The Discordance Between the Axis Powers

Karen Armstrong
I. Introduction
World War II was the great battle of good vs. evil in the history of the world. The noble
Allied Powers went u against a genocidal maniac and his flun!ies to save the day and reserve
eace and democracy for all. "r so oular media and our culture would li!e us to believe. In
reality# erhas obviously# World War II was not so simle. The Allied Powers did their fair share
of unsavory things $including betraying established treaties themselves# articularly in the
relations between the %nited &tates and 'aan(# and the Axis Powers were not )evil*) every
single one of them had reasons# in some cases not unreasonable ones# for doing some of the
things they did. In addition# the Axis certainly were not the organi+ed gang of thugs they are
sometimes made out to be. While some contemoraries at the time# such as ,eo &trauss# a 'ew
who left -ermany in ./01 and never loo!ed bac!# believed -ermany was the ultimate aggressor
and the rest of the Axis were simly following along# a closer examination of the facts roves
this not to be true.
.
All of the Axis Powers# though this aer focuses on -ermany2s relationshi
with Italy and 'aan secifically# had their own agendas and goals# and none of them truly had
much control over the others# in site of what -ermany clearly wanted* to be the ringleader
during the war and then draw bac! and isolate itself into the erfect -erman3only state 4itler
desired. Because of this# cooeration and communication were oor# and there were many
roblems between the Axis Powers as a result# including trying to )use) each other as
distractions# unclear and roblematic treaties# overhyed senses of self3imortance# ersonality
clashes# and olitical betrayals. In reality# -ermany cared little about the well3being and interests
. ,eo &trauss# )The 5e36ducation of Axis 7ountries concerning the 'ews) $The Review of Politics 8/ $199:#
original ./;0(* <093<0=.
.
of Italy and 'aan so long as they could be used to -ermany2s advantage# which resulted in
discordance that would ultimately lead to the defeat of -ermany and her allies and the fall of the
Third 5eich.
II. &hared 4istories
It is imortant to understand the histories of -ermany# Italy# and 'aan in the inter3war
era and even a little before that# into the late ./
th
century. -ermany2s roblems began the minute
-erman troos marched into >rance near the beginning of World War I in a failed strategy to
crile their owerful neighbor to avoid fighting a two front war against both >rance and 5ussia.
?eedless to say# all did not go as lanned and -ermany was loc!ed in trench warfare on the
Western front for four bitter years with little to no gains at exonential cost in life and finances.
The Treaty of @ersailles# signed at the conclusion of the war# was widely unoular in -ermany
because of its harsh treatment of -ermany# esecially because the -ermans had technically won
on the 6astern front against 5ussia# which had crumled and withdrawn from the -reat War in
./.: to enter into its own bloody civil war. With that win# the -ermans had gained significant
territory in 6astern 6uroe# that they were then forced to relinAuish under the treaty they signed
at @ersailles. The onset of the -reat Deression also did not hel# which threw many -erman
civilians into overty# and all these events combined left many -ermans destitute and unsatisfied
with the olitics of the Weimar 5eublic. It was the erfect time for a young ustart from Austria
to ut his charismatic talents to wor! on the -erman eole.
-ermany2s road to World War II and her allegiances with Italy and 'aan began when
4itler was elected chancellor of -ermany in ./00. 4e made Auic! wor! of getting rid of
1
oosing olitical arties# esecially communists# and lacing his own fascist arty in comlete
control of the -erman state. 4itler2s olicies and ideals $esecially those involving his desire for
fascism and his hatred of communism( were instrumental in his and the other ?a+i leaders2
decisions to create alliances with whom they did# which will be detailed later in this aer. As a
country with a new fascist government and a lot to say# do# and gain on the world stage# 4itler
got straight to wor!# with disastrous results.
Italy was the first of the three maBor Axis owers to become fascist. In fact# it defined the
fascism revolution with the rise of Cussolini2s government in ./11. 4is rise to ower was the
result of a cou that too! over 5ome and instilled itself as the ruling ower in Italy# unli!e both
4itler and the 'aanese government# which were )fascist) on account of their citi+ens electing
them into ower. ,i!e -ermany# to see why Italy is a maBor layer in the Axis Powers it is
imortant to loo! at her history# esecially the swath of time after World War I. )Italy had
intervened in the War for two main reasons. The first was the desire to comlete its unity by
adding to the territory the Kingdom the Italian rovinces still held by Austria34ungary. The
second was the hoe of securing colonial outlets for its suerabundant oulation.)
1
Both of
these desires and the issues facing Italy at the conclusion of World War I led Italy to a act with
-ermany that would last from the late ./092s to the mid ./;92s.
