NAT

O
OTA
N

State of the Insurgency

Trends, Intentions, and Objectives

Classification of this briefing:

UNCLASSIFIED

COL Andrea L. Thompson

USFOR-A J2
ISAF CJ2 Ops, Plans and ISAF Anti-Corruption Task Force
 NAT
Purpose O
OTA
N

Provide an overview of the current capacity,

capabilities and intentions of the insurgency in
Afghanistan

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
Insurgency Overview O
OTA
N

HIG

Peshawar Shura

HQN
AQSL

Quetta Shura

• We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
• Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
• Operational level coordination occurs across the country; best, most frequent coordination observed at
the tactical level
• AQ provides facilitation and funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
Insurgent Strategy: As of 10 DEC 09 O
OTA
N

Overall insurgent strategy going into 2010

• Increase base of support (continue to expand into West and North)
• Counter ISAF expansion and cause casualties, esp., Coalition partners
• Undermine efforts of good governance
• Consolidate Command and Control, especially in the South
• Maintain momentum in the winter and increase aggressiveness
• Increase influence around urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul

Mid year adjustment of Taliban strategy

• Leverage tribal influence to gain popular support
• Improve Command and Control and operational security
• Delegitimize participation in GIRoA
• Expand operations in the West and North

Taliban overarching goals:

• Expel foreign forces from Afghanistan
• Undermine GIRoA’s authority and perceptions of security
• Establish a Sunni state under Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar
4
UNCLASSIFIED
 Afghan Taliban Intentions and Directives NAT
O
(Propagate the message of imminent Taliban victory) OTA
N

Taliban Code of Conduct (Published by Taliban leadership in Mid July 2009)

• “This is our mission: to keep people and their property safe. Do not let those people
that love money take our local people’s property and cause them problems.”
• “Keep good relationships with your friends and the local people, and do not let the
enemy divide / separate you.”

Intentions Directives
• We don’t have to beat ISAF militarily, just outlast • Reiterated prohibitions on the following:
international will to remain in Afghanistan – Mistreating population
• Continue population outreach and protection programs – Forcibly taking personal weapons
• Continue successful asymmetric operations – Taking children to conduct jihad
• Expand lethal IED and high-profile attacks to deny – Punishment by maiming
ISAF freedom of movement – Forcing people to pay donations
• Emphasize increasing violence in RC North and RC – Searching homes
West
– Kidnapping people for money
• Demonstrate Taliban reach and perceived control of all
Afghanistan
• Make the main enemy the United States

Use the winter months to build on perceived successes

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
Information from Detainees O
OTA
N

VERALL TRENDS:

009 perceived as most successful year of the war for INS

xpanded violence viewed as INS victory

lections viewed as INS success; low turnout; fraud

OMMAND AND CONTROL:

NS attempting to solidify command structure

irected leadership replacement causing friction with local elements

BSL reestablishing strategic vision; wants TB seen as fair, uncorrupt

iew Al Qaeda as a handicap – view that is increasingly prevalent

OLITICS:

enewed focus on becoming a legitimate government

xpand shadow governance

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
Normal Government O
OTA
N

Central Government
Ta xes
$

$ Budgetary $ Patronage
Allocations

Other
Governors Provincial
Government
COP
Officials

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
GIRoA Government O
OTA
N

$
$
Donor $
Dubai Ministry Ministry
Ministry USA

Ministry Central Government Ministry

Ministry
Ministry
Ministry Ministry
Permission
$
Contractors $ Protection $ Punishment
Private
$ Governors Crony Sector

Narco $ $
Provincial
COP $
$
Lower
Officials
Insurgents
remaining
developmen
t ISAF & IC (enforcers)
$
to people
Insurgents
anger
 NAT
Anti-Corruption Task Force O
OTA
N

MOD ISAF
MOI
JIOC-A
ACU Anti-Corruption IJC

Task Force
NDS ATFC
CJ2 lead
CSTC-A /
MCTF
NTM-A
HOO EUPOL

UN EMBASSIES
IOs

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
What This Means O
OTA
N

Events Density
No events
• Insurgency is loosely Low
organized but increasingly Medium
effective Significant
High

• Insurgent strength is
enabled by GIRoA weakness Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 30 NOV 05

• International support for

development has not met
population’s expectations

Kinetic Events 01 Jan 07 – 30 NOV 07

• Security force capacity has lagged
behind a growing insurgency

• Perceived insurgent success will

draw foreign fighters
Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 30 NOV 09

