable to compensate Mr. Tony Snark as the defendant because:
1. Mr. Steve Rovers have discharge the Contract by performance
2. Mr. Tony Snark has own fault as he uses LPT against terms of Contract.
3. Mr. Tony Snark has all means of discovering the defects in LPT Machines, but he fails to do
so.
4. Mr. Tony Snark has shown no apprehension on the delay of delivery of LPT Machines.

PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly requested that this Hon’ble Supreme Court may be pleased to:
a) Declare contract dated “14th August 2017” not by fraud.

b) Declare that the contract dated “14th August” is not voidable contract at the option of
HPC Ltd.
c) Declare that Mr. Steve Rovers is not liable to compensate Ms. Amy Santiago for the
death of her husband and her consequent loss of livelihood.
d) Declare that there is no breach of contract by Mr. Steve Rovers and so no liability arises
to compensate HPC Ltd.
And pass any such order which this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest of
Justice, Equity and Good Conscience. All of which is respectfully submitted.
For This Act of Kindness, the Respondents Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for the Respondents)

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TC-01

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF ASNARD

IN THE MATTERS CONCERNING

(UNDER ART. 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ASNARD)

HPC Ltd., & AMY SANTIAGO……………………………………………..…PLAINTIFF

STEVE ROVERS…………………..……………………………….... DEFENDANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

Cases Referred ………………………………………………………………………………….5

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 2.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 3.

7. DR. R.K. BANGIA, LAW OF TORTS (23 ed. 2013).

1. BRYAN A. GARDNER, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2001)

1. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 4.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 5.

Smith v. Chadwick (1884) 9 A.C. 184.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 6.

Amy Santiago & HPC Ltd. v. Mr. Steve Rovers

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 7.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 8.

1. WHETHER FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY MR. STEVE ROVERS UNDER SECTION 17 OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 9.

ISSUE 1: - WHETHER FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY MR. STEVE ROVERS UNDER

MR. TONY SNARK?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 10.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 11.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 12.

B. MERE SILENCE IS NO FRAUD

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 13.

(a) Caveat Emptor

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 14.

C. MEANS OF DISCOVERING TRUTH

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 15.

D. PLAINTIFF AT OWN FAULT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 16.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 17.

E. BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE PLAINTIFF

OF MR. TONY SNARK?

A. CONTRACT NEEDS TO BE AVOIDED, BEFORE IT BECOME UNAVOIDABLE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 18.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 19.

a. Where the plaintiff has expressly or impliedly ratified the contract; or

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 20.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 21.

A. DAMAGE NOT CAUSED BY DEFENDANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 22.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 23.

(a) The test of reasonable foresight:

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 24.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 25.

C. RIGHT OF LIVELIHOOD IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND, IS AVAILABLE ONLY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 26.

A. DISCHARGE OF CONTRACT BY PERFORMANCE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 27.

B. DEFAULT ON THE PART OF MR. TONY SNARK

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 28.

(a) NO APPREHENSIONS TO DELAY IN DELIVERY

(b) USING LPT MACHINE AGAINST TERMS OF CONTRACT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 29.

(c) CARELESS AT INSPECTING LPT MACHINES

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 30.

a) Declare contract dated “14th August 2017” not by fraud.