The last maBor member of the Axis to go over is 'aan# which was an imortant member
of the Axis in site of its location relative to its allies. ,i!e -ermany in World War I# throughout
the late ./
th
and early 19
th
centuries# 'aan also struggled to ma!e a lace and name for itself on
the increasingly relevant international stage. To do this# the 'aanese eole began consuming
Western culture. They did their best to become )modern.) They went to cafes# dressed in western
1 ,uigi @illari# Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini. $?ew Dor!* Devin3Adler# ./<8(* 0.
0
clothes# and went to clubs. In other words# 'aan did their absolute best to become Bust li!e
America# >rance# and Britain so they would be seen as eAuals# even though it is unli!ely that ever
would have haened under the general "rientalist attitudes redominating Western culture at
the time. When 'aan still found themselves being treated as )Asians trying to be Western) and
not ta!en seriously by the Western owers# 'aan slowly grew more and more bitter at the West#
beginning to raise an emire of its own and turning against the countries it had once held close
ties with.
4owever# the real mystery to historians# both inside and outside 'aan# was how an
industriali+ed# democrati+ed country $'aan fought on the side of America# >rance# 5ussia# and
Britain during World War I( became the nation that allied with ?a+i -ermany and infamously
bombed the %& ?aval Base at Pearl 4arbor# drawing the %nited &tates into World War II. "ne
factor in the answer to this Auestion is# li!e -ermany and Italy# 'aan was not hay with the
outcome of the @ersailles &ystem. 'aan felt she had gotten next to nothing even after heling the
Allies win the war.
%nli!e -ermany and Italy# 'aan2s )fascist) government did not sei+e control of the
country and its olitical field by force. $)>ascist) is in Auotes because while the government of
'aan at the time might not have been fascist er se# they clearly saw similarities between
themselves and their soon3to3be Western allies in order to want to unite with -ermany and Italy
because of ideological reasons# who were fascist.( 5ather# they hiBac!ed the existing olitical
system and !et it in lace throughout the war and even afterwards with some minor
modifications after America resented them with a new constitution to follow ost3occuation.
4owever# various crisis at home and abroad# such as )economic deression# intense social
;
conflict# military exansion# and the assassination of rime ministers and leading caitalists)
eventually led 'aan away from democracy to embrace a form of fascism in the ./092s.
0
III. The >orming of the Axis
The Axis Powers officially formed on &etember 1:# ./;9# when -ermany# Italy# and
'aan all signed the Three3Power Pact in Berlin. The act stated that*
The governments of -ermany# Italy and 'aan# considering it as a condition recedent of
any lasting eace that all nations of the world be given each its own roer lace# have
decided to stand by and co3oerate with one another in regard to their efforts in greater
6ast Asia and regions of 6uroe resectively wherein it is their rime urose to establish
and maintain a new order of things calculated to romote the mutual roserity and
welfare of the eoles concerned. >urthermore# it is the desire of the three governments
to extend co3oeration to such nations in other sheres of the world as may be inclined to
ut forth endeavours along lines similar to their own# in order that their ultimate
asirations for world eace may thus be reali+ed.
;
At this oint# there were many reasons why such an alliance made sense and why it was
ultimately imlemented# esecially due to similar ideology EfascismF# similar hatred for another
ideology EcommunismF# racticality for a war that no one wanted $resumeably( but loo!ed
ossible# and similar shared histories# such as late industriali+ation. 4owever# there were some
early indications that roblems were already showing.
A maBor reason these three countries in articular chose to ally with each other was
because they shared a similar olitical ideology. Italy became fascist first# in ./11# while
-ermany and 'aan followed suit in the ./092s. >ascism was seen as the next big global
revolution to these eole# esecially in -ermany where there was a ramant fear of communism
0 Andrew -ordon# A Modern History of Japan: Fro To!ugawa Ties to Present $?ew Dor!* "xford %niversity
Press# 1990(* .=1.
; )Three3Power Pact Between -ermany# Italy# and 'aan.) The Avalon Pro"ect. Accessed Aril <# 19.0.
htt*GGavalon.law.yale.eduGwwiiGtriarti.as.
<
after the 5ussian 5evolution in ./.:. 'aan also held a disdain for communism# both because of
their want to be li!e the caitalist West but also because of their long3standing and bitter
relationshi with the &oviet %nion. Italy also had a desire to not see communism sread.
Another maBor reason for the alliances was racticality for the coming war. 4itler and
?a+i3led -ermany wanted to create an isolated -erman state in 6uroe but !new they would
need distractions to !ee the other Western owers out of their way while they conAuered other
nations to build it. 'aan2s reasons for involvement in the war were ainfully obvious* to combat
communism and allow for the sread of their own budding emire. 6ver since emerging as a
modern ower# they had ta!en on the 5ussians and the 7hinese in the 5usso3'aanese $./9;3
./9<( and &ino3'aanese $.=/;3.=/<( wars resectively# and done extremely well# building an
emire for themselves in 6ast Asia. With the Western owers moving towards war it seemed li!e
a good oortunity for 'aan to sei+e more territory from 7hina# 5ussia# and in the &outh Pacific*
)As 4itler2s regime moved toward war in 6uroe# the 4inamura government was attracted to the
idea of an alliance with ?a+i -ermany to counter both &oviet and Western ower in Asia.)