UNCLASSIFIED
 Security Rollup NAT
O
OTA
N
950
900 Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government Organizations Presidential and Provincial
850 Bombs (IED and Mines), Exploded Council Elections
800 Bombs (IED and Mines), Found and Cleared 20 AUG 09
750 Ambush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms Attacks
700 Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks
650 Threat Assessment
600 • Attack trends are expected to continue with levels of security incidents projected to be higher in 2010
550 • Spike in attacks during Provincial elections not expected to be as high as National elections
500
Ramadan
450 18 OCT – 14 NOV 04 IJC Stand Up 12 NOV 2009
5 OCT – 4 NOV 05 Transfer of
400 Authority to ISAF
24 SEP – 23 OCT 06
350 13 SEP – 13 OCT 07 31 JUL 06
1 SEP – 28 SEP 08
300 22 AUG– 20 SEP 09
250
200
Parliamentary Elections
150 18 SEP 05
Presidential
100 Elections
50 OCT 04
0
Apr-06

Apr-09
Apr-04

Apr-05

Apr-07

Apr-08
Jan-04

Jan-05

Jan-06

Jan-07

Jan-08

Jan-09
Jul-04

Oct-04

Oct-05

Jul-06

Oct-06

Jul-07

Oct-07

Jul-08

Oct-08

Jul-09

Oct-09
Jul-05

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
IED Evolution In Afghanistan O
OTA
IEDs by Type
N
Timed IED

2007 – 2009
Hoax
Projected Events: 6440
VBIED

Increasing use of Homemade Explosives (HME) PBIED

False Casualties: 4754
Detonated
Discovered

(80 to 90 percent from Ammonium Nitrate) SVBIED

RCIED
(2009)
Casualties: (07 – 2293), (08 – 3308) Components
Command IED
VOIED
Unknown

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450

4169
(2008)

2718
(2007)

1922

Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 30 NOV 05 (2006)

831
(2005)
326 Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 30 NOV 09
(2004)
IEDs by Type
Components
False
Hoax
Events: 2003 – 2006
Predominantly Military Ordnance
PBIED
Projected
SVBIED
81 Detonated
Discovered
Command IED
Timed IED Casualties: (04 -- 16), (05 – 279), (06 – 1473)
VBIED
VOIED
(2003) * No IED related casualty data available for 2003
RCIED
Unknown

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
Main Charge Size Trends O
OTA
N

IED Main Charge Weight IED Main

0-25
Charge Weight
26-50 51-75 76-100 101+
0-25 26-50 51-75 76-100 101+
May 2008 Nov 2009

76-100 lbs 100+ lbs

51-75 lbs 100+ lbs 0-25 lbs

0-25 lbs 76-100 lbs

26-50 lbs

51-75 lbs
26-50 lbs

 Percentage of IEDs with charge weights over 25 lbs has

dramatically increased

 Trend of increasing charge size is an effort by INS to provide a low-

cost method of attempting to defeat Friendly Force Armor

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
Sustainment O
OTA
N

The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself

indefinitely

• Weapons and Ammunition:

− Small arms weapons and ammunition readily available in region
− Increased availability of IED and HME materials and technology

• Funding: External funding is top-down, while internal funding is bottom-up, providing

Taliban a consistent stream of money to sufficiently fund operations:
− Internal: Significant amount from opiate trade
- Most reliable, accessible source of funds
- Taxes; narcotics nexus; corruption
− External: Originate in Islamic states
- Delivered via couriers and hawalas

• Recruits:
− Retain the religious high-ground
− Able to recruit from frustrated population Over 18 tons of opiates destroyed during
recent operation, May 2009
− Exploit poverty, tribal friction, and lack
of governance
UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
Insurgent Strengths and Weaknesses O
OTA
N

Strengths
• Organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically
expanding
• Strength and ability of shadow governance increasing

• Much greater frequency of attacks and varied locations

• IED use is increasing in numbers and complexity; as much a tactic and process as it is
a weapon

• Speed and decisiveness of their information operations and media campaign

Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities

• Comprised of multiple locally-based tribal networks

• Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership at local levels

• Dependent on many marginalized / threatened segments of Pashtun population

• Over-reliance on external support

UNCLASSIFIED
 Conclusions NAT
O
OTA
N

The situation is serious -- serious change is

required.
• We have a key advantage – Taliban is not a popular movement (yet); population is
frustrated by GIRoA, we must make them believe ISAF / GIRoA can succeed

• Taliban represents an existential threat -- only they have sufficient organizational capability
and support to pose a threat to GIRoA’s viability (they are most coherent in the south)

• Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse

• New strategy will incur risks -- not adopting the strategy has greater risk
 Longer war
 Greater casualties
 Higher overall costs
 Loss of political support

• Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum
requires protecting the population and changing perceptions

• Under-resourcing significantly elevates risk, increases lag time, and is likely to cause failure

• Success requires operating / thinking, in a fundamentally new way

UNCLASSIFIED
 NAT
O
OTA
N

Questions / Discussion

UNCLASSIFIED