<
4owever# -ermany really only wanted to use 'aan as a device to !ee the %nited &tates# as well
as 6ngland and >rance and any other Western ower that was a threat to them# neutral and
distracted while 4itler achieved his goals in 6uroe* )-ermany2s chief aim in the Western
4emishere was to !ee the %nited &tates at least temorarily neutral# and to that end she tried to
use 'aan as a counteroise.)
8
The Axis Powers all had some interesting commonalities in their histories# esecially a
somewhat late industriali+ation. In the case of -ermany and Italy# they were both also new states
< -ordon# A Modern History of Japan# 19:.
8 4.,. Trefousse# )-ermany and Pearl 4arbor#) $The Far #astern $uarterly .. $./<.(* 0<3<9(* 0<.
8
geograhically because unification of many smaller states had haened in both cases. Bac! in
World War I# this was actually something -erman roaganda drew on# ortraying their country
as somehow secial and more modern than their enemies. They were the heralds of change#
while >rance and -reat Britain were relics of a bygone era socially# desite how technologically
advanced they were. Western owers# as well as 'aan itself# eventually began to feel that 'aan
was secial too# for having industriali+ed in only thirty years to catch u with the rest of the
world.
Another reason was simly hurt feelings still lingering from World War I# which have
already been exlained as a maBor reason for the fascist revolutions in both -ermany and Italy.
'aan also felt# li!e -ermany# that it had been shortchanged at @ersailles after contributing# in
their eyes# greatly to the war effort during World War I and getting next to nothing out of it. With
a fledgeling emire in the face of imerialism falling out of fashion in the West# as well as
several dilomatic betrayals from the %nited &tates $which 'aan was not unBustified in feeling(
'aan began to drift further and further away from its once3allies in the West. Italy also faced
similar issues# with a number of rows with -reat Britain and >rance ultimately culminating in the
fascist cou that brought Cussolini to ower.
In reality# the alliance between 'aan and -ermany went bac! even further than
-ermany2s alliance with 5ome. In ./0;# a young 'aanese military officer# "shima 4iroshi# was
assigned to be 'aan2s military attachH in Berlin. It was through his dilomatic actions that the
Anti37omintern Pact was forged in the first lace# laying the framewor! for 'aan2s later
comlete and utter alliance with -ermany and Italy in the Three3Power Pact Between -ermany#
Italy# and 'aan.
:
: 7arl Boyd# )The Berlin3To!yo Axis and 'aanese Cilitary Initiative) $Modern Asian %tudies .< $./=.(* 0..3
:
-ermany2s initial relations with Italy were roc!y at best# desite the fact that 4itler had
long wanted Cussolini as an ally. The main concern was Austria# since while it had always been
on 4itler2s mind to annex Austria# )Cussolini referred the indeendence of the small Austria
created by the ././ eace treaties to the alternative of having a much more owerful -erman
neighbor on the northern border.)
=
Austria remained a roblem# however# because while Austria
had many ethnic -ermans that 4itler had a self3rofessed interest in# and it was clear that one of
his main goals was to conAuer his native Austria and return it to its roer lace as art of a
greater -erman state# Italy also had interest in Austria because Austria )still held the Italian3
sea!ing rovinces on the northern and northeastern frontiers.)
/
4ow to roceed on the matter of
Austria caused a divide between -ermany and Italy from the beginning. >inally# -ermany
succeeded in reairing relationshis with Austria over the common goal of ensuring &ain
emerged fascist from the revolution and civil war it was undergoing at the time. Desite
Cussolini2s ersonal disli!e of 4itler# which will be discussed later# he believed an alliance with
-ermany was a good move militarily* )In demograhic# economic# and military strength# . . . the
trends were clearly in -ermany2s favor.)
.9
&ain is an entirely odd matter on its own# because while 4itler ersonally li!ed
Cussolini he absolutely hated >ranco# and this seems to be a maBor reason for him simly not
wanting to engage in an alliance with fascist &ain# even though it would stand to reason that the
countries with newly3formed fascist ideologies should stand together against their communist
enemies as well as more moderate Western owers who did not li!e what they were seeing.
00=(* .31.
= -erhard ,. Weinberg# )>oreign Policy in Peace and War#) in &a'i (erany) ed. 'ane 7alan. $?ew Dor!*
"xford %niversity Press# 199=(# .//.
/ @illari# Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini# <.
.9 5ichard ,.Di?ardo# (erany and the A*is Powers: Fro +oalition to +ollapse $,awrence* %niversity of
Kansas Press# 199<(* 1:.
=
While it is true 4itler wanted to use the ongoing conflict in &ain to buy his own armies time to
rearm# it is odd that he# and his regime# did not seem to want fascist &ain as an ally alongside
Italy and 'aan# since another >ascist country in Western 6uroe would have undeniably heled
the Axis war effort.
It is also odd that 4itler was so willing to see! hel from non3)Aryan) nations# due to his
extreme views on race and sueriority. Perhas olitical ideology trumed race in some cases in
his mind. This is esecially true in 'aan2s case# because 'aanese certainly would not have
counted as )Aryan#) but Italy was not exactly ethnically -erman either. It ma!es one wonder
what 4itler2s lans for his allies would have been had the Axis won the war. Would he have
wanted to ta!e what they had obtained in the war as wellI "r would he have simly not cared
what they did so long as they left his erfect little -erman state aloneI
A ossible answer to these Auestions is that 4itler simly did not want to ally with
anyone# and his alliance with Italy was based mostly# if not solely# on his hero worshi of
Cussolini. After all# )6ven when -ermans were at the height of their ower# 4itler reBected any
attemt to forge alliances with subordinate owers. . . . 4e reBected meaningful collaboration
with other fascist movements on the continentJ the only excetion was his alliance with Italy.)
..

'aan was on the other side of the world and 4itler simly did not care one way or the other what
they did# so long as they acted as a distraction for the &oviet %nion# 7hina# and the %nited &tates.
This shows in the multitude of failed communications in military matters between the two fascist
states.
-ermany# and 4itler in articular# seemed to have wanted to !ee >ascism alive# but not
in any way as to threaten -ermany2s dominance on the continent. When von 4assel# the -erman
.. Peter >rit+sche# ,ife and -eath in the Third Reich) $4arvard %niversity Press* 199/(* .<<.
/
ambassador to 5ome# reorted bac! to 4itler in 'anuary of ./08# he said*
We must do everything to revent the various oonents throughout the world of the
authoritarian system of government from concentrating uon us as their sole obBect. But
aart from this it was also in our interests that Italy as a iece uon the 6uroean
chessboard should not be wea!ened too much. There was a time# esecially after
Cussolini2s well3!nown demonstrations at the Brenner Pass# when erhas we might not
have wished to see Italy emerge from the conflict too great or too victorious# but
nowadays this danger surely no longer existed to any considerable degree. "n the
contrary# it was much more to be feared that >ascism# and indeed Italy herself# might be
destroyed or at least emerge seriously imaired by the ordeal.
.1
This statement shows Bust how -ermany viewed her alliances. They were only worth it if
-ermany could use them as a means to an end# such as acting as a distraction for -ermany2s
enemies or for !eeing >ascism alive in the form 4itler and his eole wanted it to be# and they
should never be allowed to surass -ermany in ower.
"bviously there was a lot of hyocrisy in official statements as well. When 5ibbentrom
made a tri to 6ngland in late ./08 4itler urged 5ibbentrom to* ). . . get Britain to Boin the
Anti37omintern act# that is what I want most of all. . . . But if in future all our efforts are still in
vain# fair enough# then I2m ready for war as well. I would regret it very much# but if it has to be#
there it is.)
.0
While it is arguable that 4itler did in fact want war# it does not seem li!e he did. In
other words# 4itler and -ermany were laying the field comletely to their advantage# did not
care who li!ed them and allied with them or did not li!e them and fought with them as long as
-ermany emerged as an isolated# ethnic -erman state.
Digging deeer into the )'ewish Kuestion) as well as the )>inal &olution#) it seems that
there was some effort# or at least the Allies thought there was some effort# on -ermany2s art to
convince the other Axis Powers of 4itler2s views on the 'ews# and this would not be a stretch. In
.1 );/8.) In &a'is) ././0./12: A -ocuentary Reader. 6dited by 'eremy ?oa!es and -eoffrey Pridham# 88=.
6xeter* %niversity of 6xeter Press. .//=.
.0 );//.) In &a'is) ././0./12: A -ocuentary Reader. 6dited by 'eremy ?oa!es and -eoffrey Pridham# 88=.
6xeter* %niversity of 6xeter Press. .//=.
.9
the seech )The 5e36ducation of the Axis 7ountries concerning the 'ews#) given by ,eo &trauss
$who was 'ewish himself( on ?ovember :# ./;0 at the ?ew &chool for &ocial 5esearch# he
clearly seems to believe that there has been some coercion and forcing of -ermany2s anti3&emitic
olicies on the rest of its Axis allies. 4e states*
In the remar!s which I am going to ma!e# I shall limit myself to -ermany# in the first
lace# because I have some firsthand !nowledge of -ermany# whereas I have none of any
other Axis country. It is only fair that I should add that even my firsthand !nowledge of
-ermany is very limited* I left that country in ./01 and never returned to it afterward.
&econdly# the roblem before us concerns -ermany much more than any other country.
The other 6uroean Axis countries are as much the victims as they are the allies of
-ermany.
.;
This statement heavily imlies that ,eo &trauss believes -ermany is the aggressor# and it is
-ermany that is the roblem# not the rest of the Axis Powers# though it is un!nown if he is
referring only to the smaller countries $which he does mention( or them as well as Italy and
ossibly even 'aan $which he does not mention# but also says that is not his rimary toic(. But
in a way he seems to be trying to excuse these other countries from any actions they might ta!e
against their 'ewish residents because -ermany was the one goading them on. ?ow whether or
not this extends all the way to Italy he does not say# though given how 4itler ersonally met
Cussolini and corresonded with him many times throughout their alliance as well as 4itler2s
obsession with eradicating the 'ew from 6uroe# it is not imossible to assume that at some oint
he tried to convince his )ally) of this )necessity.)
There are some issues to ta!e with &trauss2 osition# however. -ranted# this man was
'ewish and undoubtedly wanted the Allied Powers as well as the rest of the world to Bust blame
-ermany for the mass !illings that had begun haening in -ermany and -erman3held
territories at the time# but the reality is Anti3&emitism had existed for centuries in 6uroe $as a
.; ,eo &trauss# )The 5e36ducation of Axis 7ountries concerning the 'ews#) <093<0..
..
matter of fact it was comletely acceted# even fashionable# before the 4olocaust( and 4itler
simly made it the forefront of his olicy and too! advantage of a hatred that was already
resent. It is wrong of &trauss# good as his intentions may be# to excuse the other Axis countries
of any blame in the war# as well as in the 4olocaust# though once again he does not mention that
because he robably did not !now the extent of what was going on in the concentration cams in
./;0# at the height of the !illings.
I@. 4ow It >ell Aart
As early as ./0/# roblems began to show in the communication and trust the Axis
Powers had in each other. Indeed# 6li+abeth Wis!emann wrote in ./;8 that* )?o serious erson
suosed in ./;9# when Cussolini went to war with -reat Britain and >rance# that the Axis
alliance was oular in either Italy or -ermany.)
.<
In the Anti37omitern Pact between -ermany and 'aan# signed in ./08# they state they
would )mutually !ee each other informed concerning the activities of the 7ommunistic
International# EandF will confer uon the necessary measure of defense# and will carry out such
measures in close co3oeration.)
.8
The act had a five year san# and it is unclear whether or not
it would have been extended if things had gone better for the Axis. This sounded fine and was in
erfect agreement with both -ermany and 'aan2s anti3communist rhetoric at the time. 4owever#
when 4itler forged a nonaggression treaty with &talin in ./0/
.:
$which he would famously later
brea! himself( the 'aanese government got understandably uset and the rime minister at the
.< 6li+abeth Wis!emann# )The Brea!ing of the Axis) $International Affairs 11 $./;8(* 11:310/(* 11:.
.8 )Anti37omintern Pact.) The Avalon Pro"ect. Accessed Aril <# 19.0. htt*GGavalon.law.yale.eduGwwiiGtri..as.
.: )Treaty of ?onaggression Between -ermany and the %nion of &oviet &ocialist 5eublics.) The Avalon Pro"ect.
Accessed Aril <# 19.0. htt*GGavalon.law.yale.eduG19thLcenturyGnonagres.as.
.1
time# 4inamura# angered and ashamed by the betrayal# resigned.
.=
'aan had a right to feel this
way# because -ermany had also been carrying out secret meetings with the &oviet %nion. In
August ./0/# the 5eich >oreign Cinister met with &talin and attemted to )exlain away)
-ermany2s alliance with the &oviet %nion2s foremost enemy in the 6ast* )The 5eich >oreign
Cinister stated that the -erman3'aanese friendshi was in no wise directed against the &oviet
%nion. We were# rather# in a osition# owing to our good relations with 'aan# to ma!e an
effective contribution to an adBustment of the differences between the &oviet %nion and 'aan.)
./
-ermany was essentially trying to aint its relationshis with the two mortal enemies as a good
thing to acify the &oviet %nion# that -ermany was interested in eace between 'aan and the
&oviet %nion# when in reality -ermany was in it for herself and did not articularly care what
haened to her allies so long as she got what she wanted out of the deal. The document is also
labeled as )@ery &ecretM &tate &ecret) on the to# showing that at the time -ermany and the
&oviet %nion did not want anyone on either side of the ucoming war to !now these meetings
were ta!ing lace. This going behind the bac!s of her 'aanese ally# and later her &oviet ally# was
not a smart move for -ermany and would ultimately lead to her downfall.
-eneral Togo# who would later become one of the most desised names to emerge from
World War II# was not in favor of any sort of military alliance between 'aan and -ermany.
)Togo felt that a -erman3'aanese military alliance would be of no hel in 'aan2s efforts to end
her war with 7hina# and that it would eventually involve 'aan in a conflict with 4itler2s
6uroean adversaries.)
19
It was "shima who heled ush the measures through and convince
.= -ordon# A Modern History of Japan) 19:.
./ )Cemorandum of a 7onversation 4eld on the ?ight of August 10d to 1;th# Between the 5eich >oreign
Cinister# on the "ne 4and# and 4err &talin and the 7hairman of the 7ouncil of Peole2s 7ommissars Colotov#
on the "ther 4and.) The Avalon Pro"ect. Accessed Aril <# 19.0.
htt*GGavalon.law.yale.eduG19thLcenturyGns9<0.as
19 Boyd# )The Berlin3To!yo Axis and 'aanese Cilitary Initiative#) 01:.
.0
'aan that a military alliance with -ermany was in both countries2 best interests. This only goes
to show that even -ermany2s allies were uneasy about getting into an alliance with her# fearing
that they would get drawn into a 6uroean war that 'aan undoubtedly felt was none of its
business.
'aan also initially did not resond well to what -ermany wanted them to do* )&he
E-ermanyF attemted to ersuade 'aan to attac! the Dutch and British emires# and later to
attac! &iberia. The 'aanese# however# refused to go along# and even tried to come to some
agreement with the %nited &tates.)
1.
"nly when those negotiations failed did 'aan bomb Pearl
4arbor# and -ermany $and erhas Italy( must not have li!ed this because mere days after Pearl
4arbor haened# the Pact Between the Axis Powers Barring a &earate Peace with the %nited
&tates or -reat Britain was signed# on December ..# ./;..
11
This act forced all three countries
to do exactly as its title states. This goes to show the attemts -ermany made to try and get its
allies to do what it wanted them to do# to no avail. Instead of wor!ing together they each tried to
outdo each other# which heled lead to their downfall.
Personality clashes were another maBor issue that the Axis faced but were unable to
overcome# esecially in the 5ome3Berlin Axis. While 4itler had comletely and utterly raised
Cussolini* )What will ran! Cussolini among the great men of this earth is his determination not
to share Italy with the Carxists# but to destroy internationalism and save the fatherland from it#)
10
by all accounts Cussolini did not li!e 4itler ersonally and only agreed to the alliance because
he believed in the benefits the alliance would offer both him and Italy. Cussolini also did not li!e
Mein 3apf# and reortedly never read it because he could not get through it. Their ersonal
1. Trefousse# )-ermany and Pearl 4arbor#) 0<.
11 )Pact Between the Axis Powers Barring a &earate Peace with the %nited &tates or -reat Britian.) The Avalon
Pro"ect. Accessed Aril <# 19.0. htt*GGavalon.law.yale.eduGwwiiGtriart.as.
10 Adolf 4itler# Mein 3apf) Accessed Aril 09# 19.0. htt*GGwww.hitler.orgGwritingsGCeinLKamfG.
.;
corresondence shows us this much. In letters written in August ./0/# 4itler goes on and on#
as!ing Cussolini about his oinion on various foreign olicy issues and exlaining himself
thoroughly# as if a lot of thought and caring were ut behind his words. Cussolini2s rely letter#
on the other hand# is very short and curt# ortraying a )Des# 4itler#) or )?o# 4itler#) feeling# as if
he had nowhere near the same enthusiasm 4itler did about their relationshi.
1;
There was little to no coordination between the Axis Powers and their governments#
desite the romise of cooeration. The idea was simly that -ermany would ta!e most of
6uroe# while Italy could have southern 6uroe and the Cediterranean and 'aan could retty
much do whatever they wanted in 6ast Asia# because 4itler did not seem overly concerned. This
is selled out in the Three Power Pact in the first two articles. Article "ne reads* )'aan
recogni+es and resects the leadershi of -ermany and Italy in establishment of a new order in
6uroe#) while Article Two reads* )-ermany and Italy recogni+e and resect the leadershi of
'aan in the establishment of a new order in greater 6ast Asia.)
1<
While it is agreed that the three
governments will cooerate to achieve these goals# the way they were going about it was still
extremely fragmented# giving one government comlete control over a certain region but nothing
else. And it does not secify which parts of 6uroe Italy and -ermany were resectfully in
charge of. Cany treaties between countries of this nature are very secific when it comes to
dividing u territory# usually through landmar!s such as rivers or mountain ranges# or even exact
coordinates. This vagueness of wording therefore oens u the ossibility of Auarreling over who
is entitled to what# which did haen# as will be tal!ed about next in regards to 7roatia and the
1; ),etter from 4itler to Cussolini# August 1<# ./0/.) The Avalon Pro"ect. Accessed Aril <# 19.0.
htt*GGavalon.law.yale.eduG19thLcenturyGns9<:.as.
and ),etter from Cussolini to 4itler# August 1<# ./0/.) The Avalon Pro"ect. Accessed Aril <# 19.0.
htt*GGavalon.law.yale.eduG19thLcenturyGns9<=.as.
1< )Three3Power Pact Between -ermany# Italy# and 'aan.)
.<
issue of Austria as mentioned earlier in the argument.
There was even some outright cometition between the suosed allies# esecially
between -ermany and Italy in 6astern 6uroe. In his article# )5ivalry between -ermany and
Italy in 7roatia# ./;13./;0#) &rdBan Trif!oviN goes over some of the things the ?a+is did# though
not in the oen# to assert their control# esecially in economic matters# over a country and region
that had been agreed uon to belong to Italy. There were reasons for this# but the result was
ultimately distrust that began to manifest itself between the two allies*
4itler and his aides constantly reiterated to their Italian allies that Italy enBoyed
recedence in 7roatia. 4owever# by the second half of ./;1# -ermany was beginning to
lay an ever increasing role in 7roatian military and olitical affairs. Two factors
contributed to this. "ne was the rise of insurgent activity# which occasionally threatened
!ey military and economic interests# such as the railroad from Belgrade to Oagreb and the
mining of strategic minerals in Bosnia34er+egovina. The other factor# otentially more
serious# was the external threat to the Bal!an eninsula. >or the first time# -erman
commanders had to consider the ossibility of an Allied landing on the Adriatic coast. In
order to deal with both threats# the -ermans had to disregard old Italian claims to
recedence in the Indeendent &tate of 7roatia. At first# it seems# this did not haen due
to an elaborate design# but more or less incrementally and sontaneouslyPBust as most
-erman arrangements in occuied 6uroe tended to roceed.
18
Perhas this was a by3roduct of the issues surrounding 4itler2s foreign olicy# because it does
not seem that he# or his arty# had any real secific ideas of what the world would loo! li!e once
the war was over* )7ometing ideas and designs for a ?ew "rder only had to fit into the
>uhrerQs overall framewor!. 4owever# excet for his anti3'ewish obsession# there was little
guidance or consistency in 4itler2s 2vision2 of the new 6uroe.)
1:
&uch oor lanning and even
disregard for his allies was an early sign that these )alliances) were not going to wor! very
smoothly* )Admittedly# the rimacy of -ermany was always imlicitly ta!en for granted# even in
18 &rdBan Trif!oviN# )5ivalry Between -ermany and Italy in 7roatia# ./;13./;0.) $The Historical Journal 08
$.//0(* =:/3/9;(* ==1.
1: Trif!oviN# )5ivalry Between -ermany and Italy in 7roatia# ./;13./;0#) ==0.
.8
relation to its 2artner2# Italy.)
1=
This shows 4itler2s rather blatant and inflated sense of self3
imortance# and when alied to the whole of -ermany# this attitude was disastrous for holding
allegiances and wor!ing together to win such a maBor war.
There were other roblems between Italy and -ermany as well# articularly in the
!eeing romises deartment. As -alea++o 7iano# the Italian Cinister of >oreign Affairs#
comlained# -ermans )had bro!en their romise of Cay ./0/ to !ee the eace for four or five
years.)
1/
"n the other hand*
. . . in the eyes of the -ermans E7iano was also guilty ofF two other anti3?a+i actions*
first# on August 0.# ./0/# of having told British Ambassador &ir Percy ,orraine that Italy
would not Boin -ermany in its attac! on Poland# thus inducing the Allies to declare war
on -ermanyJ second# to have told the Belgian ambassador to 5ome on 'anuary 1# ./;9
that -ermany was lanning to attac! the ?etherlands.
09
,ater in the war# the mere fact that it became necessary for Cussolini to )rove) himself
to 4itler. )Cussolini was able to show 4itler the !ind of ower he still exercised over the >ascist
arty. . . The Duce also roceeded to comlete the first urge of the army high command.)
0.
This
also goes to show how roc!y the 5ome3Berlin Axis was at times# when showing each other that
they were still in ower became something they were actively thin!ing about.
@. The Axis Brea!s
With such maBor ersonality clashes such as 4itler adoring Cussolini but Cussolini
desising 4itler# as well as the lac! of communication or coordination with a 'aan whose
government had several maBor changes after the Three3Power Pact was formed# it is not that
1= Trif!oviN# )5ivalry Between -ermany and Italy in 7roatia# ./;13./;0#) ==0.
1/ &anti 7orvaBa# Hitler 4 Mussolini: The %ecret Meetings. Translated by 5. ,. Ciller. $?ew Dor!* 6nigma Boo!s#
199.(* ../
09 7orvaBa# Hitler 4 Mussolini: The %ecret Meetings# ../3.19.
0. 7orvaBa# Hitler 4 Mussolini: The %ecret Meetings# ./1.
.:
surrising that the Axis Powers and their relationshis with each other began to fall aart as
World War II began and dragged on.
The maBor reason for the final brea!age was a simle one* the Axis Powers had been
defeated by the military might of the Allies. )It would be ridiculous to suggest that the Axis
alliance collased indeendently of the growing strength of the nations allied against itJ indeed
there is amle material for an estimate of the art layed by the Allies2 military achievements.)
01

Though it is imortant to scrutini+e her comments carefully since she was writing after the war
had been won by the Allies# Wis!emann is correct in that the Allies# esecially after the %nited
&tates eventually entered the War on the side of the Allies# achieved many military victories
against the Axis.
4itler2s double3crossing of &talin# attac!ing the &oviet %nion even after forging a
nonaggression treaty with it# was one of the last maBor mista!es -ermany made# as well as
invading the &oviet %nion in the middle of winter $ironically echoing the same scenario that led
to ?aoleon2s downfall(. The disastrous defeat at &talingrad in articular was a harsh blow to
-ermany and to her allies# as well as the failed camaign in ?orth Africa# where -ermany had to
bail out the Italians who were losing horribly and thus divert troos from erhas more imortant
camaigns and sreading her military might too thinly. Issues on the home front# as both 4itler
and Cussolini2s governments began raidly losing oularity as the war drew on# also
contributed to the Axis2 downfall. In the end# the Axis fell one by one.
Italy fell first to the Allies# and the arrest of Cussolini# in ./;0# was one of the maBor
nails in the coffin for the Axis Powers. Without that )distraction#) as 4itler had undoubtedly used
Italy as# the Allied Powers in 6uroe could then focus on 4itler and therefore achieve victory by
01 Wis!emann# )The Brea!ing of the Axis#) 1::.
.=
throwing everything they had at -ermany alone. The deseration in -ermany at the turn of the
tide on the military front could be felt in the si!e of !illings in the concentration cams that
yearJ the higher3us in the ?a+i Party undeniably wanted to cover u the mass atrocities they had
been committing.
-ermany finally fell in ./;< when 4itler committed suicide on the 09
th
of Aril. By that
oint# many -ermans had lost faith in their >uhrer# and while they still loved -ermany# they
were forced to ac!nowledge that they had lost the war and waited in treidation for what
suosedly horrible conseAuences awaited them at the hands of the enemy# their defeat in World
War I undoubtedly at the forefront of their minds.
'aan was the last to surrender# after the %nited &tates droed two bombs on 4iroshima
on August 8# ./;<# and ?agasa!i on August /# ./;<. This led to the downfall of the wartime
government# the execution of most of its leaders# and ten years of American occuation of the
'aanese islands afterward. The small island of "!inawa to this day holds a maBor %& military
base# which is deely unoular in 'aan and even more so amongst the natives of "!inawa#
who have had to give u half their island. The echoes of World War II and the atrocities that
haened still cast a shadow over the former Axis Powers to this day.
@I. 7onclusion
The tale of the Axis Powers and -ermany2s relationshis to her two allies was a very
comlicated one. -ermany did not have as much control over her allies as she robably thought
she did or wanted to have. Personal issues were a roblem# such as the unreAuited areciation
4itler had for Cussolini but his stubborn refusal to accet hel from or further other fascist
./
revolutions in 6uroe# articularly >ranco2s in &ain# when it would have been olitically to his
advantage to do so. These ersonal roblems were not Bust reserved for the leaders# though. The
eole in both Italy and -ermany had issues with higher3us on the other side for suosed
)wrongdoings) or )insults.) %nclear and roblematic treaties were another issue. -ermany and
her allies agreed to several treaties that did not define goals# secifically the goal of the
establishment of a )new order.) Political rhetoric on all sides was detrimental# because it resulted
in an overhyed sense of self3imortance to the oint where some -ermans# such as von 4assel#
wanted to see -ermany reign as some sort of sureme !ing over the fascist movement# with
other countries following in -ermany2s footstes but never gaining enough ower as to surass
her. This was undoubtedly the result of 4itler2s reaching about the innate sueriority of the
-erman race and this rhetoric was not helful in gaining# wor!ing together with# and !eeing
any sort of ally in the long term. Perhas the most damning tactic used by the Axis# but
articularly -ermany# was the ractice of trying to )use) each other as distractions# articularly
'aan but also the civil war in &ain and to some extent Italy as well. Political betrayals were
also a significant factor in the downfall of the Axis. It is fairly safe to say that these three
governments did not cooerate with each other well enough to be effective in olicy or on the
battlefield. All three countries were guilty of oor lanning for after the war too# esecially
-ermany# who was so caught u in the )great idea) of 4itler2s )new order) without any real idea
of what the world would loo! li!e once all was said and done. Ideology and racticality are two
very different things# and it seems the Axis Powers had a hard time searating those two concets
in the years leading u to# during# and even after# World War II.
19
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11